GROUNDS FOR DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST JUDGES

PROBLEMS AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS UNDER ATTY. CAPULE MD

SUBMITTED BY:

Delos Santos, Kate Kimberly

Panis, Rezza Marnelli

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LIABILITIES OF JUDGES

IN GENERAL

Judges are not liable, generally. The general rule is that a judge is not liable administratively, civilly or criminally when he acts within his legal powers and jurisdiction. He may not be held liable for every erroneous order or decision he renders. To hold otherwise would be to render judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment. He may only be held accountable where his error is gross or patent, deliberate and malicious, or is incurred with evident bad faith.

The rule is that in the absence of fraud, dishonesty, corruption or bad faith, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary, much less to civil or criminal, action. This judicial immunity rests upon considerations of public policy, its purpose being to free the judge from apprehension of personal consequences to himself and to preserve the integrity and independence of the judiciary.

A judge cannot be subjected to liability — civil, criminal or administrative — for any of his official acts, no matter how erroneous, so long as he acts in good faith. In such a case, the remedy of the aggrieved party is to elevate the error to the higher court for review and correction. However, a judge is not above the law. For this reason, he may be held criminally, civilly or administratively liable for malfeasance or misfeasance in office.

ADMINISTRATIVE LIABILITY

Generally.

Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution provides that Justices of the Supreme Court may be removed from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other Justices and judges from the Court of Appeals to the lowest level “may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment.”

The civil service embraces, among others, the judicial branch of the government104 and “No officer or employee of the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law.”105 Hence, a civil service officer includes justices and judges, who shall not be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law. The phrase “for cause” means for reasons which the law and sound public policy recognize as sufficient warrant for suspension or removal.106

Administrative charges, generally. The acts or omissions which may constitute grounds for discipline may either be malfeasance, misfeasance or nonfeasance. Malfeasance is the performance of some act which ought not to be done. Misfeasance is the improper performance of some act which might lawfully be done. And nonfeasance is the omission of an act which ought to be performed.109 There are two general categories of the grounds for suspension or dismissal, namely: (1) those related to the discharge of the functions of the office concerned, such as neglect of duty, oppression, shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law.”105 Hence, a civil service officer includes justices and judges, who shall not be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law. The phrase “for cause” means for reasons which the law and sound public policy recognize as sufficient warrant for suspension or removal.106

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Serious charges. Serious charges are those which require sanctions from a fine of not exceeding P40,000.00 to dismissal from the service. These are the following:

A. Bribery, direct or indirect.

Bribery is a serious charge punishable by dismissal from the service, with forfeiture of benefits and disqualification from reinstatement in the government office. Thus, a judge who has been caught in an entrapment receiving bribed money deserved to be dismissed. It is this kind of gross misconduct on the part of those who are charged with the responsibility of administering the law and rendering justice that so quickly and surely corrodes the respect for law and the courts. Bribery is not only a ground for dismissal, but is also a ground for disbarment of the judge, which can be decreed in the same disciplinary proceedings, as part of the sanctions against him for conduct unbecoming of a member of the bar.

B. Dishonesty and violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act or the law.

“Dishonesty” means “disposition to lie, cheat or defraud; untruthworthiness; lack of integrity.” False testimony by a judge injudicial proceeding shows not only his lack of honesty and integrity but also reveals grievous disrespect for the office he has sworn to uphold, and for such infraction, he has been dismissed from the service. A judge who, in his application for appointment to the judiciary, answered the question as to whether there is any pending criminal complaint against him in the negative, when in truth there was at the time, commits gross dishonesty which warrants his dismissal from the service. The fact that he had subsequently been acquitted or that the administrative complaint was unsubscribed and anonymous is not important, for he is not being chastened for having a pending criminal case at the time but for his act of dishonesty and misrepresentation and while such kind of complaints is received with caution, its documented contents which are easily verifiable may not be ignored. Similarly, a judge who concealed the fact in his bio-data form required by the Judicial and Bar Council that he had been dismissed as assistant city fiscal for gross misconduct in the discharge of his duties committed an act of dishonesty that rendered him unfit to remain in the judiciary.

Section 9 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019) provides that violation of any of the acts defined therein as a crime is a sufficient cause for removal or dismissal of a public officer, even if no criminal prosecution is instituted. Inherent in such violation is gross dishonesty, as the word “corrupt” implies.

C. Gross misconduct constituting violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct.

Misconduct is defined as wrong or improper conduct and “gross” has been held to mean flagrant; shameful. It implies a wrongful intention and not mere error of judgment. The misconduct must have a direct relation to and be connected with the performance of official duties amounting to either mal-administration or willful, intentional neglect and failure to discharge the duties of the office; transgression of some established and definite rule or action, an unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public officer; or the acts complained of were corrupt or inspired by an intention to violate the law or were in persistent disregard of well-known legal rules.

In the law of public officers, as ground for disciplinary action, grave or gross misconduct refers to such misconduct which shows the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of established rule.

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Gross misconduct of a judge refers to transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly unlawful behavior or gross negligence. There must be reliable evidence showing that the judicial acts complained of were corrupt or inspired by an intention to violate the law, or were in persistent disregard of well-known legal rules. Examples of such serious misconduct are:

1. The act of a judge of allowing a litigant in his sala to pay for the freight of his personal acquisitions. Such act violates Rule 5.04, Canon 5, of the Code of Judicial Conduct prohibiting judges from accepting a gift, bequest, favor or loan from anyone except as he may be allowed by law.2. allowing himself to be influenced by outside pressure in the discharge of duties.3. Sitting in a case which he is legally disqualified from trying or deciding.

D. Knowingly rendering an unjust judgment or order as determined by a competent court in an appropriate proceeding.

A judge may be held liable for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment or interlocutory order or for rendering a manifestly unjust judgment or order through inexcusable negligence or ignorance. Knowingly rendering a just judgment is both a criminal act and administrative misconduct. As a crime, it is punished under Art. 205 of the Revised Penal Code and requires the following elements: (a) the offender is a judge; (b) he renders a judgment in a case submitted to him for decision; (c) the judgment is unjust; and (d) the judge knows that his judgment is unjust. The gist of the offense is that an unjust judgment be rendered maliciously or in bad faith, that is, knowing it to be unjust. To discipline a judge for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment or order, it must be shown beyond cavil that the judgment or order is unjust as being contrary to law or as not supported by the evidence, and that the judge rendered it with conscious and deliberate intent to do an injustice. To hold a judge liable for rendering a manifestly unjust judgment or order through inexcusable negligence or ignorance, it must be clearly shown that although he has acted without malice, he failed to observe in the performance of his duty the diligence, prudence and care which the law requires from a public official. Negligence and ignorance are inexcusable if they imply a manifest injustice which cannot be explained by a reasonable interpretation. Inexcusable mistake only exists in the legal concept when it implies a manifest injustice, that is to say, such injustice which cannot be explained by a reasonable interpretation, even though there is a misunderstanding or error of the law applied, yet in the contrary, it results logically and reasonably and in a very clear and indisputable manner in the notorious violation of legal precept. Section 8 of Rule 140 makes the qualification “as determined by a competent court in an appropriate proceeding.” This means that before knowingly rendering an unjust judgment or interlocutory order or for rendering a manifestly unjust judgment or order through inexcusable negligence or ignorance, may be used as a ground to hold a judge administratively liable therefor, there must be a prior final finding or determination by the appellate court that the judge has indeed committed the proscribed act in an appeal from the judgment or special civil action challenging the order. It is premature to file an administrative complaint on such ground when the appeal or special civil action is still pending resolution by the appellate court.

E. Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude.

A judge may be disciplined for his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. The term “moral turpitude” means anything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals, or to any act of vileness, baseness or depravity in the private and social duties

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that a man owes his fellowmen or to society, contrary to the accepted rule of right and duty between man and man. In general, all crimes of which fraud or deceit is an element or those which are inherently contrary to rules of right conduct, honesty or morality in a civilized community, involve moral turpitude. They include such offenses as estafa or swindling, falsification of public document, smuggling, bribery, murder, bigamy, abduction, seduction, concubinage, and violation of Batas Pambansa Big. 22. In a disciplinary proceeding against a judge based on his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, the sufficiency or legality of the conviction is no longer at issue even if the judge asserts that the judgment is a judicial error. The judgment of conviction is no longer reviewable, that being after its finality a closed matter. The only issue before the court is whether or not the crime of which he was found guilty actually involves moral turpitude. A finding that the crime involves moral turpitude warrants imposition of the corresponding penalty therefor. For by his conviction, the judge himself has shown that he is unfit to discharge his judicial functions or that he is no longer of good moral character.

F. Willful failure to pay a just debt.

The failure to pay a debt, to be considered a serious offense for discipline, requires that the debt be just and the failure to pay is willful. The term “just debt” means claims adjudicated by a court of law or claims the existence and justness of which are admitted by the debtor. “Willful” means premeditated; malicious; done with intent, or with bad motive or purpose, with indifference to the natural consequences.“Willfully” in penal statutes means with evil intent, or with legal malice, or with bad purpose. A judge who refused to pay the amount of rental of the leased premises, which amount was fixed by the court, and who delayed the ejectment case filed against him for ten (10) years from the municipal trial court to the Court of Appeals and who, after the judgment had become final, delayed payment thereof for two more years, is guilty of the serious offense of willful failure to pay a just debt.

G. Borrowing money or property from lawyers and litigants in a case pending before the court.

Rule 5.04 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides that “A judge or any immediate member of the family shall not accept a gift, bequest, favor or loan from anyone except as may be allowed by law.”

In the case of Cabrera v. Pajares, the Court dismissed respondent Judge from the service, having found him guilty of accepting money from a party litigant in a case before his sala knowing that the amount was given to him by reason of his office, stressed: ‘Members of the judiciary should display not only the highest integrity but must at all times conduct themselves in such manner as to be beyond reproach and suspicion, x x x.’

H. Immorality.

Gross immorality of a judge is a ground for disciplinary action against him. For the personal behavior of a judge in his every day life should be beyond reproach. And he should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities. For no position in the government service exacts a greater demand on moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the judiciary. A judge must possess unquestionable moral uprightness in both his public and private life. For example, a married judge was dismissed, who established an intimate relationship with a woman and as a result fathered a child with her, whom he housed in a condominium unit.

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He was guilty of gross immorality, has behaved in a manner not becoming of his robes and as a model of rectitude, betrayed the people’s high expectations, and eroded the esteem in which they hold the judiciary in general. The Code mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of impropriety not only with respect to his performance of his judicial duties, but also as to his behavior outside his sala and as a private individual. There is no dichotomy of morality: A public official is also judged by his private morals. The Code dictates that a judge, in order to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times. Being the subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge should freely and willingly accept restrictions on conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen. He should personify judicial integrity and exemplify honest public service. The personal behavior of a judge, both in the performance of official duties and in private life, should be above suspicion. Similarly, a judge’s open cohabitation with a woman not his wife while his marriage was still subsisting constitutes gross immoral conduct. The fact that his wife had not been heard of for four years did not excuse him from his misconduct, for seven years had not lapsed and therefore no presumption that his wife was dead had arisen. Sexual harassment is also a serious offense, which warrants dismissal of the judge from service, such as making sexual advances to his subordinates. For he not only transgressed the norms of decency expected of every person but he failed to live up top the high moral standards expected of a member of the judiciary. Thus, a judge who was found guilty of sexual harassment was suspended from office for one year.

I. Gross ignorance of the law or procedure.

Not every error or mistake of a judge in the performance of his duties makes him liable therefor. To hold a judge administratively accountable for every erroneous ruling or decision he renders is to make his position unbearable. And time may come when there will be no more judges to administer justice. For no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment. That the Supreme Court has reversed many decisions of trial courts and of the Court of Appeals, in cases elevated to the high tribunal for review, attests to such fact.

The error or mistake of a judge, as basis for disciplinary action, must be gross or patent, malicious, deliberate or in bad faith.It is only when he acts fraudulently or corruptly or with gross ignorance that he may be administratively held liable. It has been held that, “To merit disciplinary sanction, the error or mistake must be gross or patent, malicious, deliberate, or in bad faith. In the absence of proof to the contrary, defective or erroneous decision or order is presumed to have been issued in good faith.”184 Ignorance of the law, which every one is bound to know, excuses no one — not even judges. Ignorantia juris quod quisque scire tenetur non excusat. To warrant a finding of ignorance of the law, as ground for disciplinary action, the error must be so gross and patent as to produce an inference of ignorance or bad faith or that the judge knowingly rendered an unjust decision. The error must be so grave and so fundamental to a point as to warrant condemnation of the judge as patently ignorant or negligent.Bad faith is the ingredient of liability.

Examples of gross ignorance of law warranting imposition of disciplinary sanctions may be cited, as follows: 1. Failure to apply the rule that when questions arise as to ownership of property alleged to be part of the estate of a deceased person, but claimed by some other person to be his property, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the deceased but by title adverse to that of the deceased and his estate, such questions cannot be determined by the judge in

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the administration proceedings but in an appropriate action where parties concerned are afforded due process. 2. Rendering a verdict of conviction that could in no way legally or factually be justified. 3. Resolving a motion to dismiss a criminal case only after eighteen months and failing to file the order and serve a copy thereof on the prosecution.

To hold a judge administratively liable for ignorance of law or settled rule requires that the act must not only be contrary to existing law and jurisprudence, but must also be motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption on his part. In other words, a judge may not be held liable for erroneous ruling or decision issued in good faith, which is presumed in the absence of proof to the contrary.

J. Partisan political activities. A judge as a public officer is prohibited from engaging in partisan political activity. Section 79 of the Omnibus Election Code defines the term as “act designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates to a public office,” such as soliciting votes or distributing handbills for a particular candidate. However, “expressing his views on current political problems or issues, or from mentioning the names of candidate for public office whom he supports” is not prohibited.

Rule 5.10 of the Code of Judicial Conduct admonishes that while “A judge is entitled to entertain personal views on political questions,” he should “avoid suspicion of political partisanship” by not making “political speeches,” contributing “to party funds, publicly” endorsing “candidates for political office or” participating “in other partisan political activities.”

Section 29 of the Omnibus Election Code defines “candidate” as “any person aspiring for or seeking an elective public office, who has filed a certificate of candidacy by himself or through an accredited political party, aggroupment, or coalition of parties.” Thus, there is no partisan political activity where there is yet no candidate who has duly filed a certificate of candidacy.

Other election offenses which a judge may commit, as basis for administrative charges against him, include (1) coercion of subordinates, (2) appointment of new employees, (3) transfer of officers and employees in the civil service, and (4) intervention of public officers and employees. .

K. Alcoholism and/or vicious habits. Alcoholism is the “pathological effect (as distinguished from physiological effect) of excessive indulgence in intoxicating liquors.” Habit is the “disposition or condition of the body or mind acquired by custom or usual repetition of the same act or function.” “Vicious” means “having the nature of quality of vice; violative of moral rectitude; contrary to accepted standards of right or good.” “Vice” is a “fault, defect, or imperfection. Immoral conduct, practice or habit.”

Commission of more than one less serious offense. The commission of two or more administrative offenses alleged in the same administrative complaint may aggravate the offense and render the same serious, which will warrant dismissal of the judge from the service. Thus, a judge had been dismissed for:

1. Defying a suspension order issued by the Court for his failure to file his comment on the charges against him as required by the Court, continuing to discharge his judicial functions notwithstanding such suspension order, and assuming the mediation functions of the Barangay Lupon and issuing a mediation order.

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2. Failing to reply to the tracers of the Office of the Court Administrator, disregarding the Supreme Court’s show- cause order, losing the records of some cases pending before him and failing to decide submitted cases within the 90-day period to resolve them.

3. Submitting service certifications stating that he had no pending cases submitted for decision within the 90- day period, when he had several pending and submitted cases undecided within the 90-day period, calendaring many cases and holding only a few hearings in a long period of time, solemnizing marriage and notarizing documents for a fee without submitting reports thereon.

A judge who had been meted a penalty short of dismissal is usually warned that violation of the same or similar administrative offense in the future will be dealt with more severally, which may be removal from office. In other words, a less serious offense, if repeated, becomes a serious administrative offense.

Less serious charges. The less serious charges are those which warrant the imposition of sanctions ranging from a fine not exceeding P20,000.00 to suspension from service of not more than three (3) months. These are the following:

A. Undue delay in rendering a decision or order, or in transmitting the records of a case.

Non-observance of the time limitation to decide cases constitutes a ground for administrative sanction against the defaulting judge and a serious violation of the constitutional right of the parties to a speedy disposition of their cases. Thus, a judge has been dismissed for failure to decide more than one hundred cases within the required ninety-day period from their submissions and executing certifications falsely asserting the contrary, enabling him to receive his salary. His falsification of his service records make him not only administratively liable but also criminally liable therefor. If such failure to decide is exacerbated by his defying court’s orders to do so, his dismissal from the service is warranted. The judge’s failure to decide a case within the prescribed period, without requesting for time to resolve the same, is not excusable by the failure of the stenographer to transcribe the notes or by the inefficiency or mismanagement of court personnel. The failure to decide with the required period constitutes gross inefficiency which, if the case remains undecided for years, would become a serious misconduct that would justify his dismissal from the service.

A judge cannot seek refuge behind the acts or omissions of his staff members because a judge is expected to keep his own record of cases so that he may act on them promptly without undue delay. It is incumbent upon him to devise on efficient recording and filing system in his court so that no disorderliness can affect the flow of cases and their speedy disposition. Proper and efficient court management is as much his responsibility. He is the one directly responsible for the proper discharge of his functions.

B. Frequent and unjustified absences without leave or habitual tardiness.

The Supreme Court issued Adm. Circular No. 3-99, dated January 15,1999, which requires judges to hold session hours “from 8:30 a.m. to noon and from 2:00 p.m. to 4:30 p.m., from Monday to Friday” and that they “must be punctual at all times.” The Civil Service Commission issued Memorandum Circular No. 04, Series of 1991 on habitual absenteeism and habitual tardiness, which the Supreme Court adopted by issuing Circular No. 1-91 and making it applicable to all trial judges

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Any employee shall be considered habitually tardy if he incurs tardiness, regardless of the number of minutes, ten (10) times a month for at least two (2) months in a semester or at least two (2) consecutive months during the year. A judge who held his office to his house and who had gone into long absences and extended leave of absences without official approval was held administratively liable therefor.

C. Unauthorized practice of law.

Rule 5.07 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides that “A judge shall not engage in the private practice of law.” Section 35 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court also states that “No judge or other official or employee of the superior courts x x x shall engage in private practice as a member of the bar or given professional advice to clients.” The Court explained the rationale of this provision: “It is based on sound reasons of public policy, for there is no question that the rights, duties, privileges and functions of the office of an attomey-at-law are so inherently incompatible with the high official functions, duties, powers, discretions and privileges of a judge of the Court of First Instance. This inhibitory rule makes it obligatory upon the judicial officers concerned to give their full time and attention to their judicial duties, prevent them from extending special favors to their own private interests and assure the public of their impartiality in the performance of their functions. These objectives are dictated by a sense of moral decency and the desire to promote the public interest.”

The services rendered under a contract of professional services between a corporation and a judge whereby the latter would head the corporation’s legal department and render services after official hours at a fixed compensation plus a certain percentage of the amount recovered or saved in a litigation constitute private practice of law and the contract is null and void, as contrary to law and public policy. A judge who replied to the letter of Sangguniang Bayan as to whether the latter can remove squatters in its property pursuant to council resolution that it can immediately do so is guilty of unauthorized practice of law, as a judge must know that rendering legal opinions is not the function of a judge. “The function of the court is limited to adjudication of actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable or enforceable. Unlike lawyers, judges cannot render legal advice. Judges are expressly prohibited from engaging in the private practice of law or from giving professional advice to clients.”

E. Receiving additional or double compensation unless specifically authorized by law.

Section 9(5) of Rule 140 makes the act of receiving additional or double compensation, unless specifically authorized by law, a less serious administrative offense.

Section 17 of Act No. 4187 provides: “Any existing law act, rule or order to the contrary not- withstanding, no full time officer or employee of the government shall hereafter receive directly or indirectly any kind of additional or extra compensation or salary including per diems and bonuses from any fund of the government, its dependencies, and semi-government entities or boards created by law, except:

“(1) Officers serving as chairman or members of entitles and enterprises organized, operated, owned or controlled by the government, who may be paid per diem for each meeting actually attended or when on official travel;

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“(2) Auditors and accountants; “(3) Provincial and municipal treasurers and their employees; “(4) Employees serving as observers of the weather bureau; and “(5) Those authorized to receive extra or additional compensation by virtue of the provision of this Act.”

The Constitution provides that no elective or appointive public officer or employee shall receive additional, double or indirect compensation, unless specifically authorized by law. Except the Vice-President, members of the Cabinet and their deputies and assistants, who are prohibited from receiving additional or indirect compensation from ex-oficio positions they may hold officials and employees who are duly appointed by competent authority to any position in another government office or agency in a concurrent capacity, may, in the discretion of the President, be allowed to receive additional compensation in the form of allowances or honoraria at such rates he shall fix and subject to such conditions as he may prescribe. Such additional compensation shall be paid from the appropriations of the office or agency benefiting from the concurrent service. Commonwealth Act No. 246 provides that those who have retired from the government service, who have received life pension, annuity, or gratuity and who reenters the government service, cannot receive both the pension, annuity or gratuity and the compensation for the position. He has to choose which one to receive, or only so much of the compensation over and above the pension. The reason for the restriction is the rule against double compensation.

Section 8, par. 2, Art. IX, of the 1987 Constitution has impliedly repealed Com. Act No. 246, when it provides that “pensions or gratuities shall not be considered as additional, double, or indirect compensation.” Thus, it has been said that a government retiree receiving pension or gratuity after retirement can continue to receive such pension or gratuity if he accepts another government position to which another compensation is attached. And if he retires and meets all retirement requirements in the latter position, he will be entitled to double retirement pensions without violating any law. However, his previous years of service until his first retirement cannot be credited or added to his subsequent years of service for purposes of computing the retirement or other benefits under the subsequent government position, as it would violate the rule against double compensation.

Section 12 of Article VIII of the Constitution provides that “The members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions.” Rule 5.09 of the Code of Judicial Conduct states that “A judge shall not accept appointment or designation to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions.” The agency referred to is a government agency.

Rule 5.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct allows a judge to “serve as an officer, director, trustee, or non-legal advisor of a non-profit or non-political educational, religious, charitable, fraternal or civil organization,” so long as it will “not interfere with the performance of judicial duties or detract from the dignity of the court.”

F. Untruthful statements in the certificate of service.

Trial judges are required to submit certificates of service, as basis for paying them their salaries. Their submitting and executing certifications falsely asserting that they have no cases submitted for decision beyond the required 90-day period to decide and thus enabling them to receive their salaries make them not only administratively liable but also criminally liable therefor for falsification. If such failure to decide is exacerbated by his defying Court’s orders to do so, his dismissal from the service is warranted.

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G. Simple misconduct or inefficiency.

Misconduct in office has a well-defined meaning. It refers to a misconduct such as affects the judge’s performance of his duties and not such only as affects his character as a private individual. Misconduct in office as ground for disciplinary action against a judge must have direct relation to and be connected with the performance of his official duties, and it must be serious. To constitute an administrative offense, misconduct should relate to or be connected with the performance of the official functions and duties of a public officer.

Like misconduct, inefficiency as a ground for disciplinary action must be serious or one which is weighty or momentous and not trifling. Negligence in the performance of duty, if reckless in character, could amount to serious or inexcusable inefficiency. Inefficiency implies negligence, incompetence, ignorance and carelessness. There is inexcusable negligence on the part of a judge when he fails to observe in the performance of his duties that degree of diligence, prudence and circumspection which the law requires in the rendition of any public service. However, to warrant disciplinary action, the act of the judge must have a direct relation to the performance of his official duties. It is necessary to separate the character of the man from the character of the officer. Light charges. The light charges include (1) vulgar and unbecoming conduct; (2) gambling in public; (3) fraternizing with lawyers and litigants with pending case/cases in his court; and (4) undue delay in the submission of month reports. They entail sanctions from admonition with warning to a fine of not exceeding PIO,000.00. However, repeated violations of light offenses may render a judge liable for less serious or even serious charges. For this reason, the usual warning when a judge is found administratively guilty of even a light offense is that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely.

Resort to judicial remedies required, in some administrative cases. The established doctrine and policy is that disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions against Judges, which arise from the performance of their judicial functions, are not complementary or suppletory of, nor substitute for, the judicial remedies, whether ordinary (i.e., motion for reconsideration or appeal) or extraordinary (special civil actions). Resort to and exhaustion of these judicial remedies, as well as the entry of judgment in the corresponding action or proceeding, are pre-requisites for the taking of other measures against the judge concerned, whether civil, administrative, or criminal in nature. It is only after the available judicial remedies against the rulings or acts performed in the exercise of their judicial power have been exhausted and the appellate tribunals have spoken with finality, that the door to an inquiry into their criminal, civil or administrative liability may be said to have opened or closed. Pursuant to the above principle, it has been held that the filing of an administrative complaint with the Office of the Court Administrator, without resorting to, or awaiting the outcome of, judicial remedy, is improper. “The Court understands the frustration that litigants and lawyers alike, would at times encounter in procedural bureaucracy, but imperative justice requires proper observance of indisputable technicalities precisely designed to ensure its proper dispensation. For if a party is prejudiced by the orders of a judge, his remedy lies with the proper court for the proper judicial action and not with the Office of the Court Administrator by means of an administrative complaint.”An administrative complaint is not the appropriate remedy for every act of a judge deemed aberrant or irregular where a judicial remedy exists and is available. For if subsequent developments prove the judge’s challenged act to be correct, there would be no occasion to proceed against him at all.

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A party litigant abuses the processes of the court by prematurely resorting to administrative action or criminal prosecution of a judge even before the judicial remedies are settled. Such prematurity when the correctness of the latter’s orders, upon which the viability of the recourse depends, is still pending appellate review.

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ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE

How proceedings are instituted. Proceedings for the discipline of judges of regular and special courts and justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan may be instituted motu proprio by the Supreme Court or upon a verified complaint supported by affidavits of persons who havepersonal knowledge of the facts alleged therein or by documents which may substantiate said allegations, or upon anonymous complaint, supported by public records of indubitable integrity. The complaint shall be in writing and shall state clearly and concisely the acts and omissions constituting violations of standards of conduct prescribed forjudges by law, the Rules of Court, or the Code of Judicial Conduct.

The Supreme Court does not, as a rule, entertain anonymous complaints against judges, except in cases in which the charges could be fully borne by public records of indubitable integrity, thus needing no corroboration by evidence to be offered by complainant whose identity and integrity could hardly be material where the matter involved is of public interest.

Action on the complaint. If the complaint is sufficient in form and substance, a copy thereof shall be served upon the respondent, and he shall be required to comment within ten (10) days from the date of service. Otherwise, the same shall be dismissed. If the charges appear to merit action, a copy thereof shall be served upon the respondent requiring him to answer within ten days from date of service. If the charges do not merit action or if the answer shows to the satisfaction of the Supreme Court that the charges are not meritorious, the same shall be dismissed.

By whom complaint investigated. Upon the filing of the respondent’s comment, or upon the expiration of the time for filing the same and unless other pleadings or documents are required, the Court shall refer the matter to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report and recommendation or assign the case for investigation, report, and recommendation to a retired member of the Supreme Court, if the respondent is a Justice of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan, or to a Justice of the Court of Appeals, if the respondent is a judge of a Regular Trial Court or of a special court of equivalent rank, or to a judge of the Regional Trial Court if the respondent is a Judge of an inferior court.

Hearing. The investigating Justice or Judge shall set a day for the hearing and send notice thereof to both parties. At such hearing, the parties may present oral and documentary evidence. If, after due notice, the respondent fails to appear, the investigation shall proceed ex parte. The withdrawal of the complaint by the complaint does not divest the Supreme Court of the authority to order the investigation the charges, nor does it preclude such investigation nor result in its dismissal. For to condition administrative actions upon the will of every complainant who may, for one reason or another, condone a detestable act is to strip the Supreme Court of its supervisory power to discipline erring members of the judiciary.

Report and recommendation. Within thirty (30) days from the termination of the investigation, the investigating Justice or Judge shall submit to the Supreme Court a report containing findings of fact and recommendation. The report shall be accompanied by the record containing the evidence and the pleadings filed by the parties. The report shall be confidential and shall be for exclusive use of the Court.

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Quantum of evidence required. There have been conflicting decisions as to the quantum of evidence necessary to hold a judge administratively liable for his misdeed. In some cases, it has been held that impeachment proceedings against judges are penal in nature and are governed by the rules applicable to criminal cases. The charges must, therefore, be proved beyond reasonable doubt in cases which will require dismissal from the service.

There is thus a need to reconcile the apparently conflicting decisions of the Supreme Court on the quantum of evidence required to hold a judge guilty of an administrative charge. The Supreme Court amended Rule 140, pursuant to which it classified the charges against judges into serious, less serious and light, and fixed the sanctions that may be imposed accordingly. The quantum of evidence may depend on the nature of the charge in light of the classifications of the charges.

If the administrative offense involves a violation of a criminal law, which if proved will require dismissal of a judge from the service, the quantum of evidence required to hold him liable is proof beyond reasonable doubt, as held in Loyola v. Gabo, Jr.,321 such as knowingly rendering an unjust judgment or order.

In this regard, it is useful to reiterate the ruling in Raquiza v. Castaneda, Jr., which stressed that ‘The ground for removal of a judicial officer should be established beyond reasonable doubt. Such is the rule where the charges on which the removal is sought is misconduct in office, willful neglect, corruption, incompetency, etc., the general rule in regard to admissibility in evidence in criminal trials applies.’” However, where the charge refers to the administrative aspect arising from the criminal act which requires dismissal from service, such as gross immorality as held in Castillo v. Calanog,330 or where the charge is less serious, preponderance of evidence is necessary. Where the charge is light, mere substantial evidence may be required.

Res ipsa loquitur. An erring judge may be held liable based on res ipsa loquitur, which means that there is on the face of the assailed decision, an inexplicable grave error bereft of any redeeming feature, a patent railroading of a case to bring about an unjust decision, or a manifestly deliberate intent to wreak an injustice against a hapless party. The facts themselves, previously proven or admitted, are of such a character as to give rise to a strong inference that evil intent is present. Such intent, in short, is clearly deducible from what is already of record. Under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the Court may impose its authority upon erring judges whose actuations, ontheir face, would show gross incompetence, gross ignorance of the law, or grave misconduct.

The res ipsa loquitur doctrine does not dispense with the necessity of proving the facts from which the inference of evil intent is based. It merely expresses the clearly sound and reasonable conclusion that when such facts are admitted or are already shown by the record, and no credible explanation that would negative the strong inference of evil intent is forthcoming, no further hearing to establish them to support a judgment as to the culpability of a respondent is necessary. Decision; sanction. The retirement of a judge or his separation from the service during the pendency of the administrative case against him does not deprive the Supreme Court of the jurisdiction to decide the case. The court retains its jurisdiction either to pronounce the respondent official innocent of the charges or declare him guilty thereof. A contrary rule would be fraught with

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injustices and pregnant with dreadful and dangerous implications, x x x If only for reasons of public policy, this Court must assert and maintain its jurisdiction over members of the judiciary and other officials under its supervision and control for acts performed in office which are inimical to the service and prejudicial to the interests of litigants and the general public. If innocent, respondent official merits vindication of his name and integrity as he leaves the government which he served well and faithfully; if guilty, he deserves to receive the corresponding censure and a penalty proper and imposable under the situation.

The Court shall take such action on the report as the facts and the law may warrant,336 which may be dismissing the complaint or holding the judge liable and imposing the corresponding penalty against him. If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of the following sanctions may be imposed:

1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as this Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations. Provided, however, That the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits.

2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months; or

3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00

If the respondent is guilty of a less serious charge, any of the following sanctions shall be imposed:

1. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) nor more than three (3) months; or

2. A fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.337

If the respondent is guilty of a light charge, any of the following sanctions shall be imposed: 1. A fine of not less than PI,000.00 but not exceeding P10,000.00; and/or 2. Censure; 3. Reprimand; 4. Admonition with warning.

While double jeopardy does not lie in administrative cases, it would be contrary to equity and substantial justice to penalize a judge a second time for an act, the penalty of which had already been served by him. Confidentiality of proceedings. Proceedings against Judges of regular and special courts and Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan shall be private and confidential. The confidential character of proceedings during their pendency has a three-fold purpose. It is to enable the Supreme Court to make its investigation free from any extraneous influence or interference. It is to protect the personal and professional reputation of the Justices and Judges from baseless charges of disgruntled, vindictive and irresponsible persons or litigants by prohibiting the publication of such charges pending their final resolution.And it is to deter the press from publishing the charges or proceedings based thereon for even a verbatim reproduction of the complaint against a Judge in a newspaper may be actionable. However, the confidentiality of the proceedings is a privilege or right which may be waived by the Judge. After the Supreme Court shall have rendered its decision or resolution in the administrative case, a copy thereof is attached to the record of the respondent in the Office of the Court Administrator. The proceeding then ceases to be confidential, and the decision becomes a public document, just like any other decisions of the Court. Reinstatement of judge previously dismissed.

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The reinstatement of a dismissed judge by the Supreme Court to his former position after the judgment of dismissal has become final may raise a legal issue. Reinstatement is essentially an act of appointment of a judge, which may only be extended by the President of the Philippines. However, the Supreme Court has reinstated dismissed judges to their former position. In this sense, the decision of the Supreme Court dismissing a judge from service does not become final, as the Court may still reinstate him to his former position or reduce the pecuniary penalties.

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