Whither UN Peacekeeping? What role do regional organisations such

as the OAS or even NATO have in being utilised by the UN in so-

called Hybrid Peace Operations?

Introduction:

“The United Nations was founded, in the words of its Charter, in

order ‘to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war.’

Meeting this challenge is the most important function of the

Organization, and, to a very significant degree, the yardstick by

which it is judged by the peoples it exists to serve” (United Nations;

2000: 1).

Meeting this fundamental requirement presupposes an essential need to foster

and sustain the peace between and within nations. But this is not the sole preserve of the UN

and most continental-based organisations, e.g. the Organisation of American States (OAS),

the African Union (AU), the European Union (EU), North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

(NATO), etc. have in their policy documents overt statements directly supporting or

corroborating the UN’s fundamental foundation principle. 1 Article 2 of the OAS refers

specifically to “its regional obligations under the Charter of the United Nations”

(Organisation of American States; 1967) and the AU declares as an objective the

encouragement of international cooperation, “taking due account of the Charter of the United

1 The EU, although essentially a trade organization, subscribes to the fundamental UN principal. Article 2 of its treaty tells us: “The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities” and Article 3 proclaims: “The Union’s aim is to promote peace, its values and the well-being of its peoples” (Borchardt; 2010: 19). Even NATO which, unlike the other organisations, is a defence alliance, asserts: “NATO’s essential purpose is to safeguard the freedom and security of its members … promote democratic values … to build trust and, in the long run, prevent conflict” while its military objective proclaims: “NATO is committed to the peaceful resolution of disputes” (NATO. n.d.).

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Sean Williams MISC 13210161

LG534 – PK/PMOs Essay 1 Rory Finegan

Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights” (African Union; 2000).

Nevertheless, peacekeeping of this nature will always require some measure of enforcement

(or the threat of enforcement) and that is why military personnel rather than civilians are the

main operatives, although this should not necessarily exclude private security personal and

civilians with logistical and other specialist skills from having a role where that is deemed

tactical and prudent.

In spite of the considerable support for its foundation principal, and especially

in the decade and a half following the abrupt end of the Cold War, the UN has repeatedly

been found lacking in fulfilling its fundamental purpose in those areas characterised by ethnic

violence and gross violations of human rights. Because international law provides for action

against human rights abuses (UN; 1945: Preamble), especially initiatives and activities that

address and remove the root causes of humanitarian disasters, even where these involve

hostilities or the threat of hostilities (Holzgrefe & Keohane; 2003: 18), one cannot presume

any parity in the manner or scale of any peacekeeping or peace enforcing operation with a

comparable precedent. But even allowing for contextual, cultural and magnitudinal disparities

between one mission and another, there are circumstances common to all peacekeeping or

peace enforcement missions. All involve cross-border interventions by one state (or a group

of states) in the internal affairs of another, aimed at preventing or ending humanitarian or

human rights violations and may occur with or without the permission of the target state

(Holzgrefe & Keohane; 2003: 18), depending on the type of mission.

Under current international law, the UN Security Council (UNSC) exercises

exclusive authority to sanction (or not to sanction) interventions of this kind and it is also the

sole arbiter over disputes relating to the legitimacy and/or legality of any peacekeeping or

peace enforcing intervention in a sovereign member state. However, there are strong reasons

to support the belief that the UNSC may not be the optimal agency to exercise exclusive

2

authority to gather and deploy a peacekeeping force with the means and potency to intervene

successfully in the face of grave sovereign or human rights violations. The record shows, in a

significant number of cases, that it has proved inept and ill-suited to this task. We have seen

recently an example of the UN’s inability to react to Russia’s violation of sovereignty in the

Crimean region of the Ukraine because of the Russian threat of veto, whereas it was possible

for the US and EU, without UNSC approval, to activate sanctions against Russia at

considerably short notice. The purpose of this paper, then, is to present an argument and a

rationale for allowing organisations that are closer to problematic regions greater autonomy

to intervene or, at least, to adopt a more meaningful role alongside UN forces, especially

where nearby human rights abuses or sovereignty issues require an immediate and resolute

response.

Problems Arising from UN-only Interventions:

The UNSC’s ineptitude at mediating intra- and inter-state conflicts and

humanitarian needs is rooted in the prescriptions of the UN Charter itself. The Charter, and

specifically Chapters VI and VII, relies upon an organisational system of action that prohibits

intervention except as an action of last resort (UN; 1945: Chapter 6-7). In these

circumstances, sanctions are generally considered as a laissez-faire alternative to war, because

they do not involve acrimonious disputes about territorial integrity or the violation of state

sovereignty, nor do they require the use of UN troops to enforce decisions. But such actions

are rarely useful in the face of humanitarian need. 2 The persuasive logic, then, is that the UN

Charter’s wording is ambiguous and defaults firstly to recommending non-forceful measures,

and this often results in unfavourable humanitarian outcomes for inhabitants. (Weiss; 2007:

45). My view is that, where appropriate and warranted, it would be more effective if

2 Gordon (1999: 388) mentions that sanctions and embargoes have been shown to have a disproportionate effect on civilians rather than governments, and can have unintended and adverse consequences for civilians, as was the case in the early 1990s during the Yugoslavian wars.

3

neighbour states and/or regional organisations were allowed to fast-track intervention

measures, thereby avoiding inevitably lengthy UNSC deliberations about legality, sovereignty

issues and resources.

Even where the UNSC sanctions military action, the convoluted command

structure under which UN forces operate presents serious difficulties and this problem is

unlikely to improve in the near future (Weiss; 1994: 64). Never was the need for a large, robust

and fast acting force more apparent than in the spring of 1994, when Rwanda spiralled into the

most abhorrent form of ethnically motivated genocidal conflict. Hylan reminds us that the

international community failed to react, because the situation in Rwanda

“escalated far too rapidly for international public opinion to get too

aroused in time; the problems started only later. After the world had

stood by and watched as perhaps half a million people were

slaughtered, there was suddenly the feeling that ‘something had to be

done’ about the refugees pouring into Zaire. That the perpetrators of

the genocide heavily manipulated them did not matter in these

circumstances” (Hylan; n.d: 99: note 428).

The shocking images of such large-scale massacre (some say over 800,000 dead) perpetrated

on ethnic Tutsis by Hutu tribesmen, despite information existing up to two years beforehand

that genocide was a probable outcome of the tension, shocked an international community

which failed to act to protect the throngs of people who were either murdered or displaced by

threats of extermination (Melvern; 2000: 4). Resolution 872, establishing the UN Assistance

Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) provided for a very limited mandate that excluded both arms

recovery and an instruction to oppose the killing of civilians (UN; 1999: 7). Significantly,

UNAMIR’s commander, Major-General Romeo Dallaire, was informed by the UN Department

of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) that “the overriding consideration is the need to avoid

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entering into a course of action that might lead to the use of force and unanticipated

repercussions” (UN; 1999: 11). These factors were crucial in weakening UNAMIR’s ability to

impact effectively on the events that were unfolding (Stanton; 2004: 221) and, unable to fulfil

its mandate when the killing recommenced, 90% of its force withdrew. One could argue that

UNAMIR’s mandate simply allowed for the preparations for genocide to continue unchecked

and the abandonment of the Tutsi population to its fate. Furthermore, the situations in Rwanda

and Darfur have also brought into focus the UNSC’s credibility in determining which cases are

worthy of intervention. Rwanda, for instance, because it was not of significance to any of the P-

5 members, was repeatedly ignored during the genocide, despite continuous appeals from

Dallaire. Never before was there such a failure of UN peacekeeping or peace enforcement.

The UNSC also dithered as genocide and ethnic cleansing occurred in the

former Yugoslavia and did little to mitigate the civil wars in both Liberia and Somalia, with the

latter having yet to be resolved. We know that, within the international community and the

UNSC, there is a systematic and deliberate avoidance of the use of the word ‘genocide’

(Melvern; 2000: 138) because, once acknowledged, it would engender a legal obligation to act

fast and decisively in accordance with the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of

the Crime of Genocide (United Nations; 1948: Article 1). The UN does acknowledge that “the

reluctance by some states to use the term ‘genocide’ [is] motivated by a lack of will to act”

(United Nations; 1999: 38). However, where this becomes endemic or where self-interest

motivates too literal and too rigid an interpretation of international law, it has the effect of

stultifying response capability and could inevitably lead to the UN reneging on its own Charter

obligations.

When the UNSC finally decided to expand the numbers involved in

UNAMIR in May 1994, the DPKO approached thirty governments with requests for troops and

equipment. However, out of a general malaise but, more likely, cognisant of the bloody US

5

intervention in Somalia a few years previously and the kidnapping and subsequent murder of

10 Belgian peacekeepers, not a single offer of troops was received at this critical moment in

time (Sise; 1995: 293). 3 Most notably, sensing the ultimate failure of the venture, none of the

P-5 UNSC members, all of whom had the resources and capabilities to put an abrupt end to the

violence, volunteered its services. By the end of July, only 550 UN troops were on the ground

in Rwanda, and the UN failure to act decisively had shocking consequences that stunned the

international community (Sise; 1995: 284).

The Case for a Regional Approach to Intervention:

In the case of peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention, regional

organisations have a number of significant advantages when compared to one directly

mandated by the UN. Firstly, being geographically closer to the area of conflict, regional

organisations often have a ‘higher stake’ in preventing and/or ending conflict within their

sphere of influence (MacFarlane & Weiss; 1994: 283). Member states within these areas feel

more acutely the effects of regional conflict, such as population displacement, a downturn in

foreign direct investment and, in general, regional instability. MacFarlane & Weiss explain

that regional organisations have a higher stake in ensuring near-neighbour stability and are

more likely to act promptly and decisively in pursuit of these ends (ibid). They conclude that,

whereas regional interventions have some obvious limitations, they convey humanitarian and

peacekeeping benefits more efficiently and more effectively than non-regional actors.

3 This shocking episode occurred in April 7th 1994 when Hutu militia captured fifteen peacekeepers from UNAMIR. The peacekeepers had been deployed to protect the Prime Minister, Madame Uwilingiyimana. Five Ghanaian peacekeepers were quickly set free. The other ten were Belgians from the Paracommando Brigade, and these were tortured and hacked to death with machetes (Melvern; 2004: 137). Major Bernard Ntuyahaga was eventually convicted of their murder in 2007. In his book, Me Against My Brother, Scott Peterson describes the barbaric details of these murders: “Their Achilles tendons were cut so they couldn't run, and the Belgian soldiers — all of them holding the rank of private — were castrated and died choking on their genitalia” (Peterson; 2000: 292).

6

Secondly, regional organisations can offer ‘better’ peacekeeping

intervention than the UN. Whereas some UN interventions, most notably in Somalia, have not

been cognisant of the cultural and societal intricacies pertaining to the target country, regional

actors are more aware of local customs and beliefs. They understand the nature of strife and

ethnic tension in their own immediate area, making them better mediators of local conflicts

(ibid). Busumtwi-Sam explains that many of Africa’s most protracted and deadly conflicts do

not have a single cause but are the result of a multiplicity of issues (2002: 93). Furthermore,

these conflicts also involve a number of exogenous actors, including rival governments,

mercenaries and various militias, all of which have their own agenda. Conflicts may span

across entire regions and involve complex arrangements of actors and roots and, in these

circumstances regional actors are best suited to mediating the nuances and intricacies

involved (ibid). Moreover, regional actors are seldom handicapped by global political

perspectives, and this allows them focus exclusively and more purposefully on the crisis at

hand. In addition, they are less fractured by internal politics (epitomised by the P-5 in UN

debates). As a result, their response comes faster and is better targeted, especially if the

intervention is undertaken by a regional power “with the right mix of knowledge and

capability” (Welsh; 2002: 516).

Since it is the African continent that is most frequently hit by humanitarian

disasters, this particular context deserves further discussion. The African Union (AU),

previously the Organisation for African Unity (OAU), first began to codify a norm of

humanitarian intervention in 1998, under the ‘Framework for the Mechanism for Conflict

Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace and Security’, which entitles it to deploy

peacekeeping and/or intervention forces into areas of internal conflicts where these pose

serious threats to peace in the region (ICISS; 2001: 169). Since then it has emerged as the

regional guarantor of African security and, through its Peace and Security Council, it became

7

the first regional organization to assert its normative right to intervene in the internal affairs of

member states when the UN is either unwilling or unable to react. Furthermore, the Economic

Community of West African States (ECOWAS) also deserves credit for attempting to solve

humanitarian crises in West Africa, despite shortcomings in the interventions it authorised.

ECOWAS has intervened militarily more than any other regional organization to stop conflict

(Taft & Ladnier; 2006: 17). This was done on foot of a protocol adopted in 1999 which

affirmed ECOWAS’s right to intervene militarily in a member state in response to

humanitarian emergencies that threaten the peace or security of the region (Taft & Ladnier;

2006: 18).

However, while acknowledging the important role of regional initiatives,

Pattinson (2008) warns of the problems facing organisations that undertake humanitarian

missions without UN sanction. While he accepts that many Western states have both the

military and logistical support capability to deploy forces on a scale that are likely to be

effective, he draws attention to how peacekeeping and humanitarian interveners are perceived

and accepted within the zone of need (Pattinson; 2008: 408). History reveals that most

Western penetrations into the global south and Middle East are likely to be faced with a large

level of local resistance. For example, in the aftermath of the Iraq War, the US and Western

democracies generally “do not have the credibility in the eyes of the world to carry out

humanitarian intervention” (ibid). Similarly, ex-colonial powers intervening in former

colonies run the risk of being perceived as pursuing colonial self-interest. Pattinson’s point is

convincing in that potential interveners must carefully weigh up whether or not they are likely

to provoke an escalation of a problem by creating more fighters than they disarms. In this

respect, he sees greater merit in using regional organisations but warns that, with the

exception of NATO and the EU, most others, such as the AU and ECOWAS, lack capability

due to shortfalls in military funding and equipment, thus rendering prolonged operations

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difficult (Pattinson; 2008: 409). He considers the EU’s potential as an effective peacekeeping

and humanitarian actor but acknowledges that, currently, it does not have agreed structures to

allow it to rapidly deploy a large force off continent. (ibid) The capacity of NATO to conduct

successful humanitarian operations has been demonstrated in Bosnia, Kosovo, and most

recently in Libya. However, since NATO is primarily a defence pact, its motives might

justifiably be perceived as self-interested, thus compromising its efforts to deploy troops in

humanitarian and peacekeeping activities (Pattinson; 2008: 408).

In their analysis of the totally inadequate response to the conflict in Darfur,

Bellamy & Williams (2006) suggest how future peace enforcement and peacekeeping by the

international community might be rendered more effective. They recommend that states

should force the issue by rejecting the primacy of the UNSC when decisions about

intervention are necessary (Bellamy & Williams; 2006: 157). Byers (2005) concurs and

furthers the argument by citing the example of NATO in Kosovo. Although initially lacking

UNSC authorisation, NATO succeeded in acquiring a somewhat ‘ambiguous authorisation’

post the event when the UNSC belatedly accepted that the situation represented a grave

threat to international peace and security (Byers: 2005: 40-51). This ‘ambiguous authority’,

sufficed to confer legitimacy on NATO’s forceful intervention which, had it not occurred,

might have resulted in the kind of genocidal atrocities reminiscent of Rwanda in 1994 and in

Srebrenica in 1995. By forcing the issue and by reacting unilaterally, but timely, NATO

restored human security and prevented any further escalation of the suffering, thus enabling

the UN to undertake a peacekeeping and development mission that continues to this day.

The Case for Hybrid Peace Operations:

While rejecting the primacy of the UNSC in favour of regional intervention is

beyond the scope of this essay, the concept of hybrid peace operations is one that is

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gathering momentum in the international playing field. The steady expansion of regional

efforts such as ECOWAS in Liberia, Guinea Bissau and Ivory Coast, the AU in Darfur and

Somalia, as well as the more publicised interventions of NATO in the former Yugoslavia

and Libya provokes questions on the relationship between UN and regional operations. It

cannot go unnoticed that many UN peacekeeping missions have been deployed concurrently

with or immediately following regional missions. As this division of labour becomes

increasingly a fixture in the international response to security and conflict, the question

arises as to how it can be accommodated and managed under the current unwieldy UN

framework or what role should the UN, as the only global and legally recognised

peacekeeping authority, have in collaborating with regional organisations. (Yamashita;

2012: 166). Yamashita conjectures that two dominant frameworks have arisen as a result of

this dual existence within peace support operations, the ‘subcontracting’ and the ‘partnering’

approaches, both of which focus on incorporating regional actions into already existing UN

structures (Yamashita; 2012: 168).

Firstly, ‘sub-contracting’ refers to an arrangement whereby regional

organisations undertake an active role in peace making and peacekeeping responsibilities

and, under international law, such contracting must be authorised, monitored and directed by

the UNSC. The subcontracting model then is a form of global cooperation in which regional

peace operations are, in essence, UN operations delegated to regional organisations. At the

general level, this idea is anchored in the UN’s ultimate authority as the lead, global

organisation responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security. To

establish the bona fides of any cooperative effort of this nature, regional organisations are

expected to seek formal authorisation in advance of any action, or at least some sort of

endorsement by the UNSC (Yamashita; 2012: 169). The ‘sub-contracting’ model enables

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obvious considerable advantage and, in particular, it “can bolster the credibility of the UN

with a lesser operational burden” (ibid.).

A prime example of this ‘sub-contracting’ approach is the UN authorised

NATO intervention in Libya in 2011. Reacting to both excessive violence by Libyan

government forces on domestic opponents and under pressure from regional entities in the

immediate vicinity, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1973 authorising ‘all necessary means’ to

quell the bloodshed (UNSC; 2011). Almost immediately, NATO established a no-fly zone

and launched an aerial bombardment on government forces. After seven months, Libyan

opposition forces had conquered the country and ousted (and killed) the former authoritarian

ruler Muammar al-Qaddafi. Western media and politicians praised the intervention as a

humanitarian success for averting a bloodbath and assisting in the transition towards

democracy in Libya (Kuperman; 2013: 105). Although open to debate, some experts cite

NATO’s Libyan intervention as an ideal model for implementing a Responsibility to Protect

(R2P) response in the face of imminent humanitarian disaster, justifying the ‘sub-

contracting’ of forces on the grounds that it undoubtedly saved civilian lives and achieved its

goals within a brief time frame. This particular timely success has to be measured against

more recent opportunity in Syria where, in similar circumstances, the R2P rule failed to

engage any regional organisation, resulting in a very different outcome.

In discussing issues of consent and legitimacy, Glanville (2013) offers a

different perspective on the role of regional organisations in peace making intervention. He

proposes less dependence on the sovereign consent of the troubled state and a greater

reliance on consent from the relevant regional organisation when making UNSC decisions

about Chapter VII interventions, particularly where human rights abuses are evident

(Glanville; 2013: 326). In examining the route to the NATO intervention in Libya, Glanville

analyses the rhetoric emanating from organisations such as the League of Arab States

11

(LAS), the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and the AU, all of which helped

procure the UN resolution authorising ‘all necessary means’ in response to human rights

violations by Libyan government forces. He notes that, in their submissions to the UN, these

organisations demonstrated a deep understanding of the nature of the Libyan conflict, the

need for immediate military action and the necessity in this particular case to transcend legal

issues relating to sovereign consent (Glanville; 2013: 336). Summarising, he concludes that

the UNSC “should be guided by the opinions of relevant regional organisations” and he

notes how, in this instance, “western permanent members pushed this resolution through

once their pragmatic requirement for regional consent had been met” (ibid). This shows that,

even when regional actors lack the necessary military capability and resources to intervene

decisively, they can exercise a crucial influence on events by aiding others to secure timely

authorisation and a strongly-framed mandate for intervention, and on advising on the nature

and appropriate strength of the intervention.

The second approach, ‘partnering’, implies a more horizontal relationship to

‘sub-contracting’ wherein the UN and regional organisations form a network of

peacekeeping partners with interconnected capabilities (Yamashita; 2012: 170).

Institutionally, the convergence of regional and UN peacekeeping is most clearly evident in

the AU/UN hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID), the first peacekeeping mission that is

formally both a UN and a regional operation. Morphing from its precursor, the solely AU

AMIS mission which was eventually rendered ineffective due to a lack of available troops

and a weak mandate, the formal transition to UNAMID took place on December 21st, 2007,

with the majority of AMIS troops being ‘re-hatted’ as UN peacekeepers (Yamashita; 2012:

502-503). The AU and the UN jointly appoint UNAMID’s top officials and agree on its

composition, and the UN provides the mission’s ‘command and control structures and

backstopping’ as well as its funding (Coleman; 2011: 537). Sub-Saharan African states form

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the bulk of UNAMID troops (71% in May 2011) because the Sudanese government insisted

on a predominantly African presence on its land (UNDPKO; 2011: 12-15). In this way, the

UN has overcome issues of misperception, circumventing the possibility that its mission

might be perceived in terms of a Western penetration into African affairs.

In spite of good, cooperative, working relationships between both partner

organisations, it is not entirely clear whether this hybrid approach is more effective in

realising its mandate than would be the case with a solely UN or regional operation. In late

2008 the UN peacekeeping chief reported that despite some progress, UNAMID had been

‘much too slow in providing real improvements for the ordinary citizens on the ground and

inadequate in resolving the Darfur crisis’ (UNSC; 2008). In April 2009, the head of

UNAMID indicated that while the mission was

“increasingly speaking with authority on the situation on the ground, its

success remained modest. Civilians remained at unacceptable risk of

violence, with millions in displaced camps or as refugees. Meanwhile,

the great wrongs committed during the height of hostilities in 2003 to

2004 went without remedy” (UNSC; 2009).

However, it is true to say that the maintenance of any peace operation in Darfur post-2007

would have been impossible had the organisations not collaborated. The AU and UN

contingents complement each other both politically and logistically. While the UN relies on

the ‘African character’ of UNAMID, so desperately sought by the Sudanese government as a

precondition for authorisation (Mickler; 2013: 502), the AU profits from the additional UN

troops, equipment and command structure, without which the AMIS mission could not have

been sustained However, any definitive evaluation of the efficacy of the ‘partnering’

approach remains to be seen.

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Conclusion:

Having considered both advantages and disadvantages of different models of

peacekeeping and peace making operations, I am impressed by the concept of hybrid peace

operations, adequately convinced that the two approaches discussed by Yamashita cover all

facets of peacekeeping operations. While the ‘sub-contracting’ idea undoubtedly favours

swift and, where necessary, aggressive action in the face of crimes against humanity, the

‘partnering’ approach is better suited to situations where a long term entrenchment of

peacekeeping forces is needed to enforce an uneasy ceasefire or peace agreement. I see

considerable merit in having regional organisations support UN operations, or indeed, in

acting as first responders in the case of immediate need. On the other hand, the hybrid

approach, provided it is flexibly and sensitively constituted and appropriately supported,

offers an interesting prospect for future peacekeeping.

However, when partnering with the UN, as guardian and guarantor of human

rights and international law, regional organisations may be presented with a number of

factors that might limit the efficacy of its mandated mission. Firstly, a peace operation is

only as successful as the cheque that funds it and, since its inception, UN funding is subject

to the financial vagaries of its member states and especially those of its host state, the US.

Secondly, UNSC decisions, even when unanimous, have always been the subject of

controversy because, being sole validator of international security action, its membership is

unrepresentative of UN membership in general. For example, none of its permanent

members come from the Southern Hemisphere and, although this P-5 have a controlling

influence over all its affairs, it is not answerable or accountable to the more representative

General Assembly or the International Criminal Court. Furthermore, its unwieldy structure

is widely perceived to be ineffectual and, because of the predictable and self-serving use of

vetoes, the overall effectiveness of its missions is routinely compromised (Thakur; 2002:

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334). The widely accepted perception that the UNSC is predominantly a forum for rhetoric,

not action, reveals its chief weakness and, lacking sufficient political capital to dissuade

member states from using unilateral force, it suffers from a credibility deficit, leaving

sanctions and the passing of resolutions as its only means of addressing wrongdoing. But, in

the face of human rights violations, civilians in peril can ill afford to wait for sanctions or

resolutions to produce results. Hence, with NATO’s intervention to protect the Kosovo

Muslims and, ironically, the recent Russian ‘reclaiming’ of Crimea in support of the

Russian-speaking population, unilateral action of this kind is often defended as ‘legitimate’

pending a retrospective declaration of legality. 4 As the Crimean situation is still unfolding,

the Kosovo example, with the benefit of hindsight, is easier to explain. Initially lacking

UNSC authorisation, NATO’s intervention succeeded in acquiring a somewhat ‘ambiguous

authorisation’ post the event when the UNSC belatedly accepted that the situation

represented a grave threat to international peace and security (Byers: 2005: 40-51).

This ‘ambiguous authority’, sufficed to confer legitimacy on NATO’s peace

making intervention which, had it not occurred, might have added to the international

communities growing list of humanitarian failures. By forcing the issue and by reacting

unilaterally, but timely, NATO restored human security and peace. In the case of Rwanda, all

international legal requirements were secured in advance and the response was both late and

inadequate with an appalling and horrific outcome. If there is any lesson to be learned from

both experiences, it is that the better outcome is achieved when, as in the case of the NATO

intervention in Kosovo, ‘legitimacy’ has primacy over ‘legality’. But, as is evident from the

currently unfolding Crimean situation, there are always dangers in setting precedents.

4 Although the rhetoric surrounding both these cases seems, on the face of it, remarkably similar, the substantive argument against the Russian action in Crimea is that the Russian-speaking population was never in any danger, nor was it under any discernible threat of danger, whereas in Kosovo, human rights abuses were real and blatant.

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