LETICIA LIGON v COURT OF APPEALS and IGLESIA NI CRISTO, G.R. No. 127683 | August 7, 1998 | 294 scra 73

FACTS: Petitioner Leticia P. Ligon (hereafter LIGON) is the mortgagee in three deeds of mortgage covering two parcels of land located along Tandang Sora, Barangay Culiat, Quezon City, belonging to the Islamic Directorate of the Philippines (hereafter IDP).  These deeds of mortgage were executed by certain Abdulrahman R.T. Linzag and Rowaida Busran-Sampaco as security for the loans of P3 million, P2 million, and P4 million, respectively, which IDP allegedly obtained from LIGON.Two groups had earlier vied for control of the IDP, namely, (1) the Carpizo group and (2) the Abbas group. The Carpizo group caused the signing of an alleged Board Resolution authorizing the sale of the two parcels of land mentioned above to private respondent Iglesia ni Cristo. The sale was evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale, wherein IDP and INC stipulated that the former would evict all squatters and illegal occupants in the two lots within forty-five (45) days from execution of the sale. IDP failed to clear the lots of squatters, hence, INC filed a complaint for specific performance with damages.IDP’s original Board of Trustees headed by Senator Mamintal Tamano, or the Tamano group, filed a petition with SEC to annul the sale of the two lots to INC. The SEC promulgated its decision in SEC Case No. 4012 annulling, inter alia, the sale of the two parcels of land to INC.  Aggrieved, INC filed a special civil action for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, the Court of Appeals granted INC’s petition and set aside the portion of the SEC decision declaring the sale null and void.  Consequently, the Tamano group appealed to court in a petition for review.The INC filed with the RTC of Quezon City a complaint[5] for the annulment of the deeds of mortgage over the two lots, impleading as defendants therein LIGON, Abdulrahman R.T. Linzag, Rowaida Busran-Sampaco, and the IDP.  Later, LIGON filed a motion to declare INC and IDP in default for their failure to file an answer to her counterclaim and cross-claim, respectively. INC opposed the motion, saying that some of the grounds raised by LIGON in her counterclaim were sufficiently dealt with in INC’s complaint the trial court granted LIGON’s motion and allowed LIGON to present evidence ex-parte to support her cross-claim against IDP. Then, LIGON filed an urgent motion for rendition of partial judgment against IDP in the cross-claim for the foreclosure of the mortgages. The trial court rendered a partial judgment (1) ordering IDP to pay LIGON the amounts of P3 million, P2 million, and P4 million “with interest at 36% per annum compounded annually” from the dates the loans became due and demandable; and (2) directing the foreclosure sale of the mortgaged properties in case of non-payment of said amounts. INC filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the partial judgment, which was, denied.Consequently, INC filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to annul the aforementioned partial judgment and the order denying private respondent’s motion for reconsideration. Undaunted by the foregoing adversities, LIGON filed the instant petition claiming that respondent Court of Appeals (1) acted with grave abuse of

discretion in refusing to order INC to implead or include IDP as an indispensable party in the petition for certiorari; (2) acted without jurisdiction in annulling the decision of the lower court; and (3) erred in not dismissing INC’s petition because INC was not aggrieved by the trial court’s decision and was guilty of forum-shopping.

ISSUE: WON INC was guilty of forum-shopping.

RULING: The SC hold that INC did not engage in forum-shopping.  There is forum-shopping when as a result of an adverse decision in one forum or, it may be added, in anticipation thereof, a party seeks a favorable opinion in another forum through means other than appeal or certiorari, raising identical causes of action, subject matter, and issues. Forum-shopping exists when two or more actions involve the same transactions, essential facts, and circumstances; and raise identical causes of action, subject matter, and issues. Yet another indication is when the elements of litis pendencia are present or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other case.  The test is whether in the two or more pending cases there is an identity of (a) parties, (b) rights or causes of action, and (c) reliefs sought.INC instituted Civil Case No. Q-90-6937 to compel IDP to comply with its undertaking to clear of squatters the lots the latter sold to the former.  On the other hand, in Civil Case No. Q-91-10494 INC sought to annul the mortgages and enjoin LIGON from foreclosing them.  The two cases involved different transactions and sought different reliefs.  Moreover, INC won in Civil Case No. Q-90-6937; hence, it cannot be said that the later Civil Case No. Q-91-10494 was filed as a result of an adverse decision in one forum.  On the other hand, CA-G.R. SP No. 40258 was a special civil action for certiorari, which was instituted, and correctly so, in reaction to an adverse partial decision in Civil Case No. Q-91-10494.Laurel vs GarciaGR 92013 July 25, 1990.Facts:Petitioners seek to stop the Philippine Government to sell the Roppongi Property, which is located in Japan. It is one of the properties given by the Japanese Government as reparations for damage done by the latter to the former during the war.

Petitioner argues that under Philippine Law, the subject property is property of public dominion. As such, it is outside the commerce of men. Therefore, it cannot be alienated.

Respondents aver that Japanese Law, and not Philippine Law, shall apply to the case because the property is located in Japan. They posit that the principle of lex situs applies.

Issues and Held:1. WON the subject property cannot be alienated.

The answer is in the affirmative.

Under Philippine Law, there can be no doubt that it is of public dominion unless it is convincingly shown that the property has become patrimonial. This, the respondents have failed to do. As property of public dominion, the Roppongi lot is outside the commerce of man. It cannot be alienated.

2. WON Philippine Law applies to the case at bar.

The answer is in the affirmative.

We see no reason why a conflict of law rule should apply when no conflict of law situation exists. A conflict of law situation arises only when: (1) There is a dispute over the title or ownership of an immovable, such that the capacity to take and transfer immovables, the formalities of conveyance, the essential validity and effect of the transfer, or the interpretation and effect of a conveyance, are to be determined; and (2) A foreign law on land ownership and its conveyance is asserted to conflict with a domestic law on the same matters. Hence, the need to determine which law should apply.

In the instant case, none of the above elements exists.

The issues are not concerned with validity of ownership or title. There is no question that the property belongs to the Philippines. The issue is the authority of the respondent officials to validly dispose of property belonging to the State. And the validity of the procedures adopted to effect its sale. This is governed by Philippine Law. The rule of lex situs does not apply.

The assertion that the opinion of the Secretary of Justice sheds light on the relevance of the lex situs rule is misplaced. The opinion does not tackle the alienability of the real properties procured through reparations nor the existence in what body of the authority to sell them. In discussing who are capable of acquiring the lots, the Secretary merely explains that it is the foreign law which should determine who can acquire the properties so that the constitutional limitation on acquisition of lands of the public domain to Filipino citizens and entities wholly owned by Filipinos is inapplicable.

Republic vs Naguiat

FACTS:Celestina Naguiat filed an application for registration of title to four parcels of land located in Panan, Botolan, Zambales. The applicant alleges that she is the owner of the said parcels of land having acquired them by purchase from its previous owners and their predecessors-in-interest who have been in possession thereof for more than thirty (30) years; and that to the best of her knowledge, said lots suffer no mortgage or encumbrance of whatever kind nor is there any person having any interest, legal or equitable, or in possession thereof. Petitioner Republic opposed on the ground that neither the applicant nor her predecessors-in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the lands in question since 12 June 1945 or prior thereto, considering the fact that she has not established that the lands in question have been declassified from forest or timber zone to alienable and disposable property.

ISSUE:Did the areas in question cease to have the status of forest or other inalienable lands of the public domain?

HELD:No, the said areas are still classified as forest land.The issue of whether or not respondent and her predecessors-in-interest have been in open, exclusive and continuous possession of the parcels of land in question is of little moment. For, unclassified land cannot be acquired by adverse occupation or possession; occupation thereof in the concept of owner, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership and be registered as title.A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way places. The classification is merely descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like.

CRUZ AND EUROPA VS SEC OF DENR

FACTS:Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous People’s Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) and its implementing rules and regulations (IRR). The petitioners assail certain provisions of the IPRA and its IRR on the ground that these amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the public domain as

well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.

ISSUE:Do the provisions of IPRA contravene the Constitution?

HELD:No, the provisions of IPRA do not contravene the Constitution. Examining the IPRA, there is nothing in the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural resources within their ancestral domain. Ownership over the natural resources in the ancestral domains remains with the State and the rights granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in their ancestral domains merely gives them, as owners and occupants of the land on which the resources are found, the right to the small scale utilization of these resources, and at the same time, a priority in their large scale development and exploitation.

Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the public domain. They are private lands and belong to the ICCs/IPs by native title, which is a concept of private land title that existed irrespective of any royal grant from the State. However, the right of ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs of their ancestral domains is a limited form of ownership and does not include the right to alienate the same.