lessons of the iraqi de-ba'athification program for iraq's future and the arab revolutions

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Strategic Studies Institute Monograph

LESSONS OF THE IRAQI DE-BAATHIFICATIONPROGRAM FOR IRAQS FUTUREAND THE ARAB REVOLUTIONS

W. Andrew Terrill

May 2012

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Comments pertaining to this report are invited and shouldbe forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. ArmyWar College, 45 Ashburn Drive, Bldg. 47, Carlisle, PA 17013-5046.

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I would like to thank Dr. Steven Metz and Mary J. Pelusi foruseful and insightful comments on earlier drafts of this mono-graph. All mistakes in this work of fact, omission, interpretation,and speculation are, nevertheless, entirely my own.

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ISBN 1-58487-527-5


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FOREWORD

In December 2011, the last U.S. combat troops werewithdrawn from Iraq after an almost 9-year presencein that country. This day was welcomed by the U.S.public after years of sacrice and struggle to build anew Iraq. Yet, the Iraq that U.S. troops have left at theinsistence of its government remains a deeply trou-bled nation. Often Iraqi leaders view political issuesin sharply sectarian terms, and national unity is elu-sive. The Iraqi political system was organized by boththe United States and Iraq, although over time, U.S.inuence diminished and Iraqi inuence increased. Inthis monograph, Dr. W. Andrew Terrill examines thepolicies of de-Baathication as initiated by the U.S.-led Coalition Provision Authority (CPA) under Am-bassador L. Paul Bremer and as practiced by various

Iraqi political commissions and entities created underthe CPA order. He also considers the ways in whichthe Iraqi de-Baathication program has evolved andremained an important but divisive institution overtime. Dr. Terrill suggests that many U.S. ofcials inIraq saw problems with de-Baathication, but theyhad difculties softening or correcting the processonce it had become rmly established in Iraqi hands.Other U.S. policymakers were slower in recognizingthe politicized nature of de-Baathication and its de-volution into a process in which both its Iraqi support-ers and opponents viewed it as an instrument of Shiiterevenge and political domination of Sunni Arabs.

Dr. Terrills monograph considers both the futureof Iraq and the differences and similarities between

events in Iraq and the Arab Spring states. He has ex-amined both Baathism as a concept and the ways inwhich it was practiced in Saddam Husseins Iraq. He


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notes that the initial principles of Baathism were suf-ciently broad as to allow their acquisition by a tyrant

seeking ideological justication for a merciless re-gime. His comprehensive analysis of Iraqi Baathismensures that he does not overgeneralize when draw-ing potential parallels to events in the Arab Springcountries. Dr. Terrill considers the nature of Iraqide-Baathication in considerable depth and carefullyevaluates the rationales and results of actions takenby both Americans and Iraqis involved in the process.

While there are many differences between the for-mation of Iraqs post-Saddam Hussein governmentand the current efforts of some Arab Spring govern-ing bodies to restructure their political institutions,it is possible to identify parallels between Iraq andArab Spring countries. Some insights for emerginggovernments may, correspondingly, be guided by a

comprehensive understanding of these parallels. TheArab Spring revolutions that have overthrown thegovernments of Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen atthe time of this writing are a regional process of stun-ning importance. While these revolutions began witha tremendous degree of hope, great difculties loomin the future. New governments will have to appor-tion power, build or reform key institutions, establishpolitical legitimacy for those institutions, and accom-modate the enhanced expectations of their publics in apost-revolutionary environment. A great deal can gowrong in these circumstances, and it is important toconsider ways in which these new governing struc-tures can be supported, so long as they remain inclu-sive and democratic. Any lessons that can be gleaned

from earlier conicts will be of considerable value tothe nations facing these problems as well as to their re-gional and extra-regional allies seeking to help them.


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The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offerthis monograph as a contribution to the national se-

curity debate on this important subject as our nationcontinues to grapple with a variety of problems as-sociated with the future of the Middle East and theongoing challenge of advancing U.S. interests in atime of Middle East turbulence. This analysis shouldbe especially useful to U.S. strategic leaders and intel-ligence professionals as they seek to address the com-plicated interplay of factors related to regional secu-rity issues, the future of Iraq, and the support of localallies and emerging governments. This work may alsobenet those seeking a greater understanding of long-range issues of Middle Eastern and global security. Itis hoped that this work will be of benet to ofcers ofall services as well as other U.S. government ofcialsinvolved in military and security assistance planning.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR. Director Strategic Studies Institute


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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

W. ANDREW TERRILL joined the Strategic Stud-ies Institute (SSI) in October 2001, and is SSIs MiddleEast specialist. Prior to his appointment, he served asa Middle East nonproliferation analyst for the Inter-national Assessments Division of the Lawrence Liver-more National Laboratory (LLNL). In 1998-99, Dr.Terrill also served as a Visiting Professor at the U.S.Air War College on assignment from LLNL. He is aformer faculty member at Old Dominion University inNorfolk, Virginia, and has taught adjunct at a varietyof other colleges and universities. He is a retired U.S.Army Reserve Lieutenant Colonel and Foreign AreaOfcer (Middle East). Dr. Terrill has published in nu-merous academic journals on topics including nuclearproliferation; the Iran-Iraq War; Operation DESERT

STORM; Middle Eastern chemical weapons and bal-listic missile proliferation, terrorism, and commandooperations. He is also the author of Global SecurityWatch-Jordan(Praeger, 2010). Since 1994, at U.S. StateDepartment invitation, Dr. Terrill has participated inthe Middle Eastern Track 2 talks, which are part ofthe Middle East Peace Process. He has also served asa member of the military and security working groupof the Baker/Hamilton Iraq Study Group. Dr. Terrillholds a B.A. from California State Polytechnic Uni-versity and an M.A. from the University of Califor-nia, Riverside, both in political science, and a Ph.D.in international relations from Claremont GraduateUniversity, Claremont, California.


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SUMMARY

The presence of U.S. combat troops in Iraq has nowcome to an end, and the lessons of that conict for theUnited States and other nations will be debated forsome time to come. It is now widely understood thatthe post-invasion policy of de-Baathication, as prac-ticed, had numerous unintended consequences thatmade building Iraqi civil society especially difcultfollowing the U.S.-led invasion. The U.S. approachto this policy is often assessed as having underesti-mated both the dangers of increased sectarianism inIraq and the need for strong efforts to manage ethnic-sectarian divisions. The Iraqi governments approachto de-Baathication was, nevertheless, much moreproblematic due to its openly biased and sectariannature. However well-intentioned, de-Baathication

originally was as a concept, in practice it had a num-ber of serious problems. These problems intensiedand became more alarming as the de-Baathicationprocess became increasingly dominated by the Iraqisand American oversight over that program graduallyevaporated. At that time, it came to be viewed as aninstrument of revenge and collective punishment byboth the Iraqis that administered de-Baathicationand those that were targeted by these policies.

A comprehensive review of Iraqi de-Baathicationis necessary before making any assertions about thelessons of these policies for either Iraq or the largerArab World. Understanding de-Baathication beginswith a consideration of U.S. policies and goals for Iraq.After the removal of the Saddam Hussein regime, the

U.S. leadership had a choice of implementing limitedde-Baathication or seeking a much more sweepingprogram. They initially chose the latter course because


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it was deemed especially important to eliminate thelast vestiges of Saddam Husseins regime to prevent

a similar type of government from reestablishingitself. In making this choice, advocates of deep de-Baathication pointed to the history of Baathist con-spirators rising to power through inltrating govern-ment institutions and seizing power in undemocraticways. This comprehensive approach neverthelessmade it extremely difcult for Iraqs Sunni Arab lead-ers to accept the post-war political system. Many U.S.leaders became concerned about this problem overtime, but they had increasing difculties moderatingIraqi administration of de-Baathication efforts.

Despite the time that has elapsed since the initialdecisions on de-Baathication, these issues remainvital for the future of Iraq. The Sunni Arab insurgencythat developed after the U.S.-led invasion reinforced

the popularity of de-Baathication among many ofIraqs Shiite Arabs, thereby keeping the policy alive.Many Shiites also agreed with U.S. concerns aboutthe potential emergence of a new Sunni-dominatedregime that would once again seize and retain power.A quasi-legal de-Baathication Commission (nowknown as the Justice and Accountability Commis-sion) continues to exist in Iraq and recently playeda dramatic role in disqualifying some leading Sunnicandidates in the 2010 parliamentary elections. Thiscommission could not have remained relevant with-out the support of a variety of important Iraqi politi-cians, including the current prime minister. Likewise,Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki arrested large numbers ofso-called Baathists in 2011, shortly before the nal

withdrawal of U.S. troops. Under these circumstances,the legacy of de-Baathication and the future of thisconcept within the Iraqi political system may yet have

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serious consequences for Iraqs ability to build a uni-ed and successful state.

Many Americans and Iraqis of diverse political ori-entations have argued that de-Baathication and thenature of sectarianism in Iraq involved a large numberof lessons that other countries may wish to consider inthe context of future political transitions. This argu-ment has found considerable resonance among somecitizens in the Arab Spring states where popularuprisings have ousted some long-serving dictators.Many of the new revolutionaries consider Iraqs prob-lems as a cautionary tale that must be understood asthey move forward in establishing new political sys-tems. In particular, it is now understood that loyaltycommissions led by politicians and set up to identifyinternal enemies can take on a life of their own andbecome part of a nations power structure. Once this

occurs, such organizations are exceedingly difcult todisestablish. Likewise, the basic unfairness of collec-tive punishment has again been underscored as an en-gine of anger, resentment, and backlash. Conversely,the importance of honest and objective judicial institu-tions has also been underscored, as has the importanceof maintaining a distinction between revenge and jus-tice. Moreover, ofcers and senior non-commissionedofcers (NCOs) of the U.S. Army must realize thatthey may often have unique opportunities and uniquecredibility to offer advice on the lessons of Iraq totheir counterparts in some of the Arab Spring nations.The U.S. Army has a long history of cooperating withsome of the Arab Spring militaries and has a particu-larly strong relationship with the Egyptian military.

These bonds of trust, cooperation, and teamwork canbe used to convey a variety of messages beyond exclu-sively military issues.


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All of the Arab Spring states may usefully con-sider the potential insights offered by events in Iraq,

but the two Arab countries where the lessons of de-Baathication may be most relevant are Libya andSyria. Libya is currently organizing a post-Qadhagovernment, while Syria is undergoing a process ofrevolution that seems increasingly difcult for the au-thorities to extinguish. In Libya, post-Qadha leadersare openly concerned about avoiding what they iden-tify as the mistakes of Iraq. It remains to be seen if theyare able to do so, or if they fall into new systems ofinternal warfare and perhaps new dictatorship. Syriamaintains both a society and a style of rule that hasnotable similarities to the Saddam Hussein govern-ment. Its future is deeply problematic, as revolution-aries struggle against an entrenched, well-armed, andincreasingly desperate dictatorial regime that is also

deeply sectarian in nature.


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LESSONS OF THE IRAQI DE-BAATHIFICATIONPROGRAM FOR IRAQS FUTURE

AND THE ARAB REVOLUTIONS

There was a tendency among promoters of the [2003-2011 Iraq] war to believe that democracy was a defaultcondition to which societies would revert once liber-ated from dictators.

Francis Fukuyama1

I pleaded with Bremer not to dissolve the [Iraqi] army,and warned him that it would blow up in our faces.I told him that I understood the rationale behind theprocess of de-Baathication, but that it needed to applyonly to those at the top with blood on their hands.Isaid I hoped he understood that if he was going to de-Baathify across the board, he would be setting him-self up for major resistance and would create a power

vacuum that someone would have to ll.

King Abdullah II of Jordan2

You cannot build a country if you dont have recon-ciliation and forgiveness.

Aref Ali Nayed Libyan National

Transitional Council3

INTRODUCTION

The presence of U.S. combat troops in Iraq has nowcome to an end, and the lessons of that conict, includ-ing those involving de-Baathication, will be debated

for some time to come. De-Baathication for Iraq wasinitiated by U.S. policymakers in 2003 as the processof eliminating the ideology of the Iraqi Baath Party


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from public life and removing its more inuential ad-herents from the Iraqi political and administrative sys-

tem. This policy constituted a central part of the effortto eliminate all signicant aspects of the Saddamiststate and remake Iraq into a democratic nation. It hasalso emerged as one of the most controversial aspectsof U.S. post-war activities in Iraq. While supportersclaim that the approach was unavoidable if Iraq wasto be reformed, critics maintain that the approach, aspracticed, amplied sectarian divisions in Iraq andalso served as an important enabler of enhanced sec-tarianism and the post-invasion Iraqi insurgency.

U.S. Government decisionmaking about the natureand depth of the de-Baathication effort centered onthe conict between pragmatists who were attempt-ing to prevent U.S. and Iraqi post-war authorities fromlosing their capacity to manage the emerging crisis in

Iraq and various hardlinersoften called neoconser-vativescalling for a fundamental restructuring ofIraqi society. The dominant fear of the rst group wasthat Iraq would degenerate into chaos without someeffort to rehabilitate and retain those Baathist bureau-crats and ofcials not directly implicated in the Sad-dam Hussein regimes crimes. For the second group,the primary concern appeared to be ensuring that afavorable outcome for regime change was permanent.Their greatest fear was often that a system of Sad-damism without Saddam would dominate the post-war environment unless large-scale societal restruc-turing took place within Iraq.4 In both groups, therewas a wide range of opinion, and some individuals(perhaps most prominently National Security Council

[NSC] Advisor and later Secretary of State Condoleez-za Rice) were open to the arguments of both sides andsought to synthesize them into coherent policy.


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While de-Baathication still retains some defend-ers in the United States, most Middle Eastern politi-

cians and observers consider it to have been deeplymisguided, and many Arabs view it as a warning ofthe ways in which a transition from dictatorial rulecan go wrong and lurch dangerously close to civilwar. A strong exception to this belief can sometimesbe found among Iraqi and other Arab Shiites, who ba-sically approve of a policy that punishes Iraqs SunniArab community from which Saddam drew most ofhis supporters and that suffered less than other Iraqicommunities under the dictatorship. The future ofIraq as a cohesive and modernizing country remainsuncertain, and it is unclear if that society can over-come simmering sectarian differences, which currentapproaches to de-Baathication continue to iname.The ways in which Iraq deals with the legacy of de-

Baathication, as well as ongoing policies for nationalreconciliation, will have a great deal to do with decid-ing the Iraq future. While Iraqis often dream of build-ing a society as prosperous as the Arab Gulf states, thedanger remains of an Iraqi society that looks more likeLebanon during its 14-year sectarian civil war.

The onset of the Arab Spring has revived anumber of questions about the problems with de-Baathication. At the time of this writing, Tunisia,Egypt, and Libya have experienced Arab Springpopular uprisings in which long-standing dictatorshave been ousted. Syria is also experiencing a seriousmass uprising led by brave and extremely committedrevolutionaries struggling against an entrenched andruthlessly tenacious dictatorship. None of these states

has ever experienced a government as authoritarianas Saddam Husseins Iraq, although the Syrian dic-tatorship clearly comes the closest to the Saddamist


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model. All of these states face considerable difcul-ties in establishing legitimate and moderate post-rev-

olutionary governments, and some face the danger ofprolonged civil conict. Lessons that can be gleanedfrom the Iraqi experience may therefore be especiallyimportant for their future.

THE BAATH PARTY AS AN INSTRUMENT OFSADDAM HUSSEINS DOMINATION OF IRAQ

In order to understand problems surrounding theeffort to remove Baathism from Iraq, it is necessaryto give some consideration to the central tenets ofBaathism as a political ideology and then to examinethe ways in which this ideology was applied and prac-ticed within Iraq under Saddam Hussein. In undertak-ing this analysis, it is worthwhile to consider that a

number of dictatorial regimes have used ofcial ide-ologies to justify the power of a particular elite ratherthan to guide their actions. Some individuals withinthe ruling elite of such systems may view themselvesas seeking to adjust their approaches to emergingproblems by emphasizing those aspects of the ideolo-gy that seem most useful for addressing a given prob-lem, while de-emphasizing those that are less useful.Such people remain ideologues despite their willing-ness to show a limited degree of exibility. Others donot take the national ideology particularly seriouslybut value its supporting party infrastructure to justifyand generate support for the decisions of the politicalleadership, regardless of how ideologically inconsis-tent those decisions may be. These people are political

opportunists in ideological garb.The Baath movement was founded in the 1940s by

two Syrian teachers, Michel Aaq and Salah al-Din Bi-


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tar, and stressed Arab unity, socialism, and efforts tomodernize the Arab World. The party, which emerged

in its modern form in 1947, sought to unite all Arabstates and to provide them with a set of moderniz-ing principles to help them overcome problems withpoverty and backwardness. The word Baath meansrenaissance or rebirth in Arabic. The movement alsosought to address the problems of the entire ArabWorld and was not to be conned to any individualcountry. Baathists throughout the Arab World wereoften viewed as committed Arab nationalists whowere particularly devoted to the concept of a strong,unied Arab nation. Their slogan is, One Arab nationwith an eternal mission.

Aaq and Bitar met at the Sorbonne in Paris,France, in 1929 where both of them became especiallyinterested in Western literature and philosophy with

an emphasis on Marxism and socialism. This form ofstudy was a fairly conventional approach for Arabstudents in France, since only the French communistsand socialists showed much sympathy for Syrian inde-pendence within the political spectrum of Paris in the1930s. Moreover, Marxisms emphasis on moderniza-tion and scientic socialism appealed to the two menas they struggled for a solution to widespread Arabimpoverishment and underdevelopment. The BaathParty. Thus began as a secular organization seeking tomodernize the Arab World in ways that were rootedin leftist, European political and social thought. Is-lam was not seen as a major part of this modernizingoutlook. In this regard, Aaq was not even a Muslim,having been raised as an Orthodox Christian.5 Batar

was a Sunni Muslim and, like Aaq, had no interestin religion as a basis for the state. Within the contextof Baathist ideology, Islam was primarily viewed as


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part of the Arab heritage rather than a way to organizecontemporary political life. Their outlook was corre-

spondingly deeply secular.Like Marxist-Leninist organizations, the Baath

Party sought to enter power through the actions ofa revolutionary elite operating in a variety of states,including Iraq. In the 1950s and 1960s, these tacticscaused the Baath to compete with a number of otherconspiratorial movements to inltrate the militaryand other centers of state power. Subversion andcoups seemed the only way in which to achieve pow-er since contested elections were almost never heldin any Arab country except perhaps Lebanon. Majoremerging political trends throughout the Arab Worldincluded communist and Nasserite movements aswell as the Baath. Thus, to achieve power within thevarious Arab countries Baathists had to operate clan-

destinely as one of many secretive opposition move-ments dealing with government counterintelligenceunits and their own splinter groups. Despite these dif-culties, Baathists seized power in Syria and Iraq in1963.6 The Iraqi Baath Party remained in power forless than a year but once again seized power in 1968partially as a result of the maneuverings of a youngrevolutionary named Saddam Hussein. Additionally,the previous Iraqi government had been unable toprovide signicant help to the other Arab countriesat war with Israel in June 1967. Iraqi Baathist leadersportrayed this failure as a form of treason, and madeanti-Israeli invective a centerpiece of their rhetoric fol-lowing their seizure of power.7

The Iraqi Baath Party began its existence with a

commitment that all party members should have abroad set of rights to elect ofcials and present theirviews in party forums. Unfortunately, this approach


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changed rapidly over time, and by 1964 Aaq wascomplaining about the stratication of the party and

the consolidation of power by a limited number ofactive members with inuence that dramatically ex-ceeded that of the rank and le. He stated that such anapproach was wholly out of keeping with the spiritof our partys rules.8Nevertheless, the requirementfor the Baath Party to carry out its activities in secretuntil it seized power for the second time in 1968 re-mained a central part of Baath organizational culturethroughout the organizations existence. During itsunderground years, the Baath became increasinglyhierarchical, secretive, and accustomed to violenceas a political tool. These mindsets carried over to theyears in power when such an approach was viewed asequally necessary to cope with real and imagined in-ternal and foreign enemies. The Baath leaders contin-

ued to see conspiracies against their government froma variety of sources including the Western powers andIsrael. The failure of Iraqs rst Baath government toremain in power more than a year underscored thelooming danger of a countercoup.

Baathism appeared to have some problems estab-lishing a popular base in the rst years after the 1968coup. Some Iraqi citizens appreciated Baath ideologyfor its emphasis on modernity and its rejection of eth-nic/sectarian divisions, tribalism, and religion as thebasis for a modern state. Unfortunately, in both Iraqand Syria, these principles had a more insidious func-tion as well, helping to serve as a smokescreen for thedomination of one social group over the others in eachcountry. Secular principles in Syria were used to mask

the almost complete domination of Syrian societyby the Alawite minority, which is usually identiedas an offshoot of Shiite Islam. In Iraq, the Baathist


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regime was dominated by Sunni Muslims, especiallyfrom the areas around Tikrit. The initial leader of the

1968 Baath revolution in Iraq was General AhmadHassan al-Bakr, but he was progressively eclipsed byhis young cousin, the hard-working, pragmatic, intel-ligent, and ruthless Saddam Hussein.

Saddam Hussein emerged as the strongman be-hind the scenes of the regime by the early 1970s andreplaced Bakr as president in July 1979. Although Sad-dam permitted some loyal Shiites to rise to high-pro-le positions in government and the military, the coreof his support was composed of Sunni Arabs. Shiitepolitical leadership was traditionally drawn from theIraqi Communist Party, the al-Dawa Islamiya (IslamicCall) Party, and the Shiite clergy. Both the Iraqi Com-munist Party and the Dawa Party were outlawed bythe Baathists, and their members were ruthlessly

massacred during Saddams years in power. TheShiite clergy also faced massive repression under theSaddam Hussein regime, although the regime couldnot actually wipe them out without severe internaland regional repercussions. Instead, Saddam soughtto silence the clerical leaders or force them to speakin favor of the regime. He also demanded that Sunniclerics adopt a nonpolitical role but never saw them asthe same type of threat as the leading Shiite ayatol-lahs.

Saddams relationship with Baathism is complex.His ability to emerge as a key Baathist leader is di-rectly attributable to party co-founder, Michel Aaq,who befriended Saddam in exile after the youngerman was forced to ee Iraq following his participa-

tion in an unsuccessful assassination attempt againstIraqi President Abdul Karim Qassim. During his yearsoutside Iraq, Saddam was able to gain Aaqs patron-


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age as a way to achieve high rank within the party.Saddams ongoing relationship with Aaq was useful

to him throughout his life. Unlike the Syrian BaathParty, which ousted Aaq and Bitar from power inFebruary 1966, Saddam remained aware of the valueof maintaining Aaq as an honored but powerlessmember of the Iraqi leadership. Aaq, for his part,had hoped to be a positive and moderating inuenceon Saddam once the dictator achieved power, butmost of his suggestions on important issues were ig-nored. Saddam did atter the older man by agreeingto some of his minor concerns. Such cosmetic conces-sions were an acceptable trade-off for the public sup-port of one of Baathisms co-founders. By consortingwith the dictator, Aaq allowed Saddam to exploithim and Baathism as window dressing for one of theworlds most oppressive regimes. Bitar, by contrast,

spent the remainder of his life in Europe. Aaq diedin 1989 in Paris, and Saddam let it be known that heused his personal funds to build a suitable tomb forthe co-founder of Baathism.

Saddam was not a military man, and as a youthwas rejected for entry into the Iraqi military academydue to poor performance on his entrance examina-tions.9Throughout his rise to power, Saddam was cor-respondingly wary of the danger of a military coupand used the Baath Party to help him secure fullcontrol over the Army. This concern is easily under-standable since coups were the traditional means ofousting an Iraqi leader once his enemies were able toorganize against him. In establishing an iron grip overthe military, Saddam made heavy use of Baathist po-

litical ofcers and frequently promoted cronies withinthe military over more qualied ofcers. Ofcers withparticularly heroic reputations in the Iran-Iraq war, aswell as brilliant planners, were quietly sidelined, since


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there was room for only one military genius in Sad-dams Iraq. Saddam understood the value of efcient

ofcers during times of war, but tended to place theseofcers in less important positions when he no longerhad an immediate need for them.

The Baath Party was also useful to Saddam inother ways than simply controlling the military andproviding an ideological veneer for the regime. Thecreation of the Saddam personality cult had nothingto do with original Baath ideology, but it was admin-istered and energized by Baath Party activists. AsSaddam Hussein consolidated his rule over Iraq, heconsistently viewed the Baath Party as an instrumentof dictatorial power and social mobilization. He didnot take its ideology and values seriously as principlesfor leadership, and individuals at the highest levelswere noted for their public and ostentatiously blind

loyalty to the President rather than their knowledgeof Baathist principles and political thought. Whilemany members of the top leadership were Sunni, thiswas not an absolute requirement. Proven Saddamloyalists included Shiites, Kurds, and various sectsof Christians.10If Saddam believed a subordinate wasa proven and committed loyalist, he did not particu-larly care what that persons sect or ethnicity was. Onthe other hand, Saddam often viewed his own familyand Sunni Arabs from the Tikrit area as having a headstart on loyalty.11Saddam and his cronies also seemedto view Sunni Arabs as being more likely to remainloyal, because they were usually more hostile to thetraditional enemy of Iran and were likely to fear a newShiite government in which they could be viewed as

accomplices in Saddams crimes. Consequently, theSunni Arabs were disproportionately represented inthe Baaths senior ranks and the regimes securityunits.


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Once in power, the Baath Party did follow throughon some of its modernization rhetoric. Saddam was

committed to building a modern state, although hebasically sought this goal primarily to improve the ef-ciency of the dictatorship rather than to benet theIraqi people. Consequently, serious and intense BaathParty literacy drives did more than teach Iraqi citizenshow to read.12They also opened an intellectual path-way that allowed them to be more thoroughly bom-barded with regime propaganda. Efforts to reduce thepower of the tribes and to limit the role of religion inpublic life were similarly presented as modernizationefforts, although their primary purpose was to furthercentralize power in Baghdad. Moreover, such policiescould be reversed when they were no longer conve-nient to the regime, as occurred in the late 1980s andthroughout the 1990s when Saddams regime sought

to encourage some increased religious devotion, solong as such sentiments were properly channeled intoactivities that the regime viewed as useful.13Addition-ally, Saddam was also willing to work through tribalelements when it suited his purposes.

On the eve of the 2003 U.S.-led invasion, SaddamsIraq was a one of the most rigid totalitarian states inthe world, with a privileged elite composed of mili-tary leaders and Baath Party members, virtually all ofwhom were terried of the leader.14The Baath Partyhad at least two million members at that time, withsome estimates reaching 2.5 million. Nevertheless,membership in the senior ranks of the Baath Partydid not protect individuals from Saddams terror,which was applied to them to ensure that rival centers

of power did not develop within the party.15Saddamwas particular wary of ambitious overachieverswho might be interested in political advancement in


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ways that could eventually lead to the rise of politicalcompetitors. He was also deeply wary of those ofcials

who began to appear too pious. Saddam further hadan occasional need for visible Baathist victims to re-inforce the determination of the remaining Baathiststo show unquestioning obedience and subservience.Senior leaders such as Tariq Aziz were sometimespublicly embarrassed by Saddam, as when he wastold to lose weight and had his weekly progress re-ported in the newspaper.16More ominously, a casualjoke about Saddam or his priorities could result in theloss of a senior leaders tongue.17Everyone within theIraqi political leadership understood that they hadno rights that Saddam could not immediately nullifyif he chose to do so for whatever reason. This prin-ciple applied to the top elite as well as the oppressedmasses. Thus, when Saddam was ousted in 2003, some

Baathists as well as non-Baathists were open to theidea of participating in the building of a new Iraq ifthey had the opportunity. The most likely exceptionsto this approach would be those Baathists who wereimplicated in Saddams crimes. These people knewthere would never be any kind of future for them inan Iraq without Saddam or at least a Saddamist typeof system.

THE DE-BAATHIFICATION ORDEROF MAY 16, 2003

Under the circumstances noted above, the Iraqpopulation was confused and uncertain about whatwould happen to the Baathists once Saddams re-

gime was removed from power. While General Tom-my Franks had abolished the Baath Party in a 2003message to the Iraqi people, he gave little indication


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of how individual Baathists outside of Iraqs topcircles would be treated. In the immediate aftermath

of Saddams ouster, both the U.S. military and thenewly established Organization for Reconstructionand Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) seemed to beshowing some clear exibility. ORHA was willing toallow former Baathist administrators and profession-als such as doctors and professors to keep their jobsso long as they were not implicated in regime crimesand were willing to renounce their previous Baathistafliations.18This approach was viewed as necessaryto keep the economy from further declining or evencollapsing. The U.S. Army also showed considerablepragmatism by sponsoring renunciation ceremoniesin which thousands of people burned their Baathmembership cards, renounced violence, and pledgedto help build the new Iraq.19This approach was par-

ticularly successful in the area around Mosul, wherethen Major General David Petraeus presided oversuch ceremonies. Mosul, at this time, remained quiet,despite its tradition of supplying large numbers ofSunni Arab ofcers to the Iraqi military. Later, af-ter more comprehensive de-Baathication policieswere instituted over the objection of the U.S. militaryleadership there, everything changed, Mosul becamemuch more difcult to manage, and a strong al-Qaedapresence was established in the region.

As noted above, the more tolerant approach ofORHA was not to last. An order to de-Baathify Iraqisociety was the rst major ofcial act of Ambassador L.Paul Bremer upon his arrival in that country to assumecontrol of the newly created Coalition Provisional Au-

thority (CPA), which replaced ORHA. Bremer issuedthis order on May 16, 2003, after being provided withthe directive in draft form by Undersecretary of De-


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fense for Policy Douglas Feith. According to Bremer,Feith told him that such an order was absolutely es-

sential to Iraqs rehabilitation.20

The order disestab-lished the Baath Party and removed members of thefour highest ranks of the party from government posi-tions. It also banned them from future employment inthe public sector. Additionally, the order required thatanyone holding positions in the top three managementlayers in government institutions be interviewed todetermine their level of involvement with the BaathParty as well as their possible involvement in criminalactivities. Those determined to be senior members ofthe party were to be removed from their positions andbanned from any future public employment. The or-der also called for the creation of a rewards programto pay individuals providing information leading tothe capture of senior Baath Party members.

The supporters of the de-Baathication programfrequently maintained that this approach was inspiredby the de-Nazication efforts that followed WorldWar II in Germany. Iraqi exiles were fond of the term,which they may have viewed as loaded in a way thatmade it a useful public relations tool to advocate warand to help clear a way for prominent roles for them-selves in the new Iraq. Additionally, some U.S. seniorofcials had, by this time, begun viewing Iraq throughthe lens of Nazi Germany with Saddam as Hitler andthe Baath Party as the Nazis.21 Such analogies cor-rectly point out the moral repugnancy of the SaddamHussein regime, but they also allow one to glance overthe particulars of Iraqi society and argue about Iraqsfuture on the basis of analogies rather than conditions

within Iraq itself. In just one important difference, itmay be signicant that the Nazis rose to power as alarge and powerful mass movement, whereas the


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Baathists rose to power in Iraq through the actions ofa group of conspirators. Individuals joining the Baath

movement after it seized power may have done sowith motives other than loyalty to Saddam Hussein.

The de-Baathication order and the subsequentCPA Order #2 (issued shortly afterward on May 23to disband Iraqs military and intelligence forces) re-ect the priorities of both Under Secretary Feith andDeputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz. Thesepriorities centered on the destruction of all forcespreviously involved in supporting the old regimeand particularly those forces that they believed had achance of reconstituting that regime. The Baath had along history of underground activity as well as a pastpattern of inltrating key institutions and then at-tempting to seize power by illegal means. The revivalof Baathism through conspiracy and intrigue there-

fore seemed a realistic danger. Unfortunately, such arevival was not the only serious danger facing Iraq atthis time, and it was not clearly so dangerous as totrump all other security concerns. It is also not clear ifthe U.S. leadership fully understood the numbers ofenemies that they were making by undertaking suchpolicies or the backlash such actions could produce.The possibility that such a backlash could lead to aserious Sunni military challenge to the new Iraq wasapparently dismissed on the grounds that such dead-enders were a marginalized force and would not beable to establish a popular rather than a conspiratorialmovement within Iraqi society. Ahmad Hashim, inhis insightful study of the Iraqi insurgency, quotes ananonymous U.S. policymaker as stating, We underes-

timated their [the Iraqis] capacity to put up resistance.We underestimated the role of nationalism. And weoverestimated the appeal of liberation [as trumping


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all other considerations for Iraqi political behavior].22Another even more biting critic stated that the civil-

ians within the George Bush administration had madethe fundamental mistake of confusing strategy withideology.23

Some authors also claim that the CPAs policieswere deliberately anti-Sunni and pro-Shiite becauseof a belief within the Bush administration that Sunniswere more dangerous to U.S. interests, while Shiiteswere more likely to be grateful to the United States forousting Saddam, since they had suffered more underhis regime.24This charge about administration policy-making is more popular in the Arab World than in theUnited States and is difcult to conrm. Some Bushpolicymakers did speak forcefully against Sunni con-trol in Iraq, but they justied their concerns aroundthe theme of democracy rather than the inherent un-

trustworthiness of the Sunni Arabs.25

In some regionalmedia, as well as in Iraq, the de-Baathication policywas sometimes referred to as de-Arabization.26Thecentral tenets of the Baath Party are Arab nationalism,anti-imperialism, and Arab socialism. Such ideals arenot usually viewed as offensive by themselves, andmany Arabs consider them to be noble and praisewor-thy. Treating Baathism, instead of Saddams versionof Baathism, as corrupt was therefore a problem formany Arabs and the pan-Arab media including thesatellite television stations where Iraqis often soughtto get the news.

In an effort that further complicated the situation,some leading Iraqi Shiites attempted to play uponU.S. fears by suggesting that Sunnis were Arab na-

tionalists. This is a label that is seldom viewed as aslur in the Arab World, but in this instance was ap-parently used to suggest an anti-American and anti-


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Israeli worldview. Throughout the years followingthe invasion, some Shiite leaders consistently sought

to convey the view that Sunnis were irredeemablywedded to radicalism, and needed to be marginalizedto protect both Iraqi and Shiite interests. In one par-ticularly revealing incident, Shiite leader AbdulazizHakim made it clear that he supported democracy solong as his organization and sect beneted from thatdemocracy. In conversations reported by journalistBob Woodward and others, Hakim told members ofthe Baker/Hamilton Iraq Study Group that the gov-ernment of Iraq represented 80 percent of the popula-tion of that country (Shiites and Kurds) so democracywas served, and nothing had to be done about the re-maining Sunnis.27

When Bremer informed the senior staff of the CPA(and especially the ORHA holdovers) of the new de-

Baathication approach, he met immediate resistanceover the scope of the order that he had brought fromWashington. Retired Lieutenant General Jay Garner,the outgoing Director of ORHA, was reported to havebeen disturbed by the order, which he characterizedas too deep.28 Charlie Sidell, the Baghdad Cen-tral Intelligence Agency (CIA) Chief of Station whoworked with Garner during this period, stated, Wellif you do this, youre going to drive 30,000 to 50,000Baathists underground by nightfall, and the numberis closer to 50,000 than it is to 30,000.29 Garner andSidell went to Bremer to attempt to dissuade him fromissuing the order until it had been moderated to reectthe realities that they were facing. They recommendedeliminating the top two levels of Baathist leadership,

which was about 6,000 people.30According to Garner,Bremer stated, Look, I have my orders. This is what Iam doing.31Since Bremer held the rank of Presiden-


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tial Envoy in direct communication with the President,it is not immediately clear who issued such orders.

Undersecretary Feith could not have done so on hisown authority. President Bush had previously givenDefense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld managerial con-trol of the occupation, so it is possible that Feith spokefor Rumsfeld who spoke for Bush and Vice PresidentDick Cheney.32 A complicating factor in this situa-tion is that throughout his time in ofce, Bremer waswilling to ignore the advice of the Defense and StateDepartments on other issues later in his tenure. If hedid not do so in this instance, he probably believed inthe policy that was being put forward or consideredit to have come directly from the President. It is alsolikely that he did not fully understand the importanceof the advice he was receiving from Garner and theCIA, since he later stated that he did not recall the con-

versation.33

Garner left Iraq shortly afterward, sharinghis concerns over de-Baathication with U.S. CentralCommand (CENTCOM) Deputy Commander thenLieutenant General John Abizaid, who also feared thatthe deep de-Baathication effort would feed the de-veloping resistance.34General Abizaid would becomeCENTCOM commander after General Franks retire-ment.

In a related event, President Bush later appearedto blame Bremer for disbanding the Iraqi Army (al-though not for deep de-Baathication), suggestingthat presidential guidance on one of the most impor-tant issues of the occupation was not reected in CPAdecisionmaking. Rather, Bush told journalist RobertDraper, The policy had been to keep the [Iraqi] army

intact. Didnt happen.35 Bremer responded angrilyto the Presidents statement, saying that he had beenordered to disband the Army by Rumsfeld, and the


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White House had approved the move. He also madethe unusual claim that disbanding the Iraqi Army had

been the correct choice, but he was not the one respon-sible for this decision.36Clearly, these are very differ-ent versions of the truth, and no one wants to takeresponsibility for disbanding Iraqi security forces inspite of Bremers professed belief that it had been thecorrect approach. Despite this inconsistency, Bremersarguments have a certain level of resonance, since it isdifcult to believe that he would have implementedsuch dramatic policy changes without at least a gen-eral understanding of President Bushs priorities onde-Baathication and the future of the Iraqi military.

At this point, Bremer was imposing Washingtonspriorities and appeared primarily concerned aboutpreventing the possible reconstitution of the Baathregime. These fears may have been enhanced by Sad-

dams status as a fugitive at that time. Moreover,Bremer also entered Iraq with the determination toestablish himself quickly as a decisive leader willingto make decisions that were unpopular with his staff,the military, and others in the U.S. Government. In hisbook, Bremer relates an incident in which his son gavehim a pair of desert combat boots as a going away giftwith the note that they were to help him kick somebutt.37 He was apparently in total agreement withthat sentiment.38Bremer clearly felt that asserting hiswill over subordinates was exceptionally important ifhe was to maintain effective control of the CPA andIraqi policy.39He made this effort in the face of consid-erable local unhappiness about CPA policy, and de-Baathication was especially unpopular in the U.S.

military because U.S. ofcers lost their hardest work-ing and most competent counterparts.40In response tothe order, some commanders, and most notably Gen-


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eral Petraeus, sought wide authority to grant waiv-ers from the de-Baathicaiton requirements for local

individuals to limit the disruptions caused by thispolicy.41

Bremer claims in his book that he expected thede-Baathication order to be applied to only about20,000 people, or what he identied as 1 percent of allparty members. The program would therefore includethe ranks ofcially designated as Senior Party Mem-bers. Bremer also claims to have been sensitive to theneeds of lower-ranking Baath Party members to jointhe organization to make a living. He later maintainedthat his order was applied in ways that he never in-tended, and that many more people were purged thanhe had envisioned under the original program. Thisincluded people of much lower rank than the levelsof Baath membership outlined in the order as well as

individuals whose links to the Baath Party leadershipwere tenuous at best. He was also apparently unre-sponsive to Ambassador Barbara Bodines argumentmade earlier to General Garner that some senior mem-bers of the party were not criminals, while various ju-nior members had engaged in serious crimes, makinga blanket approach based on rank alone unfair andineffective.42

Another problem for the CPA was that the justiceof the de-Baathication order was not clear to manyIraqis. Joining the Baath Party in Saddams Iraq wasa rational decision for anyone seeking to feed theirfamily and live in conditions other than squalor andpoverty. The best and most numerous jobs in Iraq arefound in the government and in state-controlled en-

terprises such as the oil industry. In Iraq, as in mostMiddle Eastern countries, there is not a strong privatesector with a wide variety of good jobs. Socialism and


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state control of the economy were ofcial parts of theBaath ideology, further weakening the nongovern-

mental sector, while years of United Nations (UN)sanctions (1990-2003) undermined foreign investmentin the Iraqi economy and also retarded private sectordevelopment. Yet, it is also within the governmentthat one was most vulnerable to pressure to showenthusiasm for Saddams rule. In this environment,the greatest and most direct system of rewards andpunishment had been put into place for rewardingloyalty to the government and the party. In Iraq, anon-Baathist primary school teacher would usuallybe paid the equivalent of U.S. $4 per month, while aBaathist in the same position, doing the same work,would be paid around $200 per month.43

Unfortunately, Bremers estimate of 20,000 peoplebeing purged as a result of his order did not hold up.

While exact numbers are impossible to obtain, mostestimates place the number as at least 30,000 andpossibly up to 50,000 individuals.44 A few estimatesplace it even higher and note that the party membersfamilies, as well as ousted Baathists, were harmedby the mass rings.45Blanket de-Baathication pun-ished Iraqs managerial class merely for being partof that class, and not because of individual miscon-duct, abuse of power, or other crimes. Moreover,other choices were available to address the problem,although they clearly would have been more cumber-some. According to one observer, the best alternativewould have been to place the Baathists on trial andthen punish those found guilty of human rights viola-tions, corruption, incompetence, and other crimes. A

truth and reconciliation commission could then havebeen established along South African lines. Such anoption would have avoided the approach of treating


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all Baathists in responsible positions as criminals.46Additionally, there was also the possibility supported

by Garner and others to dismiss only the top two lev-els of the Baath Party leadership and thereby try toavoid plunging Iraq into an administrative vacuumby eliminating managers and technocrats, many ofwhom were only nominal Baathists.47

As will be examined later, Bremer maintains thathis de-Baathication order was issued with a full un-derstanding of the complexities of Iraqi society, but itwas overzealously applied. Yet, if Bremers authorityand the approach of his order were abused, he stillcannot be fully absolved for the difculties that fol-lowed. In addition to problems with the decision it-self, it is unclear that the CPA leadership paid enoughattention to how his order was being implementedthroughout the process rather than simply issuing a

at and expecting it to be carried forward without dif-culty, rst under the authority of the CPA and thenby the Iraqi government. Lieutenant General RicardoSanchez, a former commander in Iraq, excoriated theCPA on these grounds noting, [T]he CPA treated [de-Baathication] like they were issuing an academic,theoretical paper. They simply released the order anddeclared success. But there was no vision, no concept,and in my opinion, no desire to ensure that the policywas properly implemented. On the other hand, it didlook good on paper.48

While Bremer was to become more pragmatic overtime, his rst few days in Iraq resulted in what havearguably emerged as some of the worst mistakes asso-ciated with the war, and these mistakes were impos-

sible to reverse by the time he started to understandtheir negative implications.49 It is nevertheless alsouseful to understand the context of Bremers actions


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by looking at the reaction to these policies in Washing-ton. In his memoir, Douglas Feith minimizes the chaos

created by de-Baathication, and takes issue withBremers later second thoughts about the policy.50Un-like Bremer, he was unprepared to admit that the de-Baathication policy may have been producing badresults. Rather than adjust his focus to the real andemerging problems as Bremer eventually did, Feith, atleast publicly, continued to support policies that wereproving disastrous.

ADMINISTRATION OF THEDE-BAATHIFICATION PROGRAM

Nine days after the issuance of CPA Order Num-ber 1, Bremer established a de-Baathication Coun-cil, which he was to supervise and which would

report directly and solely to him.51

Later, on No-vember 3, 2003, the responsibility for implementingde-Baathication was passed from the CPA to theU.S.-created Iraqi Governing Council (IGC).52The IGCmade de-Baathication the responsibility of Govern-ing Council member Ahmad Chalabi, who was placedin charge of the newly-created Supreme NationalCommission for De-Baathication. Chalabi was sup-ported in his efforts at deep de-Baathication by theShiite religious parties such as Dawa and the SupremeCouncil for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI, laterthe Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq) and by vari-ous Kurdish groups. Former post-Saddam DefenseMinister Ali Allawi (not to be confused with AyadAllawi) describes Iraqi Kurds as favoring broad de-

Baathication, but with so many exceptions that theiractual priorities were difcult to sort out.53Most SunniIraqi Arabs did not favor deep de-Baathication, al-


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though many of them had also suffered under SaddamHussein. Additionally, it did not escape Sunni Arab

attention that the primary Iraqi champions of deep de-Baathication were formerly exiled Shiite politicianssuch as Ahmad Chalabi of the Iraqi National Congressand Abdul Azziz Hakim of SCIRI. Many Sunni IraqiArabs considered de-Baathication to be synony-mous with de-Sunnization, a strong and deliberateeffort to marginalize the role of the Sunni Arab com-munity in Iraqs political future.54

The de-Baathication process impacted every im-portant aspect of Iraqi economic life, due to the cen-trality of state-run enterprises to the Iraqi economy.These included the educational system, utilities, fooddistribution centers, and the oil industry. The possibil-ity that Baathists would be educating young peoplewas of special concern to those in favor of deep de-

Baathication. Consequently, the de-Baathicationorder was used to justify the immediate ring of 1,700university professors and staff throughout Iraq, al-though no one maintained that they were all complicitin Saddams crimes or even that they were committedBaath ideologues.55Rather, they were often simply at-tempting to get by within the Saddamist system thatpermeated the state. The post-Saddam former primeminister Ayad Allawi has referred to this approachas Iraqi citizens using Baathist membership as a ve-hicle to live.56Later, Bremer expressed unhappinessthat tens of thousands of school teachers (K-12)had been dismissed from their jobs, even though theywere only low-ranking members of the Baath Partywho had been forced to join as a condition of their em-

ployment.57He strongly disapproved of such actions,but by this time much of the de-Baathication pro-cess had moved out of his direct control and was be-


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ing managed by either Chalabi or by local committeesthat had set themselves up using Bremers order as the

rationale for their activities. Chalabi, who had strongallies in the U.S. civilian leadership of the Pentagon,may have been particularly difcult for Bremer tomoderate. Much later, in retrospect, Bremer indicatedthat de-Baathication should have been conductedby a judicial body rather than a commission led byIraqi politicians.58

The collapse of large segments of the Iraqi educa-tional system harmed not only teachers but studentsand Iraqi families by rendering schools and universi-ties increasingly dysfunctional. It also created pools ofhigh school and college age males who could some-times be approached about the possibility of participat-ing in the insurgency. Other state-controlled bureau-cracies were decapitated as well, but these leadership

gaps did not always last for long. In the south and theShiite sections of Baghdad, Shiite clergy and theirsupporters quickly established their leadership overa variety of local government institutions.59Many ofthese people were afliated with Muqtada Sadrs SadrII movement (so named to indicate continuity with hismurdered fathers charitable activities). Holdover of-cials within the establishments seized by the Sadristsor other groups were quickly made to feel unwelcomeor even in danger unless they pledged loyalty to thenew leadership. These new political leaders often hadno concept of the technical or administrative issuesassociated with the enterprises that they seized. Nev-ertheless, the rise of Shiite clerics to ll the politicalvacuum in their own community is not surprising.

The Shiite political establishment was one of the onlyorganized forces outside of the Baath Party in Iraqat the time of the invasion. Moreover, it had a strong


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and loyal following, a system of self-nancing, anda record of long-standing persecution by the regime.

Later, the Sadrists lost some of their initial power fol-lowing Muqtada Sadrs political and military confron-tations with the Iraq government led by rival Shiitepolitician Nuri al-Maliki.

Many Baathists who held ranks below the highestfour levels of the Baath Party were also purged un-der the 2003 de-Baathication order, because it wasoften difcult to discern an individuals rank withinthe Baath Party. Often such standing was not clearto those around the person, and a large number of re-cords were destroyed in the immediate aftermath ofthe invasion and the looting of Iraqi government of-ces that occurred following the fall of the Saddamregime. Individuals who held important administra-tive positions were therefore often simply assumed to

be high-ranking Baathists and removed from ofce.Ironically, some individuals who were not importantin the Baath Party were strong pro-Saddam sympa-thizers, while some important Baathists sought to risewithin the Iraqi government and bureaucracy throughwhatever means available. Allowing junior ofcialsto assume the jobs of their former superiors did notnecessarily lead to a bureaucracy that was inherentlymore anti-Saddam or pro-democracy.

The decision to place Chalabi in charge of the de-Baathication process was also unfortunate. At leastsome U.S. leaders were aware of exactly what they weregetting with a Chalabi-led de-Baathication Commis-sion, and they should have understood that he wasnot likely to show restraint on this issue.60Chalabi had

been an advocate for wide-ranging de-Baathicationwell before the war against Saddam had begun in2003. He had previously published his concerns that


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the United States would invade Iraq but would not at-tempt to eliminate all aspects of the Baath Party with

the comprehensiveness that he favored. In a February19, 2002, Wall Street Journaleditorial, Chalabi attackedwhat he called the plans for the future occupation ofIraq, which he apparently believed he understood onthe basis of testimony before Congress by U.S. mili-tary and Bush administration ofcials. According toChalabi, [T]he proposed U.S. occupation and mili-tary administration of Iraq is unworkable. Unwork-able because it is predicated on keeping Saddams ex-isting structures of government in placealbeit underAmerican ofcers.61He went on to claim that, Iraqneeds a comprehensive program of de-Baathicationeven more extensive than the de-Nazication effort inGermany after World War II.

Chalabi has often been identied as the least popu-

lar member of the Governing Council among the Iraqipopulation at the time of his appointment by the IGCto head the de-Baathication Commission. His sta-tus as an exile caused at least some to view him asan outsider who had no experiences of the challengeof living under Saddam.62The strong and public tiesChalabi held to both Israelis and pro-Israeli guresin the U.S. Government were well-known and notuniversally appreciated throughout Iraq.63 Later, theDecember 2005 elections underscored his unpopu-larity when his political party failed to win a singleseat in the 475-person Parliament, despite a massivepolitical campaign under the slogan, We LiberatedIraq.64 The decision to move forward with Chalabiat the head of the Commission rather than seeking a

more reconciliation-oriented gure indicated a con-tinuing determination to impose a harsh peace on theSunnis and anyone associated with the old regime.


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This approach was consistent with the priorities of thesenior Pentagon civilians who remained concerned

that a regime similar to the one led by Saddam couldreemerge. This danger was also worrisome to manyof Iraqs Shiite and Kurdish leaders who were awarethat the Baath had previously come to power twicethrough coups.

As noted, the Shiite religious parties and othercommunity leaders were among the groups most inter-ested in comprehensive de-Baathication priorities.U.S. policymakers seeking to justify a more sweepingde-Baathication policy were quick to point out thatfailure to do this would potentially harm U.S. relationswith these parties.65 Nor is it difcult to understandthe intense hatred Shiites and Kurds held for Saddamand the Baath. Shiite religious parties, as well as theShiite-dominated Iraqi Communist Party, had suf-

fered intensively under Saddam, and most prominentmembers of these organizations had lost a number offriends and family members to torture and executionby the regime. The rise of a Shiite Islamic republic inIran through revolution was particularly frighteningto Saddam, who unleashed an especially high level ofbrutality against Iraqi Shiites who seemed even theslightest bit comfortable with the Iranian concept ofIslamic government. An overly political denition ofShiite identity during the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war wasespecially dangerous. Nevertheless, revenge (or jus-tice) was not the only motivation for the Shiite par-ties in supporting de-Baathication. Many of thesegroups also wanted as much power as possible forthemselves. Destroying the political viability of the

Sunni leadership in Iraq helped to move them towardthat goal. Some Shiite leaders may have also hopedto reverse the situations of Sunnis and Shiites perma-


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nently. In contrast to Iraqs rst 8 decades of existence,Shiites would hold the important positions, and Sun-

nis would be politically marginalized. Under thesecircumstances, some Sunni Arabs believed that theywere being offered second-class citizenship at best.

The CPA de-Baathication order was sometimestaken as at least a partial green light for some Iraqisto exact revenge on former Baathists who had per-secuted them or were their personal enemies. In-deed, a Shiite assassination campaign against formerBaathists did take place, although it is doubtful thata more reconciliationist approach by the CPA wouldhave prevented these outbreaks of violence, once thedictatorship had been removed. 66Many of these assas-sinations were carried forward in a highly profession-al manner, rather than as frenzy or sloppy revenge at-tacks. It is correspondingly possible, if not likely, that

Iranian intelligence units coordinated with friendlyShiite groups to ensure that Baathist enemies of Teh-ran were never in a position for them to cause troublefor Iran again.67According to the London-based news-magazine, The Middle East, Iranian Supreme leader AliKhamenei put the commander of the al-Quds Forcein charge of setting up a network of covert operativesin Iraq as early as September 2002, with the missionof expanding Iranian inuence in that country in theaftermath of the invasion.68

If Chalabi hoped to use the de-Baathication Com-mission as an avenue for his own rise to power, hewas deeply disappointed by the outcome of the 2005election. While he may have helped to create a powervacuum by purging a number of potential rivals, he

did not have the ability to ll it through the electoralprocess. Rather, the most important players in Iraq atthis stage were quickly proven to be the Shiite reli-


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gious parties who were also enthusiastic supporters ofde-Baathication. After the election, Chalabi moved

in and out of a variety of governmental jobs, whichhe held for various lengths of time. Throughout hispolitical maneuvering, he was unable to obtain realpower within the top leadership of the government.

As noted above, many Iraqi Sunnis viewed theeffort to remove large numbers of Sunni leaders andbureaucrats from power through the vehicle of de-Baathication as part of a new political system inwhich Shiites would dominate Sunnis. The politiciza-tion of sectarian differences also led Iraqi political par-ties to adapt an approach whereby they viewed failingto ll a political post with one of your supporters orallies as tantamount to allowing that post to be lledby enemies.69 In addition to Sunni Muslims, someestablishment Shiites had also risen to high ranks

within the Baath Party and were also caught up in de-Baathication. A key problem here is that Saddam ac-tively reached out to secular Shiites to serve as dem-ocratic ornaments, while attempting to marginalizethe Shiite clergy, which he felt was at least potentiallyloyal to Iran.70Some secular Shiite leaders, includingthose with advanced degrees from Western universi-ties, took the bait for a variety of reasons includingthe hope that they could gain some reasonable level ofpatronage for their own communities. Some of thesepeople were also well-educated and talented enoughto be of real use to the regime in performing adminis-trative tasks. These links with the regime allowed suchindividuals to become targets for de-Baathication inways that the more persecuted opposition clerics did

not once the regime had been removed.71The most prominent example of the problems

faced by establishment Shiites was the case of Saa-


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doun Hammadi, the former Iraqi premier who diedof leukemia in Germany in March 2007.72 Saadoun

Hammadi had previously served as Iraqs ForeignMinister, Deputy Prime Minister, Prime Minister, andmost recently, Saddams last Speaker of the Assem-bly, thus becoming the highest ranking Shiite withinthe regime. Hammadi held a Ph.D. in economics fromthe University of Wisconsin and has been describedas having a thoughtful and scholarly demeanor.73He also is the author of a number of academic articleson Arab affairs and political philosophy.74Hammadifavored economic and political liberalism in the past,and was presented to the world as a reform primeminister after the 1991 Gulf War. He apparently tookhis reform charter a little too seriously for Saddamand was removed for overzealousness after 7 monthsin power.75

As an articulate, respected Shiite intellectual whoheld high-prole/high-prestige government posi-tions, Hammadi helped give Saddams governmentthe appearance of broad-based Iraqi support across re-ligious sects. Saddam thus presented Hammadi withthe option of being co-opted and in return gaining afew crumbs of power for himself and some economicassistance for his Shiite supporters. This Faustianbargain was occasionally made available to Western-educated secular intellectuals, but it was almost neveran option for important members of the Shiite clergy.Although Saddam sometimes sought to appear reli-gious, formal clerical participation in the Baathistgovernment was largely unacceptable to him. Certain-ly, no ayatollah would hold any of the governmental

positions Hammadi held. Hammadi was arrested andplaced in prison shortly after the U.S.-led invasion,while his son and members of his al-Karakshah tribestringently protested his arrest on grounds that he did


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not take part in any crime against the Iraqi people.76He was released in February 2004, in partial response

to the uproar within the Shiite community. He thentraveled to a series of Arab countries and then to Ger-many where he died.

Other secular Shiite leaders were also tarnishedby their association with Saddams government, al-though they collaborated for a mix of personal, com-munal, and national motives. They were, however,not always subject to the same level of punishment asSunni Baathists. According to the International CrisisGroup (ICG), Shiite political parties involved with thede-Baathication process often allowed Shiite BaathParty members to repent and keep their jobs. In do-ing so, the former Baathists became subservient to theparties that allowed them to remain in their positionsand vulnerable to pressure from these parties so long

as they remained a relevant political force.77

Any for-mer Baathists showing much independence from thenew political leadership at this stage usually foundthemselves accused of leaking information to terroristsor a variety of other crimes, regardless of whether ornot they had done anything wrong. De-Baathicationconsequently may have helped the Shiite clergy andreligious parties establish almost full control over theShiite community during the rst years following theinvasion. While Shiite secularists, including those as-sociated with the Baath, were not punished to the ex-tent of Sunni Baathists under de-Baathication, theywere also not in a position to seek the leadership ofthe Shiite community. At this time, there seemed tobe limited room for a reformed anti-Iranian secularist

leadership that included ex-Baathists in Iraq.78The removal of Baathist ofcials also created

problems in nding suitable replacements with sat-isfactory political credentials. Some individuals who


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had been red by Baathists from various bureaucra-cies under the Baathist regime became strong candi-

dates to replace them following the change of regime.The problem here is that such individuals sometimes(perhaps often) were red for nonpolitical reasons,including incompetence and corruption. Upon beingreturned to their former jobs or those of their formersupervisors, they returned to old patterns of behavior,showing little responsibility, effectiveness, or commit-ment to even a limited work ethic. To be fair, it mightbe noted that these people had no monopoly on theshortcomings noted here. Most Iraqis had never hadany preparation to work in an efcient, modernizingbureaucracy, and corruption permeated the societyduring the Saddam years as it still does.79

At various times, the Iraqi government announcedthat it was relaxing the de-Baathiciation policy, of-

ten as a response to U.S. pressure. Chalabi would usu-ally announce the policy changes and then providegrandiose projections of how many people would berehabilitated under new more lenient rules. In early2007, for instance, he publicly agreed to soften thede-Baathication policy, announcing that his ofcehad begun removing hiring restrictions from formerBaathists who had not committed crimes during theSaddam years. Elaborating on this change, he statedthat more than 2,300 former high-ranking Baath Partymembers were either being reinstated in their formerjobs or granted pensions.80On the same day, Chalabistated that over 700 former Baathists had returned totheir old government jobs, suggesting that the balanceof the 2,300 people he cited were given pensions if his

gures are correct.81Chalabis commitment to reformnevertheless remained tactical, and there is no inde-pendent evidence for the gures he cited. Additional-


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ly, Chalabi opposed any new law on de-Baathicationthat would contain a sunset clause that would abolish

the commission at some future point.82

An interesting window into the impartiality of the

de-Baathication process occurred with the August2008 arrest of Ali Faisal al-Lami, then the executive di-rector of the de-Baathication Commission. Al-Lamiwas arrested as he returned home from Lebanon asa suspected senior special group leader, accordingto journalistic sources.83Various offshoots of Muqtadaal-Sadrs Mahdi Army and other pro-Iranian terror-ist organizations are known as special groups andare among the most extreme forces within the Iraqipolitical system. Some of these groups are controlledby Iranian intelligence organizations such as the al-Quds Force.84The idea that someone comfortable withthis ideology was presiding over de-Baathication

is bone-chilling. Chalabi nevertheless demanded al-Lamis release following the arrest.85 He stated thatal-Lami played a great essential role [in] ghtingand confronting Saddams regime despite the risksthat surrounded him.86 He further added that U.S.forces pay no attention to Iraqi human rights. Whilemany details of this situation were not disclosed andal-Lamis guilt remained publicly unproven, his pur-ported admiration for Tehran further reinforced theimage of the de-Baathication Commission as hope-lessly biased against Sunni Arabs. Al-Lami remainedin detention until August 2009, when he was releasedas part of an agreement between the Iraqi governmentand various Shiite parties.87After his release, al-Lamireturned to political and de-Baathication activities,

as noted later in this monograph. Al-Lamis role inde-Baathication ended in May 2011 when he was as-sassinated by unknown gunmen who were probablymembers of al-Qaeda.88


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MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF

DE-BAATHIFICATION

The decision to dissolve the Iraqi Army and theBaath Party within the rst few days of establish-ing the CPA administered an overwhelming blow toorganized Iraqi life. This radical shock therapy wasdeemed by some members of the Bush administrationas vital to the establishment of a stable democracy inIraq. Of all of the CPA actions in this time frame, theabolition of the Iraqi Army was the most controversialand disconcerting to many Iraqis, who often viewedthe military as something more than a pillar of the Sad-dam Hussein regime. Supporters of the decision oftenclaim that the Iraqi Army dissolved itself, and that thereality of the post-war situation was simply being rec-

ognized. This argument implies that the United Statesonly had only two choices, reconstituting the 600,000-man Iraqi Army in its Saddamist form or bringing theIraqi Army down to zero. The choice, however, wasnever that binary, and the CPA order was issued at apoint when U.S. Army General David D. McKiernanand various CIA ofcials were already working on athird option, that of reconstituting certain units of theIraqi military on a voluntary basis under vetted of-cers.89These efforts had to be discontinued followingthe CPA announcement.

Armed resistance to U.S. forces at some level fol-lowing the invasion was probably inevitable, no mat-ter how well the post-war reconstruction effort washandled. The question was, would this resistance

comprise small groups of terrorists or would it en-compass much larger forces drawn from alienatedsocial groups that were able to organize into a strong


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network of resistance organizations. At this stage inthe conict, the Bush administration was loath to ad-

mit that segments of the Iraqi population were wagingwar against U.S. forces rather than welcoming them.At a June 2003 press conference, Secretary of DefenseRumsfeld stated, I guess the reason I dont use thephrase guerrilla war is because there isnt one.90Ingeneral, the administration seemed to believe that theIraqis would be sufciently grateful for liberation thatthey would be granted sweeping ability to do anythingthey wanted in Iraq without much of a backlash.91Thisview was emphatically reinforced by some of the mostpro-war Iraqi exiles who maintained that Iraqis wereso oppressed that they did not care about much elseother than their deliverance from Saddam Hussein.92

The de-Baathication order, as unpopular as it waswith Sunni Arab Iraqis, was not as unpopular as the

disbanding of the Iraqi Army. Yet, if the United Stateswas determined to implement a de-Baathicationorder, the rationale for dissolving the Army becomesmuch less clear. Senior Baathist ofcers could havebeen retired under the de-Baathication order, andlow-ranking Baathists and non-Baathists could havebeen offered the option to remain in the military pro-vided that they were not complicit in regime crimes.Baath political ofcers, who were often resented byregular army ofcers, could easily have been removedfrom service, and elite units with special loyalty toSaddam could have been dissolved.93The Iraqi Armyunder new leadership could then have been used tohelp provide order rather than be left disgraced withmany of its members facing destitution. The special

relationship of the Iraqi Army to Iraqi society went farbeyond Saddam. Even a number of anti-Saddam Iraqiexiles urged that it not be abolished.94


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The alternative to abolishing the Army in additionto wide-ranging de-Baathication would have been

to purge and restructure the Army. This would in-volve removing the political functionaries and specialsecurity forces that served throughout the military toensure loyalty to Saddams regime. The special secu-rity forces involved in this effort were commandedby Saddams younger son, Qusay, and were givensweeping powers to meddle in the operations of mili-tary units despite their lack of competence in militarymatters. The political ofcials were generally detestedby the professional military, who would have wel-comed efforts to rid the Army of such ofcials.95Mostwould also have been pleased to end the long hours ofideological instruction that were supposed to supportmorale and readiness, but in effect detracted from unitpreparation for military missions. The presence of

these political units, the use of purges, and the generaldistrust Saddam felt for any gifted military leaders of-ten caused many Iraqi Army ofcers to feel that theywere victims of the regime rather than a part of it. Itwas, therefore, a deep shock to such individuals whenthe order was issued to disband them including thoseunits that had chosen not to ght against the U.S.-ledinvasion.

Additionally, Saddams primary means of controlover the military was the Baath Party functionaries(commissars) noted above rather than insisting thatall high-ranking ofcers join the Baath. Accordingto Colonel John Agoglia who served as a CENTCOMplanner during this time frame:

[I]n June, we found the personnel records of the IraqiArmy at the Ministry of Defense, and we had thosecomputers that contained those personnel records ex-


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amined by special technical experts. The special tech-nical experts conrmed in fact that the records wereauthentic and not tampered with. One of the key nd-ings of those records which was shared with [CPA Di-rector for National Security and Defense] Mr. [Walter]Slocombe, was that in fact you did not have large-scaleBaath issues in the army until you got to the majorgeneral rank, and at the major general rank, 50 percentof the major generals were Baathists and 50 percentwerent.96

An important caveat is in order here, since theIraqi Army was extremely top heavy and had morethan 10,000 generals.97Nevertheless, the database thatColonel Agoglia mentions could have been an invalu-able tool in reconstituting the Iraqi Army and thenusing it to help

lessons of the iraqi de-ba'athification program for iraq's future and the arab revolutions

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