EL PUEBLO DE FILIPINAS VS. MARQUIDAGR 953, SEPTEMBER 18, 1947

FACTS:The case at bar is an appeal of respondent of the decision rendered by the lower court, finding him guilty of the crime of treason. Respondent was charged with the crime of treason for allegedly helping out Japanese occupants in arresting and abducting of Filipinos who were thought to be guerrillas. He was found guilty by the lowercourt, using the testimony of many witnesses. It is alleged that respondent cannot be found of guilty of treasondue to the indetermination of his citizenship or nationality. Following the doctrine of stare decisis, wherein in a prior case, 2 were not found to be citizens since during the time of birth, a limitation on the application of jus soli for citizenship was established.

ISSUE:Whether or not the principle of stare decisis should be applied to the case at bar?

HELD:No. Stare decisis doesn’t work up to the extent of perpetuating an error. If it is found that in the past there was a mistake, stare decisis shouldn’t bar the Court from correcting itself

PAQUITO BUAYA, petitioner, vs. STRONGHOLD INSURANCE CO., Inc., respondent.

D E C I S I O N

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Courts are duty-bound to put an end to controversies. Any attempt to prolong, resurrect or juggle them should be firmly struck down. The system of judicial review should not be misused and abused to evade the operation of final and executory judgments. Moreover, the remand of a case does not nullify the entire proceedings. It merely authorizes the trial court to receive additional evidence, not to conduct a trial de novo.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the August 28, 1998 Decision [1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 52999, dismissing Petitioner Paquito Buaya's appeal of the trial court's Order dated November 13, 1995, which denied his Petition for Relief. The assailed Decision disposed as follows:

"IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Appeal is DISMISSED. The Order appealed from is AFFIRMED. With costs against the Appellant."[2]

The Facts

The facts of this case are as follows:[3]

"On July 31, 1985, x x x Stronghold Insurance Company, Inc., the [respondent] in the present recourse, filed a complaint against Paquito B. Buaya, its erstwhile [b]ranch [m]anager for Cebu and the [petitioner] in the present recourse, for the collection of the principal amount of P678,076.83, representing his unremitted premium collections owing to the [respondent]. For failure of the [petitioner] and his counsel to appear at the scheduled pre-trial, the [petitioner] was declared x x x in default, and the [respondent] was allowed, by the [c]ourt, to adduce its evidence,  ex parte. On the basis of the evidence of the [respondent], the Court a quo promulgated a Decision, dated September 17, 1987, in favor of the [respondent], the decretal portion of which reads as follows:

'WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the [respondent] and against the [petitioner] ordering the latter to pay the former the sum of P678,076.83 plus legal interest thereon from the filing of the complaint until fully paid; the sum equivalent to 25% of [respondent's] claim as and for attorney's fees plus the cost of suit.'

The [petitioner] appealed, from said Decision, to [the CA], entitled and docketed 'Stronghold Insurance Co., Inc., versus Paquito B. Buaya, CA-GR. No. 17329.'On March 30, 1990, this [c]ourt promulgated a Decision in favor of the [petitioner] annulling the Decision of the [c]ourt a quo and remanding the case to the lower [c]ourt for further proceedings. (at page 154, Records). The Decision of this [c]ourt became final and executory. Accordingly, the [c]ourt a quo issued an Order setting the case for hearing on December 13, 1990 at 8:30 o'clock in the morning (at page 169, Records). The [petitioner] himself filed a 'Motion for Postponement' of the hearing. [Petitioner's] motion was granted by the [c]ourt a quo and the hearing was reset [to] February 15, 1991, at 8:30 in the morning. However, the hearing was reset to March 14, 1991, at the same time, on motion of the [respondent] (at page 180, Record).  The [petitioner] himself filed a 'Motion for Postponement' of the hearing set on March 14, 1991 on the ground that his

[c]ounsel, Atty. Bartolome A. Avancena, had died and [petitioner] needed time to engage the services of new counsel. The hearing was reset to May 16, 1991 at the same time (at page 187, Record). However, the [petitioner] filed another motion for the resetting of said hearing on the ground that he needed [more] time to secure the services of new counsel. The hearing was reset to July 26, 1991, at the same time. But then, the [petitioner] filed another motion for the postponement of said hearing on the ground that 'he was weak and sickly'.  However, the [respondent] opposed [petitioner's] motion. Nevertheless, the [c]ourt reset the hearing to November 29, 1991, at the same time, but subject to the condition that if, for any reason, the [petitioner] still failed to appear on said setting, such failure shall be deemed a waiver of his right to present evidence (at page 250, Records). On November 27, 1991, Atty. Manuel Maranga, the new counsel of the [petitioner], filed a 'Motion to Postpone'. The [respondent] opposed [petitioner's] motion. On December 19, 1991, the [c]ourt a quo issued an Order denying [petitioner's] motion and declaring the [petitioner] to have waived his right to adduce evidence in his behalf (at page 222, Record).  The [respondent] forthwith filed a motion praying the [c]ourt to reinstate its Decision, dated September 17, 1987. The [petitioner] filed a 'Motion for Reconsideration' of the Order of the [c]ourt a quo, dated December 19, 1991. On March 18, 1992, the [c]ourt a quo issued an Order denying [petitioner's] 'Motion for Reconsideration' and granting [respondent's] motion for the reinstatement of its Decision, dated September 17, 1987. The [petitioner] filed a 'Petition for Certiorari' with [the CA], entitled and docketed as 'Paquito Buaya versus Hon. Fernando Agdamag, et al.,['] CA-G.R. No. 27814 (SP), assailing the Orders of the [c]ourt a quo, dated December 19, 1991 and March 18, 1992. On August 24, 1992, [the CA] promulgated a Decision dismissing [petitioner's] Petition for lack of merit (at page 261, Record).  The Decision of this [c]ourt became final and executory on June 28, 1993 (at page 282). [4] On [m]otion of the [respondent], the [c]ourt a quoissued an Order, dated October 29, 1993, directing the issuance of a [W]rit of [E]xecution (at page 298, Record). The [petitioner] filed a 'Motion for Reconsideration' of said Order, dated October 29, 1993. On March 16, 1995, the [c]ourt a quo issued an Order denying motion (at pages 359-360, Record). On April 12, 1995, the [petitioner] filed a 'Notice of Appeal' from said Order. However, on May 11, 1995, the [c]ourt [a quo] issued an Order declining to give due course to the appeal of the [petitioner] considering that the Decision of the [c]ourt had already become final and executory (at page 365, Record). On June 2, 1995, the [c]ourt a quo issued a Writ of Execution. On July 27, 1995, the [petitioner] filed a 'Petition for Relief from Order'. On November 13, 1995, the [c]ourt a quoissued an Order denying the Petitioner's 'Petition for Relief."

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The CA denied petitioner's appeal which centered on these issues: (1) whether the September 17, 1987 Decision of the trial court had become final and executory, and (2) whether the failure of petitioner to inform his new counsel of the status of the case before the trial court constituted "mistake and excusable negligence."

In view of the amount involved in the collection suit, the CA disbelieved petitioner's contention that he had failed to apprise his counsel of the status and the particulars of the case in the trial court.  Granting arguendo that he did make such omission through sheer inadvertence, his counsel was duty-bound to familiarize himself with the case before accepting the same, specially because litigation had already commenced.Such omission did not constitute "mistake or excusable negligence" that would have entitled him to relief from the trial court's judgment.  Thus, he deserved to suffer the consequences of his own mistake or omission.

Noting that the validity of the March 18, 1992 Order of the trial court reinstating its September 17, 1987 Decision had been affirmed by both the CA and the Supreme Court, the CA also condemned the penchant of petitioner for resurrecting the same issues. Hence, his appeal was solely designed to further derail the execution of the lower court's Decision.

Besides, the present posture of petitioner is antithetical to his earlier "Petition for Relief from Order," which was denied by the trial court. In filing said action for relief, he was admitting that the Decision of the trial court had become final and executory. Hence, he cannot claim the Decision's nullity.

Hence, this Petition.[5]

Issues

Petitioner interposes the following issues for resolution:[6]

"I - Petitioner is presenting in this petition a question of law which is believed or which appears to be one of first impression, namely: Can a decision of a Regional Trial Court which is annulled by the Court of Appeals be reinstated by the trial court which rendered the decision or any trial court for that matter and thereafter order its execution?

"II - When the decision of a trial court is annulled by the Court of Appeals for having been rendered without notice to the [petitioner] of the pre-trial and subsequent hearing and remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings, does the jurisdiction of the trial court merely require the presentation of evidence for

the [petitioner] and without anymore requiring the presentation of [respondent's] evidence for cross-examination by the [petitioner]?"

The Court's Ruling

This Petition has no merit.

First Issue: Annulled Decision

Petitioner persistently avers that no trial court can reinstate a decision that has been annulled by the CA because such a decision is "dead" in legal contemplation.

We disagree. We doubt the veracity of petitioner's claim that the September 11, 1987 Decision of the trial court was annulled by the CA, because his Appeal Brief stated that it had merely been set aside. He merely alleged that "[t]he aforesaid judgment of September 11, 1987, was a judgment by default x x x so that the Court of Appeals, on appeal by [petitioner], in its decision rendered on March 30, 1990, SET ASIDE said judgment and ordered the case to be REMANDED to the court of origin for FURTHER PROCEEDINGS. x x x."[7] This allegation shows that the trial court's Decision was reversed and set aside, not annulled, by the appellate court. Since it was merely set aside to enable petitioner to present his evidence, then there was nothing wrong with the Order of the trial court reinstating its original decision after he had failed to take advantage of the ample opportunity given him to present evidence.

Moreover, the failure of petitioner to attach a copy of the March 30, 1990 CA Decision, which he claims annulled the September 11, 1987 trial court Decision, is an added reason why this Petition should be denied. True, said CA Decision is not in question here. Nonetheless, an authentic copy thereof should have been submitted to support his claim that the Decision of the trial court had indeed been annulled by that of the CA. [8] Hence, a copy of the latter is a "material portion of the record [that] would support the petition." Failure to attach or submit it is sufficient ground for this Petition's dismissal.[9]

We also reject the assertion of petitioner that the CA Decision of August 24, 1992 did not affirm the reinstatement of the September 11, 1987 trial court Decision, but only sustained the denial of his Motion for Postponement.  This is simply not true. The CA specifically resolved the issue of the legality of the RTC Orders dated December 19, 1991 and March 18, 1992, which not only denied petitioner's Motion for Postponement but also reinstated the September 17, 1987 trial court Decision.[10] The appellate court ruled that respondent judge showed no arbitrariness or capriciousness that would warrant the grant of that Petition.[11] Hence, there was no need for the CA to explicitly reinstate the September 11, 1987 trial court Decision. Indeed, petitioner cannot be allowed to prevent that RTC Decision from attaining finality by engaging in useless hairsplitting distinctions. On this dilatory practice, the CA clearly and cogently ruled:

"x x x. The [Petitioner] raised the same issue in his Petition for Certiorari in CA-GR No. 27814 (SP) filed with this Court where he assailed the validity of the Order of the Court a quo, dated March 18, 1992, ordering the reinstatement of the Decision of the Court a quo, dated September 17, 1987, and this Court dismissed [petitioner's] Petition for lack of merit, and, [i]n effe[c]t, affirmed the aforesaid Order of the Court a quo. The [petitioner] filed a "Petition to Review" with the Supreme Court, from said Decision of this Court and the Supreme Court dismissed [petitioner's] Petition. Appellant's penchant [for] resurrecting the same issue in the Court a quo x x x, in the present recourse, deserves the severest condemnation as it was designed solely to further derail the execution of the Decision of the Court a quo. x x x."[12]

Second Issue: Final and Executory Judgment

Petitioner condemns the unfairness of the trial court when it ruled that he had waived his right to submit evidence, when it should have merely ordered plaintiff to present its evidence first. He interprets the CA remand to mean that both parties, subject to cross-examination, would again present their respective sets of evidence.

We disagree. The CA remanded the case to the court of origin for further hearing, not for retrial.  A motion for new trial under Rule 37 of the Rules of Court, is a remedy separate and distinct from an appeal. Plaintiff (herein respondent) had rested its case long before the September 11, 1987 Decision was rendered. In fact, the evidence adduced by herein respondent became the sole basis of the Default Judgment of September 11, 1987.

Finally, the Court holds that the September 11, 1987 Decision of the trial court become final and executory on June 28, 1993.[13] A Writ of Execution of the March 16, 1995 Order of the trial court reinstating the September 17, 1987 Decision was issued by the trial court on May 11, 1995. Once a judgment becomes final and executory, the prevailing party can have it executed as a matter of right, and the issuance of a Writ of Execution becomes a ministerial duty of the court.[14] It is axiomatic that once a decision attains finality, it becomes the law of the case regardless of any claim

that it is erroneous.[15] Having been rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction acting within its authority, the judgment may no longer be altered even at the risk of occasional legal infirmities or errors it may contain. [16]

The February 24, 1993 Resolution of this Court in GR No. 108354 barred not only a rehash of the same issues resolved in the Petition, but also any other issues that might have been raised therein. An existing final judgment or decree -- rendered upon the merits, without fraud or collusion, by a court of competent jurisdiction acting upon a matter within its authority -- is conclusive of the rights of the parties and their privies.This ruling holds in all other actions or suits, in the same or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction, touching on the points or matters in issue in the first suit.[17]

Indeed, nothing decided on in the first appeal, between the same parties and the same facts, can be reexamined in a second or subsequent appeal. Right or wrong, the decision in the first appeal is binding on both the trial and the appellate courts for the purpose of that case and for that case only.

Courts will simply refuse to reopen what has been decided. They will not allow the same parties or their privies to litigate anew a question, once it has been considered and decided with finality. Litigations must end and terminate sometime and somewhere. The effective and efficient administration of justice requires that once a judgment has become final, the prevailing party should not be deprived of the fruits of the verdict by subsequent suits on the same issues filed by the same parties.

Courts are duty-bound to put an end to controversies. Any attempt to prolong, resurrect or juggle them should be firmly struck down. The system of judicial review should not be misused and abused to evade the operation of final and executory judgments.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED, and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Double costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.

BUAYA V. STRONGHOLD INSURANCE COMPANY, INC.GR 139020 OCTOBER 11, 2000

FACTS:On July 31, 1985, Stronghold Insurance Company, Inc. filed a complaint against Paquito B. Buaya, a manager of their Cebu branch for the collection of the principal amount of P678,076.83, which is allegedly his unremitted premium collections owing to the Stronghold. For failure of Buaya and his counsel to appear at the pre-trial, he was defaulted and Stronghold was allowed to present his evidences, without the other party. On the basis of Stronghold’s evidence, the court decided on September 17, 1987, in favor of Stronghold. Buaya appealed to the CA, and on March 30, 1990, decided in favor of Buaya, annulling the decision and remanding the case to the lower court for further proceedings. The lower court therefore set a hearing on December 13, 1990 but Buaya filed a ‘Motion of Postponement’ of the hearing and was granted. He repeated his motion and gave several reasons to postpone the hearings. On July 26, 1991,Stronghold opposed the motion, but the court granted Buaya’s motion provided that the next time he does it, it will be considered a waiver of his right to present evidence. Stronghold filed a motion to reinstate its previous decision dated, September 17, 1987. Buaya filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. He files a ‘Petition for Certiorari’ assailing the orders of the court but was dismissed for lack of merit. On June 28, 1993, the court’s decision has became final and executor and thus denied all other appeals made before it.

ISSUES:1. Can a decision of a Regional Trial Court which is annulled by the Court of Appeals be reinstated by the trial court which rendered the decision or any trial court for that matter and thereafter order its execution?

2. When the decision of a trial court is annulled by the Court of Appeals for having been rendered without notice to the Buaya of the pre-trial and subsequent hearing and remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings, does the jurisdiction of the trial court merely require the presentation of evidence for Buaya and without anymore requiring the presentation of Stronghold’s evidence for cross-examination by the Buaya

RULING: This petition has no merit. DENIED.RATIO:1. Annulled Decision: The decision of the trial court was not annulled by the CA, because his Appeal Brief stated that it had merely been set aside. This shows that the trial court's Decision was reversed and set aside, not annulled, by the appellate court. Since it was merely set aside to enable petitioner to present his evidence, then there was nothing wrong with the Order of the trial court reinstating its original decision after he had failed to take advantage of the ample opportunity given him to present evidence. An authentic copy thereof should have been submitted to support his claim that the Decision of the trial court had indeed been annulled by that of the CA. Hence, a copy of the latter is a "material portion of the record [that] would support the petition." Failure to attach or submit it is sufficient ground for this Petition's dismissal.

2. Final and Executory Judgment: Once a judgment becomes final and executory, the prevailing party can have it executed as a matter of right, it is axiomatic that once a decision attains finality, it becomes the law of the case regardless of any claim that it is erroneous. Having been rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction acting within its authority, the judgment may no longer be altered even at the risk of occasional legal infirmities or errors it may contain. Litigations must end and terminate sometime and somewhere. The effective and efficient administration of justice requires that once a judgment has become final, the prevailing party should not be deprived of thefruits of the verdict by subsequent suits on the same issues filed by the same parties.

Agilent Technologies Singapore vs. Integrated Silicon Techngology Philippines Corp.[GR 154618, 14 April 2004]

Facts: Agilent Technologies Singapore (Pte.), Ltd. is a foreign corporation, which, by its own admission, is not licensed to do business in the Philippines. Integrated Silicon Technology Philippines Corporation is a private domestic corporation, 100% foreign owned, which is engaged in the business of manufacturing and assembling electronics components. Teoh Kiang Hong, Teoh Kiang Seng and Anthony Choo, Malaysian nationals, are current members of Integrated Silicon’s board of directors, while Joanne Kate M. dela Cruz, Jean Kay M. dela Cruz, and Rolando T. Nacilla are its former members. The juridical relation among the various parties in the case can be traced to a 5-year Value Added Assembly Services Agreement (VAASA), entered into on 2 April 1996 between Integrated Silicon and the Hewlett-Packard Singapore (Pte.) Ltd., Singapore Components Operation (HP-Singapore). Under the terms of the VAASA, Integrated Silicon was to locally manufacture and assemble fiber optics for export to HP-Singapore. 

HP-Singapore, for its part, was to consign raw materials to Integrated Silicon; transport machinery to the plant of Integrated Silicon; and pay Integrated Silicon the purchase price of the finished products. The VAASA had a five-year term, beginning on 2 April 1996, with a provision for annual renewal by mutual written consent. On 19 September 1999, with the consent of Integrated Silicon, HP-Singapore assigned all its rights and obligations in the VAASA to Agilent. On 25 May 2001, Integrated Silicon filed a complaint for “Specific Performance and Damages” against Agilent and its officers Tan Bian Ee, Lim Chin Hong, Tey Boon Teck and Francis Khor (Civil Case 3110-01-C), alleging that Agilent breached the parties’ oral agreement to extend the VAASA. Integrated Silicon thus prayed that Agilent be ordered to execute a written extension of the VAASA for a period of five years as earlier assured and promised; to comply with the extended VAASA; and to pay actual, moral, exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. 

On 1 June 2001, summons and a copy of the complaint were served on Atty. Ramon Quisumbing, who returned these processes on the claim that he was not the registered agent of Agilent. Later, he entered a special appearance to assail the court’s jurisdiction over the person of Agilent. On 2 July 2001, Agilent filed a separate complaint against Integrated Silicon, Teoh Kang Seng, Teoh Kiang Gong, Anthony Choo, Joanne Kate M. dela Cruz, Jean Kay M. dela Cruz and Rolando T. Nacilla, for “Specific Performance, Recovery of Possession, and Sum of Money with Replevin, Preliminary Mandatory Injunction, and Damages”, before the Regional Trial Court, Calamba, Laguna, Branch 92 (Civil Case 3123-2001-C). Agilent prayed that a writ of replevin or, in the alternative, a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, be issued ordering Integrated Silicon, et. al. to immediately return and deliver to Agilent its equipment, machineries and the materials to be used for fiber-optic components which were left in the plant of Integrated Silicon; and that the latter be ordered to pay actual and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. Integrated Silicon, et. al. filed a Motion to Dismiss in Civil Case No. 3123-2001-C, on the grounds of lack of Agilent’s legal capacity to sue; litis pendentia; forum shopping; and failure to state a cause of action. On 4 September 2001, the trial court denied the Motion to Dismiss and granted Agilent’s application for a writ of replevin. 

Without filing a motion for reconsideration, Integrated Silicon, et. al. filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. In the meantime, upon motion filed by Integrated Silicon, et. al., Judge Antonio S. Pozas of Branch 92 voluntarily inhibited himself in Civil Case 3123-2001-C. The case was re-raffled and assigned to Branch 35, the same branch where Civil Case 3110-2001-C is pending. On 12 August 2002, the Court of Appeals granted Integrated Silicon, et. al.’s petition for certiorari, set aside the assailed Order of the trial court dated 4 September 2001, and ordered the dismissal of Civil Case 3123-2001-C. Agilent filed the petition for review. 

Issue:1. Whether a foreign corporation without a license is incapacitated from bringing an action in Philippine courts. 2. Whether Agilent was doing business in the Philippines. Held: 

1. A foreign corporation without a license is not ipso facto incapacitated from bringing an action in Philippine courts. A license is necessary only if a foreign corporation is “transacting” or “doing business” in the country. Section 133 of the Corporation Code provides that "No foreign corporation transacting business in the Philippines without a license, or its successors or assigns, shall be permitted to maintain or intervene in any action, suit or proceeding in any court or administrative agency of the Philippines; but such corporation may be sued or proceeded against before Philippine courts or administrative tribunals on any valid cause of action recognized under Philippine laws." The aforementioned provision prevents an unlicensed foreign corporation “doing business” in the Philippines from accessing our courts. In a number of cases, however, the Court held that an unlicensed foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines may bring suit in Philippine courts against a Philippine citizen or entity who had contracted with and benefited from

said corporation. Such a suit is premised on the doctrine of estoppel. A party is estopped from challenging the personality of a corporation after having acknowledged the same by entering into a contract with it. This doctrine of estoppel to deny corporate existence and capacity applies to foreign as well as domestic corporations. The application of this principle prevents a person contracting with a foreign corporation from later taking advantage of its noncompliance with the statutes chiefly in cases where such person has received the benefits of the contract. The principles regarding the right of a foreign corporation to bring suit in Philippine courts may thus be condensed in four statements: (1) if a foreign corporation does business in the Philippines without a license, it cannot sue before the Philippine courts; (2) if a foreign corporation is not doing business in the Philippines, it needs no license to sue before Philippine courts on an isolated transaction or on a cause of action entirely independent of any business transaction; (3) if a foreign corporation does business in the Philippines without a license, a Philippine citizen or entity which has contracted with said corporation may be estopped from challenging the foreign corporation’s corporate personality in a suit brought before Philippine courts; and (4) if a foreign corporation does business in the Philippines with the required license, it can sue before Philippine courts on any transaction. 

2. The challenge to Agilent’s legal capacity to file suit hinges on whether or not it is doing business in the Philippines. However, there is no definitive rule on what constitutes “doing”, “engaging in”, or “transacting” business in the Philippines, the Corporation Code itself is silent as to what acts constitute doing or transacting business in the Philippines. An analysis of the relevant case law, in conjunction with Section 1 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Foreign Investments Act of 1991 (FIA, as amended by RA 8179), would demonstrate that the acts enumerated in the VAASA do not constitute “doing business” in the Philippines. Section 1 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the FIA (as amended by RA 8179) provides that the following shall not be deemed “doing business”: (1) Mere investment as a shareholder by a foreign entity in domestic corporations duly registered to do business, and/or the exercise of rights as such investor; (2) Having a nominee director or officer to represent its interest in such corporation; (3) Appointing a representative or distributor domiciled in the Philippines which transacts business in the representative’s or distributor’s own name and account; (4) The publication of a general advertisement through any print or broadcast media; (5) Maintaining a stock of goods in the Philippines solely for the purpose of having the same processed by another entity in the Philippines; (6) Consignment by a foreign entity of equipment with a local company to be used in the processing of products for export; (7) Collecting information in the Philippines; and (8) Performing services auxiliary to an existing isolated contract of sale which are not on a continuing basis, such as installing in the Philippines machinery it has manufactured or exported to the Philippines, servicing the same, training domestic workers to operate it, and similar incidental services. By and large, to constitute “doing business”, the activity to be undertaken in the Philippines is one that is for profit-making. Herein, by the clear terms of the VAASA, Agilent’s activities in the Philippines were confined to (1) maintaining a stock of goods in the Philippines solely for the purpose of having the same processed by Integrated Silicon; and (2) consignment of equipment with Integrated Silicon to be used in the processing of products for export. As such, Agilent cannot be deemed to be “doing business” in the Philippines. Integrated Silicon, et. al.’s contention that Agilent lacks the legal capacity to file suit is therefore devoid of merit. As a foreign corporation not doing business in the Philippines, it needed no license before it can sue before our courts.

JM TUASON AND CO. INC. VS. MARIANOGR 3314O OCTOBER 23, 1978

FACTS:Respondents filed a complaint praying that they be declared owners of a certain parcel of land located in Rizal. They alleged that their father acquired this land with a Spanish title. They alleged that petitioner fraudulently or included the land in an original certificate of title. They also alleged that transfer certificates of title were issued topetitioners irregularly. Given such, they are praying that the titles derived there from be declared void due to irregular proceedings.The lower court issued an order requiring the parties to produce documents to support their allegations. With this, the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition, inter alia, that the lower court be ordered to dismiss the complaint and enjoined from proceeding the case. Before this present complaint, the respondents had already filed a complaint questioning the validity of the titles of petitioner, wherein the lower court and the SC upheld its validity.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the titles can still be questioned by respondents?HELD:They cannot anymore question. Considering the principle of stare decisis, the respondents cannot anymore continue with their action without eroding the long settled holding of the courts of the validity of the titles and no longer open to attack. It is against public policy that matters already decided on the merits be relitigated again and again, consuming the court’s time and energies at the expense of other litigants.

TALA REALTY SERVICES CORP VS. BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGSAND MORTGAGE BANKGR 137980 JUNE 20, 2000

FACTS:Respondent has a legal problem with regard to its real estate holdings. The law requires that respondent’s real estate holdings should only be 50% of its net worth. This constituted a bar to the planned expansionof respondent. To solve the predicament of the respondent, it created a separate entity, which is petitioner, wherein the existing branch sites would be unloaded and the said petitioner would also acquire new branch sites for respondent and lease it to the latter. Pursuant to theagreement between the two parties, the petitioner acquired properties from respondent and then leased them to the latter. It was a part of the agreement that petitioner only holds properties for the respondent and that the said properties would be returned to respondent at its pleasure. There came a time when there was a disagreement between the two parties on which of the 2 lease contracts of lease presented by each party governs them. Petitioner contends that it is the 11-year contract while the other presents a 20-year contract. Both contracts have been allegedly notarized and executed on the same date. Using the 11-year contract as basis, the petitioner filed a petition for ejectment against respondent. However, the petitioner lost in all its cases and appealed the case to the Court of Appeals. The CA mentioned in its decision that the lower courts erred in refusing toexercise jurisdiction, when the issue of possession and issue of validity of contract is intertwined. Nonetheless, it dismissed the petition to maintain judicial consistency and stability as other ejectment cases like the one at bar have already been decided on. Petitioner filed MR and was granted by ordering respondent to pay the unpaid rentals.Subsequently, the respondent filed an MR and the CA reversed its decision, which made petitioner file an appeal to the SC saying that the CA erred in considering the ruling of the court in another case as the law of the case between petitioner and respondent. Respondent then said that only decisions of the SC establish jurisprudence or doctrines.

ISSUE:Whether or not the principle of stare decisis should be applied to the case at bar even if the parties and properties involved are different?

HELD:The stare decisis principle should be upheld. There had been previously a decision by the SC involving the same parties but different property, wherein it was upheld and decided that the 20-year lease contract should prevail. It even mentioned inits decision that the 11-year contract was forged and simulated as it was never really notarized nor submitted to the Central Bank, as required by law. In the light of the aforementioned decision, the Court doesn’t have any option but to uphold the 20-year lease contract, following the principle of “stare decisis et non quieta movere (follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been settled)”. It is the policy of the Court to maintain judicial stability in accordance to stare decisis. As in this case, the same questions relating to the same even have been put forward by parties similarly situated as in a previous case litigated and decided by a competent court, the rule of stare decisis is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issue. The ruling is final even as to parties who are strangers to the original proceedings and not bound by the judgment under the res judicata doctrine. Stare decisis should apply if the facts aresubstantially the same even if the parties may be different

URBANA VELASCO AROC VS. PHHCGR L-39674 JANUARY 31, 1978

FACTS:The case at bar in appeal of the decision to the CA the order of the Court of First Instance dismissing on the ground of res judicata the complaint to declare null and void the sale of a certain parcel of land. Appellants are occupants of one-half of a parcel of land. They constructed a house and made some improvements on the land. Theylater on filed with appellee corporation application for the award and sale of such portion of land. They did this for several times without any action from appellee corporation. They later found out that the parcel of land had been unlawfully and in bad faith awarded and sold to appellee spouses, who according to appellants, are disqualified frompurchasing said land since they have prior purchased a land already from appellee corporation together with other properties. Appellants filed a case against the appellee corporation and spouses. In defense of the spouses, they contend that the case should be dismissed due to the ground of res judicata. A case was already decided in their favor, wherein the issue was regarding quieting of title. They contend that appellants are barred by prior judgment.The Court of First Instance dismissed the complaint of the appellants, using the ground raised by the appellees of res judicata. It contended that the prior case had already been final and executor and that there is nothing else for them to do but to dismiss the complaint of the appellant.

ISSUE:Whether or not res judicata is applicable in the case at bar?

HELD:No, it is not. For the principle of res judicata to apply, four requisites must be present: the former judgment must be final, it must have been rendered by a court with proper jurisdiction over the case,

it must be a judgment on the merits, and there must be, between the two cases, identity of parties, subject matter, and cause of action. In this case, it is only with regard to cause of action that the parties disagree.Cause of action is defined to be an act or omission of second party in violation of the legal rights of the other, and its essential elements are legal right of the plaintiff, correlative obligation of the defendant, and act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right. In the prior judged case, the cause of action was for the quietingof title or removing the cloud on the title of the land. While in the case at bar, the cause of action was not only to ask for the nullification of the award and sale of the parcel of land but also, it questions the validity of appellee corporation’s award and sale of the parcel of land to the spouses. Given such, the two causes of action are differentfrom one another. In the application of the doctrine of res judicata wherein it is sometimes doubtful whether there are same causes of action, the test normally employed is to consider the identity of the facts or whether the same evidence would sustain both. If the same facts and evidence would sustain both, then the former would be a bar to any subsequent action. Otherwise, there wouldn’t be. And with applying such test, it is found that more evidence is needed to prove the second cause of action. Given aforementioned circumstances, the second cause of actionis remanded to the Court of First Instance for further proceedings.

CAYANA VS. CAGR 125607 MARCH 18, 2004

FACTS:It appears that the petitioners and respondents’ father, with the marital consent of his wife, sold two parcels of land to their son, one of the respondents in this case. At the death of the father, the mother filed an Affidavit of Adverse Claims pertaining to the two parcels of land, alleging that the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of their son wereforgeries. However, later on, she issued an affidavit withdrawing such adverse claims.Later on, together with petitioners of this case and respondent Marceliano, they filed a case against respondent Pastor, for the cancellation of the Deed of Absolute Sale and reconveyance of the two parcels of land. Meanwhile, respondent Pastor entered into an agreement of counter guaranty with respondent corporation using second parcel of land; mortgaged first parcel to respondent bank and sold first parcel of land to a certain Rosafina Reginaldo, who thenmortgaged the land to respondent bank. As the civil case against respondents was ongoing, respondents petitioners to file evidence ex parte. The court decided the civil case in favor of petitioners, declaring the deed of absolute sale null and void but denied the prayer for reconveyance saying that the mother was still the owner of the land. No appeal was entered by respondents and the decision was deemed final. The mortgage on the first parcel of land was foreclosed and the bank being the highest bidder, bought the property who then sold it to respondent spouses Marceliano Cayabyab. The respondent spouses M. Cayabyab then sold the land to respondent spouses Ramos. The petitioners filed a verified complaint for the nullification and cancellation of the deeds of absolute sale of the respondents. They asked also for the possession of the 2 parcels of land due to the alleged donation inter vivos of their mother. The trial court decided in favor of the petitioners, part of the decision included the application of res judicata. Respondents appealed this to the CA contending the misuse of res judicata. CA decided in favor of the respondents. It held that res judicata was inapplicable and also, declared the deeds of absolute sale and TCT’svalid. CA mentioned that it was evident that there was an affidavit withdrawing adverse claims over land, that the sale of parcels of land were not simulated and not done in bad faith, and that there was no evidence for the donation inter vivos being alleged by the petitioners.

ISSUE:Whether or not the decision on the first civil case constitutes a bar to the defenses and claims of respondents in the second case?

HELD:Both the trial court and CA misread the provisions on the effect of judgments or final orders as given by Rules of Civil Procedure: SEC. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders.—The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as follows:(a) In case of a judgment or final order against a specific thing, or in respect to the probate of a will, or the administration of the estate of a deceased person, or in respect to the personal, political, or legal condition or status of a particular person or his relationship to another, the judgment or final order is conclusive upon the title to the thing,the will or administration, or the condition, status or relationship of the person; however, the probate of a will or granting of letters of administration shall only be prima facie evidence of the death of the testator or intestate;(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement to the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity;(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest, that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment or final order which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein or necessarily thereto. Res judicata and the bar of prior judgment is not applicable to this case since the requisites for these two to apply are not present. There is ‘bar by prior judgment’ when, between the first case where the judgment was rendered and the second case which is sought to be barred, there is identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action. The judgment in the first case constitutes an absolute

bar to the subsequent action. It is final as to the claim or demand in controversy, including the parties and those in privity with them, not only as to every matter which was offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but as to any other admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose and of all matters that could have been adjudged in that case. But where between the first and second cases, there is identity of parties but no identity of cause of action, the first judgment is conclusive in the second case, only as to thosematters actually and directly controverted and determined and not as to matters merely involved therein. For res judicata to apply, there must be (1) a former final judgment rendered on the merits; (2) the court must have had jurisdiction over the subject matter and theparties; and, (3) identity of parties, subject matter and cause of actionbetween the first and second actions. According to the appellate court, the third requisite for the application of res judicata is not present in this case. The doctrine that should have been followed in this case is conclusiveness of judgment--a fact or question which was in issue in a former suit and there was judicially passed upon and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusively settled by the judgment therein as far as the parties to that action and persons in privity with them are concerned and cannot be again litigated in any future action between such parties or their privies, in the same court or any other court of concurrent jurisdiction on either the same or different cause ofaction, while the judgment remains unreversed by proper authority. The decision of the trial court, which was final, declaring the deeds of absolute sale null and void, precluded the CA from further adjudicating the validity of the deeds and titles.

ARGEL VS. JUDGE PASCUAAM RTJ-94-1131 AUGUST 20, 2001

Facts:Argel alleged in his complaint that Judge Pascua rendered a decision convicting him of murder notwithstanding the fact that he had already been previously acquitted by Pascua in her Decision. Argel contends that respondent is guilty of gross ignorance of the law and of violation his constitutional right against double jeopardy. Pascua acquitted Argel of murder because she erroneously thought that there was no witness that could have identified the accused. Her mistake was brought about by the fact that the testimony of the eyewitness was not attached to the records at thetime she wrote her decision. After reviewing, she revised her decision finding Argel guilty of murder. Pascua ordered the police to bring Argel to court to inform him of his liabilities arising from the crime. Argel charged Pascua with gross negligence for not exercising extreme caution in the preparation of her decision by making sure that all the transcripts of stenographic notes were attached to the records before writing the decision.Issue: Is a decision once final no longer susceptible to amendment or alteration?

Ruling: Yes.

Ratio:Except to correct errors which are clerical in nature, to clarify any ambiguity caused by an omission or mistake in the dispositive portion, or to rectify a travesty of justice brought about by a moromoro or mock trial, a final decision is the law of the case and is immutable and unalterable regardless of any claim of error or incorrectness. In criminal cases, a judgment of acquittal is immediately final upon its promulgation. It cannot be recalled for correction or amendment except in the cases already mentioned nor withdrawn by another order reconsidering the dismissal of the case since the inherent power of a court to modify its order or decision does not extend to a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case.