PraiseforLEFTOFBANG

InanagewhenAmerica’s technologicaledgehaseroded inmilitarymatters,VanHorneandRileyhavewritten a compelling and detailed outline for continued American adaptation through improved tacticalcunning.Using timeless and proven techniques that can putAmerican troops above and beyond enemycapabilities, the tactical awareness they outline is stripped of mystery and presented in a compellingmanner.Throughouthistorywehaveseenskilledwarriorsdefeatenemieswhoaremorenumerousorlesstrained.At a timewhenwemust adapt to thechangingcharacterof conflict, this is a seriousbookonaseriousissuethatcangiveustheedgeweneed.

—GeneralJamesMattis,USMC,Ret.

LeftofBangoffersacrisplessoninsurvivalinwhichVanHorneandRileyaffirmacompellingtruth:It'sbettertodetectsinisterintentionsearlythanrespondtoviolentactionslate.LeftofBanghelpsreadersavoidthebang.

—GavindeBecker,bestsellingauthorofTheGiftofFear

Rareisthebookthatisimmediatelypracticalandinteresting.LeftofBangaccomplishesthisfromstarttofinish.Thereissomethinghereforeveryoneinthepeoplebusinessandweareallinthepeoplebusiness.

—JoeNavarro,bestsellingauthorofWhatEveryBODYisSaying

LeftofBangisahighlyimportantandinnovativebookthatoffersasubstantialcontributiontoansweringthechallengeofFourthGenerationWar (4GW). In4GW,once“bang”hashappened, thestatehas failedanditslegitimacyisfurthereroded.All“firstresponse”istoolate.Thestate'sfocusmustbeprevention,andLeftofBangsuggestsconcreteways“bang”canbeprevented.

—WilliamS.Lind,authorofManeuverWarfareHandbook

LeftofBangisbornfromthebloodandfirelessonsofMarinesincombat.Thelearningcurveisshortinthefightandfailureoftenmeansdeath.Seeing,recognizing,andactingondangerbeforethehammerfalls iswhatLeftofBangisallabout.Tothatend,PatrickVanHorneandJasonA.Rileyhavesetforthlessonsofhumanabilityandconductinconflict.Theseactionsandconceptsapplytoeachofuswhofightthegoodfight against enemieswho seekour destruction.Whethermilitary, police, or citizendefender, towin thebattlewemustfindawaytointercepttheenemyanddeterhisplans—atoughchallengeagainstanenemywho is often hiding in plain sight.Left ofBang contains answers to detection, deterrence, and ultimatevictory.Thisisawarrior'sbook.Getit,readit,liveit.

—JeffChudwin,ChiefofPoliceRet.,President,IllinoisTacticalOfficersAssociation

Anamazingbook!Applying the lessons learned in the longestwar inAmericanhistory,andbuildingonseminalworkslikeTheGiftofFearandOnCombat, thisbookprovides a frameworkofknowledge thatwill bring military, law enforcement and individual citizens to new levels of survival mindset andperformanceinlife-and-deathsituations.LeftofBangisaninstantclassic.

—Lt.ColonelDaveGrossman,U.S.ArmyRet.,authorofOnCombatandOnKilling

DISCLAIMER

TheviewsexpressedinthisbookarethoseoftheauthorsanddonotreflecttheofficialpolicyorpositionoftheUnitedStatesMarineCorps,Departmentof

Defense,ortheU.S.Government.

BLACKIRISHENTERTAINMENTLLCANSONIASTATIONP.O.BOX237203

NEWYORK,NY10023

COPYRIGHT©2014BYPATRICKVANHORNEANDJASONA.RILEY

BOOKDESIGNBYDERICKTSAI,MAGNUSREXFOREWORDBYSTEVENPRESSFIELD

EDITEDBYSHAWNCOYNE

ALLRIGHTSRESERVED

FIRSTBLACKIRISHENTERTAINMENTPAPERBACKEDITIONJUNE2014

FORINFORMATIONABOUTSPECIALDISCOUNTSORBULKPURCHASES,PLEASEVISITWWW.BLACKIRISHBOOKS.COMOR

WWW.STEVENPRESSFIELD.COM

ISBN:978-1-936891-30-6EBOOK:978-1-936891-18-4

2345678910

WededicatethisbooktotheMarineswhohavelostlifeandlimbfightingfortheirfellowMarinesandforusathome.MaythisincreasefutureMarines’

understandingofhumanbehavior,survivability,andlethalityanddecreasetheenemy’seffectiveness.

TABLEOFCONTENTS

PrefaceStrangersInStrangeLandsParadigmShift—JasonA.RileyIWishIHadThisBefore—PatrickVanHorne

PartOne:TheWarLab1.AMarineCalled“Chaos”2.LeftOfBang3.Cooper’sColorCode4.Re-EngineeringTheToolkit5.TheExperts6.ItWorks7.WhatCombatProfilingIs8.Proactive,NotReactive

PartTwo:EverywhereWeGo,ThereWillBePeople1.TheDilemma2.ParalysisByAnalysis3.InformationOverload4.PerfectDecisionsAren’tPossible5.TheBetterWay6.BiasForAction7.BaselinesAndAnomalies8.HumanUniversals

PartThree:Detail

HeadlineTakenFromNewspapersOnJanuary1,2000:1.TheSixDomains2.TheLanguageOfProfiling3.Kinesics4.Biometrics

5.Proxemics6.Geographics7.Iconography8.Atmospherics

PartFour:TakingAction1.DecidingToAct2.TheCombatRuleOfThree3.TheThreeDecisions

PartFive:Applications1.BringingItAllTogether2.ApplyingProfiling3.EstablishingBaselinesEverywhereYouGo4.IdentifyingKeyLeaders5.StayingLeftOfBang:AttacksFromWithin6.DevelopingYourProfilingAbility

Endnotes

Bibliography

I

FOREWORD

ADAYATCAMPPENDLETON

firstmetCapt.VanHorneandMaj.Riley(hewasacaptainthen)whentheytook me through a one-day mini-version of the Combat Hunter Course at

Camp Pendleton in southern California. After three minutes I thought, “Thisstuffhasgottobemadeavailabletothewiderpublic.”

TheCombatHunterCourseteachesMarineswhattheirconventionaltrainingdoesn’t.Notonlyhowtodealwiththebadguys—buthowtospot theminthefirstplace,particularlywhentheylookandactexactlylikethegoodguys.LeftofBangisnotforcombatwarriorsonly.It’sforyouonthesubway,you

inabadpartof town,youwith thesharks in thecorporateboardroom.It’s foryour wife when she’s home alone, or entering a dark parking structure, orwalkingwiththekidsonvacationoverseas.

“Rightofbang,”asVanHorneandRileyexplaininthesepages,meansafterthebombhasgoneoff,aftertheshotshavebeenfired,afterthedamagehasbeendone.

“Leftofbang”meansbeforethebadstuffhappens.That’swhereyouwanttobe—alert,ready,preparedtorespondtoprotectyourselfandyourlovedones.

I’mproudtobepartof the teamthat isgetting thismaterialout,not just tosoldiersandMarinesintheirtraining,butintothewiderworldthatincludesyourfamilyandmine.

Banghappens.Thisbookwillteachyouhowtostayleftofit.

StevenPressfieldLosAngeles2014

AAKNOWLEDGMENTS

s Malcolm Gladwell skillfully demonstrates in his book Outliers, mostsuccess stories should be understood as a combination of mutually

supportingfactors, twoofwhicharehardworkandopportunity.Wehavebothput hundreds of hours into researching this material, refining and furtherdeveloping course material for the Marine Corps, and training Marines.Although we are nowhere near the ten-thousand hour mark needed to claim“expertise,” our numerous deployments, experience, and research into thesetopicsgiveusauniqueinsightintothetypeofbehavioralanalysiswearewritingabout.Moreimportantforbothofushavebeentheopportunitieswehavebeengiven:tobecomeapartoftheCombatHunterprograminthefirstplace,tobeabletobuildupontheworkandsuccessesofthosewhocamebeforeus,andtobe able to workwith tremendously professional and inspiringMarines withinMobile Training Company. Becausewe are building off of others’ works, wemusttakeafewmomentstogivecredittowhomcreditisdueandtothankthemforwhattheyhavedone.

First,wewishtothanktheMarineswhohavethemselvesspenthundredsofhours training Marines and developing courses: Major Dane Hanson, MajorKeithMontgomery, Major Paul Chase, Gunnery Sergeant Gonzalez, GunnerySergeantTollett,StaffSergeant“Moose”Morris,StaffSergeantHammer,StaffSergeantBaldino,StaffSergeantValdez,StaffSergeantJerew,SergeantArnett,SergeantGuzman, Sergeant Syvrud, SergeantGiles, SergeantGibson, and thenumerous Marines who came before us. We apologize for anyone we’veforgottentoinclude.

Second,wewishtothankthecivilianinstructorswhopassedthebatontous:Greg Williams and his colleagues poured several years into developing theCombat Profiling program and deserve full credit for the genesis of theseconcepts. While we have made these concepts our own, even disagreeing atmanypoints,andhaveadvancedthoughtinnumerousways,theydeservegreatcreditfortheirhardwork.

We alsowish to thank those researchers and scientists whowere generousenoughtosharetheirtimeandexpertisewithusasweconductedourresearch.

WealsowishtothankStevenPressfieldandShawnCoynewhobelievedinusandmadethepublicationofthisbookpossible.WewouldalsoliketothankLisa

andAngieforreadingeveryword,listeningtoeveryrehearsal,andsupportinguseverystepoftheway.Withoutyou,thisbookwouldneverhavebeenfinished.Wefullyacknowledgethatwithouttheseindividualsthisworkwouldnotexist.

Finally, we humbly thank the thousands of Marines who have deployedabroad, andwho are currently deployed, ensuring the peace and freedomswetakeforgrantedeveryday.

I

PREFACE

STRANGERSINSTRANGELANDS

magineyouareaU.S.Marineorsoldierpatrollingthecrowdedmarketplaceofahostileenemyvillage.Youareseparatedfromthenearestsquadmember

byaboutninetyfeet,thedistancebetweenhomeplateandfirstbaseataMajorLeague ballpark. You are easily identifiable by your tan uniform, flak jacket,weapon,radio,andothergear.

The enemy is unidentifiable. The enemy could be anybody. Themarket iscrowded.Peoplearepushingandshoving.Somearebumpingintootherpeopletoavoidyou.Othersdon’tmoveoutofyourwayuntilyouinvadetheirpersonalspace.Others,notpayingattention,bumpintoyou.

Duringyourpre-deploymenttraining,youweretoldtolookoutformilitary-age males when patrolling an urban area. But what does that mean? You’veheardreportsof ten-year-oldchildrenproficientlyfiringweapons.You’vebeentold that the natives have been fighting for centuries and that some of thetoughestwarriorsinthevillageareoldmen,elders,andwarlords.So,military-agemalesincludeeverymanandboyinthevillage.Youhavealsoheardreportsoffemalesuicidebombersblowingthemselvesupinthemidstofapatrol.Howdoyoudeterminewhoisthethreat?

Onthebestday,yourpatrolmovesthroughthevillagewithoutincident.Onagoodday,youobserveaweaponorsuicidevest,andyouareabletoreactbeforetheinsurgentfiresatyouoryourcomradesorblowshimselfup.Onabadday,theenemyistooquickortoocloseforyoutodoanythingatall.

Allofyourtrainingstatesidefocusedonwhattodooncesomethinghappens:A bullet is fired in your direction, an improvised explosive device (IED)explodes,oramortarroundimpactsnearby.Youcan’thelpbutwonderhowyoucouldgetajumponthebadguy—beforethebang.Howcanyoudiscernthosewhowant toharmyoufromthosewhoarejustafraidor justgoingabout theirbusinessbefore theattack?Howcanyoudefusea threatbefore it happens? Isthatevenpossible?

TheCombatHunterprogramhasprovenagainandagainthatitis.

Marinesandothermembersof theArmedForces, lawenforcementofficersand other security personnel, and even the average person cannot wait fordangerouspeopletodobadthingstothem.Norarecontemporaryenvironmentsofperilconfinedtoforeignlands.ThestreetsofLosAngeles,likethealleysofKandahar,arecomplexandchaoticenvironmentsinwhichitisnotalwayseasytotellthegoodguysfromthebadguys.

Themilitary,lawenforcement,securitypersonnel,andevencivilianscanusethe principles of Combat Hunter to identify the three types of people in anypublicarena—the“shepherds”(goodguys),“sheep”(regularguys),and“wolvesinsheep’sclothing”(badguys).

It’snotmagic.It’s basedon theuniversal patterns of humanbehavior.Nomatter the race,

religion,nationality,sex,orage,peopleshareacommonphysicallanguagethatcanbelearnedandinterpretedbyanyone.TheCombatHunterprogramteachesustodothat.

ParadigmShift—JasonA.Riley

I first learned about theCombatHunter program after I had already deployedthreetimes.Thephrasecommonlyusedtodescribethechangeinmindsetafteraperson completes a Combat Hunter course is “paradigmatic shift.” After thecourse,youperceivetheworlddifferently.Younolongersimplyseefootprintsin theground,butevidenceofhumanactivity.Asetof footprintsbecomes thebeginningofatrackline.BeforeCombatHunter,Iwasonlypartiallyawareofthemeaningofhumanbehavior.Likemostpeople,Ihadcertainintuitionsaboutsituationsandotherpeople,butIcouldn’tarticulatethem.AfterCombatHunter,IhadalanguagetodescribethephenomenaIwitnessedandunderstoodhumanbehaviorentirelydifferently.Nevertheless,IwasdisappointedthatIcouldreflecton three deployments and identify numerous times in which Combat Huntercould have aidedmyMarines’ andmy ability to identify insurgents and IEDsandmoreeffectivelyconductcounterinsurgencyoperations.

I am a suspicious person. By that, I mean that I am usually suspicious ofanything new and popular, and Iwas immediately suspicious of this program.CombatHunterwasn’ttheusualtacticalcourse.Iwasn’tabeliever,initially.

What is also a stumbling block formany people is that, once a person haslearned about combat tracking and combat profiling, it doesn’t seemcomplicated. It seems obvious. Of course, footprints have outlines, edges,shapes,etc.Of course, aperson steppingon rockswill displace themor leavemud on the rocks. Of course, someone will act differently if they feeluncomfortable.Anyfoolcantellyouthat.Butthisislikesaying,“Ofcourse,theearthrevolvesaroundthesun.”CombatHunter is likeaCopernicanrevolutionof themind. It seems obvious afterwards but is rarely realized on one’s own.Another problem is that most people can’t articulate what they see, and theycan’t say anything about themeaning of other people’s actions. They usuallydon’t do anything about other people’s behavior. What Combat Hunter andespecially combat profiling does is instill a mindset of proactiveness in anindividual—withthetangibleskillsofobservation,tracking,andprofiling.

We’ve trained numerous people from outside of the military. When lawenforcement agents go through our course, especially senior agents, they areconsistentlyamazed that theywerenever taught these thingsbefore.Naturally,mostofthesenioragentstacitlyknowthisstuff.Theyhaveyearsofpracticeofobservinghumanbehaviorand,ifpressed,couldprobablyarticulatemostofthisstuff inonewayoranother.However, theseagentsalso say thatwhatCombat

Hunter,especiallycombatprofiling,providesisalifetime’sworthofexperienceinafewweeks.ItgivesMarinesandlawenforcementagentsexplicitknowledgethatwouldhavetakenyearstolearnonthejob.

Now that I’ve been trained in the skills, have developed courses, and havetrainedotherpeople,Ibelievethatanyonewhoisconcernedfortheirsafetyandthesafetyofotherswoulddowelltolearnwhatweteach.

IWishIHadThisBefore—PatrickVanHorne

IwasfirstexposedtoCombatHunteraftertwicedeployingtoIraqandspendinganotheryearpreparingacompany for itsyearlongdeployment toAfghanistan.AsIsatthroughthatfirstclass,Icouldn’tstopmyselffromgettingangrierandangrieraseachclassbuiltuponthelast.WhenitcametopreparingMarinestoidentify an enemy hiding amongst a civilian population, the material taughtduringthatfirst,two-weekCombatHuntercoursemadeitoneofthebestIhadseen.Theinstructorswerediscussingtopicsandrestructuringhowwelookedatthe world, and I was mad that my units didn’t get to learn this before wedeployed.The coursewould have had a huge impact on thewaywe operatedoverseas, thewaywepatrolled, and thewaywe talked to localvillagers.Thishadtochange.

Spendingthenexttwoyearsleadingamobiletrainingteam,Ibegantoseetheunderlying problem. It was one of exposure and distribution. We were onlyteachingabout40Marinesinabattalionofnearlyathousandbuttherewasnowaywecouldeverget this toeveryMarineheadingdownrangebecauseit justisn’tpossibletoprovideclassroominstructiontoeveryone.Thecourseprovidedskills that might bring more Marines back alive from deployment, yet thereweren’tenoughinstructorsortimetoteacheveryone.Thishadtochange.

Thisbook,ourwebsite,*andnowmycompanyexisttofixthatveryproblem.NoMarineorsoldiershouldhavetodeploywithoutfirstlearninghowtofindtheenemy before he begins his attack.No police officer or security guard shouldhave to go on patrol without knowing how to identify a criminal before hecommitshiscrime.Nopersonshouldhavetowaituntiltheyseeaguntoknowthatthereisthreatpresent.

Gettingleftofbangrequirestwothings.Thefirstisamindsetandmentalityto actively search your area for people that don’t fit in. The second is theknowledge toknowwhatcausessomeone tostandout from thecrowd. Ihopethat thisbookand thewebpages thataccompany thesepageshelpprovideyou

withwhatyouneedtodoboth.

PARTONE

THEWARLAB

I1.AMARINECALLED“CHAOS”

n July 2006, at the height of the Iraqi insurgency,American service peoplewerebeingkilledandmaimedinunprecedentednumbers.Inasinglemonth,

1,666IEDsweredetonated,andanother959werefoundwaitingtoexplode.1InSeptember 2006 alone, 776 Americans were wounded. In the first week ofOctober, 300 more were hit.2 In the lexicon of after-action analysis, thesewarriorswere“rightofbang.”Theywerereactive,andtheenemytriggeredhisexplosivedevicesbeforeourtroopswereawareofthedanger.

ToprovideperspectiveconcerningthedestructivenatureofanIED,considerthe Bradley Fighting Vehicle. The Bradley is armored and heavily armed,designed to transport andprovide suppressive fire fordismounted troops inanattack. Itsmainweapon is a 25mm cannon,which fires up to 200 rounds perminute (three to fourbulletsper second)at amaximumeffective rangeofoneandhalfmiles.TheBradleyalsoweighsapproximately22tons.TheBradleyisaferociously powerful vehicle capable of bringing significant destructive forceupontheenemy.

ButeventheBradleyisnomatchforanIED.In2004,afteraBradleystruckanIEDinIraq,itsarmoredbottomplatewasfoundmorethan60feetfromthesiteoftheexplosion.3Onesimple,yetpowerful IEDcandestroya$3,200,000machineinseconds.ThedestructiveforceisevengreaterwhenIEDsarestrungtogetherinwhatarecalled“daisychains”orarecombinedwithcomplex,direct-fire ambushes. If these statistics about IEDs are not startling enough, otherintelligenceestimatesindicatedthattheinsurgentswereactivelyhuntingsoldiersonpatrol.4

Beginningin2005,severalvideoswerereleasedbyaninsurgentgroupcalledtheIslamicArmyinIraqthatdepictedanenemysniperkillingAmericansoldiersand Marines. This individual became known as the “Juba Sniper,” and it isunknownhowmanysoldiersandMarineshewoundedbeforehiscapture.Thefigures are certainly in the double digits, perhaps even the triple digits. Theeffectofthevideosandthetargetingoftroopsonpatrolwasunnerving.ThelonghoursoffootandvehiclepatrolsandstandingguardmadeMarinesandsoldiersfatigued and complacent. The set patterns made their targeting easy. It wasobvious to the troops on the ground that stateside training was inadequate infinding the sniper andothers likehimhiding inplain sight.The IEDsand thetargeting ofAmerican forces by Iraqi insurgent snipers gravely threatened theentireU.S.wareffort.Somethinghadtobedone.

Thefirstresponsefromthemilitaryestablishmentwastoincreaseproductionandemploymentofbetterbodyarmorandheavierarmoredvehicles.Thesestepshelped,buttheyalsomadeU.S.Marinesandsoldiersclumsier,slowerandmoreobvious targets thanbefore. Itwas a losingbattle because the largerwemadevehicles and the thicker we made armor, the larger and more deadly theinsurgents made the IEDs. Although the addition of armor and othertechnologieshelpedprotecttroopsfromIEDs,wewereonlytreatingsymptoms,notthecause.

MarineGeneralJamesMattis,callsign“Chaos,”hadadifferent idea.Mattiswas theCommanderof theFirstMarineExpeditionaryForce,commandingallMarines in Iraq. While Mattis believed in the importance of integrating thetechnology, he also saw the limitations of what was then available. Thetechnology,atthetime,mostlyprovidedadefensivecapability,andhewantedtogo on the offense.Hewanted to take away the enemy’s options ofwhen andwheretheIEDcouldbedetonated.TomakeMarinesmoretacticallycunningonthebattlefiled,hebelievedincreatingnotonlybettertechnologybutalsobettertraining.InFall2006,herequestedthattheMarineCorpsdevelopaprogramtoinstill ahunter-likemindset inMarines, trainMarines for increased situationalawareness,proactivelyseek threats,andhaveabias foraction.5MattiswantedMarinestobethepredators,nottheprey.

Thisdirectivefrom“Chaos”wasthegenesisoftheCombatHunterprogram.

2.LEFTOFBANGTheMarineCorpsWar-FightingLabwenttoworkinearly2007withthetaskofcreating a program that gave Marines the ability to realize an attack wasimminent.Thepreparation for an attack leaves behind cues a trainedobservercan pick up on to provide an early warning. TrainingMarines tomake thoseobservations was one of the goals of the program. In the lexicon of CombatHunter,thepurposewastogetMarines“leftofbang.”

Ifyouweretothinkaboutanattackonatimeline,bangisinthemiddle.Bang

istheact.BangistheIEDexplosion,thesnipertakingashot,orthebeginningofanambush.Bangiswhatwewanttoprevent.Beingleftofbangmeansthatapersonhasobservedoneof thepre-event indicators,oneof thewarning signs,thatmustoccurearlieronthetimelineforthebangtohappen.InanIEDattack,aninsurgentwouldhavetoobservetheMarineunitinthearea,identifythattheyuse the same road on their patrols, determine where on that road theywouldplacetheIED,acquirethematerials,buildthebomb,digthehole,puttheIEDinthehole,connectthetrigger,andwatchtoseeiftheattackwassuccessful.Beingleft of bang means that we can identify the people doing the surveillance oremplacing the IED and prevent an attack from happening by stopping theprocess there.Being leftofbangmeansnot letting the insurgentcarry throughwiththeplantokillAmericantroops.

Beingontheotherendofthetimelineisreferredtoasbeing“rightofbang.”Most of the training that military operators and law enforcement personnelreceive is reactive.They learn skills and techniques that relyon someone elsetakingtheinitiative,whichmeanswaitingfortheenemyorcriminaltoactfirst.Unfortunately, whoever strikes first possesses a powerful tactical advantage.Whenapersonisrightofbang, theyarereactingto theactionthat tookplace.After the IEDdetonates, then theMarinesestablish securityon that site.Afterthe IED detonates, then the Marines treat their casualties. After the IEDdetonates, then the unit returns fire on the enemy. Whenever a person isoperatingrightofbang, itmeans that theenemyhas the initiativeandcontrolsthesituation.

Butoperatingleftofbangrequires intenseconcentrationto identifythepre-event indicators and gain an advanced warning about the enemy’s intentions.These indicators, however, are not always easy to discern. If the first time aMarinerealizesathreatispresentiswhenheseesanAK-47assaultrifleaimedin his direction, he has already lost the initiative and is now reacting to theenemy.Gettingleftofbangrequiresthathecanmakeinformedobservationsandbuildanenhancedawarenessofhissurroundings.

3.COOPER’SCOLORCODEInFebruary2013,NewOrleanspoliceofficerJohnPassarorespondedtoareportofarobberyatalocalDollarGeneralstore.6Itwasabout7a.m.Theinformationgivenbythedispatcherwasvague.Goingintothesituation,OfficerPassarowasunsure if the store or an individual had been robbed. He was unsure if theassailantwasstillat thesceneor ifhehadfled.Hedidnotknowif therobberwasarmed.WhenOfficerPassaroarrivedatthescene,hedidnotseeanyonein

thestore.Backupwasontheway,butPassarodecidedtoenterthestoreonhisownanyway.Ashemadehiswaythroughthestore,henoticedthedoortothemanager’sofficewasclosed.Heapproachedthedoorandannouncedthathewasapoliceofficer. Immediately, therobberopenedthedoorandfiredonPassaro,hitting him twice and leaving him in critical condition. The shooter fled.Thankfully,backuparrivedwithinsecondsofOfficerPassarobeingshot,andhislifewassaved.

Rightnow, there is insufficient information toknowexactlywhatPassaro’sactions were at the scene. It is unknown if he had drawn his gun. Initialinterviewsand reportsof the incidenthaveplaced someblameon theunclear,ambiguousinformationgiventheofficer.Capt.MichaelGlasser,presidentofthePoliceAssociationofNewOrleans,stated,“Hadtherebeenanyindicatoritwasin progress, I’m sure he would’ve acted differently.” There is certainly sometruthtothis.BetterinformationdefinitelywouldhaveinfluencedOfficerPassarototakedifferentactions.Ifhehadknownthattherobberywasstillinprogress,hemost likelywould havewaited for backup.RaymondBurkart III, a lawyerandspokesmanforthelocalFraternalOrderofPolicelodge,wasadamantthat,“Theway… communications relayed it to (Passaro), the officer did not haveaccurate information tomake the proper decision.” This is probably true, butcertainlynottheonlyreasoneventsunfoldedastheydid.

Inanalyzing this situation through the lensofcombatprofiling,wewant toraise the issueofawareness. Innowaydowewant toportrayOfficerPassarobadly,andwecertainlydonothaveenoughinformationtocriticizehisactions.RegardlessofwhatOfficerPassarodidordidnotdo,he isnotat fault forhisshooting.Noonehastherighttofireonalawenforcementagent,andtheonlyone guilty in this situation is the perpetrator.Nevertheless, it is appropriate todiscuss the situation to learn from it. The situation could be viewed frommultipleperspectives.Tactically,perhapsOfficerPassarocouldhavepositionedhimselfbetter(atanobliqueanglefromthedoor)orensuredhehadcoverbeforeannouncinghimself.

Our focus is the psychological perspective. What was Officer Passaro’sawarenessatthescene?Washeofthemindsettorespondwithlethalforce,evenifhedidn’thavepositive information that the robberywasstill inprogress,orwasheunpreparedandunreadytotakelethalaction?

Fromtheperspectiveofcombatprofiling,abasicmentalpreparednesstotakelethal actionmaybe thedifferencebetween life anddeath.RetiredMarineLt.Col.JeffCooperdevelopedasystemofawarenesshecalledhisColorCodethatdescribed the psychological conditions a person could have during any given

situation. Cooper’s Color Code possesses four levels of awareness: White,Yellow,Orange,andRed.

ConditionWhitemeansbeingunpreparedandunreadytotakelethalaction.Apersonwhois inConditionWhite is ina lowstateofpsychologicalawarenessandphysiologicalarousal—ifattacked,thispersonwilllikelybethevictim.Thispersonbelieveshisorherpersonalsafetyisnotinjeopardyandhaschosennotto actively assess the surroundings for potential threats. Should a threat arisebecause of a lack of awareness, that personwould be completely unprepared,forcingthemtobereactive.

ConditionYellowmeansthatthepersonunderstandsthathisorherlifeisindangerandisthereforepsychologicallypreparedtodosomethingaboutit.Thispersonisactivelysearchingthesurroundingstofindathreatbecauseheorsheisinamoderatelevelofpsychologicalawarenessandphysiologicalarousal.Onceapersonhasrecognizedathreat,theyhaveescalatedtoConditionOrange.

ConditionOrange is themindset inwhichaperson is focusedona specificthreatandispreparedtotakeactionagainstthatthreat.Thispersonisactuallyina lower state of psychological awareness than in Condition Yellow but in ahigherstateofphysiologicalarousal.Thispersonhasbeguncreatingaplanforhowtodealwiththethreat.ThedegreeofawarenessaMarinehashereis lessthanthatofConditionYellowbecausetheperson’sattentionisnowfocusedonaspecificthreat.

Condition Red is labeled the “lethal mode”—it is the psychologicalwillingnesstokill ifcircumstanceswarrantthataction.ConditionRedincludesbeing“in thefight”andexecuting theplanscreated inConditionOrange.Thisperson is in a much lower state of awareness due to being focused on onespecific threatandhasaveryhighdegreeofphysiologicalarousal.Becauseofthe inherent risk of engagement in a fight, the person’s awareness of thesurroundings is further reduced as his or her mental capacity is focused onpersonal challenges to survival. Based on research by retired Lt. Col. DavidGrossman and others, theMarine Corps has adapted Cooper’s Color Code todescribephysiologicalarousalandawarenesslevels.

IntheMarineCorps’system,anothercolorconditionexists:ConditionBlack.ConditionBlack ischaracterizedbywhenaperson’sheart rate reachesapointthatiscounterproductive(above175beatsperminute)andthatpersonbeginstoloseawarenessofthesurroundings.ApersoninConditionBlackcannolongercognitivelyprocessinformationandmaycompletelyshutdown.7

The normal psychological state of anyone concerned about personal safetymust be Condition Yellow. This means being aware of one’s surroundings,

looking for potential threats, and being alert, nomatter the situation. Combatprofiling rests on the assumption that being proactive, being left of bang,requirescontinuousawarenessandalertness.Itrequiresthatthecombatprofileralwaysbepsychologicallypreparedtotakeaction.Fromthisperspective,OfficerPassaro’ssituationcanbeevaluateddifferently.Althoughhemaynothavehadaccurateinformationaboutthecrimeinprogress,thatshouldnothavematteredto him. Any police officer responding to a scene should be psychologicallyprepared to use deadly force, if necessary. Regardless of whether one knowsdanger is present, one should be ready to take action and be looking forindicatorsofathreat.

In the aftermath of the shooting, Capt. Michael Glasser, the PoliceAssociation of New Orleans president said, “You anticipate that back-up iscoming, and you anticipate that this is probably going to be like all the othercalls.”Fromtheperspectiveofcombatprofilingthisistheoppositeofwhatwewantpeopletothink.Youshouldneveranticipate“thisisprobablygoingtobelike all the other calls.” Marines, police officers, and anyone who wants tosurvive an attack must never be caught off guard. Every situation must beconsidered potentially dangerous, and you must be constantly ready to takeactionifathreatemerges.

4.RE-ENGINEERINGTHETOOLKITMarines, soldiers, police officers, and basically anyone who operates in acomplexandpotentiallyhostileenvironmentmustmake toughdecisionsundersevereduress,usuallywithlittletimeandinformation.

Notonlymust theMarineidentifytheenemy,buthealsomustconsiderthevarious rulesof engagement* and escalationof force**measures—and ensurehe has positive identification (PID) on the enemy before returning fire.Whatmanydonotunderstandisthat,thoughthesemeasuresaresupposedtofacilitatedecisions, to the rifleman on patrol, these measures seem constraining,hindering,andoverburdening.TheaverageMarine’sheadspinswhentryingtoconsiderallofthesefactorswhilesimultaneouslykeepinghimselfandhisfellowMarinesalive.

Since the invasion into Afghanistan in 2001, Marines have been put intocountlessbadsituations,andwhilesomehavemadelessthanidealdecisionsthathavegottenagreatdealofattentioninthemedia,thevastmajorityofMarineshavemadegreatdecisionsandhaveshownincredibleinsight,sharpnessofmind,unerringintuition,andtheabilitytoexamineasituationandknowexactlywhatto do. Here’s the problem: It’s all chance. There’s no way to tell from one

Marine to the next who will have the keenness of intellect to make gooddecisionsonthebattlefieldandwhowillfail.Currently,it’snotentirelybasedonthetrainingtheyreceive.AMarine’sabilitytomakedecisionsismostlyduetohisorher lifeandexperiences.TheMarinecannotcontrolmuchof this.SomeMarinescanquicklyidentifycertainpatternsinAfghanistanbecausetheyhave,for instance,experiences stayingsafe indangerousareasofNewYorkorL.A.They havewhatwe call “thick file folders,” a significant amount of relatableexperiences they can quickly access in similar situations abroad. But certainMarineshavingtheseexperiencesissimplycoincidental—theyjusthappenedtohavegrownupinadangerousenvironment.OtherMarinesaren’tsoluckyanddo not have the experiences needed to make the same decisions driven byintuition.

Intuitionisapowerfulforce;however,itispoorlyunderstood.Intuitionisnotblackmagicorsomeinexplicableforceofnature.Intuitionisnothingmorethana person’s sense about a situation influenced by experience and knowledge.Intuition is the way the mind picks up on patterns and uses experiential andlearnedknowledgetoguideapersonduringagivensituation.However,intuitionis often driven by the subconscious. It’s rightly called a “gut feeling,” sincepeoplecanliterallyhaveaphysicalresponsewhentheir intuitiontries tomakethemawareofsomethingtheydonotconsciouslyknow.

SomeofthemoresignificantstudiesregardingintuitionhavebeenconductedbyGaryKlein,whodevelopedthe ideaofrecognition-primeddecision-making(RPD).RPDdescribeshowpeoplewithexpertiseintuitivelyidentifyapatterninasituationandquicklydetermineacourseofresponses,withoutanyanalysisorcomparingdifferent courses of action.These intuitivedecisions are veryoftenright—buttheyare“goodenough”solutions,notperfectsolutions.Kleinandhisfellowresearchersconductedstudieswithpilots,nurses,military leaders,chessmasters,firefighters,andotherexpertsinvariousfieldsanddeterminedthat, inmostcases, theseexpertsdidnotdeliberatewhen reacting toa situation—theyjust acted. The type of intuitive decision-making that Klein describes is bestdoneinthetypesofsituationsthataretimeconstrained,highstakes,uncertain,andconstantlychanging.Soundfamiliar?ThesearetheexacttypesofsituationsthatMarines,policeofficers,andothersecuritypersonnelexperiencedaily.Oneof the key aspects of RPD is pattern recognition: “The basic aspect ofrecognitional decision-making is that people with experience can size up asituation and judge it as familiar or typical.”8 These individuals do it quickly:Fire-ground commanders make 80 percent of their decisions in less than oneminute,medicsmaketraumatreatmentdecisionsinseconds,chessmastersplay

moves in less than six seconds.9Consequently, thosewith experiencegrowingupintough,do-or-dieneighborhoodsoftenhavegreatintuitionaboutplaceslikedowntownBaghdadorKabul.

Most Marines do not have sufficiently significant life experience to makedecisionslikeexperts.Theydon’thavetheknowledgeandexperiencebasefortheir intuition to be completely reliable.However, by constantly being aware,Marinescanproactivelytakeactionbeforegettingcaughtrightofbang.ThisiswhyCooper’sColorCode is so important. Cooper’sColorCode allows us toquantifyaMarine’sstateofmindandgivesusatargetofawarenesstoaimfor.Unfortunately,mostsituationsdon’tleadMarinesintoConditionYellow,rathertheypushMarinesdirectly intoConditionRed,andsometimesevenConditionBlack.

We need to be in the Yellow state of mind, left of bang, to avoid thepossibilityofdeterioration into theBlackstate if andwhen there is a right-of-bang event. The Marine Corps war lab endeavored to detail the qualities aMarine would need to reach andmaintain a Yellow state of awareness. TheywantedtodeterminehowaMarineonpatrolcouldtakeontheoffensivemindsetofahunterinsteadofthedefensivemindsetofprey.

5.THEEXPERTSThroughout 2007, the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory leveraged theexperience of many civilian and military experts to design and structure thecourse thatwould becomeCombatHunter.Theprogramwasdesigned to takethebestandmostbasicskillsofobservation,hunting,andurbanknow-howandcombinethemtoincreaseMarines’abilitiestoproactivelyidentifythreatsonthebattlefield. Three specific skills were identified and focused upon: enhancedobservation, combat tracking, and combat profiling. Ultimately, the MarineCorps Warfighting Laboratory chose three experts to lead the development,expansion,andinitialinstructionofeachofthesespecialties,thethreepillarsofCombatHunter.

Ivan Carter, a big-game hunter from Africa, developed the observationportionofCombatHunter.Herecognizedthefoundationofeveryhunteristheability to see his prey. He influenced the development of classes to teacheffectiveobservationtechniquesandhowtobetterusebothdayandnightoptics.

DavidScottDonelan, a formerRhodesian special forces operator, designedthecombattrackingportionofCombatHunter.CombattrackingteachesMarineshow to read and understand the physical terrain and identify the physical

1.

2.3.4.

evidence individuals leavebehind as theymove through an environment.ThisskillallowsMarines topursueanarmedenemywhilegathering information todeterminetheirfutureactionsandintent.

Greg Williams, a former law enforcement officer, designed the combatprofiling pillar of Combat Hunter. While combat tracking is focused on thephysical terrain, profiling teaches Marines how to read the human terrainthroughanincreasedunderstandingofhumanbehavior.ThisallowsMarinestorecognizethesubtleaspectsofhumanbehaviortofindtheenemyhidinginplainclothes.

The integration of these three skills and concepts into military operations,whetherinaninsurgencyorinafull-scalewar,createsamoreintelligentwarriorcapableofoutthinkingandoutmaneuveringanenemywhoseekstoblendinwithhisenvironment.ThegoalofCombatHunteristoteachMarineshowtoseparatethe “sheep” (the unarmed civilians that populate the battlefield) from the“wolvesinsheep’sclothing”(theenemy).Inawarinwhichourenemiesdonotwear uniforms and blend inwith and exploit the local populace, the effort tolocate and isolate the enemycanbe challenging.CombatHunter aims to trainMarinestofacethisproblemheadon.*

6.ITWORKSThe Marine Corps’ Combat Hunter course has trained thousands of Marinessinceitsinceptionin2007andcontinuestoprovideMarineswiththeskillsandthemindsettosurviveinthecomplex,chaoticenvironmentsofAfghanistan.ThecourseistaughtinvariousplacesandschoolsthroughouttheMarineCorps,butmainlytheprogramhasbeengearedtowardtrainingMarinesbeforedeployment.Through the hard work and dedication of the program’s enlisted and officerinstructors,CombatHunterhasmadeaninvaluableimpactontheMarineCorps.Whathavetheinstructorsandstudentsallcometorealize?

ItWorks.Since the first Combat Hunter course was conducted in the fall of 2007,

deployingforceshaveprovidedincrediblypositivefeedback.Fourcommentsaretypical:

“This is the best training I’ve received in my entire Marine Corpscareer.”“Iwishthiscoursewaslonger.”“EveryMarineshouldreceivethistraining,”and“IwishIhadhadthistrainingbeforeIlastdeployed.”

Marines have eagerly reported that the increased awareness of both thephysical and human terrain has alerted them to threats and has given themadditionaltimetorecognizethesituationandtakeactionagainsttheenemy.Asinstructors, this is positive and encouraging; however, the second reality ishumblingandfillsuswithremorse.

Marines often tell us that thematerial they learned during Combat Huntercouldhavehelpedthemwhentheywereincombat.Often,studentsrememberingspecific events reflect on a fallen brother-or sister-in-arms that might still bealive if theyhadreceivedthis trainingsooner.Unfortunately,noteveryMarinereceivesthistraining.Thisbookoncombatprofilingandourtrainingwebsitearedesigned to supplement theCombatHunterprogramandcorrect that problem.EveryMarineandsoldiershouldhavethistrainingbeforetheydeployandmustfaceanarmedenemy.

The concept ofCombatHunter is aworking hypothesis, not an establishedscience.However,wehave seen this conceptwork inpractice and continuallyreceive feedback from Marines deployed about the effectiveness of what weteach. The program works. It has made Marines more aware of theirsurroundings,moresurvivable,andmorelethalonthebattlefield.

CombatHunter,andspecificallycombatprofiling,isnotsolelyforMarines.Theseconceptsandlessonsrelatetoeverypersonwhohasdedicatedhisorherlifetoprotectingothers—soldiers,sailors,airmen,policeofficers,othersecuritypersonnel,oreventhosewhosimplywanttoremainsafeastheygoabouttheirdaily lives.Whetheryouandyour familyareonvacationoverseasorwhetheryou are a woman who finds yourself alone in a dangerous environment,understandingwhenyouoryour lovedonesare inpotentialdangercanbe thedifference between life or death. Combat profiling is universal and applicableanywhereintheworld.

7.WHATCOMBATPROFILINGISThis book is focused on theCombatHunter’s third pillar, combat profiling, amethod of proactively identifying threats based on human behavior and othercues from one’s surroundings. Combat profiling is a practice based on aproactive mindset that incorporates many specific skills. Four of these aresituational awareness, sensitivity of baselines and anomalies, critical thinking,anddecision-making.

Combat profiling allows theMarine, soldier, or law enforcement officer toproactively identify threatsbasedonhumanbehavior.Todo this, thatoperator

mustfirstbeactivelyawareofhisorhersurroundings.Thefirstskillthismethodprovides is the ability to quickly develop situational awareness. To havesituational awareness, youmust be able to read both the environment and thepeoplearoundyou.However,youmustalsobeabletoseparateimportantfromunimportant information. Not everything you see is relevant for identifyingthreats.

The second skill in combat profiling is the ability to determine whatindicators are important and directly related to your safety. Thismeans beingable topickuponbothovertandsubtlecuesof thephysicalenvironmentandpeople’s behavior. We will discuss human behavior further below and willprovidedetaileddiscussionsofhumanbehaviorinthefollowingchapters,butfornow,itissufficienttosaythatpeople’sbehaviorbetraystheirintentions.Bythis,wemeanthatyoucanreadsubtlecuesinaperson’sbehaviortodetermineandpredict what they will do. Combat profiling gives you both an in-depthunderstanding of human behavior and the skills to read human behavior andpredict people’s intentions. We will tell you what indicators to look for toidentifythreats,threateningbehavior,andthreateningenvironments.

The third skill that combat profiling teaches is critical thinking. We aresurroundedbyinformation,ambiguity,andvariousfactorsindifferentsituations.No two situations are exactly alike.Therefore,we teach you how to criticallyassess the information you collect and how to weed out the unimportantinformationandfocusontheimportant.

Finally,thefourthskillthismethodteachesistheabilitytomakesoundsnapdecisions,or“heuristics.”Heuristicsarewaysofmakingadecisionwithlimitedtimeandinformation.Whetheryouareinthemilitaryorlawenforcement,youwill never have all the time or information you need to make the perfectdecision. So you must make the best decision with what you have.Unfortunately, few people are ever taught how tomake a decision. Decision-makingiseithersomethingyouareassumedtohavelearnedthroughoutlifeorare taught as a lengthy, deliberate process. Neither of these options helps theoperatoronpatrol.Soweteachyouhowtomakeanaccuratedecisionquicklybasedonafewpiecesofrelevantinformation.

8.PROACTIVE,NOTREACTIVECombat profiling is, first and foremost, not racial profiling.When identifyingthreats,onedoesnotfocusonrace,religion,orethnicity,butonbehaviorwithina given situation. In fact, someonewho only focuses on surface, broad-baseddifferencesbetweenhumans is playing right into thehandsof the enemy.The

enemyhasexploitedthoseprejudicesextremelyeffectively.Unfortunately, since 2001, most Americans, including military and law

enforcementpersonnel,havefallenvictimtoIslamophobia.Weconstantlylookfor people who look like “terrorists.” By this, we implicitly mean young tomiddle-aged,Middle-Eastern,Muslimmales. There are several problemswiththis.First,onlyasmallpercentageofMuslimsareextremists,andonlyasmallpercentage of those individuals conduct violent acts. Second, criminals andterroristscomeinallshapes,sizes,andagesandfromallraces,ethnicities,andreligions. They can be either male or female. The United States has sufferedenoughfromhomegrownterroristslikeTimothyMcVeighthatweshouldknownot to assume a person is a terrorist because of appearance.Third, aswewilldiscuss later regarding decision-making, by focusing on indeterminate factorssuchasraceorethnicity,wemissoutonimportantbehavioralindicatorsthatarenecessary in identifying threats. Additionally, when we allow our false,preconceived notions and biases to give us tunnel vision, we do not see thedangerousindividualswhodonotfitour“racialprofile.”

Combatprofilingisalsonotcriminal,psychological,orpersonalityprofiling.Thesetypesofprofilinghavespecificpurposesandarevalidandusefulwithintheappropriatecontexts.Acriminalprofile is“acollectionof inferencesaboutthe qualities of the person responsible for committing a crime or a series ofcrimes.”10Thatis,criminalprofilingisawayof“inferringthecharacteristicsofan offender from the way that offender acted when committing the crime.”11Criminalprofilinganalyzestheevidenceandpatternsofaparticularperpetratortoinfercertainpersonalitycharacteristicstoassistinsolvingcrimes.Thistypeofprofiling is synonymous with what the FBI terms “criminal investigativeanalysis.”12 Although combat profiling shares several qualities with criminalprofiling—like inference, critical thinking, analyzing patterns, and consideringan individual’s or group’s modus operandi (MO)—the two methods differsignificantlyintheirapplications.

The first, and primary, difference between criminal profiling and combatprofiling is that criminal profiling is reactive, while combat profiling isproactive. Since we are not yet at the point of precognitively seeing futurecrimes like in the movieMinority Report, criminal profiling requires that anindividual commit a crime or a series of crimes to develop a profile of theperpetrator.Additionally,criminalprofilingisanon-real-time,behind-the-scenestypeofanalysis.Unlessspecificevidenceisavailable,criminalprofilingcannotpredict the time, location, and target of the next crime. Conversely, combatprofiling is an on-the-spot method of proactively identifying and predicting a

threat. It is usedby individualswherever they are, in real-time.While combatprofilingdoesuseinformationgainedfrompreviousattacksorcrimes,similartocriminalprofiling, thefocusofcombatprofiling is tobeproactiveandpreventtheeventfromeveroccurring.

Now that we have a very broad understanding of what Combat Hunter is(proactive, behavior-based data collection and analysis) and isn’t (prejudicial,socially imposedcategorizationwithnoanalysisbeyondblackorwhite),whataretheskillsMarineslearnincombatprofilingtraining?WhattheexpertshavecontributedhassavedscoresofMarines.

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EVERYWHEREWEGO,THEREWILLBEPEOPLE

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nNovember1,2011,Marine1stLt.JeffWaddellwasondutymonitoringsurveillance video when he spotted a known enemy operative. This

insurgentwasresponsibleforbuildingthebombthatwoundedaMarinesergeanttwo days before. 1st Lt. Waddell, a Bronze Star recipient from his previousdeploymenttoAfghanistan,orderedanearbysniperteamtofireonthemanafterreceiving permission from the battalion’s combat operations center. After thesnipershittheinsurgent,agroupofAfghanmalesrantothemanandattemptedtoputhimona tractor.Seeingthis,1stLt.Waddellorderedthesniper teamtoengage the tractor’s engine block to disable it and prevent the man fromescaping. The tractor was hit, and no civilians were injured. It wasn’t untilapproximately three weeks later that it was discovered that the people whorushedout tohelpthewoundedinsurgentwereteenagers.Uponthisdiscovery,1st Lt. Waddell’s battalion commander promptly relieved him of duty forviolating the rulesof engagementbecause the snipers fired at individualswhowereseeminglygiving“medicalassistance” to thewounded insurgent.Despitethe positive review from a Marine brigadier general who stated that 1st Lt.Waddell was a “superb and heroic combat leader,” his career was effectivelystunted. Despite the fact that his quick, level-headed thinking dealt with thesituation in a way that resulted in no civilian casualties, 1st Lt.Waddell waspunished because of the complexity of the rules Marines must follow whileoverseas, the rapid pace of combat, and the difficulty of the decisionsMarineleadersmustmakewithoutaccesstocompleteorperfectinformation.13

ThereareseveralproblemswiththesituationswithwhichMarinesarefacedandthedecisionstheyareforcedtomake.ThefirstisthatnoonehasevertaughtMarines, or anyone really, how to make decisions—particularly quickly, withlittletimeandinformation.Throughoutlife,peopleareexpectedtosimplylearnthrough trial and error how to make a decision. Generally, this tacit way oflearning tomake decisions is adequate to getmost people through life, but instressful situations such as combat, many people either freeze and make nodecisionormaketerribledecisions.

Marineslearntwolessonsearlyonthatgivethemafalsesenseofdecision-makingability:BAMCISandOODA.BAMCISisaMarineCorpsacronymforthesixtroop-leadingsteps:

Begintheplanning,Arrangethereconnaissance,

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Makethereconnaissance,Completetheplan,Issuetheorder,andSupervise.

Unfortunately,these“troop-leadingsteps”donotactuallyteachMarineshowtomakeadecision.Theyoutlineageneralprocessofdevelopingandexecutingaplan.Thesecondacronym,OODA,standsfor

Observe,Orient,Decide,andAct.

This is also called the Boyd Decision Cycle. This process, articulated byColonel(Ret.)JohnBoyd,describesthefourmainstepsthataperson,group,ororganization takesfromobservingaphenomenontoresponding.This isaveryhelpfulwaytoenvisionhowpeopleobservetheirsurroundings(Observe),makesenseofwhat they see (Orient), decidewhat todo (Decide), and thenexecutewhatthey’vedecided(Act).However,justasBAMCISsimplytellsaMarinetobeginandcompleteaplanwithoutteachingthemhowtoplan,OODAstatesthatadecisionmustbemadewithoutexplaininghowtomakethatdecisionorwhatMarinesshouldbeseekingtodecideintelligently.

2.PARALYSISBYANALYSISThesecondproblemis that thedecision-makingmethodspeopleare taughtarealmost exclusively analytical, very deliberate approaches of weighing thevariousissuestoaproblem(prosandcons,costs/risksandgains,etc.)andthen,somehow, determining the best decision.Analytical decision-makingworks insituationsinwhich:

Weneedtomakethebestpossibledecision.Wehavesufficienttimetoproblemsolve,plan,anddeliberateoptions.Wehavesufficientinformationtoconsideralltheissues.Wehaveclearcriteriatodecidebetweenoptions.Weneedtojustifyourdecision.Weneedtocarefullyplancontingenciesoralternateplans.

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Unfortunately, most situations Marines encounter do not allow for anyanalysis at all.While the analytical approach has its strengths, it also has itsweaknesses.Infact,manyofitsstrengthsareoftenliabilities:

Deliberateplanningoftentakestoomuchtimetoconductfully.There isoftennot enough information toanalyzea situationorproblemproperly.Too much information exists without a way to determine what’s mostimportant.Clearcriteriaforchoosingbetweenoptionsmaynotexist,oroptionsmaybesimilarenoughthatadeliberatedecisionispracticallyarbitrary.

Therealityisthatwedon’tusethisapproachforthemajorityofdecisionswemakeonadailybasis.Ifwedid,wewouldnevergetthroughtheday.Imaginethinkingthroughtheissues,developingmultipleoptions,weighingtheprosandcons, and determining a course of action for everything we do. We haveprobably all seen someone fall victim to “paralysis by analysis” and becomeunabletomakeadecisionbecauseofhisorherneedtoconsidereverypieceofinformation.

Furthermore, even deliberate decision-making is not purely analytical ineveryway;itoftenusesintuitionandheuristics.Last,justbecauseapersonusesanalysis does not guarantee that the decision will work, be right, or even begood. Analysis is often wrong and in many cases ends up with less accuratedecisionsthaneitherintuitionorheuristics.

Itisn’tuncommontothinkthroughsomething,onlytohaveagutfeelingthatthe decision we made is not the right one. The problem for Marines is thatanalytical decision-making is neither practical nor useful in the high-stresssituations encounteredwhile on patrol:whether to shoot or not in amatter ofmilliseconds,whethertotravelaparticularstretchofroad,whethertogoonthealert when passing a group of villagers. A better, quicker method of makingdecisionsisneeded.

3.INFORMATIONOVERLOADThenextproblemisasortofaparadox.Atoneandthesametime,Marinesarebombardedwith toomuch information andmustmakedecisions basedon toolittle information. Marines operate in 360-degree, three-dimensionalenvironments, threatenedbyhazards fromanydirection.Anyoneandanythingcouldbeathreat.AnytrashpilecouldbehidinganIED.Furthermore,Marines

are often doing multiple things at once: communicating with one another,maintaining their patrol formation, and providing security by watching theirsector. Some are talking with locals, some are monitoring the radio andcommunicatingwithotherunits,somearespecificallylookingforcertaintypesofthreats(e.g.,vehicle-borneimprovisedexplosivedevices[VBIEDs],snipers,IEDs). Meanwhile, each Marine is thinking through potential situations andattempting todeterminehowtoreact.Theamountof information thatMarinesmusttrytoprocessatanygiventimeisoverwhelming.

Marines never have enough information to make a perfect decision. Localdrivers often speed toward a patrol oblivious to the patrol’s presence.Unfortunately, to theMarines on patrol, this looks like the action of a suicidebomber.Locals often approachpatrolswith requests.Marines havenowayofabsolutely knowing any particular individual’s intentions, whether hostile orfriendly. The challenge of language and cultural barriers only compound theuncertainty and difficulty of determining a person’s intentions. Despite this,Marinesmustmakeadecision;unfortunately,towaituntilthespeedingdriverorthe approaching local is definitively a threatwill often be too late. Therefore,Marines must be taught a way to make decisions that ignores unimportantinformationwhile taking advantage of the little important information they dohave.

4.PERFECTDECISIONSAREN’TPOSSIBLEMarinesonthegroundareoftenexpected,thoughthisisnotexplicitlystated,tomake perfect decisions. A decision aMarine on the groundmakesmay carrysignificant, possibly even strategic level consequences, but it is simplyimpossibleforMarinestomakeperfectoreventhe“best”decisioninanygivensituation. The environment is too complex, time is too short, and not enoughclear indicators are available. At the higher levels of command, it is widelyrecognizedthatleadersshouldnotseektomaketheperfectorbestdecision,buttomakeagooddecision. In fact,GeneralPatton isoftenquotedassaying,“Agood solution applied with vigor now is better than a perfect solution tenminutes later.”14 One of theMarine Corps’ own doctrinal publications states:“Manymilitaryproblemssimplycannotbesolvedoptimally,nomatterhowlongorhardwemaythinkabouttheproblembeforehand.Inmanycases,thebestwecanhopeforistodevisepartial,approximatesolutionsandrefinethosesolutionsovertime,evenafterexecutionhasbegun.”15Later,thesamepublicationstates,“Whatmattersmost is not generating the best possible plan but achieving the

bestpossible result.”16Leaders andplanners are called todevisegood enoughsolutionsquickly,thenaggressivelycarryoutthosesolutions.Thegoalistoactviolentlyandquicklytodrivethetempoofbattleandcausetheenemytoreact.

If leaders andplanners are expected tomakegoodenough,butnotperfect,decisions, why are the Marines on the ground expected to make perfectdecisions? Many Marines (as well as soldiers and police officers) have beensecond-guessed, investigated, and disciplined for making less than perfectdecisions in the midst of a stressful, chaotic, uncertain, and time-constrainedsituation.The irony is that the leaders and plannerswho are expected only tomake good-enough decisions have significantlymore time and information todecidethantheMarineontheground.ItistheMarineonpatrol,surroundedbypotential threats, whomust be given the freedom and training tomake good-enoughdecisions.ThisisnotanargumentforMarinestogooutandmakepoordecisions.Thepurposeof thisdiscussion is topointout thatMarines areonlyable and should only be expected tomake good-enough decisions. Therefore,Marines should be given the training to make quick, good-enough decisions,whichwillmostoftenbethebestdecisionstheycanmake.

Abetterwayforwardisneeded.Marinesmustbegiventhetoolstoobservemore acutely, judge more accurately, and decide more quickly in dynamicenvironments.This iswherecombatprofilingfits in.Thedecision-makingthatMarineslearnhelpsthemtofocusonthemostimportantpiecesofinformationandmake accurate snap decisions based on that information.Marines learn tohaveabias foractionandbeproactive in identifyinganddealingwith threats.CombatprofilingteachesMarinesasimple,yeteffectivestrategytouseonthebattlefield.

5.THEBETTERWAYThe combat profilingwayofmakingdecisions is the betterway.Heuristics isnothingmore thanawayofmakingdecisionswith little timeand information.Letmegiveascientificdefinitionandthenprovideadown-to-earthexplanation.Aheuristicis“a(consciousorsubconscious)strategythatsearchesforminimalinformation and consists of building blocks that exploit evolved abilities andenvironmentalstructures.”17 In simple terms:Manyproblemsandsituations inlife do not have perfect solutions, and the best solution is unknowable.Manysituationsaresocomplex,itisimpossibletoexamineeverypieceofinformation—orsodangerousthatlookingformorethanafewpiecesofcriticalinformationriskslives.

In these situations, only the minimum amount of information is needed tomakeadecision.Often,justonepieceofinformation,onecue,isimportant.Aheuristic focuses on the important cue or cues and ignores the rest. A goodheuristic decision ismade by 1) knowingwhat to look for, 2) knowingwhenenough information is enough (the “threshold of decision”), and 3) knowingwhatdecisiontomake.

Aheuristicexploitsourevolvedcapabilities—inthecaseofcombatprofiling,theabilityto“thin-slice,”quicklypickuponpatterns,anddetermineaperson’sintentionsbasedonhumanbehavior.Thinslicingmeansmakingadeterminationabout a situation or person with a thin slice of information, often with justsecondsofobservation.

Butcanquickobservationsbeaccurate?More than 100 scientific studies have demonstrated that people can make

incrediblyaccurateintuitivejudgmentswithjustalittleamountofinformation.18Thesestudieshaveresearchedawidearrayofquick,accurate judgmentsmadein a matter of seconds or minutes. For example, in just two seconds ofobservation, people candeterminewhether someone is a violent offender.19 Indeterminingwhethersomeoneislying,fifteensecondsofobservationarebetterthanthreeminutes.20Bylookingatagroupinteractingforonlythirtyseconds,apersoncanaccuratelydeterminetheroleofeachpersoninthegroupjustbasedonbodylanguageandnonverbalsignals.“Fromcontextsasdiverseasevaluatingclassroomteachers,selectingjobapplicants,orpredictingtheoutcomesofcourtcases,humanjudgmentsmadeon thebasisof justa thinsliceofobservationaldatacanbehighlypredictiveoflaterbehavior.”21

ArmySergeantFirstClassTierneywasonpatrolinsummer2004inMosul,Iraq.Hewasleadinghissquaddownastreetwhenthepatrolnearedacarparkedonthesidewalk.Insidethecarweretwoyoungboysstaringatthesoldiers.Thecarwasfacingoppositethedirectionoftraffic,andthewindowswererolledup.Itwas120degreesthatmorning.

Thesoldierclosesttothevehiclemusthavefeltcompassionforthetwoboysinside.If itwas120outside, theinsideofthecarmusthavebeenadeathtrap.The soldier askedSFCTierney if he couldgive theboys somewater.Tierneysaidnoandthentoldhismentofallback.

Assoonasthesoldierturnedaround,theIEDexploded.On this day, no soldiers were killed or severely wounded, because SFC

Tierney listened to something inside him that said the situation wasn’t right.Perhaps itwas the fact that theywerenotgreetedasusualby the localswhentheyleftonpatrol.Perhapsitwasthefactthatthingsseemedquieterthannormal

—noonehad shot at themyet.Perhaps itwas the fact that twochildrenwereinside a car—which must have been well over 120 degrees inside—with thewindows rolled up.Whatever itwas that tippedTierney off, itwasn’t rationalanalysisthatmadehimsuspicious.Callitasixthsense,gutfeelingorintuition;regardless,hisbrainwasprocessinginformationandnudginghiminawaythatbypassedhisconsciousbrain.Tierneysayshisbodygotcolder.Hecalleditthe,“youknow,dangerfeeling.”22

Onewaythebrainmaydrivethesedecisionsisthroughtheamygdala,apartof the limbic system that deals with emotion, memory, and decision-making.When a person encounters something that innately or through learning hasemotionalsignificance, theyautomaticallyexperienceanemotional response.23SFCTierney had significant experience and training identifying IEDs and thewarning signs of an attack. Although he did not explicitly or rationally thinkthroughallthefactorsthatledtohisdecision,henonethelessobservedvariousindicators,whichhisbrainwasprocessingoutsidehisconsciousawareness,andthenactedbasedontheemotionalsignalshisbrainwasgivingthatthingswerenotright.

Humanshave evolved tomakequickdecisions, oftenbasedonpatternswehaveobservedand learned:“If facingsomeoneor something in the forest,ourancestorsneeded to respond instantly: friendor foe?Thosewhocould readanexpression in a flash more often lived to leave descendants, including us.”24Intuitionisbestusedwhenapersonhassignificantexperienceandknowledge,which guides that person’s subconscious thought processes. Where does thishinkymojocomefrom?Theanswerliesinmillionsofyearsofhumanevolution.

TheMiddleofYourBrainThinkbacktotheStoneAge.Ourknuckle-draggingancestorswerebothhunterandprey.Theyneededtoforageforfood,hunt,andbringhomethebacon(sotospeak)everysingleday.So,too,weretheythemaincourseformuchlargerandstrongermammals.It’ssafetosaythatthosehumanbeingscapableofavoidingbeing eaten were the ones able to procreate and pass their genes to the nextgenerationofknuckledraggers.

Something inside those human brains gave them an advantage. What thatsomethingwas and remains today lies inside the limbic system, themiddle ofourbrains.

Thefrontpartsofourbrains,aboveoureyeballs,definesthemodernhuman.This frontal cortex is the place where thoughts, emotions, and senses areexperiencedandrecorded.Themiddlepartofthebrainisthelimbicsystem,the

placewhereautomaticbehaviorslive,includingflinches,twitches,andforlackofabetterdescription,our“extrasenses,”whichtelluswhensomethingisnotquiteright.Thelastpartofthebrainisaroundthebloodbrainbarrier,andthispart is kind of the engine center. It keeps our heart going, keeps us breathingwithoutthinkingaboutit,etc.It’sessentiallyourautomaticsystemscoordinator.

The part of the brain that combat hunters need to trust in themselves andunderstandinothersisthemiddlebrain,knownasthelimbicsystem.

TheLimbicSystemTounderstandbodylanguagerelatingtobehavioralanalysis,itiscriticaltohaveabasicknowledgeofthecognitivebasisofnonverbalbehavior.Allourgestures,postures,andexpressionsresultfromthewayourbrainidentifiesandperceivesthreats,consciouslyorsubconsciously.Themostimportantpartofthebrainthatdirectly affects nonverbal behavior is the limbic system.The limbic system isuniquebecause,inadditiontocontrollingemotions,itiscompletelyfocusedonoursurvival.25 Due to this important function, to ensure a person’s protectionfrom threats, it reacts to the surrounding environment automatically,immediately, and outside conscious awareness. Surviving in hostile, predator-filled environments requires immediate reaction, and the limbic system isdesignedtorespondquicklyandspontaneously.Therefore,thelimbicsystemisalso the honest part of the brain because it provides unmediated responses toexternalstimuli.

Thelimbicsystemisateamofstructuresinthebrain(suchastheamygdala,hippocampus, hypothalamus, and thalamus) that work together to ensure oursurvival. The limbic system processes information observed by the varioussenses (sight, sound, smell, taste, touch)andcontinuouslyand rapidlyassessesthatinformationinaverysimplisticway,categorizingeachstimulusaseitherathreat or a non-threat. To ensure an immediate reaction to a determination of“threat,”thelimbicsystemcommandsaresponsefromthebodythatisinstantlyexecuted. The bodywill react to a threat by stopping in place and halting allmovement,movingawayfromthethreat,orpreparingtophysicallyengagethethreat.Thesethreeresponsesareoftenreferredtoasthe“freeze,flight,orfight”responses.

Freeze,Flight,andFight

THEFREEZERESPONSE

The freeze response isanearly survivalmechanism that ishard-wired into the

brainsofmostcreatures.Eyesarenaturallyattractedtomovement,sotheearlyancestorsofhumansandotheranimalscouldescapedetectionfrompredatorsbysimply freezing in place. In common terms, this equates to the “deer in theheadlights” look.26Policeofficershaveseen this responsefromfoiledburglarswhofreezeinplacebeforeattemptingtoflee.27FreezingisaconceptingrainedintoMarinesandsoldierswhoaretaughttodroptothegroundandfreezewhenflares or illumination go off in themiddle of the night. By simply halting allmovement, humans and animals increase the chances of not being seen andthereforeincreasethechancesofsurvival.

This response also provides time to further assess the situation beforeexecuting the next decision, whether flight or fight. Physiologically, the brainalso suppresses bodily functions such as heart rate, breathing, and bloodpressure, and subdues those vital systems so the brain can take in as muchinformationaspossiblebeforemakingadeterminationtostayandfightorflee.28

THEFLIGHTRESPONSE

Theflight response is thesecondoption the limbicsystemconsiders regardingsurvival. The purpose of fleeing is to create a physical separation from thepredatororthreatandthusavoidinjuryordeath.Thegreaterthedistancefromtheattacker,thefeweroptionstheattackerhastodoharmandthemoretimethevictimhastorespondtofurthermovementsbytheattacker.Inmostsituations,however,humanscannotsimplyrunfromeverythingthatisapotentialphysicalor psychological threat, and so other distancing behaviors have developed toservethesamepurpose,suchasputtingupabarrier,leaningaway,coveringtheface,or turningone’sback.Regardlessofwhetherone runs from the threatordistances oneself nonverbally in some other way, the purpose of flight is toincrease the distance from the attacker, and thus increase one’s chance ofsurvival.However,iffleeingisn’taviableoption,almostallcreatureswillturntothelastresponse:fight.

THEFIGHTRESPONSE

Thefightresponseisthelastoptionconsideredbythelimbicsystembecauseofthe inherent potential for harm or death. The most ferocious fighters arevulnerable to injury from less dangerous creatures. This potential for harmmakesfightingtheleastpreferredresponse.However,beforeengaginginafight,most creatures will attempt to persuade the other combatant to back downwithoutphysicalconfrontation.Thisiscalledposturingandisanattempttowina fight without fighting. Posturing involves trying to appear larger and more

dangerousandincludesshouting,spreadingthearmsorotherappendageswide,puffingupthechesttolooklarger,ormovingaroundandtakingupmorespaceonthegroundwhileappearingunpredictable.However,whenaperson’sbackisagainst the wall, either physically or psychologically, the brain willingly andquicklypreparesthebodytofightifthatisthebestchanceforsurvival.

WhyWeNeedThisInformationAlthoughtherearefewthreatsthatwefaceintoday’ssocietythatrequireustorespond with physically striking a person (fight) or physically fleeing from aperson that intimidates us (flight), they still manifest themselves in variousforms.Thinkofa situation thatyouhaveexperienced recentlywhereapersongottooclosetoyouandyoufeltthattheyhadenteredyour“personalbubble.”Howdid you respond to that invasion? If you took a couple steps away fromthemtore-establishthatseparationorevensimplyleanedbackinyourchair,youexecutedaformoftheflightresponse.Whenwefeelthreatened,wewillattemptto distance ourselves from that threat, even if it is only a few inches or feet.Thinkof another situationwhere someone challengedyou about a topic aboutwhichyouknewyouwerecorrect.Howdidyourespondinthissituation?Didyoustandup,putyourhandsonyourhips,gestureaggressively towards them,andraiseyourvoice?Thosedominantbehaviorsweredrivenbythesamefightresponse used by people around theworld in response to threats and stressfulsituations.Thewaythatthoseresponsesmanifestthemselvesinobservablebodylanguage cues are howwe can accurately apply these observations around theworld.

Understandingthelimbicsystemanditscorefreeze,flight,orfightresponsesisthefirstphaseindetectingathreat.It’simportanttorememberthattheenemystalkingaMarineonpatroloraseeminglyhelplesswomanonherwayhomeisunderduress.Thisstressmanifestsitselfinphysicalactions.Ifwelookfortheseparticular physical actions when our limbic system gives us the “heads up,something’snotright”signal,we’llbeabletooperateeffectively“leftofbang.”

Butoncewestartcatalogingthesebehaviorstosupportourgutfeelings,howdowedecidewhentheevidenceisoverwhelmingenoughtoact?

6.BIASFORACTIONCombatprofiling isamethodofmakingdecisions incomplex,chaotic,hostileenvironments,wherenoperfectsolutionsexist,wheredecisionsneedtobemadequicklyandwithlittleinformation,andwhereoperatorsneedtomakethemost

of their intuition.Anymethod ofmaking a decision in a combat environmentshould driveMarines tomake a decision andquickly act on that decision—tomaintainabiasforaction.Combatenvironments,oranyhostileenvironmentforthatmatter, requirepeople tobeable to recognize threats andpatternsquicklyandthenact immediatelybasedonthat information.“Tohesitate isoftentobelost, whether this means losing an opportunity for a meal or a mate to acompetitor, or losing one’s life or limb to a predator or otherwise hostileenvironment.”29Aswehavealreadyshown,researchershavedemonstratedthat“Gooddecisionscanbemadewithlittleinformation.”30

Aswecansee,itisincrediblyhelpfultohavethickfilefolderslockedinsidethe frontpartofourbrainswhenmaking intuitivedecisions influencedbyourmiddle-brainlimbicsystem.

Butwhataboutthevastmajorityofpeoplewhodon’thavethenecessarylifeexperience to take advantage of those decisions? When we do not have theexperiencenecessary to quicklypickuponpatterns and identify good-enoughsolutionsimmediately,wehavetouseanotherwaytomakequickdecisionswithlittle information. This is the benefit of the heuristic method used in combatprofiling.

Combat profiling is heuristically and intuitively driven. It is built like aheuristic but applied with intuition. The basic foundation of combat profilinginvolvesquicklyestablishingabaselineanddetermininganomalies, aswell asquicklyidentifyingthreatindicators.Establishingabaselineinvolvesobservingonly certain types of information, the information that comes from the sixdomains. Once an individual reaches the threshold of decision—identifying acertainnumberofanomaliesorcertaintypesofindicators—theindividualmustmakeadecision.Combatprofilingdrivesindividualstohaveabiasforaction.

Before thecombatprofilercanactanddestroy the threat,heneeds todetailand profile his target to support and determine his action. But for a combatprofiler to identify the anomalies that influence his decisions, he needs toestablishabaselineofbehavior.

7.BASELINESANDANOMALIES“Well,thesheriffcamearoundinthemiddleofthenight/Heardmamacryin’/knewsomethingwasn’t

right.”–SteveEarle,“CopperheadRoad”

Humans effectively live because things generally remain the same. Trafficgenerallyflowsthesameway,at thesametime,onthesamedays.Ourfriends

behave the same in similar situations. Life works because things have a“normal.”But,when something is off, out of place, or unusual,weknow thatsomethingisn’tright.When“somethingisn’tright”—whetherthesituationisarelationship, walking down the street, or on patrol in Afghanistan—then it’slikely there is a problem.Unfortunately,most people don’t do anythingwhen“something isn’t right.” They don’t allow their intuition to guide them. Theydon’tproactivelyseektodeterminewhatisoutofplace,theydon’tstepbacktoobserve the situation more closely, or they don’t duck. It is only after thesituationhasoccurred—inhindsight—when they realize somethingwasout ofplace.Thisisliving“rightofbang.”

InMarch2011,theSecondReconnaissanceBattalionsentoutthedailypatrolto provide route clearance and security for an engineering company that wasdoingroadimprovementinHelmandProvince,Afghanistan.Onthisday,thingsweren’t normal. For this province, normal meant people outside—peopletraveling,kidsplaying,peopleinteracting.Normalincludedamanwhowouldsitinfrontofhishousedrinking teaeveryday.Thisday,noonewasoutside,noteventhedailyteadrinkerwhosehousewasclosedandlocked.Whensomethingisn’t normal, watch out. The abnormal atmosphere of the village—theseanomalies—indicatedwhatwas tocome.As thepatrolmoved forward, a250-poundIEDexplodedbeneatha14-tonmine-resistantambushprotected(MRAP)vehicle,sendingthevehicleflyingintotheairandinjuringtheMarinesinside.31

Identifyingthreatsmeansestablishingabaselineandlookingforanomalies.Abaselineiswhatisnormalforanenvironment,situation,orindividual.Generally,every environment, type of situation, or individual exhibits normal patterns:patterns of movement, emotion, behavior, and interaction.We usually do notconsciously considerwhat these patterns are because they are ingrained in us.While some of these patterns differ from culture to culture, place to place, orperson to person, patterns are a part of life and human behavior around theworld.

Ananomaly is anyvariation from thebaseline—andwhatweareprimarilysearching for isanomalies.Anomaliesare things thateitherdonothappenbutshould,orthatdohappenbutshouldn’t.Duringanysituation,weexpectcertainthings to happen and not to happen. For example, when a VIP (high-rankingmilitaryofficer,villageelder,etc.)walks intoaroom,weexpect individuals tostandandgreettheVIP;anyvariationfromthis(individualsnotstandingastheVIPentersornotgreetingtheVIP)isananomaly.Anomaliesindicatesomethinghas changed in the situation.Often they are indicators that something is awry.Another way to classify an anomaly is based on the presence or absence of

something.Whensomething(orsomeone)isnotpresentwhenitshouldbe,orispresentwhenitshouldn’tbe,thisisananomaly.Now,itisnormalforbaselinesto vary to some degree. Not every person wakes at the same time. Trafficpatternsvaryslightlyfromdaytodayandweektoweek.Thisiswhyweobservesignificant variation and look for multiple indicators that the baseline haschanged.Inacomplexenvironment,oneindicatorisoftennotenoughtoacton.

Anotherwaytodescribetherelationshipbetweenanomaliesandthebaselineisthatanomaliesarethingsthatriseaboveorfallbelowthebaseline.Anomaliesthat rise above the baseline are things that 1) are happening that shouldn’t ordon’t normally happen or 2) are present that shouldn’t be or aren’t normallypresent. Anomalies that fall below the baseline are things that 1) are nothappeningthatshouldhappenornormallyoccuror2)arenotpresentthateithershouldbeornormallyarepresent.

Whyareanomalies indicatorsofpotential threats?Anomaliesare indicatorsofchangesinsituations.Granted,noteverychangeinasituationisbad,butanychangeinasituationneedstobeconsideredwithsuspicion.Aswehavealreadysaid,lifeworkswhenthingsarenormal.Humans,societies,nature,etc.fallintobehavioralpatterns.Whensomethingnewisintroducedintoasituation,changesare evident. Whatever is new is an anomaly, and the resulting changes areanomaliesbecause theydiffer fromthebaseline.Forexample, ifanewpersoncomesintoanunfamiliararea,thatperson’sactionswillnotbenormalinrelationtothelocalsbecausethepersonisunfamiliarwithand/oruncomfortable in thearea.Additionally,thelocalswillrespondtothe“intruder”inwaysthatarealsoabnormal—differentthanhowtheywouldinteractwithfellowlocals.

The phrase “something wasn’t right” is common lingo among people whohaveobservedanomalies.People say it inhindsight about someone’sbehaviorleadingtosuicide.Copsuseittodescribesuspiciousbehavior,whichtheymight

discover was indicative of a crime taking place or a perpetrator. In 2009, aUniversity of California, Berkeley, police officer acted on a suspicion that“somethingwasn’tright”andsolvedan18-year-oldkidnappingcase.32Whattheofficerobservedwasabnormalbehaviorfromchildrenamanclaimedwerehis.Theirbehaviorwasemotionallyunresponsive,eerie,andsuspicious.

Whentrackersobservethegroundforevidenceoftheirquarry(thetermforwhatever they are following) they are looking for anomalies. The physicalenvironment,likethesocialenvironment,hasabaseline.Nothinginnaturelookslike a human footprint.Mud doesn’t magically appear on rocks. Rocks don’tmoveontheirown.Trackers lookfor thingslikedisturbances,displacementofnaturalitems,anddiscolorationofvegetationandothernaturalitems.Inherentinthosewords is the sense that something isn’t right.Combatprofilersalso seekdisturbances in thehuman environment.LikeNewton’sThirdLawofMotion,humanactionshave reactions.Anyabnormalbehavior is an anomaly thatwillresult in more anomalies. Combat profilers need to carefully observe foranomalies and act when they identify them. Thankfully, humans act inpredictableandusualwaysthatcanserveasastartingpointforobservinghumanbehaviorandestablishingbaselines.

8.HUMANUNIVERSALSCombatprofilingworksbecausehumanbehavioristheproductofanddrivenbyhuman nature. The founding principle of combat profiling is that beneath thedifferences and idiosyncrasies of varying human cultures there remains auniversal constant we call human nature. Irises widen due to certain stimuli,adrenalineflows,musclestenseorrelax;wesmile,wecringe,webareourfangs.Every person in the world possesses universals that allow us to apply theprinciples of combat profiling consistently anywhere across the globe. Thefoundation of combat profiling is the universal similarities in humans, despiteculturaldifferences.

Donald E. Brown, professor emeritus of anthropology at the University ofCalifornia, Santa Barbara, has determinedmore than 400 universal individualand cultural behaviors and traits. He writes: “Human universals—of whichhundreds have been identified—consist of those features of culture, society,language,behavior,andmindthat,sofaras therecordhasbeenexamined,arefound among all peoples known to ethnography and history.”33 According toBrown, human universals include such things as daily routines, aggression,gestures, and facial expressions.34 Paul Ekman, a renowned psychologist and

leading expert on micro-facial expressions and deception detection, hasdetermined seven universal facial expressions of emotion.35 Alex Pentland,director of Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s (MIT) Human DynamicsLaboratory,hasstudiedandwrittenaboutwhatarecalledhonestsignals.Honestsignalsarebiology-basedcuesthatanimalsandhumansdemonstratethatcanbeusedtoreliablypredictbehavior.36Researchisshowingthathumansacrosstheglobearemuchmorealikethanwepreviouslyknewandwantedtobelieve.Thisiswonderfulnewsforthecombatprofilerbecausehecanapplytheseconceptsandmethodsanywhere in theworldandbealert topotential threats.Basedonthese assumptions, we have identified nine principles of human nature thatdirectlyapplytocombatprofiling.

1)Humansarecreaturesofhabit.In a study conducted by Northeastern University network scientists, it wasdeterminedthathumanbehavior,regardingpatternsofmovementandmobility,is 93 percent predictable. By using information collected from cell phones,physics professor Albert-Laszlo Barabási determined that human movementpatterns are predictable regardless of distance traveled or demographiccategories (such as age, gender, urban versus rural, etc.).37 In short, “humansfollowsimplereproduciblepatterns.”38Notonlydopeoplefollowpatterns,butalsohumans are reluctant to change thosepatternsuntil thebehavior becomesunproductive.39Infact,eveniffacedwithclearfailure,peopleoftenfollowthesamebehavioralpatternsinthehopestheywillworkagain.

2)Humansarelazy.Humansaregenerallylazyandwilltakethepathofleastresistance.Facedwithtwoormoreoptions,thehumanwillgenerallytaketheeasiest.Giventhechoicebetween walking one hundred meters through the grass from one point toanother and walking five hundred meters around the grass along a sidewalk,humanswillgenerallytaketheshortestpath,eventhoughitisnotanofficialorauthorizedpath.

3)Humansarelousyliars.Humanshavesignificantcognitivelimitations.Ithasbeenshownthatimposingcognitiveloadcanhelpuncoverliars.Aliarmustcreateastoryandmonitorthefabrication to ensure it sounds believable while attempting to maintain abelievable appearance. While telling a lie, the liar must monitor theinterviewer’s reaction to assess how he or she is doing; the liar is also taxed

mentally because a lie requires continuous effort whereas telling the truth isautomatic.Soasthoughtfulquestionsarebroughttothetable,forcingtheliartospendmoremental energy creating a lie and keeping the lies straight, the liarbecomesvulnerabletoleakingemotionsandotherindicatorsthatcanalertustodeception.40Additionally,humanscannotdivide theirattentionwell.Themoretasksapersondivideshisattentionbetween, thepoorerhewillperformanyofthose tasks. Another example is short-term memory. Humans can onlyremember, on average, between five to nine items using their short-termmemory. All of this is important because, as we observe individuals, reliablenonverbal indicators will leak out and indicate their emotions, attitudes, andintentions, particularly when their attention is focused on something such ascompletingtheirmission,gettingcloseto their target, thinkingabout theirnextlie,etc.

4)Humanswillrun,fight,orfreeze.Humans are driven by fight-or-flight responses, which translate into certainautonomicresponsesandbehaviors.Wewilldiscusstheseresponseslateraswellas the autonomic responses to stress. For now, it is sufficient to say that ourbodies often exhibit uncontrollable, automatic reactions to our emotions inresponse to thesituationsweare in.Because thesereactionsareautomaticanduncontrollable, they are reliable indicators of the emotions and attitudes of apersonandcanclueus in tohow thatperson is feeling inanygivensituation.Furthermore,whenweunderstandthefight-or-flightresponse,wecanpredictaperson’sbehaviorinanystressfulorthreateningsituation.

5)Humanstelegraphtheirintentions.Emotions are difficult to control and are often spontaneous responses to asituation. As Paul Ekman points out, we don’t often have control over ouremotions,andourcognitivebrain isnotalways incontrolofouremotions—atleast at first.41 By understanding the behaviors associated with specificemotions,we can identifypeople’s emotional states and changes in relation totheir emotions. As Alex Pentland discusses, “honest signals” are behaviorsmainlydrivenbythesubconscious.Byreadingpeople’shonestsignals,wecanpredictwhatpeoplewilldo.42Onasmallscale,weseethisprincipleplayoutinboxing and basketball. Good boxers can pick up on the ways their opponenttelegraphshisnextmove.Inbasketball,gooddefenderslookforwaysinwhichtheiropponent telegraphs theirnextmove,whether theplayer intends togo tothe right,pass theball,or take the shot.Pokerplayers look for“tells” in their

opponents’behavior.Combatprofilerslookforpeopletelegraphingintentionstodoharm.

6)Humansarepredictable.Humansarenotgenerallyspontaneousorrandom.Thisprincipleisrelatedtothesecondprincipleabove.Asmuchaswethinkweareunpredictableandrandom,wereallyareverypredictableandfollowregularpatterns.Astudythat tracked10,000peopleviacellphoneconcludedthatpeopledisplayaveryhighdegreeofregularitywhenthey travel,because theyreturn toonlyafew,veryfrequentedlocations.43 A more mundane example is the game Rock, Paper, Scissors.Research shows that, even in games that rely on being unpredictable, humansare, in fact, very predictable and not at all random. We involuntarily mimicothers,andwepredictablyattempttocomebackfromlosses—atleastinRock,Paper,Scissors—bydoingwhateverbeatusinthelastround.44Thismeansthatourenemywillsetpatternsthat,ifwetakethetimetoanalyze,wecanidentifyandusetoouradvantage.Onceweknowtheenemy’spattern,wecanpracticallypredicthisnextmove.Unfortunately,thisalsomeansthatwearenotasrandomas we think and that the enemy can identify our patterns to predict our nextmovements and actions.Anyonewho has operated inAfghanistan or Iraq canverifythisreality:theenemyplacesthesametypeofIEDinthesamelocationsbecauseweuse thesameroutesat thesame times.Whatweneed to realize isthat the enemy is also using the same routes, the same hiding places, and isconductingthesameactivitiesatthesametimes.

7)Humansarenotgoodatmultitasking.Ingeneral,humansonlylooknaturalwhennaturallyfocusedondoingonething.Furthermore, multitasking is a myth. This relates to the principle above thathumanshavesignificantcognitivelimitations.Peoplecanonlydoonethingatatimewell;whentheyattempttodomorethanonethingatatime,focus,ability,andproductivitysuffer.Whenyourattentionisdivided,andyou’reconcentratingondoingmorethanonething,yourbehaviorandspeechwillappearunnatural.For instance, if someone is actually reading a paper, then their attention andmentalenergywillbefocusedonreadingthepaper.If,however, thatpersonisonlyactingasiftheyarereadingthepaperandinsteadisattemptingtoconductsurveillance, then thatperson’sbehaviorwillnot looknatural.Or imagine, forinstance, conversingwith someone attempting to discreetlywatch someone inthecrowdofpeoplearoundyou togetsome typeofsubtledirection fromthatperson. The person to whom you are talking will not be focused on theconversation.Instead,hismentalenergywillbedivided.Hisactionwillbejerky,

andhisspeechwillseemchoppy,broken,orslowerthannormal.Hisbrainwillhavetoswitchbackandforthbetweenactivities.45

AsAlexPentlandexplains,“Whenthereareseveralconflicting‘commands’coming down from our higher brain centers, each requiring our body to takedifferent sorts of actions, this interferes with our ability to act in a smooth,consistentmanner.”46Hecallsthisaspectofbehaviorconsistency.

8)Humansaregenerallyclueless.Humansingenerallacksituationalawareness.Asyougoaboutyourday,takeaminute and simplywatch the people around you.Generally, peoplewalkwiththeirheadsdown,ortheyarefocusedononeparticularthing.Peoplerarelylookaroundattheirsurroundings(withtwoexceptions:goodguysandbadguys.Andeven then these two types of people become focused and lose their generalawareness at times). If theyare lookingaround, theyusuallydon’tpickuponwhat is happening around them.Often,when conducting our ownobservationtrainingoffbase,weestablishovertobservationpostsonthetop-floorbalconiesofbuildings,orwesitintheopentoobserveaparticularlybusylocation,oftenfor long durations (several hours).We often begin by discreetly watching thebehavior of people aroundus, in an attempt to pick up on behavioral patternswhile not drawing attention to ourselves. However, after some time, we areusuallyblatantinpointingoutobservations—weoftenendupliterallypointing.Particularly in today’ssecurity-concernedenvironment,youwouldassumethatsomeonewouldconfrontusfor“conductingsurveillance.”However,rarelydoesanyoneevenlookatus,letalonethinkwearedoinganythingunusual.Yet,weare doing the exact same thing that a criminal or terrorist would do inpreparationforacrimeoranattack—andwearen’tevenattemptingtodisguiseourbehavior.Furthermore,becauseofourcognitivelimitations,whenapersonis mentally focusing on something—whether an activity, conversation, orthought—theylosesenseoftheirsurroundings.

9)Humanscan’tdoverymanydifferentthings.Therearealimitednumberofdimensionsinhumanbehavior.Humanbeingsarefinitecreatures.Ourbodiesreactincertainwaystostressandotherstimuli.Ourcommunication is limited, basically, to verbal and nonverbal.We rarely act inisolation;rather,weinteractwiththeenvironmentaroundus.

Although there are a number of ways to view human behavior, we breakhumanbehaviorintosixdifferent,butinterrelated,dimensions(wecallthesetheSixDomains.)Thesedomainsrangefromautonomictodeliberate,andpersonal

a.b.c.d.e.f.

tosocial.Theyare:Kinesics:Consciousandsubconsciousbodylanguage.BiometricCues:Biologicalautonomicresponses.Proxemics:Interpersonalspatialinteraction.Geographics:Patternsofbehaviorwithinanenvironment.Iconography:Expressionthroughsymbols.Atmospherics:Collective attitudes that create distinctmoodswithin anenvironment.

Combatprofilingisbasedonthesedomains.

PARTTHREE

DETAIL

B

HEADLINETAKENFROMNEWSPAPERSONJANUARY1,2000:

“ExplosionatLAX,MillenniumBomberkillsover100;over300injured”

ut a bomb didn’t explode on January 1, 2000, at LAX. No one’s NewYear’sDaywas interrupted by breaking news of hundreds dead.No one

read this horrible headline. New Year’s Day in 2000 did not become anAmericantragedybecauseofoneperson’ssuspiciousbehaviorandonecustomsagent’squickthinking.Infact,September11,wasn’tsupposedtobetheopeningsalvoofAl-Qaeda’sattackontheWest.AyearandahalfbeforeSeptember11,before theWarOnTerrorbecamea frequent conversationatAmerica’sdinnertables, a 130-pound bomb was set to detonate on a luggage carousel at LosAngeles InternationalAirport (LAX).Theonly reason thatheadlinewasneverwrittenwasbecauseofawomannamedDianaDean.

Deanwas a customs agent at Port Angeles,WA, andwas an inspector forpeople crossing into America on a ferry fromVictoria, British Columbia. OnDecember14,1999, justbefore6p.m.,sheapproached the lastcarshewas toinspect thatday.Asshe took thedriver’s licenseandpassport fromamanshebelieved to be Benni Noris, she immediately realized something was wrong.There was something about Noris that Dean later described as “hinky.” Shecouldn’tfigureoutexactlywhatwaswrong,buthewasn’tactingliketheotherpeopleshehadinspectedthroughouthercareer.Assheaskedfairlysimpleandstraightforwardquestionsaboutwherehewasgoingandhowlongheplannedonstayinginthecountry,hebecameextremelyfidgetyandjittery,begantosweat,and seemedunnecessarily anxious—therewas somethingnot quite right aboutNorisorthewayhewasmovingaroundinsidehiscar.

Because of theman’s suspicious behavior,Dean conducted a search on hisrented 1999Chrysler 300M,which should have been fairly simple because itwasalreadysearchedasitwasloadedontheferryinBritishColumbia.Asshewentthroughthetrunkofthecarwiththehelpfromsomeotherinspectors,shefoundmanygreenplasticbags filledwithapowderysubstanceunderneath thecovertothesparetirecompartment.Therewerealsosomeblackboxes,twopill

bottles,andtwojarswithbrownliquidinthem.TheirfirstassumptionwasthatNoriswastryingtosmuggledrugsintothecountry.

Theplanwas toconfrontNoriswithwhat they found,andasone inspectorbegantoguidehimtohiscar,Norisshuddered.BeforetheygottoNoris’car,hetookoff running into thePortAngelesparking lot.When they finallydetainedhim, it didn’t take long for the customs agents to learn his real namewasnotBenniNorisandthoseweren’tnarcoticsinhiscartrunk.ThepersontheycaughtonDecember14,1999,wasAlgerian-bornAhmedRessam,andthegreenbagswere more than 130 pounds of explosive material. The Al-Qaeda-trainedoperativewasonhisway toLosAngeles to conduct surveillanceonLAX fortwoweeksandtoexecutehisstrikeonNewYear’sEve.

Whatwouldhavehappened ifDeanhadn’tnoticed the cues that somethingwaswrongwithAhmedRessamandthathisbehaviorwasoutsidethebaselineshehadestablished?Shedidn’tusetheterminologywediscussinthisbook,butshe observed his kinesic cues, realized they were off, and took action. Thishappened21monthsbeforeSeptember11,beforetherewerelegitimateconcernsthat Americans could be attacked at home. Her observations helped stop the“MillenniumBomber”fromreachinghistargetandconductingaterroristattackonAmericansoiltwoweeks“leftofbang.”47

1.THESIXDOMAINSTo make quick decisions, combat profilers need to know what to look for.Current battlefields bombard operators with massive amounts of information.Without the ability to filter out the nonsense and noncritical information,Marines and soldiers cannot effectively identify threats. Combat profilingfocusesontheimportantdetailsofhumanbehavior,whichcanbeviewedfromsixbasicviewpoints.Welabelthesedimensionsthesixdomains.

FirstDomain:Kinesics…isthedomainthatinvolvespeople’sconsciousandsubconsciousbodylanguage.This is important because humans give off signals through their postures,gestures,andexpressionsthatcommunicatetheircurrentemotionsandpossiblytheir future intentions. Being able to pick up on these signals is critical toproactively identifying threats. See the section titled “kinesics” for anexplanationofouruseoftheterm.

SecondDomain:Biometriccues…is the term we use to describe the uncontrollable and automatic biological

responsesofthehumanbodytostress.Thesephysiologicalresponsesarekeytounderstandingaperson’semotionalstatesandchanges.

ThirdDomain:Proxemics…is the domain that allows us to understand groups of people by observinginterpersonal distance and identify an individual’s relationships and intentionsbased on how they use the space around them. While proxemics is oftendiscussedwithinthelargercategoryofnonverbalcommunication,weseparateitfrom biometrics and kinesics because proxemics allows us to understand anindividual’s behavior as it relates to the surrounding people. Proxemics alsopermitsustounderstandgroupdynamics.

FourthDomain:Geographics…is the domain that involves reading the relationship between people and theirenvironment. This helps us to understand and identify who is familiar orunfamiliar with the area they are in and how people move around theirsurroundings. Because human behavior is predictable, combat profilers cananticipatewherepeoplewillgoandwhattheywilldoincertainareas.

FifthDomain:Iconography…is the domain that allows us to understand the symbols people use tocommunicate their beliefs and affiliations. Gangs, insurgents, terrorist groups,and individuals use iconography as a symbol of group unity, for rapidrecognition of other members, and to communicate their beliefs to the largerpopulace.Observingthesesymbols,particularlytheincreasedpresenceorevensuddenabsenceofthem,canbekeytoacombatprofiler’ssituationalawareness.

SixthDomain:Atmospherics…is the domain focused on the collective attitudes, moods, and behaviors in agiven situation or a place. Combat profilers can read the social or emotionalatmosphere of an environment and pick up on the changes or shifts in thatatmosphere that often signal that something significant has changed or thatsomething is about to occur.Understanding the collective atmosphere can keycombat profilers into those individualswhose attitude, emotions, andbehaviordonotfitthegivensituation—theseindividualsareanomalies.

Thesesixdomainscapturethemostsignificantaspectsofhumanbehaviorinsimple terms thataidcombatprofilers inestablishingbaselinesand identifyinganomalies.

2.THELANGUAGEOFPROFILINGWe’llbethefirsttoadmitthatthisterminologyisamouthful.Andthetermsarenot easily discernible to the average person either. However, by using theterminology of the domains and breaking nonverbal communication into itssubcomponents, a police officer can effectively explain a decision to stop andsearchapersontohisbosswithoutbeingtoospecific.Hewitnessedaproxemicpush (as theperson tried toavoidhispatrol), abiometriccue (the individual’shandsbegantoshakewhenquestioned),andkinesicindicators(thepersonbeganpattingandtouchinghiswaistband).Theseobservationswouldleadanofficertobelieve the person had a concealedweapon andwould be able to confirm hisassessmentbysearchingtheindividual.

Byaddingadegreeofdescriptivenessandquantifyingspecificallywhatwasobserved,thepoliceofficercanbeconfidentinhisdecisionbecauseitwasbasedongroundedobservationsregardingthesuspect’sbehavior,notinaccurateracial,gender,age,orreligiousbiases.

Whenitcomestoaperson’sabilitytoreadbodylanguage,therearetwotypesofpeople.Thefirst isthepersonwhowasforcedtolearntheskillearlyinlifebecause recognizing threats through behavior became the best chance forsurvival. People who grew up in dangerous neighborhoods or in abusivehouseholds had to learn to identify threats, or they paid the price formissingthese signals.The secondgroupofpeople learned somewhere later in life andprobably learned through dedicated self-study. In American schools, we aretaughttoread,write,andspeakEnglish,butarenevertaughthowtoreadbodylanguage. Because the people in this group are likely not the “naturals,” theyneedastructureforconsolidatingthematerialandexperiencestheyareusingtodevelopthemselves.Thedomainsprovidethisframework.

Weliveinanageofinformationoverload,andobservinghumanbehaviorisno different. Although the terminology we use may seem foreign, it givescombatprofilersanaccurateandsufficientlyspecificsetoftermstofocustheirobservations, rapidly categorize what they observe, make good decisionsquickly, and effectively communicate those observations to others. Combatprofilers use the six domains to focus their observations on what is mostimportant:humanbehavior.

3.KINESICS“Everythingapersondoesiscreatedtwice—onceinthemindandonceinitsexecution—ideasand

impulsesarepre-incidentindicatorsforaction.”

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—GavindeBecker

Kinesicsisthestudyofbodylanguageandaccountsforasignificantpartofallinterpersonal communication. Our use of the term kinesics may seem toogeneral. For example, we could refine our discussion even further bydifferentiating between body movements (kinesics proper) and nonverbalcommunication that involves touching (“haptics”). However, incorporatingadditionalteriminologywouldcreateunnecessarydistinctionsandwouldhamperrapidobservationandeffectivecommunication.Thepurposeofourcategories—thesixdomains—istoprovideaccurateandfuntionallanguageforindividualstomake accurate observations and communicate those observations effectively.Although the term kinesics was originally coined by the anthropologist RayBirdwhistell in the 1950s, it is still used by contemporary researchers andprovides an accurate way to describe the movements of the limbs, head, andtorso. Studying body language accomplishes two objectives. The first is toidentify those people who don’t fit in and thus warrant further attention. Thesecond is topredictpeople’sbehaviorbasedon thesubtlebehavioralcues thatgive away their intentions. These subtle and subconscious acts, rather thanobvious movements, matter the most. When compared to the behavioralbaseline,smallersignalsoftenprovidetheinformationneededtomakesmarter,fasterdecisionsincombat.

While researchersdisagreeas towhatpercentageof total communication isaccounted forbybody languageandothernonverbalmeans, there isnodoubtthat a significant portion of all communication is transmitted nonverbally. Toignore such a significant aspect of communication would be foolish.Marinesand other security personnel consistently interact with people from othercultures,manyofwhomdonot share the same language. It ismore importantthan ever to effectively read a person’s intentions through body language andothernonverbalsignals.

The science of body language can be used to separate the sheep from thewolves in sheep’s clothing.Several critical issues guide the frameworkof thispartofthebook:

This is a chapter on body language. Numerous scholarly and popularresources exist on the topic of body language and nonverbalcommunication,includingbook-lengthtreatmentsandextensivearticles.The purpose of this discussion of kinesics is to emphasize the use ofbehavioral clusters and to describe how using clusters enables combatprofilerstoquicklyandconfidentlyinterpretbodylanguage.Mostgestures,inandofthemselves,arenotimportant.What’simportant

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tothecombatprofilerisagestureinthecontextofthebaseline.Combatprofilingfocusesonclustersofbehavior,ormultiplecues,ratherthansinglegestures.48All the information provided in this chapter will be about observableindicatorsbelowtheshoulders.Understandingindividualbehavioristhefoundationforcombatprofiling,andtodothisaccuratelywewillignorefacialcommunication.

Because of these reasons, this chapter does not discuss individual gestures.Instead, combat profiling relies on observing “clusters,” which are groups ofreinforcinggesturesandothernonverbal indicators thatcommunicate thesamemessage.Theseclustersarethencomparedtothebaselinetoidentifyanomalies.

WhyNottheFace?The human face is incredibly expressive and is used both consciously andsubconsciouslyincommunicatingemotion.Inallsixofthepossibleclustersthatwill be discussed below, facial expressions and emotions could be used toconfirmand supplement thebehaviors listed;however, facial expressionshavebeenleftoutduetosomeinherentlimitations.

Thefirstlimitationisthat,toidentifyfacialexpressionsaccurately,youmustbe relatively close to the person you are observing. This can be useful in asettingsuchasanintervieworconversation,butnotnecessarilyinsituationsinwhich some type of safety standoff is required.Marines should be capable ofrecognizingandidentifyingkinesicclustersupclose,butmoreimportantlyfromlonger distances for security and safety reasons. Since we discuss clusterswithout referring to facial expressions, we have given combat profilers theabilitytodeterminepeople’semotionsbasedonbehaviorindicators,whichcanbe observed from a distance. However, facial expressions can still provide asignificantamountofinformationtoacombatprofilerandshouldbeobservedtosupplementtheinformationgarneredbyobservingthebodylanguagerelatedtotheclusters.

Thesecondlimitationtofacialexpressionsisthatatrueemotion,whichcouldbedisplayedasamicro-expression,mayonlybepresentonthefacefor1/25thofasecond.Withanemotiondisplayedforsuchashortamountoftime,thereisahighchancethataMarineonpatrolinacombatzonewillmissitwithsomanyotheractionstakingplacearoundhim.Justaswiththefirstlimitation,thisdoesnotmeanMarinesandothersecuritypersonnelshouldn’tbe trained to identifytheseexpressionssincetheycanbesomeofthemosthonestindicatorsavailable,

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but operators needother indicators thatmaybepresent for a greater lengthoftime.*

UniversalBehaviorsandClustersBecause Marines operate throughout the world, combat profiling focuses onbodylanguageandanalysisthatisuniversallyapplicable,asopposedtocountry-orculture-specificgestures.Freeze,flight,andfightresponsesdrivethesetypesofuniversalbehaviors.

Since the field of kinesics was first studied, researchers have disputed thescience behind body language because they cannot assign one and only oneuniversal meaning to a specific gesture. For example, the simple behavior ofcrossing one’s arms across the chest could mean several different thingsdependinguponthecontext:

Thepersoniscoldandseekstowarmhimselfbycrossinghisarms.The person is creating a barrier between him and someone else in anattempttoclosehimselfoff.The person is comfortable and has crossed his arms because there isnothingelseavailabletosupportordowithhisarms.Thepersonisuncomfortableandissubconsciouslyattemptingtoprotecthimself.

Toovercomethisinherentambiguity,combatprofilingreliesonbrainscienceto determine the cause of these gestures. The body’s reactions to our freeze,flight,andfightresponseprovideuswithascientificcauseforthegesturesweareobserving.49Furthermore,combatprofiling relieson identifyingclustersofmutually reinforcingcues todetermineaperson’s intentions—thesearegroupsofbehaviorsandgesturesthatpointtothesamemeaning.

Combatprofilingstrivestoobserveclustersofmultiplecuesthatleadtothesame conclusion about what a person may be feeling or what his or herintentionsare.50Themore indicators leading to thesameconclusion, themoreaccuratecombatprofilerswillbeinpredictingaperson’semotionsandactions.Toconfirmacluster,oneneedstoobserveatleastthreeindicators.Clustersarebasedonaperson’sperceptionofthreatsandhowtheyarepreparingtodealwiththem.

Theyare:Dominantvs.submissiveUncomfortablevs.comfortable

3. Interested vs. uninterested (in the person or object they are interactingwith)

Looking back at how Dean initially described the Millennium Bomber’sbehaviorprovidesone example forwhywe relyon these six classifications todescribethepeoplearoundus.Whatsheaccuratelydescribedas“hinky”couldhavealsobeenclassified as anxious,nervous, suspicious, furtive,or anyothersynonymthatapersoncoulduse toexplain that typeofbehavior.Wecall thattype of behavior “uncomfortable” to simplify how combat profilerscommunicatewhat they are observing.By ensuring that everyone is using thesameterminologyandlanguagetodescribeandcommunicatetheirobservations,we can also ensure quick, concise, and accurate discussions and decisionsbetweeneveryoneinvolved.

Once three indicators are observed, combat profilers then judge the clusteragainst the baseline: Should the person be feeling dominant/submissive,uncomfortable/comfortable, and interested/uninterested right now? If theperson’sbehaviorfitsthebaseline,thentheydonotrequirefurtherinvestigation.However, if the person’s emotions and behavior do not fit the situation, thatpersonhasnowbecomeananomaly, andadecisionmustbemade fordealingwith that person. In the case of the Millennium Bomber, a certain degree ofdiscomfortcouldbeexpected.Similar topassing throughaTSAcheckpointatthe airport, peoplemaynaturally exhibit amoderate amount of uncomfortablebehavior solely because of the nature of the search. Ressam’s intense,uncomfortablecuescomparedtootherpeopleDeanhadsearched(thebaseline)alertedhertotheanomaly.

There are, of course, an infinite number of ways to classify behavior; theclusters and categories used in combat profiling are quick, effective ways toassesspeople’sbehaviorandidentifypotentialthreats.

TheDominantClusterThefirstclusterthatshouldraiseacombatprofiler’sawarenessisthedominantcluster. Dominant behavior is an expression of the limbic system’s fightresponse. Even in situations in which physical aggression is inappropriate,peopleoftenusedominantbehaviorstointimidate,bully,andassertcontroloverothers.Theruleusedtoclassifyapersonasexhibitingdominanceisthattheyareusingtheirbodytotakeupagreateramountofspaceorinaterritorialdisplay.Generallyspeaking,authoritativepeopleseektoestablishownershipoverpeopleandobjectsintheirimmediatevicinity,51andthisbeginswithtakingownership

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ofthespacearoundthem.Dominantbehaviorincludesgesturesandposturesthatmake a person look larger to intimidate “smaller” people into submission.Examplesofthesegesturesandposturesinclude:

LowerBody:Seated—Feetplantedonfloor,andlegssplayedout,takingupspace.52Seated—Legscrossedandwiththeirhandsholdingtheirankleorlowercalf,demonstratingconfidenceinone'sview.Standing—legsshoulder-widthapart,takingupmorespace.

Torso:Seated—Leaningbackwithhandsclaspedbehindhead, takingupmorespace.53Standing—with hands on their hips in an authoritativeway,with theirarmsakimbotheyaretakingupmorespace.54Standing and leaning forward in an aggressive manner, attempting tolookbiggerorintimidateothers.Standing—Stretching torso andmaking oneself look taller by standinguprightanderect.This can be complemented by observing the chin up and thrusting thechestout.

HandsandArms:Arms spread out on an object (table, counter, etc.)—taking up morespace,whichisoftenconsideredaterritorialdisplay.55

Handsclaspedbehindbackasifjudgingorevaluating.56

Wristandpalmfacingdownwhenshakinghandsorgreeting.57

Pointingwithhandswhiletalkingorlecturing.58

Steeplegesturewithhands(perceivedasintellectualandconfident).59

OtherIndicators:Maintainingone’sgazeforalongerperiodoftime,ornotavertingone’sowngaze.60Dominantpeoplecanbreachothers’ intimateproxemiczone (discussedinalaterchapter),showingtheyfeeltheycangowherevertheywant.Touching other people which demonstrates control over anotherperson.61

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TheSubmissiveClusterThe submissive cluster is the opposite of the dominant cluster and ischaracterized by the absence of the fight response. This isn’t to say that theperson doesn’t perceive a threat, only that the person has determined the bestchanceofsurvivalagainstanaggressorissubmission—literally,notputtingupafightordefendingthemselves.Submissivebehaviorisidentifiedbythetypesofbehaviorthatcauseapersontotakeuplessspace.Thisisalsoaposturethatcanbeused to show receptiveness,warmth, and respect. Indicators for submissivebodylanguagecouldincludebodylanguagefromthefollowinglist:

LowerBody:Seated—feet and legs crossed at the ankle and tucked underneath thechair,makingapersonlooksmaller.Seated—feet wrapped around legs of chair, seeking stability andsecurity.62Legswill often not be used as barrier as it could offend the dominantpersonorbeseenasanaggressiveresponse.

UpperBody:Leaning forward apologetically andmaking the body smaller and lessthreatening, instead of the aggressive posturing forward lean of thedominantcluster.63

Armspulledintothebody(nonthreatening,noabilitytostrikeback).64

Wristsandpalmsexposedingreeting(vulnerable).65

Shouldersloweredandnotprotectingtheneck.66

OtherIndicators:Avertingeyesorfailingtomakeeyecontactwithanotherperson.

Oftentimes people display submissive behavior when they are feelingnonconfrontational. Think about times in your life when you saw a personwalkingaggressivelydownthestreetandyousteppedaside to let themby.Asyouarebeginning tosee, thebehaviors thatmakeup theclustersareones thatyouhaveobservedinotherpeopleorexperiencedyourself.Assigningnamestothe primary ways a person responds to stress is the first step in recognizinganotherperson’semotionalstate.

ItIsn’tAlwaysABadThing—KeepingItInContext

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The importance of putting observations into the context of their surroundingscan’t be overstated. BecauseMarines must quickly and accurately read thosearoundthemanddetermineiftheyareathreatornot,theclustersofdominanceandsubmissionarebestdescribedfromtheperspectiveofwhetherapersonwillputupa fight ifconfronted.Thesamedominanceandsubmissioncuescanbealso observed in other, nonhostile settings in which a subordinate person isshowingatruelevelofrespectanddeferencetoapersonofahigherstatus.Inacaselikethis, thebehaviorforrespectmaybecharacterizedassubmissive,butthe relationship isn’t adversarial. Similarly, leaders accustomed to being incharge and having influence may naturally assume dominant postures whenaround others. Because dominance and submissiveness may have differingmeanings indifferent situations, it iscritical thatcombatprofilersconsider thecontextofthebehavior.

TheUncomfortableClusterWhenapersonfeels threatened,scared,nervous,orbegins toexperiencesomeothernegativeemotion, thatpersonwilldisplaydiscomfort.This ispartof thesecond category of clusters that combat profilers attempt to identify. Just asdominant behavior resulted from the limbic system’s fight response,uncomfortable behavior comes from a person’s flight response. People whoperceiveathreatwilleitherwanttoremovethemselvesfromthesituationordosomething to protect themselves. Distancing behaviors, using barriers, andpacifying behaviors are clear indicators that someone is uncomfortable.However, any combination of three indicators from the following list shouldimmediatelyidentifysomeoneasuncomfortable.LowerBody:

Feetbouncing(limbicsystempreparingthebodyforflight).67Feetoriented towardadoororexit (showingwhatone’s intentionsare,preparingforflight).Legscrossedwhileseated,formingabarrier(protectingvitalareas).68Legs shoulder width apart while standing (body capable of defendingitself).69

UpperBody:Torsoleaningaway(distancingfromathreat).70Torso rotatedaway frompersonorobject (either facingexit toprepareforflight,orturningtoprotectvitals).71

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Armscrossedacrosschest(establishingbarrierstoprotectvitalareas).72Arms/hands covering crotch/groin (establishing barriers to protect vitalareas).73Shouldersraised(responsetoa threat toprotectneck/carotidarteryandhead).74Increaseuseofpacifyingbehavior(resultingfromtheenergymanifestedbytheautonomicnervoussystem).75

OtherIndicators:Eyesglancingaroundtheroom,lookingforanescape.

PacifyingBehaviorsThe use of pacifying behaviors is an immediate sign someone isuncomfortable.76 A pacifying behavior is any act or gesture used to calm orcomfort oneself when experiencing the body’s autonomic responses to stress.Differentbooksandresearchersmayclassifythemusingdifferentterms,suchasadaptors or self-manipulators,77 but they all refer to the same category ofgestures.* People display pacifying behaviors in different ways. Some peoplewillclenchtheirfists,somewillrubtheirhandsontheirthighs,otherswillrubthebridgeoftheirnose,andotherswillusealong,drawn-outexhalationtocalmandcomposethemselves.

Thecauseofthistypeofbehaviorisinitiallytriggeredbythelimbicsystembecausetheenergytheautonomicnervoussystemisgeneratingcannotalwaysbeusedinovertlyaggressiveorprotectiveways,suchaspunchingorfleeing.Whensomeone experiences an increased heart rate or respiration rate (or any otherlimbicsystemresponsetoathreatorstress),thatperson’sbodywillrespondtodecreaseheartrateandrespiration.Pacifyingbehaviorsallowthebodytoreturnto balance and release this built-up energy in discreet, comfortingways. Thisbuildupofnervousenergyiswhatdrivespacifyingbehaviors.

TheComfortableClusterThe comfortable cluster is the opposite of the uncomfortable cluster and isclassifiedastheabsenceofthefight-or-flightresponse.Nostimulus,whetherapersonorobject,hascausedthepersontofeelthreatened.Whenapersonfeelssafe, thatpersonwilldisplaybehaviors that indicatevarying levelsofcomfort,vulnerability,andease.Apersonwhodoesnotperceiveanythreattohissurvivalwilldisplaysomeofthebehaviorslistedbelow.Again,alwayslookforclusters

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ofthree:

LowerBody:Feetmotionlessandrelaxed(nolimbicsystemresponsecausingthemtodistancethemselvesfromthethreat).Legsuncrossedor legs crossedwith the insideof the thigh exposed toanotherperson(nolimbicsystemresponsetoprotectvitalareasandthefemoralarteryontheinsideofthethigh).78Standingwith legscrossed (no threatperceived,bodyvulnerablewhilestanding with all the weight on one foot, body not prepared tofight/flight).79

UpperBody:Torso upright or leaning in (no threat perceived, not concerned aboutdistancing).80Torso leaning away or splayed out (in a reclined or lounging typemanner,bodyunpreparedtodefenditself).81Armsopen—at thesidesof thebody,gesturingopenly,orbehindback(no immediate threat recognized and no need to use hands/arms toprotectthebody).82Shoulders lowered—no turtle effect (no threat recognized, no need toprotectvitalareasofneck).83Nopacifyingbehaviors.

OtherIndicators:Generalrelaxedpostures.

MutuallyExclusiveThefirstfourclustersthatwediscussedrelatesolelytoaperson’slimbicsystemresponsetotheworld.Becauseapersoncannotexperiencebothafightandflightresponse simultaneously, a person canonlydisplayone cluster at a time.Thisisn’t to say that a person cannot escalate from uncomfortable behavior todominantbehaviorveryquickly,but the initialclassificationwillbeoneor theother.Thenextcategoryofclusters,interestedvs.uninterested,complementstheprevious sets of clusters. An individual may be “dominant and interested” or“dominant and uninterested.” Determining a person’s interest will provide agreat deal more information about the person’s emotional state and futureintentions.

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TheInterestedClusterThethirdcategoryofbehaviorclustersrelatestoaperson’sinterest.Theguidingprinciple for identifying a person’s interest is assessing where the person’sattention is focused,whetheron the subjectwithwhom theyare interactingorelsewhere.Beingabletodeterminewhoisinterestedoruninterestedcanprovidea significant advantage when determining whom to contact and engage inconversation.Indicatorsthatshowifapersonisinterestedcaninclude:

LowerBody:Feetpointingatpeopleinconversation(bothfeet).84Feet remaining still, not bouncing (no limbic system preparation toleave).Nolegbarriers(openness).

UpperBody:Torsoleaningforward(seatedorstanding).85

Openbodylanguage(noarmbarriers).86

OtherIndicators:Headnods.87

Gazewillbeorientedinthedirectionofthepersonspeaking.88Mirroring or mimicking of any emotion communicated through theconversationbytheotherpeopleinthegroup.

TheUninterestedClusterThe uninterested cluster will mainly be displayed through behaviors thatdemonstrate the person wants to leave the situation. These will include thefollowing:

LowerBody:Feet bouncing (body preparing to distance itself from the person orobject).89Feetorientedawayfromthepersonorobjectinthedirectiontheywouldliketomove.90Legscrossed—useoflegbarriers.“Shifty”behavior,personmovingorrockingbackandforth.

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UpperBody:Armbarriersup(closingofffrontoftorso).Torsoleaningawayfrompersonorobject.91Maysee“stopping”gestureswithhands.Increaseuseofpacifyingbehavior.

Ifapersondisplaysanybehavioralindicatorsofdisinterest,thatperson’sinterestinasituation,conversation,oreventiseitherwaningorlost.

EmblemsEverything discussed to this point has been universal behavior, as it is drivensubconsciouslyby the limbic system.Therearealsoculturally specifickinesiccues that shouldbeconsideredwhilepreparing todeploy toa foreigncountry.One specific set of important and culturally specific behaviors is called“emblems.”Emblemsarehandgesturesthatcanreplacewords.92Gesturesusedto communicatemessages such as “stop” or “come here” are emblems.Otheremblems include the “thumbs up,” the “A-OK” sign, or the middle finger.Emblems can include facial actions and expressions such as nodding to showagreement and approval, or shaking the head to display disagreement anddisapproval.Manyemblemsaredisplayedsubconsciouslyandareveryreliableindicators of the person’s emotional state, particularly in settings in which aperson must conceal his or her emotions. The topic of emblems is worthmentioning since they are significant and specific to each culture. However,becauseemblemsaresoculturallyspecific, itwouldbeimpossible to list themall.

Immediately upon entering a new country, Marines and security personnelshould quickly determine what the local emblems are. The psychologist PaulEkmanstudiedseveralculturesandidentifiedemblematicgesturesthatindicate“greeting anddeparting, replying, direction/locomotion, insultingor evaluatinganother’s actions or appearance, referring to a person’s physical state, orannouncing a person’s current condition or state.”93 With limitations ininterpreter/translatorsupportinforeigncountries,understandingtheseculturallyspecific emblems can ensure all Marines on patrol know how to give basiccommands that the local population understands and make rudimentaryassessmentsaboutconversationsandrelationshipswhentheycannotunderstandthewords.

KinesicBaselinesandAnomalies

Aswe’vediscussedearlier,itisimportanttoconstantlyestablishabaselinefortheareaweoccupy.Thiscanbedoneat themacrolevelusingall thedomainsbutcanalsobedoneforeachindividualdomain.Wewanttoestablishabaselinefor a person’s body language so we have a starting point for follow-upobservations and can identify changes that occur.Akinesic baseline is simplythe cluster you use to characterize a person as (dominant, submissive,uncomfortable,or comfortable).When the situationand timeallows, a combatprofilercanaddintothatinitialclassificationwiththeinterestedvs.uninterestedclustertoprovideamoredetailedpicture.

Thereasonweuseaclusterasthebaselineisbecausethiscanbeestablishedbefore you approach someone. Often, a visible sign of authority will cause achange in people’s behavior. Picture a situation in which a police officer isapproaching a group of teenagers in the mall. Before the police officerapproaches, an observer would probably notemuch dominant behavior in theteenswhen they think they haven’t done anythingwrong and are comfortablewith their friends. However, when they see the police officer approach, youwouldlikelyseeashiftinthegroupassomewouldbecomeuncomfortablewiththe police officer, somemight become submissive, and somemay attempt tobecomemore dominant at the presence of authority.Without establishing thatinitialbaselinebeforeheapproached,theofficerwouldn’tbeabletonoticethosechanges.While agroupof teenagersmightnotpose a significant threat, thosechangesbecomeimmediatelymoreimportantforMarinesonpatroloverseasora police officer on patrol in a gang-controlled neighborhood. Those changescouldbethefirstindicatorthatthegangmemberhasdecidedhedoesn’twanttoreturntojailandwouldrathertakehischancesbyfightingorshootinghiswayoutof thesituation.Beingproactivemightonlybeafewseconds leftofbang,butthosefewsecondsandthoseinitialchangesinbehaviorcanbethedifferencebetweensuccessandfailureonthebattlefield.

KinesicAnomaliesUp to thispoint,wehaveprovidedameansofestablishingabaseline,but thegoalisforcombatprofilerstoquicklyobserveanomaliesinordertoproactivelyidentifythreats.Aswediscussed,ananomalyisanythingthatrisesaboveorfallsbelow our baseline. Regarding kinesics, an anomaly can be any behavior thatdoesnot fit the situation: someoneuncomfortable in a casual setting, apersonwho is overly interested, or behavior that seems overly dominant or toosubmissive. Besides these types of anomalies, there are several specificanomalies combat profilers should look for: threat behaviors, kinesic slips,

smugglingbehavior,and“acting”natural.

SpecificAnomaliesThatRequireActionIdentifyingthreatbehaviorisdiscussedlastbecauseitseemstogoagainstmostofwhatwehavetalkedaboutuptothispoint,especiallytheRuleofThreeforestablishingacluster.However, aswediscussedabove, combatprofilersdon’talwaysneedtoobservethreeindicatorsbeforemakingadecision.Insomecases,only one indicator is needed to take action. Military personnel and lawenforcementofficershavethelegalresponsibilityandtheauthoritytotakeactionwheneverapersonposesanimmediatethreattothemorothers.Itisthedrivingconceptthatcreatedrulesofengagement—weexisttoprotect.Therearecertainbehaviors in thecategoryof threatbehavior thatdonot requireacluster tobebuilt; whenever they are identified, they require immediate attention. Policeofficers are trained early on to identify many of these behaviors and haveconsistentlymentionedthemwhendiscussingthreats.

Thefirstareaof thebodyMarinesshouldobserveonapersonis thehands.Checkingthehandsofapersonensuresthatthepersonisnotholdingaweaponandisnotpreparingtostrike.Marinesshouldensurethatanypersontheycomeintocontactwithexposeshisorherhands—thiswillhelptoensurethepersonisnotanimmediatethreat.Makingthedecisiontocontactapersonofteninvolvesgettingphysicallycloseandcreatesasignificantamountofrisk:limitedreactiontime, increased number of options for the attacker to do harm, and less skillrequiredbyanattackertodoharm.

Additionally,handscanoftentimesbetraywhereaperson’sattentionis.Ifaperson has something concealed they don’twant discovered, such as a gun, aknife,drugs,stolenitems,etc.,thatpersonwilloftentouchorpatthatareaonthebodywheretheobjectisconcealed,asiftoensuretheobjecthasnotbeenlostanditisstillhiddenfromview.Repeatedpattingcanindicatethatthepersonhasaweaponorsomethingelseworthidentifyingconcealedonhisorherbody.

Anotherindicatortolookforispeoplewhoare“checkingtheirsix.”Thisiswhen a person looks over the shoulder to seewho is around or behind them.Only people who are aware of their surroundings conduct this behavior, andsincemostpeopledonotbother to search for threatsorbother tobeawareoftheir surroundings, this is an indicator that demands further observation. Asdiscussedearlier,peoplearecategorizedintooneofthreecategories:goodguys,badguys, and the rest of thepopulation.Goodguys (Marines, soldiers, policeofficers,etc.)aretrainedtobeawareoftheirsurroundingsandwillconductthisact of checking their six to see if anyone is approaching them, to look at the

people around them, and to maintain a general level of awareness. Bad guys(criminals,insurgents,terrorists,etc.)willconductthesametypeofbehaviortoassesstheirareaforeasytargetsandtoensurethereareno“goodguys”aroundthemwhocouldcatchthemintheact.Anypersoncheckinghisorher“six”isimmediately an anomaly and deserves further observation. A decision isdefinitelyrequiredinthesesituations,evenifjustfurtherobservationtoidentifytheperson’sintentions.

KinesicSlipsAkinesic slipoccurswhenaperson’snonverbalbehaviorbetrays theperson’swords. Nonverbal communication should complement and supplement verbalcommunication, either adding emphasis or illustrating a point, but can alsocontradict the words used. Sowhen the nonverbal communication contradictsthe words used to communicate the same point, combat profilers should bealerted that somethingmight be awry. For instance, if a person is recalling asituation and says that he was driving down a road and turned left at theintersectionwhilehishandspointedtotheright,morecredenceshouldbegivento the gesture. This is because the gesture occurred without any thought orcontrol;however,thestorymayhavebeenconsciouslyalteredtofitaparticularpurpose,thatis,alie.Ifapersonisbeingquestionedaboutwhether“badguys”are in thearea (e.g., insurgents, criminals) and says“no”butnods“yes,” thenweight should be given to the gesture, not the words. The person issubconsciouslyandnonverbally telling the truth(i.e.,badguysare in thearea)buttheyareverballylyingorconcealinginformation.

SmugglingBehaviorPicture a person attempting to smuggle drugs through an airport, or a personattemptingtosmuggleaweaponontoaplane.Whatbehaviorswouldthispersondisplay?First,situationslikethisposesignificantrisksforthepersonattemptingtosmugglesomethingpastsecurity.Particularlyinplacessuchasairports,thereis ahighpossibility that the smugglerwill be caught.Anytime there is a highchancethatapersonwillbecaughtdoingsomething,thatpersonwillexperiencesome type of distress. Furthermore, the person’s body language will provideindicators of distress and discomfort. Uncomfortable behaviors might bedisplayed. Additionally, the person’s body will display visible physiologicaleffects of the stress. Second, smugglers have a high degree of concern forwhateveritistheyaresmuggling.Unlesstheyhavetrainedextensivelytopaynoattentiontotheobjecttheyaresmugglingandareabsolutelyconfidentthatthey

stillhaveitintheirpossession,smugglerswilldevotesomeeffortandattentiontowardtheobject.Anindividualsmugglingaweaponordrugsonhisbodywilloccasionally(orsometimesoften)reachfortheobjectandtouchittoensureitssafety.Normalindividualsdothiswiththingssuchascarkeys,wallets,andcellphones.Whenpeoplegetupandmove,theyoftenpattheirpockettoensuretheystillhave theirwallet,watch,andcellphone—theseare important to themandtheydon’twanttolosethem.Smugglersdothesamething.Whydowediscusssmugglers here? The behavior that smugglers exhibit is the same type ofbehaviorthatsuicidebombers,orsomeonecarryingaweaponintoaplacetheyarenotsupposedto,willexhibit.

“Acting”NaturalOneoftheprinciplesofhumannaturethatcombatprofilingisbaseduponisthatpeopleonlylooknaturalwhentheyarenaturallydoingsomething.Briefly,thismeans that, when we are truly focused on some activity, our actions will besmoothandfluid,andwewillappearlikeweareconcentratingontheactivityinwhichweareengaged.However,ifweareonly“goingthroughthemotions”ofthe activity, but are instead mentally doing something else (e.g., thinking orworrying about something else, trying to observe others, etc.), then our bodylanguage will give us away.We will appear unfocused, will move slower orfasterthanweshould,willover-exaggerateorunder-exaggerateourmotions,andwill not move fluidly or smoothly. Consider the behavior of a constructionworkerlayingbricksataconstructionsiteacrossfromtheWhiteHouse.Now,ifthisconstructionworkeris trulyconcentratingonhis job,allofhismentalandphysical energy will be focused on the task at hand: mixing mortar, movingbricks,digging,etc.Hewillmostlikelynotbeconcernedwithwhatisgoingonaroundhimandwillbemovingataspeedappropriatetohisactivity.

Now imagine this same construction worker attempting to look like he islayingbricksbutis,instead,conductingsurveillanceontheWhiteHouse.Sinceno one can reallymultitask—i.e., truly do two things at once—this individualwillhavetodividehisattention.Hewillhavetoshiftbackandforthbetweenthejobheisactinglikeheisdoingandhisprimarytaskofcollectinginformation.Hewillmoveslower thanheshouldoverall,orhemay try toactquicker thannormal during the times he is “working” to make up for the time lost whileobserving. He will certainly appear unfocused; in fact, he may become soconcernedwith the taskofobserving theWhiteHouse thathemaycompletelyloseallsituationalawarenessandforgetheissupposedtobelayingbricks.

Whydowebringupthisexample?FarmersinAfghanistanwhoareactually

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collecting information onU.S. patrols or criminals conducting observation onpotentialtargetswhileactingliketheyaredoingsomethingelsewillexhibitthesametypeofbehaviorasourconstructionworkerabove.

KinesicsSummaryBeforeapersontakesanyactionormakesanygesture,thedecisionisfirstmadeinhisbrain,eitherconsciouslyorsubconsciously.Whenthatdecision ismade,peoplewillbegintopreparetheirbodiesforthatactandwillbegintotelegraphtheir intentions and let others know what they are about to do. Time spentdeveloping theability to readandunderstandbody language,bothquicklyandaccurately, will provide much insight into other people’s intentions andemotions.

KinesicsTakeaways

Onegestureisinsufficienttomakeanobservation;alwaysformaclusterofthreeindicatorsleadingtothesameconclusion.Clustersshouldbeformedusingindicatorsfrombelowtheshoulderstopreventmisinterpretingfacialexpressions.Searchforbodylanguagethatistheresultofthelimbicsystem’sfreeze,flight,orfightresponsetostressandtheperceptionofthreats.Dominantcluster:Thefightresponse isdefinedbythebehaviorpeopleshowwhenattemptingtomakethemselvesappearlarger.Submissivecluster:Theabsenceof thefightresponse isdefinedby thebehavior people show when attempting to make themselves appearsmaller.Uncomfortable cluster: The flight response is defined by the behaviorpeopleshowwhentheyaredisplayingdistancingorblockingbehaviortoprotectthemselves.Comfortablecluster:Nothreatperceived;thisisdefinedbybehaviorthatshowsopenness.Interestedvs.uninterestedcluster:Whereaperson’sattentionisfocused.Threat indicators: Include smuggling behavior (patting an area on thebody), situational awareness (checking their six) and attempting to actnatural.

4.BIOMETRICS

There are, of course, many surface manifestations of excitement. Thecontraction of blood vessels with resulting pallor, the pouring out of “coldsweat,”thestoppingofsaliva-flowsothatthe“tonguecleavestotheroofofthemouth,”thedilationofthepupils,therisingofthehairs,therapidbeatingoftheheart, the hurried respiration, the trembling and twitching of the muscles,especially those about the lips—all these bodily changes are well recognizedaccompanimentsofpainandgreatemotionaldisturbance,suchasfear,horror,anddeepdisgust.Butthesedisturbancesoftheevenroutineoflife,whichhavebeencommonlynoted,aremainlysuperficialand thereforereadilyobservable.Eventheincreasedrapidityoftheheartbeatisnotedatthesurfaceinthepulsingofthearteries.*

When a person experiences some type of stress, a threatening situation, or astrongemotionalresponse,thatperson’sbodyexperiencescertainphysiologicalchanges—mostly caused by the response of the autonomic nervous system(ANS)andbythereleaseofcertainhormonessuchasadrenaline.Infact,theseautonomic changes provide the foundation for polygraph tests.94 Theseuncontrollable, automatic, and observable reactions that people experience arecalledbiometriccues.Becausethesecuesarecloselyrelatedtothefight-or-flightresponse, combat profilers can observe and read people’s biometric cues asindicatorsthatapersonmaybeapotentialthreat.

Why are biometrics important? In short, biometric cues are caused byemotionalchanges.Peopleexperienceemotionswhensomethingishappeningorisabouttohappen(evenjustthinkingsomethingwilloccur)thatwillaffecttheirwell-being.Emotionsprepareapersontoreactquicklytoasituationbycausingphysiological changes that help deal with what caused the emotion.95 Whiletheseemotionscanbepositiveornegative,combatprofilersareconcernedwithnegativeemotionssuchasanger,fear,andcontemptandthewaythatthefight-or-flight response can be observed on the body as opposed to the facialexpressionsassociatedwiththeemotions.

BiometricBaselinesandAnomaliesThe body generally tries to maintain equilibrium, which is a normal state ofbeing in functions such as heart rate, respiration rate, body temperature, andbloodpressure.Whenconditionschange,thebodyreactstothemandattemptstoadapttothenewconditions.Thatstateofequilibriumandbalancewillbecomethebaselinewhen itcomes tobiometriccues,and theobservablechangeswillbecometheinitialindicatorsofananomaly.

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When establishing baselines with regard to any domain, combat profilersneed to understand the context of the situation. This will determine what isnormal and what is anomalous. For instance, a person shivering may be ananomaly—shivering is an indicator that the autonomic nervous system haswithdrawnthebloodfromtheextremitiesanddivertedittothemajororgansandmuscle groups in preparation for a fight-or-flight response.96 This could alsoindicatethattheindividualmaybeanxious,afraid,orevenangry,butcouldalsobearesponse to thepersonsimplybeingcold.It is important to identify if thepersonisshiveringbecauseoftheenvironment,97ratherthansomephysiologicaleffectofemotions.Therefore,thefirstquestioncombatprofilersmustaskwhenidentifyingananomalyis:Doesthisperson’sbehaviorfitthesituation?Oncethebaselinehasbeenestablished,anomaliescanmoreeasilybedetected.Therearethreemaintypesofanomalieswithregardtobiometrics:

Anindividualwhosebiometriccuesdonotfitthesituation.A change in the observed biometric cues, whether sudden or gradual,thoughasuddenchangecommunicatesamoreimmediatechangeintheperson’semotions,whichwouldbeamoreurgentindicator.Indicators that an individual is attempting to mask or hide potentialbiometriccues,orsomeonegivingoffnonverbalindicatorsofattemptingtocontrolthemthroughpacifyingbehaviors.

EmotionsandTheirBiometricCues

ANGER

AsPaulEkmansays,“thefaceofattack,ofviolence,isanger.”98Angermaybecausedbybeingorfeelingphysicallyorpsychologicallyrestrained, insultedorharmed, taken advantage of, or many other reasons.99 From an evolutionaryperspective, anger was an important emotion for survival since it helped tomobilizeanindividualtofightathreat.100Angeristhemostcommondangerousemotionsincethemotiveofangeroftenistoharmthetarget.101Whenapersonexperiences anger, that person’s body gives off certain honest signals thatcommunicatetoothersthatthepersonisangry.Anangrypersonmayflaretheirnostrilsandbecomeredintheface.102Angerisassociatedwithincreasedheartrate,increasedrespiratoryactivity(fasterbreathing),103andfacialflushing.104

FEARFearisanemotionthatiscloselyrelatedtoanger.105Feariscausedbyeventsor

situationsthatsignaldanger106aswellasthethreatofphysicalorpsychologicalharm.107Evolutionhaspredisposedhumanstoafewmainresponsestoathreatdiscussedearlier—freeze, flight,or fight.Fear isassociatedwith theflightandfreeze responses, though angermay quickly follow fear,whichmay lead to afight response, particularly if it seems as though fleeing or freezing will notwork.108Fearmayalsodifferdependingon thesituation,whether the threat isoccurringrightnoworifitwilloccurinthefuture.Animmediatethreatleadstoaction (flight/ freeze) to respond to the threat. An impending threat leads toincreased vigilance.109 Just as with anger, there are visible and non-visiblephysiologicalreactionsbythebody.Fearisassociatedwithincreasedheartrate,vasoconstriction (paling of the skin), and faster breathing.110 Pupil dilation,sweating, and increased blood flow are also associated with fear.111 Anxiety,whichisrelatedtofear,maycausepupilconstrictionandfasterorshallowerthannormalbreathing.112

CONTEMPT

The two emotions discussed above, anger and fear, are directly related to thebody’s fight-or-flight mechanism. Contempt, although not directly related tofight-or-flight,oftenincludesanelementofangerandcaneasilyleadtoapersonbecomingangrytowardthetargetofcontempt,whichthenmayleadtoviolence.Disgust, which is closely related to contempt, corresponds to faster breathingandacceleratedheartrate113aswellasincreasedsalivation.114

Ourbodygivesoffsignalsthatitisexperiencingtheseemotions,andbecausetheseemotionsareoftenspontaneous, thesignalsareoftenspontaneous.Somephysiological aspects that are associatedwith emotional change include bloodpressure, heart rate, respiration, salivary secretion, sweating, muscle tension,tremors,andeyeblinking.115Furthermore,whensomeonedoesrealizethattheyareexperiencingtheseemotions,theymayattempttoconceal,repress,ormaskthem—whichmaybe,attimes,anevenmoreobviousindicatorthatsomethingisgoingon.Itisthejobofthecombatprofilertopickupontheseindicators.Thenextseveralsectionswillintroducespecificindicators.

EyesIthasoftenbeensaidthattheeyesareawindowintoaperson’ssoul.Whilethismayormaynot be true, the eyesdo tell a lot about aperson’s emotions.Theeyesrespondimmediatelytostressandprovideobviousindicatorsthatapersonisundergoingsometypeofstress.Therearethreemainbiometriccuesthatrelate

totheeyes:pupildilation/constriction,blinking,andtunnelvision.

PUPILDILATIONANDCONSTRICTION

A person’s pupil is normally between 2 mm to 5 mm in diameter, but cancontractto1.5mmandcandilateupto9mm.Itcanalsoreacttostimuliin0.2seconds,116whichmeansthatthepupilscanprovideanimmediateindicatorofaperson’s emotions. The late psychologist andUniversity of Chicago professorEckhardH.Hessconductednumerousstudiesdemonstratingthatpupilsizecanbe a reliable indicator of attitude and emotions—when people see things theythink are positive or pleasurable, their pupils dilate, butwhen they see thingsthey think are negative or that cause anxiety, their pupils constrict.117 Pupildilation has often been shown to be associated with both anger and fear.118Pupilsalsodilateduetoneworinterestingstimuli,whenapersonisfocusedandpayingattention tosomething,whenconcentrating,orwhenexperiencingpain.The pupil sometimes constricts in response to negative stimuli, as alsodemonstrated by Hess. For a combat profiler, any significant change in aperson’spupil size shouldbe takenasan indicator that somethinghasarousedthatindividual,whetherpositivelyornegatively,andthatpersonhasexperiencedsometypeofemotion.

BLINKINGBlinking is such a common and routine activity that it is often forgotten. Anormalpersonblinksthousandsoftimeseachdayandrarelynoticesit;however,blinkingisanincrediblyreliableindicatorthatapersonisundergoingstress.Forinstance, in1999, formerPresidentClintonwasunder significant stressduringthe deposition concerning his relationship with Monica Lewinsky. His bodylanguage and speech clearly confirmed this. In addition to more obviousbehavioral and verbal signs, Clinton’s blinking also indicated that he wasextremelyuncomfortableandupset.Duringthedeposition,SolomonWisenbergaskedClintonaseriesoffairlyexplicitquestionsregardinghisrelationshipwithLewinsky. Take any one-minute segment of this conversation, and Clinton’saverageblinkrateisaboutsixtyblinksperminute.Contrast thiswithhisblinkrateduringaspeechhegaveinJanuary1998,inwhichheinitiallyrespondstotheallegationsregardingLewinsky.Duringthisspeech,Clintondoesnotappeartobeundermuchstress,andhisblinkrateisbetweentwelvetofifteenblinksperminute. His blink rate while under stress was about four times his blink ratewhilenotunderstress.Aperson’snormalblinkrateisbetweensixtotentimesperminute,butblinkingincreaseswhenapersonisunderstress,119emotionally

aroused,120orwhenapersonattemptstomaskemotions.121Blink ratecanalsobean indicator that someone isextremely focusedsince

blinking has been shown to decrease when one is under significant cognitiveloadorhighlyfocused.122Attemptingtosuppressanemotionisphysiologicallytaxing,andaspecificindicatorofsomeoneattemptingtosuppressanemotionisincreasedblinking.Basedonthisinformation,combatprofilersshouldconsidersignificantblinkingasanindicatorthatsomeoneisexperiencingahighlevelofstress (andmaybe anxious, scared, or nervous), andvery little blinking as anindicatorthatsomeoneisextremelyfocused—perhapsmissionfocused.

TUNNELVISIONANDMISSIONFOCUSTheareaofaperson’sfocusedvisionisrelativelysmall,andperipheralvisioniscriticaltounderstandone’ssurroundingsandallowingthebraintomakesenseoftheworld.However,whenaperson’speripheralvisionislostandfocusedvisionis reduced, that person can have significant difficulty doing even the simplesttasks.Tunnelvisionistheextremelossofperipheralvision.Itisanautonomicresponsethathappensastheresultofseverestressandanexcessiveheartrate.123When a person has tunnel vision, that person will appear to not be payingattentiontothesurroundingenvironment(whichistrue)andwilleasilyrunintoobjects thatwould have normally been noticed and avoided.Combat profilerswill not actually see the loss of peripheral vision occur, but theywill see theeffectsofthelossofperipheralvision.124

“FaceYourEnemy”The face reveals much about a person’s emotions, more than most peopleunderstand and appreciate. In addition to expressing emotions, the face alsogives off certain biometric cues that combat profilers can observe to helpidentify anomalies. The main indicators on the face are facial flushing(blushing),paling/blanching,anddrymouth.

FacialFlushing(Blushing)andPalingReddeningoftheface,thatis,facialflushing,iscausedbythecapillariesinthefacedilatingandbeingfilledwithblood(vasodilations)andcanbetheresultofseveral situations. For instance, a person’s face may redden during or afterintensephysicalactivity,suchasexercise.However,facialflushingalsooccurswhenanindividualisangryandintendingtofight.125Thisreddeningmayalsospreadtoaperson’sneck.Incontrast,palingisassociatedwithfearandanxiety

as thebody takesbloodaway from the skin andextremities (vasoconstriction)and diverts it to the important muscle groups.126 Paling may also occur withforms of anger associated with bracing or protecting one’s self against anattack.127Thekeyisthatanysignificantcolorchangeinaperson’sfaceisaclearindicatorthatthepersonisexperiencingasignificantemotionalresponse.

DryMouthDrymouthisoftenassociatedwithincreasedactivityoftheautonomicnervoussystem.Itwouldseemthattheautonomicnervoussystemdivertsneededfluidstomoreimportantpartsofthebodyandfunctions,suchassweating.Increasedemotional arousal has also been shown to increase swallowing.128 In fact,increased swallowing is also associated with the repression of emotions,particularly embarrassment. As one researcher writes, “This fairly easilyobserved behavior (i.e., swallowing) might be a useful cue to observers thatsomeoneisexperiencinganemotionalstatebuttryingtonotshowit.”129

ChestandTorsoEmotionalresponsesoftenaffecttheentirebody,notjusttheface.Thetorsoandlimbs may also provide indicators that are important for combat profilers toobserve.Twoofthemajorindicatorsarerapidbreathingandshaking.Increasedrespiration (i.e., faster breathing) and irregular respiration are associated withnegativeemotions(e.g.,angerandfear).130Anotherindicatorrelatedtothechestandtorsoisshivering,whichresultswhentheautonomicnervoussystemdivertsbloodfromtheperiphery(hands,skin,etc.)andsendsittothemajormuscles—individuals who experience this may feel cold and begin to shiver. This canhappenduringbothfightandflightresponses.Becauseoffeelingcold,apersonmaydisplayparticularnonverbalindicators,suchascrossingthearmsacrossthechestorrubbingthearmsandchesttowarmup.

Indicatorsassociatedwiththelimbsincludeshaking,sweatypalms,otherwiseexcessivemovement (fidgeting), and loss of finemotor skills. Tremblingmayoccur after physical activity because of extreme vasoconstriction in theextremities or as a result of the release of adrenaline.131 In fact, adrenalineincreases heart rate and causes the constriction of bloodvessels in addition totrembling.132When a person’s heart rate exceeds 115beats perminute (bpm),finemotorskillsbegintodeteriorate.After145bpm,complexmotorskillsbegintobelost.133Whenourautonomicnervoussystemisaroused,oneoftheresultsis an increase inmotor activity, and evenwhen one attempts to suppress this

energy,itmaystillappearassmallfidgetsandother“nervous”behavior.Thesefidgetsarehonestsignalsofincreasedautonomicnervoussystemactivity.134

Masking,Hiding,ComfortingAlthoughmostpeopledonotconsciouslyknowhowtheANSandlimbicsystemreact during times of emotional stress, they still learn how to deal with theeffects. Every person displays types of pacifying behaviors, which may beindicators that they are experiencing the types of autonomic-biological effectsdiscussedinthischapter.Althoughtheywerediscussedindetailinthekinesicschapter, we want to briefly touch on them here since they are indicators thatsomeone is either trying to mask or respond to these biometric cues. Forinstance,watchapoker tournament, andyouwill notice that some individualswearsunglassesduringthepokergame.Theydonotwearsunglassesbecauseitisbright inside,butbecause theyunderstand that theirpupilscouldpotentiallygiveawaytheiremotionalresponsetothecardstheyhaveintheirhand.Takingthisastepfurther,incombatsituations,wewanttobesuspiciousofindividualswhoseclothesdonotfittheenvironment,whoweartoomanyclothes,orwhoseclothes are too loose. Each of these may be indicators that the person isattempting tomask biometric cues their body gives offwhen they experiencestress.Nonverbally,pacifyingbehaviors consistof rubbing theneck,breathingdeeplyandslowly,rubbingthearmsandchest,orrubbingthelegswhenseated.These actions are done to relax hair follicles, slow down respiration, inhibitshaking and shivering, and generally calm oneself down. For example, as apersonexperiencesincreasedrespirationastheperson’sbodyattemptstotakeinmoreoxygen, thepersonmayattempt tocontrolhisorherbreathingbytakinglong,slowbreaths.

UsingBiometricstotheCombatProfiler’sAdvantageBiometriccuesprovideimmediateandaccurateindicatorsofthetypeofemotionthatapersonisexperiencing,aswellasindicatorsofsuddenemotionalchanges.However,identifyingbiometriccuesrequiresbeingcloseenoughtoone’stargetof observation to be able to identify small changes such as pupil dilation,reddeningorpalingoftheskin,andsweating.Someindicatorscanbeseenfromfurther away, such as rapid breathing. By looking for these biometric cues,combatprofilerscanreadtheemotionsofthosearoundthemandidentifythoseindividuals who are experiencing some type of emotional stress or change inemotion. Someone attempting to smuggle or steal, discreetly escape, harmsomeone, or do anything in which they may experience some type of strong

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negativeemotionwilldisplayoneormoreoftheseindicators.Sincerarelydoesonly one indicator appear by itself, combat profilers will usually be able toidentify other anomalies, from either this or another domain, to confirm thatwhattheprofilerhadobservedbiometricallywasanaccurateindicator.Thenextsection will build on this knowledge of human nonverbal comunication andprovidefurtherindicatorstoidentifypotentialthreats.

BiometricCuesTakeaways

Biometriccuesaretheuncontrollableandautomaticresponsestostress.Biometriccuescontributetotheclustersofindividualbehavior.Reddeningoccursastheresultofangerorembarrassmentandisseenontheface,neckorextremities.Palingoccursduringfearandisseenbytheabsenceofnormalskincolorasbloodispulledawayfromtheextremities.Pupilsdilatewhensomethingpleasurableorpositiveisseenaswellasintimesoffear.Pupilsconstrictwhensomethingnegativeisobserved.Blinkrateincreasesduringtimesofstress.Dry mouth occurs as moisture is drawn from extremities and can beobservedbyapersonlickinghisorherlips.

5.PROXEMICSproximate,adj.,1.nextornearestinspace,order,time,etc.proximity,n.,1.thestateorqualityofbeingnear.

“Making correct inferences about the imminent behavior of others hasadaptivebenefits,andmisunderstandingwhatanother individual intends todocanseriouslyimpairsurvival.”135

Thewayhumansusespace tocommunicate iscalledproxemics.Likeotheranimals,humansmove towardwhat theyareattracted toandmoveawayfromwhat they fear. For the combat profiler, the twomost significant factors withregardtoproxemicsarerelationshipandstatus.Relationshipaffectsthedistanceatwhichtwopeoplewillstand.Forinstance,friendsstandclosertooneanotherthan they do with strangers. Status is significant in how people use space tocommunicate, as subordinates rarely initiate contact with someone of higher

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socialrank.Understandingrelationshipandstatusinagivensituationiscriticalto making good observations. Two friends who are maintaining a significantseparationfromoneanothermaybeananomaly,justasasubordinateinitiatingcontactwithapersonofhigherstatusmaybeananomaly.

Theuseofproxemicsincombatprofilingrestsonseveralkeyprinciples:Peoplearedrawntowardthingstheylike,thattheyareattractedto,thatmakethemfeelsafeandcomfortable.Peopleavoidandmovewayfromthings they dislike, are afraid of, or that make them feel unsafe anduncomfortable.136The closer people choose to be, generally themore comfortable thosepeoplearewithoneanother.Peoplewhoknoweachotherwill standneareachother. Inanycrowd,peoplewhoknoweachotherwillbenexttoeachother,andthosepeoplewhoknoweachotherbestwillbetheclosesttoeachother.

Proxemics makes it possible for Marines to identify potential threats byobserving how others use space. Proxemics involves two main elements:distance,asitrevealsrelationshipsorattitudes,andmovement,asanindicatorofintention.

DistanceProxemics provides combat profilers with the ability to evaluate groups ofpeopleanddeterminesignificantaspectsoftherelationshipsbetweenthemandtheirattitudestowardoneanother.Thegroup’srelationshipsinspaceprovidetheobserverwithawealthofinformationabouteachindividualinthegroupaswellasthegroupasawhole.

AnthropologistEdwardT.Hallhasdefinedfourproxemiczones.Thesezonesarethegeneraldistancesthatpeoplemaintainfromoneanother,dependingupontheir level of comfort with one another. Although specific distances areculturally dependent, the four zones are still validways of using the distancebetween people tomake a determination about their relationships. Hall’s fourzonesaretheintimate,thepersonal,thesocial,andthepublic.

1.THEINTIMATEZONETheintimatezoneistheareathatisclosesttothebody.Itisthespacenormallyreservedonly forpeople in theclosestof relationships.137 Spouses, boyfriendsand girlfriends, children, parents, and very close friends are usually the onlypeoplewillinglypermittedintothisarea.Thisareaiswellwithinarm’sreachand

provides themost risk for someone to do harm.This is the reason people areselectiveaboutwhoisgrantedaccessintothisspace.

At times, the intimate zoneboundary is crossedwithout consent.There aremanyreasonsthatthiscouldoccur.Oneofthesereasonscouldbebecauseoneperson is attempting to establish dominance over another. Since a proxemicviolation“occurswhensomeactualharmisdonebytheinvasion,”138thepersonviolating the proxemic boundarymay be trying tomake the other person feeluncomfortable and ultimately submissive to either gain ormaintain influence.Thesetimeswhenpeopleareforcedintosocially“close”situationswillcausealimbicsystemresponse,as thebodyprepares todealwith the threat.Apersonwhoseintimatezonehasbeenviolatedandwhofeelsdefensiveoruncomfortablemay put up barriers or display pacifying behaviors (kinesics), begin to blush(biometrics), or move away from the person to re-establish proper separation(proxemics).

There are situations in which violations of the intimate zone becomeunavoidable, such as on crowded city streets, in airplanes, elevators, or inprofessional environments like a doctor’s office, a beauty parlor, or abarbershop.People are generally acutely awareof invasions, not onlybecausetheydon’twantothersintrudingontheirspace,butalsobecausetheydon’twanttoviolate thespaceofothers.139 Insuchsituations, there isanexpectationthatotherswillmakeanefforttomaintaintheproperdistance.Whenthatisnotthecase,thelimbicsystemrecognizesapotentialthreatandrespondsaccordingly.

2.THEPERSONALZONEThepersonal zone is the second smallest circle surroundingaperson. It is thespacewithinwhichmostfriendsandacquaintancesinteract.140Thisdistance isgenerallyaboutarm’slengthandistheconversationalseparationatwhichmostdaily interaction is conducted.Peoplewhooperate in this zonegenerallyhavesomerelationshipbutarenotcloseenoughtoalloweachotherintotheintimatezone.

Aswiththeintimatezone,situationsariseinwhichindividualsareforcedintoone another’s personal zone, such as in shoppingmalls, restaurants, or publictransportation. The kinesic cluster of interested vs. uninterested will provideconfirmation that this boundary has been violated. Signs that two people arecomfortable within each other’s personal zones may be an acknowledgementbetweenthemsuchaseyecontact,nods,feetortorsoturningtowardtheperson,orhandshakes.Ifnoindicatorsofapositiverelationshipexist,thiscouldindicatethatthetwoareintentionallytryingtoavoideachother.

3.SOCIALANDPUBLICZONESThesocialandpubliczonesarethetwolargestzones.Thesearethedistancesatwhichpeopleprefertokeepstrangers.141Thetwozonesareaddressedjointlyinthissectionbecausebothindicatethesamerelationship:norelationship.Whydopeople tend to keep strangers at a distance? Safety.As distance increases, theoptionsavailabletoanattackerdecrease.

Forthepurposesofcombatprofiling,thesocialandpubliczonesarebeyondarm’slength.

Howpeopleinteractwiththespacearoundandbetweenthemisasignificantdynamic and predictor of human behavior anywhere in the world. Proxemicdistancecanindicatethenatureofrelationshipsbetweenpeopleofagroupandrelationships between groups. Identifying the proxemic zones between peopledoesnotrequirethattheobserverbeupcloseandpersonal.Observationcanbedonewithstandoff(i.e.,sufficientdistancetoprotectoneself)usingbinocularsorother optics. This observation is one that the combat profiler must study andmaster. The objective, remember, is to place ourselves and those we areprotecting“leftofbang.”

A note about cultural differences: The exact distance of the four zonesdescribed above varies from culture to culture. On a recent trip to Tokyo, aJapanese male and an American Marine were observed in conversation. TheJapanese man continually tried to move closer to theMarine to establish theconversationaldistancecustomaryinJapaneseculture.Eachtimehedidso,theMarine backed away, seeking the comfort (to him) of the normal Americanconversational distance. This “proxemic dance” continued throughout theencounter.

MovementIfdistanceisthefirstelementofproxemics,movementisthesecond.

People move for a purpose, and the way a person moves can reveal thatperson’s intentions. A predator creeping in for the kill looks different than aperson casually searching for a friend, and an attackerwith violent intentionsmoving quickly toward his or her target looks different than a person rapidlyapproachinga friendwithexcitement.Theability todetermine intentions frommotionisaskillevolvedbyhumansovermillionsofyears.Asonestudystates,“One of ourmost fundamental cognitive adaptations is the ability to infer theintentionsofothers.”142

Combatprofilersclassifymovementintothreecategories:movementtoward,movementaway,andidlemovement.

Movementtowardcanbebothpositiveandnegative;itcanmeanfriendlyorhostileintent.Movementawaycanmeanevasionorflight,orsimplymovementaway from one thing toward another without any negative intention. Idlemovementcan includeactivities suchaswaitingorotherbenignpurposes,butcanalsocommunicatesurveillance.Combatprofilersmustdistinguishbetweenthesetypesofmovement.Thebestwaytolearnispractice:toplaceourselvesinscenarios where we can observe different intentional movements and developfilefoldersoneachtype.

Imagine you are walking along a busy street. People are passing in everydirection. Most are paying no attention to you. No one is increasing ordecreasinghisspeedrelativetoyours,andnooneischanginghisdirection.Youcanquicklyruleout thatanyoneaheadofyouisattemptingtoevadeyou.Youobservethoseindividualswhoarefacingyouandwalkingtowardyou.Again,nooneseemstonoticeyou.Nooneincreasesordecreaseshisspeed.Theiranglesrelativetoyouremainthesame.Thefewpeoplewhoarewalkingclosetoyourpathdochangetheirdirectionabittoavoidyou.Youcanquicklyinferthatnoneofthesepeopleisathreat.However,asyouglancetoyourrear,younoticeoneindividual who does seem to be increasing his speed and whose angle anddirectionmatchesyours.Asyouturndownasidestreet,heturnsthesameway.You increase your speed. He matches it. You cross the road.When you turnback,youseethatthisindividualhaschangedhisangleanddirectiontotaketheshortest route toyour location, andhe isnow inadead sprint.Apart fromhisfacial expressions or other body language, you can quickly infer that he ischasingyou.Youmust nowdetermine if theperson followingyou is a threat;kinesicsandbiometricshelpyoutodoso.

ProxemicPushesandPullsAfoundationaldynamicofhumannatureisthatpeoplewillapproachthingstheylike and which they expect will deliver pleasure and avoid things that areunappealingorcouldcausethempain.143

Incombatprofiling,movementtowardapersonorthingiscalledaproxemicpull.Theopposite,movementaway,isaproxemicpush.

1.PROXEMICPULLA proxemic pull occurs when a person or group is drawn to another person,group, object, or place. Proxemic pulls occur for many reasons: because thepersonbeingpulledisinterested;becausetheotherperson,object,orplacecanfulfill a need; a relationship or association exists; or there is a degree of

attractionandcuriosity.Proxemicpullsoccurwhensomeonedoesnotperceiveany threat, so the body is not prepared for fight or flight. Proxemic pulls aresignificant to combat profilers because they focus the profiler’s attention onspecificinteractionsthatprovideinsightintothegroupbeingobserved.

Proxemicpullsareindicatorsthatsomepersonorelementstandsoutfromthebaseline.Ifpeopleareattractedanddrawntoaperson,combatprofilersshouldeither continue to observe that person or contact that individual to figure outwhatmakesthatpersonsignificant.Consideradrugdealeroperatingonastreet.This individualwill be continually approachedbyothers andwill have a highdegreeofsituationalawareness.Hisinteractionswillexhibitsignificanthand-to-hand contact, which is the obvious sign of possible drug deals. Although thehand-to-hand contact is the indicator of illegal activity, it is the proxemic pullthatwillinitiallydrawthecombatorlawenforcementprofiler’sattention.

Marines deployed overseas deal with this dynamic every day. On manypatrols,Marineswilldesignateonememberasthe“candyman.”ThecandymanistheMarinewiththebackpackfullofsweets,pens,pencils,andanythingelsetogivetothelocalkids.Assoonasthecandymanhasbeendiscoveredbythelocal children, other youngsters are proxemically pulled to that one Marine.While the candy-manpull canbe abenefit forMarines as they strive tobuildrelationshipswith the locals so they can root out the enemy, the enemy oftenusestheseproxemicpullstotheiradvantageaswellbystagingattacksaspeoplecongregate.

2.NEGATIVEPROXEMICPULLSuicidebombersseekcentersofproxemicpull:amarket,ahouseofworship,amedicalsupportmission.Theygowherethehighestnumberofpeopleare.

Astarkproxemicrealityisthatless-skilledattackersneedtogetclosetoustoharmus.Thismakesitcriticalforprofilerstorecognizewhenproxemicpullsareoccurringandtobealertforthesepotentialthreats.

Insurgentsalsoattempt touseproxemicpullsasameans tobaitAmericansintoareaswheretheymaybeattacked.Insurgentsdon’thaveanendlesssupplyof equipment,munitions, ormanpower.Theymust bemore efficient inwheretheychoosetostrike.Theycandothisinoneoftwoways—eitherbystudyingourtactics,habits,andpatternstopredictwherewemightbeinthefutureorbydoingsomething todrawAmerican forces intoanareawhere they, theenemy,arewaiting.Insurgentsmightuseseveraltacticstocreateaproxemicpull:causeacivildisturbance to forcestand-by forces todeploy,emplaceadecoy IED toforceexplosivespecialiststorespond,openfireonapatrol,thenfleetocausethe

patrol togivechase.Byunderstanding theenemy’smethodofproxemicpulls,patrol leaders can use tactical cunning to think through where the enemy istrying to pull the patrol and outmaneuver the enemy instead of gettingambushed.

3.PROXEMICPUSHAproxemicpush is theoppositeof aproxemicpull; it is themovement awayfromanotherperson,place,orobject.Aproxemicpushoccurstoavoidarealorpotentialthreatorbecauseoffearoruncertaintycreatedbyalackofknowledge.In contrast to the proxemic pull, there is usually a “flight” element to thedecisiontomoveawayfromaperceivedthreat.

Inciviliansociety,individualsrarelyfindthemselvesinsituationsthatrequireimmediatephysicalflight.Thatdoesn’tmeanthatproxemicpushesdon’thappeneveryday.Thebusinessmanbeingcriticizedbyhissuperiorduringacommitteemeetingmay roll his chair backwards a few inches and then lean even fartherawaytocreateasmuchseparationfromhisbossaspossiblewithoutmakingthediscomfortobvious.Theneedtoseparateoneselffromathreatisuniversal.Thecombatprofilercanandmustbeawareofthis.

Patrols by U.S. forces in foreign nations, such as Afghanistan, have atendency to pull children toward them. However, at times, a U.S. force mayencountersituationsinwhichchildrenorotherlocalspurposefullyavoidpatrols.Dothelocalshaveadvancedwarningofanimpendingambush?HavethelocalsbeenthreatenedbyinsurgentswithconsequencesiftheyinteractwithorhelptheAmericanforces?Inthesesituations,anAmericanpatrolhascausedaproxemicpush.Childrenandotherlocalsarerepelledforreasonsoftheirownsurvival.

Good guys and bad guys are continually engaging in a proxemic push andpulldance.Asalways,thecombatprofilermustestablishthebaselineandthenimmediatelyhunt for anomalies. Inproxemics, theseanomalies aredefinedbytwodistinctfactors:distanceandmovement.

Imagine your patrol has entered a village. Your squad car drives into aneighborhood.Thefirstanomalythatshouldalertaprofilerisasuddenchangein proxemic behavior, especially avoidance (proxemic push). When peoplesuddenlygrantgreaterproxemicspacethanisnormal,itislikelythattheyhavebeenpushedawayfromsomethingtoensuretheirownsafetyandsurvival.Thesecond anomaly is decreased proxemic standoff. Have individuals placedthemselves closer (anomaly) than they should be (baseline)?Are theymovingevencloser?Isthatmovementaccelerating?

The domain of proxemics is about identifying and confirming people’s

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relationships and intentions based on how they interactwith the space aroundthem.Thesefundamentalsofproxemicscanbeappliedanywhereintheworld.While thephysical distanceswill change for thedifferent proxemic zones, thezoneswill still imply the same information about the relationships that peoplehavewitheachother.

Justliketheotherdomainsdiscusseduptothispoint,theproxemiczonesandproxemicpushesandpullsareobservationsthatpeoplehavebeenmakingtheirentirelives.Theonlydifferenceisthatcombatprofilingisnowclassifyinganddefining behavior, which allows for more intelligent decisions that can becommunicatedtootherpeopletoexplainthehumanbehaviorbeingobserved.

KeyTakeaways—ProxemicsProxemicsistheinterpretationofspacebetweenpeopleandotherpeopleorobjects.Intimatezone:Reservedforonlytheclosestofrelationships,insideonearm’s-lengthdistance.Personalzone:Reserved for friendsandacquaintances,generallyaboutonearm’sdistance.SocialandPubliczones:Distancewherestrangersaremaintained.Proxemicpull:Thephysicalmovementstowardapersonorobject,likelycausedbythingsthatareconsideredattractive,safe,andpositive.Proxemicpush:Thephysicalmovementaway fromapersonorobject,likely caused by things that are considered harmful, unappealing, andnegative.

6.GEOGRAPHICS

WhatAreGeographics?“InLosAngeles,everystreetisclaimedbyonegangoranother.Itdoesn’tmatterifitisinthesuburbsorthestreetthepolicestationison,agangwillclaimtheyownit.Somestreetsaremorecontestedthan

others,butthefirststepinunderstandingcrimehereistounderstandwhohasclaimedwhat.”—LosAngelespoliceofficer,GangTaskForce

hefirstprincipleofGeographicsisthathumanbeings(andanimalsaswell)act with greater confidence in areas with which they are familiar. Home

fieldadvantageisreal.Individualsmovefluidly,comfortably,andconfidentlyinareas they feel at home in, but more deliberately, slowly, and with greatercaution in areas where they don’t know “the lay of the land.” Crime and

insurgent activity occurs almost always in settingswhere the criminal and theinsurgenthaveestablishedahighdegreeoffluencyandfamiliarity.Becauseofthis, Marines and law enforcement professionals need to be capable ofidentifying individuals and groups who have developed an intuitiveunderstandingof theirenvironment.Thisbeginsbystudyinghowpeoplemovethroughtheneighborhoodsandvillageswithwhichtheyarefamiliar.

Whoistheenemy?Whereishe?Asyou, the combat profiler, seek the foe hiding in plain sight and in plain

clothes,thedomainofgeographicsisindispensable.Geographicsallowsyoutomakeassessmentsabouttherelationshipbetweenthepeopleandthevillage,theneighborhood,and the land.Geographicsprovidesamethodologyforbreakingdowntheareaofoperationsintomanageablesections:areasinwhichtheenemyconductsattacks,areasinwhichhelivesorisbased,andpathsandbywaysbywhichhemovesfromonelocationtoanother.Justas theskilledhunterknowshisprey’stracksandtrails,densandsleepingsites,sowecombatprofilersmustlearn not just the enemy, but the ground hemoves upon, takes shelter in, andfromwhichhestrikes.

1.NATURALLINESOFDRIFT

If you have ever seen themovieFerrisBueller’sDayOff, consider the scenewhereFerrisisinaracetobeathismombackhomesothathewon’tgetcaughtditchingschool.Ferrisknewthebeeline route.Heknewwhich fences to jumpandwhich backyards to cut through.He knew theway home as intimately asinsurgents crossing from Pakistan to Afghanistan know the “ratlines” throughthemountains.Heknewthenaturallinesofdrift(NLDs).

Thecombatprofilermustknowtheselinestoo.Toidentifywheretheenemywillbe,wemustlearnhowheintendstogetthere.

In any environment, humans and animals will seek the path of leastresistance. Inanthropological terms,movement iscostly,andinorderformosttypesofmovementtobeworthwhile,gettingtothegoalshouldnotcostmoreintime,energy,safety,etc. thanit isworthtoget there.Whentravelingfromoneplacetoanother,peopletakepathsthataresimple,safe,andobstacle-free.Note:Thisisnotalwaystheshortestway.Additionally,everyenvironmentisshapedinways that provide certain natural paths for people to follow.This is as true inurban environments as it is in rural environments. The combination of thesefactors—simple,safe,andobstacle-freepathsthatfollowthenaturaloutlayofanarea—createNLDs.Oncethecombatprofilerbeginstolookforthesepathways,

he starts seeing themeverywhere.NLDsmaybe pathsworn throughmulchedplantbeds inmallparking lots,game trails through thewoods,oropenings infences.

Combat profilers can use NLDs to predict where and how the enemywilltravel.IdentifyingNLDsiscriticalbecausethesearethepathstheenemyoftentakestomovebetweenhisbaseofoperationsandtheplacesheconductsattacks.Marines normally considerNLDswhen thinking tactically. Patrol leaderswillplanroutes,hidesites,observationposts,andothertacticalactivitiesawayfromNLDs. Since NLDs are routes that locals frequently take, Marines normallymakeeveryeffort to avoid them to avoiddetectionand limit the riskofbeingobservedandcompromised.Infact,forgroupssuchassnipers,beingtoocloseto NLDs can prove fatal. When analyzing terrain with an offensive mindset,MarinesuseNLDstoestablishambushsitessincetheenemymayoftenfollowNLDs when patrolling. Like Marines planning an ambush, combat profilersshouldconsiderNLDsassomethingtobeexploited.NLDsindicatehowpeoplemove through a neighborhood, tree line, or other types of terrain. EnemypersonneluseNLDsjustliketherestofthelocalpopulace.Forcombatprofilers,NLDs show how people use the surrounding terrain. Furthermore, whenobserving NLDs, combat profilers can use the other domains (biometrics andkinesics) to identify potential anomalies. Proxemically, anyone who avoidsNLDsshouldalsobeconsideredananomaly.

TheconceptofNLDsisnotjusttheoretical;it’saprinciplethatcriminalsliveby.ALosAngelespolicedepartmentofficerwhohasspent themajorityofhiscareer studying and combating gang violence in the Hollenbeck District tellsabout a time early in his careerwhen hewould chase gangmembers throughalleyways.Thegangmembersknewthelocationsofall thefootholesinwallsandfences thatcouldbeused tohelp themjump theseobstaclesandkeeponestepaheadofthepursuingpolice.“Individuals,includingcriminals,donotmoverandomly through their environment.”144 Over time, this gang officer hadstudied his area so thoroughly that he knew all the side streets and alleygetaways,knewwheremostofthegangmemberslivedorwouldgotohide,andwasabletooperateaseffectivelyinthatareaasthecriminalsthemselves.

The principle of natural lines of drift can be applied in combat zones bylooking at an area of operation to find creative ways to target insurgents.Homegrowninsurgentswillalwaysknowtheirneighborhoodsandvillagesbetterthanourdeployedforces.AninsurgentplantinganIEDwillnottransitbymainroadsorheavilypatrolledbyways.He’lluseobscurealleysandbackstreets,andif he’s spotted, he’ll know all the “trap doors” and escape routes tomake his

getaway.Finding thesenatural lines of drift is extremely important and canoftenbe

donebyincorporatingtheartoftrackingintoyourpatrolsasawaytodeterminehowmanypeople travel a certainpath,howoften theycome through, and thelast timethat theywere there.Onceyouhavefoundthesepathwaysaroundanareawhereyouthinkanambushmayoccur,youwillbeable torespondmuchmorequicklyinpredictinghowtheenemywill leavethearea,allowingyoutocutoffhisescaperoutes.

HabitualAreasandAnchorPointsTo the combat profiler, individuals congregate in one of two places: habitualareasandanchorpoints.

A habitual area is a place where anyone can come or go at any time. Ananchor point is the opposite.An anchor point is a placewhoseownership hasbeenclaimedbyaparticularpersonorgroup,eitherformallyorinformally,andis identifiedbytheexistenceofpre-establishedcriteria togainentry.Thelocalmallisahabitualarea.TonySoprano’sBadaBingClubisananchorpoint.

HabitualAreasThefunctionofhabitualareasisthesameallovertheworld.AlthoughamallinAmerica looks different than a bazaar in theMiddleEast, both places exist toprovidethenecessarycommoditiesthatpeopleneedtolive.Nationalattiremaydiffer,andthetypesofproductsforsalemayvary,butthelayoutanddesignofmarkets (or other similar places) is often very similar across cultures.Humanbehavior, regardless of location, will display a great number of parallels. Thestudentcombatprofilerdoesn’tneedtotraveltoBangladeshorBurkinaFasotolearn his trade.We can learn a lot right here at home. Developing thick filefolders for American settings can go a long way toward increasing a combatprofiler’s recognition capabilities and decision-making abilities. Instead offocusing on differences between cultures, the student combat profiler shouldfocusonthesimilaritiesinhumanbehaviorattheselocations.

Becausetheinsurgenciesourcountryhasbeenfightingforthelastdecadearepeople-and population-centric fights, Marines on patrol naturally operate incrowded and heavily populated areas. Because of that, Marines often findthemselves in themarketplaces andgathering sites to interactwith locals.ThecatchisthatMarinesaren’ttheonlyonesattractedtotheseareas.Criminalsandinsurgentsalsoviewhabitualareasasplacesofopportunity.Insuchsettings,badguyswillofcoursedotheirbesttoblendinwiththelocals.OnceaMarinehas

established a baseline for the habitual area, he can then begin observing andhuntingfortheanomalies.The“wolvesinsheep’sclothing”willeasilystandoutbecausetheirbehaviorwillnotfitthebaseline.

Habitualareasarepointsofattraction(markets,bazaars,publicsquares),buttherewillalsobepointswithinhabitualareasthathaverestrictedaccessandthatpeople seek to avoid. In any city (habitual area), youwill find neighborhoodswhere not everyone feels welcome. In outdoor markets that are open to thepublic,therewillbestoresandboothswhereonlycertainpeoplearepermitted.The next section will discuss the category we call Anchor Points, where noteveryone iswelcome.It is important for thecombatprofiler tounderstand thatwithin neighborhoods, malls, city streets, buildings, and even a single room,therearealwayslocationsthatareoff-limitstooutsiders.

AnchorPointsConsider a family’s house. Under one roof are both habitual areas (kitchen,livingroom,bathroom)andanchorpoints.Theparentsmaynotalloweveryonetoenter theirbedroom.Dadmayhaveastudyorworkshopthatothersenterattheirownrisk.Teenagers,ofcourse,areuniversallyprotectiveoftheir“private”space.

Onelevelhigher,thehouseitselfmaybeconsideredthefamily’sanchorpoint—theplacefromwhichthefamilyasawholeoperates,andwithinwhosewallsonlycertainoutsidersarewelcome.Movingupa few levels,a townorvillagepossesses both habitual areas and anchor points. Habitual areas include thedowntown area and the market. Anchor points are those areas to which onlycertainpeoplearepermittedaccess.Agang-controlledareaofaneighborhoodisatypeofanchorpoint.

Ananchorpointisahomebase.It’stheplacefromwhichapersonorgroupoperates.Ananchorpointmaybeidentifiedbythevolumeoftrafficcomingandgoing—andbytheemotionalattachment itevokesin thosewho“belong.”It istheplacethatapersonorgroupvisitsregularly,andit’softenthemostimportantplaceinthatperson’sorgroup’slife.

Formostpeople,theirhomeistheiranchorpoint.145Criminalsandinsurgentsmaynotnecessarilyusetheirhomeasananchorpoint,butmayhavesomeotherlocationfromwhichtheyoperate.Theseanchorpointsmaybefixedormobile,temporary, or permanent. Most crime happens in the vicinity of a criminal’sanchorpoint,inthoseareaswithwhichheorsheismostfamiliar.146Thesamecan be assumed for insurgents. Since insurgents often work in teams, theyusually operate from some type of centralized base. That base is their anchor

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point.Identifyinganchorpointswillhelpthecombatprofilertodevelopabaseline

fromwhichtopredicthumanbehavior.Thequestionbecomes,howareanchorpointsidentified?Anchorpointsarenotidentifiedbytheirlocationandoftennoteven by theway the place looks.Anchor points are identified based upon thebehavior of the people at that location. The following are behavioralcharacteristicsandpatternsthatcanhelptoidentifyanchorpoints:

Only certain people have access to the location. Visitors are vetted.Strangers must meet some type of screening criteria to be grantedpermissiontoenter.The place is protected and defended. Access is controlled by securitypersonnel such as doormen or bouncers. Lookouts or outposts mayprovide early warning of any unauthorized approach. Should someonegainaccesswhoisnotwelcome,therewillberetaliationfortrespassing.Localsintheareawhoknowoftheanchorpointmaygooutoftheirwayto avoid it. In this instance, we see simultaneously both the proxemicpushof repulsion tooutsidersand theproxemicpullofmembersbeingdrawntothelocation.

Humanbeingsareterritorial.Groupstakepossessionofspace.Nationshaveborders; gangs have turf. Whenever we observe “behavior characterized byidentificationwithageographicareainawaythatindicatesownership,”wealsoexpect that ownership to involve “defense of that territory against perceivedinvaders.”147Peoplewillfightforwhatistheirs.

TemporaryAnchorPointsAnchorpointsdon’talwayscomeintheformofbuildings,andtheydon’thavetobeestablishedforlongperiodsoftime.Twogangmemberstakeapositiononastreetcorner,talkingloudlyandmakingascene.Howcomfortablewillpeoplefeel walking past with small children? That corner has become a temporaryanchorpoint.Whenthegangmembersmoveaway,thetemporaryanchorpointvanisheswiththem,revertingtobeingahabitualarea.

Temporaryanchorpoints arequitecommon.Youwill see themwheneverapersonorgroupoccupiesanareaforalimitedtime,suchasparkbenches,aspotonthebeachwithchairsandtowels,seatsonpublictransportation,tablesatanoutdoorcafé,oraplaceinline.

Criminalvs.PersonalAnchorPoints

All criminals and insurgents have anchor points, but not all anchor points arecriminal.Thehomeof anunderground leader, for instance,maybeapersonalanchor point, in that the leaderwill not be available to the population in thatlocation.Areligiousleadermaybewillingtotalktoanybodywhileheisatthereligiouscenter,butmaystillconsiderhisprivate residence tobeoff limits.Aperson’s homewill become an anchor point for a variety of reasons, but isn’tnecessarilyacriminalanchorpoint.

Combatprofilersshouldfocustheirsearchesoncriminalandinsurgentanchorpoints. Criminals and insurgents need a haven where they feel secure inconducting their planning and preparations,whether it is amember’s home, alocalbarormeetingplace,asafehouse,etc.Thislocationwillalsobetheplaceto which the criminal returns immediately following the crime. To targetcriminalsandinsurgentseffectively,thecombatprofilermustbeabletoidentifythese sanctuaries and force them to move by removing their perception ofsecurity.Peoplearealwaysmorevulnerableonthemove,andifwecontinuetoeliminate safehavens andanchorpoints for criminals, our ability toneutralizeandeliminatethemwillincreaseexponentially.

FindingCriminalAnchorPointsCriminalsand insurgentsarenotgoing tomake identifying theiranchorpointseasy.Everycarewillbetakentoconcealsuch“secure”areas.Combatprofilersmustsearchforcuesthatareoftenextremelysubtleandcovert.

Localsmayunwittinglyrevealthelocationofanchorpointsbywalkingoutoftheir way to avoid a certain building or block within their village. In thelanguageofcombatprofiling,thisisaproxemicpush.

Marinesonpatrolmustremainalerttochangesinthebodylanguageoflocalsasthepatrolapproachesaseeminglyinnocentlocation.Dopeoplemoveaway?Does their demeanor alter from comfortable and open to uncomfortable anddefensive?

Graffiti, flags, or other insigniamay indicate the presence of a criminal orinsurgentanchorpoint.

Bufferspaceisanothercharacteristicthatcanhelpuslocateananchorpoint.Abufferzoneisthe“demilitarized”areasurroundingananchorpoint.Thisspaceprovidesthecriminalorinsurgentwithalevelofcomfortandsecurity.Criminalsand insurgents do not usually conduct crimes and attacks within this spacebecauseoftheriskofgettingcaughtorofhavingtheiranchorpoint identified.ButchCassidydidnotrobtrainswithinahundredmilesofhishideoutatHoleintheWall.Thecriminalisprotectinghisneighborsaswell,bynotbringinghostile

securityforces into theirbackyard,asheexpects theseneighbors toshieldhimbykeeping theirmouths shut.The buffer zone keeps criminals and insurgentsfrom“operatingtooclosetohome.”148

The combat profiler should look for areas that, though surrounded byinstancesofcriminalactivity,remainremarkablyimmunetoattacksandcrime.Thismaybeanindicatorofananchorpointsurroundedbyabufferzone.Visualassessmentofthisareamaythenconfirmthepresenceofananchorpointbasedonthebehavioroflocalsandthepeopleattheassumedanchorpoint.

The reward for identifying criminal and insurgent anchor pointswill be anexponentialincreaseintheeffectivenessofpatrolsandothersecurityoperations.Byforcingtheinsurgentstoreacttoourpresenceandactionsandremovingthesecuritytheywereseekingwhentheyestablishedtheiranchorpointwillallowustomaintainoffensiveandproactiveactionsinthehunt.

GeographicsinHistoryBeforehisdeathin2011,therehadbeentwoverypublicattemptsonOsamabinLaden’slifesinceSeptember11,2001.ThefirstonewasexecutedinDecember2001 in Tora Bora, a mountainous region on Afghanistan’s eastern border,dubbedOperationAnaconda.The assault beganwithAfghan troops supportedbyU.S.SpecialOperationsforcesandAmericanaerialbombing,followedafewdays later by an area sweep conducted by soldiers of theU.S. 10thMountainDivision. Ultimately, bin Laden escaped this hunt, but the concept ofgeographicscanprovideuswithaninstructivepictureoftheepisode.

ToraBorawasananchorpoint. ItwasaplacewhereOsamabinLadenfeltsecure.ToraBorawassurroundedbyabufferzone.BinLadencouldeat,sleep,confer with confederates, and plan operations, knowing that he had abundantearly warning of transgressors. Tora Bora was close to the Pakistan border,shouldtheAl-Qaedaleaderneedtofleethecountry,andtheareawasfilledwithloyalfollowerswillingtodefendhimagainstanyattackers.OperationAnacondafailedbynotsecuringacordonaroundthevillageandblockingtheegressroutesleadingout ofToraBora. In themissionplan, this taskwas leftmostly to theAfghanforces,andwhiletheydidestablishcheckpointsonthemainroutes,dueto a lack of sufficient manpower, they left mountain trails and “goat paths”unsecured.

During the course of the fight,Osama binLadenwas escorted out of ToraBorabyfortytofiftyfighterswhohadanextensiveknowledgeoftheareaandwho used the natural lines of drift (those goat paths) to get him out fast.According to reports after the operation in Tora Bora, many believe that bin

LadendidnotreturntoPakistanasoriginallythought.WithanAmericanbountyonhishead,hedidnot feel safe in that country. Instead, it isbelieved thathewent north towards Jalalabad and established a new anchor point. The keycriterion in creating an anchor point is the ability to ensure security andexclusivity of access.As history shows, bin Laden correctly assessed that thetribes in Jalalabad would provide better security than what he would havereceivedinPakistan,asheremainedfreeforalmostanotherdecade.149

Consider how the concepts of combat profiling helped ultimately to locateandkillOsamabinLaden.TheprimarysearchwasforbinLaden’sanchorpoint.This ended with the identification of a compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan.InsteadofthemountaincavethatmanyinU.S.intelligencepredictedwouldbehis hideout, bin Laden was holed up on the third floor of a million-dollarcompound that had twelve foot-high concrete walls topped with barbed wire,further protected by two security fences. Besides the obvious protection, theanomaliesbegantomount.U.S.agenciesdiscoveredthatthecompoundlackedaphoneorInternetconnection,thoughsuchamenitiescouldbeacquiredwitheaseinaffluentAbbottabad.Observersdiscoveredthatthewalledcompoundburnedits own trash instead of putting it out for collection like the rest of the town.This,alongwithotherevidence,allowedourintelligenceagenciestofocustheirsearchonthatbuildingtoconfirmtheirassumptions.Astheywereplanningtheraid, they kept inmind the natural lines of drift that Bin Laden could use toescapeandkeptahelicopter-borneresponseforceonstand-byshouldtheyneedreinforcements for an immediate search if bin Laden managed to escape thehouse.150

AbbottabaditselfwasahabitualareathatPakistaniswouldgotovisitduringtheheatofthesummer,butitwastheactofsortingthroughthepeoplethereandidentifyingitasananchorpointwithkeyanomaliesthatallowedtheAmericansto target the most wanted terrorist in the world. The successful result of theattack shows how geographics can help us narrow our focus from a largehabitualarea,inthiscase,anentireregionoftheglobe,intosmallerobservablesegmentsandmakemoreeducatedplansanddecisions.

GeographicsSummaryIfthecombatprofilercanidentifyananchorpoint,habitualareas,andNLDs,heorshecanbegintopredicthumanbehaviorwithinageographicarea.Abaselinecan be established even before he or she enters the location.Thiswill greatlyreduce the time it takes to orient himself or herself to any potential threats oranomalies.Thiswillincreaseourpredictiveandthereforeproactivenatureonthe

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battlefield.Understanding these geographical concepts allows us to further understand

andforecastcriminalacts.Weknowthatbadguyswillleavetheiranchorpoint,whether it is theirhomeora safehouse,when theyare ready toconduct theirnextcrime.Thecrimewilllikelyoccurinahabitualarea,whoseterraintheyarefamiliarwithandwithinwhosepopulationtheybothfeelsecureandcanblendin.TheywilluseNLDsbothtoapproachtheirtargetandtowithdrawfromit.

Additionally,weknowthatbadguysdon’tjusttargethabitualareas,buttheychoose also to target areas that they are familiar with, which offer them anincreased level of confidence in the ultimate success of their crime.Understanding the relationship thatpeoplehavewith theirenvironmentcan letyoupredicthumanbehaviorandmovementlongbeforeanactiontakesplace.Itisacrucialaspectofunderstandinghumans.

GeographicsTakeawaysPeopleactdifferentlyinanareadependingonwhethertheyarefamiliarorunfamiliarwiththeenvironment.NLDsarethepathwaysthatpeopletakethatallowforasimpleandsafemovement from pointA to pointBwhile exerting the least amount ofeffort.Habitualareasareplaceswhereanypersoncanvisitwithoutrestriction.Anchorpointsareplaceswhereonlypeoplewhomeetanexclusivesetofrequirementsaregrantedaccess.Anchorpointscanbeidentifiedbyplaceswhereaccessiscontrolled.Identifying criminal anchor points is the focus of effort for securityforcesseekingtodisruptcriminal,insurgent,andterroristactivities.

7.ICONOGRAPHYIconographyisvisuallanguage.

We see it everywhere: as symbolsonT-shirts, tattoos, graffiti onbuildings,traffic signs, advertisements, and the images companies use to identify andmarkettheirproducts.

An icon is any symbol used to promote a person’s or group’s presence,beliefs,oraffiliations.Individualsandgroupsuseiconographytodrawalliesandconverts to them, to intimidate enemies and drive them away, to further theiragendas, to boast, to brag, to bully, and to buffalo. Iconography oftencommunicatescomplexmessagesthroughsimplepictures,symbols,andwriting.

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Butwhyshouldcombatprofilerspayheedtoiconography?Iconographyisnotdirectlyanaspectofhumanbehavior.It isnotdrivenby

the limbic system or autonomic processes. Iconography, particularly personaliconography, is easily masked or hidden (e.g., tattoos) or changed (e.g.,clothing). We include iconography as one of the domains because combatprofilerscanuseiconographytoincreasetheirsituationalawareness.

Payingattentiontoiconographyopensthecombatprofiler’seyestomessagesbeing communicated by symbols in the environment. By analyzing andunderstanding the iconography present in any human situation, the combatprofiler can determine the beliefs of an individual or group. He can tell thatpersonorgroup’saffiliation.Whoaretheirallies?Whoaretheirenemies?Whatdotheystandfor?Combatprofilerscanobserveiconographytounderstandwhatthingsareimportantinanareatoindividualsandgroupsandwhatelementsareinfluencing the people in an area. By identifying the changes in iconographyover time, combat profilers can understand how and in which direction apolitical,social,ormilitarysituationistrending.

Iconographycanbedividedintotworealms:indicatorsthatappearonpeopleandindicatorsthatappearingeographicalenvironments.

Inageographicalenvironment,iconographycantellus:Theintentorbeliefsofthosewhoimprintedtheiconography,Whethergroupsintheareaareinconflict,andTherelationshipbetweenthepeoplewholiveintheareaandthepeoplewholefttheiconography.

Regarding this last point, there is a significant difference between allowingtheiconographytoremaininplace(e.g.,graffitiorpoliticalorreligiousslogansscrawledonwalls)andtakingactiontoeradicateitorpaintover it. Inthefirstcase,thecommunitytoleratesandmayactivelyembracethebeliefsandagendaofthoseimprintingtheiconography.Inthesecond,thelocalpopulationresistsorisattemptingtodisassociateitselffromthepurveyorsoftheiconography.

The iconography that individuals display on their person also providesimportant information. First, we can determine what types of things a personsupportsordoesn’t support,particularly if the iconographydisplaysanegativemessageaboutsomething.Second,wecantellwhataperson’sassociationsare.Third,we can tell a person’s status or assumed status (i.e., what they believetheirstatusis).

Personal iconography is important to the average person, but significantlymore important to the criminal: “It bears emphasizing that especially in the

criminalpopulation,symbolsandexternalmarkingsacquiretenfoldmeaningandhavegreat value and a significant function.”151 The criminalworld often usessymbols that are considered illicit or illegitimate in the law-abiding world.Criminalschoosesymbolsthatoftengoagainstthenorm.152

Therearethreemaincategoriesoficonographythatcombatprofilersshouldbeawareof:graffitiandotherformsofpubliciconography,tattoos,andclothingandotherartifacts.

GraffitiGraffitiisanywritingordrawingonapublicplacedonewithouttheconsentoftheownerofthespace.

Threetypesofgraffitiareofconcerntothecombatprofiler:territorialgraffiti(tagging done by groups to identify their territory), political and ideologicalgraffiti(graffitiwhichexpressessometypeofpoliticalorbeliefstatement),andthreatening graffiti (graffiti that menaces or attempts to intimidate others,specificallylocalorforeignsecurityforces,orinspiresotherstodoso).

Territorialgraffiti isusedbygangsandsimilargroupsto letoutsidersknowthattheyaretrespassingonturfclaimedbythegang.Oftenagang’sterritoryismarked by boundary graffiti, which indicates the limits of the gang’s homeground. Graffiti increases the more deeply one penetrates to the heart of theterritory.153Graffiti is often a real-time indicatorof local attitudes, and asonestudy argues, graffiti can be a “prelude and a directive to open behavior andcluestotheboundsandintensityofacommunity’scontrolofitsterritory.”154

Otherpubliciconographyincludesartifactssuchasflags,signs,evencolors.These are often indicators ofwhat type of groups are operating in an area, orwhattypeofgroupsthepeopleintheareasupport.Flagsareprominentmeansofprovidinggroup identityandsolidarity.Aflagadvertisesagroup’spresence inanarea; it establishes a rallyingpoint for thegroup’smembers.Flags are alsooften rich in symbolism. Many provide extensive clues to the values andideologiesofthegroup.

Consider the symbolsandcolorsof theAmerican flag.ThevariousTalibanflags,whichhavebeenusedsincethatgroupemergedintheearly1990s,havenotonlyservedasiconsbutalsohavebytheirpresencemadepowerfulpoliticalstatements. After a battle between U.S. and Taliban forces in late 2009, theTaliban raised a flag in the province of Nuristan in eastern Afghanistan as astatementofwhattheyclaimedwasavictory.155ThiswasasignificantattemptbytheTaliban to influence the localpeople—anactdemonstrating theirpower

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andtheirclaimtoownershipofthearea.Incontrast,forcesloyaltotheAfghangovernmentraisedtheirnationalflagoverthecityofMarjahtodemonstratetheirvictoryoverTalibanforcesinearly2010.156

Inadditiontoflags,otherpubliciconographyincludesthesimpledisplayofcolors.ThebluebandanaoftheCripsandtheredoftheBloodsarerecognizedinevery American city. In recent years, businesses in Los Angeles with ties toterrorist groups in the Arab world have begun displaying colors withMiddleEastern significance. Colors are often given meaning by the groups that usethem.Redfrequentlycarriesthemeaningofsacrifice,duetoitsassociationwithblood.White often indicates purity. Black may indicate death. The key is tounderstand the significance of colors in whatever area you are operating. Inaddition to flags and colors, any sign, flyer, or other public symbol should beassessedtodetermineitssignificance.

TattoosBecausetattoosarepermanent,theyoftenpossessextremelysignificantmeaningforthewearer.Thelocationontheperson’sbodymaybemeaningfulaswell.157Tattoosaremeanttogainattentionandtocommunicateamessage.158Themostimportantforthecombatprofilerinclude:

Membershipinagroup,specificallyagang,insurgent/terroristoperation,orextremistorganization.Association or identification with a specific cause, especially one thatespousesviolence.Symbolsrepresentingpastincarceration.

ThenumberofAmericanswith tattoosremainsrelativelysmall—perhapsatmost,sixtofifteenpercentofallAmericans.159However,thenumberoftattooedindividualswho are or have been in prison is significantly higher—thirty-twopercent.160

Astudy,whichfocusedontherelationshipbetweentattoosandthecriminalwayoflife,foundthatcriminalsgettattoosforreasonssuchas“self-indulgence,aneedforgratification,adeepcommitmenttodelinquencyandcriminalityandadisregardoftheirconsequences”andconcludedthattattoosendorsethecriminallifestyle.161

Tattooshavebeenshowntobeassociatedwithhigh-riskbehavior.162Severalstudies have linked tattoos with “deviance, personality disorders, substanceabuse, risk-taking behavior, and criminality.”163 One scholar writes, “The

criminal world universally considers tattoos an inseparable part of theirsymbols.”164

Ifapersonhasavisibletattoo,itdoesnotmeanthatheorsheisorwillbeacriminalorathreat;however,atattooiscertainlyoneindicator,whichmaymarkanindividualasananomalyworthyoffurtherobservation.Forexample,inIraq,certaingroupsof insurgent fighterswore tattoosof three small dots formingatriangleononeoftheirhands.Observingthiswouldimmediatelywarrantfurtherobservationorquestioningoftheindividual.

ClothingandOtherArtifactsHumansacrossallculturesuseclothingandotherartifacts(e.g.,jewelry,badges,accessories, emblems, and images on clothing) to communicate associations,beliefs, and status.Gangs, teams,military forces, insurgent organizations, andotherorganizedgroupsoftenwear some typeofclothingoremblemunique tothem. This is “branding.” It is done to allow group members to identify oneanother, toprovideasenseofunityandsolidarity,aswellas todistinguishthegroupfromothercompetinggroups.

Often the emblems chosenhave symbolic significance—they tell a storyofthe group’s beliefs, origins, goals, or other important aspects of collectiveideology.

Individuals select clothing and other artifacts to communicate messages toothers.OnthedaythatTimothyMcVeighwasarrested—thesamedayheblewup theMurrah FederalBuilding inOklahomaCity—hewaswearing a T-shirtwithapictureofAbrahamLincolnonthefrontandtheLatinphraseSicSemperTyrannis (“Thus always to tyrants”). On the back was a quote attributed toThomasJefferson:“Thetreeoflibertymustberefreshedfromtimetotimewiththe blood of patriots and tyrants.” JohnWilkesBoothwas said to have cried,“Sicsempertyrannis”aftershootingAbrahamLincoln.McVeighworetheshirtbecause it displayedhis ideology,whichdrovehis decision to attack a federalbuildingandkillalmost170people.

Individualswithin groups also distinguish themselves by their clothing andotheremblems.Videosofinsurgentleadersoftenshowtheinsurgentleaderwithclothing, jewelry, weaponry, or other items that set them apart from theirsubordinates.Gangs in theU.S.wear clothes,which in some formor fashion,exhibitsymbolsthatrepresenttheirgang—thesesymbolsmaybespecificcolorsorcertainprofessionalsportsemblems.

A recent study reported that drivers who displayed bumper stickers(“territorial markers”) were significantlymore likely to exhibit road rage and

otheraggressivebehavior.“Itappearsthatthemerepresenceofterritorymarkershas predictive value in determining aggressive driving, as does the number ofterritorymarkers.”165 Although the studywas not able to confirm that hostilebumper stickerswere related tomore aggressive driving, it is not too far of astretch to suspect that individualswhodisplayhostile or threateningmessagesmay be more prone to aggressive action than others who display neutral orfriendlymessages.Abumperstickerthatreads“Violencesolveseverything”isamuchdifferentmessagethanonethatreads“Embracepeace.”

IconographicBaselinesandAnomaliesIconographyisnotabehavioralindicatorlikebiometrics,kinesics,orproxemics.Rather, iconography is a deliberate display, communicated via signs andsymbols, of a person or group’s associations and beliefs. Combat profilersshouldimmediatelybegintoassesstheiconographicbaselineforanylocationinwhichtheyoperate.Combatprofilersshouldlookforpatternsintheiconographyoftheenvironment:Whatgroupsarerepresented?Arethemessagespositiveornegative?Howdothelocalsrespondtotheiconography?

Apopulationwill either support, tolerate,or rejectmessages communicatedthrough public iconography. If the locals support the group and itsmessages,theywilldemonstratethisthroughtheirbehavior.Theywillbegintomimicthemessages, signs, and symbols. Theymay display the iconography themselves.They will be proxemically drawn to it. Locals who simply tolerate theiconography will not mimic the messages but will continue to allow theiconographytobedisplayed.Localswhorejecttheiconographywillattempttoconcealordestroyit,e.g.,paintingovergraffiti.Additionally,iftheiconographyis offensive, or if the locals are intimidated by the group that has created anddisplayedit,localsmaybeproxemicallypushedawayfromtheiconographyandmayexhibitsignsofdiscomfortaroundit.

Therearetwomainanomaliesrelatedtoiconography.Thefirstanomalyisthesuddenappearanceoforchangeiniconography.Newtypesofgraffitimaypopup in an area or themessages of the graffiti may change. For example, localiconographydisplaymessagesthataresupportiveofthelocalsecurityforcebutthen suddenly begin communicating negative messages. The second type ofanomaly is the attempt to hide or conceal the iconography whenMarines orsecurityforcesarepresent.Bothoftheseanomaliesrelatetopubliciconography(graffiti, flags,etc.)andpersonal iconography(tattoos, logosonclothing,etc.).Bothofthesetypesofanomaliesshouldbewarningflagstocombatprofilers.

Combatprofilersshouldbeaware thatclothingandotherartifactscanoften

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distinguishleaderswithingroups,andthatpeoplecommunicatemessagesaboutthemselves based on their clothing and artifacts. We should not ignore themessages that individuals broadcast to those around them. Symbols havemeaning.Becausecertainiconographycanbeconcealedorremoved,itmaynotbe identifiable or present in all circumstances; however, being aware of themessages displayed through iconography can make a combat profilersignificantlymoreawareofhisorhersurroundings.

ICONOGRAPHYTakeawaysIconography is not an uncontrollable element of humanbehavior, so itcan be easilymasked or concealed, and sometimes requires significantinterpretation.Iconography can be geographic or personal and conveys a person orgroup’sbeliefsandaffiliations.Graffiti,flags,signs,banners,andpostersareoftenusedtomarkterritory(affiliation) but also convey the beliefs of the group that posted themessage.Tattoos and clothing are used for the same purpose but are personaldisplaysoftheirbeliefsorassociations.

8.ATMOSPHERICSThe last domain of combat profiling is atmospherics. Atmospherics can bedefined as the collective mood of a situation or place. On June 2, 1967,Company D, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines and Company F, 2nd Battalion, 5thMarines were patrolling toward an objective near the village of Vihn Huy inVietnam. As both companies advanced across a rice paddy, the villagers,normallyactive,seemedsilentandstill.Livestockanddomesticanimalsdidnotmove. Even the birds went silent. Suddenly, the NVA launched an ambush.PatrickHaley,ananti-tankassaultmanwithCompanyF,describedthemomentbeforetheattackas“tooquiet,tooserene…youcouldalmostsmellthepresenceoftheenemy.”166

Thecollectivemoodisthecombinationoftheindividualmoodsandemotionsof people in an environment. This mood is displayed primarily throughnonverbal behavior (biometric, kinesic, and proxemic cues), geographicindicators,iconography,andotherindicators.

Atmospherics is not somemystical feeling or indefinable vibe. Thoughwemay first experience the atmosphere of a situation through an instinct or a

feeling,byemployingthescienceofatmospherics,wecanbreakthatgutsensedownintodefinable,observableindicators.

Combat profiling is about having situational awareness and proactivelyidentifyingthreats.Beingabletoreadthemoodofasituationispartofhavingsituationalawareness.Theinabilitytopickupontheatmosphericsofasituationcanbedeadly,likethecustomerwhostrollsintoaconveniencestoreandshopswithoutanyclue thata robbery is inprogressor thecopwhowalks intoagasstation and does not pick up on the fact that the cashier is being robbed atgunpoint.AMarinepatrolmayfailtopickuponthehostilemoodofavillage—displayedbythelocalsthroughnegativebodylanguageandproxemicpushes—whichcouldindicateanimminentattack.

EmotionsareHonestAtmosphericsisnothocus-pocus.Theconceptofcollectivemoodisaconcretereality.Thecombinationofindividualmoodsandemotionsinasituationcreatesthiscollectivemood.167Moodsandemotionsaretrueresponsestoasituationorevent.Whenpeopleseemanxious,tense,orafraid,itislikelythatsomethinghasoccurredorispresentthatismakingthemfeelandactthatway.

Emotionsandmoodsaredrivenbyautonomicandsubconsciousprocessesinthebrain.168Thepartof thebrainresponsible forpickinguponotherpeople’semotionsistheamygdala.Theamygdalaispartofthelimbicsystem.Itisalsoresponsiblefordetectingpotentialthreatsandforpreparingthebody’snecessaryphysiological responses and actions.169 Becausemoods and emotions are firstexperiencedsubconsciously,inanygivensituation,wewillinitially“feel”whatis going on beforewe become consciously aware of it.Being attuned to yourown emotional response in any situation can increase the speed atwhich youcognitivelyunderstandwhat isgoingon.This iswhyweoftensaythingssuchas, “The situation felt tense,”or “Patrolling through that villagemademe feeluneasy.”Wefeeltheemotionandmoodthatisexpressedthroughthebehaviorofothers. That behavior is a true indicator of the emotions people are feeling,whichisanhonestresponsetosomethingthathaseitherhappened,ispresent,orisabouttohappen.

MoodsareContagiousMoodsandemotionsarealsocontagious.Theypassfromonepersontoanothersubconsciously throughmimicry and other means. This is true particularly ofnegative emotions. One person with a negative emotion (anger, anxiety, fear,

etc.) can infect a large group.170 Peoplemimic others around them;whenonepersoncopiesanother’sbehavior,thesecondpersonwillbegintoexperiencethefirst person’s emotion.171 When an individual senses something and has anemotionalreactionsuchasfear,anxiety,oranger, thatperson’semotionalstatecanaffecteveryoneelse.172

Therearetwocategoriesofatmospherics:positiveandnegative.Justbecauseaplaceorsituationexhibitsapositiveatmospheredoesnotmeanthatwecanletourguarddown.Wemustalwaysbesuspicious.ToborrowGavindeBecker’sidea,wemustalwayshavethemindset that“Anattackwillalwaysoccurrightnow.”173 So even when the atmosphere is positive, combat profilers mustconstantlylookforanomaliesandthreats.

Anegativeatmosphere,conversely,shouldserveasanimmediatealarmthatsomething is wrong. Negative moods and emotions can be categorized assadness,anxiety,fear,anger,hostility,andcontempt.

AtmosphericBaselinesandAnomaliesAs in the other domains, the combat profiler uses atmospheric indicators toestablishabaseline.Everyplaceorsituationpossessesanemotionalatmosphere.This atmosphere will be a true indicator of the emotions and attitudes of thepeopleinthesituation.

Oncetheemotionalatmosphereofasituationisdetermined,combatprofilersshouldbegin toconsciously identify thebehavioral indicators that arecreatingtheatmosphere.Evenwhenwearenotphysicallypartofanevent—say,whenwe are observing from a distance—we can still determine the atmosphericbaselinebyreadingtheindicatorsdiscussedbelow.

When we are a part of a situation, we will reason first from “feel,” thenconfirmourassessmentbasedonobservableindicators.Whenweareobservingfrom a distance, we don’t have the luxury of “feel.”We must determine theatmosphereofasituationbasedentirelyonindicators.

BiometricsandKinesicsSince mood and emotion are primarily communicated through nonverbalbehavior, these two domains will most likely provide the main indicators.Displaysofpositivenonverbalbehaviorcommunicateapositiveatmosphere.Anegative atmosphere will be characterized by negative body language—armscrossed, aggressive stances, clenched fists, facial expressions of anger orcontempt,peopleleaningawayifsittingdown,etc.

ProxemicsInterpersonaldistancecanbeakeycluetotheatmosphereinasituation.Peopleavoidingorkeepingtheirdistancefromsomethingorsomeonemayindicatefearoranxietyaboutwhatevertheyareavoiding.Thekeyistoidentifywhatitisthatpeople are avoiding or keeping their distance from. Aggressive movementstowardsomethingorquickmovementsawayfromsomethingmayalsoindicatedangerorapotentialthreat.

IconographyThemessagesdisplayedinanenvironmentsetamoodortoneforthatarea.Theiconography displayed in an area tells us about the beliefs and affiliations ofwhoeverpainted,posted,broadcast,orwore the iconography.Additionally, themessages and mood communicated by the iconography have an effect uponthosewhoareexposedtoit.

NoiseLevelEveryplaceorsituationhascertainnoisesandsoundsassociatedwithit.Whenyouwalkintoyourhome,youexpecttohearcertainsounds.Whenthosesoundsarealteredorabsent,youknowsomethingisdifferent,perhapsdangerous.ThesamegoesforastreetinLosAngeles,abazaarinAfghanistan,orakeyleaderengagementintheMiddleEast.

Silence may be explained by two phenomena: lack of noise or auditoryexclusion.Auditory exclusion occurswhen your brain begins to shut downorreduce your ability to hear any sound or certain sounds in stressful situations.Thisisrelatedtothetunnelvisiondiscussedinthebiometricssection.Yourbodydivertsenergyandattentiontowardthethreatorpotentialthreatandreducesorcutsoffunneededavenuesofinformation.Thisiswhymanyindividualsreporthearingnothing,orhearingmuffledsounds,duringsituationssuchasafirefight.Studies have shown that between fifty-one and eighty-four percent of lawenforcement officers involved in shootings remember experiencing diminishedsoundperception.174Truesilencecanoccurbecausepeopleinanareahavefledor hidden themselves because of fear or because tension or dread has causedpeopletobecomesilent.Eitherway,lackofnoiseinanareaorsituationinwhichnoiseshouldbepresentshouldbetakenasanimmediatewarning.

ActivityDowntownKabulisbusyduringthedaytime.TheWallStreetStockExchangeis

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amadhouse. But people don’t generallymove frantically and display agitatedbehaviorinplacessuchasamosqueorafuneralhome.Thecategoryofactivitycanalsoincludeactivityovertimesuchasshopsopeningandclosingatacertaintime or times of busy traffic. It is critical to identify the baseline patterns ofactivityinalocationsothatyoucanidentifychanges.Thebehaviorandlevelofactivityinanareashouldfit thesituationandenvironment;anydeviationfromthenormisananomaly.

OrderandDisorderTheconceptoforderanddisordercanbeappliedtoaphysicalenvironmentortoacrowdorgroup.

Inaphysicalenvironment,orderanddisorderrefertothewaythearealooksand whether or not rules are being followed in the area. A recent study hasprovidedsupport for the“BrokenWindowTheory.”Thisreportconfirmedthatevenoneelementofdisorderinanarea(e.g.,graffiti,thesoundoffireworksinanareainwhichfireworksarebanned,orevensomethingassimpleasbicycleschainedtoafence)createsfurtherdisorder—evencriminalactivity.175

Regarding a group, order and disorder refer to the group’s behavior. Anorderlymarchordemonstrationisobviouslydifferentfromahostileandchaoticriot.Betweenthesetwoextremesexistvariouslevelsoforderanddisorder.Themoredisorderlyagroup’sbehavior,thegreaterthepossibilityforviolence.

DeterminingAnomaliesTherearethreemaintypesofanomaliesassociatedwithatmospherics:

An immediatenegativeatmosphere.Often thecombatprofilermaynothavethetimeorabilitytodeterminetheatmosphericbaselineofanarea.Manytimes,wesimplyhavetorespondbasedonthecurrentatmospherewithoutextensiveobservation.Because this is thecase,we should takeanynegativeatmosphereasanindicatorthatsomethingmaybewrong.The individual who does not fit the atmosphere. Because mood iscontagious and emotions are honest, we should expect that people’smoods and emotions will match each other and fit that situation. Weshouldconsideranypersonananomalywhen theirattitude,emotionormood,and/orbehaviordoesnotfitwhatisexpectedforasituation.A sudden change in mood. In combat profiling, this is called anatmosphericshift.Atmosphericshiftscanbebothpositiveandnegative.We are primarily concerned with negative atmospheric shifts, but any

suddenshiftintheatmosphereofasituationshouldmakeustakeacloserlookforotherindicators,aswellasforwhatevercausedtheatmosphericshift.

AtmosphericShiftsLikeripplesinapondcausedbythesplashingofastone,atmosphericshiftsaretheemotionalandsituationalreactionstoadevelopmentinasituation,suchasapersonenteringanarea,somethingsaid,orsomethingdone.Weseethingslikethis on a daily basis. A group ofMarines casually talking or interacting willimmediately change their behavior as soon as an officer or senior enlistedMarineapproaches.Officeemployeesexhibit thesamebehaviorwhilechattingaroundthewatercoolerwhenthebossapproaches.Talkingturnstosilence,andslouching turns to sittingor standingupright.This same typeof behaviorwasobservedbyaresearchteaminAfghanistanconductinginterviews.AtonepointduringaninterviewwithayoungAfghanwoman,“Shesuddenlystoppedtalkingand covered her face with her chador when her soon-to-be mother-in-lawstepped into the room.She turned her covered face away from themother-in-law,anddidnotsayanotherword.”176Whenobservinganatmosphericshift,itisimportant to identifywhether the shiftwaspositiveornegative,but it ismoreimportant to identify what caused the atmospheric shift. The change inatmosphere is the indicator; what changed the atmosphere is most likely thethreat.

Therearetwotypesofatmosphericshifts:positiveandnegative.Thatis,theatmosphere of an environment can go from a negative to a positive mood (apositive atmospheric shift) or from a positive to a negativemood (a negativeatmospheric shift). Combat profilers should be concerned primarily withnegativeatmosphericshifts,sincetheyaremorelikelyindicatorsofapotentialthreat.For instance,Marinesonpatrolmaybeeffectivelyspeakingwith localsuntil a Taliban member (unknown to the Marines) approaches. At this point,localsmayshutdownandstopconversingbecausetheyfeelintimidatedbytheindividual approaching. Negative atmospheric shifts may be caused by anincreaseintension,anxiety,fear,oranger.Indicatorsofanegativeatmosphericshift may be displays of defensive or aggressive body language, increasedproxemicdistance,orsilenceorstoppedconversation.

Combatprofilersmustrecognizethattheythemselvesmaybethecauseofanatmospheric shift. When this happens, a new atmospheric baseline will beestablished until the combat profiler leaves the area or situation. Furtheratmospheric shiftsmay also occur due to the combat profiler’s actions or the

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presenceorentryofanotherindividual.By identifying atmospherics, combat profilers can gain an immediate

understanding for the moods, emotions, and attitudes of people in any givensituation. By quickly establishing a baseline, using one’s intuition andidentifyingobservableindicators,combatprofilerscanmorequicklypickuponanomalies. Combat profilers should be concerned primarily with negativeatmosphericmoodsandnegativeatmosphericshiftsbecausethesearerelatedtopotentialthreats.

AtmosphericsTakeaways*Atmospherics is the collective mood of a situation or place and canprovideanimmediateindicationofsafetyordanger.Atmospherics are made up of information gained from the otherdomains, thenoise level, the levelofactivity,and thesenseoforderordisorderinthearea.Positiveatmosphericsindicateasenseofsecurity.Negativeatmosphericsareoftena“leftofbang”indicatorofathreat.Negative atmospheric shifts are sudden changes in an area from a“positive”feeltoa“negative”feel.Theyshouldalertthecombatprofilertoasignificantchangeinthearea.

PARTFOUR

TAKINGACTION

M1.DECIDINGTOACT

akingdecisionsincombathasneverbeeneasy.It’saheckofaloteasierwhen the enemy iswearingadistinguishableuniformand isdirectly in

frontofyou.ThereisnodoubtthattheMarinesandsoldiersduringWorldWarIIortheKoreanWarhaditrough.ModernMarinesrarelyfindthemselvesrushinga machine-gun bunker or wading through eight hundred meters of surf in anattempt to attack a heavily fortified small island. At least in conventionalwarfare,theenemyisobvious,whereasintoday’sirregularwarfare,theenemycan be anywhere at anytime and is often not distinguishable from thesurrounding populace. It’s safe to say that making decisions is much moredifficult in the complex, chaotic whirlwind of an environment in which themodernMarine,orsoldier,findshimselftoday.

In today’s combat environment, often the only visible clues of enemypresence or activity are subtle indicators—children not playing outside, localsavoidingacertainstretchofroad,orvillagersactinglessfriendlythanusual.Theenemy,byandlarge,doesn’twearauniform,doesn’tdeclarehisintentions,anddoesn’tstandoutfromthecrowd.Instead,heattemptstoblendwiththerestofthe population. The enemy does his best to mask his intentions, conceal hisactions, andmake every effort to attackMarines and soldiers at the time andlocation of his (the enemy’s) choosing. Marines returning from combat havedescribedthisrealityrepeatedly.Onecombatvetdescribedthechallengeonthegroundwith:

Whatmakesthisjobdifficultisthatyoucan’teasilydistinguishagroupofordinarypeopledoingtheirordinarybusinessfromarmedgroups.Inaninsurgency,youaredealingwithcivilian-clothedopponents.It’shardtotellwhoaretheTaliban.Iamsuretherearehard-coreelements,butbecauseofthenatureofthesociety,onedayyouarealignedtotheTaliban,thenextday,tosomebodyelse.Thetrickforthemistoblendinwiththelocals.TheTalibanusecommunitiestoplayhideandseekwithus.Untiltheyfireuponour

troopsit’simpossibletodeterminetheirmotives.Accordingtotherulesofengagement,that’stheonlytimewhenitbecomesobviouswhotheenemyis.177

Aswe discussed early on, combat profiling provides peoplewith away tomake quick and accurate decisions. The combat profiling heuristic assists inmakingsnapdecisionswith little timeandwith little information.Theprocessfor making decisions is simple: Establish the baseline, identify anomalies,decide,andact.Thekeytoanydecision-makingiswhentodecide—thecombatprofilingheuristicsaysthatthreeanomaliesareenoughtodecide.

2.THECOMBATRULEOFTHREEAnyeffectivemethodofdecision-making shouldhavea thresholdofdecision.This is the point at which, no matter what, you must make a decision. Athreshold of decision guards against hesitation and indecision due tooveranalysis or waiting for additional information. The combat profilingthresholdiscalledtheCombatRuleofThree:Whenyouobservethreeanomaliesorindicators,youmustmakeadecision.Donotwaitformoreinformation.

Three indicators are enough informationwithwhich to act.Does thismeanthatyoumusthavethreeanomaliestomakeadecision?No.Insomesituations,oneanomalyorindicatorissufficient.Forinstance,followingtheusualrulesofengagement,ifanindividualexhibitsahostileactorhostileintent,oneindicatorisenough.SomeonepresentingaweaponinahostilewaytowardaMarineonpatrol or copon the street is all it takes to engage that individualwithdeadlyforce.

Vehiclecheckpointsoftenhavea trigger line—apoint atwhich if avehiclecrosseswithoutfirstcomingtoastopandbeingwavedthroughbyfriendlyforcepersonnel, thenthevehiclewillautomaticallyeitherbeshotat(withawarningshot)or fullyengagedby fire (again, thisdependson thecurrentescalationofforcemeasures).Butthetriggerlineservesasathresholdofdecision—nomoreinformation isneeded.Crossing the trigger linedemonstratesahostileact,andthatisenoughtomakeadecision.Therealityisthatnootherinformationhastobe collected in those situations.AMarine providing security for a checkpointusually only has this one piece of information with which to work. Vehiclesapproachingacheckpointwiththeintenttodoharmtothesecuritypersonnelatthecheckpointoftentravelathighratesofspeed.Thereisnotimetocollectanyotherinformation.Marinescan’tconversewiththedriverorreadhisintentbasedonfacialexpressionsoremotions.Yet,adecisionmustbemade.

Inthemajorityofsituations,oneindicatormaynotbeenough.Forinstance,any Internet search of “deception detection” or “lie detection”will result in ahost of pseudosciencewebsites and blogs that claim to tell you about how todetect if someone is lying. Many of them list certain “foolproof” indicators.Commonamongthesefoolproofindicatorsarefidgetingorshakinghands.Thesewebsitesclaimthatyoucantellthatsomeoneislyingbasedononeindicator—this just isn’t true. Paul Ekman, the world’s foremost expert on deceptiondetection,writesinhisbookTellingLies,“Peoplewouldlielessiftheythoughttherewasanysuchcertainsignoflying,butthereisn’t.Thereisnosignofdeceititself—nogesture,facialexpression,ormuscletwitchthatinandofitselfmeans

thatapersonislying.”178In combat profiling, we look for a cluster of cues. We advocate making

decisionsbasedonthreecues.Oncethreecuesareidentified,adecisionmustbemade.Thestrengthofaheuristicisthatthesedecisionsarepre-determined,andcombatprofilingprovidesthreemaindecisions.

3.THETHREEDECISIONSBeforewediscussthethreedecisions,weshouldmakeitclearthattheoriginalpurposeofcombatprofilingis to trainMarines tobebetterandfasterdecisionmakers in combat. Therefore, the three decisions reflect that reality. Anyapplicationofcombatprofiling inothersituations,byothersecuritypersonnel,oreven theaveragepersonwanting tobemoreawareandstaysafeonadailybasiswillhavetoadapt thedecisionsto theirparticularcircumstances.Onthatnote, the threedecisions thatacombatprofilermaymakeareKill,Capture,orContact—inthatorder.

Whatdoesthismean?Itdoesn’tmeanthatthefirstthingthatcombatprofilersdo is kill. It means that, in any given situation, in a potentially hostileenvironment, the first decision that combat profilers shouldmake is to kill orprepare to kill. If an individual does not commit a hostile act, demonstratehostile intent, or provide indicators of an immediate threat, then the combatprofilermovestothenextdecision—capture.Iftheindividualdoesnotgiveoffindicators of a potential threat or if the person does not appear to be ofsignificant intelligence value, then the combat profiler moves to the next andfinal decision—contact. If, for some reason, the individual gives off furtherindicators, then the combat profiler may move back up the decision tree tocaptureorkillifnecessary.Thissimpledecisiontreecanbedepictedassuch:

Beforewebrieflyexplaineachofthesedecisions,weshoulddiscusswhyourdecisiontreeproceedsfromthemostviolentdecisiontotheleastviolent.

There are twomain reasonswhy our decisionmaking tree beginswith themostviolentcourseofaction.First,humanshaveaninternalreluctancetokill.InOnKilling, Dave Grossman writes about the nature and effects of killing inhumans,andstates:“Ibegantorealizethattherewasonemajorfactorthatwasmissing from the common understanding of killing in combat, a factor thatanswers this question and more. That missing factor is the simple anddemonstrablefact that there iswithinmostmenanintenseresistancetokillingtheirfellowman.Aresistancesostrongthat,inmanycircumstances,soldiersonthe battlefield will die before they can overcome it.”179 It is difficult to sayexactlywhypeoplearereluctanttokill,butasGrossmanarticulates,“Therecanbenodoubt that this resistance tokillingone’s fellowman is thereand that itexists as a result of a powerful combination of instinctive, rational,environmental,hereditary,cultural,andsocialfactors.”180Thisiscertainlynottosay that soldiers won’t or don’t kill, but that there is a strong reluctance tokilling.Therefore, it isnecessaryinacombatenvironment,orotherpotentiallyhostile situation which may require responses of deadly force, to begin thedecisiontreewithkill(orpreparetokill)toreduceanychanceofrationalizingorbackingdownfrommakingthetoughchoiceofpullingthetrigger.

The second, and more important, reason the decision tree begins with themostviolentoptionis that, incombatenvironments, tonotbepreparedto takethemostviolentcourseofactionistoputoneselfatrisk.Inhostilesituations,itismucheasier tobackdown fromadecision tokill than it is to rampup toa

decisiontokill.Furthermore,ifthesituationisseriousenough,andifthethreatisimmediate,thentocyclefromcontacttocapturetokillwastesvaluabletime.Oneofthemainpurposesofcombatprofilingistoproactivelyidentifythreats—thisespeciallymeansproactivelyidentifyinghostilepeopleandpreparingtotakeaction once hostile indicators are present. Therefore, combat profilers shouldbegin by assessing whether the most serious decision—kill—is required first,andthenmovingtothenext,lessserious,decision—capture.

The first decision—kill—certainly involves the act of killing (pulling thetrigger)butalsoinvolvesthementaldeterminationandphysicalpreparationstokill. Based on the observed indicators, the combat profiler may not have theopportunitytoactuallyseeanyspecifichostileactorhostileintentorbeinthebestpositionnecessarytoactuallypullthetriggerandkillthethreat.Whenthisisthecase,thecombatprofilermusthavethemindsetthat,whentheconditionsareright,orwhenthehostileactisexhibitedorhostileintentisexpressed,thenhe will immediately pull the trigger. Therefore, he must prepare to kill—mentallyandphysically.

The second decision—capture—means either physically subduing thetargetedindividual(s)orensuringthatthetargetcannotegressfromtheareaandescape.Thismaynecessitatephysicallycordoningofftheareaandhavingotherindividualscontrolexitpoints.Atthispoint,thetargethasgivenoffindicatorsofsuchanaturethatdetentionandfurtherquestioningisnecessary.

The third decision—contact—involves either physically contacting theindividual through purposeful or casual questioning or continuing focusedobservation.Atthispoint,thetargethasnotgivenoffsufficientindicatorstobeconsideredan immediate threator inwarrantphysicaldetention,but theyhavepresentedthemselvestobeananomalyandfurtherinvestigationorobservationis required. The purpose of contacting is to determine whether or not theindividualisapotentialthreatoriftheindividual’sanomalousbehaviorwarrantsany further action. If through either further observation or questioning theindividualisdeterminedtobebenign,thenthecombatprofilerletstheindividualgoandbeginsagaintoscantheenvironmentforanomalies.

Decisionsaresituational.Therearenodecisionsthatwillabsolutelyapplytoall situations.Aswe stated above, the decisions kill, capture, contact areonlyintendedtobeappliedbyMarinesinacombatsituation.Thedecisionsarenottobeusedoutsideofacombatsituation.Wecannotcovereverytypeofsituationinwhichapersonmayneedtomakeaquickdecision.Lawenforcementpersonnelmustselectandemployasetofdecisions thatalignwithcurrent lawand theirownofficial procedures. For civilians in noncombat situationswe recommend

“run,hide,fight.”Foracivilianwhoencountersanattacker,thebestchanceforthat person’s survival is to put as much distance as possible between him orherselfandthethreat.Thegreatertheseparationtheharderitisforanattackertobeeffective,requiringahigherdegreeofskilltouseaweaponeffectivelyandtoits fullest capability.When fleeing is not viable, the second option is to hidefrom the attacker and create asmany barriers as possible to avoid being seen(concealment)andtofindprotection(cover).Finally,thethirdoptionexistsforthe times when all other chances of avoiding confrontation are no longeravailable.Inthiscase,fightingtheattackerthroughanymeansavailablemaybetheonlychanceofsurvival.Thisoptionisthelastchoicebecauseitisinherentlythemostdangerous.

Some situations may require a different set of decisions, such as when anactiveshooterhasenteredintoaschool.Run,hide,fightismosteffectivewhentalking with adults who are able to fully understand and assess the situation,which isn’t necessarily the case with small children. For teachers who findthemselvesinasituationwithashooter,thebestcourseofactionistohidethestudents andattempt tokeep theattackeroutof theclassroom.The reasonwedon’trecommendthatteacherstrytoevacuatethebuildingwiththeirstudentsisbecausetheriskofachildfreezinginahallwayorinthefaceofanattackeristoohighandcouldriskthelivesofagreaternumberofstudents.Thatbeingsaid,weunderstand that every situation is unique andourgoalwith this book is toprovide you with the greatest amount of time left of bang to recognize thesituationandtaketheactionthatisbestsuitedforthecircumstancesyouarein.

PARTFIVE

APPLICATIONS

O1.BRINGINGITALLTOGETHER

nFriday,January3rd,2014,22-year-oldRoxannaRamirezwasworkinginthelosspreventiondepartmentataTargetstoreintheSanFranciscoBay

areawhenshenoticedamanwhostoodout.Afterwards she said, “Somethingjustdidn’tseemright.Hewasactingweird,asifhewasuptosomething.”Eventhough themandidn’t steal anything, hisbehaviorpiquedher interest and sheintuitively recognizedhimas an anomaly.Using the store’s video surveillancesystem,shetrackedthemanouttohiscar,wherehebeganshakingthesteeringwheel.While therewasnothingshecoulddoorneeded todoat thatmoment,shewrotedown theman’s licenseplatenumber.A fewhours later she learnedabout anAmberAlert for a seven-year-oldgirl and thought that themakeandmodeloftheabductor’scarwassimilartothemanshefollowedthroughTarget.Shecalledinatip.ThattipledtothearrestofDavidAllenDouglasandthesaferecovery of a missing girl who was sitting in the back of his car.181 Ms.Ramirez’sawarenesshelpedsaveagirl’slife.BecauseshehadbeenoperatinginConditionYellowandwasactivelysearchingforpeoplewhostoodoutfromthebaseline,shestoppedachildabductor.

Getting leftofbang requires identifyingapotential threatbefore somethinghappens.That“something”couldbeanattack,abduction,orevenarobbery.Thekey is to observe pre-event indicators, and to do this it is necessary to be inConditionYellow:awareandobservant.However, it isalsonecessary tomovebeyond simply observing pre-event indicators and concluding that somethingmayhappen.Effectivelyoperatingleftofbangrequirestakingaction.Thisonlyhappens if you are able to transition from Condition Yellow into ConditionOrangeandthenConditionRed.

Becausenonverbalbehaviormakesupbetween60percentand90percentofeverythingthathumanscommunicate,tryingtoidentifypotentialthreatswithoutknowledgeofthesixdomainswillbeextremelydifficult.Someoftheexampleswehave referred to throughout thebookareaboutaverage folkswho,withoutknowledge of the six domains, were able to operate left of bang and stoppotentially disastrous events without having any training in combat profiling.However,theirobservationswerebasedeitheronyearsofexperienceoravaguegutfeeling.Experienceisanincredibletooltouse—theproblemisittakesyearsto build. Without explicitly knowing how to look for behavioral pre-eventindicators, most Marines, soldiers, police officers, security guards or otherstryingtoensure theirownsafetywouldhavetowaitforanevent tohappento

knowsomething iswrong.This is rightofbang.This is reactive.Thisdoesn’thavetohappen.

Thesixdomainsofbehaviorcanbeexplicitlyusedtoestablishabaselineandhunt for anomalies. They give the “Marine on the ground” tangible things tolook for and assess.Combat profilingwill not remove all the uncertainty thatexistsinasituation,butitcanhelpMarinesfocusontheimportantinformationandusethattomakebetterdecisions.

In2011,oneofourCombatHunterinstructorswastransferredtoaninfantryunit, based out of Camp Pendleton, CA, that was scheduled to deploy toAfghanistan.Afterjoininghisnewbattalion,hewasassignedasasectionleaderin the Combined Anti-Armor Team (CAAT) platoon. He immediately begantraining hisMarines in the skills ofCombatHunter (combat tracking, combatprofiling, and observation), on top of the numerous required skills that hisMarines needed to learn (weaponry, tactics, standard operating procedures,communication, patrolling, etc.). Throughout the deployment, he and hisMarines used combat profiling and the other CombatHunter skillswith greatsuccess.Byestablishing thebehavioralbaselineofhisareaofoperation (AO),observing human behavior and identifying anomalies, his CAAT section wasincredibly successful at reducing Taliban influence, positively influencing thelocal populace, and hindering the Taliban’s ability to operate in the area.Additionally, by employing the principles of tracking as well as establishingbaselines and looking for anomalies in the physical environment, he and hisMarines spotted numerous improvised explosive devices (IEDs) before theinsurgents were able to detonate them. Not one IED detonated on his CAATsection.

After he returned from his deployment, we interviewed him to see howcombatprofilinghelpedhimandhisMarines“incountry.”Thisisapartofhisresponse:*

Itwasn’taboutgettingthebigwins.Forus,combatprofilingdidn’tprovideuswithonebigknockoutvictory,butitprovidedcountlesssmallwinsthroughoutthecourseofourdeployment.Whenwefirstarrivedinthearea,thelocalvillagershatedus.Wewouldtrytostartconversationswiththemonlytowatchthemturntheirbacksonusoryellatustogoaway.Theywouldsay,“Goaway,you’llgetmyfamilykilled.”We

weren’tmakingmuchprogress.

Beingamobileunit,weweremovedaroundalotandweren’talwaysinthesamearea,whichmeantwehadtoconstantlyworkhardtoestablishabaselineandensurethatwecouldfigureoutwhatwasgoingonintheareaswejustarrivedin.WebegantolookatourAOforhabitualareasandanchorpoints.Wewentwherethepeoplewere;whileotherunitstriedtostayawayfromthoseplaces.Goingwherethepeoplewereoftenkeptusfromgettingblownup.Weestablishedbaselinesjustbyobservingbehavior.Weasked,“Whatdopeopleinthisareado,dayinanddayout?”Andestablishingabaselinewasaboutmorethanjusthumanbehavior.Literally,everythinginanareaispartofthebaseline.Wewereabletoidentifythesignalsthatthe

Talibanwasusingtotrackourpatrolandcommunicatewithoneanother,justbyobservinganomaliesinthearea.

Wefoundthatineachareawewentto,wecouldfigureoutwhothekeyleadersweresimplybyobservingbehavior.Oncewewereabletoidentifyandtalkwiththeleadersineachofthevillages,thelocals’attitudetowardusquicklychanged.Therewasoneguywhoweallthoughtwasthe“villageidiot.”Hedidn’tworkandjustseemedtobumaroundallday.Wedidn’trealizethathewastheoneincharge.Hedidn’tworkbecausehedidn’thaveto.Butafterobservinghimforawhile,wenoticedthatpeoplewereconstantly

comingtohim.Yousee,atfirst,wethoughtthekeyleadersweretheoldestmales—theseniorvillageelders.Wethoughttheleadersweretheoneswhowerethemostvocal,whoseemedtospeakonbehalfofthevillage.Butthiswasjustafront.Afterobservingpeople’sbehaviorwebegantonoticesomething—thatwhenweweretalkingtoagroupofpeople,certainpeoplewouldstepback.Webegantoidentifythekey

leadersbecausetheirbehaviorwasalwaysalittledifferentthantherestofthepeople.Sometimestheleaderwouldbethepersoninthegroupwhowouldn’ttalktousatall.Werealizedthatitwasn’tthepeoplewhoweretalkingtousthatwereincharge,buttheoneortwopeoplepresentwhoweren’ttalkingtous.Theirsilencewasananomaly.Theywerelettingtheirsubordinatesdothetalkingforthem.Wealsonoticedthatthetrueleadersmaynothavebeenverballyrespondingtotheconversations,buttheywerephysically

responding.Sometimesitwasachangeintheirfacialexpressions,sometimestheywerephysicallydrawnclosertotheconversation,andsometimesitwasaclearshiftintheirbodylanguage.Andeventhoughthey

weretryinghardtoappearuninterested,theirbehaviorgavethemaway.

Onceweidentifiedthatthe“quiet”oneswerethepotentialleaders,webegantoobservewheretheylived.Aswewatchedsomeoftheseindividualsfurther,wewouldnoticepeoplecomingandgoingfromtheir

housesatallhoursoftheday,andinmuchhigherfrequencythanotherhouses.Wedeterminedtheirhouseswereanchorpoints.Soweworkedhardtoestablisharelationshipwiththesepeoplewhowethoughtmightbeleaders.Aswedid,wewatchedthetownandourbaselinestarttochange.Peoplebegantoopenup—theybecamelessdominantanduncomfortableinourpresence.Theywouldinviteusintotheirhousesandevenapproachourpatrolbasetotalktous.Theyweren’tafraidofbeingseenbytheTalibantalkingtous.Theystartedprovidinguswithinformation,lettingusknowwhereweaponswerebeinghiddenandwhenattackswereplanned.Astheybecamemorecomfortablearoundus,thatbecameournewbaseline.Itwasallbecausethepersontheyviewedastheleaderhadacceptedusandwasworkingwithus.Theywerejust

followingsuit.

Asthelocalsbegantosupportusmore,wenoticedthattheIEDswerebeingplacedfurtherandfurtherfromthevillage.Wesawthevillagesliterallybecomingsafertopatrol.Beingawareofpeople’sbehaviorhelpedustoachievethesesmallvictoriesbecausewecouldidentifywhohadtheinfluenceovertherestof

thevillagers.

Asthelocalpeoplebecamemorecomfortablearoundus,italsobecameeasiertorecognizethosewhostoodout.Whenwesawpeoplewhowereclearlyuncomfortableinourpresenceitwouldtellusoneoftwothings.Eithertheywereuncomfortablebecausetheywerehidingsomethingintheirhousesorcompounds(usuallytheywereTalibanthemselvesorwereTalibansupporters),ortheywerebeingwatchedbythe

Talibanandwereafraidoftheconsequencesiftheywereseentalkingtous.Byobservingbehavior,wewereabletofindtheinsurgentshidinginplainsight.Thisalsoledtofindingmoreweaponcaches.Betweenthesesmallwinsandusingthecombatprofilingterminologytocommunicatewithadjacentunitsandinafter

actionreports,wewereabletolearnwhatotherunitsweredoingsuccessfullyandincorporatethatintoouroperations.Butitallstartedbyhavingacommonunderstandingofhumanbehavior,andwhatthebehaviorofthevillagerscommunicated.WeusedcombatprofilingeverysingledaythatwewerearoundtheAfghan

people.Itkeptusalive.

ThisMarineandhisCAATsectionusedcombatprofilingonadailybasistostay alive, influence the villagers they interacted with, identify who were the

insurgentsorinsurgentsympathizers,andlocateweaponscachesandIEDs.Theywereabletorecognizethebehaviorsthatstoodoutfromthebaseline.Theywereabletoidentifythetrueleadersandusethatinformationtotheiradvantage.Theysaw noticeable and significant shifts in locals’ attitudes toward the Marines,whichresultedinthevillagesbecomingsaferplacesfortheMarinestooperate.Talibaninfluencewaned.Marinesstayedalive.

The six domains of behavior are different lenses to look through tounderstand the environment and people in away thatmost people have neverpreviouslyconsidered.Whenyoubeginlookingatsituationsthroughthelensesofthesixdomains,youdevelopbettersituationalawarenessandaremorelikelyto pick up on other people’s intentions so that you can proactively respond.Many of the behaviors thatmake up the domains are likely not new tomostreaders.Andalmosteveryonehasrecognizedsomeonewhohasstoodoutfromthecrowd.However,mostpeopledon’tdoanythingaboutwhattheyobserveandarecaughtreactingtoacrisis.Byemployingtheprinciplesofcombatprofiling,youwillbebetterabletoobservepre-eventindicators,identifythatacrisismayoccur,anddosomethingaboutit.

Throughout the book, we’ve talked about different examples of whenmembers of the military or law enforcement have recognized something waswrong, but the applications of these behaviors go well beyond the battlefieldoverseasorgangcontrolledneighborhoodsofLA.Thesixdomainsofbehaviorcan be observed everywhere we go. As the story of Ms. Ramirez shows,oftentimes it is more important to be aware when you’re close to home andwhere you are likely to feel the safest. Every situation is going to be a littledifferentandthelensthatyouusetogetleftofbangmightchange,butbeingleftof bang is all about being able to understand the people around you and howtheiractionsindicatetheirintentions.

2.APPLYINGPROFILING“Itisn’tjustthebenefitofestablishingabaselinethatyougainbygoingthroughtheprocess;theincreasedunderstandingofeveryoneinvolvedistherealaccomplishment.ThisiswhatwillmakeMarinesmoreadaptable.Thisiswhatwillmakethembetterhunters.Thisiswhatwillmakethemmoresurvivable.”

—U.S.MarinewhohasattendedaCombatHuntercourse

FeedbackFromtheFrontlinesFollowingtheirverysuccessfuldeploymenttoAfghanistanfromtheendof2010and into 2011, we had the opportunity to sit down with a group ofNoncommissionedOfficersandOfficersfrom2ndBattalion,1stMarines,toget

feedbackonhowCombatHunterhelpedthemwhiledeployed.ThegoalwastoseeiftherewereanygapsintheCombatHuntercoursethatwecouldadjusttoprovide the greatest support for Marines overseas. We came away from theinterview very impressed with the Marines’ ability to apply what they hadlearnedintheirtrainingtothesituationstheyencounteredinAfghanistan.

ThatgroupofMarinesagreedthatitwouldtakeasquadofMarines(thirteenMarines)approximatelyfifteenpatrolsbeforetheycouldestablishabaselineforthevillageinwhichtheywereoperating.Thisisthroughnofaultoftheirown.Marinesaretrainedtocontinuallyvarytheirroutestopreventsettingpatterns,soduring those fifteen patrols, theMarines were not necessarily exposed to thesameareaseverytime.Ifthatsquadwasoneofthreesquadsataplatoon-sizedpatrolbase,thenMarineswerebeingexposedtothelocalpopulaceandenemyalmostforty-fivetimesbeforetheyfelttheyreallyunderstoodtheareatheywereresponsibleforcontrolling.

TheseMarinesweredevelopingtheirimplicitunderstandingofthatarea,buttheir ability to establish a baseline was hindered because developing tacitknowledgetakestime.Withouthavingabaselinetocomparetheirobservationsto, their ability to identify threats and identify people who didn’t fit in wasgreatlyreducedduringthoseinitialfewweeksinAfghanistan.Theotherreasonthat this raised a concern for us is that the enemy was able to observe theMarinesonforty-fiveoccasions,developingtheirknowledgeoftheMarinesandidentifying their patterns. Additionally, it wasn’t only the enemy that wasobservingtheMarines,buttheentirevillage.

This interview began the initiative to develop a systematic approach toestablishing a baseline to shorten the time required to have a functioningunderstandingofanareaatthebeginningofadeployment.TheaddedbenefittothisisthatMarinescanpatrolandoperatewithanexplicitunderstandingofwhatto lookfor tomoreeffectivelyandquicklyestablishabaseline.Over time, theexplicitknowledge that iscreatedon thefirst fewpatrolswillbecomeimplicitandwillexpandpast theresultsof thefirstattempts.The immediategoal is tofind quantifiable observations that can be communicated across a unit andreduce thecontinuousexposureneeded tocreateamutualunderstandingofanarea’sbaseline.182

Themethodwe advocate for developing your ability to explicitly establishbaselinesandapplyingthecombatprofilingmethodisathree-stepapproach.Byconsistently and explicitly going through this process, you will quicken yourability to understand your surroundings, speed up your ability to identifyanomalies,andultimatelyincreaseyourdecision-makingabilities.Themoreyou

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use this process, the quicker you’ll begin to tacitly evaluate your environmentand the less mental energy you’ll require to establish baselines and identifyanomalies.

Thethreestepscanbesummedupwithafewsimplequestions:First,whatisgoingonhere?Second,whatwouldcausesomeonetostandoutandwhy?Third,what would I do about it? The key to combat profiling is understanding thebehavioralpatternsofanareaand individuals (establish thebaseline)and thenidentifying those individuals or situations that break the patterns (find theanomalies).

Whatisgoingonhere?The first step begins bymaking a quick and immediate assessment about theatmosphericsofthearea.Atfirstglance,doestheareahavepositiveornegativeatmospherics? If the area has positive atmospherics, is there anyone whoseattitudeorbehavioralclusterdoesn’tfitthebaseline?Thispersonmaywarrantasecond look. If theareahasnegativeatmospherics, is thereanyone in theareawhoisdisplayingthecomfortablecluster?Thisfirststepisdesignedtoquicklydetermine if there is anyone blatantly deviating from the baseline. The keyquestionsare:

Whatisthegeneralfeeloftheplace?Whatisthecommonemotion?Isitpositiveornegative?Whatarethecommonorconsistentbehaviorsamongpeople in the area? Are people comfortable, uncomfortable, relaxed,aggressive,etc.?What defines this situation: order/disorder, busy/ slow,crowded/uncrowded?

The second element of understanding “what is going on here?” is todetermine the type of place you’re in based on geographics and iconography.Geographics defines the large-scale patterns of an environment or situation.Iconography provides further atmospheric indicators and gives you a sense ofthegroupsandmessagesaffiliatedwith thearea.Atmospherics andproxemicshelptointerpretthegeographicbehaviors.Thekeyquestionsare:

WhereamI?AmIin(orobserving)ahabitualareaorananchorpoint?Are there anchor points within the habitual area? Who controls them?Whatbehaviorsorindicatorsidentifytheanchorpoints?Aretherepeopleproviding over-watch or physical security? Are there passive securitymeasures (e.g., cameras, fences)? Are most people avoiding a specificlocation, while only certain people are proxemically pulled to that

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location?Whatarethenaturallinesofdrift?Wherearepeopleheaded?

Ultimately, the combat profiler is attempting to determine the large-scalebehavioral patterns in order to establish a standard against which to judgeanomalies.As thecombatprofiler asksandanswers thesequestions,heor sheshouldalsoattempttoidentifytheunderlyingcausefortheobservedbehaviors:e.g.,whyistheplacecrowded?Whyarepeoplekeepingacertaindistancefromoneanother?Whyistheatmospherepositiveornegative?

Finally,thethirdpartofansweringthequestionof“whatisgoingonhere?”isto understand the behavioral patterns that are occurring and identify theprocessesthatareuniquetotheareayouareobserving.Thisthirdsteptakestheobservationsdowntothemicro-levelandisfocusedonindividualsandgroupsofpeople.Thekeyquestionsare:

WhatpatternsofmovementdoIobserve?Arepeoplebeingproxemicallypulledtowardorpushedawayfromsomeoneorsomething?Whatdistancearepeoplekeepingfromoneanother?WhatactivitiesdoIobserve?

While working through this first step, the combat profiler should notdisregard appropriate assumptions in helping to judge the observations beingmade.Webelieveitisimportanttousetheknowledgeofparallelsituationsfromothercontextstodevelopreasonableassumptionsforwhattypesofbehaviortoexpect. For example, while a market in downtown Los Angeles will lookdifferentandhavedifferentbehaviorspresentthanabazaarintheMiddleEast,similarities in behavioral patternswill still exist. This is due to shared humannature which restricts and encourages similar types of behaviors in the twosituations.Trading, selling,bargainingpatternscausedbyproxemicnecessitiesand spatial organization, and various other elements, create numeroussimilaritiesbetweenaU.S.marketandaMiddleEasternbazaar.Formingusefuland effective analogies is key for combat profilers. They provide the combatprofiler with initial sets of expectations and assumptions that can be quicklyconfirmed. These assumptions will sometimes need to be corrected, but theyspeeduptheobservationalprocessandarebetterthanstartingfromscratch.

Almostallaspectsofhumanbehaviorcanbepotentialelementsofabaseline:whenpeoplegetup,whenlocalsvisitthemarketplace,whenpeoplegotosleep,trafficpatterns,greetingbehaviors,andnumerousotherbehaviors.Itisimportantthatcombatprofilersareexplicitaboutwhattypesofbehaviorstheyareusingto

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establishthebaselinefortheareaandensurethattheyrecordtheirobservations.Combat profilers should also consistently update baseline observations asbehaviorsshiftandchangeovertime.

Whatwouldcausesomeonetostandoutandwhy?The second stepmoves the combat profiler towardmore focused and specificobservations, with the distinct goal of being prepared to identify anomalies.While the first stepprovides thecombatprofilerwithapictureof the“norm,”during step two, the combat profiler focuses his or her observations on thosethings thatwould go above and below the norm—the things that don’t fit thesituation. Here, the domains that are of most help are proxemics, kinesics,biometrics,andiconography.Proxemicshelpstoidentifyunusualmovementandplacementof individuals.Kinesicsandbiometricshelp to identify thosewhoseemotions,attitudes,andintentionsdonotfitthenormalemotions,attitudes,andbehavior of the situation. Iconography will help to identify affiliations,motivations,andmessages.Thegoal is tobeginmentallypreparing to identifythepersonwhostandsout.Thekeyquestionstoaskduringthisstepinclude:

Whoseemsfamiliarorunfamiliarwiththearea?Whohas access to anchor points?What is the clothing andbehavior ofthoseindividuals?Whoappearsuncomfortable,dominant,interestedoruninterested?Whosemovementappearsaggressive?Whoisproxemicallytooclose,orpushedtoofaraway?Whosebehaviorappearsunnaturalordistracted?Whoseattentionappearsdivided?Whose iconography associates themwith hostile or threatening causes?Whichindividualsinthecrowdmaybeaffiliatedwithoneanotherbasedonsimilariconography?Isanyoneexhibitingsmugglingbehaviororcheckinghisorher“six”?Doesanyone’sbiometriccuesindicatedistress,discomfort,anger,anxiety,orothernegativeemotions?

WhatwouldIdoaboutit?Thethirdstepissimplytothinkabouttheactionyouwouldtakebasedonyourobservations.Thisistheapplicationofthecombatprofilingheuristic.Thefirstquestion: is anyone an obvious hostile threat? If so,what is your plan to dealwith it? If not, then is anyonegivingoff three (ormore)behavioral indicators

that they are an anomaly?Remember,whenyouobserve three indicators, youhavetoact!Decidewhichtypeofbehaviorswouldwarrantdifferentresponses.Action may simply be contacting the person to ask some questions andobserving themupclose.Butdonotwaituntil further indicatorsareexhibitedbecauseitmaybetoolate.Basedonthecombatprofilingheuristic,youmustdosomething. For the Marine in a combat environment, the decisions are kill,capture, or contact. For the civilian in a potentially unsafe situation, thedecisionsarerun,hide,orfight.Eachsituationwillbedifferent.Asecurityagentinapublictransportationfacilitymaydecidethattheirhierarchyofdecisionsisquestion, detain, or subdue. A civilian in the same location might considerreport,alert(i.e.,soundanalarm),orrun.Apoliceofficeronpatrolmayhavetodecidebetweenshoot,arrest,orquestion.Regardlessofwhatsituationyoufindyourselfin,orwhatroleyouareplayingatthemoment,youmusthaveasetofpre-establisheddecisionstomakebasedonwhatyouobserve.Otherwise,you’llfreeze,taketoolong,ormakeadecisionthatisnotinyourbestinterest.

Thesethreestepsareabasicguidetoestablishingabaseline,thinkingabouthowyouwillidentifyanomalies,andbeingreadytoactquickly.Thisisforyoursafetyandthatofothers.Followingthesestepswillkeepyouleftofbang.

3.ESTABLISHINGBASELINESMEVERYWHEREYOUGO

Asdiscussedabove,whenarriving inanewarea, thefirst task is todeterminewhatisgoingonintheareayouareoperatingin/observing:thegeographicandbehavioral patterns. Although each setting is unique, the general approachdiscussed above will help in establishing baselines for every place a Marinemight encounterwhiledeployed.However, there is anotherway that aMarinecan shorten the timeneeded togo through that process, and that is by findingsimilar locations here in the states with which to draw analogies to placesoverseas.

If aMarine unit expects to conduct a high number of vehicle or personnelcheckpoints,thereareanumberofplacestopracticeestablishingabaseline.Apersoncouldobservethebehaviorofpeoplestandinginlineatadepartmentofmotor vehicles, at a TSA checkpoint at an airport, or even a border-crossingcheckpoint.Byinitiallyanalyzingthebehaviorofthepeopleatthecheckpoint,observingeachdomainoneatatime,andthenanalyzingbehaviorencompassingallofthedomains,Marinescanquicklyestablishabaselineforthatsetting.Themoreexperiencecombatprofilershaveatanalyzingpeopleandplacesusingthe

SixDomains,thelargerfilefolderstheywillcreateandthequickertheywillbeable to make observations in new environments. This is particularly true ifcombatprofilerscanobservesituationsathomethatmirrororprovideanalogiesto situations abroad. If a unit expects to be operating in a mostly rural area,Marines could observe the behavior of peoplewhowork in similar industries.There could be a great number of similarities between the behavior of a fieldworkerintheU.S.andafarmeroverseas.

Combat profilersmay not be able to find parallel experiences at home forsomesituations that theywill faceoverseas, suchas IEDattacks. In situationslike these, Marines and soldiers need the ability to conduct a mentalsimulation183 ofwhat theywouldexpect tobe thebaseline for theevent.Thiswill dramatically reduce the time needed to make sense of what is occurringwhen they arrive at a chaotic scene. The high degree of uncertainty and theelementoftheunknowncancausestressthatlimitsyourabilitytothinkclearlyin these scenarios. Taking the time before you deploy to list any possiblecontingencies youmay respond to anddiscussing themwith peoplewhohaveexperienced similar events on previous deployments can help you to buildtemplatesforthosecontingencies.

The picture below depicts the scene around a gang shooting victim in LosAngeles.

(PhotoCourtesyofBrandonValdez)

Toestablishanimmediatebaselineforthisevent,itissafetoassumethatthedeceased victim would become a center of focus for the surrounding people.

However,onlypeoplewhoarefamiliarwithvictimsorwhohaveaninterestinthem would approach them (proxemic pull). These people may be firstresponderswhowanttoprovidefirstaidandsavetheperson’slife.Theycouldalsobepeoplewhowanttoremovethingsfromthebody(eithersomethingthatthey own andwant to get back or to steal something that theywant from thevictim) before the police arrive. With the exception of those two groups ofpeople,wewouldexpectallof theotherbystanders tobeproxemicallypushedawayfromthevictim,astheywouldhavenoneedtogetanycloser.

Wewouldexpectpeoplewhohadnowarningthatthesetwomenweregoingto be killed to be shocked at the event, causing them to display a cluster ofuncomfortablebehaviors,whilesomeonewhoanticipatedtheeventmayshowalowerdegreeofinterestinthescenebecausetheysawitcoming.Wewouldalsoexpectpeopletobeshowingasubmissiveclusterinresponsetothesceneastheyrealizethattwopeoplearenowdead.Theotherextremeofthissituationwouldbepeoplewhoaresoangeredbytheeventthattheydisplaydominanceastheybecomeemotionallyarousedandexperiencearushofadrenaline.

With these very basic assumptions formed for a baseline,wemay considerthe Los Angeles picture by first looking at the girl on the right edge of thephoto.*Her body language shows that she is interested in the scene: her feet,torso,andgazearealldirectlyorientedat thevictims.Wecouldconclude thatsheisfeelinguncomfortable,sincesheisdisplayingpacifyingbehaviorsassherubsherclavicleandhascrossedherarmsacrossherchest.Theseobservationsfitourinitialassumptions,leadingtowardthedecisionthatshefitsthebaselineanddoesnotwarrantanyadditionalattentionatthemoment.ShiftingleftinthepictureandobservingthefemalewearingawhitesweatshirtandCapripants,wecometoasimilarconclusionasthefirstfemale.Shehascoveredhermouthwithher hand,which is a response often associatedwith surprise andgrief.* Sinceshealsofitsthebaseline,shedoesnotneedanyimmediateattention.

The third female in the picture, wearing a white shirt, jeans, and whitesneakers,however,isananomalyanddoesnotfitthebaseline.First,onefootisoriented toward the scene and the other foot is pointing away from the scene,showingthatshemaybepreparingtoleavethearea.Herdividedinterestcauseshertostandoutfromtheothertwowomen.Theotherindicatoristhe“handsonthehip”posture,whichweclassify in thedominancecluster.Thefact thatshedoes not fit the baseline and stands out as an anomaly does not indicate anywrongdoing.Butitrequiresatleastcontactinghertofindoutwhatinformationshemayhaveabouteitherthevictimsortheshooters.

Any timeMarines attempt to establish a baseline using either analogy or a

mental simulation approach, they will arrive on the scene with a set ofassumptions.Inmanysituations,theassumptionswillinitiallyfaroutweighthefacts. Because combat profilers may enter a situation with a high degree ofunconfirmed assumptions, the need for accurate and actionable information isveryhigh inorder to raise their awarenessabout theevent.Thebenefitofourapproachisthattheycanquicklyadjusttheirassumptionsandfillinthegapsofinformation.

WebelievethattherewillbeenoughsimilaritiesbetweenvarioussituationsintheU.S. and analogous situations overseas that developing initial assumptionswillshorten the timerequired todevelopabaselinewhiledeployed.Withoutabaseline,youwillhavenothingagainstwhichtocompareyourobservationsandnowaytoassess initiallywhetherornotapersonisananomaly.Theintentofcombat profiling is to increase a Marine’s situational awareness andsurvivability. By practicing establishing baselines now, you can decrease thetimeneededtoisolatetheenemyandminimizethechanceofanenemyhuntingyou.

4.IDENTIFYINGKEYLEADERSUnderstandinghumanbehavior ishugelybeneficial toMarinesandhelps themgaintheupperhandintheirdailyliveswhileathomeordeployed.ApplicationofthisunderstandingismosthelpfulforMarinesastheyattempttoidentifykeyleaders in any group of people.While often the leader will willingly identifyhimself, therecouldbesituations inwhichheconcealshis role.Often,combatprofilersmustobserve fromadistanceandwillnothave thebenefitsofbeingintroduced to thekey leader.How, then,cankey leadersbe identified?Humanbehaviorandgroupdynamicsarekey.

In relation to combat, in highly kinetic scenarios, a sniper team capable ofidentifyingaleaderfromathousandyardsawaywithahighdegreeofcertaintycanprovideseveraloptionstothegroundcommander:theycankillthatleader,maneuver ground forces to detain the leader, or continue observation to gainmoreinformation.Incounterinsurgencysituationswherethereisagreaterneedto influence the localpopulationasameansofgaining intelligence to rootoutinsurgents,identifyingthelocalleadersandpowerbrokersinavillageiscritical.Thekey-leaderindicatorsdiscussedherearenotlimitedsolelytoenemyleaders,butanyleaderwithinagroupofpeople.

TheMADEMan

IntheItalianMafia,becominga“made”manisassociatedwithstatus,respect,and a higher-level power in the organization’s hierarchy. To help Marinesremember the fourmainbehavioral indicators for leaders,weuse theacronymMADE. These indicators areMimicry, Adoration, Direction, and Entourage.*Anytimeyouobservetheseelementsofbehavior,youcanbereasonablycertainyouhaveidentifiedtheleaderofthegroup.

EntourageThe first indicator for identifying key leaders is an entourage. In fact, it’s anecessaryindicator,sinceit’sdifficulttoidentifyakeyleaderofagroupwithoutagroup.Anentourageissimplyoneormorepeoplearoundtheleader.Thismayseem obvious because the well-established fact in leadership research is thatinteractionisoneofthemainactivitiesofleaders.Whiletheleaderneedsothersaroundtocontrolorgiveguidance,havinganentouragecomeswithadditionalrequirements.Anentourage,whichmayincludeamessenger,abodyguard,oratrusted advisor, provides a benefit to the leader. The President of the UnitedStateshasanentouragemadeupoftheSecretServicetoprotecthim,agroupofadvisorstoprovidecounsel,andsupportpersonnelwhohandleanytaskheneedsdone.Everyonearoundhimprovidesabenefittohimbecauseheistheleaderofthatgroup.EventhoughleaderswillnotalwayshaveasextensiveanentourageasthePresident,anentouragewillstillbepresent.

The leader must also provide a benefit to their entourage. Whether it ismoney, guidance, drug connections, or protection from authorities or rivals,some reason exists for the entourage to choose and support the leader. Todeterminetherolesofindividualsinsideofagroup,answeringquestionsaboutwhoisprovidingphysicalprotectionforwhomandwhoisthecenterofattentioncanfacilitatethiseffort.

DirectionThe second leadership indicator is direction—the leader provides direction forthe rest of the group. A leader who is significant will be in control of hissubordinates.Givingdirectionisoftenakinesicindicatordesignedtocontroltheactionsandbehaviorsofothersandcouldeitherbeveryobviousorverysubtle.Militarycommandersoftenevoketheimageofgivingobviousdirectionastheyorder their different units topush forward, hold firm,or anyother action theyrequire.* While obvious indicators of direction are easy to identify, such aspointingormotioning,combatprofilersmustalso look for subtle indicatorsofdirection. Subtle indicators could be a nod, a wink, stroking a beard, or

somethingthatwouldnotattractmuchattentionyetwouldstillconveyspecificguidancetoothers.

Oftentimes,juniorleadersinanorganizationareeasiertoidentifythantheirsuperiorsbecausethejuniorleadersaremoreapttogiveveryobviousdirection.In an attempt to exert control ormake a name for themselves, theywill verylikelybemoreovertintheiractions,veryclearlyorderingtheirsubordinatestotake certain actions. They are more likely to be offended if their orders aredisobeyed.Seniorleaderswhohaveprogressedthroughtheranksandareusuallymorematuremay not feel the need to continuously display overt dominance.They may feel more secure in their position or do not want to attract theattention of others, which in a criminal enterprise may result in detention orarrest. Subtle indicators of directionmay bemore indicative of the true shot-callers.

Asthehumaneyeisnaturallyattractedtomovement,kinesiccuesassociatedwithdirectionareoftenwhatwillinitiallycaptureourattentionandallowustoidentifyotherleadershipindicatorsthroughsustainedobservation.

AdorationAdoration is the third key-leader indicator and can be defined by positivedisplaysofadmirationandrespecttowardanindividual.Thesecanbeverbalandnonverbal, as well as overt and subtle. Verbal adoration includes language ofrespect.Thiscanbecallingsomeone“sir”or“ma’am,”addressingapersonbytitle(suchasmilitaryrank,“doctor,”etc.),orusingformallanguagereservedforpeopleofhigher status (as in languages suchasKorean).Nonverbal adorationencompassesactionsandgestureswhichshowdeferencetowardanotherperson.Overtsignsofadorationincludegesturessuchassaluting,bowing,orkissingthehand.Subtlesignsofadorationincludethingssuchaswalkingbehindthepersonofhigherrank,holdingthedooropen,standinginapostureofsubmissiveness,physicallysittingata lowerheight than thekey leader, standingwhile thekeyleader sits, looking to the key leader for acknowledgement, etc.* In manysituations,criminalsorevenlocalswhoarefriendlytowarduswillnotwanttoovertly indicatewho their key leader is. It is fairly easy to temporarily refrainfromshowingovertsignsofadoration;however,itisverydifficulttokeepfromshowing subtle signs of adoration toward a superior because they are soingrainedinpeople’sbehavior.Behaviorwillbetrayintentionsandrelationships—with sustainedobservationcombatprofilerscanconfidently identify thekeyleadersanddecisionmakersinanygroup.

MimicryThe last leadership indicator is mimicry which includes the subconsciousgestures,mannerisms,facialexpressions,postures,speechpatterns,accents,andother behaviors that people display which are identical to those they areinteractingwith.184 Research has shown thatmimicry is a positive element ofgroup dynamics that establishes rapport and increases positive relationshipsbetweengroupmembers.

Mimicrywasevenamethodemployedbyourancestorstosurvivebecause,inthe harsh conditions in which they lived, social isolates did not survive.185Mimicking another person’s actions demonstrates respect, and often peoplesubconsciouslyandnaturallymimicthosewhomtheyrespect.Whilebehavioralmimicry can be a deliberate act and done intentionally, also important are theelementsofmimicry thatoccuroutsideofconsciousawareness.Theseare trueindicatorsofsocialstandingandauthority.Becausepeopleshowahigherdegreeof mimicry when they are interacting with others by whom they want to beaccepted,186combatprofilersshouldlookforthepersonwhoinitiatesaspecificbehavior aswell as the peoplewhomatch ormimic that behavior.The leaderwilloftenbe thedominantperson in thegroupand therefore theonewhofirstassumes a posture, expression, or gesturewhich is subsequentlymimicked bytherestofthegroup.*

When done outside of conscious awareness, mimicry will show where aperson’struerespectliesandmaynotalwayssyncwithanacceptedhierarchyinan organization.Many companies,militaries, and social groups have a personwhohasbeenchosentobethepublicandvisibleleader,whilethereisastrong-willedsecondincommandwhoistheglueintheorganizationandhasearnedthetrustandrespectofthosewithwhomtheywork.Subtledisplaysofmimicrywillhelpyoufindwhotherealleadersareinanygroup.

FindingtheMADEManInsituationswhereyoucanobservefouroutoffour,oreventhreeoutoffour,indicators previously discussed, you can be reasonably certain that you arewatching the leader of the group. Other times, you may be alerted to thepresence of a leader based on other aspects of the profiling domains, and thepreceding indicators can be used to supplement your observations. As eachsituationyoufindyourselfinwillbeslightlydifferent,theseindicatorsmayhelpyouidentifytheleaders in thegroupsyouareobserving.Findingandtargetingthese people can not only improve your effectiveness but also improve the

perception of your capabilities. Counterinsurgencies can turn into a “war ofinformation,”andthosewiththemostinfluencecangreatlyaffecttheoutcome.Findingthosepeoplewithinfluenceisasignificantwaytotipthescalesinyourfavor.

5.STAYINGLEFTOFBANG:ATTACKSFROMWITHIN187

“Workplace violence,” “insider threat,” or “green-on-blue attack.”Call itwhatyouwillbuttherealityremainsthesame.Thosewhowearesupposedtobeableto trustviolate thatverytrustbyconductingaviolentattackagainst theirown.For U.S. military personnel, the threat of “green-on-blue” attacks has risenconsiderably in thepast fewyears.According tooneongoingdatabase,green-on-blueattacks(attacksagainstcoalitionpersonnelbymembersofjointsecurityforces)morethantripledfrom2010to2011.Themostattacksoccurredin2012,withapproximately44separateincidentsresultingin61coalitiondeaths.FromJanuary 2008 until October 2013, there were approximately 85 green-on-blueattacksresultinginaround140killedand159woundedcoalitionpersonnel.188

ThereasonforthisincreaseinattacksbyAfghansecurityforcepersonnelislargelyduetotheheightenedriskresultingfromtheincreaseinjointoperations(such as patrols) and the increasedmentorship roles that coalition forces haveassumed.More interpersonal interactionresults inagreaterrisk.Thecausesofthese attacks mainly fall into two categories. First, tensions resulting fromculturaldifferencesandinterpersonalconflict.Second,infiltrationandinfluencebyinsurgentgroups. InAugust2013, theInternationalSecurityandAssistanceForceCommander,GeneralJohnAllenstatedthatupto25percentofgreen-on-blueattacksweretheresultofinsurgentinfiltration;however,themajorityweretheresultofpersonalgrievances.189AslongasMarinesandotherU.S.militarypersonnel continue towork alongside host-nation security forces, the threat ofthese types of attacks will remain. The key is to take the necessary steps tomitigatetheseattacksandtrainourownsecurityforcestostayleftofbang.

Theproblemof green-on-blue attackspresents a very complex scenario forthemilitary, as themission inAfghanistan is to train and develop theAfghanNational Security Forces (ANSF) so that they can take charge of their ownnational security. This is a mission that requires well-developed relationshipsbetween the soldiersofeachcountryandahigh levelof trustbetweenmentorandmentee.If theAmericanmilitarytreatseveryAfghansoldierasapotentialthreat, taking away their ammunition, searching them at checkpoints, and

treatingthemassecond-classcitizens,theserelationshipswillbedestroyedandthemissionwillfail.Ontheotherhand,theANSFcan’tbetreatedasharmless,and the military can’t completely let their guard down. That approach wouldexposeourforcestoanunacceptablelevelofrisk,andwouldlikewisecausethemission to fail. Because the impact of green-on-blue incidents strains thisrelationship and jeopardizes over eleven years of combat, “threats inside thewire” have attracted the attention at the highest levels of the military andgovernment.

In addition to green-on-blue attacks, our forces have occasionally been thevictimsofdeliberate“blue-on-blue”violence.Usuallythephraseblue-on-blueisusedtorefertoincidentsinwhichU.S.personnelfireuponotherU.S.personnelwhether by accident or through negligence. At times, however, blue-on-blueviolence is the result of a U.S. service member, contractor, or governmentemployee attacking other U.S. personnel because of deliberate and maliciousintent.OneofthehighestprofileexamplesinrecenttimeshasbeenthecaseofMajorNidalHasan(U.S.Army),whokilled13peopleandinjuredmorethan30othersatFortHoodin2009.MorerecentlyinSeptember2013,NavycontractorAaronAlexisshot15peoplewithashotgun,killing12of them,afterenteringtheWashingtonNavyYardwith a valid ID card. Since these are not the onlyexamplesofthistypeofattack,theinsiderthreatisalwaysariskthatneedstobeconsidered.

The American military is not alone in experiencing workplace violence orinsiderattacks.A2001reportestimatedthat1.7million“violentvictimizations”occurred inU.S.workplaces between 1993 and 1999. Seventy-five percent oftheseweresimpleassaults;althoughlessthan1percentwerehomicides.190Anentire industry exists to provide training, advice, and security assistance toprevent and respond to workplace violence. Additionally, we have becomeincreasinglyawareofeventssuchasschoolshootingsandothertypesofattacksinplaceswepreviouslythoughtwere(relatively)safe.Ononehand,thesetypesofattacksareapartofthelargerissuesofcrimewefaceintheU.S.Accordingto the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reporting Program, there were approximately1,214,462violentcrimesnationwidein2012.191Ontheotherhand,issuessuchas workplace violence and school shootings seem more threatening, moreunbelievable,perhapsbecausetheyoccurinplaceswhereweshouldbeabletotrust thatourchildrenandwearesafe. Inmanyways,workplaceviolenceandschool shootingsparallel thegreen-on-blue andmaliciousblue-on-blue attacksourmilitarypersonnelexperiencehereandoverseas.

Various studies have defined civilian workplace violence by four main

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categories:192Civilian Type 1: These include violent acts by criminals who areunconnectedwiththeworkplace.Theseareactssuchasrobberies.Civilian Type 2: These include violence directed toward employees bycustomers,clients,orothersthattheorganizationprovidesservicesfor.CivilianType3:This isdefinedasviolence against employeesbyothercurrentorformeremployees.CivilianType4:Theseareviolenceactscommitted in theworkplacebysomeonewhodoesn’twork there,butwhohasapersonalrelationship toanemployee(e.g.,aspouseorpartner).

Fromtheperspectiveofdeployedmilitaryforces,wemaydisregardthe“Type4” incidents for several reasons. However, Types 1-3 relate to the types ofviolence thatourmilitary forcesexperience,whichcanalsobebrokenup intofourcategories:

MilitaryType1:ViolentactsbyinsurgentsandotherhostileforcesagainstU.S. patrols or bases (e.g., patrol bases or forward operating bases).(CivilianType1)MilitaryType2:Violentactsbylocalswhoarenotapartofaninsurgentgroup.(CivilianType2)MilitaryType3:Violentactsbyassumedcoalitionpersonnel(i.e.,green-on-blue).(CivilianType3)Military Type 4: Violent acts by fellow U.S. personnel (i.e., maliciousblue-on-blue;e.g.,MajHasan).(CivilianType3)

TheMilitaryType1eventsequatetotraditionalattacksagainstU.S.forcesbyinsurgentsandotherhostile forces.But theseareexpected.Theusual training,precautions, and security measures apply to deny the enemy the ability toconducttheseattacks.Offensivetactics,suchasdispersion,360-degreesecurity,and over-watch, help to mitigate some of the risks of these types of attacks.Defensive obstacles, checkpoints and barricades, security positions, and othermeasures help to create defensive standoffs to keep hostile forces out of ourpositions.However, these typesof riskscomewith the job,and it’scombatingthesetypesofattacksthatourmilitarypersonnelarebesttrainedtodealwith.

TheMilitary Type 2 are those inwhich local civilians, who are not activemembersofahostileor insurgentgroup,attackU.S.orcoalitionforces.Theseare often the result of grievances, such as the loss of a child or other familymember.Civiliancasualtiesareanuglyrealityofviolentconflictandoftenfuel

negative sentiment againstmilitaries andother security forcesoperating in thearea. These attacks may be spontaneous or premeditated. In the types ofenvironments in which U.S. forces are currently operating, it is extremelydifficulttodistinguishbetweenthesetypesofattacksandMilitaryType1attackswhichinvolverecognizedenemyforces.Thesametypesoftacticsanddefensivemeasureshelptomitigatetheeffectsoftheseattacks.Nevertheless,itiscriticallyimportantthatweattempttominimizeciviliancasualtiesandtreatlocalcivilianswithrespect.Insurgencies,andevenpolicingmissions,requirethesupportofthelocalpopulace.

ThetwotypesofattacksthataredefinedasinsiderattacksareTypes3and4.Theseareviolentactsconductedagainstourownforcesbythepeopleweshouldbeabletotrustthemost:fellowcoalitionpartnersandevenourownmilitaryanddefensepersonnel.Untilrecently,thesetypesofattackshadbeenrelativelyrare,although not unknown. Our military personnel need training to be able toprevent theseacts fromhappening.Combat profiling canprovide a number oftoolstostayleft-of-bang.

Combat profiling givesMarines and othermilitary personnel three tools tohelppreventinsiderattacks:theproactive,combathuntermindset;theabilitytoidentify pre-event indicators; and the ability to make quick and accuratedecisionswithlittletimeandlittleinformation.

CombatHunterMindsetThe FBI suggests that one way to survive workplace violence is having a“survivalmindset.”Thismeansbeingaware,prepared,andhavingrehearsedtheactions you will take during a workplace violence incident.193 Those whoprepareandtrainthemselvesforthepossibilityofviolencewillreactdifferentlythan thosewhodonot.Thosewho are not preparedwill likelypanic andwillultimatelybecomehelpless(ConditionBlack).Thosewhoarepreparedwillstillexperience anxiety but will be more likely to maintain awareness and acteffectively in a stressful situation (possibly going as far as Condition Red).Rather than a “survival mindset,” we recommend that you have a “combathunter”mindset. The first element of thismindset ismaintaining a ConditionYellowawarenesslevel.Itmeansmaintainingyoursituationalawareness.

The reality is, however, that it is not always possible to be in ConditionYellow100percentof the time.Whenapersonfocusesonreadinganaccountreport, isengaged inan importantbusiness relatedconversation,orconductsanumber of other tasks, that person’s situational awareness will be limited, orpossibly even lost.However, there is no excuse forwalking around the entire

daycompletelyunawareofyoursurroundings.Afterreadingareportorfinishingataskorconversation,everyoneshouldassesshisorhersurroundings.Thismayonlytakeafewsecondsbutmaybethedifferencebetweenbeingavictimandbeingasurvivor.ForMarinesandotherdeployedservicemembers,itisalsonotpossible for every single individual to be completely aware and searching forthreats at all times. However, they have an advantage in that Marines andsoldiers can be assigned to serve as “guardian angels.” These are personnelwhose job it is to be on the lookout, at all times, for potential threats.Additionally, military forces can establish and maintain various securitymeasures not available to many civilian organizations, such as securitycheckpoints andpersonnel searches.Thismeans thatmilitarybasesabroadareverycontrolledenvironments.And, insteadof lettingthis leadtocomplacence,Marinesandothersecuritypersonnelshouldrecognizethatthesecuritymeasuresin place provide for an even greater ability to identify potential threats andpreventattacks.

IdentifyPre-EventIndicatorsAttacks do not happen “out of the blue.” Even what may be consideredspontaneous violence is almost always the result of a gradual progression ofaggression and pre-cursors to violence. In order to conduct attacks, terroristgroupsmust plan, prepare, reconnoiter, rehearse, stage for the attack,move tothelocationoftheattack,andnumerousotherthingsbeforeactuallyconductingtheattack.Thesamecanbesaidabouttheworkplaceshooter,therapist,ortheviolentassaulter.However,astheFBIstates,“Itmustbepointedout,however,thatnosinglebehaviorismoresuggestiveofviolencethananother.Allactionshavetobejudgedinthepropercontextandintotalitytodeterminethepotentialforviolence.”194Nevertheless,thekeytopreventingmanyattacksisidentifyingthepre-eventindicators.

Combatprofilingfocusesonobservingbehavioralindicatorsthatsomeoneisa potential threat. These include autonomic indicators of emotions and stress(biometric cues), behavioral indicators of aggression (kinesics), violations ofinterpersonal distance and other movements that attackers make (proxemics),andvariousotherbehaviorcluesthatapersonwantstodoanotherpersonharm.Military personnel, or anyone in aworkplace, should look for these andotherindicators that someone may be planning or preparing to conduct an insiderattack.

BehavioralIndicators

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Combat profiling is primarily a method of behavioral analysis—analyzing aperson’sbehavior todeterminetheiremotionsandintentions.Weexpect toseesimilartypebehaviorsfromsomeonewhoisplanningtoconductanattack.

Nervous behaviors (uncomfortable cluster) – Personally and physicallyconductinganattackagainstanotherpersonrequiresagreatdealofrisk.Theattackerisatpersonalriskatanumberofpointsfrominitialplanningto the actual attack itself. Most people will be uncomfortable with thechance of getting caught or having their attack thwarted. Drug dealers,shoplifters, smugglers, and even suicide bombers would rather not becaught. Instead, they want to accomplish their goal and carry out theirmission.Additionally,peoplehaveanaturalaversion topain, injury,anddeath.Humannatureproducesastrongdesire forsurvival,andveryfew(if any) people can or will walk into the face of death unaffected andundeterred—eventhemostidealisticsuicidebomber.Thatbeingthecase,anyonewhoseekstoaccomplishataskinasituationwherethereishighriskof getting caught and a significant potential for injuryor deathwillexperience nervousness and fear as the survival instinct kicks in andreleasesanumberofhormonessuchasadrenaline.Concealing theplan (uncomfortable cluster) –Prior to the actual attack,anyindividualswhoareinvolvedinplanningtheattackwilllikelyexhibitsecretivebehavior.Thiswilllikelybeexpressedinvariousways.Onetheonehand,apotentialattacker(oranyindividualinvolvedintheplan)willseektohidethefactthatanattackisbeingplannedandpreparedfor.Thismay result in avoidance behaviors or proxemic pushes away from thosewhomightbeabletointerveneandpreventtheattack.Ontheotherhand,a potential attacker may also exhibit aggressive behaviors as acounterresponse to those inquiring about the secretivebehavior. In thesecases, the person may exhibit a behavioral cluster shift fromuncomfortabletodominantbehaviors.Bothofthesetypesofbehaviorwilllikelybeoutsideof thenormalbehavioralbaseline for anygivenpersonandshouldbereasonsforsuspicionandpotentialaction.Interestinthetarget–Anattackerwillhavetoobserve,learnabout,andultimately get close enough to the target for the attack to be effective.Depending upon the type of attack andweapon being used, an attackermayhave toget extremely close for the attack tobe successful.Suicidebombers must be within feet of the target. Over a period of time, anattacker will exhibit a consistent pattern of being proxemically pulledtoward the target. The attacker’s behavior will indicate interest in the

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targetatalevelthatwillbeunnatural.At the timeofattack, theattackerwillmoveinawaythatismissionfocused,aggressive,andindicativeof“being on the hunt.” Proxemically, the attacker will move toward thetargetwithapurpose.

Considertheanalogyofahunterorpredatoryanimal:Ahuntermustacquiretheprey,observetheprey,(potentially)followthepreyorwaitfortheprey,andeventuallyclose inon theprey.Huntersobserve theirprey inorder to identifypatterns of behavior. Surveillance exhibits unique behavioral indicators thatshouldbeobvioustothecombatprofiler.Thesamecanbesaidaboutfollowing,or tailing. The actual attack may necessitate that the attacker close in on thetarget.Thisapproach(proxemicpull)maybeunusual—unusualtiming,unusualspeed,unusualperson,andmaybreaksociallyacceptedproxemicrules.

PLANNINGAcquiring,orattemptingtoacquire, informationaboutsecurity, routines,schedules, or other types of information for which the person has noreasontohave.Accessingdatabasesoutsideoftheirworkrelatedrequirements.Observing individuals in an unusual manner, following certainindividuals, or asking about personal matters of fellow coworkersinappropriately.Contactingpeopleoutsideoftheorganizationtoshareinformation.

PREPARATIONBehavioralindicatorsofincreasedstressand/ornegativeemotionstowardfellowcoworkers.Verbal or written communication that a person is thinking of doingthemselvesorothersviolence.Increased interest inweapons (talkingabout,purchasing,etc.)orviolentmedia.Testingsecuritymeasures.

DecisionMakingQuiteoften,manypeopleseeoneormorepre-eventindicatorsleadinguptoaninsider attackbut fail todo anything about it.Theybrush it off, rationalize it,don’t report it, or don’tmake a note of it and ultimately forget about it. Thisdiscussionisnotacalltobesuspiciousthateverycoworkerisplottingamajor

attackor tobehypervigilant to thepointofdistractionso thatyourcolleaguesbecomeuncomfortableandsuspiciousofyou.Rather,thepurposeofthissectionistoconvinceyouthatmanyincidentsofworkplaceviolenceandinsiderattackscan be prevented through people being proactive. As the saying goes, ifsomethingdoesn’tseemright,itprobablyisn’t.Thekeystorespondingwellinasituation are knowing when to make a decision, knowing what decisions tomake, and rehearsing those decisions so thatwhen it comes time to act, youractionsareimmediateandspontaneous.

The combat profiling heuristic requires that when you observe threebehavioralindicatorsthatsomeoneisananomaly,youact.However,sometimesitmaybenecessarytoactononeortwoindicators,providedthoseindicatorsareclearandobviousincommunicatingapersonisathreat.

Combatprofilingalsorequiresthatyouhaveasetofpredetermineddecisionstomakeintheeventthatyouobserveanomalies,orpre-eventindicators.FortheMarineincombat,thesearekill,capture,andcontact.For thecivilianwalkingabout, the decisions are run, hide, and fight. For civilian workplace violenceincidents, the decisions may be talk, report, and intervene: First, contact theindividual, engage them in conversation, and ask probing questions to furtherdetermine if the personmay actually be a threat. Second, if the conversationleads you to believe that the person is a threat, or if the indicators are clearenough,immediatelyreportthepersontotheappropriatesecuritypersonneland/orauthoritiesandprovideasmuchdetailandinformationaspossibleaboutwhyyou think the person is a potential threat. Third, intervene. We would neverrecommend that a person purposefully put himself or herself in danger, butdependingonthesituation,thismaybenecessary.Interventioncouldbeverbalorphysical,aloneorwithagroup.Nevertheless,thethirdoptionischosenwhenaviolentincidentisimminentandotheroptionsareunavailable.

CombatprofilinggivesMarines,soldiers,otherlawenforcementandsecuritypersonnel, as well as civilians, the mindset and knowledge to identify thebehaviors and events leadingup to an attack.Combat profiling increases yoursurvivability.Thecombatprofilingdomainsareuniquelydesignedandcapableof preventing the insider attack because they train people to realize when apersonhasthoseviolentintentionsandprovidetheabilitytodetermineifheorsheiscapableofcarryingthemout.

PreventingtheAttackWemustdoeverythingpossibletopreventinsiderattacks.Becausemostinsiderattacksaretheresultofinterpersonalproblems,itisimportantthatleaderstake

an interest in the welfare of their Marines, soldiers, and employees. Militarypersonnel deployed abroad, and who are working closely with host-nationsecurity forces, cannot afford to risk their own lives and the lives of theircomradesbytreatingtheirhost-nationcounterpartsdisrespectfully.Preventinganattackmaybe as simple as respecting thoseweworkwith, treating themwithdignityandlikevaluablemembersoftheteam,andrespectingtheircultureandvalues.Unfortunately,interpersonalconflictwillalwaysarise,andviolencemaybetheresponse.Additionally,someattacksareideologicallydriven.InregardtoMaslow’shierarchyofneeds,ideologytrumpseveryotherlevelofhumanneed.Even if apersonhashisorherbasicneeds takencareof, is safe, and is inanenvironmentinwhichtheyarerespectedandvalued,thatpersonmaystillhaveadeepideologicalproblemwiththeorganizationandpeoplearoundhim.ThisisthecaseforpeoplelikeMaj.Hasan.Theonlywaytopreventattacksfromfolksliketheseistoestablishthepropersecurityproceduresandforeveryoneintheorganization to maintain awareness, report any pre-event indicators, andinterveneifnecessary.

6.DEVELOPINGYOURPROFILINGABILITY“Weevaluatepeopleallthetime,quiteattentively,buttheyonlygetourconsciousattentionwhenthereisareason.Weseeitall,butweeditoutmostofit.Thus,whensomethingdoescallouttous,weoughttopay

attention.Formanypeople,thatisamuscletheydon’texercise.”—GavindeBecker

Whenyou first starteddrivingacar, therewereanumberofdifferent tasksthatyouhadtosimultaneouslyaccomplishforyoutosuccessfullydrivethecarsafely.Sinceyouwereanovicedriver,your focuswas internal to thecar, andyour attentionwasdirected toward accomplishing all of the tasks.The acts ofusingtheturnsignal,checkingyourmirrors,changingtheradio,changinggears,carryingonaconversation,andturningyourlightsonwereallindependenttasksthatrequiredconcentrationandeffortforyoutoaccomplishseparately.

Itwasn’tuntilyouhadspentcountlesshoursbehindthewheelthatthosetasksbecame very simple and automatic, something you simply did as part of thedrive.Asyoubecamemorecomfortable inside thecar,youalsobecamemorecomfortableandawareofthosewhowerearoundyouontheroad.Youbecameabetter judgeof howmuch spaceyouneeded tomake a left hand turn throughoncoming traffic, you learned how to assess the relative speed of a carapproachinginyourrearviewmirror,youlearnedtheareasthathighwaypatrolofficerswouldlikelybeintocatchyouspeeding,andyoulearnedtheindicators

1.2.3.4.5.

6.7.

thatwouldalertyoutoanerraticdriverthatneededcloseattention.Thesametypeofdevelopmentisrequiredforyouasaprofiler.Earlyinyour

development,youwillfindyourselffocusingagreatdealononesingledomain.Youwill likelybeveryobvious inyourefforts towatchpeopleandwill likelyattract attention to yourself. You will also find it difficult to profile whilesimultaneously being involved in a conversation. Over time and with morepractice,thisprocesswillbecomefluid.Butittakespracticeandeffort.Thetimethat you put in each day to develop this ability will lead to you becomingcapableofautomatingthetasksinvolvedinprofilingintoyourlifethesamewaythatyoubecameabetterdriver.Thiswill letyou look farther aheaddown theroadandseeallofthepossiblewaysasituationcouldplayout.

BecominganExpertThegoalistobecomeanexpertcombatprofilerandtobesoadeptatprofilingthatyoudoitintuitively.Theabilitytocarryonamentallytaxingconversationwhile simultaneously analyzing the verbal and nonverbal indicators, the cuesthatarebeingpresented,isreservedforthepeakperformers.Thisisagreatgoalto have.However, the reality of thematter is that it could take you up to tenyears195beforeyoureachthislevelofproficiencyandexpertise.*

I tend to believe that, to become a true expert in the field, a decade ofexperiencecouldbenecessarytoreachthepinnacle.Ialsobelievethattherearesome steps that we can take to become better profilers today, as well as setourselvesonapathtoattaintheexpertlevel.Todothis,let’stakealookatwhatmakessomebodyanexpertintheirfield.

GaryKleinisarenownedandexpertresearcherondecision-makingandcitesthefollowingaspectsthatexpertshavetheabilitytoseewhichnovicesdonot.196

Expertsseepatternsthatnovicesdonotdetect.Expertsseeanomalies—eventsthatdidnothappen.Expertsseethebigpicture(situationalawareness).Expertscreateopportunitiesandimprovisations.Experts have the ability to predict future events using their previousexperiences.Expertsseedifferencestoosmallfornovicestodetect.Expertsknowtheirownlimitations.

With an understanding of the differences between the experienced and thenovice,we canbegin to design a plan to overcome the shortfalls. Fortunately,

understandingthatitisn’ta“matterofintelligence,butamatterofexperience”meansthatwecansystematicallysetaboutgainingtheexperiencenecessary.

Onewayyoucoulddo this isbychoosinganarea thatyoucaneasilyvisitrepeatedly without raising unnecessary attention to your presence. Establish abaselineforthatlocationusingoneoftheapproachesdiscussedintheprecedingsections. If you dedicate time to going back to that same location, confirmingyour baseline andobserving every single person that comes through that area,youwill begin to build that database of experiences that is the key differencebetweenexpertsandrookies.Whenyoubelievethatyouhavereachedalevelofsuccessinyourpredictionsforpeopleinthatonearea,whereyouareobservingboththesimilaritiesaswellasthesubtledifferencesbetweeneverypersonthatenters,andcaneffectivelycommunicate thoseobservations,moveon toanewlocationandrepeattheprocess.Asyoucontinuetodothisateverylocationyoucommonly visit, youwill also begin tomake the practice of profiling a habit,requiringlessmentalattentionfromyouto“remembertoprofile.”

Thedeliberateapproachtoestablishingbaselineswillhelpguideyoureffortsinitially and ensure that you systematically cover the entire area. Initially, thisapproach may limit your ability to comprehend the bigger picture. However,over time, you will rely less on the methods and seamlessly blend the stepstogetherintoasmoothactivity.

Oneofthemajordifficultiesyouwillneedtoovercomeasyoutrainyourselfas a profiler is the lack of feedback you will receive for your observations.Withoutthatfeedbackloopforyourjudgmentsandconclusions,youwillneverbe able to learn from your mistakes and become a better observer. Werecommend that youdo this in areaswhereyou can contact people and easilytalk to people to confirm or deny your observations. It is we why often useStarbucksandmallsduringourclassesbecausetheyareplaceswecangotodayandobservewitharelativelylowlevelofrisk.Thisprocessofcontactingpeoplewillalsorequirethatyouusesomecunningtoelicittheinformationthatyouareseeking without letting the person know you have been observing them,ultimatelyexpandingallofthefilefoldersnecessaryforanexpertprofiler.

Thegoalforthisdevelopmentisforyoutoincreasenotonlythesuccessrateforyourpredictions,butalsotheconfidenceyouhaveinyourabilitytoprofile.However,wealsowant toensureyouare realistic inyourabilities,understandyourlimitations,anddon’tbecomeoverconfidentinyourskills.InhisbookTheInvisibleGorilla,ChristopherChabris talksabouthisresearchonchessplayersandtheirperceptionoftheirrating,whichshowshowtheyrankcomparedwiththerestofthechessworld.Hefoundthat75percentofchesstournamentplayers

believedtheywerebetterthantheirpublishedrating.197Toreducethevariablesintheresearch,hecheckedbackonthesameplayersayearlatertofindthattheymaintained the same ranking.The rankingwas accurate, but the perceptionofthe skill possessed by the chess players was inflated. The reason I bring theresearch from The Invisible Gorilla up is because there will always be moreresearchthatyoucouldconductandtherewillalwaysbemorescenariosthatyoucouldusetodevelopyourabilityordifferentsettingsforyoutoapplythisskill.Overconfidence will result in incorrect predictions because you failed to takeinto account all of the information present. Learning is impossible withouthumility.Weencourageconfidence,notcockiness.

TrainingResourcesontheWebInanattempttofurtherassistyouonthisjourney,wehavealsocreatedawebsiteforyoutocontinueyourtrainingandeducation.Thegoalofthesiteistosupportthisbook.Weprovidearticlesonotheraspectsofprofiling,differentviewpointsonthetopicsinthecourse,areadinglistwithreviewsofthebooksthatweusetodevelop new instructors which are referenced throughout this book, andmostimportantly,avideotrainingsection.

Theintentofthewebsiteistoprovidealibraryofvideosandothertrainingfor you to develop your file folders, with accompanying articles for you toexpand your view of what profiling has to offer. Videos allow us to watch aspecific incident asmany timesasnecessary to learnhow toanalyzebehaviorandassociateitwithathreatwhilealsoprovidingfeedback.Whenothervenuesarenotavailable,thisvideotrainingcanbeconductedfromyourhometobuildyourprofilingfoundation.

From the website, you can easily find our contact information, and weencourageyoutotellusyourstoriessothatwecancontinuetoproviderelevantand effective training. Tell uswhat youwant to learnmore about, and tell usaboutbetterwayswecanuseandapplytheinformationdiscussedhere.

Visitwww.cp-journal.com

AFinalLetterDearReader:

Our goal for this book was simple: to make Marines, soldiers, lawenforcementofficers,andanyoneelsewhohasdedicatedtheirlifetoprotectingoursocietymoreeffectiveinhuntingourenemiesandincreasingtheirabilitytorecognize threats. These areas will make Marines more survivable on patrol,both while deployed and at home. The information in this book has been

previouslyinaccessibletomostMarines.Wehopewechangedthat.Developingintoaprofilerwillbearollercoasterride.Itcertainlyhasbeenfor

us.Therewillbetimeswhenyouthinkthatthisisthemostfascinatingthingyouhaveeverdoneinyourlife.Therewillbeothertimeswhenthefrustrationwillseem insurmountable and youwillwant to take a break from analyzing everygesture thatyouareobserving.That iscompletelynatural.Therewillbe timeswhenyoubelievethatyourobservationsareabsolutelyspoton,andyouwillfeelextremelyconfidentinwhatyouidentify.Othertimesyouwillquestionyourselfand feel thatyouarenocloser tounderstandinghumans thanyouwerebeforeyoustartedstudyingthisfield.Thisisalsonatural,andyouwillgetpastit.Butyouhavetosticktoit.Wedonotclaimtobeexperts.Weonlyclaimthatwearestrivingtobecomeexpertsandaretakingthesamejourneythatwehopewehaveinspiredyoutotake.Itisn’tajourneythatanyofuswillevercomplete.Assoonasyoubelievethatyouareinexpertinyourfield,youwillnolongerhavethedrive to keep learning. Humans are diverse, adapting and changing; there isalwayssomethingtolearn.Thesixdomainsofcombatprofilingandthecontentin this book should provide you with the foundation to grow in this pursuit.Goodluck.

NeverForget.NeverQuit.SemperFidelis.

PatrickVanHorne/JasonA.Riley

ENDNOTES

PART1:THEWARLAB1Gordon,Mazzetti,&Shanker,2006.2Tyson2006.3Wilson2005,2.4USMC2009,fwd.5USMC2009,1.6VargasandMartin2013.7GrossmanandChristensen2007,43-44.8Klein1999,89.9Klein1999,4.10Turvey2008,43.11Turvey2008,80.12Turvey2008,81.

PART2:EVERYWEGO,THEREWILLBEPEOPLE13Carter2012.14PattonJr.1983,408.15USMC1997,22.16USMC1997,82-83.17Gigerenzer2006,120.18Ambady2010,271.19Stillman,Maner,&Baumeister2010,298-303.20Albrechtsen,MeissnerandSusa2009,1052-1055.21Pentland2008,99.22Carey2009.23Bechara,DamasioandDamasio2003,366.24Myers2010,373.25Navarro2008,23.26Navarro2008,27.27Navarro2008,27.28MacDonald2008,136.

29DudleyandTodd2001,195.30DudleyandTodd2001,213.31Kologie2001.32Officerswhocrackedmissinggirlcase2009.33Brown2004,47.34Brown2004,47.35EkmanandFriesen2003,27.36Pentland2008,x.37Song,etal.2010,1021.38HumanBehavioris93PercentPredictable2010.39KnappandHall2010,66.40Vrij,PorterandGranhag2010,29.41Ekman2007,xviii.42Pentland2008,18.43González,HidalgoandBarabási2008,781.44Wolchover2011.45Medina2010,84-8846Pentland2008,15.

PART3:DETAIL47Bernton,etal.2002.

Kinesics48Navarro2008,10;PeaseandPease2006,23-24.49Navarro2008,26.50PeaseandPease2006,21.51KnappandHall2010,136.52Navarro2008,66.53Navarro2008,102,124-125.54Navarro2008,120-121.55Navarro2008,125.56Navarro2008,116-117.57PeaseandPease2006,36.58PeaseandPease2006,38.59Navarro2008,147-148.

60KnappandHall2010,418-419.61KnappandHall2010,273.62Navarro2008,82.63Navarro2008,95-97.64Navarro2008,125.65PeaseandPease2006,36.66Navarro2008,105-106.67KnappandHall2010,284.68Navarro2008,73-74.69Navarro2008,69.70Navarro2008,86-87.71Navarro2008,86-87.72Navarro2008,88.73PeaseandPease2006,100.74PeaseandPease2006,105-106.75Pentland2008,5.76Navarro2008,35-50.77KnappandHall2010,9,283.78Navarro2008,73-74.79Navarro2008,69.80Navarro2008,86.81Navarro2008,101-102.82Navarro2008,89.83Navarro2008,105-106.84Navarro2008,60.85Navarro2008,89;KnappandHall2010,413.86Navarro2008,88-89;KnappandHall2010,413.87KnappandHall2010,295.88KnappandHall2010,413.89Navarro2008,59-60.90Navarro2008,60-61.91Navarro2008,86-87;KnappandHall2010,141.92KnappandHall2010,224.93KnappandHall2010,229.

Biometrics

94Plutchik1994,136.95Ekman2007,19-20.96Malmo1975,96.97Malmo1975,96.98Ekman2007,110.99Izard1978,329-330.100Izard1978,333.101Ekman2007,114.102Izard1978,330.103Kreiberg2010,400.104Izard1978,330.105Ekman2007,125.106Izard1978,356.107Ekman2007,152.108Ekman2007,154.109Ekman2007,156.110Kreiberg2010,404;seealsoLevinson1992,25.111Izard1978,379.112Kreiberg2010,403;seealsoAboyounandDabbsJr.2010,498.113Kreiberg2010,403.114Levinson1992,25.115Plutchik1994,137.116Andreassi2000,219.117Hess1975,7-92.118Cannon1915,35-36.119Ekman2007,130.120Ekman2009,142.121PorterandtenBrinke2008,512.122PorterandtenBrinke2008,512;alsoEkman2007,130.123Godnig2003,95-99.124GrossmanandChristensen2007,46-48.125Frijda1986,131.126Frijda1986,130.127Frijda1986,131.128Harris2001,892-893.129Harris2001,893.

130Frijda1986,133.131Frijda1986,140.132Frijda1986,146.133GrossmanandChristensen2007,30-31.134Pentland2008,13.

Proxemics135Barrett,etal.2005,314.136Mehrabian1971,1.137Hall1966,116-119.138Lawson2001,184.139KnappandHall2010,141.140Hall1966,119-120.141Hall1966,121-125.142Barrett,etal.2005,313.143Mehrabian1981,13.

Geographics144Rossmo2000,2.145Rossmo2000,91.146Rossmo2000,91.147KnappandHall2010,136.148Rossmo2000,120.149GellmanandRicks2002;seealsoCruickshank2001.150Mazzetti,CooperandBaker2001;seealsoSchmidle2001.

Iconography151Shoham2010,988.152Shoham2010,988.153LeyandCybriwsky1974,496.154LeyandCybriwsky1974,503-504.155Mackey2009.156Abawi2010.157Shoham2010,987.158Loranzo,etal.2011,511.

159Shoham2010,987;also,Palermo2011,507.160Palermo2011,507.161Palermo2011,508.162Heywood,etal.2012,56.163Loranzo,etal.2011,510.164Shoham2010,987.165Szlemko,etal.2008,1678.

Atmospherics166Haley1989,88.167Olson2006,196.168Barsade2002,645.169Olson2006,196.170Barsade2002,645.171Barsade2002,647-648.172Olson2006,196.173DeBeckerandMarquart2008,8.174Artwohl2002,19-20.175Keizer,LindenbergandSteg2008,1681-1685.176Saito2007,11.

PART4:TAKINGACTION177BBC.com2010.178Ekman2009,80.179Grossman1996,4.180Grossman1996,39.

PART5:APPLICATIONS181ABCNews2014.182Klein1999,149.183Klein1999,148-149.184KnappandHall2010,245;seealso,Yabar,etal.2006,97.185Yabar,etal.2006,98.186Yabar,etal.2006,99.187VanHorne2012.

188RoggioandLundquist2013.189Shanker2012.190RugalaandIsaacs2012,12.191FBI2012.192RugalaandIsaacs2012,13.193Romano,Levi-Minzi,Rugala,VanHasselt2001.194Romano,Levi-Minzi,Rugala,VanHasselt2001.195Gladwell2008,41.196Klein1999,157.197ChablisandSimons2010,84.

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AbouttheAuthors

PatrickVanHorne is the founder andCEOofTheCPJournal, a behavioralanalysis training company. His firm provides training support to the U.S.military, federal and local law enforcement agencies and the private securityindustry. Van Horne is a former infantry officer in the United States MarineCorps, earning the rank of Captain before returning to the private sector. Hiscompany’s training programs are focused on teaching people how to preventviolentactsfromoccurringandfindingattackershidinginplainsight.

JasonA.RileyiscurrentlyaMajorintheUnitedStatesMarineCorpsReserve,with over six years on active duty. While with 1st Battalion, 2nd MarineRegiment, he served as an infantry platoon commander, company executiveofficer,andcompanycommander,anddeployedtwicetoIraqwiththe24thand22ndMarine Expeditionary Units. He also served as a combat advisor to theAfghanNationalArmyinaneasternprovinceofAfghanistan.From2009until2011,hewasamobile trainingteamleaderOfficer-in-ChargewiththeCombatHunterprogramat theSchoolof Infantry (West).There,hedeveloped trainingcoursesandtaughtbehavioralprofiling,amongotherduties.Hecurrentlyserveswith a reserve unit at Camp Pendleton, California. Jason is also pursuing hisPhD.

*Toseemoreaboutwhatdrove theauthors towrite thebook,watchan interviewwith thematwww.cp-journal.com/leftofbang

*Rules of engagement are the circumstances thatmust bemet for themilitary to employ lethal force incombatsituations.Usually,theyencompass,ataminimum,identifyingeitherahostileactorintentandhaving a positive identification of that person. These are customized by the CommandingOfficer indifferentengagementsandcanbechangedtomeettheneedsofthatunit.

**Escalation of force measures are the conditions that must be met to elevate from a less than lethalreactiontolethalactionagainstaperceivedthreat.Thesemeasuresaretakentohelpreducetheriskofunnecessarycasualties,whethermilitaryorcivilian.

*Theability to identifyattackershiding in thecrowd isa skill thatbothournation’s security forcesandciviliansshouldpossess.Forfurther informationaboutapplyingtheseobservations toensuresafety inschools,theworkplace,orinpublicplaces,visit:www.cp-journal.com/leftofbang.

*Tolearnabouthowtoreadfacialexpressions,visit:www.cp-journal.com/leftofbang*WehavechosentheclassificationandterminologyJoeNavarrousesinhisbookbecause,tous,itmakes

thesectiontitle“PacifyingBehavior”themostself-descriptive.*WalterCannon,BodilyChangesinPain,Hunger,FearandRage,1915.*To view and download the indicators that make up each of these domains, visit: www.cp-

journal.com/leftofbang

*WehavepurposelykeptthereportofthisinterviewanonymoustomaintaintheMarine’sprivacy.HeiscurrentlyaStaffSergeantservingatMarineCorpsBaseQuantico,VA.

*Foranypicturethatisanalyzed,weacceptthatthephotoisamomentintimeandmaynotreflectthetruebehaviorthepersonisdisplaying.Picturesarechosenfortheinstructionalvaluethattheyprovide.Moreaccurateconclusionscouldbemadewithvideofootageoradditionalpicturesofthepersonorsituation.

*Manypicturesof theresponsetotheSeptember11attacksinNewYorkCityshowonlookerswiththispose,coveringtheirmouthsinshock.

*AlthoughweusetheacronymMADE,we’lldiscusstheelementsintheorderEDAM,whichisamorenaturalorderforhowtheseindicatorswillbeobserved.EDAMjustdoesn’tmakeagoodacronym!

*Ifyoudon’thaveexperienceinthemilitary, thinkof thebodylanguagethata trafficcopwouldusetocontrolcarsastheypassthroughanintersection.

*An example of overt and subtle adoration can be seen in a Taliban video that showsTaliban fighterslootingabasefromwhichU.S.forceshadwithdrawn(inKamdesh,Afghanistan).Forthevideogotowww.cp-journal.com/leftofbang,andviewthepostlabeled“FindingtheLeader—Adoration.”Ataboutthefour-minute,40-secondmark,atruckdrivesintothecompound,andseveralindividualsgetout.Oneoftheindividualsiswearinglightbrownclotheswithadarkbrownvestandiscarryingarifleinhislefthand.Soon,alloftheTalibanfightersgatheraroundthismanandproceedtolineuptoshakehishandandgreethim(overtadoration).However,ifyoulookclosely,asubtleformofadorationoccurswhenwhatappearstobehis“right-handman”discreetlytakestheriflefromtheleadersothathecanshakehandsandhugthefighters.

*Mimicry isnot inevitablebetweenpeople,and therewillbe timeswhen“counter-mimicry” isusedbypeoplewhotakedeliberateactionnottomimicthebehaviorofthosesurroundingthem.

*Theten-yearmilestoneisderivedbytakingwhatresearchershavedeterminedastenthousandhoursofpracticing a complex task to gain true expertise (Gladwell,Outliers, p. 40). Ten thousand hours isdividedintopracticingataskthreehoursadayeverydayfortenyears.