lee van cott, 2003, from exclusion to inclusion. bolivia's 2002 elections
TRANSCRIPT
-
8/9/2019 Lee Van Cott, 2003, From Exclusion to Inclusion. Bolivia's 2002 Elections
1/26
From Exclusion to Inclusion: Bolivia's 2002 ElectionsAuthor(s): Donna Lee Van CottReviewed work(s):Source: Journal of Latin American Studies, Vol. 35, No. 4 (Nov., 2003), pp. 751-775Published by: Cambridge University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3875831.
Accessed: 21/05/2012 08:49
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at.http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].
Cambridge University Pressis collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access toJournal of
Latin American Studies.
http://www.jstor.org
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=cuphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/3875831?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/3875831?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=cup -
8/9/2019 Lee Van Cott, 2003, From Exclusion to Inclusion. Bolivia's 2002 Elections
2/26
J.
Lat.
Amer. Stud.
35,
751-775
?
2003
Cambridge
University
Press
75
I
DOI:
io.iro7/Soozz222i6Xo3oo6977
Printed in the United
Kingdom
From
Exclusion
to
Inclusion:
Bolivia's
2002
Elections*
DONNA LEE
VAN COTT
Although
we are a
simple
people,
we
are
prudent
like 'Amaru' and
'Katari',
and we raise
our
sights
to
the horizon
full
of
hope
that
they
will
once
again
unite the
oppressed
people
for
the finalreconstruction
f
their
people.Thus,we willhoist the divinecocaleafthroughoutheterritory f
Qullasuyu
ntil the DAY
of
Kutipacha-Pachakuti.
Manifestoof the Instrumento
Politico
para
a
Soberania
e los Pueblos-Movimiento
l
Socialismo1
We are
entering
here
-
in
the
Congress
in
order
to sit ourselves
down
and
see ourselves
face to face
with our
oppressors;
his is
going
to be
a
struggle
of
the
mind,
of
the
indigenous
mind
against
the
q'ara
white]
mind,
and
therewe are
going
to
fight.
Felipe
Quispe,presidential
andidate,
Movimiento
ndigena
Pachakutik2
Abstract. n
Bolivia's
2ooz
national
elections
ndigenous-movement-based
olitical
parties
combined
to
capture
27
per
cent
of
the
vote,
far
surpassing
heir
previous
performance
and
constituting
a
major
mprovement
n the
representation
f
the
country's
excluded
indigenous
majority.Using
a
social
movement
theory
frame-
work,
I
attribute his
result to five
interacting
actors:
institutional
hanges
that
opened
the
system;
the
collapse
of
two
competitive
parties;
he consolidation
of
indigenous
peoples'
socialmovement
organisations;
he
unpopularity
f the
Banzer-
Quirogagovernmentand the intense
anti-government
mobilisations t provoked
in
2000;
and
the
ability
of
the
indigenousparties
o
capitalise
n
growing
nationalist,
anti-US
public
sentiment.
Donna Lee
Van
Cott
is
AssistantProfessor
n
the
Department
f
Political
cience,
University
f
Tennessee,
noxville.
*
The
author
wishes o thank
Willem
Assies,
Kevin
Healy,
ose
AntonioLucero
ndthe
anonymouseviewersf this ournalor comments na previous raft, nd o acknowl-
edge
he
receipt
f
funding
rom
he
University
f Tennessee
ordellHull
Fund nda UT
Professional
evelopment
ward,
hich
upported
ield
research
n
2oo001
nd
2oo2.
1
Movimientol
socialismo,
Territorio,
oberania
vida,'
n
Opinionesy
ndlisis.
lecciones
Generales
002-2007.
ropuestas
lectores
La
Paz,
2002),
p.
88.
2
'Mallku:
Nuestros
ministros
erain
os Mamani
Yujra ,' a
Prensa,
a
Paz,
28
June
2002,
p.
8.
-
8/9/2019 Lee Van Cott, 2003, From Exclusion to Inclusion. Bolivia's 2002 Elections
3/26
7
5
2
Donna ee
Van
Cott
In Bolivia's
30
June
2002 nationalelections two
indigenous
peoples'3
par-
ties
combined,
the
InstrumentoPolitico
para
la Soberania
de los
Pueblos
(IPSP),
running
under the borrowed
registration
of the
Movimiento
al
Socialismo(MAS),and the MovimientoIndigenaPachakutikMIP),won
27
per
cent
of
the vote
(see
Table
i).
Despite
the
fact that
62.05
per
cent
of
the
population
is
indigenous, according
to the
200oo
census,
this was a
revolutionary
esult for
the
politicallyunder-represented
ndigenous
ma-
jority.
In
previous
national
elections,
the best result
for
all
indigenous
parties
combined
was
4.6
per
cent
(see
Table
2).
One
of
the
indigenous
parties,
he
IPSP-MAS,
inished
second
in
a
fragmented
ield
of i i
presi-
dential
candidates,4
ess
than
two
percentagepoints
behind
the
winner,
former
President Gonzalo Sanchez
de Lozada
(1993-1997).
The
IPSP-
MAS
now holds the second
majority
n
both
houses
of
congress
and
approximately
ne-third
of
the
seats
in the
57-member
ody
are
occupied
by
indigenousrepresentatives
with
strong
links to
indigenous
and
peasant
organisations. reviously,
no more
than
ten
indigenous
persons
had
sat
in
congress
at one
time,
and
most
of these
were
accountable
o traditional
political
parties.5
n
order
to
accommodate
the
unprecedented
inguistic
3
Social
scientists
disagree
on
how to define
'indigenouspeoples'.
For
purposes
of
clarity,
I use the United NationsSub-commission n the Preventionof Discrimination ndPro-
tection
of Minorities:
'Indigenous
communities,
peoples
and nations are
those
which,
having
a
historical
ontinuity
with
pre-invasion
nd
pre-colonial
ocieties
that
developed
on their
territories,
onsidered
hemselvesdistinct
rom other
sectors
of
the
societies
now
prevailing
n
those
territories,
r
parts
of
them.
They
form
at
present
non-dominant
ectors
of
society
and
aredetermined
o
preserve,
develop
and
transmit
o future
generations
heir
ancestral
erritories,
nd their
ethnic
identity,
as the basis
of their
continuedexistenceas
peoples,
in accordancewith
their own cultural
patterns,
ocial institutions
and
legal
sys-
tems'.
Study
f
the
Problem
f
Discrimination
gainst
ndigenous
opulations,
N Doc.
E/Cn.4/
Sub.z/1986/7Add.4, para.
379
(1986).
4
Bolivia
has
one
of the most
fragmented
arty
systems
n Latin
America,
with an
average
effectivenumberof parties or seats (ENPS)between
1979-1993
of 4. ENPS was 4.7 in
1993.
See Scott
Mainwaring
nd
Timothy
R.
Scully
(eds.),
Building
emocratic
nstitutions:
Party
Systems
n
Latin
America
Stanford,
1995),p.
30.
ENPS
was
5.07
in
1997
and
4.82
in
2002
(my
calculations ased on
senate
plus
chamber
of
deputies).
The effective
number
of
parties
or
seats s
calculated
y
squaring
he
proportion
of seatseach
party
wins,
adding
up
all of the
squares,
and
dividing
one
by
that number.
See
MurkuuLaakso
and Rein
Taagepera,
EffectiveNumber
of Parties.
A
Measure
with
Application
o
Western
Europe,'
Comparative
olitical
tudies,2,
I979,
pp.
3-27.
5 Craig
Mauro,
Bolivia's
downtrodden ndian
majority ains
political
voice, clout,'
Associ-
ated
Press,
15
Aug.
2002.
Wigberto
Rivero
Pinto,
former
director
of the
Instituto
Indigenista
Boliviana,
nd
vice minister
f
campesino
and
ndigenous
ffairs nder
Banzer-
Quiroga
also
puts
the current
ndigenous
deputy
otalat
50o,
asedon the criteria
language
spoken,
customs,
and
self-identification)
sed
in the
2001
Censo
Nacional
de Poblaci6n
y
Vivienda.He
distributes hese
among
the
parties
as:
MAS
(30),
MIP
(6),
MIR
(8),
NFR
(8),
and
MNR
(i).
Rivero,
Indigenasy Campesinos
n las elecciones:
el
poder
de
la
Bolivia
emergente,'
unpublished ms.,
20zoo03,
.
z21.
According
to Natalia
Wray, eight indigenous
legislators
sat in the
previous congress, representing
various
parties.
'Los
cambios en las
relaciones
politicas
entre
pueblos indigenas,
los estados
y
las
sociedades
nacionales en las
-
8/9/2019 Lee Van Cott, 2003, From Exclusion to Inclusion. Bolivia's 2002 Elections
4/26
-
8/9/2019 Lee Van Cott, 2003, From Exclusion to Inclusion. Bolivia's 2002 Elections
5/26
7
5
4
DonnaLee
Van Cott
Table
2.
Combined
lectoral esults
for
Indigenous
arties,
97&-2oo2
Combined
Year
%
of
Vote
Indigenous
Parties
Competing
1978N o.6 Movimiento Indio Tupaj Katari (MITKA), Movimiento Revolucionario
Tupak
Katari
(MRTK)*
1979N
1.6
MITKA,
MRTK*
I98oN
2.1
MITKA,
MITKA-I,
MRTK*
I985N
2.7
MRTK,
Movimiento
Revolucionario
Tupaj
Katari
de
Liberaci6n
(MRTKL)
I989N
2.5
MRTKL,
Frente
de Unidad de
Liberaci6n Katarista
(FULKA)
I993N
0.7
Movimiento
Katarista
Nacional
(MKN),
Eje
Pachakuti,
MRTKL**
I995M
4.4
MRTKL,
Asamblea de la
Sobernia de los
Pueblos
(ASP)
1997N
4.6
ASP,
Eje
Pachakuti,
MKN***
1999M
4.9
MRTKL,
Katarismo
Democritico
Nacional
(KDN)
(new
name of
MKN),
ASP,
ISPS-MAS
(split
from
ASP)
zoozN
27.0
MAS,
Movimiento
Indigena
Pachakutik
(MIP)
N:
national
election;
M:
municipal
election.
*
MRTK
results
not
included because
it
ran in
alliance
with
leftist
parties.
**
MRTKL
ran
with
the MNR and
separate voting
results
are
not
available.
***
MKN ran
with
ADN.
Sources:
Diego
Pacheco,
El
indianismoy
os indios
contemporaneas
n
Bolivia
La
Paz,
1992).
Mario
Rol6n
Anaya,
Politicay
Partidos
en
Bolivia,
3rd
ed.
(La
Paz,
i999).
Salvador
Romero
Balliviain,
Geografia
lectoral e
Bolivia
(asi
votan los
bolivianos),
nd ed.
(La
Paz,
1998).
Luciano
Tapia,
UkhamawaJakawisaxa
Asi
es
nuestra
vida).
Autobiografia
e
un
aymara La
Paz,
1995).
set of
constraints on
and
incentives
for
collective
political
action
presented
by
the
political
environment
to
existing
or
potential
social
movements.
Typical
POS
variables
include:
shifts
in
elite
alignments
or the
emergence
of
intra-elite
cleavages,
the
support
of
key
allies,
the
relative
openness
of
political
institutions,
changes
in
government policies
affecting
social move-
ments,
international
trends that
shape
domestic
institutions,
and the state's
capacity
for
repression.7
The
application
of the
POS
framework
to
Bolivia's
new indigenous parties is particularlyapt, given their lack of formal political
party
structure and
their
reliance, instead,
on
social
movements
for
organis-
ational,
ideological
and
human
resources.
The
first
POS variable
consists of
institutional
changes
undertaken
in
Bolivia
between
1994-1995
that
enabled
regionally strong
indigenous organ-
isations
to
compete
in
national
elections.
Of
particular mportance
were the
municipal
decentralisation and
the conversion of 68
seats
in the
chamber
of
7 Joe
Foweraker,
TheoriZng
ocial
Movements
London,
1995), pp.
71-2;
Doug
McAdam,
'Conceptual
origins,
current
problems,
future
directions,'
in
Doug
McAdam
et
al.
(eds.),
Comparative
erspectives
n Social
Movements
(Cambridge,
1996), p.
27;
Sidney
Tarrow,
Power
in
Movement.
ocialMovements
nd
Contentious
olitics,
znd
ed.
(Cambridge, 1998), p.
8o;
Donna
Lee Van
Cott,
'Andean
Indigenous
Movements and
Constitutional Transformation:
Venezuela
in
Comparative
Perspective,'
Latin
American
Perspectives,
ol.
30,
no.
i,
Jan.
2003,
pp.
50,
66,
n.
3.
-
8/9/2019 Lee Van Cott, 2003, From Exclusion to Inclusion. Bolivia's 2002 Elections
6/26
FromExclusion
o
Inclusion:
olivia's
002Elections
755
deputies
from
party-list
to
a uninominal
(named
candidate)
districts
system.
As
POS
theorists
predict,
a more
open political
system
provided
incen-
tives
for collective actors
to
engage
in formal
politics.
Second,
the
political
party system lost two parties that had absorbed on average
35.22
per cent
of the vote
in
previous
national elections
since
i989,
and
a
third
major
party experienced
a more
moderate
decline.
The loss
of these
parties
provoked
a shift in elite
alignments
that
favored
the
emergence
of a
new
counter-elite.
Whereas
these two
POS variables
-
representing
the
cumulative
impact
of a
longer
process
of institutional
and
party
system
change
- created
a
more favourable
political
environment
and,
thus constitute
necessary
con-
ditions, two additional catalysts of a
more
conjunctural
nature
tipped
the
political
balance
decisively
in
favour
of the two
new
indigenous
parties.
First,
the
Banzer-Quiroga government
(i997-2002)
enacted
unpopular
policies
that caused
many
former
supporters
of the
traditional
parties
to
seek
alternatives.
The
government's
actions
provoked
intense
anti-government
mobilisations
that increased the
political popularity
of
the
leaders
of
the two
indigenous parties
successful
in 2002.
Second,
indigenous
political
parties
capitalised
on
the
growing
nationalism
generated
by
overt
pressure
from the
United
States
to eradicate coca
crops,
together
with
offensive
statements
made
by
the
US
ambassador
days
before
the
elections.
Widespread
outrage
expanded
the
parties' support
beyond
their
base
to
include
protest
votes
from middle class
and even
wealthy
elites offended
by
the
ambassador's
audacious statements.
Each of these
five
arguments
will
be
presented
in
turn.
Institutional
hange
Bolivia has had one of the least stable
political
histories in Latin America,
with
frequent coups
interrupting
brief
periods
of elected
civilian
rule since
independence
in
1825.
The
most recent
democratic
period
began
in
i982.
Today
Bolivia
has a
presidential,
unitary political
system,
with
nine
depart-
ments,
divided
into
i22
provinces
and
314
municipalities.
Two
recent
insti-
tutional
changes
made
it
easier for
indigenous
political
parties
to
form,
to
contest
elections,
and to win those
contests:
the
municipal
decentralisation
of
1995,
pursuant
to the
1994
Law
of
Popular
Participation
(LPP),
and the
creation in the 1994-5 constitutional reform of uninominal districts for
68
of
the seats
in the
13o-seat
the
chamber
of
deputies.
Prior
to
these
reforms
it was difficult
for
local,
regional,
or
poorly
funded
movements
to
compete
in
Bolivia's
centralised,
unitary system.
Party
lists
for national
elections
were
constructed at
the national level
and,
since
I979,
have had
to earn three
per
cent of
the vote
in
order
to
maintain
registration.
Many
-
8/9/2019 Lee Van Cott, 2003, From Exclusion to Inclusion. Bolivia's 2002 Elections
7/26
756
Donna
Lee Van Colt
fledgling
indigenous
parties
lost
their
registration
in the
i98os
because
they
were unable to
win sufficient
votes
or
to
pay
fines
imposed
for this
failure.8 The
national-level,
proportional representation,
party
list
system
for electing the legislature made it difficult for geographically concentrated
indigenous
movements to
win
enough
votes
nationwide
to
gain
national
office.
Prior
to
1994
only
a few
dozen
municipal
governments
existed
in the
country, mainly
in
urban
areas.
The
1994
LPP created
3
11
(later
expanded
to
3
14)
municipalities,
the
majority
in rural
areas,
many
of them
with
majority-
indigenous populations.
In
the
first-ever nationwide
direct
municipal
elec-
tions in
1995,
candidates
identifying
themselves as
peasant
or
indigenous
won 28.6
per
cent of
municipal
council
seats, constituting
a
majority
in
73
of
311
municipalities.9
For
the most
part,
they
did so
by
allying
with
non-indigenous
traditional
parties, particularly
the
Movimiento
Nacional
Revolucionario
(MNR)
and
the
leftist,
agrarian-oriented
party
Movimiento
Bolivia Libre
(MBL).
As
described
below,
the
indigenous party
Asamblea
de
la
Soberania
de los
Pueblos
(ASP)
was formed
in
1995
and established
a foothold in
these
municipal
elections
that
it would
use to
expand
rep-
resentation to
the
national
level.
In
addition,
uninominal
seats
created
for the
first time
for
the
1997
elec-
tions enabled
geographically
concentrated
movements to
compete
success-
fully
in
their
geographic
base. The
ASP
elected
four national
deputies
in
1997
from the coca
growing regions
of Cochabamba. Coca
growers
leader,
Evo
Morales,
representing
six
of the
seven
coca
growers'
organisations,
won the
highest
percentage
of
the vote
of
any
uninominal candidate
in
the
country
-
more
than
6o
per
cent in a
field
of
Io candidates.10
Political
arty
system
hange
Bolivia returned
to elected
civilian
rule
in
1982
after
a tumultuous
four-year
transition that
ended
a
period
of
military
rule
that had
begun
in
1964.11
The
only
important political party
to survive the
military interregnum
was
the
MNR,
the
party
that
led the
1952
Bolivian
Revolution.
A
variety
of leftist
parties
split
off
from the
MNR,
of
which
the centre-left
Movimiento
de la
Izquierda
Revolucionaria
(MIR)
would become
the most
important.
General
8
Luciano
apia,
UkhamawaJakawisaxa
Asi
snuestra
ida).
utobiografia
eun
aymara
La
Paz,
1995),
P.
390-440.
9
DonnaLee Van
Cott,
The
Friendly
iquidationf
thePast:The
Politics
f
Diversity
n
Latin
America
Pittsburgh,
oo2000),
.
i88.
10
Clifford
Krauss,
LaucaEne
Journal:
A
Bolivian
Legislator
Who
Just Says
Yes to
Coca,'
NewYork
Times,3June
1998,
.
4A.
n
See Laurence
Whitehead,
Bolivia's
aileddemocratization
977-1980,'
in
Guillermo
O'Donnell t
al.
(eds.),
Transitionsfrom
uthoritarianule:
atinAmerica
Baltimore,
986).
-
8/9/2019 Lee Van Cott, 2003, From Exclusion to Inclusion. Bolivia's 2002 Elections
8/26
From
Exclusion
o Inclusion:
olivia's
200oo2
lections
757
Table
3.
Variation
n Votes
for
Dominant
Parties
and
Leftist
Parties
in
Bolivia,
19g0-2002
Combined otes
ThreeDominant arties Combined otes
MNR
+
ADN
+
MIR
Add
Condepa
UCS
Leftist
Parties
i98oN
37.0%
47.4%
i985N
63.9%
I4.3%
1989N
65.3% 76.3%
29.3%
1993N
54.1%
80.8%
6.o%
I995M
42.0% 75.0% 16.30%
1997N
56.7%
88.4%
6.2%
999M
61.0o%
66.9%
7.3%
2oo2N 42.17%
48.1%
0.7%
Leftist parties areUnidad DemocraiticaPopular, MIR until 1989, Movimiento Bolivia Libre,
Izquierda
Unida,
Partido
Socialista-i,
Partido Comunista
de
Bolivia,
Partido Socialista.
N:
national,
M:
municipal. Figures
do
not include uninominal
ballot results
for half chamber
of
deputies,
after
1997.
Sources:Data
prior
to
1993
is from Eduardo
A.
Gamarra
and
James
M.
Malloy,
'The
patrimonial
ynamics
f
party
olitics
n
Bolivia',
n
Scott
Mainwaring
nd
Timothy
R.
Scully
(eds.),
Building
emocratic
nstitutions:
arty
Systems
n LatinAmerica
Stanford, 995).
For later
years,
data s from
www.georgetown.edu/pdba/elecdata/bolivia,
alvador
Romero
Balliviain,
Geografia
lectoral e Bolivia
(asi
votan os
bolivianos),
nd
ed.
(La
Paz,
1998);
La
Raodn,
on-line,
9
July
2002.
Hugo
Banzer,
who
had ruled
during
1971-1978,
renounced
authoritarianism
and
formed a
center-right party,
Acci6n Democritica
Nacional
(ADN).12
Between
1985
and
I997
a
party
system
developed
around
the
competition
among
these
three
major parties
-
the
centre-right
MNR and
ADN,
and
the
centre-left MIR.
These three
attracted more than
o50
er
cent of
the
vote
in
all national
elections
during
that
period.
In
1989
two
populist
parties
joined
the
system,
Conciencia de Patria
(Condepa)
and
Uni6n Civica
Solidaridad
(UCS), which thereafterattracted a combined 22 per cent of the vote. Thus,
from
the return to
democracy
in
i982
through
the
1997
national
elections,
the five
major parties
received a
majority
of the votes
(see
Table
3).
What
may
be
more
important,
during
this
period
political parties
established
themselves as Bolivia's most
important political
actors.
Previously,
parties
organised competition
among
the
small
middle
class elite
for access
to
government
jobs,
but
were
only
a
secondary
source
of
political power,
which
was
mainly
wielded
by
corporate
actors. The
most
important
of
these
were
the militaryand the labour movement, particularly he miners union. As both
12
Eduardo A. Gamarra
and
James
M.
Malloy,
'The
Patrimonial
Dynamics
of
Party
Politics
in
Bolivia' in Scott
Mainwaring
and
Timothy
R.
Scully
(eds.),
Building
Democratic nstitutions:
Party
ystems
nLatin
America
Stanford,
99
).
-
8/9/2019 Lee Van Cott, 2003, From Exclusion to Inclusion. Bolivia's 2002 Elections
9/26
758
Donna Lee Van
Cott
of these actors declined
in the
198os,
political
parties
increased
in
importance
as vehicles
for
the
pursuit
of
political
power.
Most
governments during
this
period
were
constructed
from
pacts
between two of the three main parties,while the third main competitor was
excluded from
power.13
Thus,
Bolivia had an
equilibrated
party
system
with
the
main axis of
competition among
the three
largest
parties,
which
formed
short-term
patronage-based
alliances
with smaller
parties.
The
fluidity
of
these alliances
has made Bolivian
politics
quite
pragmatic.
The cost
has
been the
increasing
disaffection
of
the
electorate,
which time and
again
saw
its
political
leaders sell
out
their
constituencies
for
government
jobs.
The
necessity
of
keeping
alliance
options
open
has
robbed
the
parties
of their
ability
to make
convincing ideological appeals.
The needs
of
the
poor,
in-
digenous
majority
have received
only
rhetorical
recognition,
with
no
major
party
delivering
on the
promise
of
political
and
economic
inclusion
since
the
return to
democracy
in
i982.
The
2002
elections
marked
the end of
that
system.
The
results
of
those elections
are
displayed
in
Table
i,
together
with
a
comparison
of the
1997
and
2002
results for
seats
in
congress.
The
com-
bined
vote for the
five
major parties dropped
to
48
per
cent
in
2002,
with
the
main
three
winning
only
42.2
per
cent.
These
results
indicate
that
the
Bolivian
party system,
like
many
in
South
America
in the
199os,
is
experi-
encing dealignment.
During
the last electoral
cycle
new
parties
emerged
to
challenge
the
dominance
of the
traditional
parties.14
During
the
2002
election
campaign
and
post-mortem, press
and
political
analysts
referred
to these
as 'anti-
system'
parties.
In
2002,
for the first
time,
the three
dominant
parties
MNR,
MIR,
and ADN
had to
unite to
prevent
the
election
of an
'anti-systemic'
president.15
Thus,
the
axis of
competition
has
shifted
from
intra-elite
com-
petition
to
competition
between
the
'systemic'
and
'anti-systemic'
parties.16
Much of this shift can be explained by the severe decline of three dominant
13
From
1985-1989,
the MNR and ADN
governed;
from
1989-1993,
the
MIR and
ADN
governed;
from
1993-1997,
the
MNR and UCS
governed;
from
1997-zooz02,
he
ADN,
MIR,
UCS,
and
Condepagoverned,
with
Condepa
eaving
he
alliance
arly
n the
term.
14
Another new
party,
Nueva
Fuerza
Revolucionaria,
was
formed
in the
mid-i99os.
It is
mainly
a
Cochabamba
egionalparty,although
ts
leader
made a
respectable
bid
for the
presidency
n
2002,
finishing
only
0.02
per
cent behind
Morales.
Although
an
interesting
phenomenon
n its own
right,
a
complete
discussionof the NFR is
beyond
the
scope
of
this article.
15
Under
Bolivia's
constitution,
f no candidate
wins an
absolute
majority,
he
president
s
chosen
by
the new
congress
from
among
the
top
two
recipients
f votes.
16
Interview,
Rene
Antonio
Mayorga,
25June
2002; Leopoldo
Vegas
R.,
'Es
el
reflejo
de
la
realidad,'
El
Deber,
anta
Cruz,
6
July
2002,
p.
A
3;
Carlos
Cordero,
El
pais
esta
dividido
entre dos fuerzas
politicas,'
El
Deber
July
2002:
AI
3.
-
8/9/2019 Lee Van Cott, 2003, From Exclusion to Inclusion. Bolivia's 2002 Elections
10/26
From
Exclusion
o
Inclusion:
olivia's
002
Elections
759
parties:
Banzer's
right-right
ADN,
and the
populist
parties
Condepa
and
UCS.
All
three
parties
suffered
from the death
of their
founders,
who
had
been
such dominant
figures
that their absence resulted
in internal divisions
and a loss of public support.'
The
collapse
of
Condepa
-
from
22
seats
in
congress
in
1997
to
none
in 2002
-
was
particularly
helpful
to
the
new
indigenous
parties.
Condepa's
base was the
poor,
urban,
mostly Aymara
migrant
population
in the
de-
partment
of
La
Paz
and,
to a lesser
extent,
rural
indigenous
voters
in
the
highland
departments
of
Oruro,
La
Paz,
and
Potosi
and the
migrant
areas of
Cochabamba. The
indigenous
party
IPSP-MAS
won
all four
departments
in 2002.
Moreover,
Condepa
and
its leader
Carlos
Palenque
had
explicitly
identified
with the ethnic
subordination of its
base, invoking symbols
and
themes that resonated
with them
as an
oppressed
ethnic
minority.
It was
the
first
electorally
successful Bolivian
party
to
do
so,
inspiring
similar,
albeit less
successful,
ethnic
appeals
by
other
parties.
After the
death of
Palenque,
the
party
was riven
by
bitter
internal
rivalries. These
public
disputes,
as
well
as
the
cooptation
of
the
party
by
the Banzer
government
-
Condepa
joined
Banzer's
'megacoalition'
in
1997
-
lost
the
party
support
among
its base.
By
the
2002
elections
it had become
essentially
a
patronage
machine
for the
urban
Aymara
counter-elite.
Thus,
the
collapse
of these
parties,
particularly
Condepa, opened
space
for
new
ones,
especially
those
appealing
directly
to
the
disenfranchised,
poor
indigenous
majority.'8
Finally,
the
sharp
decline in the
vote
share
for leftist
parties
during
the
1990s opened
space
on
the left
of
the
political spectrum.
Whereas
the com-
bined vote share for
the leftist
Unidad
Democraitica
Popular
(UDP)
coalition
plus
the
Socialist
Party
(SP-I)
was
47.4
per
cent
in
1982,
the disastrous
economic
performance
of the
UDP caused
the
enduring
decline
of the
left,
thereafter
associated
in
voters' minds
with economic and
political
chaos.
In
the 1985 elections, leftist parties'combined share of the vote fell to 14.3 per
cent.
The
economic
austerity
and
structural
adjustment policies
imposed
by
the
MNR-ADN
government
(1985-1989)
further weakened
the
left,
particularly
he
once-dominant
miners'
union. After the
MIR moved
to the
right
in
1989,
the remainder
of the left would
not exceed
io
per
cent
of
the vote in
the
1990s.
Unified elite
support
of
the neoliberal
economic
model and the
global
decline
of
socialism
robbed
leftist
parties,
and
the
17
Banzer died in
May
zooz of
cancer,
the
diagnosis
of which caused him to
resign
as
president
in
Aug.
zooi.
Condepa
founder
Carlos
Palenque
died of
a
heart
attack
in
1997,
shortly
before the
June presidential
elections;
UCS
founder
Max
Fernaindez
died
in
a
plane
crash
n
'995.
is
Interviews,
Maria
Eugenia
Choque,
20
June
2002;
Rene Antonio
Mayorga,
zs
June
2002;
Salvador
Romero
Ballivian,
GeograJfa
lectorale
Bolivia
as
votan os
bolivianos),
nd
ed.,
La
Paz,
1998,pp.
237-45-
-
8/9/2019 Lee Van Cott, 2003, From Exclusion to Inclusion. Bolivia's 2002 Elections
11/26
760
Donna
ee
Van
Cott
traditional,
Marxist-oriented
abour movement as
articulated
hrough
the
CentralObrera
Boliviana
COB),
of
a
viable economic
programme
o
offer
the
economically
isenfranchised.
heir
radical conomic
demandswere
not
politically easible n the nationalandinternational oliticalconjuncture f
the
990os,
nd their
mestizo
eaders
epeatedly
ailed
o
articulate
discourse
that
would
appeal
o
urban
and rural
poor
voters
increasingly
nterested
n
politicalexpressions
of
ethnic
and cultural
dentity.
Maturity
nd
consolidation
of
the
ndigenous
nd
peasant
movements
As
in
most
Latin
American
ountries,
he
indigenouspopulation
n
Bolivia s
culturally
nd
organisationally
istinct
n
the
highland
and
lowland
regions.In
the
densely
populated
western
highlands,
more
acculturatedndians
are
mainly
small
peasant
farmers
belonging
either
to the
Quechua
(2,298,980)
or
Aymara
i,549,320)
language
groups,
which are also located
across
the
borders
with
Peru, Chile,
and
Argentina.
n
the eastern
Amazonian ow-
lands
groups
are more
diverse:
286,726
Indiansare divided
nto
more
than
30
distinct
languagegroups19.
Although
for most
of
Bolivia's
history
the
indigenous
have
been
predominantly
ural,
massiveurban
migration
n
the
1990S
resulted
n
more
than half of
the
indigenous
populationresiding
n
urbancentresby
zoo200.20
Illiterates
mainlyIndians)
received the
vote after
the
I925
revolution,
almost
30
years
earlier
han
illiterates
n
other centralAndeancountries.
n
exchange
or
protection
of
their ands and the
right
to
vote,
they
servedas
the
dependable
onservative nchor
of the
MNR
party
and a succession
of
military overnments
until
the
mid-i97os.
By
that time
the
military
ad
en-
acted a
number
of
economic
policies
that hurt small farmers.
After
govern-
ment
troops
killed
13
Quechua
Indians
protesting
agricultural
olicies
in
1974(theTolataMassacre), nemerging lassof Aymarantellectualsormed
independent
peasant
organisations
and
political
parties
that
challenged
the
traditional
ominanceand
manipulation
f
the
political
parties
and the
military.
Most
took
the nameof
Tupaj
Katari,
n
Aymara
ndianrebel eader
of
the
late
18th
century
who,
before
his
execution,
vowed
to
return
made
into
millions',
and
developed
a
'Katarista'
deology
hat
combined
struggles
against
ethnic
and class
oppression.21
19
The
largest
owland
groups
are
the Guarani
(75,500o),
the
Chiquitano
61,5
o),
and the
Moxefio
(38,500).
See
VAIPO,
Desarrolloon dentidad:
olitica
nacional
ndigenay
riginaria
(La
Paz,
1998),
p.
35.
20
MACPIO,
Pueblos
ndigenas
originarios
e
Bolivia.
Diagnostico
acional
La
Paz,
zooi).
21
Silvia
Rivera
Cusicanqui,
Aymara
Past,Aymara
Future,'
Report
n heAmericas
XV,
3
(Dec.
199
),
pp.
18-i
9;
SilviaRivera
Cusicanqui,
Luchas
ampesinasontemporaneas
n Boli-
via:El
movimiento
katarista
1
97o-1
980),'
in Rene ZavaletaMercado
comp.),
Bolivia
Hoy,
and ed.
(Mexico,
1987),
pp.
I44-6.
-
8/9/2019 Lee Van Cott, 2003, From Exclusion to Inclusion. Bolivia's 2002 Elections
12/26
From
xclusion
oInclusion:
olivia's
oo2
lections
76
1
The
most
important
contemporary ighland ndigenous
organisation
s
the
Confederaci6n
Sindical
Unica de
Trabajadores
ampesinos
de
Bolivia
(CSUTCB),
stablished
at a
I979
congress organised
by
the COB to
unite
disparatendependentunionsthathademergedn the late1970s.ItsAymara
leaders
nfused the
class-basedMarxist
analysis
of economic
exploitation
derivedfrom
associationswith
leftist
parties
with
the
developing
Katarista
ideology.
Thus,
the
CSUTCB's
agenda
and
discourse
encompassed
class
and ethno-national
emands
hat
emphasised
he
dual-basis
f
exploitation
of
the
highland
ndigenous
population.
The
CSUTCB
mmediately
taged
massive
demonstrations
hat forced the
government
to attend
to
peasant
demands.22
As
the
political
effectivenessof
the CSUTCB
declined
in
the
mid-late
1980s,
a
new force
within the
peasant
sector
emerged
o
fight
the Bolivian
government's
ncreasing
ffortsto
eradicate
he coca
leaf.
Most coca
culti-
vation
occurred
n
the
lowland
tropicalregions
of
the
Chapare
n the
de-
partment
of
Cochabamba
nd
in
the
Yungas
n
the
department
f
La
Paz.
The
growers
were
mainly
migrants
rom the
highlands
dislocated
by
the
MNR
government's
iring
of
state mineworkers
nd
structural
djustment
policies
that
hurt
peasant
agriculture.
y
the late
1990s
therewere
approxi-
mately
300,000
mostly
Quechua
migrants
n the
Chapare,
where
they
found
coca leaf to be the most
profitablecrop.23
Politicalmobilisation
by
coca
growers
began shortly
after the
democratic ransition
with road blockades
in
1983. By 1984
coca
growers
began forming
their own federations
as
opposed
to
the
military's
op-down
federations
to
present
heir
agricultural
demandsand to
protest against
ncreased
government
eradication
fforts.24
Under US
pressure
o crack
down on coca
growing
cocaine
production
had
dramatically
ncreasedn
198
3-1984
-
in
1986
the
government
nnounced
a
plan
to
eradicate ll
coca leaf
grown
for
export
as
coca
paste
or cocaine.As
Patzi Paco observes, Confrontedwith thisplan,for the firsttimethe coca
producers
consolidated
hemselves
as
a class movement with
possibilities
of
converting
hemselves nto a
movement of
masses,
in
that
they began
organising
lockadeswith
other
social
actors'.25
22
CSUTCB,
El
desafio
de
mantener
a
unidad,'
V
Congreso
rdinario
elCSUTCB
La
Paz,
1990);
Rivera
Cusicanqui,
Aymara
Past';
Esteban
Ticona,
Organizaci6ny
iderazgo
ymara,
197P9-996
La
Paz,
zooo).
23
Xavier
Alb6,
'Diversidad
Etnica,
Cultural
y Linguistica,'
in
Fernando
Campero
Prudencio
(ed.),
Boliviaenel
siglo
XX:
Laformacidn
e la Bolivia
contemporainea
La
Paz,
1999),
p.
476;
Felix
Patzi
Paco,
Insurgenda
sumision:
ovimientos
ndigeno-campesinos
I983-i9A')
La
Paz,
I999),
p.
49;
Esteban
Ticona,
Gonzalo
Rojas
and Xavier
Alb6,
Votosy
I
Vphalas:
campesinosy
ueblos
orginarios
n
democradcia
La
Paz,
I995),
pp.
54-5.
24
Kevin
Healy,
'Coca,
the State
and the
Peasantry
in
Bolivia,
1982-1988,' Journal
of
Inter-
american tudies nd
WorldAffairs,
3o,
2
&
3
(summer/fall 1988), pp.
Io0-26.
25
My
translation,
Patzi
Paco,
'Insurgencia
y
sumisi6n,'
p.
86.
-
8/9/2019 Lee Van Cott, 2003, From Exclusion to Inclusion. Bolivia's 2002 Elections
13/26
762
Donna
Lee Van
Cott
As
the
government
crackdown
intensified
in
the late
198os
and
199os,
the
coca
growers
became
more
organised
and
militant.
By
i
990
the
Chapare
growers
had
formed
I6o
local unions
'under
the
umbrella
of
30
sub-
federations (centrales)hich, in turn, are organised into 5 federations', while
in
the
Yungas
another five
federations had formed.26
In
the
absence
of
local
government
in
these
areas,
the coca
growers'
federations became
the
most
authoritative
and
legitimate
public
authority.27
In
1988
the
five Co-
chabamba
federations
formed a
Coordinating
Committee. The
growers
had
tripled
the
number of their
delegates
at
the
1987
CSUTCB
congress;
in
1988
their
Quechua
leaders seized
control
of
the
organisation
from
the
Aymara
intellectuals
that
had
founded it. A new
set
of
leaders
emerged
from
the
coca
growers
movement.
The
most important
was Evo
Morales,
who
had
migrated
to
the
Chapare
with
his
Aymara
father and
Quechua
mother.
While
focused
on
securing
the
economic survival
of
their
members,
the
coca
growers'
federations
assumed
many
features of ethno-cultural
move-
ments.
Their
members
were
primarily
Aymara
and
Quechua
migrants
who
retained
ties to
traditional
communities and
experienced
discrimination
based on
their
ethnic
identity.
They justified
their resistance
to
government
eradication
policies
in
light
of
the
fact that
coca
growing
is
a
long-standing
cultural
and
religious
practice
among
the
indigenous peoples
of
Bolivia
and,
indeed,
the Andes.
This
culturalist-nationalist
discourse
earned
the move-
ment the
support
of
sympathetic
social sectors
-
Cochabamba's
elite-based
civic
committee,
human
rights
organisations,
anthropologists,
and
journal-
ists,
notwithstanding
the
fact that
most
of
the coca leaf
grown
in
the
Chapare
and
Yungas
was
destined for
export.28
The coca
growers'
movement
also
is an ethnic
movement
by
dint
of
its
membership
-
and
leadership
from
1987
-
of
the
CSUTCB,
the
members
of
which
are
primarily
Quechua
and
Aymara
Indians and
which
has
always promoted
a
discourse
of
ethnic
rights
along with its agrarianagenda. Moreover, as Gustafson observes, the urban
press
and
the
government
portray
the coca
growers
as an ethnic movement.29
By
i992
the
coca
growers
had seized
control of the
CSUTCB.
They
sought
to
construct
an
independent
political party
in
order
to
complement
their
strategy
of
massive
mobilisation and resistance to
the
eradication
of
coca.
Peasant
leaders had
become
increasingly
dissatisfied with alliances
be-
tween
the
movement and
traditional
political parties,
particularly
those
on
26
Kevin
Healy,
'Political
Ascent of
Bolivia's Peasant Coca
Leaf
Producers,'
Journal
of
Inter-
american
tudies
nd
WorldAffairs,
33,
I,
spring
199
,
pp.
88-9.
27
Healy,
'Political Ascent,'
p.
89.
28
Patzi
Paco,
Insut~genciay
umisidn, .
86;
Healy,
'Political
Ascent,'
pp.
93-4.
29
Bret
Gustafson, 'Indigenous
Movements and State
Processes n Bolivia:
Racism, Regional
Politics,
and
the
Paradoxes of
Intercultural
Reform,'
in David
Maybury-Lewis (ed.),
Ident-
itiesin
Conflict:
ndigenous
eoples
nd the State n
Latin America
(Cambridge,
2002).
-
8/9/2019 Lee Van Cott, 2003, From Exclusion to Inclusion. Bolivia's 2002 Elections
14/26
From
Exclusion
to
Inclusion:
Bolivia's
2002
Elections
763
the
left.
Leftist
parties
had
increased heir
interference n
peasant
politics
since
the
electoral
declineof
the
left
in the
mid-
98os
in
an
attempt
o
regain
political
nfluence
through
manipulation
f
the
more
dynamicpeasant
ector.
Discussionswithin the CSUTCBconcerning he constructionof a peasant
'political
nstrument'
began
in
earnest
at
a
1992 meeting
commemorating
the
invasion of the
Americas
by
Europeans.
For
a
variety
of
reasons,
that
meeting
was a
complete
failure,
but CSUTCB eaders
agreed
o take
up
the
issue
again
at
a
25-27
March
I995
assembly.
Participants
t
that
meeting
agreed
o
create
he
Asamblea
de
la Soberania e
los Pueblos
(ASP)
n
order
to
participate
ndependently
n
the December
1995 municipal
elections.30
Thus,
they
took
advantage
of one
of the
two recent institutional
hanges
discussed
above
-
the
municipaldecentralisationf 1995.Among
the
most
enthusiastic
proponents
of
the
project
was Evo
Morales,
hen leaderof
the
Coordinadora
de
las
Federacionesdel
Tr6pico
de
Cochabamba,
one of
the
main
coca
growersorganisations.
In
its first
electoral
outing
the
ASP
dominated
the
coca-growing
dis-
tricts
of
the
Chapare,
netting
ten
mayors,49
municipal
ouncillors,
and six
departmental-level
onsejeros
n
Cochabamba.
t also
won
five councillors
n
other
highland
departments.31
ccording
o
peasant
eader
Rom'n
Loayza,
who
would
represent
he
ASP in
congress
(1997-2002),
the
municipal
de-
centralisationnabledthe CSUTCB
finally
o form its firstviable
political
party.32
n
1998,
mirroring
he
division within the
peasant
movement,
the
partysplit
over internal
divisionsbetweenEvo Moralesand
Alejo
VWliz
and
presented
wo lists for
the
1999
municipal
lections.The
rump
ASP,
led
by
Veliz,
won 28
municipal
councillors
and
five
mayors
n
Cochabamba;
the
splinter
nstrumento
Politico
para
a
Soberania e los Pueblos
(ISPS),
ed
by
Morales,
won
79
municipal
councillors
n
seven
of
the
country's
nine
departments
mainly
n
Cochabamba
40]
and
La Paz
[18],
the
other
main
location for cocagrowing).33 t the nationalevel,as noted above,the ASP
won
four
uninominal
eats
in
the
1997 congressional
lections.
In the
pro-
portional
vote,
which
determines
he
occupancy
of the other62
seats
n
the
chamber
of
deputies,
ASP
won
17.5
per
cent
of the
vote
in
Cochabamba,
3.7
per
cent
nationwide.
Problems
with
their
registration
equired
hat the ASP and IPSP
adopt
the
legal
registration
f defunct
eftist
parties.
n
1995
and
1997
ASP used the
registration
f
the
Izquierda
Unida
(IU).
In
1999
t borrowed
he
registration
of the PartidoComunistade Bolivia (PCB).In 1999 and
z002
the IPSP
used the
registration
f
the
Movimientoal
Socialismo
MAS).
According
o
30
CSUTCB,
'El
desafio,'
pp. I
5-I6;
Patzi
Paco,
Insurgencday
umisidn,
p.
I16-19.
31
Donna
Lee
Van Cott,
'Institutional
Changeand
Ethnic
Parties n
South
America,'
Latin
American
Politicsand
Socidety,
5, 2,
summer
zoo3,
pp.
1-39.
32
Interview, La
Paz,
21
June
1997.
*
Van
Cott,
'Institutional
Change'.
-
8/9/2019 Lee Van Cott, 2003, From Exclusion to Inclusion. Bolivia's 2002 Elections
15/26
764
Donna Lee
Van Cott
Morales,
he
MAS
s
in
the
process
of
adding
he
words 'communitarian' r
'pachakuti'34
o the
name
MAS
in
order to
convey
more
of its
cultural
message,
while
maintaining
a
name with
high public
identification.35In
contrast,Quispehadno difficulty egistering isparty orthe 200zelections,
even
though
he
fell
1o,ooo
signatures
hort
of
the number
required.
Ana-
lysts
and
MAS
militants
allege
that the
traditional
parties
pressured
the
national
electoral
ourt to
register
him
anyway
n
orderto
split
the
indigen-
ous
vote and
prevent
a
MAS-MIP
alliance,
which
might
have occurredhad
Quispe
been
barred rom
running.36
MAS militantswere
incensed
by
the
differential
reatment,
ince
their
registration
ad been
rejected
our
times
for more
minor
infractions.37
n 2002
the much-diminished
ump
ASP
did
not run a
separateist;
its
most
prominent
militantswere absorbed
by
the
Cochabamba-based
opulist
party
Nueva Fuerza
Republicana
NFR).
The
IPSP-MAS
inished irst
n
the
departments
f
Cochabamba,
a
Paz, Oruro,
and
Potosi,
winning
8
senatorsand
27
deputies.38
These
experiences
ar
surpass
arlier
fforts
by
Indians
o form
successful
parties.
When
the
military
held
elections
n
1978
to
restore
the democratic
order,
tiny
new
indigenous
parties
competed. Struggling gainst
their
lack
of
resources,
he
requirement
f
distributing
heir own
ballots,
and
fines
imposed
on
parties
not
earning
hree
per
cent
of the national
ote,
they
com-
peted
again
n
1979
and
1980,
as
military
eaders
epeatedly
nnulled lections
won
by
the
left.
In
1982,
the
1980
resultswere allowed
to
stand and
inde-
pendent
indigenous
eaders
entered
congress
for
the first
time.39
Between
34
Pachakuti
s a
Quechua
word
with
multiple
meanings.
Literally
meaning
turning
or
returning kuti)
of
the
earth
(pacha),
t is
translated
lternatively
s
'new
beginning',
re-
awakening',
revolution',
or
'renovation'.
See Andrew
Canessa,
Contesting
Hybridity:
Evangelistas
nd
Kataristasn
Highland
Bolivia,'
Journal
f
LatinAmerican
tudies,
ol.
32,
no.
i,
Feb.
2ooo,p.
I
26;
CSUTCB,
VII
Congreso
SUTCB.
Documentosy
esoludciones
La
Paz,
1996),p. 66; Rivera, AymaraPast,' pp.
19-23.
It has replacedTupajKatarias the key
symbol
of
indigenous
resistance n
the
Andes,
as demonstrated
y
its use
in
indigenous
politicalparties'
names
n
Ecuador
Movimiento
Unido
Pluricultural
achakutik)
nd Peru
(Partido
nka
Pachactiteq),
s
well
as
Felipe
Quispe's
Movimiento
Indigena
Pachakutik.
Pachakuti
s also
the nameof a
prominent
5
h-century
nca
eaderwho
ruled
during
a time
of
territorial
expansion personal
ommunication,
osn
Antonio
Lucero,
4
Dec.
20oo2).
35
Ben
Backwell,
A
Rural
Fight.
Ben
BackwellTalks to Bolivian Peasant Leader
Evo
Morales,'
Morningtar,
5
Oct.
2002,
p.
io.
On-line
through
LexisNexis
database.
36
3odias,
La
Paz,
Oct.
zoo
:
90.
37
'La
clase
politica
e
dio
la
sigla
a
Felipe
para
evitar
que
se una a
Evo,'
Pulso
emanario,
1-27
June
2oo2,
p.
13.
38
www.cne.gov.bo.
Each
department
as threesenators: wo from the
party inishing
irst n
the
joint
presidential-congressional
alloting;
one from
the
party inishing
econd.
39
The
Movimiento
ndio
Tupaj
Katari
MITKA)
won
o.6
per
cent
of the votes in
1978
and
1.6
per
cent of
the
votes in
1979
(entitling
t to a seat in
congress).
The
MITKA divided
before
the
1980
elections,
with
MITKA
winning per
cent and
MITKA-I
winning
.I
per
cent of
the vote.
The
Movimiento
Revolucionario
upaj
Katari
MRTK)
ompeted
as
part
of
the leftist UDP
coalition n
1978.
In 1979
the MRTK
divided nto
three
parties.
The
-
8/9/2019 Lee Van Cott, 2003, From Exclusion to Inclusion. Bolivia's 2002 Elections
16/26
From
xclusion
o
Inclusion:olivia's
002
lections
765
1985
and
1995
two
lineages
of
indigenousparties
competed
in
elections.
One
lineage
derived from the
Movimiento
Indio
Tupak
Katari
(MITKA),
which
represented
more
radical,
thno-national
train
of
Katarism,
ome-
times called ndianismo.lthoughdominantatthetimeof the firstdemocratic
elections,
t
virtually
disappeared
s a
political
force after
1985.
The more
radical train
would
emerge
again
n 2000 led
by
one
of its
original
eaders,
Felipe Quispe.
The
Movimiento Revolucionario
Tupak
Katari
(MRTK),
which
represented
more
moderate train
of Katarism hat
sought
to work
with
non-indigenous
social
sectors,
generated
the second
lineage.
Both
lineages fragmented
hroughout
he
I98os
until
there were
approximately
ten
tiny
splinter
parties
with
Katarista-sounding
ames.
One
of
these,
the
Movimiento
Revolucionario
Tupak
Kataride
Liberaci6n
MRTKL),
n
off-
shoot of the
MRTK,
gained
momentum
n
the
late
198os
and
early1990s
led
by
Victor
Hugo
Cirdenas,
who
made
history
by
allying
he MRTKLwith
the
MNR
for
the
1993
presidential
lections.
On the
strength
of
Cardenas'
support
n
the
indigenoushighlands,
he MNR-MRTKL
oalitionwon
35.6
per
cent
of
the
vote,
the most
decisive
presidential
ictory
since the
leftist
UDP
coalition's
victory
in
198o
(38.7
per
cent).40
However,
the
MRKTL
faded nto
electoraloblivion
thereafter,
oining
he
MITKA
and
its
descend-
ants
(see
Table
2).41
Parallel o these
developments
n the
highlands,
a lowlandmovement
emergedduring
he
democratic ransition
1978-1982)
to
demand erritorial
rights
and to
protect
indigenous
tribes
from extractive
activities
n
their
traditional
erritories.
n
1982
the
Guarani,
Ayoreo,Chiquitano,
nd
Guarayo
formed the
Confederaci6n
ndigena
del Oriente
Boliviano
(CIDOB). By
1989
CIDOB
had
expanded
o
encompass
most
indigenous
organisations
n
the
lowlands.
Through
spectacular
marchesand
successful
negotiations
with
the
government
hey
enjoyed
a
number
of
achievements
during
he
1990s.
By the mid-I990s,CIDOBhad createda six-tieredorganisationaltructure
fraction
retaining
he MRTKname
ran
with
the
MNR;
another
raction
oined
the
UDP
coalition;
the
third did
not
participate, instructing
its
militants
to
vote
for
the
left.
See,
Ricardo
Calla,
'Hallu
Hayllisa
huto.
Identificaci6n
etnica
y
procesos
politicos
en
Bolivia,'
in
Carlos
Ivin
Degregori
(ed.),
Democracia,
tnicidad
violenciapolitica
n
lospaises
andinos
Lima,
1993), p.
68;
Patzi
Paco,
Insurgeniday
umision,
.
40;
Felipe
Quispe
Huanca,
El
indio
en escena
(La
Paz,
1999);
Jan
Rocha,
'Democracy
dawns,'
pp.
254-8;
Mario
Rol6n
Anaya,
Politicay
Partidos
n
Bolivia,
3rd
ed.
(La
Paz,
1999);
Luciano
Tapia,
UkhamawaJakawisaxa.
40 Gamarra and
Malloy,
'The Patrimonial
Dynamics,'
p.
432.
41
Among
the
reasons
for
the
MRTKL's
demise
are
Cirdenas'
failure
to institutionalise
the
party
by
sharing power
with other
leaders
and the loss
of
support
among
indigenous
voters
he
encountered when he 'sold out' the
party
to
ally
with the neoliberal
MNR
government.
Patzi
Paco,
Insurgencidayumisidn,
p.
41-42;
Van
Cott,
'Institutional
Change
and Ethnic
Parties';
interviews,
Ivin
Arias,
Ramiro
Molina,
Esteban
Ticona,
La
Paz,
'1997,
2001.
-
8/9/2019 Lee Van Cott, 2003, From Exclusion to Inclusion. Bolivia's 2002 Elections
17/26
766
Donna Lee
Van Cott
that
encompassed
four
regional organisations
-
the
Central de
Pueblos
Indigenas
del
Beni
(CPIB),
the Central
Indigena
de
la
Regi6n
Amaz6nica
Boliviana
(CIRABO),
uniting
indigenous
communities
in
Pando
and
north-
ern Beni, the Consejo Yuqui, and the Coordinadora Etnica de Santa Cruz
(CESC).
The latter was
created between
1992-1994
at the insistence
of
CPIB,
which
objected
to CIDOB
playing
the dual
role
of national
coordi-
nator of
the
indigenous
movement and
representative
of the
indigenous
peoples
of the
department
of
Santa Cruz
(CIDOB
1995:
44-46).
The
CESC
later added the
word
'Pueblos'
(Peoples)
to
its
name,
becoming
CPESC. As
CIDOB
underwent
deterioration as an
organisation
between
1997
and
2002,
because
of
internal
rivalries and a rift between its
moderate
and
radical fac-
tions,
CPESC became the more
dynamic organisation.
The
lowland
organ-
isations discussed
forming
their own
political
instrument
in the
990os
but
could not reach
consensus
on
this
course
of action. Some
lower-level
organ-
isations and
individuals decided to
support
the ASP
and, later,
the MAS.
CPESC
president
Jose
Bailaba won a seat
in
congress
representing
the
MAS
in
2002.
For the
most
part,
however,
lowland Indians
entered
formal
politics
by
allying
with
traditional
political
parties,
and these
alliances
fractured
the
organisation
in
1997
and 2002.42
The
political
mobilisation of
the nation's
indigenous
majority
and the
success of the new
indigenous parties
in
1997
and
1999
convinced traditional
parties
-
particularly
he MNR
and
MIR
-
to offer candidacies
n 2002 to more
indigenous
and
campesino
leaders than
ever before.43
Many
of
these
were
elected.
For
example,
the MIR
successfully
ran Elsa
Guevara,
a
Quechua
peasant
leader who
was
subsequently
named
head
of the
MIR
congressional
42
The
latest
important
ndigenous
movement
to
emerge
has been
promoted
by Aymara
historiansand anthropologists o reconstitute he traditional yllus the pre-colombian
form of
Aymara
and
Quechua
political,
social,
and
economic
organisation
and
to or-
ganise
them
into federations.
See Maria
Eugenia
Choque
and Carlos
Mamani,
Recon-
stituci6ndel
aylluy
derechos
de los
pueblos ndigenas:
El movimiento
ndio en los
Andes
de
Bolivia,'Journal
fLatin
American
Anthropology,
ol.
6,
no.
I,
zooi,
p.
207.
As
the
highland
peasant
movement
declined
n
the
late
i980s
and
I99os,
traditional
yllu
uthorities
egan
to
challenge
and
even
to
replace
he
peasant
unions
as the most
legitimate
orm of
local
authority.
As
key
proponents
of the
movement
explain,
The return
of
our
own
authority
constitutes
an
act of
self-determination,
f
restoring
o the
community
ts
own
govern-
ment,'
while
rejecting
mposed
'foreign'
authority
tructures.
Choque
and
Mamani,
Re-
constituci6n
del
ayllu,'
p.
212. In
1997
an umbrella
rganisation
as
established
o unite
the
movement
(Consejo
de
Ayllusy
Markas el
Qullasuyu,
CONAMAQ).
This movementwas
too
new to
participate oherently
n
the
2002 elections.
Based
on
the
location
of the
organisation's
ase in La
Paz,
Oruro,
and Potosi
-
all dominated
by
the IPSP-MAS
and
MIP in
zooz
-
we can
conclude that
many
of its members
voted for the two
indigenous
candidates.
43
Interviews,
La
Paz,
Bertha Beatriz
Acarapi, 29
June
200oo2;
Elena
Argirakis,
19
June
2002zooz;
Maria
Eugenia Choque, 20zoune 2002zooz;orge
Lema,
20zoune zoo2002.
-
8/9/2019 Lee Van Cott, 2003, From Exclusion to Inclusion. Bolivia's 2002 Elections
18/26
From
xclusion
o
Inclusion:olivia's
002
lections
767
delegation.
The
populist,
Cochabamba-based
arty
NFR
incorporated
he
portion
of the
coca
growers
movement
hat
split
from
Evo
Morales n
1998,
including
ASP leader
Alejo
Veliz.
The keyobstacleto politicaladvancementor the peasantmovementon
the eve
of the 2002
electionswas a
seriousdivision
hat had
emerged
within
the
CSUTCBbetween
Evo Moralesand
Alejo
Veliz
at its
1998
Congress.
When
the
organisation
ould not decide
between
Veliz
and
Morales,
Felipe
Quispe
was chosen
as
a
compromise
ecretary-general.
he decision
revived
the
moribund
political
career
of the radical
Aymara
nationalist,
who
had
been involved
n
the
MITKA n the
early
98os,
before
leaving
to
build
an
armed
movement
(the
Ejercito
Guerrillero
Tupaj
Katari).Quispe
was
ar-
rested in
1992
and released from prison in 1997.
He attended
the
1998
CSUTCB
congress
in
order
to
generate
political
support
for his defence
against
urther riminal
charges
elated o his
guerrilla
ctivities.
After
being
elected
secretary-general
uispe
assumed he
title
of
Mallku,
high-ranking
Aymara
authority.
rom
this
institutional
latform,
over
the
next three
years
Quispe
led
militant,
sometimes
violent,
mobilisations
against
the Banzer-
Quiroga
government.
His starwould rise
quickly
during
2000
when
he led
massive roadblocks
n the
highlands
that forced
concessions
on
agrarian
policy.
UnlikeMoralesand
Vliz,
who talked
mainly
of
the economic
exploi-
tation of Bolivia's
peasants by
the Bolivian
government
and its
'puppet
master',
the United
States,
Quispe provoked
the
ire
of even
sympathetic
elites with his
fiery
ethno-nationalist
hetoric.
He
articulated
n
opposition
between the
European,
ight-skinned
Bolivia,
and
the darker
skinned,
n-
digenous
majority
nd called
or
the construction
f a
separate
Aymara
tate.
In
response
to
derogatory
acial
epithets
directed
at
Quispe,
his rhetoric
became
increasingly
nflammatory.45
The lesson of this
experience
s
that
the ethnic
parties
that
succeeded
most in Boliviawere not the personalistic ehiclesof individualndigenous
leaders,
as had been the
practice
n the
1980s
and
early1990s.
Instead,
suc-
cessful
ethnic
parties
constitute he
political
arms
of established
ndigenous
social movement
organisations
nd
were
constructed
with
significant
up-
port
from and
participation
of
their
membership.
Notwithstanding
he
severe
split
within
the
CSUTCBafter
1998,Quispe
and Morales
were
able
to
draw on the financialand
logistical
resources
of
long-established,
ocally
legitimate
CSUTCB affiliates.Even
in the
lowlands,
where
the
umbrella
indigenousorganisationCIDOBwasin disarray riorto the zooz elections,
44
Patzi
Paco,
Insutgencia
sumisin,
pp.
77-83,
i21i-;
interviews,
Victor
Hugo
Cirdenas,
Esteban
Ticona,
La
Paz,
zool.
45
Willem
Assies,
'Uncommon
citizens,
their
usosy
costumbres,
nd the
media,'
paper prepared
for the Third
European Congress
of
Latin-Americanists,
Amsterdam,
2-6
July
zooz,
p.
I
6;
Gustafson,
'Indigenous
Movements,'
p.
269.
-
8/9/2019 Lee Van Cott, 2003, From Exclusion to Inclusion. Bolivia's 2002 Elections
19/26
768
Donna
Lee
Van Cott
Table
4.
Spending
or
2oo2
Presidential
ampaigns
Seconds
f
TV
US$
Provided Total
US$
Spent
Total
US$
Spending
Party
Time
Bought'
by
CNE2
on
Propaganda
Declared
y
Party
MNR
592,722
931,295 6,519,942 6,000,000
NFR
451,898
376,00o
4,970,878
3,000,000
MIR
306,428
858,121
3,370,708
3,000,000
ADN
257,590
757,316
2,833,490
4,000,000
UCS
162,303
824,349 1,785,333
1,536,312
Condepa
48,875
878,078
537,625
No
response
MAS
28,503
94,664
313,533
Undetermined
MCC
25,406
0
279,466
No
response
LYJ
8,I6o
0
89,760
No
response
MIP
7,876
0
86,636
1,396
PS
0
0
o
No
response
Sources:
Los
partidos
astaron
us
20
millones
61o
en
Tv',
La
Ra.zn
LaPaz),
29June
2002, B6-7);
'Desde
camiones
hasta
helic6pteros
en
campafia',
La
Razdn
(La
Paz),
2z5
June
2002,
p.
B5.
1
In
cities f La
Paz,Cochabamba,
nd
SantaCruz.
Funding rovided
o
parties
ased
n
results
n
previous
lections.
his
represents
alfthe
total
money
awardedach
party.
The
second
half
s
deliveredfter
he
elections,
rovided
he
party omplies
withcertain
equire-
ments.
Article
15
of
the
Constitution
rovides
72
seconds f
TV
time
daily
o each
political
party
or
55
ays,
r
14,998
or
each
party.
the IPSP-MAS formed an alliancewith the main indigenous organisation of
Santa
Cruz,
CPESC,
and
the
organisation
secured
the
party 9.6 per
cent
of
the
vote in
that
department.46
Ties
to
these
well-rooted,
highly
mobil-
ised
organisations
provided
the
resources that the two
financially
weak
par-
ties
needed to
beat
better
financed
traditional
parties
-
surmounting
the
hurdle
that
had
tripped up
so
many
Katarista
parties
in
the
1980s.
As
shown
in
Table
4,
the
two
indigenous parties
IPSP-MAS
and
MIP
spent
far
less
on
their
campaigns
than
did
the
traditional