learning and learning to change

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Contributing to Learning to Change (Drafting for thesis, 2004; edited out) p.1

9 1LEARNING LEARNING TO CHANGE

Dianne Allen

9 LEARNING LEARNING TO CHANGE ................................................................... 1

9.1 Experience poses questions ..................................................................................... 1

9.2 Learning Issues: Fine-tuning the Inquiry and Identifying My Starting Premises . . .2

9.2.1 Understanding what is involved in effective learning for adults ......................3

9.2.2 The Nature of Learning and its Relationship to Change - My starting

premises ..................................................................................................................... 4

9.2.3 Where to from here? ......................................................................................... 6

9.3 Learning to Change Rebuilding My Conceptual Framework .............................. 6

9.3.1 Overview .......................................................................................................... 6

9.3.2 The Nature of Learning and its Relationship to Change Argyris (and

Schn)s Contribution ................................................................................................8

9.3.3 Formative and Transformative Learning Mezirows Contribution .............14

9.3.4 Levels of Learning and the Role of Culture - Batesons Contribution ...........17

9.3.5 Reflective Practice Schns Contribution ....................................................19

9.3.6 Herons Contribution ......................................................................................21

9.4 Facilitating Learning to Change for an Adult ........................................................23

9.4.1 Adult Learning ................................................................................................23

9.4.2 Learning From Experience .............................................................................23

9.4.3 Action Learning ..............................................................................................24

9.4.4 Professional Development ..............................................................................24

9.4.5 Peer Learning ..................................................................................................259.4.6 Another View - Learning to Solve Problems .................................................25

9.5 In Summary: Converging on Learning to Change .................................................25

Appendix 9.1 -Learning Experience Stories Details ......................................................27

(9.1.1) The Management Training that raised the Question ...................................27

(9.1.2) The University of Technology, Sydney - Master of Dispute Resolution

Course Experience - 1996-8 ........................................................................................28

(9.1.3) Software learning and unlearning 1998-1984 ..............................................29

Bibliography: ..............................................................................................................33

9.1 Experience poses questions

In designing my professional development activity, I was responding to a number of

experiences with staff development and management training which had raised various

questions for me about what constituted an effective professional development program.

When I looked more closely at these experiences, individually, and together, I realised

that my concern was related to learning to change, and my interest lay in seeking to

design a learning program which resulted in real learning: change.

There are at least three stories to tell that identify incidents that have developed my

thinking about learning to change, and helped focus my attention. (For details see

Appendix 9.1, below). The first is a story of observing and participating in a

1 In an earlier version of the thesis, Contributing to Learning to Change, this content was offered as

Chapter 9


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commercially contracted management training process, designed to develop line

managers capacities in interaction management and to prepare them for more

involvement in performance appraisal and development. The training involved some

simulated conversations between line managers and others representing their

subordinate staff, and dealing with providing feedback on appraisals, and working onresultant development plans. I observed that the program was well received by those

who were already operating under the basic interaction principles of(1) maintaining

or enhancing self-esteem, by being specific and being sincere (2) listening and

responding with empathy, by responding to feelings and content, and (3) asking for helpin solving the problem, by seeking and developing ideas and providing support without

removing responsibility (Development Dimensions International, 1974, 1987).

However, the training appeared to be water off a ducks back for those whose

activities were not demonstrating these principles.

The second and third stories deal with learning experiences for myself as learner. In

these instances I had some more alert access to the internal components of the learningor barriers to learning. That access to the internal provided additional information and

indicated something of the direction this inquiry should take.

The second situation occurred in the context of Dispute Resolution studies, and mirrors

some of the first story. This time I was the one finding out that, even when I wanted to

change, change was not easy. This time it was my values that had their role to play in

how I was responding in a simulated situation. When the values, needed to play a role,

were at variance with my personal value system, the level ofaffectdeveloped in me was

sufficient to limit my range of responses and my usual expectations of competence.

The third story traverses learning in an area where values were not, obviously, at issue.

The change this time was that involved with learning a marginally different computer

software application, to have the benefit of an upgrade and its additional facilities. This

time the question raised for me was: What is involved in learning a change in a routined

pattern of effective operation? The question of stress, of cognitive load, was evident,

especially in the competition for scarce time and the implications of being prepared to

become less effective for a while before more effectiveness could develop.

Having designed a professional development activity which sought to address the issues

arising from these experiences, and having implemented the design, and found that the

change, if any, developed in and for the participants was relatively subtle, the questionnow arises: What has implementing the professional development activity design

amongst professionals shown me? How am I understanding learning to change now?

9.2 Learning Issues: Fine-tuning the Inquiry and Identifying My Starting

Premises

One of the processes involved in action research cycling, the reflection on the outcomes

of action, is the move from fuzzy questions to less fuzzy questions (Dick, 2000). Here

I report on the way in which what was motivating my inquiry, the fuzzy question of

how to improve practice, becomes less fuzzy, more finely tuned.


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9.2.1 Understanding what is involved in effective learning for adults

The learning that I am interested in is the learning-to-be-more-effective that an adult

might engage in. I describe this learning-to-be-effective, for an adult, as the change in

action-thinking patterns which provides the learner, the adult, with the capacity toengage in a different response, or approach, to a presenting problem. It may include a

consideration of change of values, a significant part of the thinking-action complex.

The issues can be indicated, in part, by the following questions:

Is learning possible, if the approach seeking to be learnt is contrary to the

persons values?

What is involved in learning which involves changing patterns that appear to

have been laid down early in life and reinforced by experience and mental

models?

In the first question, my interest in the role of values in the process of learning is

informed by dispute resolution studies, and relates to the extent to which a threat to self-

identity may arise from a clash with unexamined values. Northrup indicates that a

threat to self-identity tends to lead to dispute, and an intractable dispute at that too

much stands to be lost (Northrup, 1989).

In the second question, there appear to be at least three elements that may need to be

attended to when learning to change:

Patterns laid down early in life

Patterns reinforced by experience

Patterns reinforced by mental models

I understand early in life to be during a time for the learner when there was limited

capacity to think about action-thinking patterns, and to critically evaluate them. I

understand this to be the formative learning experience of the child as distinct from the

transformative learning which is a part of the adult experience (Mezirow, 1991). In my

view, there is also formative learning during adulthood: the first round of learning about

a new activity. In my experience such learning is usually accepted on authority, and

considered to be most effectively/efficiently received, as a first layer of knowing,

when it is presented as being unproblematic.

I understand reinforced by experience to include the experiences which impact on theindividuals sense of self-identity, including those factors which contribute to self-

confidence and self-efficacy. Such experiences are attended by pleasure or pain, felt

directly (the hand on the hot stove), or involve interpretation where pain or pleasure is

indirectly moderated or mediated by another (the slap of discipline of a parent, the

emotional affirmation of a significant other). Some of these directly felt experiences

and indirectly mediated interpretations can become internalised as individual rules of

thumb. Whether verbalised or not, in time they also disappear from our actively

conscious awareness. Nevertheless, they have an impact on our actions and responses

to a situation. These interpretations build upon the patterns of attractiveness (incentive)

or avoidance (deterrence/disincentive) which contribute to what is termed as

motivation.


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I understand the reinforced mental model to be how the individual is thinking about,

and understanding, the interaction that they have experienced. However, the

reinforced mental model that I am seeking to focus on is the theory-in-use, as

distinct from the espoused-theory, to use Argyris and Schns distinctions (Argyris,

1974, 1996). As theory-in-use, according to Argyris and Schn, it is not readily, orusually, articulated, and needs to be discovered, in the first instance, from what are the

individuals actions, especially those actions which seem to be at odds with the

espoused-theory objectives. By comparison, espoused-theory is more readily

articulated and is the theory of action which is advanced to explain or justify a givenpattern of activity(Argyris, 1996, p.13). Part of the current understanding here is, thatif there has been a cognitive element in the formation of this reinforced mental

model, then that cognitive component has become more tacit, and implicit, as time, and

working with it, has passed. This happens because it appears that we have limited

cognitive capacity, and the initially conscious enunciation has been replaced by the

routine, the effective pattern (Bateson, 1972; Asimov, 1994; DeBono, 1990, 1991;

Damasio, 2000). This releases cognitive capacity to allow our minds to engage innew learning tasks or non-routine cognitive tasks.

From the very broad field of learning I have narrowed the focus of this investigation to

that of professional development. In taking this narrower focus, however, I would

note that the material, and the concepts, and the processes, have, in my view, the

potential for a wider application.

9.2.2 The Nature of Learning and its Relationship to Change - My starting

premises

Within this narrower field, there has been a further focusing on the learning that

requires some significant change in patterned thinking and associated routines of action.

If learning is to be effective, it will result in some change for the learner. My

understanding, the premises from which I start, is that there are a range of levels, and a

variety of arenas of learning in which this change can occur.2

One such change may be at a cognitive schema level how a person is thinking about

their problem. The cognitive schema may be changed by the amount of information

available an increase in the quantity of what is known about the problem. This

could be designated as the learning where the emphasis is on content.

Another change to the cognitive schema arises when there is more subtlety, more

complexity in the model in place that allows the person to manage the amount of

information available. This can be designated as theorising activity, or model-building.

A third change in the cognitive schema is that represented by transformation when

there is a significant adjustment in the way the information available is related to the

organising model. This change usually requires a qualitatively different organising

2This material is informed by my background, and my training in education studies, 1966-7, and my informal learning since. At

this stage I no longer have the means of identifying sources. Indeed, it is probably a mixture of theoretical views, and rather

eclectically gathered and constructed. I need to recognise it as my starting point. If there is need and room for change, it will beon this understanding that such change and learning needs to work. I associate 'levels of learning' now most closely with Gregory

Bateson. I associate differing arenas of learning, beyond the standard form of 'disciplines of knowledge', with Howard Gardner. Iappreciate Daniel Goleman's contribution to the identification and highlighting of 'emotional intelligence' as something to be

attended to.


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model, rather than an increase in subtlety or complexity. This change is sometimes

called the AH-HA experience. One such change in the organising model is that

associated with the big picture understanding. Here a metaphor or an analogy may be

informing the understanding, and a change in metaphor or analogy occurs which results

in a more satisfying model one that handles and explains more of the data than theprevious model. When such a change in the organising model is discontinuous it is

often described as creative or innovative.

Another, different kind of big picture understanding relates to the consideration of

values. Here, a revised understanding of the psychological, social, political, and/or

spiritual ideas and ideologies informing interpretation of experience and phenomena,

occurs. In Mezirows analysis of adult learning, he indicates that this qualitative

change involves some re-evaluation and adjustment of the values underlying the learned

action-thinking patterns. One of the stimuli here can be dissonance (or perplexity or

surprise). Other stimuli can arise out of the transactions and negotiations with self

and with others that are involved in the taking up of new and different roles that mayoccur in a transition associated with maturation. (See Mezirow, 1991, pp.192-195).

This kind of change usually goes by the designation conversion or transformation,

since it can be associated with significant behavioural changes that are generally

sustainable.

For the learning of the cognitive representations of models and/or world views, it is

understood that the processes of such learning are both individual constructions and

developed in the context of social interactions. Such social interactions include those

of both the formal schooling context, and the informal learning of living exchanges with

others in a particular cultural context (Kramer, 1995).

There is yet another level of change something other than cognitive. For this level of

change, for learning to become effective in an actionable way, more is involved there

is a learning of new actions. The knower is able to become a doer. For this learning to

be effective it needs to get to the point where those new actions become routine. The

new actions are those that constitute more appropriate responses to the particular

problem situation faced by the learner than were the previous responses. It could be

designated that competence is when there is reliance on this more appropriate routine,

where the new routine is the first recourse in a stressful context. The processes

involved in this kind of learning, learning-to-do, or know-how, are various, and they are

described according to their difference. The first technique employed by a personappears to be that of the mimic, where the child does what it sees its father/ mother/

brother/ sister/ the other doing. Using this technique deliberately, to induce learning, is

called modelling. Using this approach to learning is the mainstay of the route of the

apprentice and of coaching. In the modern era the nature of knowledge has changed to

include much more cognitive material. Consequently, an apprenticeship now includes

the learning of cognitive information and the use of the model of a cause-and-effect

relationship which is built into an understanding of what is going on as you do. The

technique of mimic is now enhanced by cognitive support. In the practice context, the

combination of modelling and cognitive inputs is sometimes called mentoring.

In some instances of action, and its becoming routine, the learner needs to have reachedemotional comfortableness with the suite of actions involved. Some of that emotional

comfortableness will be expressed in congruent kinesthetic features. The body


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language will be consistent with the verbal message. At this stage of learning the

competences get gathered up into what can be loosely called a persons natural

personality, or character their regular, consistent and reliable behavioural responses to

situations.

9.2.3 Where to from here?

As I look at my experiences, and begin unpacking what is at issue in those experiences

in the terms of the two questions posed earlier, the focus of my attention needs to be on:

The impact of values on learning, on the capacity to change.

The impact of actions-reactions and mental models which have been learned

uncritically, non-cognitively, non-verbally, and which are now ingrained as a

routine, as a patterned thinking-response.

The role of emotion and/or affect in some of these action-reaction mental models.

The role of emotion is, in my view, a significant contributor to an action-reaction

mental model. When emotion is a significant contributor, to the working model, to

the theory-in-use, I expect the task of change to be a much more difficult one. I

will be seeking to be more attentive to building understanding of this.

The process for pattern-thinking-doing learning, if unlearning, and settling into a

new (better) pattern is required.

What is required of a facilitator in the learning situation when all four of these

factors are, or may be, in play. This is what I understand to be the situation that

may exist in learning to be more effective in interpersonal interactions, at a number

of levels (one-to-one, small group, or the wider social and/or political context). Iwill be seeking to be more attentive to this aspect of learning.

9.3 Learning to Change Rebuilding My Conceptual Framework

9.3.1 Overview

As I see it, the issues I have been attentive to relate to what is involved in change, and

understanding what is needed to make learning effective. Given that this is my focus, I

have concentrated on the work of five major scholars who provide key informationfor

me about learning that involves change in the significant areas of values and ofestablished patterns. The following table identifies what each of these scholars has

contributed, and the contexts in which their particular understanding of working with

change has been formed.


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Table 9-1 Contribution of Key Scholars

Contributor: Key Information: Context of Learning:

Argyris

Focus on the development of actionable knowledge Learning: to detect and correct error (error =

mismatch of expectations of an action and what

actually happens)

If then propositions and design causality

Model II learning = certain kind of inquiry both

robust and open, dependent on trust, vulnerability

amongst actors to get all the available information on

the table and to be able to test inferences and

challenge assumptions and dependent on autonomy

for all actors in a system

Skilled incompetence: cultural norms of supposed

self-interest in an untrustworthy world operating in

Model I learning (single-loop, instrumental learning)

Application to a system of interacting people with

freedom of action, with multiple and various value

systems based on multiple and various assumptions

The way in which an organisation limits/extends an

individuals capacity to learn and to act accomplish

change

Adults in relationshipsin operating

organisations

Personnel managers and

performance feedback

issues

The interpersonal as a

system

Argyris and

Schn Model I and Model II learning

Theorising on learning in-situ, organizational

learning

As above, and see Schn

entry below

Schn Reflective practice as a key element of professional

practice

Emphasis on the knowing that is in action Use of experience the person working with a rich

base of multifaceted personal knowledge

Multiple evaluations in hierarchical and sequential

order

Reframing changing the hierarchy and/or

sequencing of evaluations

Design the synthesis, application and/or teaching

involved in professional practice

Professionals as they

practice

How they educate othersinto such a practice

Mezirow Distinction between formative and transformative

learning

Perspective transformation

Process of changing assumptions Sources of distortions: epistemic, sociolinguistic,

psychological

Role of critical reflection on premises

Adults learning and

learning in the context

of transition

Learning about thenature of that transition

Bateson Levels of Learning

Learning to learn (learning to change)

Role of Culture in Learning

Language and culture

Communication systems

Nature of flexibility in the living system to

environmental change genetics and culture (role of

learning)

Social anthropology

Symbolic interaction?

schizophrenia

Foundational

contribution to

cybernetics the study

of communication

systems


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Contributor: Key Information: Context of Learning:Heron Another view on the process of experiential learning

Role of affect/emotion as the grounding of action

Suggestions for how this might be mobilised in

facilitating whole person learning Collaborative Inquiry

Professionals and their

practice and the whole

person engaged in that

practice

The Learning to Change Complex: such learning requires inquiry; but what form of inquiry?; what are

the culturally normed forms of inquiry; thinking-acting and/or feeling-imaging

In diagrammatic form, I conceive these strands as converging together, somewhat like

the vortex of a whirlpool contributing to my understanding of the complex and

multifaceted nature of learning to change.

Figure 9-1 The complex that is learning to change

This section explores how their work is informing my understanding.

9.3.2 The Nature of Learning and its Relationship to Change Argyris (and

Schn)s Contribution

Chris Argyris contribution to my understanding of learning in relation to change comes

from his work with building knowledge that can be acted on, and especially in any

situation where there is an effort to bring intentional change. Argyris defines learning

that is focused on intentional, mindful action, as follows: Learning occurs when wedetect and correct error. Error is any mismatch between what we intend an action to

produce and what actually happens when we implement that action. It is a mismatchbetween intentions and results. Learning also occurs when we produce a match

between intentions and results for the first time. (Argyris, 1993, p.3). This definition

of learning is complemented by his definition of actionable knowledge: Knowledge

that is actionable, regardless of its content, contains causal claims. It says, if you actin such and such a way, the following will likely occur. That means that actionableknowledge is produced in the form of if-then propositions that can be stored in and


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retrieved from the actors mind under conditions of everyday life. (Argyris, 1993,

p.2-3).

Argyris work spans many years and includes the practice of consulting, and with

professionals in organisations, and those endeavouring to deal with personnelproblems, both line manager and personnel professional. Over that time he has

developed an understanding of the issues involved in learning and change for adults

operating in an organisational and/or professional setting (Argyris, 1970, 1982, 1985).

That understanding allows him to challenge and develop Lewins concept of

unfreezing-freezing in the learning associated with social change (Argyris, 1993, p.8-

11). His collaboration with Donald Schn from the early 1970s (Argyris, 1974) has

resulted in the theorising of individual and organizational learning in which human

reasoning not just behaviour becomes the basis for diagnosis and action (Argyris,1993, p.xiii).

Argyris found that in the organisational setting there are wicked problems (Argyris,1993, p.96; Argyris, 1996, p.159) which are not readily resolved. Such problems

include problems that are likely to be embarrassing or threatening (Argyris, 1993,p.2), undiscussable, persist despite efforts to solve them (Argyris, 1985, p.87), and/or

have counter-productive second-order consequencesgenerated when intentionalchange is taken to solve them (Argyris, 1993, p.35). Earlier in his career Argyris

focused effort on experiential learning of interpersonal interaction routines of how to

deal with these problems. He found this learning could not be transferred back to the

workplace and so began studying the nature of what was going on in the workplace that

prevented the effective application of that learning to the live situation. This work, and

its associated systematic study, led Argyris, when working later with Donald Schn, to

develop maps of organisational interactions when the participants were not solving

certain kinds of problems (Argyris, 1974, 1996).

From those maps, Argyris and Schn developed an articulation of two different

theoretical models of action (Argyris, 1974, 1996). They call these: Model I and

Model II, and sometimes describe them, when operating in organisational contexts, as

single-loop and double-loop learning. Model I/ single-loop learning is learning from

experience, working with errors to correct them. It is straightforward learning, of

technical dimensions, when there is no need to explore why the system is as it is, that is

say, there is no need to question its foundational values. Model II/ double-loop

learning is the more difficult level of learning, which requires the learners to detecterrors by exploring the foundational values of the activity, the assumptions made in

establishing the system, questioning those foundations, and if necessary making

changes, corrections, at that level.

9.3.2.1 The system strand: the system that is the interpersonal

When the system being examined, and acted on to bring change, is the interpersonal

interactions of the participants in the organisation, the foundational values and

assumptions made are held by people, each one an individual in their own right. These

values and assumptions are subject to variation between individuals. The individualshave learned their in-use models from so-called bitter experience, which includes

variation of responses, especially from other individuals. There has been little or no


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systematic study of the experiences leading to the learning, and so there is no

recognition of the range of complexity involved, or of the variation of context informing

different responses, or of the reasoning associated. Consequently, the patterns formed

to explain these almost random responses rarely include an understanding of the

interrelatedness of action-reaction between individuals with some freedom of choice inresponse, nor of the gradual development of reinforcing cycles of interaction. Further,

there is often a social contract, a tacit agreement, not to explore these variations of

values, or assumptions and inferences made from actions. When this area is closed off

from inquiry, there can be no review of the values and assumptions, and this source of

error is not open to understanding and correction.

9.3.2.2 The actionable strand: when interpersonal learning is not effective

One of the areas of actionable knowledge is the area associated with interpersonal

competence. Here we are dealing with a complex of learned routines and associatedmental models. The learned routines and mental models have been established early in

life. The first stages of such learning occurred before the learner knew, or could

manage, vocabulary and speech. It is learning which has been reinforced and/or

challenged by other formative learning, including early socialisation experiences

beyond the family, in elementary schooling, and in and through wider social group

associations experienced as the individual grew and matured3. The learning has been a

mixture of modelling (eg the cuddle, the reciprocal smiling, the tickling and laughing of

affirmative parenting, etc, or its reverse) and exhortative, moral (or values) instruction

(eg about how to deal with anger, about sharing toys with siblings and a wider group of

friends, about how doctors respond to a particular ethical dilemma).

For the interchanges and interactions that relate to some interpersonal routines, in some

contexts, it is Argyris claim that we have developed skilled incompetence. The

incompetence relates to the incapacity to engage with another person, on an issue with

personal elements, in a way that generates valid information, and provides the

conditions for free and informed choice. Argyris describes these issues as the stuff of

the wicked problems that develop in social, especially organisational, life. The

learned routines that result in skilled incompetence include the socialised behaviour

associated with tact. They are part of the accepted conventions of comfortable

interpersonal discourse. They are the routines that minimise the risk of harm when

there are problems where a person is likely to be threatened in their identity, and as a

consequence, are fearful for themselves in a deep, personal way. They are also the

learned routines where a person may anticipate (infer/ assume) that the threat is likely to

be the case for someone else in the interaction, and then takes a unilateral decision to

act, in the discourse, to protect the other from this danger. The action to protect, in

both cases, usually involves withholding information that is likely to embarrass or

threaten. The information withheld is often evaluative. It sometimes may involve

elements of what is called intuitive judgment, with non-rational components including

emotional thinking. Indeed, part of emotional intelligence (Goleman, 1996) is the

empathy which enables the person (who takes the action to withhold information) to

discern that the information might be embarrassing or threatening to the other. While

the action taken may be intended to express empathy, the action is unexplained, and3

I include the formative learning by modeling without words that occurs when an individual is seeking acceptance and trying to

develop expected competence which is part of reinforcing their self-perception of identity, for example when becoming inducted

into a professional practice.


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without explanation it can generate ambiguity. It is ambiguous since it is the same

action as one that can be a cover for what is called, in psychological terms,

transference. In transference it is the fears of the evaluator, rather than the actor, that

come into play, and the evaluator is unknowingly attributing those fears to the actor.

The result of interactions based on these inferences is not a positive contribution.

9.3.2.3 Learning to change, in a system including the interpersonal

To move beyond this socialised, skilled incompetence, Argyris claims the actor needs to

resolve to make a change, to know that change is going to be difficult, and to know why

it will be difficult. The actor also needs some tools to help them make that change,

including training, and in a live practice situation.

I understand Argyris and Schn to describe the process of change in the following way.

(This is developed from my reading of Argyris, 1970, pps.16-35, 156-174; Argyris,1974, pps.86-91; Argyris, 1982; Argyris, 1985, pps.236-265; Putnam, 1991; Argyris,

1993, pps.63-64; Argyris, 1996, pps.150-176). The actor4 is

Alerted to certain responses in their interpersonal exchanges that amount to skilled

incompetence, and how these responses interfere with effective interpersonal

interaction.

Given a description of two different models of action and their associated in-use

theories:

o Model I: actions that cause difficulties in interpersonal interactions and

express the predominant in-use theory that informs those actions. Model I

theory is a view that one can have effective unilateral control over others, and

that the unilateral actor knows best. It comprises actions which maintain four

underlying values: (1) to achieve purposes as defined by the actor; (2) that

winning is best; (3) that suppressing negative feelings is best; (4) that being

rational is best. The in-use theory, however, is often not the actors espoused

intent.

o Model II: actions that are consistent with the predominantly espoused values of

democratic autonomy. Model II theory is a view recognising the reality of joint

control in activity, including inquiry. It comprises actions which maintain three

underlying values: (1) to strive for valid information of all possible sorts; (2) to

strive for free and informed choice in taking action; (3) internal commitment

between the joint controllers of action to maintain the first two values.However, while most people espouse Model II, they do not act in a way that

indicates that they rely on it as being true. Rather, they regularly act on the

basis that the values of Model I are true in almost all circumstances.

Given a suite of alternative routines to address the skilled incompetence, including

o asking particular kinds of questions, to seek valid information;

o being open to personal risk, by sharing certain kinds of information about the

actors own thinking, especially thinking that involves inferences from anothers

action.

The alternative routines are modelled by the intervenor in their own interactions

with the actor.

4The 'actor' here, is any person seeking to act in an intentional way, to be more effective in their practice, by learning to change.


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The routines involve the intervenor and the actor respecting the emotional aspect

of a persons own and others responses, as it is important to get the emotional

aspect out onto the table as information.

Once any inferences from actions, including any emotional content of a response,

are validated or rejected, actors can reconsider their thinking about choices, andthere is the potential to make different choices, now informed by the validated

information, rather than unvalidated inferences

The actor is then encouraged to follow up their own performance (using some direct

feedback process like audio taped material).

The actor is encouraged to monitor both their own responses and the responses

of the other participants to the exchange. The purpose of monitoring is to call both

the actor and other participants to account on the tasks of providing valid

information, honouring the free and informed choice of all parties to the transaction,

and monitoring the effectiveness of the discourse and the engagement with the

presenting problem.

Argyris reports that given such a process, and diligence in undertaking it, in continuing

to apply it over time, actors do learn to change (Argyris, 1993, pp.245-247). Argyris

stresses that in this kind of behavioural learning the new action does not entirely

replace the older knowledge, as might be implied by the concept of unfreezing-

freezing enunciated by Lewin in 1951 (Argyris, 1993, p.244). The older knowledge of

a self-protective response, and of single-loop learning, where underlying values do not

need to be addressed, is still available as a learned response and a learning process.

Single-loop learning is useful in situations where wicked problems are not involved,

or where linear analytic approaches to solving problems is sufficient. But it is also

tapped in times of high stress, when it is not as useful, and where the stuff of wickedproblems is in play. Single-loop learning can also be tapped to try and solve complex

issues, and when it is found inadequate to the task, that can generate further stress by its

inadequacy in dealing with the complex. In instances of high stress, for the actor who

has learned alternative ways of responding, part of the learning is the ability to

recognise an ineffective response for what it is the older knowledge. When the actor

responds with the older, emotional reaction, and steam, as it were, is let off, the cooler

head can explore the emotion implicit in the response, and the information contained in

the emotion. The actor can then go to the next stage of working through the

interpersonal exchange and its attendant emotion, openly, and with the other party.

They are then in a position to proceed to deal with the presenting problem more

effectively.

When these rules of double-loop learning are in place, actors are able to get all the valid

information that is available and with which they can then address the presenting

problem. Where the presenting problem includes issues involving freedom to act for

more than one party, there can be an open conversation about the impact of choice of

actions to take, the values expressed in any particular choice, and the consequences of

diverse choices being made by individuals in a corporate endeavour (Argyris, 1970,

1982, 1993; Putnam, 1991, 1996). And there can be a commitment to hold to these

principles of seeking full and valid information, acting so that there is freedom of choice

for all parties, to act on the values they see operant for themselves. That commitment

is made with the understanding that the response crafted in such a context, thoughperhaps apparently less effective than another response, is to be preferred. The

understanding is that acting on this preference, by establishing a basis for ongoing


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interactions, will lead to more effective responses in due course. The underlying

assumption of distrust of the other party, which develops from faulty inferential

attribution of motives, is challenged. The parties learn to be able to trust that they will

have access to all the valid information available, they will be free to act according to

their own values, and that covert coercion, available in other processes, is what theychoose to not do round here. The trust then formed leads to a context where there is

more openness about inferential thinking, about expression of values held and

informing actions, and, as a result, more trust is developed. This is one of the

reinforcing cycles in such interactions. Indeed, it is the reinforcing cycle of distrust

that has generated the problem in the first place.

When learning a change process, the learner needs to go beyond the know-what and the

know-how and the capacity to do it once or twice. The process needs to be actively

practised, to the point where it will be the persons response in most cases, and then

sustained even under moderate stress.

For the change that Argyris maintains leads to more effective interpersonal interactions,

it also needs to be the learned and chosen response of others with whom the person is

working. Then, as an interactive system, they will have practice in using it when in the

midst of endeavouring to deal with a wicked problem, most of the time, and especially

when under stress. It needs to be established and reinforced enough, that the actor is

generally able to manage to use it in situations where it is counter-cultural where

others are not yet interacting in this way, that is to say, where there is limited-to-no

social support for this kind of activity.

9.3.2.4 Linking Argyris contribution to my professional development activity design

As can be seen from Chapters 2 and 3, it has been my aim, with my proposed

professional development strategy, to prepare participants for this kind of work in an

endeavour to utilise peer information and skills to create an ongoing context for this

kind of learning.

I have also built on Kressels work (Kressel, 1997), and other understandings developed

out of dispute resolution studies.

The design of the professional development activity recognises Argyris position that

there is a need to put some kind of preparatory work in place to assist people,

(professionals, the participants to the research) who wish to engage in effective activity

to improve their professional practice. Further, the design recognises that such

preparatory work is required to establish a different context to the usual, to be able to

engage in the kind of discourse that (1) produces this calibre of valid information and

(2) encourages the practitioner to take a free, and informed, choice about crafting new

actions and being prepared to try them in-practice, and being prepared to keep on

practising them until they become part of their effective professional practice.

As I understand it, the preparatory work that my design addresses is different to

Argyris usual process. For me, it is preparation at an earlier stage. It is workingwith the participants to develop self- and other-awareness, and on key dimensions that


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may be operative in helping the actor understand and accept more of themselves and

others as they respond in an interaction.

In considering to what extent my design prepares participants to engage in effective

activity to improve their professional practice and move toward enacting a Model IIapproach to presenting problems, my experience would be that the design helps, but

does not compel (but then again, in Argyris and Schns own Model II terms, neither

should it compel!). Within the 40 hour time frame that I had with the two groups, the

materials presented did allow us to reach a point of considering Argyris and Schns

Model I and Model II as appropriate explanatory models for their engagement in less

effective interactions. There were indications for some of the participants that the

explanatory model had a contribution to make towards their practice, but within this

time frame that awareness did not develop to an enacted understanding (Chapter 6,

Chapter 75). Within my self-study, I was involved in becoming increasingly aware of

the level of my own Model I behaviour, and how that impacted on progress with

implementing the professional development activity design, which in turn may wellhave impacted on the participants experience of preparation for using the models in

their own practice (Chapter 6.7, Chapter 7).

Reviewing the detail and context of Argyris work, suggests that his experience is that

learning Model II responsiveness takes time, and indeed much more time than a 40 hour

engagement provides (Argyris, 1993, pp.xii-xiii, pp.244-247, 254). It is my

expectations, coloured by societal views and values, about learning and time, that need

to be reviewed, yet again. I might espouse that this is not a quick fix (Section 3.2.7)

but in-practice, in my evaluatory processes, I was hoping for significant change to beobservable and/or assessable at a self-reporting level, in a relatively short period of

time. As with Argyris professionals, as I, and others, experience the difficulty of this

kind of learning, and the time required to reinforce the use of a different routine,

because of its better outcomes, in due course, we may also recognise how current

societal views and values are working against our own real interests, and then seek to

take action to challenge those societal views. One such action for me, is represented in

this report, which would indicate that some of the expectations built up, in learning

about current evaluatory processes, are unrealistic, simplistic, and need to be

challenged, in the interests of those who come after us.

9.3.3 Formative and Transformative Learning Mezirows Contribution

Mezirows work contributes to my understanding by providing a useful clarification of

the distinction between formative learning and transformative learning (Mezirow,

1991). It also adds to my conceptual framework by addressing some of what is

involved in the challenging of the assumptions of the system that Argyris and Schn

indicate is part of process of Model II action/ second loop learning (Argyris, 1996, p.28-

29).

In Mezirows theorising (model-building) work on adult education, he identifies four

levels of change in learning.

5 Cross references here are to Chapters ofContributing to Learning to Change


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To get to this point, Mezirow firstly identifies four kinds of learning: (1) perception,

prereflective learning (p.15); (2) comprehension learning through language (p.19); (3)

the development of meaning schemes specific beliefs, attitudes and emotional

reactions articulated by an interpretation (p.35, see also p. 44 a meaning scheme is the

particular knowledge, beliefs, value judgments, and feelings that become articulated inan interpretation); and (4) the development of meaning perspectives generalized sets

of habitual expectation (p.34).

Within Mezirows model of meaning perspectives he identifies three different types of

perspective: (1) epistemic perspectives our assumptions about knowledge and

knowing (p.43); (2) sociolinguistic perspectives assumptions developed by the nature

of our language, or native tongue, and the social and cultural norms inculcated as a part

of our socialisation (p.43); and (3) psychological perspectives assumptions developed

from our experience of events in the world and their impact on our sense of safety or

threat to our personal being and persisting (p.43).

Secondly, working with Habermas model of knowledge and human interests and his

theory of communicative action, Mezirow identifies three kinds of intentional learning:

(1) instrumental learning (p.72); (2) communicative learning (p.75); (3) emancipatory

learning (p.87).

Thirdly, Mezirow indicates that reflectivity, the process by which an adult engages in

learning by and from their experience, involves examining assumptions and premises,

of either the instrumental or the communicative domain (p.97).

Fourthly, Mezirow gathers this together to indicate that adultlearning may assume any

of the following four forms: (1) learning through existing meaning schemes; (2)

learning new meaning schemes; (3) learning through the transformation of meaning

schemes, and (4) learning through the transformation of meaning perspectives. (p.98).

These appear to correlate with what I have been trying to describe:

Learning through existing meaning schemes additional content that is

easily integrated into current understandings and enhancing of the schema in

quantity or subtlety

Learning new meaning schemes new knowledge of a different area of

environment and environmental management (for example: learning know-what

and know-how for mediation, as a specialty within dispute resolution; orlearning management as a practice on top of town planning)

Learning through the transformation of meaning schemes the Ah-ha of

a qualitatively different understanding of how know-what and know-how

information fits together

Learning through the transformation of meaning perspectives (for

example being able to move from the empirical-analytic mindset to the post-

modern mindset; or being released from the dominant hegemony to take up a

more radical perspective)

The first two kinds of learning nominated here are what can be called formative

learning. The last two kinds of learning are what Mezirow calls transformativelearning. To me, it is logical that the formative needs to be in place before it can be

transformed, if it needs to be transformed.


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Having identified that there are three different factors contributing to the meaning

perspectives, the epistemic, the sociolinguistic and the psychological, Mezirow points

out that distortions in thinking can also occur in these three areas (Mezirow, 1991,

pp.118-144). For the epistemic, the distortions are usually logical errors, errors ofconstruction of argument. In the sociolinguistic area, the distortions that arise are

associated with the ambiguity relating to words and the realities they seek to map, and

the fluxing capacity of words and their use. Words change in their meaning and use,

with use, by users, sometimes deliberately the play on words; sometimes inadvertently

misuse, from lack of understanding, becoming standard form. (For example: from

this point in time; basically; other eventually meaningless fillers). In the

psychological area the distortions come from a variety of sources. Some of these are

faulty expectations and explanations/interpretation built up by the teaching of

significant others, or coincidental experiences which have no causal relationship (the

stuff of superstition). Sometimes, these are constructions designed to ameliorate

uncomfortable feelings fear, anger, pain with interpretations that are inappropriate:attributing external locus of control when it should be internal, and vice versa. And

any and all of these distortions can be used by another as a point of leverage in the

abuse of power, which leads to another kind of interrelational distortion. To work at

transformative learning involves working at whichever of these areas where distortion

(which builds faulty mental models) is happening.

Mezirow makes the point that it is the last two, the change in meaning schemes, and the

change in meaning perspectives, which constitute the areas where change has greater

potential to flow on into all areas of life, and to have the potential to make a change in

action (Mezirow, 1991, pp.145-195). From Mezirows model making, it is when and

where reflection is capable of focusing on assumptions that the capacity for

transformative change arises. It is Mezirows position, that Development in adulthood

refers to movement toward more developmentally progressive meaning perspectives. Adevelopmentally progressive meaning perspective is more inclusive, discriminating,

integrative, and permeable (open) than less developed ones. The transformationslikely to produce developmentally advanced meaning perspectives usually appear to

occur after the age of thirty.(Mezirow, 1991), pp.192-3.

For both Argyris and Mezirow, part of flexibility is an open epistemology where

knowledge to act is built by an open inquiry process. Mezirow stresses the role of

critical reflection in opening up assumptions to examination.

Looking at the findings of the in-action testing, there are indications of changes in the

two kinds of formative learning, and the first level of the transformative learning with

adjustments to meaning schemes, eg the Ah-has, and the integrative impacts that

participants acknowledged (Chapter 6, Chapter 7). It would be my view that changes

in all these three kinds of learning need to be happening to contribute to the final, more

comprehensive change in meaning perspectives, unless it is stimulated by a significant

life experience that precipitates a level of cognitive dissonance that is only resolved by a

change of meaning perspectives. As a facilitator I am aware of not knowing enough

about the last step, and safe pathways to it, to move any further than I have, in say,

precipitating a cathartic event (Heron), but I need to be aware that what I am doing maygenerate such an outcome and be prepared to work with it, if and when it happens.


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9.3.4 Levels of Learning and the Role of Culture - Batesons Contribution

Both Argyris and Mezirow draw on Bateson for some understanding of the differencesin different kinds of learning. In my work with scholarship, and current scholarship, I

often find it beneficial to go back to sources. As I have gone back to Gregory

Batesons work, especially in Steps to an Ecology of Mind(1972), I have found that he

has much to say to me about the issue of learning to change. The first contribution is

that of clarifying that the term learning hides different kinds of learning, which

Bateson nominates as Levels of Learning. Batesons second contribution, to a more

nuanced understanding of learning to change for me, comes from my re-appreciating the

nature of learning in the context of the development and transmission of culture. This

understanding throws more light on what is involved in being counter-cultural when it

comes to engaging in learning to change.

9.3.4.1 Levels of Learning

For Bateson, the first level of learning that results in change (Learning I) is that

associated with trial-and-error, so-called instrumental learning. It is part of learning

from experience (Bateson, 1964 & 1971, pp.287-292, 293).

There is a second level of learning (Learning II) that develops when it is recognised that

the instrumental response is not always the case. It is also a part of learning from

experience. We now need to take in more information about the environment,

gathering cues to help us decide which of the possible responses is most appropriate.One of the changes we might need to make is in how we punctuate a sequence of

events where a sequence begins and ends (Bateson, 1964 & 1971, pp.293-301).

Bateson notes that it is Learning II that produces character in a person (p.297).

Bateson describes yet a third level of learning (Learning III) where whole sets of

alternate responses, or a range of alternate ways of punctuating experience, ways of

seeing the environment, need to be taken into account and where change is not of a

part but of the whole. The choice of right action is made in the context of these

differences (Bateson, 1964 & 1971, pp.293, 301-306). These broader sets are what

constitute meaning perspectives for Mezirow (Mezirow, 1991, pp.89-91). They include

the assumptions that are accepted as determining the purpose of a system, one of whichis the learning system that conditions prevailing patterns of organizational inquiry,

that Argyris and Schn speak of when talking of organizational double-loop learning

(Argyris, 1996, p.29). This third level of learning also requires learning from

experience, and in particular, the learning from the experience of the first two levels of

learning, that provides the capacity to go beyond the first two levels, as well as

indicating the need to do so.

Bateson, in identifying different levels of learning, and what contributes to the capacity

to be flexible in responding to environment and change, also indicates that the learning

to learn to change involves working against the tendency to routinisation. He cites the

principles of zen learning as an example of this (Bateson, 1964 & 1971, p.301). He

postulates that there are few individuals that reach this level of operation for their living.


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9.3.4.2 The role of culture, including language

Batesons original training and work in anthropology has given him an understanding of

aspects and elements of other cultures, to understand what culture is, and what culture is

about: what is its purpose, and the crucial importance of context.

From my reading of Batesons work in Steps to an Ecology of Mind(1972) and Mindand Nature (1979), I now appreciate that the nature of the difficulty with learning tochange also relates to the inbuilt nature of the natural system of life, governed by

genetics, learning and evolution. There is a natural tendency towards conservatism. If

there were not this conservatism, then the homoeostasis required for survival, into the

indeterminate long term, in a closed system, would be jeopardised. Too much change,

(capacity to change) too quickly would be too risky/unstable/ inherently dangerous a

system. One consequence, logically, of too much change is that it would tend to make

instrumental learning, the first step of learning to adapt to environmental constraints,

impossible: there would be no consistency of response from which we could postulatecause-and-effect. There is also, in Batesons terms, an ecology of mind, where,

through all living things, and the closed system of life-on-earth, there is a capacity to

live with diversity, because of diversity. There is a capacity to live with change

because of the capacity to change. There is also a capacity to live with change that

results from the capacity to change/learn (and change that is accelerating because of this

capacity to learn) by tapping into the greater flexibility underlying this process

(Bateson, 1972, 1979).

It may be that I like this explanation because it suits my radical conservative approach

go to the roots and come out finding that I support the fundamental structure which

tends to be the conservative view. It may also be that this appreciation is related to my

resilient frame: Batesons work includes enough from the discipline of science to be

talking within that understanding of the world to bring me along with him in the

argument. I have done some study of anthropology, so I am able to follow his

argument, in his chosen territory. And it is now, when I am seeking to learn to be more

effective in my world, by engaging in a more intense study of my and other human

actions and interactions, that this kind of explanation has power for me.

In his metalogues (Bateson, 1972, pp.1-58), which are words about words and the

thinking that is capable/ mediated through the use of words, it appears to me that

Bateson demonstrates some of the principles which currently inform socialconstructivism. This enhances my appreciation of Mezirows concept of the

sociolinguistic aspect of a meaning perspective.

9.3.4.3 A Reflection on My Experience of the Implications of Levels of Learning and

Culture

I need to note, that in reading Bateson, and the other material I have been reading, I

have found this concept of different levels clarifying, but also a bit elusive. It is as if

the material I am trying to work with is at a certain level, and that my activity of reading

to understand, etc, fluctuates between that level and the alternative levels: sometimeslower, sometimes higher. I get confused. I wonder too: if I am confused, perhaps

others are likewise confused. In some cases they may not even know they are not


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clearly distinguishing things that are different because they are using the same term

learning to cover different levels of learning. If that is the case, then the confusion

simply escalates and compounds, and scholarship that does not go to the level of

making these distinctions is flawed. And my endeavours to traverse the territory are

becoming unstuck on such hazards.

In Argyris terms, I need to learn to detect this error. In Mezirows terms, I am coming

into contact with epistemic and sociolinguistic distortions within the culture of current

academic writing. For myself, I am beginning to call this kind of flip-flop in-and-out

of an elusive insight of subtlety, to wit the inability to see the obvious that is part of my/

anyones tacit practice, the meta- process, the meta- aspect. It is of interest it is an

associative connection that the one of the more significant findings that developed for

me from the in-action testing of the professional development activity, and my role as

facilitator, has the flavour of the meta- level of discernment, see Chapter 8.

9.3.5 Reflective Practice Schns Contribution

Schns contribution to my understanding of learning to change derives from his

analysis of the nature of professional practice; the operation of reflective inquiry as the

key tool for working in situations which are uncertain for the practitioner; and the

implications that develop for educating the reflective practitioner (Schn, 1983, 1987,

1991, 1995).

In his analysis of the nature of the practice of a competent-to-expert practitioner, in a

range of professional disciplines, Schn mounts a cogent argument for the recognition

that the artistry of a practitioner develops from the use of reflection-in-action, as distinct

from, and in addition to, the use of the tools of technical rationality. Without an

understanding of the processes of reflection-in-action, any education for practice that

leaves out working with the experiences of practice, and fails to provide opportunities

for the novice and/or practitioner to engage with others in discussion about their

processes of problem solving, is likely to give the developing professional a false sense

of competency, and then a rude awakening when their expectations are not matched by

the consequences of the actions they develop from a strict application of technical

rationality.

For Schn, the structure of reflection-in-action is a particular stance toward inquiry(Schn, 1983, p.163), where the practitioner treats a situation as being unique and

uncertain, and where, acting as an agent/experient, the practitioner needs to make their

own sense of the situation. For Schn, reflection-in-action has the following

characteristics (Schn, 1983, pp.130-163):

There are evaluating experiments in problem setting which may involve a series

of reframings

The past experience of the practitioner is brought to bear on the unique situation

and often requires that the practitioner be inventive in developing new frames,

theories and strategies of action

The possible solution is trialled through either a thought experiment of the what

if kind, or a tentative action, designed to produce an intended change amove-testing experiment


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The process is repeated until the practitioner has a sense of satisfaction that the

problem is framed in a way that, thus far, it is understood. When an action,

designed in the light of that understanding, is taken, and the outcome surprises,

the practitioner is opened to another round of appreciation, action and

reappreciation. The questions, What is this? and How have I been thinkingabout it?, which are raised by the surprise, perform a critical function,

questioning the assumptional structure of the practitioners knowing-in-action

(Schn, 1987, p.27-28).

Such an inquiry process, with its openness to new information, its preparedness to

question how the practitioner has been thinking about the problem that is implicit in the

actions that the practitioner takes, links the relationship between acting and thinking and

operates within an epistemology that recognises that many aspects of in-practice

decision-making happen in a zone of indeterminancy (Schn, 1995), where reflective

judgment is called for (King, 1994) and where a willingness to be open to change, to

require innovation, inventiveness and creativity, is part of the necessary flexibility tooperate effectively in such situations.

This knowing-in-action that Schn identifies as so significant to practice is so tacit that

it is hard to recognise. I have called it doing what comes naturally (Allen, 1998).

That is how it appears to me. I have to confess that it has taken me over four years to

discern that what I am doing, in handling the How do I improve my practice question,

is engaging in the kind of multiple evaluations that Schn describes as the nature of

designing (Schn, 1983, pp.76-104; Schn, 1987, pp.44-80). As I report in Chapter 7,

part of this slowness seems to relate to just how natural/ embedded/ tacit such a practice

is for me.

Further, when I approach documented texts my attentiveness to the empirical, and my

predominant interest in the material presented in text, is in order to stimulate the tension

between my experience and the experience of others that generates creativeness in

design ideas. For me, Schns work complements the understanding I am developing

from my reading of Argyris, Mezirow and Bateson, together with my experience, of

what is the essence of creativity. Creativity comes from questioning the thinking-

action linkage at its assumptive roots. The questioning allows for another frame to be

considered. Within this new frame, by appreciation rather than logic, I use the

knowledge derived from experience and knowing of self what a person oneself

could do that is different, that might deal with the presenting problem. (The dolphincoming up with another action that is different from all previous actions that got the

feed reward, to get feed reward this time, because that is what is required this time,

Bateson, 1966).

The areas of practice where this kind of creativity is called for are those that Schn

nominates as indeterminate, uncertain, unique or conflictual (Schn, 1995), what

Baskett, Marsick and Cervero refer to as non-routine (Baskett, 1992c), and King and

Kitchener describe as the ill-structured (King, 1994). By definition the indeterminate

problem is one where there are a number of possible solutions, meeting different criteria

in different ways; and that in the end the decision/judgement about best solution is

one of aesthetics what Schn refers to as artistry (Schn, 1987, p.25-35). Anaspect of artistry for the individual is what they can do, as well as how well they do it.

This brings me back to the person, the practitioner, and perhaps personal style/integrity


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nexus and Herons presence and presentational (Heron, 1999, pp.215-248, 335-

343), to Jack Whiteheads embodied values (Whitehead, 2003) and to Eisners

artistry (Eisner, 1990, p.96).

9.3.6 Herons Contribution

If, as I understand it, Argyris has argued that learning to change requires a learning that

involves/requires inquiry, and the kind of inquiry that needs to reach down to the level

of assumptions and values, then we are potentially working with what Mezirow calls

transformative learning. Further, as I understand it, Schn has argued that the kind of

inquiry that reaches down into the assumptions and values of the professional

practitioner includes reflection-on-action which (1) asks questions of a practitioner

about what they are doing and how they are thinking about what it is that they are doing

and (2) may indicate a requirement for new thinking, new ways of framing what they

were understanding the problem to be. In addition, if, as I understand it, Bateson hasindicated that change at that point, in the first instance, needs to be discontinuous and/or

creative; and that discontinuity is essentially risky, running against all the other

indicators of the conservative: culture, and prior experience informed by the simpler

arguments of instrumental learning and reasoning; then a great deal of energy is

required to overcome the emotional barriers involved. Such energy can come from the

comfortableness of the understanding that develops in the solution itself the satisfying

feeling coming from new meaning. That is to say it becomes grounded in feeling. It

is at this point that Herons contribution comes into play for me. Heron presents an

alternate view6 of experiential learning, and with this alternate view, has suggestions of

how such an understanding might be mobilised in facilitating learning.

Herons model of experiential learning, enunciated in (Heron, 1999) and drawing on his

theorising on personhood (Heron, 1992) and aspects of human inquiry (Heron, 1981,

1988, 1996 (a), (c)) is hierarchical rather than circular, though in action, Heron

recognises the cycling through the hierarchy. For Heron, the base of action, for the

whole person, is affect: feeling, emotion. The next level in the hierarchy is imaginal:

intuition, imagery. Then comes the conceptual: reflection, discrimination. The apex

of the hierarchy is practical: intention, action. Heron argues that the expression of

these hierarchical levels of psychological modes occurs in two polar forms: the

participatory, engaging with other; and the individuating, forming an identity of self as

distinct from other. These aspects and relationships can be presented in the followingmatrix form (Heron, 1999, pp.46-47):

Table 9-2 Herons Model of Psychological Modes for the Whole Person

Psychological modes: Participatory Form:

(unitive interaction with a

whole field of being)

Individuating Form:

(experience of individual

distinctness)

Practical (Apex) Intention Action

Conceptual Reflection Discrimination

Imaginal Intuition ImageryAffect (Ground) Feeling Emotion

6Alternate to the uni-dimensional cycle usually associated with Kolb and others building on his concepts


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In his model he claims that what is higher is also tacit and latent in the lower, and the

lowest level is the formative potential of higher levels which emerge out of the lower

levels. There are many different possible forms of emergence. He calls the higher

levels a reduced precipitate of the lower and indicates that higher levels are a focusedconsummation of the lower. Further, he claims that each level has relative autonomy

within the whole system, but indicates that what is lower grounds, supports and

nourishes what is higher (Heron, 1999, pp.46-47). It is this relative autonomy that

allows us to focus on, and work with some success, at each of the levels separately. It

is this success at a separate level that can blind us to the need to work at other/all levels

to accomplish whole person learning.

Heron then speaks of facilitating learning, expediting learning, by using these four

levels in a certain sequence. He suggests that a facilitator is one who prepares the

learner for the open-self primary-cycle experience by using the conceptual mode of

propositions, discriminating the basic structure, to redirect the imaginal from its habitualset. The open-self primary-cycle of experiential learning is through the four steps of:

Person (of personal orientation and positive emotional arousal) moving to

Patterns (a variety of perceptual experiences imaginatively developed) then on

to

Propositions (with discrimination of the basic structure) and finally on to

Practice (where there is active application and feedback) which cycles back into

the personal, with more positive emotional arousal that arises from success in

action and understanding.

The secondary cycle, with intentional change of sequence, using the conceptual beforethe imaginal, is where the facilitator is seeking to re-vision the imaginal through prior

conceptual structures (Heron, 1999, p.277). It is in this way that the habitual can be

changed. Heron compares this process with the usual, closed-self, learning process,

which is, by comparison, suppressed and narrow, only using limited emotion which then

limits the level to which imagery, discrimination and action occur (Heron, 1999, pp.49-

50).

From my understanding of these concepts, it seems to me that Herons work offers

something more than Mezirow, Argyris or Schn. His model, in recognising affect for

the grounding and mobilising force it is in learning, suggests the potential for a different

approach. His theorising on this model, and his exploration of other issues infacilitation related to autonomy and holism, provide further specific guidelines for the

practising facilitator. In these two ways he has something more positive, as well as

fuller, to say about learning in areas where the person, as a whole, is important. And

though I am still struggling with understanding Herons different point of view in all its

fullness, I recognise that it is where I struggle most that I am likely to learn most. What

is even more pertinent to my understanding of what is involved in learning to change is

that in his extensive treatise on facilitating learning and whole person work Heron

encourages a definite move towards this kind of learning occurring in the context of

collaborative inquiry. It is in these two areas: of finding an effective way to mobilise

the whole capacity of the learner, and doing so in the company of peers, that my

ongoing learning task, for making the most of my professional development activitydesign, resides.


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9.4 Facilitating Learning to Change for an Adult

The conceptual framework of learning to change that I have built from the literature of

Argyris, Mezirow, Bateson, Schn and Heron, as key contributors to my understanding,

indicates that the particular form of learning to change that I am focusing on is complexand difficult. A broader literature base indicates that any processes that are designed to

contribute to learning to change, for an adult, need to attend to elements of what is

known already about adult learning, learning from and by experience, transformative

learning, and action learning. In addition, if the processes are being applied in a

professional practice context, using a peer support group as the vehicle for change, then

attention needs to be given to what is already known about effective professional

development processes in such a context.

The question posed in this section then is: what does the literature contribute to an

understanding of what is likely to be involved in a professional development activity

that seeks to deal with:

learning to change

when such change cuts across values

when such change requires dealing with a routine/patterned response

which has proven to be inadequate in some instances

The following is a brief survey of the literature as I understand it and seek to let it

inform my practice. I would note, from my engagement with the bodies of literature

dealing with these issues, that there appears to be a fair bit of common ground.

However, that common ground does not appear to be recognised because it seems that

there is not much in the way of discourse between the different patches of territory.

The test of whether this literature is informing my practice can be undertaken by

checking the enunciated design of intended professional development activity (Chapter

3) and the move-testing implementation of the design with the two groups of

professionals where I have applied the professional development activity (Chapters 5-

8).

9.4.1 Adult Learning

From the literature of adult learning, it is clear that for effective adult learning thefollowing elements need to be taken into account:

recognition of adult status for the nature of the relationship between adult learner

and facilitator and between adults learning (Burns, 1995);

recognition of past experience, in all its various forms as the resource it is (Burns,

1995; Scott, 1998);

the need to focus on issues that are relevant (Abadzi, 1990; Power, 1992) and timely

(McIntyre, 1995; Toulmin, 1996c) for the learner.

9.4.2 Learning From Experience

From the literature on learning from experience, key aspects of effective learning from

experience are associated with:


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the role, importance and the nature of the forms of reflection that are considered

vital to the quality of the learning that can be derived from experience (Boud, 1985,

1993, 1996)

what barriers limit learning from experience (Boud, 1985, 1993, 1996)

the need to focus reflective work on thinking, actions and affect (Boud, 1985b,1985c)

the importance of the dimension of affect as the ground of action (Heron, 1985,

1992, 1996, 1999)

for reflective work on thinking, there is a need to focus on meaning schemes and

meaning perspectives, and particularly the assumptions embedded there, in order to

reach a level where transformative change can occur (Mezirow, 1981, 1990, 1991).

9.4.3 Action Learning

In the literature on action learning effective learning about taking action occurs when

there is emphasis on:

an endeavour to use the experience of others, (see also adult learning literature for

the recognition of and focus on own experience)

o the principle behind the action learning set (Pedler, 1991; Moving on, 1995;

Mumford, 1997; Pedler, 1997)

o the source of additional valid information concerning what might be involved in

understanding such experience (Argyris, 1982, 1985, 1993)

an inquiry frame (Argyris, 1982, 1985, 1993; Pedler, 1991; Moving on, 1995;

Mumford, 1997; Pedler, 1997; Heron, 2001; Reason, 2001; Rudolph, 2001)

a social context of peer accountability which focuses the effort of the participants onexploring a problem, designing an action to take, and when that is done, reporting

back on its effectiveness

o particularly the accountability mobilised in an action learning set (Pedler, 1991;

Moving on, 1995; Mumford, 1997; Pedler, 1997)

o the sharing of the experiences of others in any convergence/divergence testing of

tentative hypotheses about understanding that experience that arises in any

collaborative inquiry (Heron, 2001; Reason, 2001; Rudolph, 2001)

o using ones own experience as a source of valid information to be tested in the

pool of the experiences of others, in an authentic, collaborative inquiry process

(Torbert, 1999, 2001)

9.4.4 Professional Development

From the literature of professional development, improvements in effective professional

development education arise when the focus is on:

the use of information derived from work that involves self-assessment (Klevans,

1992). Such an approach allows the adult professional to identify what learning

they need. Such identification is a first step by the adult professional in committing

to effort in learning in that area (perhaps, in part, because it is dealing with their

current (timely) learning needs (relevance).

the significant learning possible in the social context of work, and with and from

peers (Ellerington, 1992; Lovin, 1992). Indeed, Wenger has mounted an argument

that relies on understanding learning as something that develops naturally within a


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persons various social contexts, and the learning that constitutes proficiency and

expertise in a professional practice is especially dependent on such a community of

practice (Wenger, 1998).

practice problems, recognising that practice knowledge is, and needs to be, different

from generalised knowledge, and that learning to learn how to develop this kind ofknowledge is a significant and ongoing task in the development of a professional

(Boreham, 1992; Farmer, 1992; Jennett, 1992).

the learning and expertise of the professional practice that is beyond the technical

rationality developed in formal preparatory professional education is developed,

primarily, by reflective practice (Schn, 1983, 1987, 1991, 1995).

9.4.5 Peer Learning

In each of these specialty areas of the study of learning, the particular and potentially

helpful role of the peer is recognised. Further, the mobilisation of resources from, andwith, peers is encouraged. However, there are also indications, from this literature, and

the literature of group dynamics and organisational learning, that there are contexts,

formed by group dynamics, and/or socialisation, which operate to work against quality

learning in a peer group. Argyris and Schn (Argyris, 1996), building on Argyris

concept of skilled incompetence, elaborates what is involved here.

As noted earlier, it is my understanding of this material, combined with my

understanding of the field of dispute resolution, that suggests that some preparation of

the participants, to help alert them to what is at issue, and how they will need to deal

with it when it arises, may be required.

9.4.6 Another View - Learning to Solve Problems

Another way of viewing the material in the literature noted above, is to see that for the

learning to change that

learning and learning to change

Documents