CLICOWorkingPapers

Integratedtheoryofhydro­climaticsecurity

Leadauthors:MarisaC.GouldenandSamGrainger

Affiliations: Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research and School of InternationalDevelopment,UniversityofEastAnglia(UEA)Contributing authors: Amaia Albizua (ICTA, UAB), Adriana Bruggeman (CyI), Tobias Böhmelt (ETHZ),GiacomoD’Alisa(ICTA,UAB),NiklasGebert(UNU‐EHS),ChristianeGerstetter(Ecologic),ClemensHoffman(UoS),GiorgosKallis(ICTA,UAB),JuliaKloos(UNU‐EHS),KatrionaMcGlade(Ecologic),AnitaMilman(UEA/UMass),EduardPla(CREAF),FabriceRenaud(UNU‐EHS),ThereseRosenfeld(UNU‐EHS), JanSelby(UoS),JulieSnorek(UNU‐EHS),andChristosZografos(ICTA,UAB).

Contactperson:MarisaGoulden,m.goulden@uea.ac.uk

Date:October2012

Referto:Goulden,M.C.,Grainger,S.,2012Integratedtheoryofhydro‐climaticsecurity.CLICOWorkingPaperNo.13

CreativeCommonsLicense3.0AttributionNon‐Commercialhttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by‐nc/3.0/

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AbstractThispaperpresentstheupdatedconceptualframingoftheCLICOresearchproject,andevaluatesthecontributionoftheCLICOresearchfindingstotheoryonhydro‐climaticsecurity.Wedrawoutthe theoretical findings fromtwentyoutputsof the fiveCLICOresearchworkpackages includingtwelve case studies in the Mediterranean, the Middle East and the Sahel region, where climaterelatedwater stresses threaten insecurity.We relate these findings to seven research questions.We then provide an updated conceptual framework of hydro‐climatic security based on thefindingsandasummaryofthekeytheoreticalfindingsoftheCLICOresearch.Wefindthatclimatechangeandwaterrelatedstressorsmayexacerbatehumaninsecurityeitherdirectly by adding to existing sources of human insecurity, or throughmaladaptive policies andinterventionsdesignedbygovernmentsinthenameofadaptationtoclimatechange.Factorsthatinfluence conflict situations and human security are multi‐scalar and in most cases, moredependentonpolitical,socialandeconomicconditionsratherthanenvironmentalfactors.Conflictthat is severe and prolonged is a significant driver of vulnerability to hydro‐climate stressors.Cooperation, and more specifically coordination and communication between groups andinstitutions is seen as an important contributor to adaptive capacity. Without this divergentadaptation can occur,where one individual or group’s adaptation can reduce another’s adaptivecapacity. Some debate exists as to the desirability of state intervention in adaptation and whatconstitutesadaptivecapacity.Adaptationplanningcanbeconflictiveandpresent risks tohumansecuritywhenitfailstotakeintoaccountdifferentperspectives,valuesandknowledgebasesandisopentomanipulationbystateactors.Casestudyevidencealsosupportsargumentsinfavourofabalance between incrementalism and transformation, since transformational adaptation risksexacerbatingsometypesofhumaninsecurities.

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Contents1. INTRODUCTION................................................................................................................................................................. 12. THE CLICO CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK................................................................................................................. 23. FINDINGS ............................................................................................................................................................................. 84. REVISED THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK.................................................................................................................. 225. SUMMARY OF KEY THEORETICAL FINDINGS ...................................................................................................... 24

Acknowledgements .............................................................................................................................................................. 28

ListoffiguresFIGURE 1: MAP OF THE CLICO CASE STUDY LOCATIONS (SOURCE: BRUGGEMAN ET AL. 2012) ................. 1

FIGURE 2: MULTIPLE SCALE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE ECONOMIC, POLITICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONTEXT, CLIMATE AND WATER-RELATED STRESSORS, CONFLICT AND COOPERATION AND HUMAN SECURITY........................................................................................................................... 2

FIGURE 3: REVISED CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF HYDRO-SECURITY.......................................................... 23

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1. IntroductionTheCLICOprojectexaminestherelationshipbetweenclimatechangeandhydro‐climaticstressors,conflict and human security. The project consists of five research based work packages. Workpackage1 is the theoretical framingof theproject, ofwhich this report is part.Workpackage2consistsof twelvecasestudiesofhydro‐climatichot spots in theMediterranean, theMiddleEastandtheSahelregion(seeFigure1foramapshowingthecasestudylocations).Workpackage3isalarge‐N study of conflict and cooperation in domestic water related events. Work package 4examinespoliciesand institutional frameworksrelevant forresponses tohydro‐climaticstresses.Work package 5 examines adaptive capacity and conflict resolution mechanisms at theinternationalscalefortransboundaryriverbasins.The CLICO project was underpinned by a conceptual framework developed by the consortiumpartnersinthefirstsixmonthsoftheproject.Theaimoftheframeworkwastoprovideaguidefortheresearchinthedifferentworkpackagesoftheprojectandtostimulatesuggestionsofresearchhypothesesorquestionsthatcouldbeaddressed.Asaprimaryoutputoftheproject,CLICOaimedto develop and sharpen the concepts and relationships of terms used in this framework andcontribute to the theoretical development of understandings of hydro‐climatic security (howclimateandwaterrelatedhazardsinfluencehumansecurity).This reportpresents the conceptual framingof theCLICO researchprojectdevelopedduring thefirstsixmonthsoftheprojectandtheseveninitialresearchquestionsthatguidedtheresearchinthefourempiricalworkpackagesoftheproject.Thereportthenevaluatesthecontributionoftheresearchfindingstotheoryonhydro‐climaticsecurity–anexplorationoftherelationshipbetweenwater‐relatedclimaterisksandhumansecurity.Thereportdrawsonthesefindingstoproposearevisedversionoftheconceptualframeworkandasetofkeytheoreticalfindings.

Figure 1: Map of the CLICO case study locations (Source: Bruggeman et al. 2012)

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2. TheCLICOconceptualframework

Figure 2: Multiple scale relations between the economic, political and environmental context, climate and water-related stressors, conflict and cooperation and human security.

The framework shown in Figure 1 focuses on the human security of elements within a social‐ecological system and conflict and cooperation interactionswithin that system as the objects ofstudy.Asocial‐ecologicalsystemisoneinwhichthelinkagesbetweensocietyandtheenvironmentare considered (Gunderson and Holling, 2002, p122). In this conceptual framework we areinterested in the social, political, environmental/ecological, and economic aspects of the systemunder study. The boundaries of the system under consideration must be defined and linkagesbetween different scales are often important to recognise. Human security can be described asprotectionofindividualsorcommunitiesfromthreatsanddisruptionaswellasprotectionoftheirrightsandbasicneeds(HumanSecurityNetwork,2010;Kaldor,2007;UNDP,1994)andiscloselyrelated to concepts such as humanwell‐being. Conflict and cooperation are terms often used toqualify interactions occurring at different intensities and geographic scales within or betweenindividuals, communities and states, varyingover time and frequently coexisting (Goulden et al.,2009;Keohane,2005;Yoffeetal.,2003;Zeitoun,2007;ZeitounandMirumachi,2008).Conflicthasalsobeendistinguishedbywhetheritislatent(notexpressed),overt(ormanifest,butnon‐violent)andviolent(Lund,2009).“Cooperationshouldnotbeviewedastheabsenceofconflictbutratheras a reaction to conflict or potential conflict” (Keohane, 2005, p54). Keohane (2005) describes

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cooperation as occurring “when actors adjust their behaviour to the actual or anticipatedpreferencesofothers”(p51).ThemultiplespatialscalesshowninFigure1recognisetheimportanceoftheglobalorregional1,nationalandsub‐nationalscaleeconomic,politicalandenvironmentalcontexts.ThesocialsystemdepictedinFigure1canbeexaminedatanyofthesespatialandtemporalscalesandmayindeedcrossscales,dependingon thesystembeingstudied.Wealsorecogniseaneed to incorporateanunderstandingofdifferenttemporalscaleswithintheframework,althoughitwasnotpracticaltoreflectthisonthediagram.CLICO research investigated the causal links between environmental factors (climate andwaterrelated stressors, being our focus) conflict and cooperation and human security as well as thecausallinksbetweenpoliticalandeconomicfactors,humansecurityandconflictandcooperation,asindicatedbythetwolargearrowsinFigure1.The lower of the two large arrows depicts potential causal links from themulti‐scale economicpolitical and environmental context to the social‐ecological system under study. Political andeconomiccontextsinfluencesocio‐ecologicalsystemsinavarietyofwaysandatarangeofscales,including for instance the systems’ integration into the international trade in food staples and‘virtualwater’(Allan,2001),internationalpoliticalrelationswithregionalstatesandinternationaldonors, the domestic policies and capacities of state institutions, and internal unevenness inpatterns of economic development. Analysis of these factors could involve consideration ofinstitutions,socialrelations,power,interestsandknowledge.Institutionsandsocialrelationsalsogovernaccesstonaturalresourcesandinfluencethewiderenvironmentalcontext.Theupperlargearrowdepictsahypothesizedrelationshipbetweenstressorsorhazardsrelatedtothe climate and water system, at a range of scales and the object of study, in terms of humansecurity and cooperation and conflict interactions within the social‐ecological system.We focusprimarily on water related stressors associated with climate change and climate variability, forexample droughts, water scarcity, extreme rainfall and sea level rise leading to flooding andsalinisationoffreshwater,howeverotherclimatechangestressorssuchasextremeandincreasingtemperaturesarealsorelevant,forsomeofthecasestudies.Thetermclimatevariabilityisusedtodescribeshortertermvariationsinclimate,forexampleofdecadesorless,whereasclimatechangereferstolongertermvariationsinclimateofseveraldecadesorlongerandincludesprojectionsofchangeinclimateforthefuture(Watson,2001).Exposureofthesocial‐ecologicalsystemtoclimateandwaterrelatedstressorsleadstoriskstothevulnerable elements of the socio‐ecological system. We draw from the disaster risk reductionliteratureinrecognizingthatrisksaretheproductoftheinteractionoftheclimatechangerelatedstressorsorhazards and thevulnerabilityof the system,which is linked to its adaptive capacity(Birkmann, 2006; Wisner et al., 2004). We also recognize that there may be opportunities

1Weuse‘regional’torefertoregionswithincontinents,e.g.easternAfrica,southernEurope.

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associatedwithclimatechange,andforthisreasonweusethetermstressorratherthanhazardonthediagram.Vulnerability has different dimensions (e.g. physical, social, environmental, economic, andinstitutional)andcausalfactorsincludingexposure,sensitivityandadaptivecapacity(Adger,2006;Birkmann, 2006; Füssel, 2007). The exposure of the social‐ecological system to stressors is theextenttowhichthesystemexperiencesthestressorhazardandisinfluencedby,forexample,thelocation of the system and the magnitude, frequency, duration and geographical extent of thestressor. The system’s sensitivity is “the degree to which a system is modified or affected” bystressors(Adger,2006).Adaptivecapacitycanberelatedtothecopingrangeorthresholdswithinwhich an individual, group or system is able to deal with or recover from stresses (Smit andWandel,2006)andiscontextandscalespecific(Vincent,2007).Inadditiontoexaminingadaptivecapacity we are also interested in understanding the actual goals, processes and outcomes ofadaptation,definedbyBrooks(2003)as ‘adjustmentsinasystem’sbehaviourandcharacteristicsthatenhanceitsabilitytocopewithexternalstress’.Wearealsointerestedinidentifyinginstancesand causes of ‘maladaptation’ (Barnett and O'Neill, 2010), i.e. adaptation that increases thevulnerabilityofsomegroups,sectorsorsystems.The nature of the hypothesized relationships between human security and conflict andcooperation,vulnerabilityandadaptivecapacityhavebeenexaminedintheCLICOcasestudiesandworkpackagesasindicatedbythedashedarrowsinFigure1.Thehumansecurityofthesystemorsocial group under considerationwas themain object of study in the CLICO research, althoughsome case studies and work packages focused more on some elements of the framework thanothers.Althoughhumansecuritycanbethoughtofasoperatingprimarilyatthesub‐nationallevel,therearecross‐scaleelements,e.g. safety‐netsprovidedbygovernments, internationalsolidarity.We suggest in the framework that human security may be influenced by the vulnerability andadaptivecapacityofthesystemwhichmayactasfiltersoramplifiersofriskassociatedwithclimateandwater relatedstressorsandotherpolitical‐economicandenvironmental factors.Conflictandcooperation interactionswerehypothesizedaspotentialamplifiersofhumansecurity inadditiontobeinganobjectofstudy.The CLICO project adopts a political ecology approach for some of the case studies and in thistheoreticalanalysis.KallisandZografos(2012)portraypoliticalecologyasadisciplinethatfocusesattentionon‘winners’and‘losers’andthedistributionofcostsandbenefitsofsocio‐environmentalchange,andwhichstudiespoweroveraccessanduseofresources(WattsandPeet,1996).Politicalecologistsconsidertheexpansivemetabolismofsocietiesandtheunevenprocessesofaglobalisingeconomy, side‐by‐side with uneven power distributions as the fundamental causes of unequalvulnerabilitydistribution.A set of seven research questions, listed in Box 1, were proposed alongside the conceptualframework to guide the research of the work packages, exploring different elements of theframework. The findings from CLICO research that relate to these questions are presented insection 3. In section 4we present a revised theoretical framework of hydro‐climatic security inresponsetothefindingsandinsection5weprovideasummaryofthekeytheoreticalfindingsoftheCLICOproject.

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Box1:Sevenproposedresearchquestions

1. How is human security affected by risks associated with water and climate‐relatedstressors,societalvulnerabilityandsocial‐politicalfactors?Thiscanbeexpandedintotwosub‐questions:What is therelative importanceofenvironmentalriskscomparedtosocialandpoliticalfactors?Andwhatarethemechanismsbywhichtheserisksandvulnerabilitiesamplifyeachotheratdifferentscales?

2. Howdopolitical,economic,environmentalandclimaticfactorsexacerbateormitigate

water‐relatedconflict?

3. Howdoeshumansecurity(orlackofit)affectthedemandforcooperation?

4. Underwhatconditionsmayconflictreduceratherthanexacerbatevulnerabilities?

5. Whatconstitutesthecapacityofstatesandtheirinstitutionsandotherorganizationstoimplementchange,orevenradicalchangenecessaryundertimesofstress?

6. Whatinterventionsmightbesuitableforreducingrisksandimprovinghumansecurity

associated with climate and water related stressors, either by reducing thevulnerability of the system and increasing its adaptive capacity or bymodifying thehazards?

7. Under what conditions might policies of adaptation to perceived or experienced

climate change impacts increase thevulnerabilityof somegroupsand/orexacerbatesocialconflict?

Tables 1 and 2 show a list of the research outputs from the different work packages with anindication of which areas of the framework they addressed (Table 1) and which of the sevenresearchquestionstheirresearchisrelevantto(Table2).Thenextsectionreviewsthefindingsofthesepapers,inparticulardrawingouttheirtheoreticalimplications,andisorganisedbythesevenresearchquestionsidentifiedabove.

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Table 1. Mapping CLICO papers onto Conceptual Framework

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Table 2. Mapping CLICO papers onto the conceptual framework suggested questions

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3. FindingsInthissectionwereviewtheoutputsfromtheCLICOresearchfromworkpackage2(twelvecasestudiesofhotspotsofhydro‐climaticstressandhumaninsecurity)andfromworkpackage3(largeN statistical study of domestic water events), work package 4 (analysis of national andinternationalpolicies)andworkpackage5(analysisoftransboundaryriverbasinagreementsandadaptivecapacity). Wedrawout the theoretical implicationsof thesestudiesbyaddressing theresearchquestionsposedintheprevioussection.

1. How is human security affected by risks associated with water and climate­relatedstressors,societalvulnerabilityandsocial­politicalfactors?

The outputs of the CLICO research support the premise that human security is multi‐faceted(UNDP,1994)andinfluencedbyarangeofsocial‐political,economicandenvironmentalfactors.Toanswertheabovequestionwefirst lookatthedifferent factorsthatare identified insomeoftheCLICOcasestudiesandtheirrelative importance(Question1a),andthenexaminewhetherthereareanyindicationsastohowthesefactorsmightamplifyeachother(Question1b).

1a)What istherelative importanceofenvironmentalriskscomparedtosocialandpoliticalfactors?

Kallis and Zografos (2012) suggest that it is important to understand that there is no definitivecausalrelationbetweenanindividual’ssecurityandaparticularaspectoftheirenvironment.Theyalso note that separating the effects of hydro‐climatic variables from other factors can beproblematic (Kallis and Zografos, 2012). Instead, they suggest that it is more useful to identifyfactorsthattendtodominateunderdifferentsocio‐environmentalconditionsandcontexts,ashasbeendoneintheCLICOcasestudies,asweillustratehere.One of the CLICO case studies examined the Intercontinental Biosphere Reserve of theMediterranean(IBRM)inMoroccoandSpain(Pascualetal.,2012).Thesetwocountries,operatingunder very different political and institutional environments, cooperate to secure the region’senvironmental and cultural diversity. Increasing socio‐economic pressure in tandem with agrowing population and decrease in water availability due to regional climate variability andclimatechangeareexposingthelocalresidentstoanevenmorewater‐scarceenvironmentinthefuture.Transboundary tensions and political and social conflicts and uncertainties in the PalestinianTerritoriescombinedwithcapacityconstraintsarethoughttobemajorfactorsinshapingtherisksto human security posed by inadequate access to water (Tamimi and Abu Jamous, 2012). Forexample,TamimiandAbuJamous(2012)statethattheaveragerenewablewatersupplypercapitainthePalestinianTerritoriesis500m3ayear,butthatduetoIsrael’sclaimsonmuchofthiswater,

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whichislocatedintransboundaryaquifersandrivers,only80m3perpersonperyearisavailabletoPalestinians and even less than this is actually utilised by Palestinians because of a lack ofinfrastructurethatpreventsthefulluseofavailablewater.Thishasahighimpactinparticularonthe poor who are forced to pay more for water where piped water supplies are not available(TamimiandAbuJamous,2012).Futurerisksincludeapossibledeclineinfuturewateravailabilitywith climate change, in addition to the political, social and institutional uncertainties that arealready factors in poor management of water (Tamimi and Abu Jamous, 2012). Bar‐On andGerstetter(2012)identifyconstraintsresultingfromtheIsraelioccupationasafactorconstrainingaccess to water for Palestinians and thus having a negative impact on human security. Theyobserve that according to local stakeholders and experts, climate change will have a relativelyinsignificantimpactonwateravailabilityforPalestiniansascomparedtotheimpactresultingfromtheongoingconflictwithIsrael.Bothofthesepapersillustratethepoliticalnatureofconstraintsonwatermanagement andwater related human insecurities in the Palestinian territories, that arerooted in the power imbalance between Israel and thePalestinianAuthority (Hoffman, personalcommunication).In the Sudr region of Egypt, Tawfic Ahmed (2012) finds that factors leading to vulnerability toclimate change include the isolation of the Bedouin population, illiteracy and low awareness ofclimate change, combined with a sensitive ecosystem, subject to extreme climate variability.However,astronglocalknowledgeoftheecosystemprovidestheBedouinpopulationwithahighadaptivecapacity, inparticular those inurbanareaswhoare less isolated.TawficAhmed(2012)also observes that women are more vulnerable to climate/water hazards, such as floods anddroughts,astheymaybeforcedtotravellongdistancestocollectnaturalresourcessuchaswoodandwater.Furthermore,childrenaremorevulnerabletodiseasescausedbyscarcityofwaterandpoorsanitationfacilities.The uncertainty of future environmental risks as well as social and political conditions makesprediction of the relative importance of these different factors into the future problematic. Forexample,Gebertetal.(2012)noteahighdegreeofuncertaintyinsealevelrisepredictionsandalsoinsocialandpolitical trends inEgypt.Thesemultipleuncertaintiesaffect thecapacity toprovidesustainable responses in the form of planned relocation for residents of the Nile Delta nearAlexandriathatisthreatenedbyfloodingasaresultofsealevelrise.1b)Whatarethemechanismsbywhichtheserisksandvulnerabilitiesamplifyeachotherat

differentscales?Reviewing the relevant literature, Kallis and Zografos (2012) explain that human security isconsidered to bemore closely related to economic prosperity and political freedom rather thanenvironmentalpressure.However,studiessofarhaveyetto investigateindepththerelationshipbetween socio‐economic elements and security. Results from the CLICO case studies shed somelight on possiblemechanisms bywhich the social, political, economic and environment contextsinteracttoamplifyrisksandvulnerabilities,asillustratedbelow.Snorek et al. (2012) suggest that social vulnerabilities are related to issues of social justice andhumanrightsandthatsocialmarginalisationcanexacerbatevulnerabilitytoclimatestressesand

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human insecurity.This is exemplified in severalof the case studies including those conducted inNiger(Snoreketal.,2012),Turkey(Turhan,2012)andEthiopia(MilmanandArsano,2012).Turhan (2012) explains how social and political changes during the post‐war 20th Century,including conflict in the late 1980s between Kurdish insurgents and the Turkish army, led todispossession of the rural population and the creation of amigrant labour force in Turkey. Thehumaninsecurityofthispopulationisduetoitssocialandeconomicmarginalisationinaneoliberalera which results in few employment rights and poor living conditions, increasing theirvulnerability to climate impacts. The seasonal migrant agricultural labourers are vulnerable tomarket price fluctuations and socialmarginalisation aswell as the impacts of climate variabilityandchange.Climate impacts includedelays to theharvestorpoorharvestsand flooddamage totheirtemporaryaccommodationwhichhaveimpactsonhealthandeconomicwell‐being(Turhan,2012).MilmanandArsano(2012)describearangeoffactorsinfluencinghumansecurityintheregionofGambella inEthiopia, includingexistingtensionsbetweenandwithindifferentethnicgroupsthathave involved violence, as well as food insecurity, poor service provision and vulnerability toclimateimpacts.Competitionforlandandwaterresourceshasresultedfrompopulationgrowthaswell as displacement of populations by conflict, and in some areas is exacerbated by policyinterventionsbythestate.Givenexistingfoodinsecurityandthevulnerabilityofthepopulationtoclimatevariability,MilmanandArsano(2012)describeclimatechangeasa“multiplicativestressormeaning that even small biophysical changes could exacerbate existing and historically rootedforms of human insecurity, particularly if changes in water affect land use either viafloods/droughts or if climate adaptation policies are interpreted as incorporating ethnic biases.”(MilmanandArsano,2012,p8).Several of the case studies explore the additional risks to human security posed by societalresponsestoclimate/waterstresses,eitherforthosewhoareresponding/adaptingorothersocialgroups negatively affected by particular responses/adaptation actions or development choices.Snorek et al. refer to this as ‘divergent adaptation’,which theydefine as “those adaptations thatpromote the success or adaptive capacity of one individual/community (User A) in a sharedecosystem which leads to a reduced adaptive capacity of an alternative individual/community(UserB)inthesameecosystem”(Snoreketal.,2012,p6).Forexample,agro‐pastoralistsinNigerhaveadaptedtopooryieldsfromunreliablerainfallbyexpandingcroplandsandseekingpaymentin response to crop damage by grazing animals. These adaptations have lessened the adaptivecapacityofpastoralistswhofindtheareaofgrazinglandsthattheyhaveaccesstohavediminishedandtheirexpensesincreasedbecausetheyhavetopayforcropdamagebytheirherds(Snoreketal.,2012).Othercasestudieshighlight theadditional risksposedbystate ledadaptationresponses (Dalisa,2012;Gebertet al., 2012;MilmanandArsano,2012).Forexample,Gebertet al. (2012) considerrisks to human security arising from sea level rise affecting low elevation coastal zones, inparticular how planned relocation in response to risks to lives and livelihoods changes risks tohumansecurity.Theysuggest thatrelocationmayreducedirectrisks fromsea levelrise,suchasdangerfromflooding,butexposepeopletonewrisksassociatedwithdisplacementandremovalof

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sustainable livelihood strategies. Factors influencing potential human security outcomes includethe impact of relocation on household asset portfolios and structures, and the preferences andpriorities of households which affect the decision to participate in planned relocation. Theincentives provided for relocation are also important and are influenced by the capacity of thecountry or region to provide conditions for sustainable long term solutions. A key influence onhumansecurityoutcomesisthoughttobethedegreeofmatchbetweenpeople’spreferences(suchas housing requirements and livelihood opportunities) and the benefits provided by plannedadaptationprogrammessponsoredbythestate(AlbizuaandZografos,2012;Gebertetal.,2012;).D’Alisa and Kallis (2012) suggest that securitisation of issues by the state can increase humaninsecurity associated with environmental hazards due to the de‐politicisation of issues and thestifling of debate around alternative disaster response and adaptation strategies. By declaringenvironmentaldisastersasa‘stateofemergency’,suchasthatcausedbythemudslidesintheSarnoincident of 1998, the state is able to concentrate on responses that are popularist rather thanbeneficial to long termhuman security in thewider region. Albizua and Zografos (2012) note asimilar impact of securitisation in reducing debate in their Ebro delta case study (as discussedunderthenextquestion).The role of adaptation policies in enhancing human security or exacerbating human insecuritieswillbereturnedtounderquestion7.2. How do political, economic, environmental and climatic factors exacerbate or mitigate

water­relatedconflict?Kallis and Zografos (2012) and Selby and Hoffman (2012) identify a number of studies thatpostulatethatwaterandclimateconflictmayresultfromeitherscarcity(Gleick,1993)oranoverabundanceofwater resources (Fairhead, 2001;Gleditsch et al., 2006).However, CLICO researchquestionsanydirectlinkbetweenhydro‐climaticinfluencesandconflictandoffersawiderangeofexamples that illustrate the multiplicity of political, economic, social and other factors thatinfluenceconflict.Böhmelt et al. (2012) analyse time‐series cross‐section data pertaining to 10,352 water‐relatedeventsin35countriesintheMediterranean,MiddleEastandSahelfrom1997‐2009derivedfromadatabaseofmediaarticlesofdomesticwaterrelatedevents(Bernaueretal.,2012).Theyexploretheextenttowhichdemandforwater(measuredusingindictorsforGDP,populationdensityandagriculturalproductivity), supply (measuredusing indicatorsof climatevariability)and restraint(institutional characteristics that may deter violence or conflict in general) determine whetherinteractionsoverwaterareconflictiveorcooperativeandtheintensityofconflictorcooperation.Theauthorsfindthatchangesinwaterdemand(affectedprimarilybyeconomicdevelopment)andrestraint factors influence domestic water‐related interactions more than supply variations.Increased water demand (predicted by higher economic development) is associated with anincrease in low‐levelconflictoverwater.Böhmeltetal. (2012)proposethateconomicprosperityand political freedom in democratic countries may allow ‘political space’ for disputes, whereasviolentconflictsarefarmorecommoninnon‐democraticenvironmentsthandemocraticones.Lowlevelconflictindemocraciesmaycontributeovertimetoconsensusbuildingprocessesthatcould

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bedescribedascooperation,hencetherecanbepotentialoverlapbetweencooperationandconflictindecisionmakingprocesses.Tamimi and Jamous (2012) describe how existing insecurities due to political conflict and pooraccesstowaterincreasethevulnerabilityofthepopulationinPalestine.TheyconcludethatclimatechangeintheWestBankwillnotonlyimpacthumansecuritybutalsostrengthenthelikelihoodofconflictbetweendifferentsocialgroupsintheregion.Bar‐OnandGerstetter(2012)describehowdifferent narratives on the Israeli and Palestinian side make it difficult to reach agreement onwater‐relatedissuesbetweenbothsides.FischhendlerandKatz(2012)examinetheinfluenceofdifferentsourcesofuncertainty, includingpolitical,socialandenvironmentaluncertainties,onthedegreeofcooperationorconflictassociatedwith negotiations over transboundary water resources shared between Israel and Palestine. Byexaminingdocumentsrelatedtoaseriesofbilateralandtrilateralnegotiationsheldbetween2007and 2009 between Israeli, Palestinian and US negotiators, they find that political and socialuncertaintiesdominateoverphysicaluncertaintiessuchasthoseassociatedwithwaterresourcesandclimatevariability.However, theyalsofoundthatuncertaintiesofonetypecan ‘spill‐over’ toimpact on water uncertainties. For example political uncertainties can threaten successfulnegotiationsonwaterissues.Thetypeofpersonsinvolvedinthenegotiations(whetherpoliticiansor technical officials) and the type of cooperative mechanisms proposed also influenced theoutcome in terms of increased cooperation or conflict: legal mechanisms were more likely toreceive objections from the parties compared to mechanisms such as exchange of information.However, mechanisms to address uncertainties were often cooperative on the surface, e.g.feasibilitystudies,butmayhavebeenintendedtodelayresolutionratherthanresolvedifferences.Somemeasures to reducephysicaluncertaintybroughtupnewsocialandpoliticaluncertainties,acting as additional barriers to cooperation. An example that the authors cite is the building ofdesalination infrastructure by Israel, which reduces the incentive for Israel to cooperate sincesharedwaterresourcesbecomelessimportantasaresultofthisnewsourceofwater.ThisexampleisalsopickedupbyGerstetteretal(2012)whofoundthatinsomecasesmutualthreatstohumansecurity from water related risks can instigate cooperation (for example a joint sewagemanagement initiative forNicosia inCyprusreducedthethreat to thepopulation fromuntreatedsewage),whilst inothers, certainpoliciesandresolutionmechanisms thataimto lessenriskandconflict,sometimestriggernewdisputes,forexampledesalinationinIsrael.UsingacasestudyofSudanandSouthSudan,SelbyandHoffman(2012)arguethatprocessesandstructuresatmultiplescalesfromthelocaltothatoftheglobalpoliticaleconomyareresponsibleforshapingthenatureofthestate’sagency.TheyassertthattheevidenceforSudansuggeststhatitis the historical context and current shape of the state and actions of its agents that influenceconflict as well as contributing to environmental vulnerabilities, rather than any scarcity ofresourcesimposedbyenvironmentalchange.However,theyfindthattheexistingsituationofhigh

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insecurity, aswell as changing economic conditions due to a drop in oil revenues2, hampers theabilitytocreatecapacitytorespondtopotentialclimateandwaterrelatedstresses.AccordingtoSnoreketal. (2012)water‐relatedconflict inNigerstemsfromtheexistingpoliticaland economic context. Snorek et al (2012) suggest that conflict is a political response tomarginalizationofcertaingroups’livelihoodneedsoverothers,aresponsethatisexacerbatedbyenvironmentalchange.Whileinstitutionsatmultiplescalescaneithereaseorcompoundongoinglatent conflicts/disputes between divergent groups, corruption, low accountability and low trustinhibit individuals from seeking solutions through institutions. In theNiger context, individualsexposed to both resource scarcity and a lack of institutionalmechanisms to support livelihoodsturntoconflicttoestablishcontroloverassetsorentitlements.In contrast, Turhan (2012) describes how lack of organisation and unionmembership amongstseasonal migrant workers in Turkey “hinders the possible emergence of class‐based conflicts”(p21) between workers and their employers in an era of changing agricultural systems ofproduction.Albizua and Zografos (2012) describe differing perceptions amongst those affected and decisionmakersregardingtheneedtoadapttothreatstowaterresourcesintheEbroriverdeltaincludingsalinisation,subsidence,sea levelriseandthe impactsofwater transfers.Perceptionsdifferwithproximitytotheproblemandthelevelofknowledgeofthedeltasystem.Conflictbetweenactorsisnotovertandthesedifferencesinperceptionsdonotfeedfullyintodebateonpossibleresponses.Althoughscientificknowledge iskey fordealingwithvulnerabilitydrivers, theauthorspointoutthatanoveremphasisonexpert scientificknowledgeandarguments thatemphasise the securityimplications of the risks facing the delta, risk a closing down of the debate that perpetuatesinequalitiesbetweengroups.Hence,theyidentifyapersisting““fear”ofbeingdisposedofwater”(AlbizuaandZografos,2012,p15)inspiteofstate‐ledadaptationattempts.TheydrawonthepointmadebyZeitounandWarner(2006)that“silentconflicts”areoftencausedbyexcessivewateruse,transferorcontaminationbyhydro‐hegemonicactors.Milman and Arsano (2012) describe multiple linkages between conflict and political, economic,environmentalandclimatic factors for theGambellaregionofEthiopia.Conflicthas longbeenanoutcome of competition for land and water resources between different ethnic groups, oftenexacerbatedbycontestedstate‐ledpolicies,suchasresettlementprograms.Althoughthereislittleevidence for climatic factors directly influencing conflict, current policies designed to reducevulnerabilitytoclimatestresses,amongstotheraims,givepreferencetosomeaspectsofsecurityover others, creating new insecurities and influences on conflict potential. This preference foraddressing someaspectsof securityoverothers “both results fromand influences socio‐politicalinteractionsintheregion”(MilmanandArsano,2012,p12).

2 Sudan lost twothirdsof itsoil resourceswhenthesouthseceded in July2011,butretainedprocessingandexportfacilities.DisagreementsbetweenSudanandSouthSudanledtosouthSudanstoppingoilproductioninJanuary2012,reducingtheincomeofbothcountries(BBCnews,http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world‐africa‐1968670).

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3. Howdoeshumansecurity(orlackofit)affectthedemandforcooperation?This question was relatively under developed in the CLICO research since direct links betweenhuman (in)security and cooperation were few. In the western Mediterranean, hydro‐climaticchangeisexpectedtobringfurtherhumaninsecurities.Tohelpmitigateforthesechanges,Moroccoand Spain have created a reserve across theBasin, bringing cooperation between two countriesthatotherwisemaynothaveworkedtogether(Pascualetal.,2012).Otherinstancesofcooperationwere documented by Gerstetter et al. (2012) between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriotcommunities, who cooperate over sewage treatment works on the island of Cyprus, whilst theauthors also noted the potential for collaboration between Israel, Jordan and Palestine if theRed/DeadSeaCanalisapproved.Cooperationmayberelatedtoacomplexrangeofhistoricalandpolitical influences, and it is not clear how much concerns over human security influencecooperationintheseexamples.Although some literature supports the theory of mutually beneficial cooperation (Zeitoun andWarner,2006),othersbelievethatsomekindsofcollaborationmayonlyseektoreinforceunequalsituations (Albizua andZografos, 2012). Some actors in theEbrodelta study expressed a strongaversiontouncertaintywhichwasconnectedwithsupportforstateinterventionandtheuseoftheprecautionary principle (Albizua and Zografos, 2012). However, thosewhoweremost aware ofthreats to their human security, because of a perceived inequality in the distribution ofenvironmental impacts, feared the impact upon them of actions purporting to be ‘cooperative’(such aswater transfers) and rejected the possibility of losing their coastal land in the spirit ofcooperation.Moreover, thoseactorswhostrongly favouredtechnologicalsolutionssuchasdikes,hadlittlefaithinthecapacityofpublicpolicytoovercomepowerfulinterestsandprovideadequatesolutionsfortheirsecurity(AlbizuaandZografos,2012).FischhendlerandDeBruyne(2012)suggestthatchoosingtocooperateinthefaceofconflictoftenis determined more by transaction costs3 rather than any environmental variability or anindividual’sadaptivecapacity.UnilateralmeasuresbyIsraelsuchasbuildingdesalinationplantstoincreasewatersecurityhavepossiblyacted toreduce Israel’s incentive tocooperateoversharedwaterresources(FischhendlerandKatz,2012).4. Underwhatconditionsmayconflictreduceratherthanexacerbatevulnerabilities?KallisandZografos(2012)explainthatconflictisamulti‐facetedsocialphenomenon,whichundercertaincircumstances(e.g.oppressivesituations)canevenbebeneficial,helpreducevulnerabilityandimproveadaptivecapacity.Forexample“Adaptive”conflictsbetweenherdersandfarmersintheWesternSahelhavepushedforpoliticalchangeandStateactionto legitimizemobility,avitaladaptation strategy for drought‐hit herders (Turner 2004). Conflict cannot be reduced tointernationalandcivilwaronly,i.e.conceivedonlyatthenation‐statelevel(whichisoftenthecasein the literature on climate security) as it frequently occurs at sub‐national scales ranging from3 FischhendlerandDeBruyne (2012)describe transactioncosts in this contextas theexpensebornebynegotiating

partiesintermsofpolitical,monitoringandenforcementcostsassociatedwithnegotiatingandimplementingconflictresolutionmechanismsintreaties.

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inter‐communal conflictdown to thehouseholdscale.Anotherdistinction involvesarmedversussocialorpolitical conflicts thatdonot involvedeath‐threateningviolence, suchasdisagreementsanddisputes(KallisandZografos,2012).It has been argued that conflict can coexist with cooperation and even prompt cooperation(Keohane, 2005; Zeitoun and Mirumachi, 2008). Evidence for this arises from some of thetransboundary scaleCLICO studies. Fischhendler andKatz (2012) show thatdifferent sourcesofuncertainty could provoke cooperation in negotiations over transboundary water managementbetween Israel and Palestine, but that political constraints remained. In their review ofinternationalwater treatiesFischhendlerandDeBruyne(2012)examinetheadoptionofconflictresolutionmechanisms.Theyfindthat,byconfrontingunderlyingissuesthatotherwisemayneverhavebeenraisedoraddressed,conflictresolutionmechanismsintransboundaryagreementshavethepotentialtotakeintoaccountfutureuncertainty,improveflexibility,imposecommitmentsandaddresspotentialdisputes(FischhendlerandDeBruyne,2012).Atasub‐nationalscaleD’AlisaandKallis(2012)suggestthatthesilencingofpoliticaldebateandconflict(dissent)overresponsestrategiestoenvironmentalhazardsbyahegemonicstateleadstonegative human security outcomes in the case of Sarno, Italy, since long term vulnerability tolandslidehazardsremainshighintheregion.Thisimpliesthatalevelofpoliticalconflict,includingdissensionanddebate(ratherthanviolentconflict)canprovidepositiveconditionsforafullrangeofadaptiveresponsestobeconsidered.5. What constitutes the capacity of states and their institutions and other organizations to

implementchange,orevenradicalchangenecessaryundertimesofstress??Coordination across institutions is emphasised byMilman et al (2012),who assess the adaptivecapacityoftransboundaryriverbasininstitutionstoclimatechangeusinganindicatorsapproach.They assert that adaptive capacity is determined more by an actor’s ability to communicate,cooperateandcoordinate rather thanany financial, technicalorhumanresources. Theysuggestthat climate change adaptation in a transboundary river basin will not only be determined byinternational institutional capacity but also national and sub‐national abilities to cooperate atdifferent scales (Milman et al., 2012). Furthermore, Milman et al. suggest that effectivetransboundary institutions also tend to have a greater capacity to develop adaptation strategies(Kranzetal.,2010).Milmanetal. (2012) investigated the influenceofa ‘weak link’ (abasin thatcontains a nation withmuch lower adaptive capacity than other nations in the basin) on basinadaptivecapacityandfoundthatitwasnotastronginfluence.Through the creation of a common protected area (IBRM), institutions from Spain andMoroccohave been working together on the creation of a common framework to foster sustainableterritorialdevelopmentandimprovemanagementofwaterresourcesintheregion(AbdulMalaketal. 2012). The cooperation channel generated between both countries has led to the increase ofstability,securityandsustainabledevelopmentwithintheregion.However, some elements are still considered as a barrier for an effective management of theReserve, namely the weak implementation of current laws and policies, duplication among

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institutions and the low levels of public participation and absence of co‐responsibility of thepopulationinwatermanagement(AbdulMalaketal.2012).TheexampleofNigershowsthatinstitutionscaneitherenhancecooperationorhinderit.Insomecases the customary hierarchical institutions were found to enhance cooperation but in otherscorruption and social marginalisation or entrenched social biases and inequities promoteinstitutionsthataredestructiveandincreasethepotentialforconflict(Snoreketal.,2012).Inthistype of environment, mechanisms need to be in place to minimise policies and norms thatencourageinequitablesolutions.Atthesametime,institutionsmustbeheldaccountableandrulesmustbeenforcedtoensurerepeatmistakesareavoided(Snoreketal.,2012).In Egypt, where sea level rise may require relocation policies to be implemented, actors arecurrently operating under uncertain conditions with the country still recovering from a civiluprising.Asaresult,institutionsareunabletofullyaddresstheinherentcomplexitiesthatneedtobeunderstoodtoplanandmanagesuchadaptivemeasureseffectively(Gebertetal.,2012).Snoreketal.(2012)emphasizethattoframeadaptationactionseffectively,systemsneedtobeabletocopewith high uncertainty whilst still being dynamic enough to adapt if conditions change (Ostrom,2005;Pahl‐Wostl,2009).Institutional and infrastructural gaps, such as poor access to reliable data, contribute to poorenvironmentalmanagementandhuman insecurity in theSudancasestudy(SelbyandHoffmann,2012). SudanandSouthSudan’sfutureabilitytocopewithhydro‐climaticstressesdependsonastrengtheningof state institutions. SouthSudanese institutionshaveonly recently emerged fromconflictandhavetoadjusttothenewlywonindependenceoftheyoungrepublic.NorthSudanesestateinstitutions,ontheotherhand,sufferfromahighlevelofpersonalisationandpoliticisationofthebureaucracy.Withmoreeffectiveandaccountablestateactors,moreuniversalaccesstojusticemay contribute to the avoidance of future conflict associated with adaptation and developmentplanning (Selby and Hoffmann, 2012). This vision is in stark contrast to experience ofimplementationofrecentandpastdevelopmentinitiativessuchastheconstructionoftheMerowedamandreportsofleasingoflandandwatertoForeignDirectInvestorsthatalthoughpotentiallytransformative, have indications of exploitation and exacerbation of social conflict (e.g. Deng,2011).Milman and Arsano (2012) point out that the nation state is conceived of as the institutionresponsible for climate change adaptation planning by the international community, under theUNFCCC. However, they question the role of the state and state‐led societal transformation inadaptation. They raise concerns over transformative agendas for adaptation, describing how thestate‐ledagendasfortransformingagricultureandlivelihoodsinGambella,Ethiopia,valuecertainlifestylesandaspectsofhumansecurityoverothersandtaketimetoimplement.Thusnotionsoftransformation for adaptation raise questions of “who and what is prioritized and how suchdeterminationsaremade”(MilmanandArsano,p18).Vidaurre and Tedsen (2012) observe that policy actors and actors interviewed were relativelysatisfied with the adaptation‐related policy frameworks in Ethiopia, criticising only a lack ofimplementation of the relatively recently adopted policies on the ground. Milman and Arsano

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(2012)goontoexplainhowthecapacityofthegovernmenttoimplementadaptationsinfluenceswhich adaptations are prioritized. For example, reducing risk from flooding by resettlingpopulationsismoreachievableandhasadditionalbenefitstothegovernmentcomparedtothehightechnical and capital requirements needed to reduce threats to livelihoods from insufficient anderraticrainfall.MilmanandArsano(2012)ask“howcantraditionalsocietiesadapttoclimatechange”inacontextwherethestatepromotesagriculturalmodernizationinordertomeetdevelopmentandadaptationneeds? Their research explains how state development and adaptation policies in Gambella,Ethiopiaarefoundeduponaviewoftraditionallivelihoodsas‘backward’andabarriertoeconomicgrowth. This view fails to recognise that themobility involved in traditional livelihoods such asfloodplainrecessionagriculture,pastoralism,shiftingcultivationandharvestingofforestproductsprovideasourceofresiliencetoclimatevariability.Dalby (2012) maintains that individuals and communities exposed to hazards can become toodependent on state institutions, reducing their independent adaptive capacity. Strong popularsupportforstate interventionsfromthoseaffectedbydisasters is illustratedbythecasestudyoftheSarnobasininItalywhereaseriesofmudslidesresultedinahumanitariandisaster(D’AlisaandKallis 2012). The authors describe how a massive scale intervention by the state providedprotection to those individualswho had been affected but failed to solve the root causes of thedevastationandleftotherareasjustasatriskasbefore.Theresponseensuredcontinuedsupportforgovernmentintheareabutfailedtodeliverradicalchangeandprotecthumansecurity,leavingmuchofthepopulationatriskofthesamethinghappeningtotheminthefuture.D’AlisaandKallis(2012)suggest that thepopulistandneo‐liberalapproachof thegovernment,combinedwiththeuseofstatesofemergencytogovern,resultinasilencingofpoliticaldebateandareducedcapacitytoprotectthehumansecurityofthepopulation.Insomecases,actorsmustimplementchangewithoutexternalassistancefromthestateorthroughco‐operation with other actors. Charalambous et al. (2012) found that in Cyprus, which hasexperienced a number of severe droughts over the past two decades, 80% of the 51 touristaccommodationbusinessesthatrespondedtotheirsurveyhadinstalledatleastonewatersavingdeviceand90%hadencouragedwater savinghabits throughstaff trainingornotices forguests.Weaver(2011),however,describeshowthereislittleincentiveorpressuretoalteroperationsinthetourist industryandreferstowatersavingsnoticesasbeingmotivatedbyeconomicbenefits.The survey also indicated that there was little awareness in the tourism sector about climatechangeanditspotentialimpacts,indicatingthattherelevantgovernmentauthoritieshavenotyetinvolvedtheminadaptationplanning(Charalambousetal.2012).

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6. What interventionsmight be suitable for reducing risks and improving human securityassociatedwithclimateandwaterrelatedstressors,eitherbyreducingthevulnerabilityofthesystemandincreasingitsadaptivecapacityorbymodifyingthehazards?

Kallis and Zografos (2012) draw attention to the conspicuous absence from the literature of adiscussion of the role that can be played by older notions of civil security/protection aswell associal security, which were central in water hazard prevention and response debates4. This isimportant because the basic functions of social security and the welfare state are relevant forhuman security. Subsidised access tohealth services, state support for thosewho losehomesorwork(e.g.afterahydro‐climaticdisaster),immigrantreceptionandintegration,areallpoliciesthathelp reduce the social vulnerability of disadvantaged groups. Those notions count with long‐established institutions for their delivery: civil security/protection agencies are still in charge offloodprevention, emergencyand reconstructionand thereforehavean important role toplay inensuringhumansecurity.Whileclimatechangecouldcompriseapowerfulrationaleforextendingsocialandcivilsecuritysystemsindevelopingandemergingeconomies,whatweinsteadevidencein recent years is the retreat of such security‐enhancing arrangements even in developedeconomies.This,itcouldbeargued,hasincreasedvulnerabilitiesandrelatedinsecurities–thoughthisquestionhasnotbeenstudied.Currently, policies explicitly designed to tackle the linkages between hydro climatic stressors,humansecurityandconflictcanmainlybefoundattheinternationalorEUlevel(Gerstetteretal.,2012). However, the CLICO studies provide lessons for policies and interventions at a range ofscalesfromthetransboundarytothesub‐national.Attheinternationalriverbasinlevel,Milmanetal.(2012)developatypologyofriverbasinswhichpoints to how interventions to bolster adaptive capacitywill bemore effective if tailored to thenatureoftherelationshipswithinthebasin. Moreover,Milmanetal.explainhowadaptationisaprocess and that building adaptive capacity includes not only building the resources andknowledge to address climate change but also a pathway through which these resources cantranslateintoaction.Fischhendler and Katz (2012) suggest restructuring negotiations to avoid barriers totransboundary water cooperation caused by linkage and spill‐over between different unrelatedpolicies.Theysuggestseparatingtherolesofpoliticiansandtechnicalprofessionalsandleavingthelatter group to negotiate on technical details at the end of the negotiations. Tamimi and Jamous(2012) suggest that both national and transboundary IWRM plans should be able to integrateclimatechangeadaptationmeasuresinthefuture,buildingconfidenceacrossallspatialscales.AlbizuaandZografos(2012)remindusthatforinterventionstobeeffective,thereneedstobejointactionatallspatialscales,butalsouncoordinatedchangesneedtotakeplaceatthehouseholdlevel(PaavolaandAdger,2006)andindividualsneedtobeincorporatedintoclimatechangeadaptationpolicymaking (Renn and Schweizer, 2009). Adger (2010) asserts that any adaptive response toenvironmental change is determined by the values attached to the questions being asked. For

4 Foranexceptionsee:Heltbergetal.2009.

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instance,whatmightbeworthpreservingforoneperson,mightnotbeforanother.Thisisinlinewiththerecognitionoftheimportanceofrepresentationandvoice,equityandfairdistributionofriskforadaptationandhumansecurity(Adger2010,inTurhan2012).Thelinkbetweenplannedlargescaleinteractionsandthevaluesandresponsesofindividuals,householdsandcommunitiesisathemethatmanyoftheCLICOstudiesexplorefurther.AlbizuaandZografos(2012)suggestthatwithoutabasicunderstandingofavalue‐basedapproach,policiesand interventionscanoftenresult inmaladaptiveresponses,as theAlexandria,GambellaandSeyhancase studies illustrate (Gebertetal.2012;MilmanandArsano,2012;Turhan,2012).Turhansuggeststhatthe“things,placesandideas”valuedbymarginalizedandhighlyvulnerablesocialgroups,suchasseasonalmigrantagriculturallaborersinTurkey,needtobetakenaccountofinadaptationinterventionsinordertohaveanychanceofimprovingtheirwellbeingandreducingvulnerability. Similarly, Gebert et al. (2012) explain how the relocation needs, priorities andpreferencesof vulnerablegroups inAlexandria, suchas thoseworking in theagricultural sector,needtobeacknowledged inrelocationpolicytoensurehumansecurityandavoidmaladaptationwhenitcomestolivelihoodreorganization.Drawing on evidence from the Ebro delta case study, Albizua and Zografos (2012) propose thatacknowledgingpeople’s valuesandperceptionsof climate change shouldbe seenas anessentialcomponentofthepolicymakingprocess.Theyalsocallformoredialogue,debate,anddeliberationbetween those involved inmanagingandbenefiting from the region’s resources toaddress theirdifferingperceptions.TheyrecognizeapointmadebyO’BrienandWolf(2010)thatanindividual’sresponse to climate change is determined to a large extent by how their specific well‐being isimpacted. Albizua andZografos (2012) illustrate thisby showing that the viewsofpeoplemostaffected by threats to theEbro delta in Spain haddifferent perceptions of adaptation options tothose decision makers who were more distant. They suggest differing values and perceptions,beyond those associated with scientific knowledge and economics, should be addressed usingdeliberativedecisionmakingprocesses,whichtheyneverthelessacknowledgearethemselvesopento the influence of power of dominant actors and discourses. Value‐based approaches can helpunderstandthelimitsofadaptation,whilstatthesametimediscernhowvalueprioritizationsarecontrolledbythosewithpoliticalpower(O'BrienandWolf,2010,inAlbizuaandZografos2012).Pascual et al. (2012) also emphasise theneed for greater public participation and integration oflocal knowledge into the development of interventions. They suggest as an example, giving thepopulation a feeling of co‐responsibility for themanagement of a resource such as a river. Theyconsider that the current institutional capacity of the IBRM in the Morocco‐Spain case study issufficienttomaintainhumansecurityevenwithfutureclimaticandsocialchanges,howevereffortsneedtobemadetoimplementcurrentlaws.Gerstetter et al. 2012 emphasize that state interventions often influence the conditions underwhich individuals or communities can adapt (e.g. through setting legal frameworks or providingfunding)andarethereforeanecessarypartofadaptationeffortsatlarge.However,theNigercasestudy (Snorek et al. 2012) illustrates the need for institutional appropriateness when trying toreduce vulnerabilities and maintain adaptive capacity. Such interventions can respond to both

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humanandenvironmentalprocesses,involvestructuralorbehaviouraloutcomes,occuratdifferenttimescalesandeitherprotect,maintainactionsoralterasituationcompletely(Snoreketal.2012).Gebertetal.(2012)examinedthepotential forforcedorplannedrelocationinAlexandria,Egypt.Their results showed that this type of intervention has been relatively unexplored from aninternationalpolicyperspective(Warner,2011)andbeenmainlyviewedasa“lastresort”option.Althoughchallengesexistregardingpossibletrade‐offs,sustainabilityandsecurityissues,Gebertetal. (2012) believe these can be overcome if integrated into previous and existing institutionalframeworks. They suggest three criteria for successful planned migration interventions. First,plannedrelocationisamustforthosewithoutthemeanstomigratethemselves.Second,programsneedtoadoptalongtermoutlookonpotentialmigrantsthataddressesthesustainabilityoftheirlivelihoodsandpoliciesneedadjustingnowso thatsustainablerelocationcanbeachieved in thefuture. Finally, tailor‐made incentives are needed to target specific groups of people, given theirincomesourceandlevel.Finally, Albizua and Zografos (2012) recommend that policies of adaptation should take intoaccountnotonlythedirecteffectsofclimatechangebutalsoanyotherindirectprocessesthatriskexacerbating these impacts, such as the downstream implications of expansion of large scaleirrigation,forexample.7. Underwhat conditionsmight policies of adaptation to perceived or experienced climate

change impacts increase the vulnerability of some groups and/or exacerbate socialconflict?

Snoreketal.(2012)recognizethatinsomecases,adaptationpoliciesreinforcesocialhierarchiesinsociety(Adgeretal.,2009).TheyrefertoworkbyEngle(2011)whosuggeststhatinequalitiesarecan be due toweak institutions that are unable to effectively determinewho ismost in need ofadaptive resources. According to Snorek et al (2012) this relationship between adaptation toclimatechangeandsocialjusticeisunderappreciated.There is some evidence in the CLICO case studies for tensions or conflict arising as a result ofunequaleffectsofadaptationsamongstdifferentsocialgroups,whomightdifferintheirvalues.Forexample,perceptionsofunevendistributionofbenefitsand thenegative impactsof responses tothreats towater resources in theEbrodeltawereparticularly strong amongst thosewho fearedlosingaccesstowater(AlbizuaandZografos,2012).AlbizuaandZografos(2012)goontosaythatwherepoliciesaresubjecttotheinfluenceofeconomicandscientificargumentsaswellaspowerrelationsthereisariskthatthedebateonpolicyalternativesandtheirunevenimpactisstifled.Vidaurre and Tedsen (2012) identify instances in Ethiopia where state‐led adaptation policiesfurtherantagonisedactorswhowerealreadycriticaltowardsthestate.MilmanandArsano(2012)examinetwokeypoliciesdesignedforeconomicdevelopmentandadaptationtoclimatevariabilityinGambella,Ethiopia:theVillagizationProgramandAgriculturalDevelopmentLedIndustrialization.Theyshowhowthesepoliciesarefoundeduponaviewthatsimplyagriculturalmodernizationwilltransform societies, provide increased food security and reduce poverty and vulnerability toclimate hazards. However, by prioritising some aspects of security over others, these programs

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have led todeclines inhumansecurity for theaffectedpopulation,at least in theshort term.Forexample,bymovingpeopleoutofthefloodplaintopermanentsettlementstheyhavereducedtheirvulnerabilitytofloodsbutincreasedtheirvulnerabilitytowaterscarcity,giventheerraticrainfallinGambellathatislikelytoincreasewithclimatechange.Theyalsoshowhowthesepolicieshavefacilitated theallocationof land fornewsettlersandagricultural investors, therebyexacerbatingtheexistingtensionsintheregion,resultinginarecentriseinviolence.Turhan (2012) shows how state‐led adaptation policies in Turkey aimed at capacity building,focused on diversification and engagement in the market economy, combined with ‘charitable’interventionsonbehalfof the state to improve living conditionsof seasonalmigrantagriculturalworkers, shift the responsibility of adaptation to the individual. By prescribing overly simplisticadaptation solutions, Turhan suggests that the state “aims at making vulnerable groups legible,simplified,homogenousandthusgovernable”(Turhan,p22).Healsoshowshowthesepoliciesandinterventionsdonothingtorespondtothevaluesandperceivedadaptationneedsofthemigrantworkersthemselvesnordotheyalterthestructuralconditionsresponsiblefortheirvulnerability.He argues that this renders them ‘invisible’ to the state, maintaining their marginal position insociety.Snoreketal.(2012)suggestthatmultipleinstitutionsandactorswithdifferingobjectives,havethepotential to lessen the vulnerability of one group or individual, but simultaneously cause areduction in theadaptivecapacityofanother (MoserandEkstrom,2010).Forexample, inNiger,the expansion of arable farming as an adaptive strategy has put greater stress on pastorallivelihoods in the region (Snorek et al. 2012). Another example comes from theAlexandria casestudy,whereGebertetal. (2012)suggest thatpoorlyplannedrelocationwould inevitablycreatesignificant insecurities forthenon‐migrantpopulation,reducingtheircapacitytoadapt. Intheseexamples,onegroup’sadaptivesuccessreducestheadaptivecapacityofanothergroupinsociety,asocial phenomena which Snorek et al. (2012) refer to as divergent adaptation. By increasingawarenessofdivergentadaptationSnoreketal. (2012)suggest that it ispossible to improve theeffectivenessofinstitutionalcapacitiesandpromotecollaborationbetweenthosewhobenefitfromadaptationandthosewhosuffer.Thehigh levelof conflict and insecurity in theSudanshasa large impacton theability toput inplace development and adaptation plans. However, as Selby andHoffman (2012) stress, conflictandenvironmentaldegradation issuesneed tobeexamined in thecontextofahistoryofneglectand exploitation associatedwith the nature of state agency, which should be seen as a processresulting fromagentsandstructuresat the local,nationalandglobalscale.Therefore,adaptationthat is planned and implemented by the statemust also be seen in this context. This raises thelikelihoodofadaptationbeingbothshapedbyandcontributingtotheconflictintheregion.Due to the existing high level of conflict and insecurity, climate change adaptation is not animmediate concern to policy makers in either Sudan or South Sudan. However planning foradaptationhasbegunatleastonpaperinSudan,whilstSouthSudanhaslittleinstitutionalcapacitytodealwitheventheimmediatechallengesitfacessuchasprovisionofsecurity,basicservicesandwatermanagement(SelbyandHoffmann,2012).SelbyandHoffman(2012)suggestthatadaptationto the decline in oil revenue by Sudan’s elite is to be achieved by intensification of irrigated

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commercial agriculture in the Nile valley (Verhoeven, 2011). A strategy such as this may riskadditionalconflictatthesub‐nationalscaleduetolandappropriationanddisplacementofpeople,as has happened in the past (Selby and Hoffman 2012). There would also be implications fortransboundarytensionsoverNilewatersharing ifSudanreaches its fullquotaofwaterallocatedunder the 1959 agreement, as it plans to do. This complicates potential negotiations over Nilequotas between Sudan and South Sudan, since South Sudan intends to pursue its own plans forirrigatedagriculturalexpansion(SelbyandHoffman2012).

4. RevisedtheoreticalframeworkFigure3illustratesarevisedconceptualframeworkthatbuildsonexistingandnewunderstandingsofhydro‐climatic insecurity fromtheCLICOstudies. Thisbuildsontheconceptual framework inFigure2andother frameworkssuchasthoseof theresilienceofsocio‐ecologicalsystems(Folke,2006)andframingsofvulnerabilityaroundexposureandrisk(Birkmann,2006;Turneretal.2003;Wisneretal.2004). Human(In‐)Security is shapedbycross‐scaledynamicprocessesofhydro‐climatic stress (waterrelatedclimaticstresses),responsesandadaptationwithinsocialecologicalsystems,interactions(conflict and cooperation) and mutual impacts. The concept of human security is the allencompassingconcept in thenewframeworkandcanbemeasuredatall scales: fromglobalandregionaldowntonational,social‐ecologicalsystems,communitiesand individuals.The individualandcommunityscalehasbeenaddedsinceseveraloftheCLICOstudiesemphasisetheimportanceofactionsandinsecuritiesatthisscale.The starting point of the framework is that hydro‐climate stresses as well as dynamic socio‐ecologicalinteractionsatmultiplescalesarelikelytoinfluenceexposureandvulnerabilitytowaterrelated stressors. This is indicated by the circle of responses and impacts in the frameworkrepresentedbythetwocurvedarrows.Humansecurity isoperationalizedbyusingtheconceptsofexposureandvulnerabilityaswellasadaptation and adaptive capacity. These concepts can be used to measure the state of humansecuritybyincludingallthesocial‐ecologicalinteractionsatmultiplescalesacrossallactors.Withinthe adaptation box we explicitly suggest various actors/entities, to accommodate the range ofresearch within the CLICO project that focuses variously on individuals, communities andinstitutions.Adaptation is a dynamic process, influenced by factors at various scales, including institutions,power,perceptions,andculture, the last twoaddedbecausemanyCLICOcasestudiesemphasizetheirimportance.Responsestohydro‐climatestressorsandinsecurities‐suchasadaptation‐areembeddedinprocessesofsocio‐ecologicalinteractionswherefactorssuchas,powerandinterests,culture,perceptions,institutions,environmentalconditionsandsocialandeconomicrelationsplayaroleaffectingtheformationofadaptivecapacityofdifferentgroupsandactorsand,consequently,theoverallpathwayofadaptation.

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Figure 3: Revised conceptual framework of hydro-security. (This diagram and the accompanying text in this section were drafted by project partners from the United Nations University: Niklas Gebert, Julia Kloos, Fabrice Renaud, and Julie Snorek).

Adaptation outcomes/strategies are determined by the way adaptive capacities are formed andaccumulated(strengthenedorweakened)andthenutilizedbymultipleactorsleadingtoadiversesetofmutualimpactsofadaptation.Weintroducetheconceptof‘divergentadaptation’(Snoreketal. 2012) into the framework since it encapsulates the relationship between conflict andcooperation,adaptationandadaptivecapacity,whereadaptationstrategiescanresult indifferenthumansecurityoutcomesfordifferentsocialgroupsoractors.Theoriginsoftheterm‘divergentadaptation’areinevolutionarybiology,whereitisdefinedastheaccumulationofdifferencesbetweengroupslocatedinseparateenvironmentsthatcanleadtotheformation of a new species (Anderson et al. 2010). In a social‐ecological system, ‘divergent’ ordeviating adaptation refers to the process of shifting adaptive capacities of alternate actors,entities, or livelihood systems. Thereby, adaptation of one individual or group can produce anincrease (+/+), decrease (+/‐) or neutral change (+/0) in another individual or group’s adaptivecapacity inasharedecosystem.Anexampleofdivergentadaptationis illustratedbytheadaptiveactionsof theagropastoralists in theNigercasestudywhichreducetheadaptivecapacityof thepastoralists(Snoreketal.(2012).

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Inthecourseofsuchadynamicadaptationprocessandpath,cooperationandconflictcancoexist,mutuallyinfluence,amplify,orreduceadaptivecapacityandadaptationstrategies.Thefocusisonthe dynamic interaction of conflict and cooperation between different actors (individuals, socialgroups, communities, governments at various levels). Both conflict and cooperation and thecombinationofthetwocanincreaseanddecreasehydro‐securityandhumansecurityatthesametimefordifferent(interacting)actors.This frameworkmakes thedynamicnatureofhuman securitymore explicit thanbeforewith itscircleofstresses,responses,adaptation, impactsandfeedbacks.Thismakes itapplicabletocaseswhere there are temporal trade‐offs in human security, for example, in the Ethiopia case study(MilmanandArsano,2012).

5. Summaryofkeytheoreticalfindings

Climatechange,hydro­securityandhumansecurity:adaptationcanbothreduceandexacerbateinsecurities

Climatechangeandwaterrelatedstresseshaveanimpactonhumansecurityinadditiontoawholerangeofothersocialandpolitical influencesonhumansecurity.Policyresponses in thenameofadaptation(MilmanandArsano,2012)andalsoautonomousresponsesofindividualsandgroups(Snorek et al. 2012) are one more channel through which hydro‐climatic impacts can beexperienced.Adaptations canhaveunequal impacts or increase the inequality betweendifferentgroups. Divergent adaptation, which occurs where one individual or group’s adaptive responsereduces the adaptive capacity of another individual or group, can increase conflict and reducehuman security (Snorek et al. 2012). Adaptation policy and interventions are subject to powerrelations that also play out in the way that diverging values, adaptation preferences andvulnerabilitiesareprioritised(AlbizuaandZografos,2012).Hegemonicpowerrelationscanresultinsomeaspectsofsecuritybeingprioritisedoverothers(MilmanandArsano,2012).Forexampleplanned adaptation responses may reduce risks from some hydro‐climate stressors but exposepeople to new risks or undermine human security in other ways, for example by reducinglivelihoodsecurity(Gebertetal.,2012)orshorttermfoodsecurity(MilmanandArsano,2012).

Climate, water and conflict: the importance of social, political and economicfactors

CLICOevidencesuggeststhatconflictisassociatedwithsocietalresponsestohydro‐climaticstressrather thanwith the impacts of hydro‐climate stresses themselves (Albizua and Zografos, 2012;MilmanandArsano,2012;Snoreketal.,2012).ForthemajorityofconflictsituationsstudiedintheCLICOproject,thepolitical,economicandsocialfactorsareconsideredtobeofgreaterimportancenowthanthehydro‐climaticstresses(Böhmeltetal.,2012;FischhendlerandKatz,2012;Snoreketal.,2012),althoughhowthisbalancemaychangeinthefutureisnotclear.However,thereismuchevidenceforlinksbetweenthesedifferentfactorsandonetypeofuncertaintyorstresscanimpactuponothers(FischhendlerandKatz,2012)andexacerbateexistingconflicts(MilmanandArsano,

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2012;Snoreketal.,2012).Factors that influenceconflictaremulti‐scalarandbuildupover longtimescales,forexampleSelbyandHoffman(2012)emphasisethattheconflictandenvironmentaldegradationseeninSudanresultfromthehistoricallyshapedandevolvingnatureofthestateanditsinstitutionsthatareconditionedbyagentsandstructuresatthelocal,nationalandglobalscale.TheexamplesofconflictdocumentedintheCLICOcasestudiestakemanydifferentformsfromlowlevel,‘silent’orlatentconflict,forexampleintheEbrodelta(AlbizuaandZografos,2012)toconflictinvolvingviolence, forexample inNiger (Snoreketal.,2012)andGambella (MilmanandArsano,2012).Whereconflictissevereandprolonged,andfrequentlyviolent,itcanbeasignificantdriverofvulnerability toclimatechange(forexample in the JordanWestBankcasestudy(TamimiandAbuJamous,2012),theGambellastudy(MilmanandArsano,2012)andtheSudanstudy(SelbyandHoffmann,2012).Thedegreeofpoliticalfreedomexperiencedinacountryappearstoinfluencethenature of conflict: more democratic countries experience more conflictual events but a lowerintensityofconflict(i.e.lessviolentinstancesofconflict)thannon‐democraticcountries(Böhmeltet al., 2012). This suggests that political freedom can allow conflicting views to be expressed.However,freedomtodebatealternativescanbecloseddownevenindemocraticcountriesbythesecuritizationofrelevantissues5(AlbizuaandZografos,2012;Dalisa,2012).

Linksbetweenconflict,cooperationandadaptivecapacity

There was some evidence at the transboundary scale for conflict or uncertainties to promotecooperation (Fischhendler and Katz, 2012) and for conflict resolution mechanisms to addressuncertaintiesandpotentialdisputes(FischhendlerandDeBruyne,2012).Atthesub‐nationalscalethedatabaseofwater related events6 recorded slightlymore cooperative events than conflictiveones,withnearlyhalf theeventsrecordedasneithercooperativenorconflictive(Bernaueretal.,2012). Cooperation or collaboration is seen as important for adaptive capacity, howevertransactioncostscaninfluencethesuccessofcooperation(FischhendlerandDeBruyne,2012)andsometypesofcooperationcanreinforceunequalsituations.

State­ledpolicyforadaptationandadaptivecapacity

Studiesdivergedintheirpositionregardingtheroleofthestateinadaptationandwhatconstitutesadaptivecapacity.ThenationstateisadoptedasthekeyinstitutionforadaptationplanningbytheUNFCCC. On the one hand, Gerstetter et al. (2012) point out the state has a certain function inadaptation as it often defines the regulatory framework governing adaptation actions byindividuals, organisations and communities. They describe how in some countries it is the stateratherthanindividualactorsthatarepushingadaptation.Ontheotherhand,MilmanandArsano(2012)questiontheappropriatenessofastrongroleforthestate in adaptationwhere the views of state actors are not representative of those of the entirepopulation,asoccursinEthiopiawherethestateadoptsaviewthatmodernisationshouldoccurat

5 Securitisation refers to the framingof an issue “in termsof security…drawingonperceptionsof national, local or

individual(in)security”(Zeitoun,2007:115)

6 Thedatabasewas compiled frommedia sources for 35 countries of theMediterranean,MiddleEast and the Sahelbetween1997and2009(Bernaueretal.2012).

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the expenseof traditional livelihoods.MilmanandArsano suggest thatquestions arisewhen thestate intervenes as to “who and what is prioritised and how such determinations are made?”Adaptation interventions or policies promoted by the state can fail to consider the diversity ofpreferences and social, political and environmental contexts in which marginalised populationsfindthemselvesandthereforefailtomeettheiradaptationneeds(Gebertetal.2012,MilmanandArsano2012;Turhan,2012)Moreover,Turhan(2012)showedhowinadequatestatepolicieshadshifted the responsibility of adaptation on to individuals (migrant agricultural labourers), whowere unable to change the socio‐institutional structure and conditions responsible for theirmarginalisation.InNiger,itwasalackofenforcementofpoliciesthatleftindividualsinadequatelysupportedintheiradaptationefforts(Snoreketal.2012).Despitethesereservationsaboutstate‐ledadaptation,someauthorssaw improvement in theadaptivecapacityofstate institutionsasanecessary condition for improving the adaptive capacity of the population (Gebert et al., 2012;SelbyandHoffmann,2012;Snoreketal.,2012).With respect to institutional adaptive capacity, there was an emphasis on the importance ofimprovedcoordinationbetweensectorsandactorsatmultiplescales(Gerstetteretal.,2012)fromthetransboundary(Milmanetal.,2012)tothelocal(AlbizuaandZografos,2012)aswellasbetteraccess to knowledge, and sufficient ability of policy actors to respond to new challenges andfinancial opportunities (Gerstetter et al., 2012). In some cases, multiple uncertainties createcomplexitiesthatactedassignificantbarrierstoplanningadaptiveresponses(Gebertetal.,2012)and in others institutional and infrastructural gaps and poor access to data were seen as keybarriers to the development of adaptive capacity (Selby and Hoffmann, 2012). An improvedaccountabilityofstateinstitutions(SelbyandHoffmann,2012;Snoreketal.,2012),moreuniversalaccess to justice, less corruption and adequate enforcement of appropriate rules (Snorek et al.,2012)werealsoseenasrequirementsforimprovedadaptivecapacity.

Conditionsforsuccessfuladaptation

The success of adaptive responses depends on the perspective taken. Diverging values andpreferences account for different adaptation outcomes. Where different values, perspectives,culture and traditions are not taken into account there is a risk of tensions andmal‐adaptation(Albizua and Zografos, 2012; Gebert et al., 2012; Milman and Arsano, 2012; Turhan, 2012).Althoughevidenceisessentialformakingadaptationdecisions,tensionscouldarisewhereexpertandscientificknowledgeisprivilegedoverothertypesofknowledge(AlbizuaandZografos,2012).Processesofadaptationplanninganddevelopmentthataredeliberativeandincorporatemultipleperspectives can improve policy effectiveness by reducing the risk of increased insecurities andconflict arising from adaptation (Albizua and Zografos, 2012; Pascual et al., 2012). However,deliberativeprocessesareopentomanipulationofthelesspowerfulbythosewithmorepowerandhavehighcoststoimplement(Chilvers,2009).Some of the findings add to the debate in the climate change adaptation literature abouttransformationalversusincrementaladaptation.Incrementaladaptations,whichmaintaincurrentfunctions of socio‐ecological systems, are seen as potentially inadequate in some locations andsystems for responding to the high rates of climate change predicted for the 21st century andbeyond. Large changes in climate coupledwithhigh vulnerabilitymay in some locations require

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transformationaladaptation,involvingnewadaptationsthattransformplacesorchangelocations(Kates et al. 2012). Nevertheless, Milman and Arsano (2012) and Gebert et al. (2012) raiseconcerns about transformational adaptation, which in the Gambella case study, increasedvulnerabilitiestosomerisksandreducedthehumansecurityofthepopulationsmostaffected,atleastintheshortterm(MilmanandArsano,2012).Gebertetal.(2012)recommendedthatplannedresettlement,whichcouldbeconsideredatransformationaladaptation,shouldaddresslivelihoodssustainabilityandprovideincentivesthataretargeted.ThesetwocasesofAlexandria(Gebertetal.,2012) and Gambella (Milman and Arsano, 2012) support an argument in favour of a balancebetweenincrementalismandtransformationinadaptationtoclimatechange.

Lessons fromapolitical ecologyperspective: the role of the state inhydroandhumansecurity

KallisandZografos(2012)explainthatasubject’sexposuretohydro‐climatestressandresultanthydro‐insecurity is the function not only of their environment but also wider, long term socio‐politicalinsecuritiesassociatedwithaspectsofthepoliticaleconomysuchaslandinvestmentsandworldmarkets. Inaddition,MilmanandArsano(2012)suggest thatanunderappreciationof thepolitical ecology of climate change adaptation may also cause further conflict and humaninsecurities in the future. According to Milman and Arsano (2012) the costs and benefits ofdevelopmentinterventionsinvulnerableregionslikeGambella,Ethiopia,aredeterminedtoalargeextent by relationships between politics, economics and power. Consequently, the politicaleconomy of an area controls the type of adaptive response and also the component of humansecurityprioritized.MilmanandArsanoassert thatmorestudiesneedtoexplorehowauthority, interestsandpoweraredistributedandhowtheseforcesinfluenceclimateadaptationoutcomes.Otherfindingsraiseattentiononthepowerimplicationsofde‐politicisingdecision‐makingthroughstate actions that securitise the issue of adaptation (Albizua and Zografos, 2012) or disasterresponseandreconstruction(D’AlisaandKallis,2012).Powereffectsarealsoevidentinadaptationresponses that may fail to consider value dimensions of climate change (Albizua and Zografos,2012;Turhan,2012)andhenceresultinthesilencingofsomevoicesthatcouldleadtoincreasedinsecurity,asenseofinjustice,andpotentiallyconflict.Turhan(2012)describesstateinterventionsinthenameofadaptationas‘biopolitics’(Baldwin,2012;Dalby,2011;Reid,2010,inTurhan2012)sincetheyattemptto“createadaptableindividualswhoneitherthreatentheexistingeconomicnorthepoliticalorder”(Turhan,2012,p4).Thereisevidenceinsomecasestudiesofstateactorsandpoliciesadoptingaclimatechangediscoursetocontroltheadaptationagendafortheirownaims(MilmanandArsano,2012;Turhan,2012).Selby and Hoffman (2012) draw attention to the experience of ecological degradation and theproduction of scarcity that result from state development policies and conflict in Sudan. Theydescribehowthesepoliciesarethemselvessubjecttosocialforcesandintereststhataremadeupofmultipleactorsthatneedtoberecognised,ratherthanoneabstractentityof‘thestate’.SelbyandHoffman(2012)andAlbizuaandZografos(2012)alsoraisetheroleofwaterdemand,inparticularfor irrigated agriculture, in the social production ofwater scarcities. Suchhydro‐insecurities arecreated not only locally and nationally butmediated by the global political economy and global

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geopolitical structures. Examples include the consequences for hydro‐security of foreign directinvestmentsinlandinEthiopia(MilmanandArsano,2012)andSudan(SelbyandHoffman,2012).Finally,studiesalsohighlighttheimportanceofpoliticaluncertaintyasanelementofthepoliticalenvironmentthatcontributestoweakstateinstitutionalcapacitytodealwithinsecurity(Gebertetal.2012;TamimiandAbuJamous,2012).AcknowledgementsTheauthorsaregrateful forthecontributionsofCLICOcolleaguestothisdocument, inparticulartheauthorsofthecasestudypapersandworkpackagedeliverablescitedinthisreportandtothemanyoftheseauthorswhoprovideddetailedcommentsandeditstothefirstdraftofthisreport:Amaia Albizua, Adriana Bruggeman, Tobias Böhmelt, Giacomo DAlisa, Niklas Gebert, ChristianeGerstetter,ClemensHoffman,GiorgosKallis, JuliaKloos,KatrionaMcGlade,AnitaMilman,EduardPla,FabriceRenaud,ThereseRosenfeld,JanSelby,JulieSnorek,andChristosZografos.

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