l&e law and finance 2012
TRANSCRIPT
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School of Economics, Finance and Management
MSc Law and Economics (ECONM2027)
Brief Notes on Law and Finance
1. Quick background on Legal Families
The two big legal families are:
Civil Law Common Law
Primary features of civil law are:
Origin based on Roman Law and CodeNapoleon
Historically concerned with preventingdisorderextensive regulation to control it byensuring judges follow the states objectives
Developed in continental Europe Based on general abstract principles regardless
of case
Codified with detailed definitions
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Each rule sets out lengthy enumerations ofspecific applications or exceptions
There are three sub families of civil law(French, German and Scandinavian)
Primary features of common law are:
Origin based on traditional English Law Developed to control the power of the state(as represented initially by monarchy) Evolved in current form from 11th century
onwards
Doctrine of stare decisis (translation - stickto decisions, i.e., essentially precedent
based) Based on reasoning from case to case Process of distinguishing (judges do not
have to apply precedent if alleged precedent
is significantly different from current case)
Judge based law
English Common Law and French and German
Civil Law have been exported throughout the
world.
See Annex 1
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2. Is the distinction between the legal families
significant and permanent?
Balas, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer
(2008 paper: The divergence of legal procedures)
suggest that it is.
See Annex 2, 3 and 4
(taken from their paper).
They look at two examples:
Bounced cheque Eviction of tenant.
Uses seven measures to create an index of
formalism they show that civil law has more
formalism than common law.
Their evidence (from 1950 onwards) shows no
convergence if anything there appears to bedivergence.
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3. Legal origin theory
Annex 5 gives La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and
Shleifers view of the relationship between legalorigin and outcomes.
Common law appears to give greater protection to
outside investors and creditors relative to civil
common law.
If true, what might be reasons?
One strand goes back to strength of thestate versus individual
Another suggests that common law isbetter able to change to meet new
situations
So what follows if it is true?
Better protection leads to better developedfinancial markets. See Annex 6, 7 8 and 9.
Less well documented but growing view thatdeveloped financial markets are good for
growth. See Annex 10.
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Ownership concentration is response to thesedifferences in investor protection (the
concentration of ownership is highest in civil
law countries).
4. All the above is hotly disputed.
Specific criticisms include:
Poor data Reverse causality Omitted variables Not what is written but the implementation of
it
See Annex 11
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5. Two Alternative views
5a Endowments Theory
There are arguments that it is the fundamental
initial endowments that matter, e.g., Beck,
Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2003) argue (using
settler mortality and latitude as a proxy for initial
endowments) that it is initial endowments that
matter.
See Annex 12, 13, 14, 15 and 16.
5b. Trust
Franks et al (2008) disagree with underlying thesis
about legal origin and claim that there is little
evidence once one looks in detail.
They claim dispersion came first (formalinvestor protection only emerged in the secondhalf of the century), claiming 1948 was the
key date and that there was little protection in
UK at all until end of 1920s - yet there was
significant dispersion of ownership at this time
and one could argue that the biggest changes
came before 1950.
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See Annex 17
They also claim protection came throughstatute not through common law.
They claim the key issue is trust (arguing thatlocal stock exchanges and shareholders
distance from the company matter in creating
trust).
See Annex 18 and 19
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References:
(In each case you will probably need to press ctrl when you click)
1. The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins Rafael La Porta,
Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer Journal of Economic
Literature 2008, 46:2, 285332
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1028081
Contains Annex 1, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10.
2. Law, endowments, and finance Thorsten Beck, Asli Demirguc-Kunt, and Ross Levine. Journal of Financial Economics Volume 70,
Issue 2, November 2003, Pages 137-181
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=321355
(click on NBER subscribers download)
Contains Annex 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 and 16.
3. Ownership: Evolution and Regulation, Julian Franks, Colin Mayer,and Stefano Rossi, inReview of Financial Studies (2008).
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=354381
Contains Annex 17, 18 and 19.
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1028081http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1028081http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/0304405Xhttp://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=PublicationURL&_tockey=%23TOC%235938%232003%23999299997%23466522%23FLA%23&_cdi=5938&_pubType=J&view=c&_auth=y&_acct=C000050221&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_userid=10&md5=10a8515c9b360c1d2840c8e9ef0df4cahttp://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=PublicationURL&_tockey=%23TOC%235938%232003%23999299997%23466522%23FLA%23&_cdi=5938&_pubType=J&view=c&_auth=y&_acct=C000050221&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_userid=10&md5=10a8515c9b360c1d2840c8e9ef0df4cahttp://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=321355http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=321355http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=354381http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=354381http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=354381http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=321355http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=PublicationURL&_tockey=%23TOC%235938%232003%23999299997%23466522%23FLA%23&_cdi=5938&_pubType=J&view=c&_auth=y&_acct=C000050221&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_userid=10&md5=10a8515c9b360c1d2840c8e9ef0df4cahttp://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=PublicationURL&_tockey=%23TOC%235938%232003%23999299997%23466522%23FLA%23&_cdi=5938&_pubType=J&view=c&_auth=y&_acct=C000050221&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_userid=10&md5=10a8515c9b360c1d2840c8e9ef0df4cahttp://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/0304405Xhttp://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1028081