law enforcement and its role in the fight against drug trafficking
TRANSCRIPT
10427/02 DCL 1 /dl
DGF 2C EN
Council of the European Union
Brussels, 19 January 2018 (OR. en) 10427/02 DCL 1 CRIMORG 53
DECLASSIFICATION
of document: ST 10427/02 RESTREINT UE/EU RESTRICTED
dated: 26 June 2002
new status: Public
Subject: EVALUATION REPORT ON
SECOND ROUND OF MUTUAL EVALUATIONS
"LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ITS ROLE
IN THE FIGHT AGAINST DRUG TRAFFICKING"
REPORT ON BELGIUM
Delegations will find attached the declassified version of the above document.
The text of this document is identical to the previous version.
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COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
Brussels, 26 June 2002
10427/02 RESTREINT UE
CRIMORG 53
EVALUATION REPORT ON
SECOND ROUND OF MUTUAL EVALUATIONS
"LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ITS ROLE
IN THE FIGHT AGAINST DRUG TRAFFICKING"
REPORT ON BELGIUM
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T A B L E O F C O N T E N T S
1 INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................................... 4
1.1 General .............................................................................................................................. 4
1.2 Persons involved in the evaluation .................................................................................... 4
1.3 Programme ........................................................................................................................ 4
1.4 Preparation of the report .................................................................................................... 4
1.5 Structure of the report ....................................................................................................... 5
2 GENERAL INFORMATION AND STRUCTURES ................................................................ 6
2.1 Competent Authorities – General Comments ................................................................... 6
2.2 Legal bases and regulating provisions .............................................................................. 8
2.3 Prosecution Services and Judges ..................................................................................... 10
2.4 Police Authorities ............................................................................................................ 11
2.5 Customs Authorities ........................................................................................................ 13
2.6 Training ........................................................................................................................... 14
2.7 Monitoring....................................................................................................................... 15
3 INTELLIGENCE...................................................................................................................... 17
3.1 General ............................................................................................................................ 17
3.2 Financial Intelligence ...................................................................................................... 19
4 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION TECHNIQUES ........................................................................ 22
4.1 Financial investigations by police, customs and prosecutors.......................................... 22
4.2 Special investigative techniques ..................................................................................... 25
5 COORDINATION AND COOPERATION ............................................................................. 28
5.1 Cooperation at national level .......................................................................................... 28
5.2 Cooperation at international level ................................................................................... 29
5.3 Drugs liaison officers ...................................................................................................... 31
6 EVALUATION OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SYSTEMS IN BELGIUM
RELATING TO THE FIGHT AGAINST DRUG TRAFFICKING: STRUCTURE,
INTELLIGENCE, SPECIAL INVESTIGATION TECHNIQUES AND
COORDINATION AND COOPERATION ............................................................................. 33
6.1 General Comments .......................................................................................................... 33
6.2 Possible Improvements ................................................................................................... 38
7 RECOMMENDATIONS TO BELGIUM, AND, WHERE APPLICABLE TO OTHER
MEMBER STATES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION .............................................................. 44
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ANNEX A VISITING PROGRAMME AND LIST OF PERSONS SEEN ............................ 46
ANNEX B BILATERAL AGREEMENTS CONCLUDED BETWEEN BELGIUM ............ 52
AND OTHER STATES ......................................................................................... 52
ANNEX C AGREEMENTS ON CROSS-BORDER POLICE COOPERATION .................. 53
WITH ADJACENT MEMBER STATES ............................................................. 53
ANNEX D LIAISON OFFICERS ............................................................................................ 55
ANNEX E STATEMENTS RECEIVED FROM THE BELGIAN AUTHORITIES ............. 57
REGARDING SUBSTANTIAL CHANGES IN THEIR POLICE AND
JUDICIAL SYSTEM
________________________
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P A R T I
1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 General
Following the adoption of the Joint Action of 5 December 1997, a mechanism for evaluating the
application and implementation at national level of international undertakings in the fight against
organised crime was established.
Belgium was the fifth Member State to be evaluated as part of the second round of mutual
evaluations concerning law enforcement and it's role in the fight against drug trafficking.
1.2 Persons involved in the evaluation
The examiners for the evaluation were Mr. Gérard Browne (Colonel, Direction Générale de la
Gendarmerie Nationale, France), Mr. Georges Heisbourg (Procureur d’Etat adjoint au Parquet de
Luxembourg, Luxembourg) and Mr. Dott. Luciano Ruggeri (Dirigente Superiore di polizia,
Direzione Centrale Antidroga, Italy). This team accompanied by two members of the General
Secretariat and one member of the Commission visited Belgium for five days from
27 November 2000 to 1 December 2000.
1.3 Programme
The programme of the evaluation team and the list of the persons seen during the evaluation visit,
and from whom information was received, is at Annex A.
1.4 Preparation of the report
Following these meetings, the evaluation team prepared this report, with the assistance of the
Council Secretariat, based on the observations and conclusions of the experts in the team together
with the answers to the Questionnaire (doc 12972/ 99 CRIMORG 171) which the Belgian
authorities had provided. The principle purpose of this report is to evaluate the application and
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implementation at national level of instruments dealing with law enforcement and drug trafficking,
of the resulting legislation and practices at national level and of international cooperation in the
fight against drug trafficking. The evaluation seeks in particular to assess cooperation and
coordination between different law enforcement structures and operational practices in them. The
main focus of the evaluation is the practical day to day cooperation between different units both at
national and international level.
1.5 Structure of the report
The report first describes the organisational structures, intelligence systems, special investigation
techniques and methods of coordination and cooperation utilised in Belgium in the fight against
drug trafficking. The report then evaluates the effectiveness of these systems and finally, the experts
draw conclusions and make recommendations.
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P A R T I I 1
2 GENERAL INFORMATION AND STRUCTURES
This chapter is aimed at describing the institutional and legal framework in Belgium that is
employed in the fight against drugs crime.
At the time of the evaluation the police service in Belgium was divided into three parts: the
municipal police, the criminal police attached to the Public Prosecutor's Office and the
gendarmerie. Coordination between the three police services is organised at local and at national
level.
It has to be noted however that as from 1st January 2001 a major restructuring of the police will take
place that is bringing into effect the provisions of a law that has been passed in 19982. Thus the
police will be divided into two forces, organised and structured on a federal and a local levels.
2.1 Competent Authorities – General Comments
2.1.1 Belgium has a central body responsible for coordinating police enquiries, the institution of
Magistrat National. It was introduced in 1990 following the urgent need to coordinate and
centralise investigations, enquiries and prosecutions relating to certain forms of serious crime.
The three areas in which the Magistrats Nationaux operate are organised crime in its various forms,
large-scale banditry and terrorism.
In the area of international cooperation, apart from exercising their own powers, the three Magistrat
Nationaux play a supporting role to their colleagues, the public prosecutors and examining
magistrates, with regard to both active and passive letters of request.
They also have specific powers with regard to cross-border surveillance (in the Schengen context),
controlled deliveries and undercover operations (pseudo-purchase and infiltration).
1 This part of the report is essentially based on the answers Belgium has provided to the
Questionnaire. 2 Loi organisant un service de police intégré structuré à deux niveaux of 7 December 1998.
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2.1.2 Within the Service Général d’Appui Policier - SGAP1, the International Judicial Cooperation
Division acts as central contact point for all cross-border exchanges of police information. In this
role it has to coordinate the use to which such information is put. This entails indexing and
recording all the information exchanged so that it can be made available to the duly authorised
law enforcement bodies.
The Division operates under the supervision of the National Magistrates' Office and the
Commission permanente de la protection de la vie privée (Standing Committee on the Protection of
Privacy).
2.1.3 In the gendarmerie, the Bureau Central des Recherches – Programme Drogues (BCR) not
only coordinates surveillance operations by gendarmerie units but also coordinates the general anti-
drugs effort. The department also has responsibility for supporting and monitoring the activities of
the operational units, and is in charge of developing anti-drugs action plans for the gendarmerie
units.
The department has a staff of 23, 17 of whom are primarily involved in coordinating the
law enforcement effort.
2.1.4 At local level, local information offices – the Bureaux d'Information d'Arrondissement
(BIA) – have been set up to coordinate the exchange of information for the different police services,
particularly on drugs. These local offices are fed with enquiry data sheets, factual data from official
statements and non-specific information of interest in police investigations. The staff of the BIA is
in principle drawn from the three police services. Furthermore a precursor unit that is also staffed
by customs officers from the DNR exists within the ministry of health.
2.1.5 Within the customs service the Direction Nationale des Recherches (DNR) acts as the national
and international coordinating unit. It facilitates information exchange, coordination of operations
and is representing the Belgian customs authorities in international for a. Since mid-1999 the DNR
has established a Europol unit that has seconded liaison officers to Europol and SGAP thus
providing an information exchange between the gendarmerie and customs.
1 The SGAP was set up in accordance with the Royal Decree of 11 July 1994 (amended on
11 June 1998).
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2.2 Legal bases and regulating provisions
2.2.1 In Belgium the guidelines and directives in the area of combating drug trafficking are acts
adopted under the law enforcement policy. The legal bases of any law enforcement policy act are as
follows:
Article 151(1) of the Constitution which assigns to the relevant minister, in this case the
Minister for Justice, the power to adopt binding law enforcement policy directives, including
directives on investigation and prosecution policy.
Article 143a of the Judicial Code setting up, under the authority of the Minister for Justice,
the Collège des Procureurs Généraux responsible for implementing law enforcement policy
as determined in directives adopted by the Minister for Justice in accordance with
Article 143b of that Code.
Article 143b further states that the Minister for Justice, after asking the Collège for its
opinion, adopts the law enforcement policy directives, including directives on investigation
and prosecution policy, and that such directives are binding on all members of the Public
Prosecutor's Office; the Principal Public Prosecutors ensure that they are implemented.
2.2.2 The Law of 24 February 19211, as amended by the laws of 9 July 1975, 14 July 1994 and
17 November 1998, penalises the principal criminal offences related to drugs crime.
2.2.3 It contains a number of aggravating circumstances that transform misdemeanours into
criminal offences. The severity of the punishment varies in such cases according to the age of the
"victim", according to the consequences of the offence or according to the degree of involvement in
drug trafficking.
1 Loi concernant le trafic des substances vénéneuses, soporifiques, stupéfiantes, désinfectantes
ou antiseptiques.
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2.2.4 There also exists a wide range of supplementary penalties like bans and closures, and
confiscation. In derogation from ordinary law, a judge may confiscate objects, which were used or
were intended for use in committing an offence, even if the objects do not belong to the offender.
In other circumstances, Articles 42 and 43 of the Penal Code remain applicable.
2.2.5 The law also contains provisions for mitigation of punishment that allow for a reduction of
sentences depending on whether information is being divulged before or after proceedings have
been commenced.
2.2.6 For habitual offenders the law foresees augmented sentences should an offence be repeated
within five years; a minor sentence may be doubled and a criminal sentence increased in accordance
and sentences passed abroad for such offences will be taken into consideration when deciding
whether a repeated offence has been committed.
2.2.7 A Joint directive concerning the prosecution policy for possession and selling of illicit drugs
for profit from the Minister for Justice and the Principal Public Prosecutors issued on 8 May 1998
laid down a prosecuting policy for possession and selling of illicit drugs for profit.
Between a purely repressive approach and a policy of tolerance, Belgium is pursuing a "third way"
based on prevention, help and deterrence its key objective being to discourage and reduce drug
consumption and cut the number of new drug users. Second objective is the protection of society
that is confronted with the phenomenon of drug use and its consequences. Measures under this
objective also include helping drug addicts to lead as normal a life as possible despite their
addiction. Criminalising, and specifically imprisonment, are considered the ultimate cure in cases
where the use of certain substances is causing problems. This Joint directive is currently being
reviewed, amended and revised.
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2.3 Prosecution Services and Judges
2.3.1 The Joint directive mentioned above has its implications on the way the prosecution policy is
executed. As stated, this directive concerns breaches of the law of 1921, as well as orders for the
enforcement of that law, specifically the prosecution policy for possession of drugs and selling
drugs for profit in order to feed a personal habit.
The Joint directive, however, covers only delinquent users. The law-enforcement policy on drug
trafficking and criminal gangs involved in drug trafficking is not its specific subject. The directive
takes the approach that selling drugs for profit must be treated differently from selling to finance a
personal habit.
From the information that was supplied by the Belgian authorities it appeared that standardising
prosecution procedures as the Joint directive advocates is a difficult matter as at local and regional
level each office developed its own template to decide whether drugs have been sold for profit or
not.
2.3.2 Most police districts have one or more magistrates who specialise in drugs problems.
However, the methods used in practice vary widely: only a few prosecutor's offices train
magistrates to specialise in drugs within organised crime units. Where such units do exist, the entire
effort in the area of drug user policy is aimed at identifying drug dealing, or detecting a link in the
chain of organised drug trafficking. Other prosecutor's offices, on the other hand, adopt a policy
which is more centred on the problems of drugs users.
2.3.3 One magistrate from the team of Magistrats nationaux is given particular responsibility for
drug trafficking cases. There are more of such cases than any other.
As mentioned in 2.1.1 the Magistrats nationaux operate both at national level (coordination of
enquiries) and at international level (cross-border surveillance, controlled deliveries, execution of
international letters rogatory).
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In addition, each prosecutor's office in Belgium has one or more specialist magistrates working
full-time or part-time on drugs cases according to the size of the office. On the other hand, there is
no judge who specialises in cases of this type. These are passed to the magistrate's courts
responsible for administering ordinary law.
The sphere of competence of such magistrates is not different from that of their colleagues.
Relations with other district prosecutors were described as good, due to the frequent general
meetings of prosecutors (27 districts) they can attend in Brussels, called by the assistant magistrate
at the Collège des Procureurs Généraux.
2.3.4 Operational coordination between prosecution services/judges specialising in the investigation
and prosecution of drug trafficking is a matter for the Magistrat National who has responsibility for
ensuring coordination and cooperation between districts.
Moreover, relations between judges and prosecuting magistrates call for no special comment.
Collaboration with the examining magistrates in such cases was described as good.
2.3.5 Police investigations are at all times under the control of a magistrate. This general rule also
applies to proactive police work. Thus any use of special investigative techniques in the course of
an enquiry is subject to the written prior authorisation of the magistrate concerned.
2.4 Police Authorities
2.4.1 As previously described, Belgium had three police services at the time of the evaluation.
The criminal police deal with criminal enquiries; in theory they have no preventive role.
The municipal police both conduct investigations (at local level) and take preventive
measures.
The gendarmerie has jurisdiction over the entire territory and can act both in criminal cases
and in matters of prevention.
2.4.2 Although in principle all three police services have the power to deal with drugs problems, in
practice their tasks are allocated in such a way that the criminal police deal only exceptionally with
drugs cases, with the municipal police being mostly restricted to investigations and measures
concerning users or drug dealing at local level.
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2.4.3 The gendarmerie is divided on the one hand into units responsible for delivering policing to
the whole population and in particular for the local aspects of the drugs problem and on the other
hand into Surveillance and Investigation Squads (BSRs) which are amongst others responsible for
the supra-local and international aspects of the drugs problem.
2.4.4 The BCR – drugs programme coordinates action by the former units and the BSR. Although
not exclusively dealing with drugs matters, a number of surveillance squads in the gendarmerie help
out the units and the BSR.
The gendarmerie has nearly 450 units and 25 BSRs. As they are not exclusively devoted to dealing
with the drugs problem, it is not possible to determine the human and/or financial resources
involved.
2.4.5 In the gendarmerie, the BCR – Drugs Programme is also responsible for coordination and
cooperation with the various competent bodies in order to implement other aspects of the fight
against drug abuse, such as cooperation with community bodies coordinating prevention of drug
abuse (VAD1, CCAD2, ASL3, focal point REITOX4 etc.), NGOs (such as Infordrogues, Sleutel,
De Spiegel or Drugsbeleid 2000) or other authorities (such as the Ministry for Secondary Education
of the French-speaking Community of Belgium).
There is also cooperation with certain private companies, such as express transport companies,
discothèque and club managers, and professional bodies (e.g. pharmacists).
2.4.6 The gendarmerie has guidelines for policing translating the political priorities in fighting the
drugs problem. This policing policy tries to strike a balance between the deterrent and the
preventive approaches or identify ways in which they can relate to each other, encouraging
collaboration between the different levels and units of the gendarmerie and if possible with services
outside.
1 Vereniging voor Alcohol en andere Drugprobleemen. 2 Comité de Concertation Action Drogue. 3 Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Suchtvorbeugung und Lebensbewältigung. 4 Réseau européen d'information sur les drogues et les toxicomanies.
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2.4.7 The current thrust of gendarmerie policy towards users is to act as a relay and provide
objective information to specialist social workers in contact with young people; with buying and
selling on a small scale, the main effort is focused on reducing nuisance and the feeling of
insecurity, but when it comes to illicit drug manufacture and trafficking, priority is given to
breaking up the criminal gangs.
2.5 Customs Authorities
2.5.1 All officials of the Customs and Excise Authority are authorised to carry out controls
anywhere in Belgium of any means of transport carrying or presumed to be carrying goods and to
make sure that there is no question of imports, exports, transit or carriage in contravention of the
law. This right also applies to the control of persons. All public-administration officials may
cooperate in any resulting controls, penalties or seizures.
2.5.2 In the particular case of the illegal import, export, transit and carriage of narcotic drugs and
psychotropic substances, the agents who first detect them are to notify their local superior and the
customs and excise investigation services of what they have found and the latter will in turn consult
the Direction Nationale des Recherches (DNR). It is customary for operational contacts with a
Magistrat National, the police services and the judicial authorities concerning narcotic drugs and
psychotropic substances to be conducted through the DNR, which directly supervises the work of
the seven regional inspectorates for customs and excise investigations.
2.5.3 In application of Article 10 of the Convention of 7 September 1967 on the provision of
Mutual Assistance by Customs Authorities (NAPLES I), information on suspect movement of
goods or forms of carriage and suspect shipping may however be exchanged directly between
Belgian regional inspectorates for customs and excise and their counterparts in the Member States
of the European Community.
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2.5.4 The DNR has a staff of 32 while there are 222 persons working for the investigation
inspectorates which have to report to it and are empowered to deal with drug matters. Such staff are
not responsible solely for investigating cases of fraudulent import, export and transit of narcotic
drugs and psychotropic substances. The number of people assigned to this task depends on the
number of "calls" from local services, on communications from national services and/or colleagues
abroad with whom they are collaborating or indeed on their own activities as elaborated in response
to risk analysis. It is therefore extremely difficult in the case of the customs services to quantify the
human and financial resources involved in prosecuting drug trafficking. Furthermore a specialised
precursor unit is operating within the DNR, staffed by members of the Ministries of Health’s
Inspection de la pharmacie and the DNR.
2.5.5 Policies are implemented by general directives that are sent out to the customs services on
how to deal with established breaches of the Act of 24 February 1921 and its implementing
provisions (including the rules for certain psychotropic substances).
2.5.6 Furthermore, a distinction is made between the ordinary law aspect which is notified to the
prosecutor's offices for their attention and customs or licensing misdemeanours which are dealt with
by the customs authorities themselves.
2.6 Training
2.6.1 The basic training undergone by every gendarme broaches the problems of narcotic drugs
(legislation, product identification, relay function, nuisance reduction, intervention in local dealing,
etc.). Gendarmes who are assigned to the BSR then undergo specific training, which covers special
police techniques (controlled delivery, cross-border surveillance, etc.), a grounding in product
recognition and legal bases (law on narcotic drugs, precursors, doping, etc.), basic property
investigation techniques and the like. This theoretical training lasts several weeks and BSR
candidates also spend several months in a work-experience placement at a BSR.
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2.6.2 There are moreover supplementary judicial-training modules for those more especially
concerned with the problems of narcotic drugs, particularly within the BSR. On this basis there
have been continuous-training sessions dealing with the dismantling of illicit laboratories,
precursors, information management, specific criminal groups (Turks, Colombians, etc.) and the
diversion of medicinal products.
2.6.3 Newly recruited staff of the Customs and Excise Authority undergo six hours of basic training
in drugs matters. Research inspectorate agents can follow specialised courses and seminars on the
prosecution of drug trafficking and related subjects (e.g. precursors).
2.6.4 To qualify for analytical training in the Gendarmerie, any applicant who so requests must pass
the "operational crime analyst" selection tests organised jointly by the recruitment service and the
Crime Analysis Bureau. However, if it is decided following the selection tests that an applicant is
not suited, this will prevent him from following such a training course for 2 years. The applicant
must also undertake to follow a 15-week training course 2 weeks of which will be residential. This
basic training includes 6 weeks of work-experience placement with the BCR and field units.
2.6.5 As well as such basic training, there are arrangements for advanced training. This is organised
for certain analysts on the basis of their evaluation or for all. Training and information days are
organised every 2 months under the aegis of the director of the Crime Analysis Bureau and the
presence of analysts is required. Regular refresher courses are organised on all matters relating to
crime analysis, particularly in the field of informatics, for all working analysts.
2.6.6 Within the customs there is presently no provision for advanced training in crime analysis. To
date, only a few representatives of the Customs and Excise Administration (investigation and
training services) have taken part in a special training seminar.
2.7 Monitoring
2.7.1 There are no special evaluation systems to assess the implementation of agreed decisions in
the law enforcement area, appropriate use of resources or whether all mandatory procedures have
been respected.
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2.7.2 The Belgian authorities informed that this function is safeguarded by the fact that the
prosecutor's office remains the guardian of the legality of investigation procedures used by the
police services, taking into account the criteria of legality, subsidiarity, proportionality and
advisability.
2.7.3 Furthermore National magistrates monitor the use of funds allocated to undercover
operations.
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3 INTELLIGENCE
3.1 General
3.1.1 A distinction needs to be made between "soft" and "hard" information. Soft information is
exclusively for use by the police and cannot be used in judicial proceedings. Hard information, on
the other hand, can be used in judicial proceedings and is stored in a data bank to which all police
services have access. Customs officials can also be given access through their liaison officer at the
SGAP and Europol.
3.1.2 Both soft and hard information may be used in strategic analysis (intelligence). The input into
the data bank of hard information consists of the records and standard forms, which summarize that
information. Every discovery concerning narcotic drugs is entered into a standard form, which is
made available to all police services.
An informal document concerning seizures at the national airport is widely circulated at both
national and international level.
3.1.3 Strategic reports produced by international bodies or other countries are used at BCR, in
particular to assess whether the measures decided on by the gendarmerie in Belgium are still
appropriate. Operational analyses by the gendarmerie may be used in specific judicial proceedings
but also, more generally, in response to a particular modus operandi. The most recent example was
analysis of imports of hashish along the route from Morocco.
3.1.4 Currently the following data banks are being used by the police:
The data banks of hard police information (POLIS and PJP). These data banks are managed
by the gendarmerie and the criminal police respectively and input via standard forms comes
from the police services connected to the systems.
The National Register, which comprises administrative data on persons and is managed by the
Ministry of the Interior.
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The DIV data bank, which contains information on vehicles registered in Belgium and is
operated by the Ministry of Communications.
The data bank containing information on telephone subscriptions to the former national
operator (Belgacom).
The data bank of soft police information with an input via reports and requests from the
various national and foreign units and services, which is operated by the gendarmerie and to
which only gendarmerie units have access.
The Europol and Interpol data banks as well as the SIS via the SGAP.
3.1.5 The limits regarding the extent of international police collaboration for judicial purposes with
foreign police authorities has been particularly specified in a recent circular from the Collège des
Procureurs Généraux. Some information may be freely exchanged between police services while
others can only be exchanged if there is prior agreement by the magistrates responsible for the
dossiers. The absence of a definition of the term "for police use only" means that the various police
services differ in their interpretations of it. Pursuant to the Directive of the Minister for Justice and
the Collège des Procureurs Généraux, Belgian police services may exchange soft information with
foreign law enforcement authorities.
3.1.6 As mentioned in 2.1.2, the International Judicial Cooperation Division of the SGAP as the
central contact point for all cross-border exchanges of police information includes among its chief
tasks coordination of the use of such information.
To that end, all information exchanged is indexed and recorded so that it can be made available to
duly authorised law enforcement services. The Division has to report to the office of the Magistrat
National and the Commission permanente de la protection de la vie privée.
3.1.7 The Cellule de Traitement des Informations Financières – CTIF is Belgiums financial
intelligence unit (FIU). It is an administrative authority placed under the joint control of the
Ministry of Justice and Ministry of Finance. Its powers for the processing of financial information
relate to the combating of all aspects of money laundering and are not therefore limited to drug
trafficking.
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3.1.8 Directly attached to the Minister of Justice is the Service de la politique criminelle. Its
genuine objective is the collection of information that is related to criminal policy which is being
processed into advice for the ministry, the Collège des procureurs on prevention policy and matters
of co-ordination between the different areas. Only recently the service has begun to extend its
activities into the sector of fighting drugs crime so that its role in a future strategy to combat drug
trafficking cannot be assessed yet.
3.2 Financial Intelligence
3.2.1 The Cellule de Traitement des Informations Financières – CTIF is headed by a magistrate
seconded from the prosecutor's office and is neither a judicial authority nor a police service but is
intended to fulfil a judicial purpose by submitting to the competent prosecutor's office dossiers
providing serious evidence of money laundering with a view to possible prosecution.
3.2.2 The CTIF centralises, processes and analyses information on the laundering of money
obtained inter alia through drug trafficking and other forms of serious crime of which there is an
exhaustive list in the Act of 11 January 19931. It is responsible for receiving declarations
concerning suspected money laundering made by financial bodies (credit institutions, foreign-
exchange offices, investment companies, life insurance companies, etc.) and other professions
which may be used for money laundering (casinos, estate agents, transporters of funds, notaries,
process servers, accountants, tax consultants, company auditors). These bodies and professions are
required by the Act of 11 January 1993 to communicate any suspicions to the CTIF. Moreover, the
latter may ask them for information of any kind, which it deems useful in carrying out its task.
However, notaries, process servers, accountants, tax consultants and auditors have the option of
invoking professional secrecy as authorised by Article 458 of the Penal Code.
1 LOI relative à la prévention de l'utilisation du système financier aux fins du blanchiment de
capitaux (annule et remplace le texte paru au M.B. du 28-01-1993, p. 1564) Publié le : 09-02-1993.
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3.2.3 In addition, the CTIF may also request information from the police services (municipal police,
criminal police, gendarmerie) and the administrative services of the State (Special tax inspectorate,
Tax authority for undertakings and revenue, Customs service, State security, Aliens office, etc.).
The CTIF makes use of the services of liaison officers from the gendarmerie and the criminal
police, who ensure the harmonious and efficient transmission of information from the police
services to the CTIF. Much information is also transmitted by the tax authority. Since
February 2000, the CTIF is also authorised to access the National Register of Natural Persons.
3.2.4 The supervisory, trusteeship and disciplinary authorities of bodies and professions required to
make declarations must also inform the CTIF of any facts they have come across that are likely to
constitute proof of money laundering.
3.2.5 Finally, the CTIF also exchanges information as part of mutual collaboration on a reciprocal
basis with FIUs abroad. Since it started to operate, the CTIF has concluded 24 cooperation
agreements.
3.2.6 The members and staff of the CTIF are subject to stringent professional secrecy. Apart from
transmitting information under the terms laid down by law to the competent public prosecutor, the
supervisory, trusteeship or disciplinary authorities, the bodies abroad that fulfil similar functions
and the European Anti-fraud Office (OLAF), they are not at liberty to divulge any information
gathered in the course of their duties, even in the cases referred to in Article 29 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, which lays down that any official who is apprised of a crime or an offence in
the course of his duties is required to notify the public prosecutor immediately.
3.2.7 The CTIF consists of six members. They decide to communicate files to the public prosecutor
responsible when they consider that there are serious indications of money laundering. They are
financial experts who must have at least ten years' experience of judicial, administrative or scientific
duties relating to the operations of persons and bodies covered by the law. Further staff consists of
nine financial inspectors for drawing up investigation reports on the basis of which members of the
CTIF take their decisions. The inspectors are holding university degrees in economics or law.
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3.2.8 Since the installation of the CTIF drugs delinquency has made up 54,1 % of the cases that
have been unveiled.
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4 SPECIAL INVESTIGATION TECHNIQUES
4.1 Financial investigations by police, customs and prosecutors
4.1.1 In Belgium there is no criminal financial investigation that is distinct from information
collection. A financial investigation will always form an integral part of information collection or
preparatory enquiries. There is no specific legislation in Belgium on property investigation, so that
the usual legal provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure do apply. It is, however the
government's intention to provide a legal basis for separate financial investigations in the future.
4.1.2 In the course of proceedings, the examining magistrate has all the powers, including that of
seizure, enjoyed by the public prosecutor. The application of the general rules on confiscation in
Belgium do not prevent, however a parallel financial investigation being conducted during
information collection or preparatory enquiries. Such an investigation then simply forms part of that
process. It can, for example, be used to evaluate the assets to be confiscated so that all preparations
have been made by the time the suspect is found guilty.
4.1.3 In 1997 Belgium has ratified the 1990 Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search,
Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime. The Convention has been implemented the
same year on international cooperation in carrying out seizures and confiscations.
4.1.4 The possibility of launching an independent criminal financial investigation once the suspect
has been found guilty is currently being studied in Belgium. However, no concrete steps have yet
been taken.
4.1.5 The CTIF has the power to conduct financial investigations in the general sense of the term
but not in the police sense. The CTIF has the right to receive originals or copies of any additional
information it considers useful. It can therefore inspect on the spot any documents, which may help
in its task and belong to financial bodies, real estate agents, transporters of funds and casinos.
Moreover, the CTIF is authorised to call upon the assistance of outside experts of its choice.
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4.1.6 The CTIF has the power to oppose the execution of a financial operation for a period of 24
hours on the grounds of the importance or urgency of the matter.
4.1.7 There are serious indications of money laundering when financial and banking data (major
movements of funds to an account, exchange of a variety of foreign currencies, etc.) can be linked
to available police data or aspects such as profession (income out of proportion to the profession
concerned), the profile of the individual (criminal network), relations with other persons
(acquaintance with persons known to be involved in drug trafficking) or the geographical locations
involved in operations (offshore centres). In this way, it has been possible to establish patterns of
money laundering.
4.1.8 The chapter on combating organised crime contained in the Federal Security and Penitentiary
Policy Plan of 31 May 2000 contains a draft 33 on the seizure of assets of criminal origin.
4.1.9 Within the Police judiciaire a special unit deals with economic and financial crime, the Office
Central de la Délinquence Economique et Financière Organisée (OCDEFO). The OCDEFO is the
natural cooperation partner of the CTIF and both have established a good working relationship. The
importance of its work is underlined by the fact that in 1999 cases in money laundering made up for
67, 5% of all the cases the unit was handling. Out of these, 34,1% were drug-related. According to
the statements made by the OCDEFO the Belgian situation clearly showed that the non-financial
sector did not comply to a sufficient extent with the legal provisions regarding the reporting of
suspicious transactions.
4.1.10 Financial investigations like other judicial investigations by the gendarmerie are carried
out by members of the BSRs. Some investigations are however carried out by the gendarmerie's
territorial squads.
Within the BSRs, financial investigators either form part of the sections dealing with traditional
crime (drugs, vice, hold-ups, etc.) or constitute an independent financial section dealing with money
laundering and property investigations.
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Within the BSRs at least one investigator has been trained in financial investigation. In the case of
the gendarmerie, some 320 members of staff have received such a one-week training.
Some investigators also undergo more advanced training in accounting that can lead to a graduate
diploma (accelerated higher education).
4.1.11 In this context it should also be mentioned that as part of the BCR's programme on
organised crime and assets, a team of 11 persons specialises in the financial approach to crime,
providing all gendarmerie units with support in the investigation of financial matters in general.
4.1.12 As far as possible prosecutor's offices increasingly carry out their financial
investigations on the basis of dossiers and at the same time as the basic dossier open another dossier
on indications of money laundering in order to try and obtain the confiscation of goods and assess
the possibility of also carrying out confiscation through equivalence.
There are not yet any precise figures, but registries will probably be able to provide specific data in
the near future.
4.1.13 Requests for the communication of financial information submitted to the customs and
excise authority by the law enforcement authorities are all answered without exception. These
mainly concern the application of magistrates' certificates.
The General Customs and Excise Act1 specifies that officials of the customs and excise authority
are still within their remit when they communicate information to other administrative departments
of the state, the authorities of the communities and regions of the Belgian state, the prosecutor's
offices and the registries of courts, tribunals and the like and to public institutions or bodies.
Information is communicated to the aforementioned insofar as it is necessary to enable them to
carry out the tasks imposed on them by law or regulation. Persons in departments to which tax
information has been supplied are required, like the agents of the customs and excise authority, to
observe secrecy and may not use the information obtained for purposes other than the
implementation of legal provisions for which it was supplied.
1 Article 320 du ARRETE ROYAL portant coordination des dispositions générales relatives
aux douanes et accises du 18 julliet 1977.
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4.1.14 Furthermore, importers, exporters and any persons involved directly or indirectly in the
import or export of goods are required by law1 to respond to any request by customs and excise
agents by communicating, without removal, their sales books, invoices, copies of letters, cash
registers, inventory books and any books, records, documents and correspondence relating to their
commercial or professional activity which it is deemed necessary to produce.
4.1.15 In the case of credit institutions, bankers and stockbrokers, communication of the
aforementioned items can be required only on the basis of a special authorisation from the Director-
General of Customs and Excise. Moreover, the persons concerned are required to supply orally or in
writing all information relating to goods. Customs and excise agents may copy or keep documents
and correspondence which establish or help to establish that a customs or excise offence has been
committed.
4.2 Special investigative techniques
4.2.1 Special investigative techniques have not so far been the subject of specific legislation. They
are governed by confidential Ministry of Justice Circulars of 1990 and 1992. The ministry of justice
is currently working on a draft bill that is taking particular account of the recommendations made
by the parliamentary committee of enquiry into organised crime in Belgium.
4.2.2 Belgium is taking part in a large number of cross-border operations to combat drug trafficking
that require coordination facilitation at an international level. According to the Belgian statistics 120
controlled deliveries were carried out in 1999. As reported by the Belgian authorities these
operations took place without any major incident.
4.2.3 The Belgian authorities noted, however, two sources of problems: One neighbouring country
has particularly restrictive legislation on controlled deliveries. That legislation inter alia prohibits
policemen from another country from participating as undercover agents in a controlled delivery in
transit through national territory.
1 Article 203 du ARRETE ROYAL portant coordination des dispositions générales relatives
aux douanes et accises du 18 julliet 1977.
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4.2.4 A further problem which has arisen more than once with another of Belgium's neighbours is
the failure to send international letters rogatory before the operation. In such cases, Belgium is
given very late notice of the operation and presented with a fait accompli.
Belgian authorities also reported that controlled deliveries were described by other countries as
simple cross-border surveillance to allow the use of the more flexible procedure in Article 40(2) of
the Schengen Convention.
4.2.5 In Belgium a request to carry out a controlled delivery is made by the prosecutor's office with
responsibility for the area concerned. It is in principle the national magistrates' office, which is
responsible for sending such international letters rogatory to other countries.
In the case of requests for controlled deliveries sent to Belgium, it is the Magistrat national who has
general responsibility; he takes a decision in consultation with the relevant local prosecutor's office
if the place of destination of the drugs in Belgium is known or he takes an independent decision if
the place of destination in Belgium is unknown or if the transport is in transit through Belgian
territory. Furthermore he checks the legality of the request (existence of international letters
rogatory) and the operational capacity available.
Both, national magistrates and the prosecutor's offices conducting enquiries are available under a
24h/7 days basis.
4.2.6 Aspects relating to drug trafficking are generally entrusted to the gendarmerie's services.
While contact with another country is in principle via the SGAP, operational coordination within the
police is organised directly by the BCR – Drugs Programme and national units from other
countries. In a very few cases, coordination is through foreign liaison officers at Europol.
Letters rogatory are most usually sent to the permanent-duty staff of the International Judicial
Cooperation Division of the SGAP. Such requests are also sometimes sent directly to the office of
the Magistrat national or the gendarmerie's BCR.
After confirmation by the Magistrat national, such requests are sent for implementation to the
gendarmerie's BCR, which ensures coordination with the surveillance teams and operational
services from the other countries concerned. In certain cases, the help of agents of the customs
investigation services may be called upon.
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4.2.7 Europol only very exceptionally takes part in this procedure. Direct contacts between the
judicial authorities and the operational services of the countries concerned is generally deemed
quicker and more effective.
4.2.8 The Ministerial Circulars of 1990 and 1992, which authorise controlled deliveries on certain
conditions, do not restrict this technique solely to deliveries of narcotic drugs. The text of the
Circular uses the more general term "illicit transport of goods", which means that this technique
which may also be used in cases of trafficking in firearms and counterfeit money.
4.2.9 Belgium also participates in "cross-border" drug transactions or substitution operations if the
drugs have been replaced in whole or in part by a legal substance. This procedure is used if there is
a risk of losing control of the transport of narcotic drugs.
It is, however, excluded if replacement could jeopardise the police operation or if it creates a
problem for subsequent judicial procedure in the country of destination of the drugs. In certain
countries prosecution can only take place on the basis of the drugs actually seized in the country of
intervention.
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5 COORDINATION AND COOPERATION
5.1 Cooperation at national level
5.1.1 In addition to the services already described, there is the office of the Magistrat national,
which is also responsible for national coordination of law-enforcement authorities. As for contacts
with other countries, the SGAP is the national contact point consisting of members of the three
police services and a member of the customs services, although no formal protocol of cooperation
exists between police and customs. Europol projects and analyses are discussed by the SGAP and
the BCR – Drugs Programme and then submitted for authorisation to the office of the Magistrat
national.
5.1.2 Given their powers to combat drug trafficking and in accordance with the international and
national legal framework, the Belgian customs have seconded to the International Judicial
Cooperation Division of the SGAP, in its role of Europol National Unit, two liaison officers, one
representing his administration in the National Unit, the other carrying out the duties of Belgian
liaison officer at Europol.
5.1.3 This collaboration in exchanging information through the Europol channel is based on a
Protocol of Agreement, signed in 1999 between the Ministers for the Interior, Justice and Finance,
which lays down the rules for cooperation. In the opinion of the Belgian authorities however,
customs and police collaboration poses certain problems in view of the fact that, since customs
officials do not have the status of criminal police officers in Belgium, customs liaison officers are
not able to participate in the exchange of information unless the dossiers relate to offences
involving the import, export and transit to or from third countries of goods subject to prohibition,
restriction and/or control measures or the dossiers relate to goods under surveillance within the
meaning of Articles 4–13°, 37 and 183 of the Community Customs Code. Moreover, given the
national regulatory framework and the Europol Convention, police information can only be
systematically forwarded to the customs authority if it has a direct bearing on the dossier in
question.
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5.1.4 The International Police Cooperation Division of the SGAP therefore plays a coordinating
role in the exchange of information under the control and with the approval of the Magistrats
nationaux. But this is a case-by-case process and the systematic communication of information is
excluded.
5.1.5 There are no specific procedures for operational matters involving both agencies and no
multi-disciplinary teams have been set up as described in the Action Plan to Combat Organised
Crime of 28 April 1997. Cooperation in operational matters is organised at local level by the
services concerned. There are no mobile patrol squads or joint training programmes, but equipment
can be shared on the basis of local agreements.
5.2 Cooperation at international level
5.2.1 Due to the impact of crime from Central and Eastern Europe, the Belgian Government
decided to step up its collaboration with those countries and the initial exchange of letters that
already started in 1997 has subsequently been or is in the process of being formalised in the form of
bilateral police-cooperation agreements.
5.2.2 The existing bilateral agreements on police cooperation with countries outside the European
Union are listed in Annex B.
5.2.3 Agreements on cross-border cooperation have been concluded bilaterally with adjacent
Member States in order to implement and spell out the Schengen agreements and are listed in
Annex C.
5.2.4 Apart from the formalised agreements on the customs sector there is in practice very close
cooperation with the customs officials of other countries through joint monitoring operations, which
are organised on a regular basis.
5.2.5 According to the Belgian approach, the choice for a specific channel requires a specific
analysis on a case-by-case basis taking into account of the principles of subsidiarity and
complementarity.
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As regards exchanges of information on serious and/or organised crime the figures available for
1999 reveal that Interpol was used in 49,9% of cases, liaison officers counted for 23,8% of the
cases, Europol for 13,9% and Schengen for 12,4% (mainly cross-border operations).
The importance of the Interpol channel stems from the fact that this body is a global organisation
and that in the opinion of the Belgian practitioners the Europol Convention imposes very strict
rules, which does not seem to encourage the maximum use of this body.
5.2.6 Magistrats nationaux and public prosecutors' offices have no contact with Europol on an
operational level. If there is contact, it is confined to the stage when information is transmitted,
which, according to the information provided by the Magistrat nationaux is rarely used.
Technical assistance or advice from Europol has been very limited so far. There are signs of change
as regards operational projects in the future. Furthermore, forwarding the results of proceedings to
Europol is subject to the authorisation of the magistrates in charge of the dossiers. These results are
not communicated to Europol as a matter of routine, but if the latter so requests, in specific
instances the results could be made known with the prior authorisation of the relevant magistrate.
5.2.7 The Belgian FIU is authorised to exchange information in the context of mutual collaboration
and on a reciprocal basis with bodies abroad performing similar functions and subject to secrecy
obligations similar to those of the CTIF. They are based in principle on the Egmont Group model.
Since it was launched, the CTIF has concluded 24 cooperation agreements with the relevant
departments of the following States: Australia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Croatia, Spain, the United
States, Finland, France, Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Latvia, Luxembourg,
Norway, the Netherlands, Portugal, the Czech Republic, the United Kingdom, Slovenia, Sweden
and Switzerland. The CTIF collaborates with the departments of other States in individual cases and
on a reciprocal basis.
Disparity in the nature of the units processing financial information may have given rise to
problems. Some units are of a police or judicial nature while others are of an administrative or even
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joint nature. There were instances where police units refused to exchange information with
administrative units. However, the CTIF has concluded cooperation agreements with departments
of this nature. At present the problem referred to above exists only with regard to one Member State
of the European Union.
5.3 Drugs liaison officers
5.3.1 At present twelve countries have liaison officers (LOs) accredited to Belgium. Four further
countries have also seconded LOs but so far they have not been accredited. They are listed in annex
D. Under the terms of their accreditation LOs have no powers to carry out investigations themselves
on Belgian territory which are the sole responsibility of the Belgian police. They ensure an efficient
exchange of police information and have jurisdiction for a wide range of offences. Only the USA
and the United Kingdom have seconded police officers, based in Belgium specially charged with
the fight against drugs.
5.3.2 For 1999, according to the figures available in the International Police Cooperation Division
of the SGAP, the exchange of information on drugs through foreign LOs represents 0,3% of the
total number of police messages exchanged. However, there exists an undeclared figure, which it is
impossible to estimate in view of the direct contacts these LOs maintain with the Belgian police as
the majority of them are posted to The Hague.
5.3.3 Belgium has so far posted 19 LOs abroad. They represent all the Belgian agencies
responsible for upholding the law (judicial authorities, police authorities and administrative
authorities) and have jurisdiction for a wide range of offences. Their deployment is listed in
annex D.
5.3.4 Operationally, these LOs come under the International Police Cooperation Division of the
SGAP. Information must therefore be exchanged via this Division, which is responsible for
verifying that the exchange complies with existing national and international rules. In an
emergency, the law enforcement agencies may contact the LOs directly but the International
Judicial Cooperation Division of the SGAP as central authority must systematically be informed so
as to ensure control and the horizontal approach needed for perfect coordination as regards the
transmission of information.
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5.3.5 When performing their judicial and/or police tasks, LOs remain under the operational control
of the relevant Belgian magistrates (national magistrates, prosecutors' offices or examining
magistrates).
5.3.6 For 1999, according to the figures available from the International Police Cooperation
Division of the SGAP, the exchange of information on drugs through Belgian LOs represents 1,2%
of the total number of police messages exchanged.
5.3.7 The intelligence gathered by LOs is routinely transmitted via the central authority
(CPI/SGAP) to the Belgian judicial authorities either directly or via the police services.
They are not authorised to use more than one channel for exchanging information and if
coordination proves necessary it must be initiated (on request or on its own initiative) by the central
authority (CPI/SGAP).
5.3.8 In accordance with their status, LOs are strategically responsible for a number of tasks that
could not be fulfilled without being present in the area concerned. Cross-border operations through
the liaison officer channel represent 9,2% of all operations for 1999. Cross-border operations on
drugs account for 66% of all operations;
5.3.9 The LOs seconded to Europol are only very rarely involved in the implementation of special
investigation techniques. Direct contact with the national authorities of the countries concerned is
generally preferred.
On the basis of the fact that in 1999 controlled deliveries represented 30% of cross-border
operations, the Europol liaison officer channel was used in 16 out of 368 (4,3%) cross-border
operations.
Compared with the Schengen channel, the use of this channel is being described as still remaining
very formalistic and above all very uncertain in that the procedures for transmitting advance
information prior to submission of the court's request are too time-consuming and imprecise.
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P A R T I I I
6 EVALUATION OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SYSTEMS IN BELGIUM
RELATING TO THE FIGHT AGAINST DRUG TRAFFICKING: STRUCTURE,
INTELLIGENCE, SPECIAL INVESTIGATION TECHNIQUES AND
COORDINATION AND COOPERATION
6.1 General Comments
6.1.1 From the observations the evaluation team was able to make during the visit they were
convinced that Belgium showed a strong commitment to fight drug trafficking and that this was
done in an efficient and effective manner. The evaluation team was struck by the very positive and
enthusiastic attitude of all practitioners from all the ministries and agencies visited. All persons that
have been encountered evoked a strong sense of professionalism and commitment to their work.
6.1.2 Belgian governments have taken the necessary steps to cope with what has become an ever-
increasing problem of the industrialised societies and one of the mainstays of organised crime.
The efforts Belgium has made are especially noteworthy as the country not only has to take into
account its federal structure but also the multilingual nature that coincides with a splitting of
competences.
The aforementioned is mirrored not only by a number of projected or draft bills but also by the fact
that the evaluation coincided with the dawn of a major reorganisation of the Belgian police services
that became effective on 1st January 20011. This major change however, also made it difficult to
assess any future structures that may have superseded those described and evaluated in the report.
6.1.3 During the last years, Belgium has undertaken numerous initiatives in drafting new legislation
aimed at fighting Organised Crime, drugs crime in particular, thus helping to enhance the means to
achieve this objective and compensate deficiencies that have been detected. According to the
Belgian authorities the main objective behind these efforts is to broaden the knowledge of
Organised Crime, and one of the means Belgium has chosen to achieve this is by laying the stress
on crime analysis.
1 Loi organisant un service de police intégré structuré à deux niveaux du 7 decembre 1998.
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6.1.4 Legislation projects are accompanied by scientific research that provides an excellent
foundation. The findings of the Étude épidemologique for instance revealed that prevention would
best be provided on the federal level requiring the budget to be restructured, which is currently
being worked on.
6.1.5 Belgium is following a multilateral approach towards drugs crime and considers
criminalisation as a last resort only while deterrence, help and prevention are understood as integral
parts of the Belgian drugs policy thus taking into account the different implications of drug
addiction. Although, practically speaking, the Belgian handling of drug delinquency allows for an
application of the opportunity principle in cases of mere consumption or negligible quantities, the
Belgian law is severe, with high sentences of imprisonment in the most serious cases when this
threshold is passed (cf. also 2.2.2).
6.1.6 However, when it comes to application of the law, the approach adopted by public
prosecutors varies according to district and instance. Criteria used to determine whether a sale was
made for profit purposes are mixed. Each office develops its own template using factors as varied as
statements made, number of customers, comings and goings at the home of the person concerned,
use of a mobile telephone, type of product, etc.
Under such circumstances, standardising prosecution procedures as the 1998 Joint directive
advocates, appear to be difficult.
6.1.7 As regards the internal organisation of the prosecution service, most police districts have one
or more magistrates who specialise in drugs problems. However, the methods used in practice vary
widely: only a few prosecutor's offices train magistrates to specialise in drugs within organised
crime units. Where such units do exist, the entire effort in the area of drug user policy is aimed at
identifying drug dealing, or detecting a link in the chain of organised drug trafficking. Other
prosecutor's offices, on the other hand, adopt a policy which is more centred on the problems of
drugs users.
6.1.8 Although the evaluation team was instructed that seized assets were flowing into Belgium’s
coffers, no provision regulating the use of such funds could be identified.
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6.1.9 The evaluation team was convinced that all Ministries concerned were eagerly trying to
enhance national cooperation, especially on a working level. This positive impression however, is
not necessarily reflected in the institutional framework.
Although a memorandum has been signed between the relevant Ministries in 1999 which lays down
the rules for cooperation in exchanging information between police and customs through the
Europol channel the evaluation team had the impression that obstacles hampering a more effective
cooperation on a broader basis do exist.
As Belgian customs officers do not have the functional status of a criminal police officer they are
excluded from most police information unless they are actually involved in a specific case.
Difficulties in the daily work that were arising from this lack in status were brought to the attention
of the evaluation team on several occasions while at the same time, the customs force were pleading
for a closer cooperation with the police.
6.1.10 It was interesting to note, that informal cooperation of customs with magistrates and
police was described as favourable in places where close cooperation is a daily requirement, such as
Brussels National Airport and the Port of Antwerp. It cannot be assessed however, to what extent
operational contact points between police and customs on a national scale would lead to an
improvement of effectiveness in controls both at national and local level.
6.1.11 As already hinted it is accepted that cooperation and coordination as required exists on a
case by case basis. On one hand this surely has to be attributed to the fact that there is a limited
jurisdiction of customs authorities relating to drugs trafficking but as it was clearly uttered on
several meetings by representatives from customs authorities it is also largely due to the fact that
customs officers do not possess the status of a criminal police officer that is authorised to conduct
investigations.
6.1.12 In general cooperation with EU partners appeared to be good, with cooperation in the
police sector being better than in the judicial area. There are nevertheless obstacles that can mostly
be attributed to different national legislations.
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Belgian practitioners reported some occasions on which minor flaws have been detected. From the
SGAP it was learnt that in some cases of letters rogatory, the Netherlands did not answer the
Belgian request. In the domain of controlled deliveries the procedural complexities encountered
with the French partners had lead to difficulties. And in the field of financial intelligence the CTIF
mentioned that a problem with Germany existed concerning the exchange of information which
stems from the structural differences between the German and Belgian authorities.
6.1.13 Although Europol was employed for exchanging information between police and
customs at a national level, information exchange with and use of Europol on behalf of the Belgian
authorities concerned appeared to be of a lesser quantity. The reasons given by the practitioners
related to the complex and restricted manner in which Europol handled the exchange of
information. This also applied to the Magistrat national, who seldomly contacted Europol.
Gendarmerie at Brussels National Airport however reported that they contacted Europol quite
frequently in cases of cocaine smuggling related to South-America in the framework of the AWF.
6.1.14 The evaluation team was convinced of the high standard of cooperation between law
enforcement agencies and players outside the law enforcement sphere. In this particular field the
Belgian authorities are showing a remarkable spirit of cooperation and initiative that is mirrored in
numerous contacts, activities and formalised agreements that have been concluded. As to
cooperation with industry and commerce it also has to be noted that at major ports of entry into
Belgium this cooperation is well maintained.
6.1.15 Although no training facility was visited, the evaluation team concluded from the
information police and customs authorities had provided that differences in the scale of training
related to drugs existed between customs and police, especially during basic training.
6.1.16 Both, customs and police have numerous ways and possibilities of acquiring
information, storing and are using a multitude of databanks.
Among some other Member States’ police forces the Belgian police has been a forerunner in
operational analysis and it seems as if those qualities are flourishing in the strategic sector as well.
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The annual drugs report that is being furnished by the BCR – Programme des drogues is a fine
example of intelligence work that can be used at all levels to asses the drug situation and develop or
adjust strategies.
6.1.17 Customs have access to data sources that are operated within the international context of
customs sector and even from the private sector, but apparently that data is not exploited
sufficiently at a national scale for analysis. Furthermore the absence of a systematic information
exchange between customs and police deprives the two services of adding their information
potential. Considering the fact that only a few customs officers have attended training courses in the
field of analysis it seems as if room for enlarging that capability is left.
6.1.18 As to the Service de la politique criminelle within the Ministry of Justice, the role that it
would take in the future cannot be assessed at this point, although its more general approach might
serve well to identify and define areas of enhancement for fighting drug trafficking.
6.1.19 As the employment of the special investigative techniques to date purely relies on the
confidential Ministry of Justice Circulars of 1990 and 1992 it is regarded as an improvement that an
initial draft bill is being worked on. It is accompanied by a study conducted by the University of
Gent. The evaluation team is convinced that this will lead to a more secure application for law
enforcement officers and will also serve the purpose of European harmonisation.
6.1.20 New laws regulating the interception of the telecommunications have been introduced
in 1994 and 1998 respectively. Although a framework for cooperation with telecommunication
companies and service providers exists, it was uttered that compliance of the industry with existing
regulations left room for some improvement. A central interception facility that is going to be
installed is supposed to improve the capabilities of the law enforcement agencies. It cannot be
denied however that the availability of offers like prepaid cards for cellular phones has created new
possibilities for criminals to remain anonymous.
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6.1.21 Following a drugs policy that is trying to build on earlier experiences made by other
countries Belgium is trying to avoid the flaws that different approaches have revealed.
Thus prevention is one of the pillars of Belgian drugs policy and is forming part of an integrated
approach that does not rely on punishment alone. Besides cooperation programmes (e.g. with
discotheques) targeted at younger non-addicts this commitment is reflected in providing strictly
supervised substitution programmes. Furthermore the Belgian approach to combine prison
sentences and controlled provision of drugs also has to be understood in preventing a relapse of
addicts.
6.1.22 All questions asked by the experts during the evaluation were related to one degree or
another to various international instruments relating to cooperation between law enforcement
authorities on a national and international level with regard to drug trafficking. Unless specifically
commented upon within the report, the experts were assured that all actions concerning the
following related instruments have or are in the process of, being adopted.
The Action Plan to combat Organised Crime of 28 April 1997
The Joint Action of 14 October 1996
The Joint Action of 29 November 1996
The Council Resolution of 29 November 1996
The Joint Action of 17 December 1996
The Joint Action of 9 June 1997
The Joint Action of 16 June 1997
The Joint Action of 3 December 1998
The United Nations Conventions of 1961, 1971 and 1988
6.2 Possible Improvements
All of the suggestions made in this part are the results of the discussions undertaken with the
representatives of the Ministries of Justice, Interior and Finance who were seen during the
evaluation visit to Belgium. Moreover, the suggestions are also informed by the meetings held with
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practitioners from all disciplines. The evaluation team realises that these suggestions are based on
experiences with other legal systems and traditions and that all of them might not fit into the
Belgian systems. Several of the suggestions made are of a minor nature, but some may be
considered to be more fundamental. The experts have of course not considered resource
implications in making these suggestions.
6.2.1 Structure
* law
At the time of the evaluation the Belgian government was considering a number of bills that were
either under consideration, projected or at draft stage. The most important deal with Organised
Crime, the reversal of the burden of proof for Organised Crime delicts and financial investigations.
With view to a greater harmonisation of legislation within the EU, reference to existing instruments
and experiences of other Member States should be considered where Belgium finds it appropriate to
do so. The evaluation team is aware of the fact that this has to be done by taking into consideration
local circumstances and requirements.
As the draft bill to supersede the Ministerial Circulars pertaining to the special investigation
techniques was still being worked on, it would be particularly desirable to conclude the work on the
bill as the absence of a law regulating special investigative techniques has reportedly lead to
difficulties in the work of the law enforcement agencies.
* Police
The effects of the amalgamation of the three police services into two, one on the local and one on
the federal level that will come into effect as from 1st January 2001 cannot be estimated yet. The
evaluation team thus found it appropriate not to comment the new police organisation as the
structure will have to prove its operationability before an evaluation can be made.
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* Customs
Although the working relationship between police and customs appeared to be adequate where
close cooperation was required it was clearly mentioned by customs staff that there have been
occasions when the lack of functional status of criminal police officer (i.e. the lacking capacity to
conduct an investigation) had hampered either efficiency of the service or cooperation between
police and customs. Having identified a certain need to look at this matter, the evaluation team
would thus suggest to discuss whether granting that particular functional status to customs officers
would be a benefit for greater efficiency of the entire system.
* Seized assets
As no provision regulating the allocation of seized assets could be identified, the evaluation team
would suggest to consider installing an appropriate instrument (e.g. an interministerial funds, as it
has been done for instance in Luxembourg). In this way assets could be used to finance projects to
fight drugs and prevent their use.
* Service de la politique criminelle
The Service de la politique criminelle, which supports the Minister for Justice and the College of
Principal Public Prosecutors in establishing the priorities for investigation and prosecution policy,
will see its staff numbers significantly increased.
The Service will thus be able to provide additional support by drawing up guidelines and other
policy documents on the broad issue of drugs. It is also necessary to emphasise the Service's key
role in drafting the current joint directive, in evaluating its implementation and in drawing up the
adjustments which will be made to it in the near future.
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6.2.2 Training
Specific training related to drugs crime appeared to be different within the spheres of the police,
customs and the judiciary. As the police appeared to offer the widest possible range of drugs-related
training the evaluation team thinks it would be valuable to consider joint training initiatives,
especially at the more advanced stages of training. This could increase awareness and might also
prove helpful to facilitate cooperation at all operational levels. To share resources and experiences
the introduction of joint training between police and customs might be considered as the latter could
benefit from the more comprehensive schedule of the police.
6.2.3 Intelligence
It was evident that two separate channels of information existed between the police and customs
and although data can be exchanged (as for instance via the liaison officers at the SGAP and
Europol) it would be for the benefit of a common intelligence approach to share data where it is
possible to do so without infringing laws or constitutional principles.
This sharing of information could be supported by applying up to date analytical methods that could
be trained on a broader scale in both services.
6.2.4 Special Investigation Techniques – Financial Investigations
As was learned from the information supplied by the Office Central de la Délinquence Economique
et Financière Organisée (OCDEFO), the indications clearly showed that the non-financial sector in
Belgium did not comply with the legal provisions regarding the reporting of suspicious transactions.
Although no particular reason was mentioned to explain this phenomenon, it might be attributed to
the fact that the OCDEFO was already heavily burdened with its tasks and was lacking resources. It
is thus being suggested to consider the allocation of staff resources.
Wire tapping, that of cellular phones in particular, has turned into a challenge for law enforcement
as the liberalisation of the telecommunications market offers a multitude of possibilities. This also
applies to Belgium and to facilitate the work of law enforcement in this field it would be desirable if
the central interception facility that is foreseen would be installed fairly soon.
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Although this is an issue of a European dimension it should be considered how the complete
anonymity of telephone subscribers (in the case of prepaid cards) could be balanced against law
enforcement’s interests. From a strategic point of view the ongoing liberalisation and fast
development of the telecommunications market requires a close screening of the situation.
6.2.5 Coordination and Cooperation
* national level
Coordination and cooperation between police and customs give room for enhancement on the
national level. While it appeared that each of the services was performing well in its own right a
more institutionalised exchange of information could help to bridge some of the existing gaps. It
should also be considered whether such information exchange could be facilitated by electronic
means on the working level.
If the above mentioned structure has revealed some gaps, it is advisable to examine and suggest,
within the framework of the European Institutions, concrete solutions for improving its
effectiveness.
In Belgium, no multi-disciplinary teams have been set up as described in the Action Plan to combat
Organised Crime of 28 April 1997. The evaluation team feels that work opportunities for multi-
disciplinary teams ought to be identified and implemented even if only on a trial basis to make use
of the forces’ potentials. Their value could then be properly evaluated.
* international level
At an international level joint investigation teams, as postulated in the Tampere conclusions, might
prove helpful to identify problems in cross-border operations. Results derived from such joint
operations could also prove helpful to accelerate harmonisation within the EU.
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During the visit it was reported that there was a certain negligence to exchange information with
Europol, a fact that was attributed to the complex and restricted manner in which Europol handled
the exchange of information. Recommendation 19 of the 1997 Action Plan suggests to establish a
national contact point for exchanging information between EU Member States and underlines the
opportunity to use Europol National Units in order to obtain the necessary coordination at national
(including Interpol and SIRENE) and international level.
If the above-mentioned structure has revealed some gaps, it is advisable to suggest, within the
framework of the European Institutions, concrete solutions for improving its effectiveness instead
of avoiding its use.
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7 RECOMMENDATIONS TO BELGIUM, AND, WHERE APPLICABLE TO OTHER
MEMBER STATES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
The evaluation team found it appropriate to make a number of suggestions for the attention of the
Belgian authorities. This should not detract from the fact that Belgium has a justly deserved
reputation for adopting an integrated policy with regard to drug trafficking that allows a flexible
response by employing deterrence, prevention and help. It appeared to the evaluation team that
cooperation in general terms works well between the different players and that all practitioners are
highly motivated and dedicated to their tasks.
The experts would like to summarise their suggestions in the form of the following
recommendations:
should continue its current initiatives concerning legislation in the fight against Organised
Crime, particularly those that are designed to enhance the daily work of law enforcement as
the bill to regulate the employment of special investigative techniques (cf. 6.1.3, 6.1.19 and
6.2.1)
should take into account that the final aim of the 1997 Action Plan is to reach a thorough
harmonisation of the strategies against organised crime and that it is advisable to envisage the
implementation of the national legislation in the different sectors of this sensitive field within
the framework of the 2000 Palermo United Nations Convention on transnational organised
crime
should further explore a future possible strategic role of the Service de la politique criminelle
in the fight against drugs (cf. 6.1.18 and 6.2.1)
should consider the creation of an instrument (e.g. an interministerial funds) designed to
administer seized assets from drugs crime that could be used to finance projects to fight drugs
and prevent their use (cf. 6.1.8 and 6.2.1)
should consider a greater extent of institutionalised information exchange between the
Ministries that are concerned with fighting drug trafficking in order to facilitate a maximum
use of resources (cf. 6.1.9, 6.1.17 and 6.2.5)
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should consider whether a common intelligence approach of police and customs regarding the
sharing of data would offer a benefit in fighting drug trafficking (cf. 6.1.3, 6.1.16, 6.1.17 and
6.2.3)
should consider joint training programmes between the police and customs, especially at the
more advanced level in order to facilitate a more common approach and the sharing of
experiences from both services (cf. 6.1.15, 6.2.2)
should continue the initiatives pertaining to the employment of crime analysis and extend
training in analytical tools and methods, especially for the customs (cf. 6.1.3, 6.1.16, 6.1.17
and 6.2.2)
should discuss the benefits for the law enforcement system that could derive from an equal
status of customs officers vis-à-vis police officers as regards the power to conduct
investigations (cf. 6.1.9, 6.1.11 and 6.2.1)
should communicate to its collaborators abroad the implications of the reorganisation of the
police regarding cooperation at an international level (cf. 6.1.2 and 6.2.1)
should consider supplementary information concerning experiences in other EU-Member
States when drafting new legislation with a view towards European harmonisation (cf. 6.1.3,
6.1.4 and 6.2.1)
should circulate among EU Member States the results of scientific studies that are currently
conducted in conjunction with legislative projects and forensic issues (cf. 6.1.4)
should consider concrete solutions for improving the effectiveness of using Europol (cf.
6.1.13 and 6.2.5)
should closely monitor the implications new developments in the telecommunications market
have on wire tapping (cf. 6.1.20 and 6.2.4).
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ANNEX A
VISITING PROGRAMME AND LIST OF PERSONS SEEN
Visiting Programme
LUNDI 27 NOVEMBRE
Arrivée des évaluateurs
MARDI 28 NOVEMBRE
9h30: Ministère de la Justice, salle 228, boulevard de Waterloo 115, à 1000 Bruxelles
Accueil des évaluateurs en présence de représentants de tous les services concernés et le
cas échéant du Cabinet du Ministre de la Justice
Présentation par le Département de la Justice des aspects législatifs et administratifs.
12h30: Déjeuner
14h – 17h: Ministère de la Justice, salle 228, boulevard de Waterloo 115, à Bruxelles
Magistrat National
Magistrat d’assistance du Collège des Procureurs généraux
Certaines magistrats spécialisés de première instance
MERCREDI 29 NOVEMBRE
9h30: Avenue de la Toison d’Or, à 1060 Bruxelles
Cellule de Traitements des informations financières (CTIF)
Office central de la délinquance économique et financière
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11h : Rue des Quatre Bras 13, à Bruxelles
Service général d’appui policier : division coopération policière interantionale
12h30 : Déjeuner à l’Etat Major de la Gendarmerie
14h : Bureau central des recherches de la Gendarmerie
Programme drogues
16h30 : Aéroport de Zaventem
Détachement de la Gendarmerie et contrôle du courrier express (DHL)
Visite des services de la douane à Brucargo
JEUDI 30 NOVEMBRE
9h30 : Boulevard du Régent 36, à 1000 Bruxelles
Direction nationale des recherches des douanes et accises
Déjeuner : à Anvers
Après-midi : – contrôle dans le port d’Anvers et ciblage du contrôle des conteneurs
VENDREDI 1ER DÉCEMBRE
10h : Ministère de la Justice, salle 228, boulevard de Waterloo 115, à 1000 Bruxelles
Réunion de clôture en présence, si nécessaire, des représentants des services concernés
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List of participants
Tuesday 28th November 2000, 9h30:
MINISTÈRE DE LA JUSTICE, SALLE 228, BOULEVARD DE WATERLOO 115, À 1000 BRUXELLES M. DEBRULLE Ministère de la Justice, Directeur général de la Législation pénale et
des Droits de l’homme
Mme LEJEUNE Avocat général, Magistrat d’assistance du Collège des Procureurs
généraux
M. DE WINTER Lieutenant-Colonel, Directeur du programme drogue de la Gendarmerie
M. DE SAGHER Administration des Douanes et Accises
M. GAZAN Conseiller général adj. Du Service de la Politique criminelle
M. GILLARD Ministère de la Justice, Législation pénale, Chef du service de droit policier
M. VANHOUTTE Ministère de la Justice, Direction générale de la Législation pénale
M. DE CRUYENAERE Ministère de la Justice, Direction générale de la Législation pénale
Tuesday 28th November 2000, 14h:
OFFICE DU MAGISTRAT NATIONAL, RUE DES QUATRE BRAS 13, À 1000 BRUXELLES M. BRAMMERTZ Magistrat national
M.me LEJEUNE Avocat général, Magistrat d’assistance du Collège des Procureurs
généraux
M.me DE VROEDE 1er Substitut du Procureur du Roi de Bruxelles, section jeunesse
M.me WILWERTH 1er Substitut du Procureur du Roi de Liège
M. CAMBIER 1er Substitut du Procureur du Roi de Tournai
M. APPART 1er Substitut du Procureur du Roi de Namur
Wednesday 29th November 2000, 9h30:
CTIF, AVENUE DE LA TOISON D’OR 55, À 1050 BRUXELLES M. VERHELST Président de la Cellule de traitement des informations financières.
M. CRUCIFIX Office central de la délinquance économique et financière
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Wednesday 29th November 2000, 11h:
SGAP-CPI, RUE DES QUATRE BRAS 13, À 1000 BRUXELLES M. MEUNIER Service général d’appui policier, division coopération policière internationale
Présence également de M. SCHRICKX, Chef de division ff CPI, de M.MERLO, SGAP-CPI et de M DE WINTER, Gendarmerie.
Wednesday 29th November 2000, 14h:
ETAT MAJOR DE LA GENDARMERIE, BUREAU CENTRAL DES RECHERCHES, RUE FRITZ
TOUSSAINT 47, À 1050 BRUXELLES M. DE WINTER Lieutenant-Colonel, Directeur du programme drogue de la
Gendarmerie M. JOORIS douanes et Accises, Cellule précurseurs
Wednesday 29th November 16h30:
AÉROPORT DE ZAVENTEM M. FRANCKX Lieutenant-Colonel, Commandant du détachement de la Gendarmerie
à Zaventem M. VAN DEN BOSSCHE Directeur des opérations M. BOONEM Unité drogue, Gendarmerie Zaventem M. VANHOOREN Directeur de la Direction nationale des recherches des douanes M. DE SAEGHER Administration des douanes et Accises M. DAEMEN Responsable des Douanes à Zaventem
Thursday 30th November 2000 (morning):
DIRECTION NATIONALE DES RECHERCHES DES DOUANES ET ACCISES (DNR): M. LUC DE SOMERE Directeur régional de la DNR M. ANDRÉ DE SAGHER Directeur à l’Administration centrale des douanes et accises M. ROGER VANHOOREN Directeur à la DNR M. LUC DEULIN Directeur à la DNR M. GUIBERT JOORIS Inspecteur à la DNR M. CLAUDE GILLARD Ministère de la Justice
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Thursday 30th November 2000 (afternoon)
DIRECTION RÉGIONALE DE L’ADMINISTRATION DES DOUANES ET ACCISES ET VISITE DU NAVIRE
"ATLANTIC IRIS" (EN PROVENANCE DE CÔTE D’IVOIRE ET DECHARGEANT DES FRUITS)
Mr. HERMAN DAMS procureur du roi à Anvers Mr. PAUL VAN SANTVLIET juge au tribunal de 1ère instance à Anvers Mr. BERNARD VAN CAMP juge au tribunal de 1ère instance à Anvers Mr. LUC DE SOMERE Directeur régional de la DNR Mr. ANDRÉ DE SAGHER Directeur à l’Administration centrale des douanes et accises Mr. WILLY BODEN Directeur à la direction régionale des douanes et accises
d’Anvers Mr. JULIEN VAN LOOCK Directeur des douanes et accises du port d’Anvers Mr. PAUL PEETERS chef de l’inspection des recherches des douanes et accises à
Anvers Mr. YVO HERMANS Inspection des recherches D & A, à Anvers Mr. DIRK DE LANGHE Inspection des recherches D & A, à Anvers Mr. DANNY VERDICKT Inspection des recherches D & A, à Anvers Mr. ANDRÉ DEJONGHE Commandant de la Brigade du port d’Anvers (Gendarmerie) Mr. JONNY GRONDELAERS BCR (Gendarmerie – Bruxelles) Mr. CLAUDE GILLARD Ministère de la Justice
29th November 2000 (afternoon)
ZAVENTEM (INSTALLATIONS OF DHL – COURRIER –EXPRESS) Mr. WILFRIED COVENT Aviation Security Manager – DHL Mr. CLAUDE GILLARD Ministère de la Justice Mr. CHARLES DE WINTER Directeur du programme Drogues, Gendarmerie – BCR Mr. J. VAN DEN BOSSCHE Directeur "Opérations" Veiligheidsdetachement Nationale
Luchthaven, à Zaventem Mr. ANDRÉ DE SAGHER Directeur à l’Administration centrale des douanes et accises –
Service Recouvrement et Contentieux – Direction Coopération Mr. ROGER VANHOOREN Directeur à la Direction nationale des recherches des douanes et
accises (DNR) Mr. GUIBERT JOORIS Inspecteur à la DNR (drogues)
29th November 2000 (afternoon)
ZAVENTEM (BRUCARGO) Mr. FRANS DAEMEN Directeur des douanes et accises, à Zaventem Mr. ANDRÉ DE SAGHER Directeur à l’Administration centrale des douanes et accises –
Service Recouvrement et Contentieux – Direction Coopération Mr. ROGER VANHOOREN Directeur à la Direction nationale des recherches des douanes et
accises (DNR) Mr. GUIBERT JOORIS Inspecteur à la DNR (drogues) Mr. STEFAAN VYVEY Vérificateur à la DNR (groupe d’observation –TSU) Mr. HENRI CAMMAERTS Vérificateur principal D & A à Zaventem (passagers) Mr. PATRICK DE COSTER Chef de l’Inspection des Recherches des douanes et accises à
Bruxelles
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Mr. JOS KUSTERMANS Inspecteur – chef de service du G.A.D. à Zaventem (dépendance de l’inspection des recherches à Bruxelles)
Mr. DANNY STRUYS Vérificateur principal au G.A.D. Mr. POL MEULENEIRE Vérificateur principal au G.A.D. Mr. CLAUDE GILLARD Ministère de la Justice Mr. CHARLES DE WINTER Directeur du programme Drogues, Gendarmerie – BCR Mr. J. VAN DEN BOSSCHE Directeur "Opérations" Veiligheidsdetachement Nationale
Luchthaven, à Zaventem
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ANNEX B
BILATERAL AGREEMENTS CONCLUDED BETWEEN BELGIUM
AND OTHER STATES
Agreement on police cooperation signed with Hungary on 4 November 1998;
Agreement on police cooperation signed with Bulgaria on 24 June 1998;
Agreement on police cooperation signed with Romania on 14 April 1999;
Agreement on police cooperation signed with Morocco on 6 May 1999;
Agreement on police cooperation initialled with Slovakia on 25 February 1999;
Agreement on police cooperation initialled with Poland on 27 April 2000;
Agreement on police cooperation being negotiated with Russia;
Agreement on police cooperation being finalised with Slovenia.
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ANNEX C
AGREEMENTS ON CROSS-BORDER POLICE COOPERATION WITH
ADJACENT MEMBER STATES
France
Agreement of 19 June 1990 authorising customs officers to apply Articles 40 and 41 of the
Schengen Convention.
Framework Agreement of 16 March 1995 on cross-border police cooperation: Setting up of a
consultation body.
Increase in exchanges of information and concerted measures.
Establishment of operational contact points in the border region.
Improvement of means of communication.
Joint training courses.
A further implementing agreement is being finalised.
Luxembourg Agreement of 19 June 1990 authorising customs officials to apply Articles 40 and 41 of the
Schengen Convention.
Benelux Agreement of 21 December 1993 on the fight against drugs (+ additional agreement
between the police departments): exchanges of information and concerted measures against
drugs tourism around the Maastricht-Liège-Luxembourg area.
Senningen Agreement of 4 June 1996 on the coordination of police cooperation in border
areas.
Benelux Memorandum of Understanding of 4 June 1996 on cooperation in the police, justice
and immigration sphere. (Setting up of a trilateral consultation body).
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Germany Agreement of 19 June 1990 authorising customs officials to apply Articles 40 and 41 of the
Schengen Convention.
Agreement of 30 September 1959 on service relations between police authorities at the
common border.
Agreement of 27 March 2000 on the same subjects as in the other above mentioned
agreements pursuant to Article 39(4) of the Schengen Convention.
Netherlands Agreement of 11 August 1949 on direct contact between, on the one hand, the State Police
and the Royal Military Constabulary and, on the other hand, the national Gendarmerie.
Benelux Agreement of 21 December 1993 on the fight against drugs (+ additional agreement
between police departments): exchanges of information and concerted measures against drugs
tourism around the Maastricht-Liège-Luxembourg area.
Agreement of 27 March 1995 on the setting up of a police consultation structure and on the
extension of means of communication between border departments.
Benelux Memorandum of Understanding of 4 June 1996 on cooperation in the police, justice
and immigration sphere. (Setting up of a trilateral consultation bo
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ANNEX D
LIAISON OFFICERS
a) Foreign liaison officers accredited to Belgium
Canada
Colombia (procedure under way)
France
Hungary
Ireland
Israel
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Norway
Spain
Sweden
United Kingdom
United States of America
b) Foreign Liaison officers seconded but not accredited
Australia
Japan
Malaysia
c) Belgian Liaison officers abroad
Austria (accredited for Austria, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Slovenia)
France
Germany
Italy (accredited for Italy, Malta, Albania and San Marino)
Morocco
Netherlands
Poland (accredited for Poland and Ukraine)
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Romania
Russia (accredited for Russia, Georgia and Moldova)
Spain (accredited for Spain, Andorra and Portugal)
Thailand
Turkey (accredited for Bulgaria)
Venezuela (accredited for Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, Panama, Peru, Colombia, Suriname,
Dominican Republic, Costa Rica, Netherlands Antilles and Aruba)
USA
In addition, there are three LOs at EUROPOL The Hague (including one customs officer) and two
LOs at Interpol Lyon.
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ANNEX E
Statements received from the Belgian authorities regarding substantial changes in their
Police and Judicial system
The following explanations were received from the Belgian authorities after the evaluation visit.
They are describing the substantial changes in the organisation of the Belgian Police and the
Federal Public Prosecutor's Office that have taken place shortly after the evaluation visit and that
have resulted in considerable changes regarding law enforcement and its role in fighting drug
trafficking as described in this report.
THE FEDERAL PROSECUTION OFFICE
1. Changes in the legislation
The Octopus Agreement of 24 May 1998 and the Law of 22 December 1998 on the vertical
integration of the Public Prosecutor's Office, the Federal Prosecution Office and the Council of
Public Prosecutors 1 that followed from it define the thrust of a thorough reform of the Public
Prosecutor's Office.
The law of 21 June 2001 "amending sundry provisions regarding the Federal Prosecution
Office" 2 is an important first step in this reform of the Public Prosecutor's Office. The
provisions of this law come into effect no later than 21 May 2002.
The purpose of the above two laws is, through the creation of a Federal Prosecution Office
under the leadership of the federal public prosecutor, to respond to the shortcomings noted by
the successive parliamentary commissions of inquiry regarding, on the one hand, the
coordination of judicial intervention in criminal cases that go beyond the boundaries of one
judicial district, beyond one sphere of competence or outside the country and, on the other hand,
the processing of complex and specialised criminal cases.
1 Law of 22 December 1998 on the vertical integration of the Public Prosecutor's Office, the
Federal Prosecution Office and the Council of Public Prosecutors, Moniteur Belge, 10 February 1999.
2 Law of 21 June 2001 amending sundry provisions regarding the Federal Prosecution Office, Moniteur Belge, 20 July 2001.
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2. Responsibilities of the Federal Prosecution Office
The law assigns four basic tasks 1: to the Federal Public Prosecutor to prosecute for certain
offences, to coordinate the conduct of public proceedings, to facilitate international cooperation
and to monitor the general and specific operation of the federal police.
A certain number of specific tasks are also assigned to the Federal Public Prosecutor Office,
de lege ferenda or on the basis of Ministerial guidelines or guidelines from the College of
Principal Public Prosecutors.
2.1. Conducting public proceedings
2.1.1. The competence of the Federal Public Prosecutor himself to prosecute is based on a
restrictive list of offences and, as a complement to that list, on two qualitative criteria (a security
criterion and a geographical one) and covers all related offences.
Each basis of his competence is briefly examined below.
The restrictive list (first, fourth and fifth subparagraphs of Article 144b(1) of the Judicial Code)
concerns the following offences:
crimes and offences against State security 2;
1 Article 144a(2), of the Judicial Code. 2 Title One of Book II of the Penal Code. The offences concerned are assaulting and plotting
against the King, the Royal family and the form of government, and acts that compromise the existence, composition and operation of the institutions (internal security) or independence of the country, the inviolability of the territory and international relations (external security).
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threat of attack or theft of nuclear equipment, theft or extortion of nuclear equipment and
offences concerning the external protection of nuclear equipment;
organised trading and trafficking of human beings 1 ;
arms trafficking 2;
serious violations of humanitarian law 3;
illegal organisations and organised criminal groups.
In such cases the Federal Public Prosecutor has jurisdiction to prosecute.
The Federal Public Prosecutor can also, on the basis of the security criterion (Second
paragraph of Article 144b(1), of the Judicial Code), prosecute in the context of offences
committed with the use of violence against persons or material objects, for ideological or
political reasons, with the aim of achieving objectives through terror, intimidation or threats.
The security criterion must be distinguished from specific offences against the security of the
State, listed in the Penal Code. Certain criminal terrorist activities or crimes with a political
aspect are not always covered by these descriptions but rather by descriptions of general law –
for example ecoterrorism. That is why the legislature drew on the broad definition of
"terrorism" used in Article 8(1)(b) of the basic law on the intelligence and security services of
30 November 1998.
Finally, in accordance with the geographical criterion (third subparagraph of Article 144b(1)
of the Judicial Code), the Federal Public Prosecutor may prosecute in the context of offences
which, to a significant extent, concern several fields of competence or have an international
dimension, particularly those concerning organised crime.
1 Paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 77a of the Law of 15 December 1980 on access to the territory,
residence, establishment and expulsion of aliens, which implies that it must concern either ordinary activities or involvement in leadership or in a complementary activity of an association (whether or not the guilty party has a leadership position).
2 Law of 5 August 1991 on the importing, exporting and transit of arms, ammunition and equipment designed specifically for military use and of the associated technology.
3 Articles 1 and 2 of the Law of 16 June 1993 on the suppression of serious violations of humanitarian law.
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It is also within the Federal Public Prosecutor’s competence to prosecute for all offences
linked to those appearing in the restrictive list or covered by the security criterion or the
geographical criterion (6th subparagraph of Article 144b(1) of the Judicial Code).
2.1.2. The competence of the Federal Public Prosecutor himself to prosecute is subject to two
further conditions, even if the offence appears in the list or is covered by the security criterion
or the geographical criterion.
First, the Federal Public Prosecutor can conduct public proceedings only "if the proper
administration of justice so requires".
The starting point is that the Federal Public Prosecutor’s competence to prosecute is
subsidiary to that of the Public Prosecutors of first instance. Only if there is an added value
for the proper administration of justice may the Federal Prosecution Office prosecute 1.
Second, the Federal Public Prosecutor may not prosecute in the cases specified by the Special
Law of 25 June 1998 governing the criminal liability of Members of the Community or
Regional Governments and by the Law of 25 June 1998 governing the criminal liability of
Ministers. In these cases, the Public Prosecutor’s competence is not affected even if the
offences come within the range of subjects for which priority is reserved for the Federal
Prosecution Office.
2.2. Coordination of public proceedings and facilitation of international cooperation
These tasks are the continuation of the current tasks of national magistrates.
2.3. Monitoring of the general and specific operation of the Federal Police
1 Bill on the Federal Prosecution Office. Parliamentary Paper 2000-2001, No 897/1, p. 6 and
No 897/12, p. 58.
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The Federal Public Prosecutor monitors the general and specific operation of the Federal
Police in accordance with the Law of 7 December 1998 on the organisation of an integrated
police service with a two-level structure.
A first federal magistrate is expressly responsible for monitoring the operation of the judicial
police department of the Federal Police 1. This magistrate ensures in particular that
specialised judicial missions are carried out by that department in accordance with the
instructions and guidelines of the judicial authorities.
A second federal magistrate is responsible specifically for monitoring the operation of the
"anti-corruption service" in the judicial police department of the Federal Police 2.
Lastly, a third federal magistrate chairs the information management monitoring body 3. The
monitoring body is responsible for processing information and data gathered by police in
carrying out their judicial and administrative police tasks 4. Its main task is to monitor
compliance with the rules on access to data and information and transmission of data and
information to the national general database 5.
1 Article 219 (first paragraph of Art. 47c of the Criminal Investigation Code) of the Law of
7 December 1998. 2 Article 219 (second paragraph of Art. 47c of the Criminal Investigation Code) of the Law of
7 December 1998. 3 Article 191 (fifth subparagraph of Art. 44(7) of the Law on Policing) of the Law of
7 December 1998. 4 Article 191 (first subparagraph of Art. 44(7) of the Law on Policing) of the Law of
7 December 1998 on the organisation of an integrated police service with a two-level structure, amended by Article 7 of the Law of 2 April 2001 amending the Law on Policing, the Law of 7 December 1998 on the organisation of an integrated police service with a two-level structure, and other laws on the setting up of new police structures (Moniteur Belge, 14 April 2001).
5 Article 191 (second subparagraph of Art. 44(7) of the Law on Policing) of the Law of 7 December 1998.
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3. Position of the Federal Prosecution Office in the Public Prosecutor's Office
The Federal Prosecution Office is solely and directly under the authority of the Minister for
Justice. It is bound by the guidelines on criminal policy adopted by the Minister for Justice
after the latter has heard the opinion of the College of Principal Public Prosecutors.
In this context, the evaluation by the College of Principal Public Prosecutors merits particular
attention (third subparagraph of Article 143a(3) of the Judicial Code).
This evaluation takes place retrospectively, on an annual basis and in particular on the basis of
the reports of the Federal Public Prosecutor and discussion with him. The evaluation is
included in the annual report of the College of Principal Public Prosecutors submitted to the
Minister for Justice, which is forwarded to the Parliament and published 1.
4. Composition of the Federal Prosecution Office
The Federal Prosecution Office is made up of the Federal Public Prosecutor, 18 federal
magistrates 2 and 47 administrative colleagues. The composition of the Federal Prosecution
Office may also be expanded by delegation or by secondment of magistrates from local public
prosecutors’ offices.
The Federal Public Prosecutor is responsible for running the Federal Prosecution Office. The
federal magistrates, delegated magistrates and seconded magistrates are under his direct
command and authority.
1 Article 143a(7) of the Judicial Code. 2 Article 144a(1) of the Judicial Code and Article 2 of the Law of 3 April 1953 on judicial
organisation.
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BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE REFORM OF THE POLICE IN BELGIUM
The law of 7 December 1998 radically reformed the police setup in Belgium.
There is now an integrated police force which is structured on two levels. On the one hand, there is
the local level, consisting of a police district in which a single police force performs all basic
policing duties. There are 196 police districts throughout the territory of Belgium. There is also the
federal level, at which the federal police carries out specialised functions and provides support for
the local police. These are two distinct policy levels which are not hierarchically related to one
another, but between which there are significant and efficient liaison elements.
The federal police was set up on 1 January 2001, while the local police districts came into being as
from 1 January 2002.
The police district consists of one or more local municipalities and has a unified local police force.
This force is composed of the former local municipal police and the territorial gendarmerie squads.
The local police is responsible for carrying out all local policing tasks, whether administrative or
judicial, along the lines of the community policing model. In addition, the local police also has to
assume certain federal policing tasks. On the other hand, it can also in certain circumstances obtain
support from the federal police.
The federal police has come about as a result of integration of the criminal police and the
gendarmerie, with the exception of the territorial gendarmerie squads. The federal police is
responsible for the more specialised judicial and criminal investigations, maintaining law and order,
traffic, personnel administration and logistical support. The federal police is headed by a
Chief Commissioner, responsible for all the general directorates and departments of the
federal police.
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The general criminal directorate of the federal police consists of central directorates and
departments, in addition to decentralised district criminal departments. One of the directorates
within the general criminal directorate is the directorate for combating crime against individuals.
The central department for combating drugs, the drugs programme, is dependent upon the latter
directorate. There is a specialised drugs unit in each devolved district criminal department.
On the occasion of this police reform a National Security Plan was also drawn up for the first time
in Belgium by the Ministers for Justice and for the Interior. The tackling of drugs trafficking and the
drugs problem is one of the priorities of that plan. An extract from the National Security Plan,
specifically relating to drugs, has been annexed hereto.
NATIONAL SECURITY PLAN
General framework.
The general international context.
Belgium has often been referred to on the international stage as one of the cradles, in Europe at
least, of synthetic drugs and precursors.
Together with the ports in Spain and the Netherlands, the Belgian ports account for the largest
imports of cocaine into Europe.
The Belgian ports and certain parts of Belgian territory are also significant transit points for drugs
being exported to the United Kingdom.
The European Union Strategy and Action Plan (2000-2004)
The main targets of the EU anti-drugs strategy include:
appreciable reduction of the availability of illicit drugs within a five-year period;
appreciable reduction of the number of drugs-related crimes within a five-year period;
appreciable reduction of money-laundering and illicit trafficking in precursors within a
five-year period.
Of the aims that the European Union Action Plan endeavours to achieve, the following are
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particularly noteworthy:
Strategy aim 4: to give greater priority to drug use prevention and demand reduction, mainly
by reducing new recruitment to drug use, and to the reduction of the adverse consequences of
drug use (and particularly points 3.1.1.4, 3.1.2.2, 3.1.2.3 and 3.1.25 of the Action Plan);
Strategy aim 5: to reinforce the fight against organised crime, illicit drug trafficking and
related organised crime, and to step up police, customs and judicial cooperation between
Member States (and particularly points 4.1.1.1, 4.1.1.3, 4.1.1.4, 4.1.1.6, 4.1.2, 4.1.2.5 and
4.1.2.6 of the Action Plan);
Strategy aim 7: to make full use of the new possibilities offered by the Treaty of Amsterdam,
particularly the articles on drug control, police cooperation and judicial cooperation as well as
the common minimum standards in legislation (and particularly points 4.2.1, 4.2.2, 4.2.3 and
4.2.5 of the Action Plan).
Measures continuing in 2001
For several years now, Belgium has been participating actively in international action against drugs
tourism ("Hazeldonck" measures), in accordance with the EU Joint Action of 1997. At the request
of the Minister for Secondary Education of the French-speaking community, the gendarmerie has
been collaborating on devising a project for the prevention of drug-taking in secondary schools.
In June this year, the Belgian judiciary decided to collaborate with Europol's projects concerning
South American criminal organisations actively involved in cocaine trafficking.
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Dealing with the adverse effects of trafficking in or the use of illicit drugs – principle
Local trafficking and the problems caused by it fall mainly under the responsibility of the local
(administrative, judicial and police) authorities. These problems are of great concern to the local
population (cf. the security charters), and it is therefore clear that they are very high on the agenda
for both the administrative authorities and those responsible for the local police.
The priorities for 2001
In view of the role to be played by Belgium in bringing about a common area of freedom and
security in Europe, it will in the first instance be tackling the problems of synthetic drugs, cocaine
and precursors. However, trafficking in heroin and cannabis will not be overlooked either.
General aim
Belgium will cooperate in achieving the European Union's objectives, and will, in particular:
– limit Belgium's involvement in drugs production and trafficking, with as a first priority
production of and trafficking in synthetic drugs as well as imports of cocaine into Europe;
– at local level, tackling the supply of illicit drugs and the related problems.
TARGETS FOR THE FEDERAL POLICE FOR 2001
In the context of the fight against synthetic drugs production and trafficking
For the central department:
– working out a method for detecting clandestine laboratories on our territory;
– working out a method for on-the-spot investigation in a clandestine laboratory in which
synthetic drugs are produced;
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– examining the practical arrangements for putting together a joint investigative team in
cooperation with the neighbouring countries;
– active involvement in the specific projects developed within the European Union.
For the decentralised departments:
– active involvement in the specific projects developed within the European Union.
In the context of the fight against cocaine trafficking
For the centralised department:
– examining the practical arrangements for putting together a joint investigative team in
cooperation with the neighbouring countries;
– active involvement in the specific projects developed within the European Union.
For the decentralised departments:
– working out a practical project for cooperation between customs and the federal police,
primarily at the external borders;
– active involvement in the specific projects developed within the European Union.
In the context of the fight against the misappropriation of precursors
For the central department and decentralised departments:
– working out a practical project for cooperation between the central department of the federal
criminal police and the precursors unit of the Ministry of Public Health;
– systematically proposing to the judicial authorities that an investigation be initiated whenever
foreign departments report to us that precursors originating in Belgium have been seized.
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In the context of the fight against heroin trafficking
For the central department:
– identifying the criminal groups most active in Belgium in order to initiate investigations;
– active involvement in the specific projects developed within the European Union.
For the decentralised departments:
– active involvement in the specific projects developed within the European Union;
– initiating investigations into the most important criminal groups.
In the context of the fight against cannabis trafficking
For the central department:
– keeping the contact magistrates informed of the genuine scope of cannabis trafficking from
Morocco and of the minimum investigative action to be initiated in Belgium;
– carrying out a preliminary study before the possible start-up of a pro-active project;
– drawing up a manual describing the police approach towards cannabis-growing in Belgium.
For the problem as a whole
For the central department:
– obtaining a picture of the specific threat posed by national and international drugs trafficking;
– active involvement in preparing for and chairing the Horizontal Working Party on Drugs
during the Belgian Presidency of the EU;
– chairing the Working Party on Drug Trafficking during the Belgian Presidency of the EU.
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TARGETS FOR THE LOCAL POLICE FOR 2001
In the context of the fight against the production of and trafficking in synthetic drugs
– Assisting in the detection of clandestine laboratories, mainly by obtaining information;
– possible involvement in the European Union's projects by passing on the necessary
information to the central unit within the federal police.
Support from the federal police for the local police in 2001.
To assist the local police in the context of the fight against drugs sales and the drugs problem, the
central department of the federal criminal police will:
– draw up and disseminate an inventory of best practices concerning the drugs problem and
drugs sales at local level;
– draw up and disseminate an inventory of best practices regarding the preventive approach;
– exchange information on products and working methods, mainly for the devolved units of the
federal police and the local police.
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