law · 3 a brief history of international law of international law by referring to developments in...
TRANSCRIPT
International LawText, Cases, and MaterialsSecond edition
Ademola Abass
LLM (Cantab), PhD (Nottingham)
Fellow of the Cambridge Commonwealth Society
Adjunct Professor of International Law
University of Leuven, Belgium
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Learning objectivesThis chapter will help you to:
• learninbriefthehistoricaldevelopmentofinternationallaw;
• understandthemeaningandconceptof‘internationallaw’;
• appreciatethenature,basis,andfunctionofinternationallaw;and
• understandthemoderncontextofinternationallaw.
International law in the modern context
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IntroductionNot long ago, international law was regarded as unserious, unenforceable, and some-
thing of a ‘non-law’ discipline. It meant little or nothing then to refer to oneself or
be referred to as an ‘international lawyer’. International law was regarded as politics
dressed in the language of the law—a sentiment also reflected in academia. In most
countries, university curricula did not include ‘international law’ until around the late
1970s. Academic writers rarely wrote about international law, and the few who did
so wrote mainly for the benefit of officials of foreign ministries and diplomats, who
were mostly concerned with issues relating to consular relations and the protection
of aliens in their countries. The rather cynical attitude of most countries towards
international law was aptly captured by a famous English adage ‘English Law is law,
foreign law is fact, and international law is fiction’ (restated in A Contributor (1995)
54 CLJ 230.
In the last fifty years, however, international law has witnessed a radical transforma-
tion. Not only is it the fastest growing of any legal discipline today, it is perhaps the
most fashionable of all legal disciplines for law students to pursue. From its relative
obscurity as a discipline developed mainly for the convenience of States and of which
‘the great majority of the lawyers of all states [knew] little or nothing’, as Oppenheim
once put it (see ‘The Science of International Law: Its Task and Method’ (1908) 2 AJIL
313, 323), international law has grown into the most effective weapon for preserv-
ing global peace and security. Today, international law regulates not only how States
behave towards one another, but also how States deal with their own subjects, espe-
cially concerning the protection of human rights, even within a State’s own territory.
This chapter provides a concise discussion of what international law is all about. It
analyses the basis, nature, and ramifications of international law, and considers how
international law has become such a powerful tool for regulating interstate relations,
and how its rules and principles are now applied across civilizations, religions, and
cultures all over the world.
1.1 A brief history of international law: a distinction between the ‘origin’ and ‘documentation’ of international lawThereisanextensiveliteratureonthehistoryanddevelopmentofinternationallaw.However,
‘history’dependsonwhoistellingit,forwhatpurpose,andforthebenefitofwhichaudi-
ence.Forexample,itiscustomaryformosttextbookwriterstobeginchroniclingtheorigin
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ofinternationallawbyreferringtodevelopmentsinWesternsociety.Somewriterssaythat
internationallaw,properlysocalled,beganwiththeconclusionofthePeaceofWestphaliain
1648,whichendedtheThirtyYearsWarinEurope.Somelocatethebirthofinternationallaw
inthepost-RenaissanceperiodortheclassicalerainEurope.Otheraccountshaveprovided
moreorlessrecentnarrativesthanthesedates.
Onecommontrendinmosthistoricalaccountsoftheoriginofinternationallawistheten-
dencyforwriterstoconfusetheperiodwhentheformal documentationofinternationallaw
beganwithwheninternationallaw,asadistinctlegalfield,emerged.Thesearetworemark-
ablydifferentissuesthatmustnotbeconfused.Itisimportanttodistinguishbetweensaying
thatinternationallaw,asused in modern times,begantogrowfromthesecondhalfofthe
MiddleAges,andsayingthatinternationallawactuallybeganintheMiddleAges.
InRobertJenningsandArthurWatts(eds),Oppenheim’s International Law,Vol. 1: Peace(9th
edn,London/New York: Longman,1996),p. 4,itisstatedthat:
As a systematised body of rules [international law] owes much to the Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius,
whose work, De jure belli ac pacis libri tres, appeared in 1625, and became a foundation of later
development. [Emphasis added]
Thisisawidelyacceptedviewofwheninternationallawstartedtobeproperlydocumented
and systematized in contrast to when it actually emerged.Itisimportanttomaintainthistype
ofdistinction,inordertoensuretheaccuracyofhistoricalanalysis.
Formanyreasons it isdifficult tospeculatewhen international lawwasactuallyborn.For
instance,theChineseareamongthevariouspeoplescreditedwithinventingtheartofwrit-
ing,evenifitwasperfectedelsewhere.Nonetheless,thevariousChineselanguageswerenot
accessibletoagreatpartoftheworlduntilfairlyrecently.Inthissituation,howcanonebe
surewhattheearlyChinesescholarswroteaboutinternationallaworStaterelations,orifthey
wroteonthesubjectatall.
Anotherdifficultyisthequestionofwhodocumentedinternationallawandwhatpara-
meterswereused indeterminingwhatconstituted international law.Until the twentieth
century, the standard for measuring acceptability of civilization was mainlyWestern. In
theInstitutes of the Law of Nations(1884),JamesLorimerclassifiedChinaas‘barbarous’.
In thefirsteditionofhis International Law: A Treatise,Vol.1 (London: Longman: 1905),
pp. 32–34,OppenheimrankedEuropeanStatesasnumber1,AmericanStates,Liberia,and
Haitiasnumber2,Turkeynumber3,Japannumber4,andPersia,Siam,China,Korea,and
Abyssiniaasnumber5. Hespecificallypronouncedthatcountriesinthelowercategoryhave
notraisedtheircivilizationtotheleveloftheWesternStates.In1955,H. Lauterpacht(ed.),
Oppenheim’s International Law: A Treatise, Vol. 1: Peace(8thedn,London: Longman,1955),
p. 49,theauthoraddedIndiaandPakistantothefourthcategoryandremovedKoreaand
Persiafromthefifth.
Perhapsthisclassificationreflectsthepersonalopinionsofindividualauthors.However,such
opinionssignificantlyaffecthowthecontributionsmadebyothersareregarded.(Forgeneral
discussion,seeXueHanqin,Chinese Contemporary Perspectives of International Law. History,
Culture, and International Law,355Recueildescours(HagueAcademyofInternationalLaw,
2012);SundhyaPahuja,Decolonising International Law (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity
Press,2011).
AuthoritativeinternationallegalscholarshavealsoshownthatthegeneralbeliefthatHugo
Grotius’sworkwasthefirstproperdocumentationofinternationallawwasinaccurate.
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AccordingtoJenningsandWatts(1996,seesection1.1):
Although he is rightly called the father of the law of nature as well as the law of nations, he has
created neither the one nor the other. Long before Grotius, the opinion was generally prevalent that
above the positive law which had grown up by custom or by legislation there was in existence
another law which had its roots in human reason and was therefore called the ‘law of nature’.
[Emphasis added]
Onemajorproblemwithattemptingtoputaspecificdateontheoriginofinternationallaw
is thatmostofwhatbecame international lawprinciplesalreadyexistedamongprimitive
nationslongbeforedocumentationstarted.Anexampleistheprincipleofgoodfaith.
InhisbookHistories(trans.A. deSélincourt,Harmondsworth: Penguin,1954),Herodotus,
theancientGreekhistorian, recorded theearly transactions that tookplacebetweencer-
tainNorthAfricantribes.Theseearlytransactions,forthemostpart,constitutedapractice
wherebycommoditiesweresoldbetweentwotribeswithoutasmuchasanexchangeof
words.TheCarthaginians,whoinhabitedseveralcitiesfromtheGulfofTunistopresent-day
Tunisiaaround1BC,wouldarriveinships,offloadtheirgoodsontothebeach,sendasmoke
signal,andthenretire.Theothertribeswouldcome,inspectthegoods,anddepositasumin
goldthattheydeemedafairpriceforthegoods.TheCarthaginianswouldreturn,inspectthe
gold,and,ifsatisfied,wouldtakethepaymentanddepart;ifnot,theywouldleaveboththe
goldandgoodsuntoucheduntiltheothertribedepositedafairprice.ThisiswhatHerodotus
describedinhisworkas‘silenttrading’—butseealsoStephenNeff,‘Ashorthistoryofinter-
nationallaw’inMalcolmEvans(ed.),International Law(3rdedn,Oxford: OxfordUniversity
Press,2010),atp. 4.
Itmaybetoooptimistictoregardthisepisodeasinternationallawproper.Nonetheless,the
narrativeindicatedtheevolutionofthedoctrineofgood faithamongst‘nations’,evenif
thisprimitiveformdidnotexactlycorrespondtothepacta sunt servanda.Aswewillseein
Chapter 3dealingwiththelawoftreaties,thiswell-establishedprincipleofinternational
lawenjoinsStatestoimplementfaithfullythoseobligationsthattheyassumeunderinter-
nationallaw.
Thevariousinstancesrecalledearliershowtheneedtobecautiouswhendealingwithhis-
toricalaccountsoftheoriginofinternationallaw.However,bydistinguishingthe‘origin’
ofinternationallawfromits‘documentation’,asOppenheimdidinthepreviousquota-
tion,weavoidmakinghastyandoften ill-foundedconclusionsaboutthe‘inception’of
internationallaw.
Thereislittleacademicbenefittoderivefromseekingthe‘origin’ofinternationallaw.Assuch,
thisbookseekstounderstandthe‘meaning’,‘basis’,‘nature’,andthe‘moderncontext’of
internationallaw.Understandingthesetopicswillbeofgreaterbenefittothosewhoarenew
tothesubjectthanwouldbeanattempttoestablishtheoriginofinternationallaw—atleast
untilsuchtimeas,asOppenheimhopedin‘TheScienceofInternationalLaw:ItsTaskand
Method’(1908)2AJIL313,317:
The master-historian, to whose appearance we look forward, will in especial have to bring to
light the part certain states have played in the victorious development of certain rules and what
were the economic, political, humanitarian, religious, and other interests which have helped to
establish the present rules of international law.
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thinking points
• Whyisitdifficulttorenderaccuratelyahistoricalaccountoftheoriginofinternationallaw?
• Whatshouldbethefocusofanyaccountofhowandwhyinternationallawbegan?
• WhatistheimportanceofHugoGrotius’searlyworkonthedevelopmentofinternationallaw?
1.2 The meaning and concept of international law1.2.1 What is ‘international law’?‘International law’ was believed to have been coined by the British philosopher Jeremy
Benthamin1789,whodescribeditas‘thatbranchofjurisprudence...[exclusivelyconcerned
with]mutualtransactionsbetweensovereignassuch’.(SeeJeremyBentham,An Introduction
to the Principles of Morals and Legislation([1789]edBurnsandHart,London: AthlonePress,
1970),p. 297.)Thisdefinitionembodiesthenotionofinternationallawintheclassicalera
whenthesubjectwasregardedasapplyingonlytoStates.
Duringthistime,however,somewritersbelievedthat international lawappliedtoentities
otherthanStates.WilliamBlackstone,aneminentEnglishjurist,wasoftheviewthatapart
fromapplyingtointerstaterelationsinternationallawalsoappliedtoindividualssothatthe
subjectappliesto‘intercoursewhichmustfrequentlyoccurbetweentwoormoreindepend-
entstates,andtheindividualsbelongingtoeach’(W.Blackstone,Commentaries on the Laws
of England(1stedn,Oxford: ClarendonPress,1765–69),BookIV,p. 66).
Mostmodernwriterstendtodefineinternationallawasabodyofrulesandprinciplesappli-
cableonlytoStates.Letusconsidersomeexamples.
AccordingtoCliveParry,‘Thefunctionoflawintheinternationalcommunity’inM. Sørensen
(ed.),Manual of Public International Law(London: Macmillan,1968),p. 1:
‘International law’ is a strict term of art, connoting that system of law whose primary function it
is to regulate the relations of states with one another.
Section101oftheRestatementoftheLaw(Third),ForeignRelationsLawoftheUnitedStates,
providesthat:
International Law, as used in this Restatement, consists of rules and principles of general
applicationdealingwiththeconductofstatesandofinternationalorganizationsandwiththeir
relationsinterse,aswellaswithsomeoftheirrelationswithpersons,whethernaturalorjuridical.
AndtheOxford Dictionarydefines‘internationallaw’as:
the law of nations, under which nations are regarded as individual members of a common polity,
bound by a common rule of agreement or custom; opposed to municipal law, the rules binding in
local jurisdictions. [Emphasis added]
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Itisnowadaysbothproblematicandoutdatedtodefineinternationallawasonlyapplyingto
States.Internationallawwassodefinedwhenitappliedonlytotherelationsamongnations.
Ifwegoback—perhapstothelatenineteenthcentury,whentheproperdocumentationof
internationallawbegan—itisobviousthatStatescreatedinternationallaw,throughcustoms
thatwerecommonintheirrelationwithoneanother.Fromthiscustomarypractice,States
begantorecordtherulesandprinciplesthattheywantedtoapplyintheirrelationswithone
another.Thefirstmoderntypeofsuchrecordswasthe1856DeclarationofParis,concluded
inanefforttoendtheCrimeanWar.Stateswerethustheonlysubjectsofinternationallawat
theseearlystages,becausetheyalonewerecapableofapplyingitsrulesandprinciples,and
itwasonlytothemthatinternationallawcouldbeapplied.Forthisreason,aswewillseein
Chapter 4,Statesremainthemostimportantsubjectsofinternationallaw,makingitsome-
whataccuratetocontinuetodescribeinternationallawasthe‘lawofnations’.
By the twentieth century, international law application opened wider. Following the
InternationalCourt of Justice’sAdvisoryOpinion in theReparation for Injuries case—that
internationalorganizationshavetheirownlegalpersonality—theybecamefullyrecognized
asinternationallawsubjects.Eventhen,HerschLauterpacht,whowasagreatcampaigner
fortherecognitionofindividualsassubjectsofinternationallaw,stillwrotein1947that‘Asa
rule,thesubjectsoftherightsanddutiesarisingfromtheLawofNationsareStatessolelyand
exclusively’(H.Lauterpacht(ed.),International Law: A Treatise(6thedn,London: Longman,
1947),p. 19).
AswewillseeinChapter 4,inadditiontointernationalorganizations,internationallawnow
appliestohumanbeingsincertaincircumstances.Internationalorganizationscanapplythe
rulesandprinciplesofinternationallaw,whichcanalsobeappliedtothem.Itispossibleto
arguethatsinceinternationalorganizationsconsistofStates,adefinitionofinternationallaw
asapplyingto‘States’invariablyincludesinternationalorganizations.However,aswewillsee
inChapter 5,internationalorganizationsarelegalpersonsandsubjectsofinternationallaw
and,assuch,theycanbedistinguishedfromtheindividualStatesthatcomposethem.
AsimilaropinionwasexpressedinAkehurst’sModernIntroductiontoInternationalLaw(7th
rev’dedn,edPeterMalanczuk,London: Routledge,1997),inwhichAkehurstnotedthat,dur-
ingtheyearsbetweenthetwoWorldWars,writershadnodifficultydefining‘international
law’asthelawgoverningtherelationsbetweenStates.However,hesaid(atp. 1)thatthis
definition:
did not reflect the reality even at that time. The Holy See, although not a State, was recognized
to have international legal personality, and so, for certain purposes, were insurgents and some
forerunners of modern international organizations. Since the inter-war period, the matter has
become more complicated due to both the expansion of the scope of international law into new
areas and the emergence of actors other than states on the international plane, such as inter-
governmental organizations established by states, non-governmental organizations created by
private individuals, transnational companies, individuals and groups, including minorities and
indigenous peoples.
TheextensionofinternationallawdefinitiontocoverentitiesotherthanStatesmustbehan-
dledwithcaution.Whileinternationallawcanbeappliedtooragainstnaturalpersons—for
example,under theRomeStatuteof the InternationalCriminalCourt (seeChapter 16)—
humanbeingscannotapplyinternationallawinthesamewaythatStatesandinternational
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organizationscan.Thus,despitethefactthatcertaincategoriesofhumanbeing(including
diplomats,staffofinternationalorganizations,amongothers)enjoysomeinternationalrights
andprivilegesthatordinarypeopledonot,theycannotappearbeforetheInternationalCourt
ofJustice(ICJ),orconcludetreatiesontheirownbehalf,althoughtheycandosoasState
officials.Furthermore,individualscannotopendiplomaticmissions(embassies,highcommis-
sions,etc.)inforeigncountries,nomatterhowimportanttheymaybe.Thereforeweneedto
becautiouswhenwedescribeindividualsas‘subjects’ofinternationallawforthepurposeof
defininginternationallaw.Intruth,theyareinternationallawsubjectsonlybecauseinterna-
tionallawcanbeappliedtothemundergivencircumstances;theycannotapplytherulesof
internationallawintheirownrelations,and,assuch,arenotonthesameplatformasStates
andinternationalorganizationsassubjectsofinternationallaw.
Nevertheless,itisnolongercorrecttocontinuetodefineinternationallawasrulesthatapply
toStatesalone,evenifStatesremainthemostimportantsubjectsofinternationallaw.Thus,
inlightoftheshortcomingsinthevariousexistingdefinitionsofinternationallaw,wepropose
todefineinternationallaw,forthepurposeofthisbook,as:
a body of rules and principles, contained in various sources, including treaties and customs,
which the subjects of international law have accepted as binding on them either in their relations
with one another per se, or in those with other juristic or natural persons.
Thisdefinitionisdistinguishablefrommostoftheexistingdefinitionsinmany ways:
• itrecognizesthatinternationallawappliestoentitiesotherthanStates;
• itliststhemainsourcesofinternationallaw—treatiesandcustoms—butisnotlimitedto
these;
• itrevealsthattheauthorityofinternationallawderivesmainlyfromtheacceptanceofits
bindingforcebyitssubjects;and
• itdemonstratesthatinternationallawdoesnotregulateonlytherelationsofoneStatewith
another,butalsogovernstherelationsofStateswithhumansandjuristicpersons(whether
nationalsorforeigners).
thinking points
• Explainthemeaningofinternationallawasthe‘lawsofnations’.
• ListwhichentitiesotherthanStatesmayapplyinternationallawandthosetowhichinter-national law may apply.
• Towhatextentdoestheproposeddefinitionofinternationallawimproveuponordetractfromotherdefinitionsofinternationallawwithwhichyouarefamiliar?
1.2.2 Public and private international law: a distinctionAsaconcept,weusethephrase‘internationallaw’ratherlooselytorefertotwodistinctareas
ofalegaldiscipline.Ontheonehand,whenwesay‘internationallaw’,wemaymean‘public
internationallaw’—thatis,thelawofnations,which,asdiscussedpreviously,concernsrela-
tionsamongsubjectsofinternationallaw.
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LetussupposethattwofictionalStates,CandomaandRutamu,regularlyconductrela-
tionswitheachotherandthattheyeachhaveanembassyontheother’sterritory.Thusthe
exchangeofdiplomaticofficialsbetweenthesecountries,theconclusionoftreatiesregu-
latingthetreatmentofnationalsofonevisitingtheterritoryoftheother,theadoptionof
rulesandprinciplesfordealingwiththecommercialenterprisesofonecountrycarryingon
businessintheother,andsoon,areallmattersforpublicinternationallaw.Thisisbecause
suchmattersinvolvetheapplicationofcertainrulesandprinciplesofinternationallawto
thetwoStates.Therulesandprinciplesare‘public’becauseneitherStatecanclaimowner-
shipofthem;rather,theyarerulesagreeduponbybothCandomaandRutamualone,or
inconjunctionwithotherStates.
Ontheotherhand,whenwesay‘internationallaw’,wemay,infact,mean‘privateinterna-
tionallaw’,otherwisecalled‘conflictoflaws’.Thisisabranchofinternationallawthatdeals
withrelationsbetweenindividualsorlegalpersons,suchascorporations,inwhichthelawsof
morethanoneStatemaybeapplied.Privateinternationallaw,orconflictoflaws,concerns
rulesdevelopedbyStatestodealwithsuchmattersastransactionsinvolvingprivatenationals
ofoneStateandanotherState,whichmaycontainsomeforeignelements.
LetusimaginethatXandYareCandomancitizenswhomarriedinCandoma,butlivein
Rutamu.TheirchildrenwereborninRutamuandtheycarryonbusinessactivitiesinthatcoun-
try.InadivorceproceedingbetweenXandYinstitutedinaRutamuancourt,theresolutionof
issuesconcerningthecustodyoftheirchildren,thedistributionofpropertyownedbythecou-
ple,andthedispositionoftheirresourceswillinvolveaconsiderationofthelawofCandoma,
underwhichthecoupleweremarried,andthatofRutamu,underwhichtheirchildrenwere
bornandunderwhichtheyandtheirchildrenreside,andunderwhichtheypractisetheirbusi-
ness.ItistheinteractionofthelawsofCandomaandRutamu,andtheconsequencesarising
therefrom,thatarereferredtoas‘conflictoflaws’,or‘privateinternationallaw’.
NOTE AlthoughthelawsoftwoStates(CandomaandRutamu)areinvolvedinthedivorce
proceedingsbetweenXandY,thecaseisnotactuallybetweenthesetwoStates.Rather,the
caseisabouthowCandomannationalswho,despitehavingmarriedinCandoma,musthave
theirmarriagedissolvedintheircountryofdomicile,Rutamu,which,nevertheless,mustcon-
siderhowCandomanlawdealswithcertainissuesarisingintheproceedings.
Distinguishingbetween‘public’and‘private’internationallawdoesnotimplythatthesetwo
aspectsofinternationallawarealwaysmutuallyexclusive,orthattheyoperateindependently
ofeachotheratalltimes.Onthecontrary,therearecircumstancesinwhichcertainaspects
ofthesetwo‘internationallaws’interrelate,andinwhichonemayberelevantindetermining
whetherabreachoftheotherhasoccurred.
InJenningsandWatts(1996,seesection1.1),atp. 7,itwassaidthat:
Although the rules of private international law are part of the internal law of the state con-
cerned, they may also have the character of public international law where they are embodied
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in treaties. Where this happens the failure of a state party to the treaty to observe the rule of
private international law prescribed in it will lay it open to proceedings for breach of an interna-
tional obligation owed another party. Even where the rules of private international law cannot
themselves be considered as rules of public international law, their application by a state as part
of its internal law may directly involve the rights and obligations of the state as a matter of public
international law, for example where the matter concerns the property of alien or the extent of
the state’s jurisdiction.
Thisisaveryimportantobservation.Indeed,situationsmayariseinwhichfailuretoapply
therulesofprivateinternationallawmayberegardedasabreachofpublicinternational
law.AswillbeseeninChapter 3,Statesacceptcertainprivateinternationallawrulesas
governingtheirinternationalrelationsandsuchrulesmayinvolveprivateinternationallaw
issues.ThereforeifaStatefailstoapplyaprivateinternationallawruleembodiedinatreaty
towhich it isaparty, that failuremaybeconsideredtobeabreachofan international
obligationagreeduponbythetwoStates,which,ineffect,constitutesabreachofpublic
internationallaw.
thinking points
• Distinguishbetween‘public’and‘private’internationallaw.
• Arepublicandprivateinternationallawsmutuallyexclusive?
• Nameonecircumstanceunderwhichthefailuretoapplyaprivateinternationallawrulecangive rise to a breach of public international law.
1.2.3 General, regional, and particular international lawAsidefromthedistinctionbetweenpublicandprivateinternationallaw,afurthercategoriza-
tion(althoughnotadistinctionassuch)canbemadeintheoperationsofpublicinternational
law.Whilethereisageneralbodyofrulesandprinciplesthatmakesuppublicinternational
law, theoperationof these rules andprinciplesmay sometimes vary.Generally speaking,
internationallawrulesmayoperateglobally,buttheymayalsoberestrictedtospecificregions
oftheworld.Usually,internationallawappliestoavastmajorityofStatesallovertheworld;
nonetheless,therearecertainrulesthatarepeculiartoparticularregionsoftheworld.Thus
weoftenspeakof‘general’internationallawand‘regional’internationallawinrespectofthe
universalorregionalapplicationofinternationallaw.
Thebasisof thedistinctionbetween ‘general’ and ‘regional’ international law liesmainly
inthescopeoftheapplicationofinternationallegalrules,aswellasthenumberofStates
involved.GeneralinternationallawusuallyappliestoagreatermajorityofStatesinall regions
oftheworld.RegionalinternationallawmayalsoapplytoaconsiderablenumberofStates
(althoughtheyareusuallyfewerthanthoseinvolvedin‘generalinternationallaw’),butthe
Statesareusuallylocatedwithinasingleregionoftheworld.
WhereastheruleprohibitingthethreatoruseofforcebyStates(seeChapter 10)isanexam-
pleofgeneral internationallaw,becauseitappliestoallStatesregardlessoftheregionin
which theyare located, the ‘Estrada’doctrine,whichconcerns the ‘recognitionofStates’
(seeChapter 4),originatedfromandinitiallyoperatedonlyinLatinAmerica.However,more
NOTE Itmustalwaysbeborneinmindthatthisbookisconcernedonlywithpublicinternationallawandnotprivateinternationallaw.
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Stateselsewherehavenowadoptedthedoctrine.Anotherexampleofregionalinternational
lawcanbeseenintherequirementssetfornewentitiesaspiringtobecomeStatesinEurope,
underEuropeanUnionlaw,inadditiontofulfillingthecriteriaofstatehoodunderthe1933
MontevideoConvention.ThesenewrulesapplyonlyinEurope(seeChapter 4).
Itisalsopossibletodescribesomerulesofpublicinternationallawas‘particularinternational
law’.ThisrefersmainlytorulesthatareacceptedbyonlyafewStates,butwhicharenotcon-
finedtoaparticularregionoftheworld.Sucharuleisnot‘regionalinternationallaw’,since
thefewStatesthatsubscribetoitarenotnecessarilyconfinedtothesameregion(inwhich
case,itwouldbe‘regionalinternationallaw’notwithstandingthesmallnumberofStates).
Thusreferringtosucharuleinsteadas‘particularinternationallaw’accuratelyrepresentsthe
factthatitappliesonlytoafewStates,unrelatedtotheirgeographicallocation.
Thebulkofinternationallegalrulesareappliedonauniversalbasis.Examplesofsuchrules
canbefoundineminentinternationaltreatiessuchastheCharteroftheUnitedNations(UN
Charter)andvarioushumanrightstreaties—especially the InternationalCovenantonCivil
andPoliticalRights(ICCPR)andtheInternationalCovenantonEconomic,SocialandCultural
Rights(ICESCR).Inaddition,generalinternationallawrulescanbefoundinsuchspecificlegal
regimesasthe1948ConventiononthePreventionandPunishmentoftheCrimeofGenocide
(theGenocideConvention).
Although‘regional’or‘particular’internationallawsaresubservienttogeneralinternational
law,thereareoccasionswhenregionalorparticularinternationallawobligationsclashwith
generalinternationallawobligations.Inordertoavoidsuchsituations,generalinternational
lawoftenregulatestherelationsbetweenitselfanditssubcategories(seeChapter 2).
Article103oftheUNCharterprovides: ‘Intheeventofaconflictbetweentheobligationsof
theMembersoftheUnitedNationsunderthepresentCharterandtheirobligationsunder
anyotherinternationalagreement,theirobligationsunderthepresentChartershallprevail.’
ThisprovisionrelatesspecificallytotheobligationsofUNmemberStatesunderany other
internationalagreements,butsuchotherinternationalagreementsincludethosethatapply
eitheramongafewStatesorinaparticularregion.TheotherobligationsoftheUNmem-
berStatesoverwhichtheirCharterobligationstakeprecedencemightbeobligationsunder
general international law(outsidethoseoftheUNCharter), regional international law,or
particularinternationallaw.Thismeansthatevenwithintheclassofgeneralinternationallaw,
theobligationsassumedbyStatesundertheUNCharter(whichembodiesgeneralinterna-
tionallaw)aresuperiortotheirobligationsunderotheragreements,whichmayalsoembody
generalinternationallaw.
Further,Article53ofthe1969ViennaConventionontheLawofTreaties(VCLT)statesthat:
Atreatyisvoidif,atthetimeofitsconclusion,itconflictswithaperemptorynormofgeneral
internationallaw.ForthepurposesofthepresentConvention,aperemptorynormofgeneral
internationallawisanormacceptedandrecognizedbytheinternationalcommunityofStatesas
awholeasanormfromwhichnoderogationispermittedandwhichcanbemodifiedonlybya
subsequentnormofgeneralinternationallawhavingthesamecharacter.
Aswill bediscussed fully inChapter 2, aperemptorynorm—otherwise called ius (or jus)
cogens—iswidelyregardedasthemostfundamentalnormoftheinternationalcommunity,
breachofwhichshakestheveryfoundationofhumancivilization.Examplesofsuchnorms
includetheprohibitionoftheslavetrade,genocide,andtheuseofforcebyStates.Peremptory
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normsarethereforerulesofgeneralinternationallawandmaynotbecontradictedbyany
otherrule,whetherregionalorparticularinternationallaw.However,aperemptorynormmay
bereplacedbyanothernormofinternationallawhavingasimilarcharacter,pursuanttothe
provisionsofArticle64VCLT.
‘Regional’and‘particular’internationallawsarenotaspopulartodayastheywereinthepast.
ThisispartlybecausealmostallStatesarenowmembersoftheUnitedNations,andpartly
becausetheexistenceofregionalcustomsarebeingsuccessfullychallengedbeforetheICJ
(seeChapter 2).InafastglobalizingworldwhereStatesareconstantlyexpandingtheirareas
ofcooperation,itisbecomingincreasinglydifficultforafewStatestoclaimthattheyaccept
customsorrulesnotopentothevastmajorityofStates.
KEY POINTS
• ‘Generalinternationallaw’meansabodyofrulesandprinciplesofinternationallawthatappliesamongavastmajorityofStates.
• ‘Regionalinternationallaw’referstotherulesandprinciplesofinternationallawthatapplytoStateswithinaparticularregionoftheworld(forexample,theEstradadoctrine).
• ‘Particular international law’referstotherulesorprinciplesof international lawapplicabletoafewStatesregardlessofwheretheyarelocated.
• Theuseofboth‘regional’and‘particular’internationallawhasdecreasedconsider-ablyinmoderntimes.
• ItisoftenverydifficultforStatestoprovetheexistenceofaregionalorparticularcustom,especiallyinmattersinvolvingStatesthatarenotlocatedwithinthesameregion.
1.3 The nature of international law: theoriesAcrossgenerations,legalscholars,philosophers,thinkers,andpoliticalscientistshavepro-
poundedvarioustheoriesaboutthenatureofinternationallawinordertobetterunderstand
itsfunctions,characteristics,andlimitations.Themostimportantandinfluentialoftheseare
thenaturalist,thepositivist,andtheGrotianschools.Thisdoesnotconstituteanexhaustive
list,butareonlythreeofthemanyschoolsofthoughtthatputforwarddifferenttheories
aboutthenatureoflawandthroughwhichthenatureofinternationallawmaybebetter
understood.
1.3.1 NaturalismAccordingtonaturalism, there isa lawofnature thatapplies toStates justassuch law
appliestoindividuals.Inproposingthata law of natureappliestoStatesandindividuals,the
naturalistsopposetheideathatStatesvoluntarily,intheirconductwithoneanother,should
thinking pointDistinguish between‘general’,‘regional’,and‘particular’international law.
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be boundby laws that they eithermake themselves orwhich theyobserveby custom.
Consequently,naturalistsbelievethatallothertypesoflaw—includingthosethatareman-
made—mustconformtoahigher(natural)law.Someeminentmembersofthenaturalist
schoolsincludedPufendorf,Hobbes(whowouldlaterbecomeapositivist),Rutherford,and
Barbeyrac.
InThe Concept of Law(Oxford: OxfordUniversityPress,2nded1994),p. 186,H. L.A. Hart,
whowasactuallyapositivist,agreedthat:
there are certain principles of human conduct, awaiting discovery by human reason, with which
manmade law must conform if it is to be valid.
Inanutshell,naturallawtheoryproposesthatitisthesamelawofnaturethatregulates
humanconductthatalsoregulatesStatesintheirconductwithoneanother.Itpositsthat
whileStates,likehumans,maymakeotherlawsbythemselves,suchlawsmustconformto
thelawofnatureinordertobevalid.Nonetheless,becausethenaturalistsdonotaccept
thatStatesmakethelawsthatbindthemintheirconductwithoneanother,theyattracted
thetitle‘deniersoftheLawsofNations’—thatis,theywereseentorejectinternational
law.
1.3.2 PositivismOpposedtothenaturallawtheoryistheconceptofpositivism,atermbelievedtohavebeen
coinedinthe1830sbyFrenchsocialphilosopherAugustComte.Comteusedthetermpositiv-
ismtomeansomething‘scientific’and‘objective’,asopposedtosomethingdeducedthrough
somereligiousorspeculativemeans.
However,beforediscussingpositivismasatheoryonthenatureofinternationallaw,weneed
toremindourselvesthat,asaconcept,positivismiscapableofawiderangeofthings.Inthis
regard,wecanspeakbroadlyofthreebranchesofpositivism.AccordingtoA. P. d’Entrèves,
Natural Law(2ndrev’dedn,London: Hutchins&Co.,1970),p. 175,these are:
• imperativism;
• normativism;and
• legalrealism.
Althoughthelasttwobrancheshavesomebroadrelationstothetheoryoflaw,itis‘imperativ-
ism’withwhichwearemainlyconcernedhere.Imperativismcapturesthewholeessenceof
positivism,inthatitconveysthenotionthatthelawisacommandofa‘sovereign’endorsed
bythehabitualobedienceofhisorhersubjects—atheorygenerallycreditedtoEnglishlegal
philosopherJohnAustin.
Positivistsrejectthenotionofsome‘higher’or‘natural’lawtowhichallman-madelaws(posi-
tivelaws)mustconformbeforetheycanbevalid.Forthepositivists,Statesareboundonlyby
thoselawsthatareeitherman-made(suchastreaties)orwhichderivethroughcustomsand
areissuedbyasovereign.Inshort,positivismisbasedontheideathatthelawisthecommand
ofanuncommandedcommander.
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Thenatureofinternationallaw: theories
1.3.3 GrotianismThethirdtheoreticalschoolistheGrotianperspective,or‘Grotianism’.Asnotedpreviously,
HugoGrotiusiscreditedasbeingthe‘fatherofinternationallaw’.Itisnotsurprisingthere-
forethatthiseminentinternationallawyerhasawholeschooloflegaltheorydedicatedto
hisname.
TheGrotiansoccupyamiddlepositionbetweenthenaturalistsandthepositivists,regarding
neithernaturallawnorpositivelawashavinganymoreoranylesscharacterthantheother.
HugoGrotiussawapossibilityofharmonizingthevariousschools.
InDe Jure Praedae(The Law of Prize)(1868),Grotiusspeaksoftheneedtosystematize:
That body of law . . . which is concerned with the mutual relations among states or rulers of
states, whether derived from nature, or established by divine ordinances or having its origin
in custom or tacit agreement . . . [and to the importance of] a knowledge of treaties of alliance,
conventions, and understandings of peoples, kings and sovereign nations . . . in short, of the
whole law of war and peace.
InTheAnarchicalSociety: AStudyoftheOrderoftheWorldPolitics (London: Macmillan,
1977),p. 27,HedleyBullobservesthattheGrotians:
View international law politics as taking place within an international society [in which] states are
bound not only by rules of prudence or expediency but also by imperatives of morality and law.
(See also H. Bull, ‘The Grotian conception of international society’ in H. Butterfield and
M. Wight(eds),Diplomatic Investigations(Cambridge,MA: HarvardUniversityPress,1968),
pp. 51–73.)
CliveParry(1968,seesection1.2.1),atp. 26,sumsupthemaintenetsoftheGrotiantheory
ofinternationallawtotheeffectthatitattributes‘equalweighttowhatstatesactuallydo,to
habitandcustomandtothecourseofdealingbetweenparties,whichcontributesignificantly
towhateversystemoflaw;andnolesstowhatstatesare—orwhattheymustdobecauseof
theirnature’.
Insummary,internationallaw,likemunicipallaw,isregardedashavingtranscendental,aswell
asmundane,origins.Statesagreetobeboundbyinternationallawwhentheysigntreaties
andenterintodifferenttypesofagreement,andwhentheirpracticeindicatessuchagree-
ment.Inaddition,Statesareregardedasbeingboundbycertainnormsandtenets,suchas
peremptorynorms,notnecessarilybasedonanyagreement,butbasedonthenatureofthe
normsthemselves.Grotianismthereforeprovidesamorecomprehensiveunderstandingofthe
basisofinternationallawanditsbindingnatureaslaw.
thinking points
• Distinguishbetween‘naturalism’and‘positivism’.
• What does ‘Grotianism’ stand for? How can it be differentiated from naturalism andpositivism?
• Inyouropinion,whichofthetheoriesdoyouthinkbestrepresentsinternationallawandwhy?
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1.4 The relationship of theories of law with international lawAswillhavebeennoticed,thevarioustheoriesconsideredpreviouslyrelateto‘law’ingeneral
andnotonlytointernationallawinparticular.Thisraisesthequestion: howdothetheories
relatetopublicinternationallaw?
Therelevanceofthesetheoriestointernationallawmanifestsintheirsubtleinfluenceson
thevariousaspectsofinternationallawratherthanasingle,dominanteffect.Forexample,
therelationshipbetweeninternationallawandmunicipalordomesticlaw,whichisusu-
allyexpressedasacontestbetweenmonismanddualism(seeChapter 9),canbeproperly
understoodonlyagainstasoundappreciationofthetheories.Whetheronebelievesthat
internationallawissuperiortodomesticlaw(monism),orthatthetwoareindeedseparate
and functionas such (dualism), dependspartly on towhat theoretical viewof lawone
subscribes.
Generallyspeaking,theinfluenceoftheabovetheoriesoninternationallawtodayismuch
lessthanitwaswhenthedisciplinebegantobesystematized.Nonetheless,Grotianismhas
provedtobethemostenduringofallofthetheories,especiallyaftertheSecondWorld
War.Thedevelopmentofastronginternationalhumanrightssystemafterthewarmeant
thatlawscouldnotsimplybeviewedasthe‘commandofanuncommandedcommander’,
norcoulditbesharplydivorcedfrommorality,aspositivistswantustobelieve.Today,a
soldier cannothope toescape liability for committingheinouscrimesduringanarmed
conflictbysimplystatingthatheorsheisauthorizedbyhisorhersuperiorcommander.
Internationallawmakeseffortsnowadaystoensurethateverysoldierisawareofthelaws
ofwar,andthatallsoldiersbehaveaccordingtotheselawsandnotsimplyaccordingto
thewhimsoftheircommanders.Inaddition,theideaoftheabsolutesovereigntyofthe
Stateasan‘uncommandedcommander’intheinternationalforumisbeingchallengedby
thedevelopmentofinstancesinwhichinternationallawwill,inasense,piercetheveilof
sovereigntyandpunishoffendersforcrimescommittedintheirterritory,aswillbeseen
inourdiscussionofinternationalcriminallaw.Allofthesedevelopmentsininternational
lawhaveledtoasharpdeclineinpositivism,justastheroleplayedbylawinthemodern
societyhasequallyreducedtheefficacyofthebeliefthatsomehigher(natural)lawisall
thatmatters.
KEY POINTS
• The relevance of ‘theory’ to international law generally declined after theSecondWorldWar, due partly to the development of international humanrights.
• The impact of ‘theory’ on international law can be seen in its influence on specificaspectsofinternationallawratherthanasanoveralleffect.
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Thebasisofinternationallaw: consent
1.5 The basis of international law: consentInanygivensociety,lawsaremadebycertaininstitutions.Indemocraticsocieties,lawsare
madebythelegislature,knownbydifferentnamesindifferentcountries.IntheUK,forexam-
ple,the‘Parliament’ isdividedintothe‘HouseofCommons’andthe‘HouseofLords’; in
theUSA,thefederallegislatureiscalled‘Congress’;inNigeria,itisthe‘NationalAssembly’,
comprisingthe‘Senate’andthe‘HouseofRepresentatives’;andinIsraelandRussia,theyare
called‘Knesset’and‘Duma’,respectively.
Incontrasttodomesticlegalsystems,internationallawdoesnothavelaw-makinginstitutions.
Hence,man-madelaws,inthesenseoflegislativeenactmentsorActsofParliament,donot
formthebasisoftheinternationallegalsystem;rather,internationallawisbasedprincipally
ontheconsentofthoseStatesthatagreetobeboundbyit.ItisonlywhenStatesacceptto
forminternationallawthatinternationallawcanexist.HowStatesconsenttotheformation
ofinternationallawcan,however,vary.Statesmayexplicitlyagreetosetouttherulesofinter-
nationallawthattheywishtoapplyandtobeappliedtothemintheirrelations,andthiscan
bedoneintreatiesorconventions;suchanagreementcanalsoemergefromthecustomary
practicesofStates.Thesetwomodes(treatyandcustom)arediscussedinChapter 2.
Theoriginof ‘consent’as thebasisof international law isbothancientandmodern. It is
believedthatconsensualinternationallawemanatedfromthepracticeoftheRomanEmpire.
ThusCliveParry(1968,seesection1.2.1),atp. 17,notesthat:
The ius gentium of the Romans—that amalgam of the laws of all the peoples of the empire . . . hav-
ing been received over much of the European continent after the Renaissance, constituted an
actually operative common system of law providing a basis ready made for international law.
Obviously,consentasabasisof international lawwas influencedbydevelopmentswithin
domesticlegalsystems,butittookawhilebeforethesedomesticdevelopmentsactuallyreg-
isteredameaningfulimpactoninternationallaw.
AsReismanobserves in‘Sovereigntyandhumanrights incontemporary international law’
(1990)84AJIL866,867:
It took the formal international system time to register these profound changes. Another cen-
tury beset by imperialism, colonialism and fascism was to pass, but by the end of the Second
World War, popular sovereignty was rooted as one of the fundamental postulates of political
legitimacy. Article 1 of the UN Charter established as one of the purposes of the United Nations,
to develop friendly relations between States, not on any terms, but ‘based on respect for the
principles of equal rights and self-determination of peoples’.
Itdoesnotfollow,however,thateveryStatemustgiveitsconsentbeforeinternationallawcan
beestablished.AccordingtoOppenheim(1908,seesection1.1),atn. 14:
The ‘common consent’ cannot mean, of course, that all states must at all times expressly con-
sent to every part of the body of rules constituting international law, for such common consent
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could never in practice be established. The membership of the international community is con-
stantly changing; and the attitude of individual members who may come and go must be seen
in the context of that of the international community as a whole, while dissent from a particular
rule is not to be taken as withdrawal of consent to the system as a whole.
JohnDuggardnotes,inInternationalLaw: A SouthAfricanPerspective(3rdedn,CapeTown:
Juta&Co.Ltd,2008),atp. 14:
While the notions of justice and the values of legal idealism associated with natural laws form
the foundation of much of contemporary international law, particularly the promotion of human
rights and the right of self-determination, it cannot be denied that for many states consent
remains the basis of their participation in the international community.
AswillbeseeninChapter 2,inthecaseofcustomswhatisrequiredisthatagreatmajority
ofStatesgivestheirconsent;inthatwaythecustomcomestoberegardedasinternational
law.Withtreaties,theruleisdifferent: onlyStatesthatconsenttoatreatycanbeboundby
therulescontainedinthattreaty,subjecttonotableexceptions.(SeealsoFernandoR. Teson,
‘Interdependence,consent,andthebasisofinternationalobligation’(1989)Proceedings of
theAnnualMeetingoftheAmericanSocietyofInternationalLaw,5–8April,pp. 558–566,
andWilfredC. Jenks,‘Thechallengeofuniversality’(1959)Proceedings of the Annual Meeting
oftheAmericanSocietyof InternationalLaw,30April–2May,pp. 85–98;AnthonyCarty,
‘Criticalinternationallaw: recenttrendsinthetheoryofinternationallaw’(1991)2EJIL66.)
KEY POINTS
• Stateconsentisthebasisofinternationallaw.
• ConsentasthebasisofinternationallawwasinspiredbydevelopmentsindomesticlawinEuropeandtheUSA.
• StateconsentdoesnotimplythatallStatesmustgivetheirconsentatalltimesforthepurposeofestablishinginternationallaw;theconsentofthemajorityofStatesissufficient.
1.5.1 The limits to State consent as the basis for international law
ThereareinstancesinwhichStateconsentisprecluded.Theseincludesituationsconcerninga
specialclassofnormsandwithregardtosomeexistingcustoms.Wewillnowconsidersome
examplesoftheseinstances.
Consent versus peremptory norm
WhileStateconsentiscrucialtotheformationofinternationallaw,therearecertainaspects
ofinternationallawinrelationtowhichStateconsentispracticallyirrelevant.Onceanormis
categorizedasaperemptorynorm(thatis,themostfundamentalinthehierarchyofnorms),
Statescannotconsensuallyderogatefromsuchanorm(seeArticle53VCLT).A Statecannot,
forexample,consenttothecommissionofthecrimeofgenocideonitsterritorysimplybecause
ithasnotratifiedthe1948GenocideConvention;neithercanaState,inpresenttimes,permit
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slavetradeonitsterritoryforanyreason.Theproscriptionofgenocideandslaveryarenow
widely regardedasperemptorynormsbyStates,because theyare so fundamental to the
existenceofhumankindthatadisturbanceofthemthreatensthatveryfoundation.A State
cannotalsoclaimthatitsinternationallywrongfulactwhichviolatesaperemptorynormis
precludedbyconsent.(SeeArticle26oftheInternationalLawArticlesonStateResponsibility
forInternationallyWrongfulActs,2001.)
Nevertheless,thefactthatonlyafewcrimesbelongtothecategoryofperemptorynorms
demonstratesthatit isonlyforextraordinaryreasonsthatStateconsentcanbeprecluded
fromoperatingoninternational law.Outsidethesenorms,therearenootherinstancesin
whichStateconsent isprecludedasbeing thebasisof international law.Stateconsent is
sopowerfulthat,aswewillseeinChapter 13,whenStatescreateinternationallaw,their
consentisevenneededbeforetheycanbeheldresponsibleforitsbreach.IfaStatedoesnot
acceptthattheICJ,forexample,shouldadjudicateacaseinvolvingtheState’sbreachofan
internationalobligationthatitowestoanotherState,thenthereislittlethatcanbedone
intermsofholdingitlegallyliable.Thisisoneofthemainreasonswhyinternationallawis
frequentlyseenas‘nolaw’,sinceeverythingseemstodependonthewishesofStates.Itis,
inotherwords,consideredtohavenoindependentorobjectiveregimeofsanctionsagainst
recalcitrantStates.But,asweshallseelater,thisisnotatruepictureofthenatureofinterna-
tionallaw.(SeegenerallyAnthonyD’Amato,‘It’sabird,it’saplane,it’sjuscogens’(1990–91)
6ConnJIL1.)
Consent and pre-existing customs
ItisoftenthecasethataStateacceptstheexistenceofaparticularcustomininternational
law.Naturally,thismeansthattheStatepractisesthecustomandisboundbyit.Thequestion
is: whathappenstothatconsentiftheStatebreaksupintoseveralotherStates?Thisquestion
isimportantbecause,generallyspeaking,‘new’Statesarenotaffordedtheopportunityto
exercisechoiceoverwhetherornottheyacceptthatcustom.Thishasledsomewriterstodeny
thatconsentisthebasisofinternationallaw,since,althoughsuchnewStateshavenotbeen
givenanopportunitytoexpresstheirconsentinrespectofsuchcustoms,theyarenonetheless
automaticallyboundbyit.
Inanidealworld,itwouldbedesirableforeveryStatetoconsenttoeveryruleofinternational
law,butthisisunrealisticinthemoderncontextinwhicheventsoccuratanexponentialpace.
ThefactthatnewStatesdonothavetheopportunitytoconsenttooldcustomsdoesnotipso
factomeanthattheirconsentisirrelevant.Itdoessuggest,however,thatwhileconsentisthe
basisofinternationallaw,itisnotitselfsufficientforthepurposeofformulationanddevelop-
mentoftherulesandprinciplesofinternationallaw.AsJohnDuggard(2008,seesection1.5)
notes,atp. 14:
Consent, on its own, however fails to provide an explanation for the rules and principles that
comprise international law. Third World States, for instance, have at no time expressly con-
sented to the rules that shaped international law before they attained independence. Indeed, as
consent becomes more difficult to obtain for the creation of new rules of law, consensus in the
form of majority decision-making is increasingly adopted.
AswillbeseeninChapter 2,ifanumberof(new)Statesbegintodepartfromtheexisting
custom,thisraisessignificantdoubtastothevalidityandsustainabilityofthatcustominthe
longrun.Also,anewStatecanbepresumedtohaveacceptedapre-existingcustomaryruleif
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suchrulerelates,forexample,toaperemptorynorm.ThespecificconsentofthatnewState
willbeirrelevant,sincethecustomaryruleregardingtheperemptorystatusofanormderives
notbyvirtueofStateconsent,butfromthefactoftheprescientstatusthattheinternational
communityhasaccordedtothatnorm.Lastly,toarguethatStateconsentisnotthebasisof
internationallawonlybecauseconsentappearsassailableonaparticularoccasionistostretch
therelevanceofexceptionstobreakingpoint.
thinking points
• WhatarethepossibleexceptionstoStateconsentasthebasisofinternationallaw?
• DoyouagreethatthefactthatnewStatesarenotgiventheopportunitytoconfirmorrejectoldcustomsunderminesStateconsentasthebasisofinternationallaw?
• Whatare‘peremptorynorms’andwhyaretheyexcludedfromthereachofStateconsent?
1.6 The functions of international lawSofarwehaveconsideredabriefhistory,thenature,andthebasisofinternationallaw,but
thesedonottelluswhatinternationallawactuallydoes.Afterall,ifweweretoaskwhat
functionsdomesticlawperforms,wecouldcomeupwithscoresofanswers.Wemightsay,
forexample,thatdomestic lawregulatestherelationsbetweenpeopleandtheState;we
mightevensaythatitisacodeofconductthatspellsoutthedutiesandresponsibilitiesof
everyonewholiveswithinaState,includingthoseentrustedwiththeresponsibilityforrun-
ningtheStateorconductingitsaffairs.Clearly,thesekindsoffunctionmakeitpossiblefor
peopletoempowerspecificindividuals—legislators—tomakelawsontheirbehalf.However,
since,asstatedpreviously,theinternationallegalsystemdoesnothavetraditionallaw-making
institutionsassuch,doesitthenmeanthatwecannotexpectinternationallawtofunctionin
amannersimilartomunicipallaw?
Thequestionwhatfunctioninternationallawperformshasexercisedthemindsoflegalschol-
arsformanyyears.Thisisatrickyquestionbecause,asobservedearlier,internationallawused
tobeconsideredasirrelevant.In1968,RichardFalkgaveashismainreasonforinvestigating
therelevanceofinternationallawthatitwaspartofalargereffortof‘liberatingthediscipline
ofinternationallawfromasenseofitsownfutility’(seeRichardA. Falk,‘Therelevanceof
politicalcontexttothenatureandfunctioningofinternationallaw: anintermediateview’in
KarlW. DeutschandStanleyHoffmann(eds),The Relevance of International Law(Cambridge,
MA: Schenkman,1968),atp. 142).
International lawperformsmanyfunctions,andtheseincludeencouragingfriendlyrelations
amongStates,outlawingwarsamongnations,andpromotingthepeacefulresolutionofdis-
putesamongnations.Themostfundamentaloftheseisthemaintenanceofinternationalpeace
andsecurityamongStates.ThisrathersacredfunctionisalsounderscoredbytheUnitedNations.
Oneoftheobjectivesoftheorganization,containedinArticle1oftheUNCharter,is:
To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective
measuresforthepreventionandremovalofthreatstothepeace,andforthesuppressionof
actsofaggressionorotherbreachesofthepeace,andtobringaboutbypeacefulmeans,and
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Thefunctionsofinternationallawinconformitywiththeprinciplesofjusticeandinternationallaw,adjustmentorsettlementof
internationaldisputesorsituationswhichmightleadtoabreachofthepeace;
AccordingtoC. Tomuschat,in‘Internationallaw: ensuringthesurvivalofmankindontheeve
ofanewcentury’(1999)23RecueildesCours1,23,internationallaw:
has a general function to fulfil, namely to safeguard international peace, security, and justice in
relations between States.
However,expressingthecorefunctionofinternationallawasthemaintenanceofinterna-
tionalpeaceandsecurityneitheranswersthepracticalquestionofhowthiscanbeachieved—
especiallywheretheneedtomaintainpeaceandsecurityconflictswiththeattainmentof
justice—norexplainswhatthetermsusedmeaninreality.Inhischapter‘Whatisinternational
lawfor?’inEvans(2010,seesection1.1),p. 32,MarttiKoskenniemirightlyqueries:
What do ‘peace’, ‘security’, or ‘justice’ really mean? As soon as such words are defined more
closely, disagreement emerges. To say that international law aims at peace between States is
perhaps already to have narrowed down its scope unacceptably. Surely, as Tomuschat [1999,
above] asks at p. 33, it must also seek to advance ‘human rights as well as the rule of law
domestically inside States for the benefit of human beings’? But what if advancing human
rights would call for the destruction of an unjust peace?
Thereisawholegenerationofwritingsontheso-called‘peaceversusjustice’tensiontowhich
Koskenniemi(inEvans,2010,above)alludes,butthisisnotourconcern.Itsufficestonote
that,originally, internationallawwasnotasconcernedwiththejusticeofasituationasit
waswiththemaintenanceofpeaceandsecurity.However,thisapproachhaschanged,partly
becauseoftheincreasingpressurethatinternationallawimposesonStatestoensurethat
theydojusticewhilepursuingpeaceandsecurity.Forexample,itisnowcommonforaState
thathasexperiencedcivilwaroranauthoritarianregimetoseektodojusticebyconfronting
itspast.Thismechanism—nowadaysreferredtoas‘transitionaljustice’—isaprocessbywhich
post-conflictsocietiesattempttounderstandtheillsandshortcomingsofthepastthatledto
thecollapseoftheruleoflaw,soastodevisestrategiesforhowbesttoaddresstheseissuesas
theybuildnewsocieties.Transitionaljusticehasfeaturedinpost-apartheidSouthAfrica,and
post-conflictLiberiaandSierraLeone,aswellaspost-authoritarianCambodia.
AnotherimportantfunctionofinternationallawisthesettlementofdisputesamongStates.
Withregardtothisfunction,internationallawdoesnotoperatewiththesamestrengthor
predictionasdomesticlaw.Thisisentirelyduetotheconsensualbasisofinternationallaw,as
explainedpreviously,andthetopicisdiscussedfullyinChapter 13.
H.L. A.Hart(2ndedn,1994,seesection1.3.1),atp. 214,underscoresthisweaknessininter-
nationallawbyobservingthat:
International law not only lacks the secondary rules of change and adjudication which provide
for legislature and courts, but also a unifying rule of recognition specifying ‘sources’ of law and
providing general criteria for the identification of its rules.
Whileitistruethatinternationallawlacksinstitutionssuchaslegislaturesandcourts,theview
thatinternationallawlacksunifyingrulesofrecognitionspecifyingsourcesisopentochal-
lenge.In‘Wickedheresiesorlegitimateperspectives?Theoryandinternationallaw’,inEvans
(2010,seesection1.1),atp. 64,IainScobbiedidchallengeHartonthispoint:
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This view was wrong when Hart first expressed it in 1961. Despite criticism, whether on the
grounds of inadequacy or inept drafting, it is generally accepted that Article 38 of the Statute of
the International Court of Justice provides at least a starting place for the enumeration of the
sources of international law and thus functions as a ‘rule of recognition’ for the international
legal system, should one wish to adopt a Hartian analysis.
Thecategoryofthefunctionsperformedbyinternationallawisnotclosed.Itisimportant
that,whenengagedinaninquiryintothefunctionofinternationallaw,legalscholarsshould
endeavourtobeascreativeandflexibleaspossible,andnotbeoverpreoccupiedbyideas
expressedbyothers.
In‘Internationallaw: contentandfunction—areview’(1967)11JConflRes504,Anthony
D’Amato,remarkedaboutawriter’soverrelianceonotherpeople’sviews:
From the writer’s point of view, therefore, the possibility of a self-fulfilling prophecy exists. This
possibility in turn encourages the writer to incorporate, to a greater or lesser extent, her own
ideas of what the law should be into her account of existing international rules. Nor should we be
surprised that legal writers invariably do this. For they are, primarily, jurists and not political sci-
entists; they have no particular commitment to scientific detachment, but rather were attracted
to their subject for motives such as patriotism, humanitarianism, morality, or merely a passion
for ‘tidying up’ the disparate assortment of available international legal rules.
Ifoneaccepts thisproposition, it ispossible tofindagreatnumberofother functions
thatinternationallawcouldbesaidtoperform,dependingonone’sunderstandingofthe
subjectmatterandthecontextinwhichinternationallawoperates.Anne-MarieSlaughter
Burleynoted that in1992 the taskof liberating international law from its own futility
‘appears to have been accomplished. International legal rules, procedures and organi-
zationsaremorevisibleandarguablymoreeffective thanatany timesince1945’ (see
Anne-MarieSlaughterBurley,‘Internationallawandinternationalrelationstheory: adual
agenda’(1983)87AJIL205.
thinking points
• Summarizethemainfunctionsofinternationallaw.
• Towhatextentisjusticeimportantwheninternationallawseekstomaintainpeaceandsecurity?
• DoyouagreewithHart’sviewofthefunctionofinternationallawwithregardstotheiden-tificationofitsrules?
1.7 What next in international law?Despiteitsphenomenalpopularityinthelastfiftyyearsorso,somestilldoubtthatinterna-
tionallawis‘law’properlysocalled.Thisviewderivesfromabeliefthatinternationallawis
eitherentirelyunenforceable—forexample,whereaStaterefusestogiveitsconsenttoadju-
dicationbeforetheICJoranyotherinternationaltribunal—orthatitisnotenforceableagainst
powerfulcountries.Itistrue,aswehavediscussedpreviously,thatStatesneedtogivetheir
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Conclusion
consentbeforetheICJcanadjudicateamatterinvolvingthem;thusthereisnocompulsory
jurisdiction,assuch,underinternationallaw.
Also,thereisnodenyingthatthecurrentstructureofinternationallawdoesnotmakeitpos-
sibleforitsenforcementagainstpowerfulStates.Itisidealistictoexpectthatinternationallaw
canbeenforcedaseasilyagainstthelikesoftheUSA,theUK,Russia,France,andChinaasit
canagainstweakandpoorStates.Aswewillseelaterinthebook,theserichandpowerful
StatesarethefivepermanentmembersoftheUNSecurityCouncil(knownasthe‘P5’)and
theyenjoyaspecialstatusbasedontheirpossessionofthevetopower—thatis,anegative
vote thateachcancast inadecisionof theSecurityCouncil involving themoranyother
State.TheimplicationofthevoteistonullifyorrenderitimpossibletopassaSecurityCouncil
resolutionintheeventofdissentbyanyoftheP5.Thereforethefactthatthestructureof
thesystemcreatedbytheUNChartercreatesadistinctionbetweenthepermanentSecurity
CouncilmembersandallotherStatesunderminestheeffectivenessofinternationallaw.To
manyobservers,ifallStatesareequalaccordingtooneprovisionoftheUNCharter,certainly
thosethatwieldthevetoaremoreequalthanothers.
TheoverwhelmingsenseoffrustrationabouttheOrwelliannatureof thecurrent interna-
tionallegalorderhascontinuedtohauntseveralgenerationsofinternationallawstudents.
Thedilemmaforstudentsofinternationallawcanbeillustratedbytheexchangebetween
someinternationallawstudentsonapopularwebsitecalled‘Answerbag’,availableathttp://
www.answerbag.com/q_view/1682.Ananonymouswritercalled‘agnostic’posedtheques-
tion: ‘Is“internationallaw”truelaw?’onthewebsite,towhichseveralpeople—apparently
mostlyinternationallawstudents—responded.On12April2009,‘littlebear’responded: ‘I
bloodyhopeso,consideringI justdedicated50+hoursofmylifestudyingit.’And‘firebrand’
responded: ‘Yes,itis—althoughnotallcountriesabidebythelaws.’
Mappingthefutureofinternationallaw,therefore,invitesustocreateafinebalancebetween
thequestionposedby‘agnostic’andtheanswerprovidedby‘firebrand’.Inreconcilingagnos-
tic’sdoubtandfirebrand’sreassurance,itmustbesaidthatinternationallawisoftenjudgedby
itsfailuresratherthanbyitssuccesses.Foreverysingleinstanceinwhichinternationallawis
unabletoenforceitsmeasuresagainstpowerfulStates,eitherforreasonsofthevetooforlack
ofcapacitytodoso,thereareseveralinstancesinwhichinternationallawsucceeds: whenyou
postaletterinEnglandtoFrance,whenyoushipanitemfromAlbaniatoSwaziland,thereis
internationallawpresent,accompanyingthepostandthefreight,guidingallhandsthatcome
intocontactwiththechattelsregardingwhattheycanandcannotdowiththeitems;whenyou
sleepinyourhouseandlistentothedroningsoundofaeroplanesflyingoverhead,international
lawensuresthatnoalienplanesinvadeyourcountry’sterritory.Itisonlyinrecognizingthat
internationallawdoesfarmoregoodthanisrecognizedthatwecanassure‘littlebear’thatthe
fifty-plushoursthatheorshededicatedtostudyingthedisciplinewerewellworthit.
ConclusionInternationallawhasgrownsignificantlyinrecenttimes.Fromthe1990s,internationallaw
madeconsiderableprogress,especiallyintheareasofcollectivesecurity,humanrights,inter-
nationalcriminal law, internationaleconomic law,and internationalenvironmental law,to
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mentionbutafew.TheUNSecurityCouncilwasabletoauthorizeanenforcementaction
against Iraqwhen it invadedKuwait in1990,afeatthatthesameinstitutionwasunable
toachieveinthefirstforty-fiveyearsoftheUnitedNations.Governmentofficials,including
headsofState,arenolongerabletocommitheinouscrimesagainsttheirnationals,orfor-
eigners,andhideunderdiplomaticimmunity(seeChapter 16).MoreandmoreStatesnow
takethehumanrightsoftheirpeoplesmoreseriouslythantheydidduringthefirstforty-five
yearsoftheUNCharter.ManyArabcountries,whichhavelongexperienceddictatorshipand
autocraticregimes,arecurrentlyundergoingmonumentalrevolution;inthecasesofEgypt,
Tunisia,andLibya,thatrevolutionhasalreadyledtothereplacementofgovernments.Inthe
IvoryCoast,theUnitedNationsandsomeofitsmemberStatesassistedIvoriansinrealizing
theirdemocraticaspirationsbyforcingoutLaurentGbagbofromtheofficethatherefusedto
vacateaftersufferingdefeatindemocraticelections.
Nonetheless,thereremainssignificantroomforimprovement.Asinternationallawbecomes
moreassertiveinthemoderncontext,moreareasemergeinwhichimprovementsarerequired.
Thefutureofinternationallawliesnotablyinhowmuchitisabletoharnessthegeneralgood-
willthatitcontinuestoenjoyamongthemajorityofStatestothebenefitofhumankind.
QuestionsSelf-test questions
1 Define‘internationallaw’.
2 Explainthedifferencebetween‘public’and‘private’internationallaw.
3 Whatare‘generalinternationallaw’,‘regionalinternationallaw’,and‘particularinterna-
tionallaw’?
4 Whatfunctionsdoesinternationallawperform?
5 Distinguishnaturalism,positivism,andGrotianism.
6 Whatisthebasisofinternationallawandisthisenoughforthepurposeofinternational
lawdevelopment?
7 Underwhatcircumstancesmayconsent,asabasisofinternationallaw,bevaried?
Discussion questions
1 Towhatextentistheassertionthatinternationallawisnotlawatruereflectionofinterna-
tionallaw?
2 ‘Withoutconsent,therecanbenointernationallaw.Consentisthebeginningandendof
internationallaw.’Discuss.
3 Outlinethevarioustheoriesoflawanddiscusswhatrelevancethesehavetointernational
law.
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Furtherreading4 ‘International law is international law.Theuseof the terms“private”and“public” to
describe international law is amatter of personal preferencewith no practical conse-
quences.’Doyouagree?
5 ‘Understandingpositivism,naturalism,andGrotianismastheoreticalfoundationsoflaw
saysnothingaboutthefoundationofinternationallaw.’Discuss.
6 ‘Thefutureofinternationallawisprecarious.’Evaluatethisassertion.
Assessment question
Candoma*hasrecentlyobtainedindependencefromRutamu*and,eagertodemonstrate
thatitisnowaStateinitsownright,decidestojointheUN.However,thenewlyelected
presidentof thecountry isconcernedthatsinceCandomawasnotaStatewhentheUN
wasestablished,ittooknopartinestablishingtherulesandprinciplescontainedintheUN
Charter,whichitmustacceptuponbecomingamemberoftheorganization.Theopposition
party,whichlosttheelectionthatbroughtinthenewgovernment,ismountingavociferous
campaignagainstCandomajoiningtheUN.Amongseveralargumentsthattheoppositionis
makingare: thatinternationallaw,whichtheUNwilladminister,isnolawatall;thatitprivi-
legesrichandpowerfulnations;thatsinceinternationallawhasnoenforcementmechanisms,
Stateswillfreelyviolateit,renderingCandomaopentoviolationswithoutremedy;andthat
ifCandomadoesnotjointheUN,ithasnoresponsibilitytorespectinternationallaw.Asan
internationallawstudentinaprestigiousCandomanuniversitycurrentlyoninternshipwith
theForeignAffairsMinistry,theministerhasaskedyoutoprepareacounter-argumentthat
mightbepresentedwhenhedebatestheissueswitharepresentativeoftheoppositionparty
liveontelevision.
Outlinetheargumentthatyouwouldsuggest.
* Note that both Candoma and Rutamu are fictional States. They will appear in assess-
ment questions throughout the book.
Key case• TrendtexTradingCorporationv. CentralBankofNigeria[1977]2WLR356
Further readingCoplin, W. D., The Functions of International Law (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1965)
Duggard, J., InternationalLaw: A SouthAfricanPerspective (3rd edn, Cape Town: Juta & Co. Ltd, 2008)
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Franck, T., Fairness in International Law and Institutions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995)
Hart, H. L. A., The Concept of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2nd ed. 1994)
Higgins, R., ProblemsandProcess: InternationalLawandHowWeUseIt (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004)
Jennings, R. and Watts, A. (eds), Oppenheim’s International Law, Vol. 1: Peace (9th edn, London/New York: Longman, 1996)
Kadduri, M., WarandPeaceintheLawofIslam (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1955)
Kelsen, H., Principles of International Law (New York: Rinehart & Co., 1952)
Neff, S., ‘A short history of international law’ in M. Evans (ed.), International Law (3rd edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 3
Oppenheim, L., ‘The Science of International Law: Its Task and Method’ (1908) 2 AJIL 313
Parry, C., ‘The function of law in the international community’ in M. Sørensen (ed.), Manual of Public International Law (London: Macmillan, 1968), p. 1
Schwarzenberger, G., The Inductive Approach to International Law (London: Stevens, 1965)
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