contentscecgr.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/polands-2020... · latter’s rebellion in the spring...

Contents Contents......................................................................................................................2

Poland’s 2020 Presidential Election...........................................................................4

Results.........................................................................................................................8

Turnout........................................................................................................................9

Voter trends...............................................................................................................10Voter tendencies.......................................................................................................12

Voters by age group................................................................................................12Voters by agglomeration size.................................................................................13Voters by vocation...................................................................................................14Voters by education.................................................................................................15Voters by gender......................................................................................................16Voters by 2015 Presidential candidate preference (run-off)..................................16Voters by 2019 Parliamentary election preference................................................17Voters by preference in the 1st round of the 2020 Presidential election...............18

Shift in poviat’s vote between 2015 and 2020.........................................................19

Results - by poviats (counties).................................................................................20

Results - by municipalities........................................................................................21

President Andrzej Duda - the 2nd term..................................................................22

A post-election United Right...................................................................................22

Opposition ahead of 2023 election..........................................................................24

Survey trends............................................................................................................26

The President in the regulatory process.................................................................26

Business impact.........................................................................................................27

Policy outlook: what to expect.................................................................................28

Macroeconomic policy in the new term..................................................................29

Transatlantic policy...................................................................................................30

European policy.........................................................................................................30

International policy...................................................................................................31

Marek MatraszekChairman

CEC Goverment Relations

4 2019 Polish parliamentary election

Final results announced on Monday 13th of July show incumbent President Andrzej Duda winning the Polish Presidential election with 51.03% of the vote, and opposition Civic Coalition candidate and current Mayor of Warsaw Rafał Trzaskowski gaining 48.97%. The State Electoral Commission confirmed a 68.18% turnout, the second highest in post-1989 Polish electoral history.

It seems the tactic of Duda’s campaign to focus on mobilizing the President’s core electorate paid off, as initial data suggests an improved turnout in rural areas, small towns and also the elderly – an important part of Duda’s constituency. The result is very close to that of 2015, when Duda won the Presidency against the then incumbent PO President Bronislaw Komorowski – in over five years, Poland’s national politics have moved almost not a jot, with the only difference that a million more voters have been mobilized reflecting the same divide.

The political implications of the victory are hugely significant, for the current government and the opposition alike. For the ruling Law and Justice (PiS) party, it represents the culmination of a brutal political campaign where the stakes were the future of the current government, the unity of the PiS party, and most likely the ability of the Polish right to win the 2023 parliamentary elections. Duda’s victory, albeit narrow, ensures that in the short term at least Prime Minister Morawiecki’s government will remain in power; although the PM did not have a central role in the campaign, a loss would have undermined his authority and increased factional pressure in PiS for his rapid removal. As it is, he seems secure in the short to medium term, and a Duda Presidency ensures that even controversial government legislation will not face a Presidential veto, as would have been the case had Trzaskowski won. That does not mean Morawiecki is entirely safe – PiS leader Jarosław Kaczyński may yet decide to install a different Prime Minister at some point in the run-up to the 2023 elections, especially if the effects of the current economic crisis start to erode the government’s popular support. In the short term as well, a governmental reshuffle under Morawiecki looks to be on the cards. But regardless, PiS is now secure on power for another three and a half years.

Duda’s victory may also for a time stymie the centrifugal forces already

Poland’s 2020 Presidential Election

CEC Government Relations Special Report 5

evident in PiS, between the core leadership faction of the party directly under the control of Kaczyński, and the two technically independent satellite parties in alliance with PiS, Solidary Poland and the “Agreement” party. Both are led by strong personalities, respectively Justice Minister Zbigniew Ziobro, and former Higher Education Minister Jarosław Gowin. A defeat for Duda would have seen the Ziobro and Gowin factions blaming each other, with the Ziobro faction also including Morawiecki as a factor and calling for his removal. As it is, for the time being, internal political balance in PiS will be preserved, although behind-the scenes jockeying for influence will continue unabated. In the longer run however it seems inevitable that the Gowin faction will be slowly eased out, given the breakdown of trust between Kaczyński and Gowin following the latter’s rebellion in the spring over the abandonment of the original 10th May election date, when Duda was riding high in the polls.

Duda’s victory increases the chances of PiS retaining power in the 2023 parliamentary elections, although three years remains an eternity in politics. Nonetheless, a relatively united party, a favourable President entrenched for another five years, and an inevitably demoralised opposition is a good starting point for PiS to build its political strategy for the future.

Attention will now turn to the impact Duda’s victory will have for government policy. The strategy that led to Duda’s victory was based in the mobilization of PiS’s core voter base, and eschewing any movement to the centre. During a controversial campaign, Duda - as well as PiS forces in government-controlled media - played openly nationalist cards directed at Germany, Brussels and international “liberal” forces in culture, as well as stressing the continued need for expanded welfare and social policies. This has strengthened the hand of those in PiS who are arguing for a “second push” in media and judicial reform to further marginalize their political and ideological opponents, as well as for a continued expansionist and statist economic policy. Now that President Duda is back for five years, PiS and the government will be tempted to push in this direction too, knowing that even an opposition-controlled Senate will not be able to prevent more radical policies being enacted.

In foreign policy, Duda’s victory means that Poland will continue on its


Eurosceptic and pro-US path, although in the latter case much depends on the fate of Donald Trump in the US Presidential elections. A Democrat victory will likely shift US policy on Europe and Poland, and Poland may yet find itself in the position of lacking support in both Washington and Brussels for its domestic and foreign policies. On the other hand, wiser hands in the US, even under a new administration, will recognize that Poland remains a crucial partner in the face of a resurgent Russia, and that with no chance of a change of government before the end of 2023 it makes sense to work with the government there is. And in the EU too, despite the distaste of the Brussels elites towards Poland’s unashamed conservatism, the requirements of European stability in the face of Brexit, COVID, economic crisis, and the twin challenges of Russia and China, will mean little appetite for opening up another front of division in Europe against Poland.

For Rafał Trzaskowski and the opposition Civic Platform the result represents a mixed bag. On the one hand, Trzaskowski and PO can be satisfied that they ran Duda so closely, and that the votes garnered for their candidate represent significant capital in their longer term plans for PO – recall that in the aborted May 10th elections, their then candidate Malgorzata Kidawa-Blonska had collapsed to below 10% before being replaced by Trzaskowski. The latter has single-handedly rescued the PO as a political force, energized its activists, and mobilized a significant voter base. Trzaskowski’s near success, and the large number of votes he has garnered, will also make it difficult for independent candidate Szymon Hołownia, who achieved almost 14% of the vote in the first round and has now created his own political movement, to make headway in the next three years. Even in defeat, Trzaskowski has emerged as a new leading PO politician, and although he now returns to his job of being Warsaw Mayor, he has already announced his intention to from a broader political movement that PO itself, bringing into his big tent activists, NGOs, local government players and others who may not be members of PO itself. How this initiative will work in confrontation with a parochial PO activist base and an equally determined Szymon Holownia looking to build his own “civic movement” remains to be seen.

CEC Government Relations Special Report 7

Marek MatraszekChairman

CEC Goverment Relations

Conversely, however, it might not take long for the “glass half empty” school of critics within and outside PO to start shaping the narrative, which can easily be spun to PO’s disadvantage: namely, that PO failed to beat Duda not once but twice, fielding two different candidates, and that polls had consistently shown that Hołownia would have stood a better chance of beating Duda in the second round. Trzaskowski’s campaign tactic of gaining support by appealing to a range of diverse constituencies and support of the spectrum of failed first round candidates was probably the only one to follow, but ultimately it proved insufficient when faced with the clear and focussed messages of Duda. Trzaskowski’s support in this perspective was one of “lent” votes expressing anti-PiS frustrations, and will not carry over naturally into support for Trzaskowski or PO in a parliamentary election. Above all, criticism will be levelled at PO that this result shows that it has still to find the “magic keys” to the hearts of a majority of Poles, and that the core constituency of PiS – Catholic, conservative and somewhat nationalist – is not going to go away. Unless and until the anti-PiS opposition finds a way of further moderating its message to appeal to this not-so-silent majority, it seems unlikely to succeed in the 2023 parliamentary elections, when it will again be divided across a range of parties whilst PiS remains a united bloc.

The further reality is that the narrowness of the victory of Duda confirms that Poland is – for now – divided almost equally, between not just political rivals or competing governmental policies, but in a much deeper sense – almost tribally, between two civilizational and ideological visions of Poland, laced with bitter emotions and fed by increasing levels of rhetoric on both sides. How this affects governance remains to be seen – and perhaps it is only now, after the elections, that real policies will be debated and decided.


Results

43.50%

51.03%

30.36%

48.97%

0.00%

10.00%

20.00%

30.00%

40.00%

50.00%

60.00%

1 2

2020 Presidential Election Results (1st round result & 2nd round official results)

Andrzej Duda Rafał Trzaskowski

9CEC Government Relations Special Report

Turnout

68.23%

49%

64.51%

68.18%

0.00%

10.00%

20.00%

30.00%

40.00%

50.00%

60.00%

70.00%

80.00%

1995 (record) 2015 2020 (1st round) 2020 run-off

Turnout(PKW official results)


Voter trends

On July 12th Andrzej Duda won a narrow re-election over the opposition candidate Rafał Trzaskowski in a campaign marked by an unprecedented level of engagement and polarisation. A remarkable turnout and the tight race revealed a Polish society that has not been as invested in choosing their country’s future since the formative days of modern Polish democracy after 1989.

A closer look at the electoral data indicates several demographic and economic tendencies that have been apparent in Poland for many years. Notably, Poland’s two-party divide has been reaffirmed once again after being somewhat weakened in the 2019 Parliamentary Election.

Turnout for the second round of the presidential election has been higher only once, in 1995. In the previous 2015 presidential race, turnout was respectively 48,96% and 55,34% in the first and second rounds. Now, participation seems to be approaching the ceiling of democratic engagement in Poland.

The trend which has been visible in recent elections is usually attributed to the United Right’s highly polarising domination of Polish politics. Social redistribution, heated conflicts over institutional conduct and the rule of law, as well as identity issues, have resonated deeply with many voters. As seen in the results of the run-off between the two leading candidates, Polish society is divided roughly equally.

The ruling PiS party framed its re-election campaign for Andrzej Duda as a struggle to preserve the social security net that Duda promised in 2015, as well as a traditionalist, conservative social order. PO, on the other hand, energised its electorate with a challenge to current government’s actions in the sphere of institutions, worldview and identity, while carefully avoiding the issue of state handouts. Trzaskowski’s campaign framed itself as the last chance to reverse PiS’s hold on state institutions and to re-establish democratically mandated liberty and tolerance, as well as Poland’s place within the EU.


Voter trends

Unsurprisingly, these narratives appeal to distinguishable profiles of voters. Duda dominated only in smaller settlements and rural areas, while Trzaskowski beat his rival in larger cities. For both candidates, agglomeration size has been proportionate to the support they received. The situation is similar in terms of age division, where both candidates scored nearly equal majorities on the opposing ends of the age spectrum, which then converged closer to the middle.

The election reconfirms the main divide in Poland, between liberal, mostly young city-dwellers and the conservative, older rural and small-town inhabitants. The former enjoy the benefits of living in economic hubs of modernity. On average, they have a liberal outlook on international relations, identity issues and morality as well as a sensitivity to civic rights and liberties. The latter are based in areas that bore the brunt of Poland’s economic transformation and globalisation in general. They find refuge from adverse changes of rapidly modernising Poland in traditional values, conservative morality, religion and nationalism. They are also less likely to be aghast at potential infringements in an abstract institutional system, as long as they feel it is a part of making right the perceived wrongs of the socio-economic order.

Andrzej Duda won, albeit by a very small margin. Perhaps the most striking feature of the presidential contest is the entrenchment of the political system dominated by two political forces. Never before has the PiS-PO duopoly mobilised 20 million voters. Still, it is too early to say whether this is a good projection for the late 2023 parliamentary election, and especially whether Trzaskowski’s coalition of 10 million voters – many of whom supported him only out of protest against PiS – will carry over into party support.

Both PiS and PO will now turn inward to clean house following the election marathon. The result will likely put an end to previous speculations that the United Right will call an early general election. And it will be especially important to watch whether the PO reconstructs itself around a new leadership, or whether Trzaskowski’s result will cause further splintering and factionalism.


Voters by age group

36.30%

45.30%

45.60%

59.70%

62.50%

63.70%

54.70%

54.40%

40.30%

37.50%

0.00% 10.00% 20.00% 30.00% 40.00% 50.00% 60.00% 70.00%

18-29

30-39

40-49

50-59

60+

Voters by age group(exit poll - IPSOS)

Rafał Trzaskowski Andrzej Duda


Voters by agglomeration size

63.80%

46.90%

49.60%

38.70%

34.20%

36.20%

53.10%

50.40%

61.30%

65.80%

0.00% 10.00% 20.00% 30.00% 40.00% 50.00% 60.00% 70.00%

rural areas

towns below 50K

50K - 200K

200K - 500K

500K+

Voters by agglomeration size(exit poll - IPSOS)



Voters by vocation

34.10%

32.60%

44.70%

81.40%

66.40%

30.10%

65.40%

64.10%

50.60%

65.90%

67.40%

55.30%

18.60%

33.60%

69.90%

34.60%

35.90%

49.40%

0.00%10.00%20.00%30.00%40.00%50.00%60.00%70.00%80.00%90.00%

Business owner

Management

Administration & services

Farmer

Labourer

Student

Unemployed

Pensioner and retiree

Other

Voters by vocation(exit poll - IPSOS)



Voters by education

77.30%

75.00%

50.90%

34.90%

22.70%

25.00%

49.10%

65.10%

0.00% 10.00% 20.00% 30.00% 40.00% 50.00% 60.00% 70.00% 80.00% 90.00%

Primary

Vocational

Secondary

Higher

Voters by education(exit poll - IPSOS)



Voters by gender

Voters by 2015 Presidential candidate preference (run-off)

51.90%

50.30%

48.10%

49.70%

46.00% 47.00% 48.00% 49.00% 50.00% 51.00% 52.00% 53.00%

Male

Female

Voters by gender(exit poll - IPSOS)


39.20%

30.10%

4.40%

91.10%

60.80%

69.90%

95.60%

8.90%

0.00% 20.00% 40.00% 60.00% 80.00% 100.00% 120.00%

Doesn't remember

Didn't vote

Bronisław Komorowski

Andrzej Duda

Voters by 2015 Presidential candidate preference (run-off)



Voters by 2019 Parliamentary election preference

40.10%

38.30%

16.80%

40.00%

29.40%

8.30%

1.80%

96.90%

59.90%

61.70%

83.20%

60.00%

70.60%

91.70%

98.20%

3.10%

0.00% 20.00% 40.00% 60.00% 80.00% 100.00% 120.00%

Doesn't remember

Didn't vote

Other

Confederation

PSL

SLD

Civic Coalition

PiS

Voters by 2019 Parliamentary election preference(exit poll - IPSOS)



Voters by preference in the 1st round of the 2020 Presidential election

57.10%

49.80%

76.10%

13%

10.80%

65.90%

34.70%

24.30%

16%

52.30%

15%

99.30%

99.10%

42.90%

50.20%

23.90%

87%

89.20%

34.10%

65.30%

75.70%

84%

47.70%

85%

0.70%

0.90%

0.00% 20.00% 40.00% 60.00% 80.00% 100.00%120.00%

Doesn't remember

Didn't vote

Mirosław Piotrowski (RPE)

Paweł Tanajno (independent)

Waldemar Witkowski (Labour Union)

Marek Jakubiak (FdR)

Stanisław Żółtek (UPR)

Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz (PSL)

Robert Biedroń (the Left)

Krzysztof Bosak (Confederation)

Szymon Hołownia (independent)

Rafał Trzaskowski

Andrzej Duda

Voters by preference in the 1st round of the 2020 Presidential election (exit poll - IPSOS)



Shift in district (poviat) vote between 2015 and 2020

Andrzej Duda won in 44 districts previously captured by Bronisław Komorowski. Rafał Trzaskowski recaptured 7 districts won by Duda in 2015, 5 of which are cities with poviat rights. Out of 44 districts recaptured by Duda, none are cities with district rights, which shows the urban-rural division pointed out before.


Results - by districts (poviats)


Results - by municipalities


President Andrzej Duda - the 2nd termThe second President in Poland’s post-1989 history to win re-election - a

renewed political mandate and a strengthened position within the United Right. Duda’s victory will underpin the United Right domination until the 2023 General Election.

In the second term:

President Duda likely to reassert himself more strongly.

Relationship with government may become more nuanced.

President Duda will wish to have more policy input into the United Right’s

A post-election United RightInternal shifts

A strong mandate

Governmental changes?

Shifts within the ruling bloc are expected. The May election crisis has deepened the divide between the Agreement party and Solidary Poland, the two associated satellite parties of Law and Justice proper. The PiS leadership will want to secure unity of the bloc – position of „Agreement” may suffer.

PiS finished the election marathon with a win, securing at least 3 more years of political domination. High numerical vote for Duda will translate into more support for PiS The party will want to continue its current policies, but Duda’s new strength may mollify policy retrenchment. A win in the next general election will require carefully nurturing of current support levels.

Potential for Government reshuffle reflecting shifting alliances. Rumours of possible change of Prime Minister for second phase of governance. PiS may renew attempt to recover control of Senate. Scenario of co-optation of PSL to government rumoured but unlikely.

23CEC Government Relations Special ReportŹródło: Jakub Szymczuk/KPRP


Opposition ahead of 2023 Elections

Civic Platform (PO)Lost 7 elections in a row to PiS. However, Trzaskowski managed to save

PO’s reputation by entering the second round of the Presidential election. A leadership contest and personnel overhaul possible. Future of opposition tactics uncertain, especially fate of Trzaskowski’s announced intent to forge a new “civic movement” encompassing PO proper and other independent movements and organizations.

PSL and the LeftThe PSL and the Left suffered disastrous defeats that have put their future in

question. A leadership contest within the PSL is possible, as well as transfers of MPs to PiS. The Left will have to rethink its current message, and perhaps tilt to the left to effectively compete with PO.

Szymon Hołownia’s „Poland 2020”Szymon Hołownia’s “Poland 2050” Movement has some momentum from the

election, but will face an uphill battle to retain dynamic until 2023. If successful, the Movement has potential to challenge PO as the main opposition force.

ConfederationThe political standing of the Confederation was boosted by Bosak’s election

result. A permanent presence in parliament now seems likely, but Confederation will need to prevent PiS from eroding its electorate.

25CEC Government Relations Special ReportŹródło: Adrian Tync/Wikipedia. Licencja Creative Commons 3.0. Brak zmian.


Survey trends

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44

Survey trends (after excluding outliers and CAWI surveys)

The Left Civic Coalition PSL United Right Confederation

2019 PolishParliamentary Election

12 July 2020

2nd round of Presidential Election

6 August 2020

The oath of the President-elect

November 2023

Planned ParliamentaryElection

weeks

%

The President in the regulatory process


Business impact

Stability & time sensitive legislationThe synergy between the United Right and President will contribute to more

regulatory stability. President Duda is likely to support the United Right and its regulatory efforts. This means that time sensitive legislation (e.g. Anti-Crisis Shield) will be signed into law without hindrance.

Business-oriented approach v. state-owned focusBoth the United Right and President Duda have previously focused their

economic policy on supporting Polish SMEs. These efforts will be continued and will be combined with measures aimed at mitigating COVID-19 effects. Still, there is a big push to consolidate state-owned industry. Continued support for large public investments (e.g. the CPK).

Foreign investmentsIn the past term, the President took active interest in promoting Polish business

abroad and attracting FDIs to Poland. However anti-FDI rhetoric (especially German) during the campaign may have damaged Poland’s reputation. Further controversial judicial reforms will undermine confidence in rule of law.


Policy outlook: what to expect

TaxesPM Morawiecki suggested that “President Duda is the best guarantee

that taxes will not be raised”, and Duda is likely to support the government in its decisions, e.g. the “Estonian CIT” proposal. Most importantly, further restrictions on tax avoidance should be expected. President Duda also pledged not to introduce a so-called smartphone tax.

ClimateA shift in policy regarding coal mining and coal heating/power plants is

unlikely. President Duda will assist the government in increasing the portion of RES in Poland’s energy mix. The President will also support the government in plans to construct a nuclear power plant.

Social securityPresident Duda promised an expansion of social security programmes. He

will fully support the government in the adoption of new or extended social programmes. Ahead of the 2023 parliamentary election, social programmes may appear on the forefront of PiS’s agenda. The President will support the introduction of the Medical Fund.

Business and investmentsPolicy towards business and investments will likely continue unchanged.

The President in cooperation with the government will work to attract foreign investments to Poland. Criticism of foreign ownership of media during campaign may however signal attempts to limit especially German media investments.


Macroeconomic policy in the new

A good startEuropean Commission Forecast: Poland with the smallest economic decline

in 2020 out of all EU states.

An updated development modelGovernment eager to use mounting USA-China tensions to attract US

investments.

Shortening supply chain and moving production; Government assumes CEE will become new production house of the EU.

Megainvestments (Central Communication Hub & Vistula Spit) are at the forefront of government’s investment plans.

Policy outlookEstablishing or reinforcing production (reindustrializing) first in COVID-19

related industries.

Public investment projects rather than social spending.

Moving towards green energy production; reform of the coal sector.

Labour reform & attracting workers from the East.

Finding new balance between attracting FDI and increasing protectionism.

Further communication about R&D (e.g. electric cars) but success largely dependent on investments.


Transatlantic policy

Continuation, for nowThe strong personal relationship between President Duda and President

Trump will continue, at least until January 20, 2021. Existing defence, energy, IT and pharma projects to continue undisturbed.

Should Biden win in the US Presidential Election, the personal relationship between the leaders will be lost. The State Department will pivot to Brussels, and rule of law and media freedom issues may emerge in US policy to Poland. Ultimately however Poland’s relations with the US are likely to remain strong, albeit more workmanlike.

European policy

Poland’s legitimacy strengthenedWhile the President has little direct impact on European policy, synergy

between the President and the government strengthens Poland’s negotiating position.

Indirectly, Duda’s win increases the stability and perceived longevity of PiS rule, which will impact calculations in Brussels and the European capitals.

While Poland’s relations with Brussels will remain strained over rule of law, there will be little appetite to push for open conflict, especially in light of Brexit, COVID-19, the economic crisis and Russia/China challenges.


International policy

Visegrad GroupCooperation within the V4 will remain strong, especially with Hungary.

President Duda will support the government in forging a regional consensus, leveraging the Polish Presidency of the V4 (July 2020-June 2021)

Three Seas InitiativeThe Three Seas Initiative is especially important to President Duda personally.

In the second term, the President will strive to deepen cooperation in this format, in alliance with the US.

Weimar TriangleThe Weimar Triangle, has lost some momentum in recent years, while Poland

has focused on strengthening ad hoc regional cooperation. However, the ongoing MFF & Recovery Plan negotiations are likely to turn Poland’s attention once again to talks with Germany and France.

DefenceIn the past term, President Duda took an active approach in shaping Poland’s

defence policy. He has contributed to strengthening cooperation with the US. He will continue to lobby for higher NATO defence spending and a more robust posture towards Russia.

ContactMarek Matraszek, Chairman

Mobile: +48 601-336040E-mail: [email protected]

Michał Koczalski, Managing PartnerMobile: +48 601-336040E-mail: [email protected]

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