June 1982

FEATURE ARTICLE demythologize some current notions in engineeringethics! 1My purpose, then, is zetetic, which means question-

ing, inquiring, doubting.2 Approaching the problems ofengineering ethics zetetically means moving to a secondor meta-level and, as I have already indicated, askingquestions about the problems themselves. As a pro-paedeutic to engineering ethics we need to ask questionslike the following: What are the ethical problems of

Individual M oral engineering? Why are they ethical rather than simplylegal, institutional, organizational, economic, or per-

c 0* * sonal problems facing individual engineers? What is ad-Res onsi illlt In ded by saying that they are ethical? Into which of these

*n categories do problems connected with whistleblowingEn ineerinlg fall? How should the distinctively ethical problems be

formulated? How do they arise? What do they presup-

Some Questions pose? What methodology and what concepts are thebest tools for analyzing the ethical issues that are involv-ed in engineering? What is the moral status of a cor-

JOHN LADD poration? What is the meaning of "responsibility" andDepartment of Philosophy of "collective responsibility?" and so on.Brown University

ENGINEERING ETHICSAND PROFESSIONALISMMany of the ethical problems associated with

In this essay, I shall examine in a rather general way a engineering are connected with the professional statusnumber of commonly discussed questions of engineer- of engineering, and so I shall start off with a fewing ethics pertaining to the special ethical obligations remarks about professionalism in general as a way ofand responsibilities of engineers as engineers. However, providing a background for the problems I shall discuss.I shall not attempt to provide specific answers to these We must begin with the fact that it is generally felt thatqr:.-stions; instead, I shall raise further questions about there is something honorable about being a member of athe questions themselves. For I believe that it is absurd profession and it is often supposed that professionalsto try to answer questions about obligations and respon- are idealistic. For this reason, members of a professionsibilities before we are clear about the kinds of questions are considered to have special duties and responsibilitiesthat we are asking, the context in which they arise and towards society over and above those of ordinary peo-the presuppositions underlying them. It is often taken ple. Society has high expectations that professional per-for granted that philosophers are especially qualified to sons, by virtue of being members of a profession, will beanswer ethical questions, including questions of honest, dedicated and responsible, more so than laymenengineering ethics, and philosophers themselves or persons in other occupations. On that account, it issometimes welcome the opportunity to play the role of thought quite seemly that professionals be better paid,preacher or of ethical guidance counselor. This is a view treated with more respect and accorded a higher statusof the practical value of philosophy that is shared by in society than others. All of this most likely applies toutilitarians and rights theorists, Rawlsians and engineers considered as professionals.Nozickians, and by many others, all of whom are only Many professions have adopted codes of ethics in im-too ready to hand out answers telling people, in this case itation of the original code of ethics of the Royal Societyengineers, how they ought to act. My own view of the of Physicians. Indeed, it is often assumed that in orderrole of philosophy is entirely different; I believe that the to become a full-fledged profession an occupation mustmost useful contribution that a philosopher can make is adopt a code of ethics. On the other hand, it has beento identify, clarify and sort out problems, and in that said about such codes that if a person is really honestconnection to unmask superstition, bigotry and il- and responsible, then he does not need a code of ethicslegitimate presuppositions. In this last regard, one of and if he needs one then it will not do him any good. Imy principal objectives in this essay will be to mention this matter simply to warn against the assump-

tion that a code of ethics can be consulted for answers toquestions of engineering ethics.3

This is a revised version of a paper presented at the Se- One frequently overlooked aspect of the ethics of pro-cond National Conference on Ethics in Engineering, at fessionalism is that professionals tend to believe thatthelIllinoislInstitute of Technology, Chicago, on March their professional "obligations," e.g., to clients,5, 1982. outweigh their obligations to others, e.g., to the public.

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In other words, their professional obligations are given directly structured around interpersonal relationships,priority. The most obvious example of this sense of as are medicine and law, the engineer-client relationshippriorities is to be found in legal ethics, where lawyers are is not as central a concept for the ethical problems ofexpected to treat their obligations to clients as having engineering as the physician-patient relationship is forprecedence over their obligations to society, e.g., a medical ethics or the lawyer-client relationship is forlawyer's obligation to a client who is guilty of a heinous legal ethics. Thus, for example, paternalism is not acrime is thought to outweigh any obligation that he burning issue in engineering ethics as it is in medical ormight have to the general public whose interest it is to legal ethics.7have criminals convicted.4 Although this assumption A second important difference between engineeringabout priorities is not always stated explicitly, it is im- and the other two professions mentioned is that almostportant to remember that it is often there by implica- all of a modern engineer's activity takes place in thetion. Indeed, I sense that engineers, like other profes- context of a formal organization of some kind or other,sionals, frequently take for granted that their obliga- for example, in bureaucratically organized industrialtions to their clients, i.e., their employers, rightfully corporations. Solo practice, which provides the tradi-take precedence over their obligations to society at tional background for medical and legal ethics, is un-large. Whether or not this is or ought to be the case is common in engineering. Being part of an industrialone of the questions that should be examined in organization, the ethical problems confronting theengineering ethics. Another typical feature of profes- engineer take on another dimension, because many ofsionalism that might be mentioned here is what Parsons them are a direct result of this status as an employee incalls "affective neutrality," that is, the generally felt re- an organization. Thus, the usual supposition that a pro-quirement that a professional ought to adopt an attitude fessional is an independent operator does not hold forof neutrality towards the ultimate objectives of his client most engineers. This facet of engineering as a professionand ought not to allow his personal judgments about makes it both simpler and more complicated to frametheir intrinsic value or disvalue to play any role in deter- and to deal with the ethical problems associated with themining the services he provides. profession.

In general, it should be observed that the elitism of It is also easy to see that the ethical problems ofprofessionalism and its willingness to sacrifice the engineers are more closely bound up with the par-public interest to other professional responsibilities at- ticularities of the economic system in which they operatetest to the profoundly anti-democratic tendencies of than are those, say, of physicians, who, in manyprofessionalism, which have so often been the target of respects, face the same sorts of ethical problems inattack by social critics.5 In any event, an ethics of pro- Russia as they do in the USA. These considerations sug-fessionalism in general, and of engineering in particular, gest that we really ought to ask: is there (or should thereneeds to cope with the implications of this charge of be) a different kind of engineering ethics for engineerselitism, which supposes that we are dealing with the working under a capitalist system from an ethics thatbest, brightest and wisest members of society when we would be appropriate for engineers working under adiscuss professionalism. communist or socialist system?

I mention all of these points about professionalism One important aspect of having organizations ratherhere, because it is my impression as an outsider that they than individuals as clients is that, for engineers, their be-play a considerable role in an engineer's perception of ing part of a system or an organization such as a largehimself as a professional and of his professional obliga- corporation often encourages a sense of futility andtions and responsibilities. helplessness as far as being ethical is concerned. It is ob-

viously difficult to be ethical when one is powerless. If,and to the extent that being moral requires self-

DIFFERENTIAL ATTRIBUTES OF ENGINEERING AS A determination and being able to operate independently,PROFESSION engineers, more than physicians or lawyers, may be in-The profession of engineering differs from other pro- clined to think that they can do nothing about a situa-

fessions such as medicine and law in two respects that tion which they deplore. They are caught up in aare basic for understanding the particular problems of maelstrom and are powerless to influence the outcome.8engineering ethics. Unlike other professionals, engineers do not live a

First, unlike medicine and law, whose services are or- sheltered existence where one is accountable to no onedinarily directed to the needs of individual persons, the but oneself. As members of the organization, they areservices provided by engineers relate to things, e.g., subject to lines of accountability like all the othermachines, buildings, equipment, products, etc.6 Insofar employees. (Compare in this regard a company physi-as an engineer has a relationship to persons, it is in- cian, who has a degree of "autonomy" in what he does,direct. For example, he relates to persons as clients who with a company engineer, who has almost none.) Forpurchase or use his services or as persons who are af- these reasons, engineering ethics involve wider isues offected by what he makes (or designs), e.g., workers, responsibility of the sort that are encountered in politicsconsumers or the general public. As a result of not being and in organizational ethics in general. In this respect,

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June 1982

some of the moral dilemmas that trouble ethically sen- moral value from these interpersonal relationships andsitive engineers could be compared to situations ex- consists in thoroughgoing dedication and devotion of aperienced by persons living under a totalitarian regime, person to what is owed another by virtue of a relation-where responsible action involving remonstrance or ship of this kind. It is odd therefore to speak of loyaltyresistance leads to extermination. I shall return to this where there is no prior personal relationship, for exam-problem later. ple, loyalty to a perfect stranger or to someone one ad-

mires at a distance but does not have any personal rela-THE ETHICS OF LOYALTY tionship to, such as a movie star. It is even more odd to

Another quite different ethical aspect of the relation- speak of loyalty to a non-person.12 Furthermore, ifship of engineers to formal organizations of which they loyalty is a moral virtue, then it cannot be conceived asare members, whether they be public or private, relates requiring something that is not due or, even less,to the issue of loyalty. It is often alleged that, as something that is not right. There is no virtue in being amembers of a particular organization, engineers have a "loyal Nazi" or a "loyal member of the Mafia." Suchspecial duty of loyalty towards that organization and notions, according to my analysis, would in fact be con-therefore, having that duty, it would be wrong for them tradictions in terms. 13to do anything that might harm the organization, i.e., If this analysis of loyalty is correct, and I think thatbe against its interest. For example, it would be disloyal any analysis that takes loyalty to be a virtue would haveof an engineer to reveal the secrets of his organization to to be developed along these lines, there are obvious dif-an outsider, even secrets about unsafe features of pro- ficulties with the idea of loyalty to a corporation, in theducts. sense of loyalty that implies that it is morally good to be

In view of the great emphasis on loyalty in discussions loyal. First, before we could speak meaningfully ofof engineering ethics, we need to ask whether or not loyalty in the context of a corporation, we need to ask:there is any validity or merit in the concept of loyalty to who in the corporation is the object of this loyalty? Is itan organization. We should note right away that the the managers? the stockholders? one's fellowloyalty in question here is not at all like the loyalty that employees? or all of these? Obviously, loyalty to thesephysicians and lawyers are expected to have towards different groups requires quite different kinds of con-their patients and clients, for the latter kind of loyalty duct, some of which may be inconsistent. If, on thesimply amounts to observing the duties of devotion, other hand, we choose to say that the object of loyalty isdedication, zealousness and avoidance of conflicts of in- the corporation itself, the corporate entity, we faceterest that are owed to their patients and clients as in- another paradox. For, quite apart from the issue of cor-dividuals as a result of their relationship. The loyalty in- porations being non-persons, something else importantvolved in the physician-patient or lawyer-client rela- for loyalty seems to be missing that might be calledtionship has often been compared to loyalty between "reciprocity." What I mean is that loyalty is thought tofriends.9 Loyalty to an organization, on the other hand, be a two-way thing: A is loyal to B and B is loyal to A.seems to be quite different from the loyalty that one in- Friends are loyal to each other. In this sense, loyalty is adividual gives to another and that can exist between bond tying people to each other reciprocally. Corporatefriends.10 "loyalty" is, in contrast, by its very nature one-way;

In order to see whether and how the concept of loyal- dedication and devotion can only be in one direc-ty can be applied to an organization, we need to ask a tion-from the employee to the corporation. A corpora-number of other questions: Is loyalty always a virtue? tion cannot be loyal to employees in the same sense asDoes loyalty ever permit or require doing something they are supposed to be loyal to it, not only because it isthat would otherwise be wrong? What kinds of things not a person but also because the actions of a corpora-can be the objects of loyalty? Do members of organiza- tion must be conceptually linked to the benefits theytions, e.g., engineers, have a duty of loyalty to their bring to the corporation. A corporation can be good toorganizations? If so, could the claims of an organiza- employees only because it is good for business, that is,tion to loyalty ever justify wrongdoing of some sort? because it is in its own self-interest. All this is a conse-

If we assume that loyalty, as distinguished from blind quence of the fact that a corporation is logically in-obedience or servile compliance, is a virtue, then we capable of having moral attitudes and its conduct canmust inquire into what we mean by "loyalty" in this only be understood in relation to the aims of the cor-sense.11 When regarded as a virtue, that is, as poration. As an ethical notion, however, loyalty cannotsomething morally desirable, loyalty is founded on be founded solely on utility or self-interest.moral relationships of one sort or other between per- As I have already indicated a number of times, cor-sons, e.g., originally between lord and vassal, but now porations are not persons in the moral sense. The factalso between family members, between friends, between that in law, corporations have the status of persons ascolleagues and between comrades. Loyalty to a nation, far as the Fourteenth Amendment is concerned, doesto a college, or to a family is simply loyalty to the people not make them moral persons: law and morality shouldin them, including perhaps to past and future genera- not be confused. My arguments against the position thattions within these communities. As a virtue, it derives its corporation are moral persons are based on a particular

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analysis of the logic of organizational decision-making, ty. Safety, it should be noted, is the kind of thing that isaccording to which organizations are logically incapable looked on as a value by everyone.It is like motherhood:of moral decision-making and of moral conduct no one is against it-in principle. So we start off thegenerally. If, as I contend, rational corporate acts must discussion of this problem with something that is uncon-and can only be logically tied to corporate goals, e.g., troversial, for safety is an incontrovertible good, or, ifprofit-making, then such acts cannot be based on moral you wish, something whose absence is an incontroverti-considerations. Essential to my analysis, it should be ble evil. It is easy, of course, to see why safety is valuedobserved, is a clear-cut distinction and separation of a by everyone, for an unsafe bit of machinery, like ancorporation as an "abstract" entity from the people airplane or an automobile, might result in one's ownwithin a corporation, who, as individuals, are, of death or the death of others who are close. The firstcourse, persons with the moral responsibilities and point, then, is that our starting place is more solid, so torights pertaining to persons.14 speak, than the starting place of most ethical problems.

To admit safety as an incontrovertible good is not toWHISTELBLOWING say that there are no disagreements about safety. There

If, as I have argued, the issue of loyalty to a corpora- are disagreements, for example, over the definition oftion is a red herring, then we need not discuss the ethics safety, how much safety should be built into a machine,of whistlebowing in that connection. However, there are what safety measures are necessary in design, structure,other issues connected with whistleblowing that we need operating procedures, etc. 17 There are also livelyto examine. The cases of whistleblowing that have disagreements over the costs of safety, over who hasreceived wide attention are spectacular. They typically responsibility for safety, and over what kind of controlsinvolve preventable disasters, errors and mistakes, and there should be over safety.usually some hanky-panky. 15 As has been pointed out, The second question about the problem behindwhistleblowing represents a particular kind of solution whistleblowing is this: granted that the prevention ofto a general problem that may have other and better preventable disasters is a problem, even a pressing orsolutions.16 So we immediately have two issues: the urgent problem, we must determine what kind of pro-rights and wrongs of whistleblowing and the problem blem it is. Is it a moral or ethical problem? Or is it athat whistleblowing is supposed to solve. As far as social problem? a legal, a political, an institutionalwhistleblowing itself is concerned, it is obvious that it is (organizational) or an economic problem? Or is it simp-not always good or bad and that it is not always suc- ly a practical human problem concerning means andcessful or necessary. As De George and others point ends, that is, concerning what measures should beout, it seems on the face of it undesirable from an undertaken to avoid the evils in question? In any case,ethical point of view to have to solve the kind of a pro- why call it an ethicalproblem, unless we are ready to sayblem that leads to whistleblowing by demanding that in- that any problem whatsoever of means and ends isdividuals be moral heroes. In any event, there are ob- automatically an ethical problem?vious ethical as well as practical objections to solutions One way that one might answer these questions is toof social problems that depend so heavily on individual say that safety is an ethical problem simply because it isself-sacrifice. an important matter that we need to do somethingTurning to the second issue, let us take a closer look about, i.e., we ought to do what we can to prevent

at the problems for which whistleblowing is supposed to preventable accidents. In that case, it becomes the pro-be the solution, that is, the evils that it is supposed to blem of how to prevent accidents, and that surely is ancorrect. They include such things as faulty design engineering problem. Of course, we might want toleading to fatal accidents, as in the Hyatt Regency Hotel broaden the scope of the problem so defined and amendand the DC 10 crash. What is the underlying problem? it by including questions about how to get those inIf we assume that in general terms it is how to prevent power to do something to prevent preventable ac-undesirable states of affairs (evils) of some sort, what cidents, that is, to take problems of safety more serious-particular states of affairs are the ones in question? Is ly. In order to solve it, then, we might need to tacklethe problem simply: how to prevent preventable some political, organizational or perhaps even socialdisasters? Or, to put it positively, is it simply how to problems. It is still unclear, however, why we shouldpromote safety in engineering? If so, is it the same pro- call the basic problem an ethical problem rather thanblem that is addressed in the Engineer's Code of Ethics, some other kind of problem and why we should call it awhen it says that "Engineers shall hold paramount the "problem" rather than a "task." Are we faced heresafety, health and welfare of the public in the perfor- with something that is inany sense amoral issue and amance of their professional duties?" One answer to our perplexity? The only thing that we can say for sure isquestion, then, might be that the ethical problem behind that whistleblowing by isolated individuals is not thewhistleblowing is simply how to maximize safety or at answer to the problem of preventing preventable ac-least how to reduce unsafety to a decent minimum. cidents.

There are two things to say about the problem as I On the other hand, we might wish to say that the pro-have just defined it. First, it involves a reference to safe- blem in question is ethical because if everyone in a posi-

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tion to do something about safety were aware of their here the other common fallacy of identifying ethics withmoral responsibilities in that regard and also were moral the 'value-system' of some group or other, that is, with(i.e., conscientious), then the problem of preventable what John Austin called "positive morality,"-theaccidents would be solved. So construed, the "bottom body of moral beliefs and conventions actually acceptedline" becomes the question of how to get people to do by a person, a group, or a society. Ethics, sometimeswhat they ought to do, i.e., to be moral. In the final called "critical morality," is logically prior to all ofanalysis, however, the way we conceive the problem these institutions and social mechanisms of control. It isdepends on what our basic concern is: is it with the evil used to criticize, evaluate and weigh the validity andof the disaster or is it with the evil of people, that is, desirability of the norms, rules and principles embodiedtheir failure to act to prevent disasters. If it is the latter, in such institutions as law and positive morality. Conse-then the ethical problem turns into a problem of, say, quently, ethics is prior to or superior to these otherhow to raise moral consciousness about safety. It is systems of norms in that it is used to determine what insolved by overcoming insensitivity or callousness on the them is morally acceptable and unacceptable.part of those who are in a position to do something There are a number of other important differencesabout safety. (This might, of course, include manage- between ethics and formal systems of control such asment.) On this view, being moral (ethical) in these senses law and management regulations. By a "formal systemis valued as a means of preventing accidents, etc. The of control" I mean a system consisting of formallyproblem behind whistleblowing (e.g., concerning faulty adopted rules, regulations, procedures and sanctionsengineering) is solved by people becoming more moral, that are and can be used to control behavior. Usuallysay, through moral education. Accordingly, we have a the rules in question are written down and published forutilitarian interpretation of the problem itself and a the guidance of those subject to them. For our pur-utilitarian answer to it, including a utilitarian view of poses, perhaps the chief difference between thesethe value of moral consciousness and moral education. systems of control and ethics is that in formal systems ofEthics has been reduced to a means for preventing ac- control such as law and management regulations somecidents! person or body of persons is authorized to create,Now, all of this seems to me to be an odd way of change and rescind the rules-at will, so to speak. Thethinking about ethics. I want to ask: whatever became authority to do this is vested in legislatures, courts, com-of ethics? Ethics is treated as if it were a kind of ..missions, boards, managers and other officials. Thebehavior control, an internal behavior control com- principles of ethics (or morals), in contrast, are not theparable in important respects to external behavior con- kind of thing that can be arbitrarily created, changed ortrol through law, institutional regulations, social prac-'. .' ~~~~~~~rescinded. Ethics cannot be dictated. In old fashionedtices, rewards and punishments. As distinct from the

terminology, the principles of ethics are "discovered"latter, ethics is internalized control. But is this whatrather than created by fiat. They are established throughethics is: internal behavior control? Must we accept the. . . . ~~~~~~~~argument and persuasion, not through imposition by anutilitarian answer? Is the problem of how to eliminate e s .external social authority.preventable accidents simply one of securing moral

behavior or one of ethical behavior control? Another critical difference between the formalIt might be observed, incidentally, that the assump- systems of control that I have been discussing and ethics

tion that ethics is essentially a kind of behavior control is their purpose, for law, corporate regulations, institu-is probably what lies behind the attempts by various tional requirements, and other formal systems of conprofessions to codify the rules of their professional trol are designed and used to control behavior forethics. It seems to be taken for granted that if what is various and sundry purposes, which may be good, evil,ethical is prescribed by a code, then members of the pro- or indifferent. From an ethical point of view it is ourfession will comply and a socially acceptable and job to weigh the validity and desirability of these pur-desirable outcome will result. Whatever the explicit in- poses. But just as important from the ethical point oftent, the underlying purpose of the codes is to create view are the ways and means selected to achieve thesesome kind of behavior control analogous to control purposes. Here we need to ask: which ways and meansthrough law. 18 At this point, I need to make some com- are legitimate and ethically justifiable and which arements on the use of formal mechanisms of behavior not. In particular, we need to ask which sorts of socialcontrol in the service of ethics. control are ethically permissible and which are not? Inconnection with the last question, there is one important

means of control that has received insufficient attentionMECHANISMS OF BEHAVIOR CONTROL: in the literature on engineering ethics, namely, the useLAW VS. ETHICS of secrecy as a means of control. When is secrecyAgreat deal ofconfusion in discussions of ethical pro- justified and when not? are the current self-serving

blems results from the assimilation of ethics to law, in- norms regarding secrecy, e.g., within a corporation andstitutions, organizational regulations, and other regarding enginering projects, tolerable from the ethicalmechanisms of social control. I hardly need mention point of view? Is it not possible that the best way to

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IEEE Technology and Society Magazine

avoid political and organizational corruption in the long phize corporations and treat them like "nice people" orrun is to make public the plans, projects and purposes else to reduce individual human beings to miniature cor-behind the operations of our public institutions, govern- porations, each in pursuit of his self-interest and inment and private corporations? 19 perpetual strife with others for profit, power and glory.

Once we rid ourselves of this mythology, we will be ableSOCIAL CONTROL AND THEORIES OF HUMAN NATURE to sort out more clearly and coherently our mutual

Ethical theories about proper and improper social rights, duties and responsibilities in society in relation tocontrol always presuppose, either explicitly or implicit- each other.ly, a theory of human nature of some kind or other.Theories of human nature in this sense are about what MORAL RESPONSIBILITY AND OTHER KINDSmotivates human beings and what ought to motivate OF RESPONSIBILITYthem, that is, what would be rational for them to wantand to do. Although it is generally assumed that theories Nowhere is the fallacious assimilation of corporationsof human nature and motivation are descriptive and em- to moral persons more apparent than in prevalent con-pirical, in actuality they are always inescapably value- ceptions of responsibility; different senses of respon-laden, both in regard to how individuals ought to act (if sibility are confused with each other almost as if therethey are rational) and in regard to what are the proper were a plot to get rid of moral responsibility altogether.means to get them to act in ways that one wants, i.e., to Pursuing the same line that I have already taken in thiscontrol them. Different theories of human nature come essay, I shall argue that the concept of moral respon-up with quite different answers to these questions. sibility, as contrasted with other kinds of responsibility,Thus, according to a Hobbesian self-interest model of cannot properly or even meaningfully be attributed tohuman nature, it is reasonable for a person to act for his corporations, that is, to formal organizations. But firstown self-interest and unreasonable for him to act we have to sort out a number of different senses ofagainst it, and for that reason the best and proper way "responsibility."to control others is to manipulate their self-interest, to The locus classicus for any discussion of responsibili-make it in their self-interest to act in certain ways. This ty is Hart's essay on the subject.21 In his essay, Hartis the typical bourgeois economic view of man and it lists four different senses of responsibility, which heprovides the rationale for many of our institutional ar- calls: (a) Role-responsibility, (b) Causal-responsibility,rangements that are designed to control behavior, e.g., (c) Liability-responsibility, and (d) Capacity-of employees.20 Whatever is in a person's self-interest responsibility. The names speak for themselves: role-is, other things being equal, permissible, nay, rational responsibilities are the responsibilities that go withfor him to do. roles, tasks and jobs; causal responsibility is the respon-For reasons that I cannot give here, the Hobbesian sibility for having caused something to happen; liability

model does not fit individual human beings very well; it responsibility concerns who is to pay for damages, andignores not only the 'irrational' and emotional side of capacity-responsibility refers to psychological capacitieshuman nature but also its moral aspect. On the other required for legal competence.hand, the model does apply very nicely to corporations, It should be noted right away that Hart does not in-at least to the commonly accepted notion of private cor- clude on his list the most important sense of "respon-porations as propelled by self-regarding drives for pro- sibility": moral responsibility, that is, responsibility infit, power and glory. The whole Hobbesian apparatus the virtue sense.22 He ignores this kind of responsibilitycan be usefully applied to an ethical analysis of corpora- because he is interested only in responsibility as it relatestions. Like Hobbesian men, corporations are, in theory to law. Furthermore, it should be observed that all ofat least, in constant competition with each other-as in Hart's four senses of responsibility can be attributed toHobbes's state of nature-and the only effective control corporations, for corporations can (a) fill roles; theyover their "rational" voracity is through the manipula- can (b) cause things to happen; they can be (c) liable,tion of their self-interest. Accordingly, if we really want e.g., for damages, and they have (d) the "capacities"to cut down unsafe practices and to reduce the incidence that Hart mentions, namely, the capacities ofof industrially caused accidents (evils) we have to make "understanding, reasoning and control of conduct.' 23it in a corporation's self-interest to take measures to It is easy to see why Hart's senses of responsibility applyprevent them. It is absurd to appeal to ethics, because to corporations, for they are essentially legal entitiescorporations are not moral beings. Profits are what and as such are subject to law, which, as I have pointedcount, and so unsafety should be made unprofitable. out, should not be confused with ethics.

I have argued that underlying most thinking about When we come to moral responsibility we are dealingethics in corporations is a certain mythology, which with something quite different.24 In order to bring outholds that corporations are persons and that therefore the difference, let me begin by distinguishing betweenthe same theories of human nature, of motivation and forward-looking and backward-looking senses ofof morality apply to them as apply to individual human responsibility, that is, between responsibility forbeings. This mythology leads us either to anthropomor- something that has already taken place and responsibili-

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June 1982

ty for what will or might take place in the future. Clear- exclusiveness of moral responsibility is that, if manyly, liability responsibility is backward looking in this people can be morally responsible for the same thing,sense and so is causal responsibility: " Who and What is then there can be such a thing as group moral respon-responsible for the crash of the DC-10?" Role- sibility, or if you wish, collective responsibility, that is,responsibility may be either past or future: a safety of- a responsibility that falls on many people at the sameficer's role was, is, or will be to monitor such and such time. In as much as one person's being responsible doesfor product safety, etc.25 Retrospectively, a person can not relieve others of responsibility, everyone in a groupbe held responsible (liable) for failure to do what his may have moral responsibility for a certain thing. Thus,role required, and prospectively, he is responsible (role) the whole family is responsible for seeing that the babyfor completing certain tasks and controlling certain does not get hurt. The whole community is responsiblekinds of results in the future. It should be noted, for the health and safety of its citizens. And all thehowever, that role-responsibilities (tasks, jobs) are engineers, as well as others, working on a project areassigned, e.g. by organizations, and from a moral point responsible for its safety.of view may be non-moral or immoral, as well as moral. Now it should be clear that underlying my analysis ofThus, a public relations official may have the respon- collective responsibility is a distinction between a groupsibility (job, task) for covering up management's failure of people, a collection or association of individuals, andto report a hazardous condition. a formal organization, which is a structure defined byNow, moral responsibility as I conceive it is for- rules, offices and jobs, etc., apart from the people whoward-looking. It is about what people ought to do to come and go in the organization. Moral responsibilities,bring about or to prevent future states of affairs. It is moral virtues and other moral qualities can be ascribedbased on the duty each one of us has to watch out for to groups insofar as they pertain to the individuals inwhat may happen to others or to oneself. As such, it im- them. But since organizations are not persons, they are,plies concern, care and foresight. To be responsible in as such, beyond the pale of morality. We cannot andthis sense is a virtue that cannot be meaningfully should not shift our moral responsibilities onto abstractpredicated of a corporation conceived as a formal entities like corporations.organization, that is, as a structure of rules, offices and One of the deep problems of our time is that peoplejobs, etc. Corporations, being nonmoral entities, can- have followed the lead of philosophers, lawyers andnot be virtuous or vicious in the moral sense; only the managers and have simply reduced moral responsibilitypeople in them can be so characterized. to the other four kinds of responsibility already men-Now, one noteworthy property of responsibility in tioned. The net effect of this move is to render all

the moral sense as contrasted with the other senses is responsibility exclusionary and to provide therebythat it is nonexclusive. In the other four senses, respon- theoretical support for a wholesale abdication of moralsibility is exclusive in the sense that to impute respon- responsibility: "That's her job, not mine"; "he did it,sibility to one thing (X) implies that other things (Y,Z) not I," etc. We are constantly looking for someone todo not have the responsibility. Thus, if one person has a fix responsibility onto, be it liability or role responsibili-role-responsibility for something, it follows that other ty. We construe the question of responsibility forpeople do not have the responsibility. Similarly, causal engineering errors as a question of fixing responsibilityand liability responsibility are exclusionary. Moral on some engineer, either holding him liable for it (in theresponsibility, on the other hand, is not exclusionary in past) or assigning him the task of watching out for it inthis sense; for one person to be responsible does not en- the future. "Divide and conquer" is the motto: if wetail, as it does for the other kinds of responsibility, that divide responsibilities like jobs or liabilities we willother persons are not also responsible. A father's avoid any trouble and we will know whom to blame.responsibility for his children does not exclude (or Our ideology gives us a way to pass the buck as far asnegate) the mother's responsibility-or, for that matter, moral responsibility is concerned. Against this, it shouldanyone else's responsibility, e.g., the responsibility of be pointed out that if everyone in a non-exclusive groupthe state. In the moral sense, there are some things that with moral responsibility for safety sets out to prevent aeveryone is responsible for, and one of these things is disaster, then the world will be much better off than ifsafety. Concern with safety is not just one person's job, we simply try to fix a disaster on a single person or if wei.e., his role-responsibility, to the exclusion of others. It assign the job ( = role responsibility) for preventingis everyone's moral responsibility-varying in degrees disasters to a particular person or outfit and then forgetonly to the extent that one person is better able to do about our own responsibilities. According to the con-something about it than others. The concept of moral ception of moral responsibility that I have in mind here,responsibility implies that there are some things that are there is a sense in which all of us, engineers andeveryone's business! nonengineers alike, are responsible for things like the

Pinto accidents, say, because we accept a way of life,based on the Hobbesian model, that assumes that whatCOLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY is good for business, anyone's business, is good for us,

A very significant ethical consequence of the non- for society, and correlatively, it is good for business to

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WEEE Technology and Society Magazine

mind one's own business. [4] For a forceful statement of this position, see Monroe Freedman,On a broader front, we can see what happens to a Lawyer's Ethics in an Adversary System. Indianapolis: Bobbs-

society when a sizeable segment of the population ab- Merrill, 1975.dicates its moral responsibility for the common good, [5] See, for example, Ivan Illich, Irving Zola, et al. Disabling Pro-that is, the good of its members, and opts for the princi- fessions. Boston: Marion Boyars, 1977.ofatmindin one's ownbusine (obrsponsibi [6] It is often advanced as a criticism of modern medical practice thatple of minding one's own business Oob-responsiblity). physicians treat patients as bodies that are like machines needingIn Germany, a result of this kind of abdication was to be repaired rather than as persons. In this way, medicineHitler. In the USA, a result of this kind of abdication becomes a technology and in that respect becomes like engineer-was Vietnam. And unless we start caring, a future result ing.of our abdication of responsibility will be World War [7] There is an extensive literature on paternalism in medicine andIII and a nuclear holocaust. Some would like to blame law.the engineers for that. But I argue that nuclear [8] In this connection, there is a series of rationalizations that arethe engineers fo ht umade by members of a bureaucracy to justify their not doingweaponry is not simply an engineering problem, that is, anything about something they think is wrong. For a criticala problem for engineering ethics, although it is also discussion of such attempts to avoid responsibility, see Dennisthat, just as problems of engineering ethics, e.g., con- Thompson, "Moral responsibility of public officials: the problemthat,ngjst of many hands." American Political Science Review, vol. 74, no.cerning safe products and concerning a safe environ- 4 (December 1980).ment, are not simply problems of engineering ethics, butproblems for all of us. All of these things are [9] See Pedro Lain Entralgo, Doctor and Patient. Tr. Frances Par-

everybody's business. tridge. New York: McGraw Hill, 1965; and Charles Fried, " Theeverybody's business. Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client

In conclusion, I want to reiterate what was said at the Relation." Yale Law Journal, 85: 1060-89 (1976).beginning of this essay: philosophers cannot be expected [10.] Hume says in this connecton that virtues like rigid loyalty to per-to provide ready-made solutions to ethical problems in sons are "virtues that hold less of reason than of bigotry andengineering. Instead, following my conception of the superstition." Treatise, Book 111, Part ll, Section X.zetetic role of a philosopher, I have simply tried to point [11.11 discuss this concept in "Loyalty," Encyclopedia ofoutanumber of questions that need to be asked and Philosophy, ed. Paul Edwards. New York: Macmillan and Free

out a number of questlons that need to be asked and Press, 1967, vol. 5, pp. 97-98.some of the pitfalls in ethical thinking about them thatought to be avoided. As far as the latter are concerned, I [12] Elsewhere I argue that formal organizations, e.g., corporations,have tried to show that serious ethical consequences are not persons in the moral sense. See my "Morality and the

ideal of rationality in formal organizations." Monist, vol. 54,follow from the blithe acceptance of corporations as no. 4 (October 1970).persons, from the confounding of moral and legal con- [13] See "Loyalty."cepts, and from the failure to recognize moral respon-sibility as a distinctive kind of responsibility that is [14] See "Is 'corporate responsibility' a coherent notion?" in Pro-nonexclusive and that can be predicated of individuals ceedings of the Second National Conference on Business Ethics.

Ed. Michael Hoffman. Washington, D.C.; University Press ofin groups (i.e., collective responsibility) as well as of America, 1979, 9, pp. 102-115.persons individually. Thus, despite the disclaimers [151 See Alan F. Westin, Whistle-blowing: Loyalty and Dissent in theabout the practical value of philosophy that I have men- Corporation. New York: McGraw Hill, 1981.tioned, philosophy in the analytic tradition still has an [16] See Richard T.De George, "Ethical responsibilities of engineersimportant and perhaps indispensable function in mak- in large organizations." Business and Professional Ethics Jour-ing clear how best to approach the problems that con- nal, vol. 1, no. I (Fall 1981)cern us in engineering ethics, even though in the end it [17] See Willie Hammer, Product Safety Management and Engineer-does not provide authoritative answers to them. ing. Englewood Cliffs, N.J. Prentice-Hall, 1980.

[181 See my "The quest for a code of professional ethics."

Notes and References [19] 1 should remind the reader that none of these institutions, accor-ding to my analysis, is a person and therefore none has a moralright to personal privacy.

[1] My position on these questions is set forth in a number of [20] See C. B. McPherson, Democratic Theory. Oxford: Clarendonwritings. See, for example, "The Poverty of Absolutism," in Press, 1973, esp. pp. 224-37.Timothy Stroup, ed. Essays in Memory ofEdward WestermarckActa Philosophica Fennica. Helsinki, 1982. See also, "The Task [21] SeeH L.A.Hart, Punishment and Responsbiity. NewYork:of Ethics," in Warren Reich, ed. Encyclopedia of Bioethics. New Oxford University Press, 1968, p. 212 et passim.York: The Free Press, 1978, vol. 1, pp. 400-407. [22] For an account, see Graham Haydon, "On being responsible."

[2] From the Greek zetein. It is a word that was used for an ancient Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 28, no. 110 (January, 1978).school of philosophers known as the Skeptics-otherwise asZetetics. [23] Op. cit., p. 227.

[3] For a critical discussion of the notion of a professional code of [24] Most of the ideas in the following paragraphs are taken from myethics see "The quest for a code of professional ethics: an intellec- "'The ethics of participation," in NOMOS XV1: Participation intual and moral confusion." AAAS Professional Ethics Project, Politics. ed. J. Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman. Neweds. Rosemary Chalk, Mark S. Frankel and Sallie B. Chafer. York: Atherton-Lieber, 1975.Washington, D.C.: American Association for the Advancementof Science, 1980. [25] See Hammer, op. cit., chapter 12. D

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