LABOR RELATIONS : CASE SET 10 (1ST HALF)ART. 280 (continuation)7 Aro et. al. v. NLRC March 7, 2012 ESGUERRA

8Universal Robina Sugar Milling Corp v. Acibo et. al, January 15, 2014 (R. Seasonal Employees). EVANGELISTA

9 GMA Network Inc. v. Pabriga, November 27, 2013. FAJARDO10 Pasas v. PNCC, July 3, 2013. HERRERA11 Gapayao v. Fulo, June 13, 2013 MAGDARAOG

12Millennium Erectors Corp. v. Magallanes, November 15, 2010 PUNZALAN

13 Caparoso et. al. v. CA, February 15, 2007 RAMOS, A

14Spouses Lim v. Legaspi Hope Christian School et. al., March 31, 2009 RAMOS, M

15 DM Consunji v. Gobres et. al, August 8, 2010 SALVADOR

16Mercado et. al. v. Ama Computer College, April 13, 2010 SANTOS

17 Brent School v. Zamora SBAIZ18 Pure Foods Corporation v. NLRC December 12, 1997 SUAN

ART. 281

1Tamson’s Enterprises Inc.et. al. v. CA, March 16, 2011 VILLALOBOS

2Hacienda Primera Development Corporation v. Villegas, April 11, 2011 ABRENILLA

3 Universidad De Sta. Isabel v. Sambajon, April 2, 2014 ABUCAY4 Univac Development v. Soriano, June 19, 2013. ALMAZAN5 Abbott Laboratories v. Alcaraz, July 23, 2013. ANACAY

6Colegio de Santisimo Rosario v. Rojo, September 4, 2013. BAGUILAT

7Tamson’s Enterprises Inc.et. al. v. CA, March 16, 2011 Repeated

8Hacienda Primera Development Corporation v. Villegas, April 11, 2011 CAPISTRANO

9 Aililing v. World Express Corp. April 25, 2012 Repeated10 Phil. Daily Inquirer v. Magtibay, July 24, 2007 RAKIM11 Alcira v. NLRC, June 9, 2004 EVANGELISTA

12Mercado v. Ama Computer College (Probi status of fixed term employees) Repeated

Art 282

1Concepcion v. Minex Import Corporation, January 24, 2012 FAJARDO

2Dreamland Hotel and Resort v. Johnson, March 12, 2014 Repeated

3Grand Asian Shipping Lines Inc., v. Galvez, January 29, 2014 HERRERA

4 Mirant Phil. Corp. v. Caro, April 23, 2014 MAGDARAOG

5Bluer than blue Joint Ventures Co. v. Esteban, April 7, 2014. PUNZALAN

6 Manila Jockey Club v. Trajano, June 26, 2013. RAMOS,A7 Hormillosa v. Coca Cola, October 9, 2013. RAMOS,M

8Chuanico v. Legacy Consolidated Plans, October 9, 2013. MIGUEL

9Duncan Association of Detailman-PGTWO v. Glaxo Welcome Phils, September 17, 2004 SANTOS

10Star Paper Corporation et al. v. Simbol, April 12, 2006 SBAIZ

11Ace Promotion and Marketing Corp. v. Ursabia, September 22, 2006 SUAN

12Concepcion v. Minex Import Corporation, January 24, 2012 Repeated

13St. Lukes Medical Center Inc. v Notario October 20, 2010 Repeated

1

LABOR RELATIONS : CASE SET 10 (1ST HALF)Art. 280

7 Aro et. al. v. NLRC March 7, 2012

GR NO. 174792 MARCH 7, 2012Wilfredo Aro, Ronilo Tirol, Jose Pacaldo, Primitivo Casquejo & Marcial Abgo, Petitioners Vs. NLRC 4th division and Benthel Development Corp, Respondents

DOCTRINE:

Article 280. Regular and Casual Employment − The provisions of written agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, except where the employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or service to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season.

FACTS:

Several employees of private respondent Benthel Development Corporation were hired for the construction of the Cordova Reef Village Resort in Cordova, Cebu. However, the said corporation dismissed herein employees and petitioners from their post without any valid reason which prompted the latter to file a complaint for illegal dismissal praying for various money claims and damages against private respondent, Benthel Development Corporation.

LA:

Labor Artbiter, Ernesto F. Carreon rendered a decision finding private respondent guilty of illegal dismissal and ordering it to pay the 36 employees of P446, 940 as separation pay.

NLRC:

The NLRC affirmed the decision of LA but with modification that private respondent be paid backwages computed from the respective dates of dismissal until finality of the decision.

Private Respondent was unsatisfied with the decision of NLRC, filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the computation of backwages should be from the date of the completion of the project since it has been found by the LA that the

employees were project employees but the said MR was denied by NLRC for failure to establish the date of the computation of the said project and for non-payment of docket fees. Respondent filed a petition for certiorari with the CA to assail such decision.

CA:

CA denied the petition and reiterated that petitioners are indeed project employees.

ISSUE:

Whether petitioner were project employees or regular employees which will be the basis for the computation of their respective backwages.

HELD:

SC agrees with the findings of the CA that petitioners were project employees. It is said that petitioners were hired for the construction of the Cordova Reef Village Resort in Cordova, Cebu. By the nature of the contract alone, it is clear that petitioners' employment was to carry out a specific project. Private respondents are only entitled to payment of backwages until the date of the completion of the project or work.

8 Universal Robina Sugar Milling Corp v. Acibo et. al, January 15, 2014 (R. Seasonal Employees).

UNIVERSAL ROBINA SUGAR MILLING CORPORATION and RENE CABATI v. FERDINAND ACIBO, et al.G.R. No. 186439, 15 January 2014

Doctrine: The period denominated in the contract of employment is not the basis in determining whether an employee is seasonal or regular. Rather, the nature of the employment depends on the nature of the activities to be performed by the employee, considering the nature of the employer's business, the duration and scope to be done and, in some cases, even the length of time of the performance and its continued existence.

Facts: FERDINAND ACIBO, et al. were employees of UNIVERSAL ROBINA SUGAR MILLING CORPORATION (URSUMCO). Acibo, et al. signed contracts of employment for a given period and after its expiration, URSUMCO repeatedly hired these employees to perform the same duties and obligations.

2

LABOR RELATIONS : CASE SET 10 (1ST HALF)Acibo, et al. filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter complaints for regularization, entitlement to the benefits under the existing Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), and attorney's fees. However, it was denied because the LA argued that they were seasonal/project employees.

As the complainants were project employees, they could not be regularized since their respective employments were coterminous with the phase of the work or special project to which they were assigned and which employments end upon the completion of each project. Accordingly, the complainants were not entitled to the benefits granted under the CBA that, as provided, covered only the regular employees of URSUMCO.

Seven of the 22 complainants filed an appeal to the NLRC. The latter reversed the LA’s ruling claiming that they were regular employees. The CA affirmed NLRC’s decision but excluded the Acibo, et al. from monetary benefits under the CBA.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Acibo, et al. are regular employees of URSUMCO.

HELD:

Plantation workers or mill employees only work on seasonal basis. This, however, does not exclude them from the benefits of regularization. Being in such nature, Acibo, et al. are considered to be regular employees.

Regular employment means that there was an arrangement between the employee and the employer that the former will be engaged to perform activities which are necessary or desirable to the usual business or trade of the latter. On the other hand, a project employment is an arrangement for a specific project or undertaking whose termination is determined by the completion of the project.

The nature of the employment does not depend solely on the will or word of the employer or on the procedure for hiring and the manner of designating the employee. Rather, the nature of the employment depends on the nature of the activities to be performed by the employee, considering the nature of the employer’s business, the duration and scope to be done. Accordingly, Acibo, et al. are neither project nor seasonal employees.

Acibo, et al. were made to perform tasks that does not pertain to milling operations of URSUMCO. However, their duties are regularly and habitually needed in URSUMCO’s operation. Moreover, they were regularly and repeatedly hired to

perform the same tasks. Being repeatedly hired for the same purpose makes them regularized employees.

The plantation workers or the mill employees do not work continuously for 1 whole year but only for the duration of the growing or the sugarcane or the milling season. Their seasonal work, however, does not detract from considering them in regular employment.

9 GMA Network Inc. v. Pabriga, November 27, 2013.

GMA NETWORK, INC. Vs. CARLOS P. PABRIGA et al. G.R. No. 176419, November 27, 2013

FACTS: Due to the miserable working conditions respondents were forced to file a complaint against petitioner before the NLRC Regional Arbitration Branch of Cebu City, assailing their respective employment circumstances.

Petitioner received a notice of hearing of the complaint.

The following day, Private respondents were made to explain why they filed the complaint. The next day, private respondents were barred from entering and reporting for work without any notice stating the reasons therefor. Private respondents, through their counsel, wrote a letter twice to petitioner requesting that they be recalled back to work. Both letters were ignored.

Respondents filed an amended complaint raising the following additional issues: 1) Unfair Labor Practice; 2) Illegal dismissal; and 3) Damages and Attorney’s fees.

Respondents claim that they are regular employees of petitioner GMA Network, Inc. The latter, on the other hand, interchangeably characterize respondents’ employment as project and fixed period/fixed term employment.

ISSUE: whether the respondents are regular or project employees,

HELD: Private respondents are regular employees. Art. 280 of the Labor code Provides: XXXX

“An employment shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer.”

An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the preceding paragraph: Provided, That any employee who has rendered at least one year of

3

LABOR RELATIONS : CASE SET 10 (1ST HALF)service, whether such service is continuous or broken, shall be considered a regular employee with respect to the activity in which he is employed and his employment shall continue while such activity exists.”

Respondents were engaged by petitioner GMA Network, Inc. to perform the following activities: 1) manning of technical operations center; 2) acting as transmitter/VTR men; 3) acting as maintenance staff; 4) acting as cameramen.

These jobs and undertakings are clearly within the regular or usual business of the employer company and are not identifiably distinct or separate from the other undertakings of the company.

10 Pasas v. PNCC, July 3, 2013.

Pasos vs PNCC GR No. 192394 July 3, 2013

FACTS: Petitioner Roy D. Pasos started working for respondent PNCC on April 26, 1996. He worked on several projects for respondent as an accounting clerk. When he was assigned to the SM-Project, no date was specified as to when his employment would end but it was stated therein that it would be "co-terminus with the completion of the project." Said employment supposedly ended on August 19, 1999. However, that said employment was extended as petitioner was again appointed as an accounting clerk. It appeared that such extension would eventually end on October 19, 2000. Despite the termination of his employment on October 19, 2000, petitioner claimed that his superior instructed him to report for work the following day, intimating to him that he will again be employed for the succeeding SM projects. For purposes of reemployment, he then underwent a medical examination which allegedly revealed that he had pneumonitis. Petitioner was advised to take a 14-day sick leave. After serving his sick leave, petitioner claimed that he was again referred for medical examination where it was revealed that he contracted Koch’s disease. He was then required to take a 60-day leave of absence.

Petitioner claimed that after he presented his medical clearance to the Project Personnel Officer on even date, he was informed that his services were already terminated on October 19, 2000 and he was already replaced due to expiration of his contract. This prompted petitioner to file a complaint for illegal dismissal against PNCC with a prayer for reinstatement and back wages. The Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision in favor of petitioner. The Labor Arbiter ruled that petitioner attained regular employment status with the repeated hiring and rehiring of his services more so when the services he was made to render were usual and necessary to PNCC’s business.

Both PNCC and petitioner appealed the Labor Arbiter’s decision. PNCC insisted that petitioner was just a project employee and his termination was brought about by the completion of the contract and therefore he was not illegally dismissed. Petitioner, on the other hand, argued that his reinstatement should have been ordered by the Labor Arbiter. He also argued that the person who verified the appeal, Felix M. Erece, Jr., Personnel Services Department Head of PNCC, has no authority to file the same for and in behalf of PNCC.

ISSUE: W/N the head of the personnel department verification and certification on behalf of the corporation was valid sans any board resolution or secretary’s certificate authorizing such officer to do the same

HELD: Yes. It has been the constant holding of this Court in cases instituted by corporations that an individual corporate officer cannot exercise any corporate power pertaining to the corporation without authority from the board of directors pursuant to Section 23, in relation to Section 25 of the Corporation Code which clearly enunciates that all corporate powers are exercised, all business conducted, and all properties controlled by the board of directors. However, we have in many cases recognized the authority of some corporate officers to sign the verification and certification against forum-shopping.

We have held that the following officials or employees of the company can sign the verification and certification without need of a board resolution: (1) the Chairperson of the Board of Directors, (2) the President of a corporation, (3) the General Manager or Acting General Manager, (4) Personnel Officer, and (5) an Employment Specialist in a labor case. While the above cases do not provide a complete listing of authorized signatories to the verification and certification required by the rules, the determination of the sufficiency of the authority was done on a case to case basis. The rationale applied to justify the authority of corporate officers or representatives of the corporation to sign the verification or certificate against forum shopping, being "in a position to verify the truthfulness and correctness of the allegations in the petition." This Court recognizes the authority of Mr. Erece, Jr. to sign the verification and certification on behalf of PNCC sans a board resolution or secretary’s certificate.

11 Gapayao v. Fulo, June 13, 2013

JAIME N. GAPAYAO vs. ROSARIO FULO, SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM and SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION

G.R. No. 193493 June 13, 2013

4

LABOR RELATIONS : CASE SET 10 (1ST HALF)FACTS

Jaime Fulo died of "acute renal failure secondary to 1st degree burn 70% secondary electrocution" while doing repairs at the residence and business establishment of Gapayao. Gapayao extended some financial assistance to Rosario Fulo, the wife of the deceased and the latter executed an Affidavit of Desistance stating that she was not holding them liable for the death of her late husband.Thereafter, private respondent filed a claim for social security benefits with the Social Security System (SSS) Sorsogon Branch. However, upon verification and evaluation, it was discovered that the deceased was not a registered member of the SSS .Upon Rosario's insistence that her late husband had been employed by petitioner from January 1983 up to his untimely death on 4 November 1997, the SSS conducted a field investigation to clarify his status of employment. The findings revealed that Mr. Jaime Fulo was an employee of Jaime Gapayao as farm laborer from 1983 to 1997 and that Mr. Jaime Fulo receives compensation on a daily basis ranging from P5.00 to P60.00 from 1983 to 1997.As per interview, Mrs. Estela Gapayao contends that Jaime Fulo is an employee of Mr. & Mrs. Jaime Gapayao on an extra basis. the SSS demanded that petitioner remit the social security contributions of the deceased. Gapayao denied that the deceased was his employee but was rather an independent contractor whose tasks were not subject to his control and supervision. Assuming arguendo that the deceased was his employee, he was still not entitled to be paid his SSS premiums for the intervening period when he was not at work, as he was an "intermittent worker who was only summoned every now and then as the need arose." Hence, Gapayao insisted that he was under no obligation to report the former’s demise to the SSS for social security coverage.Rosario alleges that her late husband had been in the employ of petitioner for 14 years, from 1983 to 1997. During that period, he was made to work as a laborer in the agricultural landholdings, a harvester in the abaca plantation, and a repairman/utility worker in several business establishments owned by petitioner. The considerable length of time during which [the deceased] was given diverse tasks by Gapayao was a clear indication of the necessity and indispensability of her late husband’s services to Gapayao's business.

ISSUE: Whether or not there exists between the deceased Jaime Fulo and Gapayao an employer-employee relationship that would merit an award of benefits in favor of Rosario Fulo under social security laws.

DECISION: Yes. Farm workers may be considered regular seasonal employees. Farm workers generally fall under the definition of seasonal employees. Court held that seasonal employees may be considered as regular employees. Regular seasonal employees are those called to work from time to time. The nature of their relationship with the employer is such that during the off season, they are

temporarily laid off; but reemployed during the summer season or when their services may be needed. They are in regular employment because of the nature of their job,and not because of the length of time they have worked.The other tasks allegedly done by the deceased outside his usual farm work only bolster the existence of an employer-employee relationship. It only proves that even during the off season, the deceased was still in the employ of Gapayao. The most telling indicia of this relationship is the Compromise Agreement executed by Gapayao and Rosario. Gapayao entered into the agreement with full knowledge that he was described as the employer of the deceased.Pakyaw workers are considered employees for as long as their employers exercise control over them. In this case, Gapayao wielded control over the deceased in the discharge of his functions. The right of an employee to be covered by the Social Security Act is premised on the existence of an employer-employee relationship.73 That having been established, the Court ruled in favor of Rosario.

12 Millennium Erectors Corp. v. Magallanes, November 15, 2010

Millennium Erectors Corporation versus Magallanes

Nov 15, 2010

Facts:

Magallanes filed an illegal dismissal complaint because he was dismissed due to old age by Tiu, the CEO of respondent. Petitioner filed a position paper arguing that respondent was a project employee whom it hired for a building project in Libis on January 30 2003 to prove which submitted the employment contract signed by him; that on August 3 2004 respondent’s services were terminated as the project was nearing completion and he was given financial assistance in the amount of P2000 for which he signed a quitclaim and waiver.

The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of petitioner, holding that respondent knew of his status as project employee and that the project was completed. On appeal to the NLRC, it held that respondent was a regular employee and because of the payrolls, it is evident that respondent was employed for 16 years. And because he performed the same functions continuously for 16 years converted an otherwise casual employment to regular employment, hence his termination without just of authorized cause amounted to illegal dismissal.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied alleging that the MR which it treated as an appeal was not perfected, it having been belatedly filed. The CA affirmed the stance, on appeal by petitioner.

5

LABOR RELATIONS : CASE SET 10 (1ST HALF)Issue:

WON the dismissal of the Labor Arbiter has become final and executor because of failure of the requirements for the perfection of appeal.

Held:

NO, PETITION FAILS.

In labor cases, rules of procedure should not be applied in a very rigid and technical sense. They are merely tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, and where their strict application would result in the frustration rather than promotion of justice, technicalities must be avoided.

The requirement regarding verification of a pleading is formal, not jurisdictional. Such requirement is simply a condition affecting the form of pleading. The non-compliance of which does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. As for the requirement on proof of service, it may also be dispensed with since in appeals in labor case, non-service of copy of appeal or appeal memorandum to the adverse party is not a jurisdictional defect which calls for the dismissal of the appeal.

The repeated and continuing need for respondent’s services is sufficient evidence of the necessity, if not indispensability, of services to petitioner’s business and, as a regular employee, he could only be dismissed from employment for a just or authorized cause. PETITION DENIEDa

13 Caparoso et. al. v. CA, February 15, 2007

Caparaso vs. CA

Facts: Petitioners were dismissed from the service and subsequently filed illegal dismissal complaint. Respondents alleged that petitioners were both hired as deliverymen, initially for three months and then on a month-to-month basis and the termination from employment resulted from the expiration of their contracts of employment on 8 October 1999. Labor Arbiter - petitioners are regular employees of respondents NLRC- Reversed LA decision CA- affirmed the NLRC’s decision. The Court of Appeals held that respondents’ manpower requirement varies from month to month depending on the demand from their clients for their products. Respondents’ manpower requirement determines the period of their employees’ services. Respondents employed petitioners for the purpose of addressing a temporary manpower shortage.

Issue: Whether respondents are guilty of illegal dismissal.

Held: Petitioners were not Illegally Dismissed from Employment Petitioners’ terms of employment is governed by their fixed-term contracts. Petitioners’ fixed-term employment contracts had expired. They were not illegally dismissed from employment.

14 Spouses Lim v. Legaspi Hope Christian School et. al., March 31, 2009

SPOUSES ALWYN ONG LIM and EVELYN LUKANG LIM, LEGAZPI HOPE CHRISTIANSCHOOL/ RAMON SIA/ OMEGA SIA/ HELEN SIA/ CECILIO K. PEDRO,G.R. No. 172818 march 31,2009Facts:Petitioner-spouses Alwyn Ong Lim and Evelyn Lukang Lim were hired in June 1999. Alwyn was assigned to teach Mathematics subjects in the high school department of Legazpi Hope ChristianSchool. Evelyn, on the other hand, was assigned to teach Chinese Language and Chinese Math subjects in the same school.On April 4, 2002, respondent Helen Sia, head teacher of the schools Chinese department, verbally informed petitioners that their employment with the school were to be terminated, without giving the reasons therefor.Thus, petitioners filed their complaints for illegal dismissal and monetary claims against the school and its officials. respondent Ramon Sia, Vice Chairman of the schools Board of Directors, sent a letter to the petitioners stating that their three-year probation had expired and that the school management had decided to discontinue their employment.Before the Labor Arbiter, respondents claimed that petitioners were merely part-time teachers and thus they can be dismissed even without waiting for the three-year probation period to lapse, as they never acquired permanent status.The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of petitioners. The NLRC found that petitioners were only part-time teachers who did not acquire permanent status; hence, their dismissal was legal.

Issue:Whether the teachers are Full time teachers, making them regular employees, thus, dismissal is illegal.

Held:In University of Sto. Tomas v. NLRC,[23] we ruled that for a private school teacher to acquire permanent status in employment, the following requisites must concur: (1) the teacher is a full-time teacher; (2) the teacher must have rendered three consecutive years of service; and (3) such service must have been satisfactory.[24]

6

LABOR RELATIONS : CASE SET 10 (1ST HALF)The burden is on petitioners to prove their affirmative allegation that they are permanent teaching personnel. However, there is not enough evidence on record to show that their total working day is devoted to the school. There is no showing of what the regular work schedule of a regular teacher in respondent school is. What is clear in the records is that Evelyn and Alwyn spent two hours and four hours, respectively, but not the entire working day, at the respondent school. They do not meet requirement c of Section 45 of the Manual. Hence, we sustain the findings of the Court of Appeals that the petitioners are part-time teachers. Being part-time teachers, in accordance with University of Sto. Tomas v. NLRC, they cannot acquire permanent status.

In this case, the contracts of employment of the petitioners were not presented.It is in fact claimed that they have no written contracts, and such contracts are not disclosed by the records in the instant case. However on record, attached as part of a pleading of petitioners, is a copy of the TEACHERS GUIDELINES[25] of respondent school which, in part, state:STATUS & PRIVILEGES OF TEACHERS1. New Teachersa. New Teachers are on probation for three (3) years, within the duration, they must submit a letter of re-application for each school year. After the expiration date of the contract, a new one must be signed if it is sent to you.b. A full time new teacher is under 10-month contract only. If his/her performance is satisfactory, he/she will be rehired and will be entitled to receive the salaries for the 2-month summer vacation. (Emphasis supplied.)x x x xConsidering that petitioners were new teachers, then in accordance with the above-quoted guidelines their unwritten contracts were considered to be for one school year at a time, they being required to submit a letter of re-application for each school year. After the end of each school year, the school did not have any obligation to give them any teaching loads, they being part-time teachers.[26] That respondents did not give any teaching assignment to the petitioners after the school year 2001-2002 did not amount to an actionable violation of petitioners right. It did not amount to illegal dismissal.

15 DM Consunji v. Gobres et. al, August 8, 2010

D.M. Consunji, Inc. v. Antonio Gobres, Magellan Dalisay, Godofredo Paragsa, Emilio Aleta and Generoso Melo

G.R. No. 169170, August 8, 2010

FACTS:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals.

Respondents Antonio Gobres, Magellan Dalisay, Godoffredo Paragsa, Emilio Aleta and Generoso Melo worked as carpenters in the construction projects of petitioner D.M. Consunji, Inc., a construction company, on several occasions and/or at various times. Their termination from employment for each project was reported to the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), in accordance with the Policy Instruction o. 20, which was later superseded by Department Order No. 19 series of 1993. Respondent’s last assignment was at Quad 4 Project in Glorietta, Ayala, Makati. On October 14, 1998, respondents were included in Notice of Termination posted on the bulletin board at the project premises.

Respondents filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal, and non-payment of 13th month pay, five (5) days service incentive leave pay, damages and attorney’s fees against D.M. Consunji and David M. Consunji with the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC.

D.M. Consunji, Inc. and David M. Consunji countered the respondents, being project employees, are covered by Policy Instruction No. 20, as superseded by Department Order No. 19, series of 1993 with respect to their separation or dismissal. Respondents were employed per project undertaken by petitioner and within varying estimated periods indicated in their respective project employment contracts. Citing the employment record of each respondent, petitioners averred that respondents were terminated when their phases of work for which their services were engaged were completed or when their projects themselves were completed. Respondents notices of termination were filed with the DOLE, in compliance with Policy Instruction No. 20, superseded by department Order No. 19, series of 1993. With respect to Melo, D.M. Consunji maintained the same positions they had against the respondents. The company contended that since respondents were terminated by reason of completion of their respective phases of work in the construction project, their termination was warranted and legal.

Petitioner also claimed that respondents have been duly paid their service incentive pay leave and 13th month pay through their respective bank accounts, as evidenced by bank remittances.

Respondents replied that the quad 4 Project was estimated to take two years to finish but they were dismissed within the two-year period without prior notice of termination. Hence, granting that they were project employees, they were still illegally dismissed for non-observance of procedural due process.

7

LABOR RELATIONS : CASE SET 10 (1ST HALF)The Labor arbiter rendered its Decision dismissing the complaint. They found that respondents were project employees and D.M. Consunji had complied with the requirements of the law.

NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter and dismissed the appeal for lack of merit.

Respondents filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. Respondents prayed that their dismissal be declared as illegal and that they be ordered reinstatement to their former position with full backwages until actual reinstatement and awarded moral, exemplary and nominal damages.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC with the modification that respondent are ordered to pay each of the petitioners the sum of P20,000.00 as nominal damages for non-compliance with the statutory due process.

The Court of Appeals stated that although respondents were project employees, they were entitled to know the reason for their dismissal and be heard on whatever claims they might have. It cited Agabon v. NLRC,13 which held that where the dismissal is for a just cause, the lack of statutory due process should not nullify the dismissal, or render it illegal, or ineffectual, but the employer should indemnify the employee for the violation of his statutory rights by paying nominal damages.

Petitioners filed a partial motion for reconsideration and prayed that the Decision of the Court of Appeals be partially reconsidered by deleting the award of nominal damages. They pointed out that under Department Order NO. 19 series of 1993, there is no provision requiring administrative hearing/investigation before a project employee may be terminated on account of completion or phase of work or the project itself. They also argued that prior notice of termination is not required in this case. And the Agabon case is not applicable in their case.

The Court of Appeals denied the partial motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS BASIS FOR THE COURT OF APPEALS IN ORDERING HEREIN PETITIONER TO PAY RESPONDENTS EACH OF THE SUM OF P20,000.00 AS NOMINAL DAMGES FOR ALLEGED NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE STATUTORY DUE PROCESS.

HELD:

The Court ruled that the petition is meritorious.

A project employee is defined under Article 280 of the Labor Code as one whose "employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season.”

In this case, the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC and the Court of Appeals all found that respondents, as project employees, were validly terminated due to the completion of the phases of work for which their services were engaged. However, the Court of Appeals held that respondents were entitled to nominal damages, because petitioner failed to give them advance notice of their termination. The appellate court cited the case of Agabon v. NLRC as basis for the award of nominal damages.

Unlike in Agabon, respondents, in this case, were not terminated for just cause under Article 282 of the Labor Code. Dismissal based on just causes contemplates acts or omissions attributable to the employee.23 Instead, respondents were terminated due to the completion of the phases of work for which their services were engaged.

Under Section 1 (c ) of Rule XXIII, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, “In cases of project employment or employment covered by legitimate contracting or sub-contracting arrangements, no employee shall be dismissed prior to the completion of the project or phase thereof for which the employee was engaged, or prior to the expiration of the contract between the principal and contractor, unless the dismissal is for just or authorized cause subject to the requirements of due process or prior notice, or is brought about by the completion of the phase of the project or contract for which the employee was engaged.”

Records show that respondents were dismissed after the expiration of their respective project employment contracts, and due to the completion of the phases of work respondents were engaged for. Hence, the requirement of due process or prior notice when an employee is dismissed for just or authorized cause under Arts. 282 and 283 is not required.

Further, Section 2 (III), Rule XXIII of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code provides that “If termination is brought about by the completion of the contract or phase thereof, no prior notice is required.”

Hence, prior or advance notice of termination is not part of procedural due process if the termination is brought about by the completion of the contract or phase thereof for which the employee was engaged. Petitioner, therefore, did not violate any requirement of procedural due process by failing to give respondents advance

8

LABOR RELATIONS : CASE SET 10 (1ST HALF)notice of their termination; thus, there is no basis for the payment of nominal damages.

16 Mercado et. al. v. Ama Computer College, April 13, 2010

Yolanda Mercado. vs. AMA Computer College-Paranaque City, Inc., G. R. No. 183572, April 13, 2010

Probationary Status and Fixed-term Employment of Teachers

FACTS:Yolanda Mercado, Charito de Leon, Diana Lachica, Margarito Alba and Felix Tonog (the petitioners-teachers) were faculty members who started teaching at AMACC on May 1998. They executed individual Teacher’s Contracts for each of the trimesters that they were engaged to teach, with the following common stipulation:

POSITION. The TEACHER has agreed to accept a non-tenured appointment to work in the College of xxx effective xxx to xxx or for the duration of the last term that the TEACHER is given a teaching load based on the assignment duly approved by the DEAN/SAVP-COO.For the school year 2000-2001, AMACC implemented new faculty screening guidelines wherein teachers were to be hired or maintained based on extensive teaching experience, capability, potential, high academic qualifications and research background. The performance standards under the new screening guidelines were also used to determine the present faculty members’ entitlement to salary increases.

Petitioners-teachers failed to obtain a passing rating based on the performance standards; hence AMACC did not give them any salary increase.

Because of AMACC’s action on the salary increases, the petitioners-teachers filed a complaint with the Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) on July 2000 for underpayment of wages, non-payment of overtime and overload compensation, 13th month pay, and for discriminatory practices.On September 2000, the petitioners-teachers individually received a memorandum from AMACC informing them that with the expiration of their contract to teach, their contract would no longer be renewed.

Petitioners-teachers amended their labor arbitration complaint to include the charge of illegal dismissal against AMACC. Petitioners-teachers claimed that their dismissal was illegal because it was made in retaliation for their complaint for monetary benefits and discriminatory practices against AMACC.

In response, AMACC contended that the petitioners-teachers worked under a contracted term under a non-tenured appointment and were still within the three-year probationary period for teachers. Their contracts were not renewed for the following term because they failed to pass the Performance Appraisal System for Teachers (PAST). This move was justified according to AMACC since the school has to maintain its high academic standards.

Ruling of the Labor Arbiter and NLRC:The Labor Arbiter declared that the petitioners-teachers had been illegally dismissed and ordered AMACC to reinstate them to their former positions without loss of seniority rights and to pay them full backwages, attorney’s fees and 13th month pay.The NLRC denied AMACC’s appeal for lack of merit and affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s ruling.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals (CA):Upon appeal of AMACC before the CA, the CA granted AMACC’s petition and dismissed petitioners-teachers’ complaint for illegal dismissal.

The CA ruled that under the Manual for Regulation for Private Schools, the petitioners-teachers were still within their probationary period since their teaching stints only covered a period of two (2) years and three (3) months when AMACC decided not to renew their contracts on September 2000. To the CA, the petitioners-teachers were not actually dismissed; their respective contracts merely expired and were no longer renewed by AMACC because they failed to satisfy the school’s standards for the school year 2000-2001 that measured their fitness and aptitude.

Petitioners-teachers filed a petition before the Supreme Court questioning the decision of the CA.

ISSUE:Whether or not the teacher’s probationary status be disregarded simply

because the contracts were fixed term?

HELD:The Supreme Court granted the petition of the petitioners-teachers.

The existence of the term-to-term contracts covering the petitioners-teachers’ employment is not disputed, nor it is disputed that they were on probationary status from the time they were employed on May 1998 and until the expiration of their teaching contracts on September 2000

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LABOR RELATIONS : CASE SET 10 (1ST HALF)The school apparently utilizes its fixed-term contracts as a convenient arrangement dictated by the trimestral system and not because the parties really intended to limit the period of their relationship to any fixed term and to finish this relationship at the end of that term. While nothing is illegitimate in defining the school-teacher relationship in this manner, the school, however, cannot forget that its system of fixed-term contract is a system that operates during the probationary period and for this reason, it is subject to the terms of Article 281 of the Labor Code, which requires that the services of an employee who has been engaged on a probationary basis may be terminated for a just cause or when he fails to qualify as a regular employee. Unless this reconciliation is made, the requirement of Article of 281 of the Labor Code on probationary status would be fully negated as the school may freely choose not to renew contracts simply because their terms have expired.

If the school were to apply the probationary standards (as in fact it says it did in the present case), these standards must not only be reasonable but must have also been communicated to the teachers at the start of the probationary period, or at the very least, at the start of the period when they were to be applied. While AMACC claimed that the petitioners-teachers failed to pass the PAST and other requirements for regularization, the exact terms of the standards were never introduced as evidence; neither does the evidence show how these standards were applied to petitioners-teachers

Inevitably, the termination of employment of employees on probationary status lacks the supporting finding of just cause that the law requires and, hence, illegal.

17 Brent School v. Zamora 18 Pure Foods Corporation v. NLRC December 12, 1997

Brent School Inc. vs. Zamora

Facts:Alegre was hired as an athletic director by petitioner school. Their contract fixed a term of 5 years for his employment. Three months before the expiration of the contract, petitioner school terminated the employment of Alegre on the ground of completion of contract. The latter also accepted the full payment of his services and signed a receipt therefor. However, Alegre protested against his termination and contended that he acquired the status of a regular employee and could not be removed except for a valid cause. The Regional Director ruled in favor of Alegre and ordered the latter’s reinstatement as a permanent employee. The secretary of labor sustained the decision of the regional director. The former ruled that alegre is a permanent employee who could not be dismissed except for a just cause and expiration of the contract was not one of the just cause provided in the labor code.

Issue:Whether or not the expiration of the contract of employment is a just cause for the termination of Alegre?

Held:Yes. The employment contract between Brent School and Alegre was executed at a time when the Labor Code of the Philippines had not yet been promulgated. At the time, there was no doubt whatever about the validity of term employment. It was clearly recognized by the Termination Pay Law, R.A. 1052, as amended by R.A. 1787. When the employment contract was signed between Brent School and Alegre, it was perfectly legitimate for them to include in it a stipulation fixing the duration thereof.

Alegre’s employment was terminated upon the expiration of his last contract with Brent School without the necessity of a notice. The advance written advice given the Department of Labor with copy to said petitioner was a mere reminder of the impending expiration of his contract, not a letter of termination, nor an application for clearance to terminate which needed the approval of the Department of Labor to make the termination of his services effective.

18 Pure Foods Corporation v. NLRC December 12, 1997

Pure Foods Corporation v. NLRC

Facts:

Private respondents were hired by petitioner Pure Foods Corporation to work for a fixed period of five months at its tuna cannery plant in Tambler, General Santos City. After the expiration of their respective contracts of employment in June and July 1991, their services were terminated. They forthwith executed a “release and Quitclam’ stating thay they had no claim whatsoever against the petitioner. Private respondent file a complaint for Illegal dismissal against the petitioner and its plant manager, Marciano Aganon.

Labor arbiter dismissed the complaint on the ground that the private respondents were mere contractual workers, and not regular employees; hence, they could not avail of the law on security of tenure. The termination of their services by reason of the expiration of their contracts of employment was, therefore, justified. NLRC ruled that the private respondents and their co-complainants were regular employees. It declared that the contract of employment for five months was a “clandestine scheme employed by the petitioner to stifle

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LABOR RELATIONS : CASE SET 10 (1ST HALF)private respondents’ right to security of tenure” and should therefore be struck down and disregarded for being contrary to law, public policy and morals. The office of the Solicitor General advances the argument that the private respondents were regular employees, since they performed activities necessary and desirable in the business or trade of the petitioner. The period of employment was null and void for being contrary to law and public policy, as its purpose was to circumvent the law on security of tenure.

Issue:

Whether or not employees hired for a definite period and whose services are necessary and desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer are regular employees?

Held:

The five-month period specified in private respondents’ employment contracts having been imposed precisely to circumvent the constitutional guarantee on security of tenure should, therefore, be struck down or disregarded as contrary to public policy or morals. To uphold the contractual arrangement would in effect, permit the former to avoid hiring permanent or regular employees by simply hiring them on a temporary or casual basis, thereby violating the employees’ security of tenure in their jobs.

The execution by the private respondents of a “Release and Quitclaim” did not preclude them from questioning the termination of their services. Generally, quitclaims by laborers are frowned upon as contrary to public policy and are held to be ineffective to bar recovery for the full measure of the workers’ rights. The reason for the rule is that the employer and the employee do not stand on the same footing. The NLRC was, thus, correct in finding that the private respondents were regular employees and that they were regular employees and that they were illegally dismissed from their jobs. The legal consequence of illegal dismissal is reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges, with full back wages computed from the time dismissal up to the time of actual reinstatement, without deducting the earnings derived elsewhere pending the resolution of the case.

Art. 281

1. Tamson’s Enterprises Inc.et. al. v. CA, March 16, 2011

TAMSONS ENTERPRISES, INC. v. COURT OF APPEALSG.R. No. 192881November 16, 2011

DOCTRINE: Probationary employees may only be terminated for a just cause or when they otherwise fail to qualify as regular employees in accordance with reasonable standards made known to them by the employer at the time of their engagement.

FACTS:Private respondent was hired by petitioner as Assistant to the President. Four days before she completed her sixth month of working for petitioner, she informed that her services would be terminated due to inefficiency. Private respondent claimed that the remarks of her superiors about her alleged inefficiency were ill-motivated and made without any basis. Petitioners asserted her work performance was monitored and evaluated and she failed to meet the company's standards. Private respondent filed a case for illegal dismissal.

LA - rendered a decision in favor of respondent, stating that a termination, notwithstanding the probationary status, must be for a just cause.NLRC - reversed the LAs finding: reasoned out that failure to qualify for regular employment is in itself a just cause for termination of probationary employment.CA - reversed the NLRC decision.

ISSUE: Whether the termination of private respondent, a probationary employee, was valid or not. [NOT VALID]

HELD: Even if probationary employees do not enjoy permanent status, they are accorded the constitutional protection of security of tenure. Pursuant to Art 281, they may only be terminated for a just cause or when they otherwise fail to qualify as regular employees in accordance with reasonable standards made known to them by the employer at the time of their engagement. One of the conditions before an employer can terminate a probationary employee is dissatisfaction on the part of the employer which must be real and in good faith, not feigned so as to circumvent the contract or the law. Here, absent any proof showing that the work performance of private respondent was unsatisfactory, SC cannot conclude that she failed to meet the standards.

The law is clear that in all cases of probationary employment, the employer shall make known to the employee the standards under which he will qualify as a regular employee at the time of his engagement. Where no standards are made known to the employee at that time, he shall be deemed a regular employee. The standards under which she would qualify as a regular employee not having been

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LABOR RELATIONS : CASE SET 10 (1ST HALF)communicated to her at the start of her probationary period, private respondent qualified as a regular employee.

2. Hacienda Primera Development Corporation v. Villegas, April 11, 2011

G. R. No. 186243 April 11, 2011Hacienda Primera Development Corporation and Anna Katrina E. Hernandez, Petitioner Vs Michael S. Villegas, RespondentFACTS

Petitioner Hacienda hired respondent Michael S. Villegas as General Manager of Amorita Resort; he was hired as a probationary employee for three (3) months. Respondent started working for petitioner on January 1, 2007. On March 14, 2007, he received a call from Paramount Consultancy and Management telling him to report back to Manila. There, he learned that his services were terminated. He, thus, asked for a written notice of termination, but did not receive any. Petitioner explained that respondent’s services were terminated because he failed to qualify for regular employment. Specifically, it claimed that respondent failed to conceptualize and complete financial budgets, sales projection, room rates, website development, and marketing plan in coordination with the Sales and Marketing Manager. He, thus, asked for a written notice of termination, but did not receive any. Hence, the complaint for illegal dismissal.

LA

Rendered a decision in favor of respondent, he was illegally dismissed.

NLRC

The instant appeal is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The charge of illegal dismissal is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

CA

CA set aside the NLRC decision and reinstated that of the LA. REINSTATED with the MODIFICATION that since reinstatement is no longer possible due to strained relations between the parties, a separation pay of one month for every year of service is ordered.

ISSUES

WON the respondent was a probationary employee or a regular employee at the time of his dismissal.

HELD

A probationary employee or probationer is one who is on trial for an employer, during which the latter determines whether or not he is qualified for permanent employment. The probationary employment is intended to afford the employer an opportunity to observe the fitness of a probationary employee while at work, and to ascertain whether he will become an efficient and productive employee. While the employer observes the fitness, propriety and efficiency of a probationer to ascertain whether he is qualified for permanent employment, the probationer, on the other hand, seeks to prove to the employer that he has the qualifications to meet the reasonable standards for permanent employment. It can be gleaned from the foregoing provisions of law and jurisprudential pronouncement that there are two grounds to legally terminate a probationary employee. It may be done either: a) for a just cause; or b) when the employee fails to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with reasonable standards made known by the employer to the employee at the start of the employment.

Petitioner Hacienda fails to specify the reasonable standards by which respondents alleged poor performance was evaluated, much less to prove that such standards were made known to him at the start of his employment. Thus, he is deemed to have been hired from day one as a regular employee. Due process dictates that an employee be apprised beforehand of the condition of his employment and of the terms of advancement therein.

3. Universidad De Sta. Isabel v. Sambajon, April 2, 2014

UNIVERSIDAD DE STA. ISABEL vs. MARVIN-JULIAN L. SAMBAJON, JRG.R. Nos. 196280 & 196286 April 2, 2014

FACTS:Universidad de Sta. Isabel (petitioner) is a non-stock, non-profit religious educational institution in Naga City. Petitioner hired Marvin-Julian L. Sambajon, Jr. (respondent) as a full-time college faculty member with the rank of Assistant Professor on probationary status, as evidenced by an Appointment Contract dated November 1, 2002, effective November 1, 2002 up to March 30, 2003. After the aforesaid contract expired, petitioner continued to give teaching loads to respondent who remained a full-time faculty member of the Department of Religious Education for the two semesters. He was likewise re-ranked from Assistant Professor to Associate Professor. He argued that his salary increase should be made effective as of June 2003 and demanded the payment of his salary differential. The petitioner replied that "Re-ranking is done every two years, hence the personnel hold their present rank for two years. Those undergoing probationary period and those on part-time basis of employment are not covered by this provision.", hence respondent is not entitled. On February 26, 2005, respondent

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LABOR RELATIONS : CASE SET 10 (1ST HALF)received his letter of termination. He filed for illegal dismissal against petitioner. Labor Arbiter Jesus Orlando M. Quinones ruled that there was no just or authorized cause in the termination of respondent’s probationary employment. Consequently, petitioner was found liable for illegal dismissal.Petitioner filed in NLRC for alleging grave abuse of discretion committed by the Labor Arbiter in ruling on a cause of action/issue not raised by the complainant in his position paper. NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter. CA sustained the conclusion of the NLRC that respondent had already acquired permanent status when he was allowed to continue teaching after the expiration of his first appointment-contract on March 30, 2003. However, the CA found it necessary to modify the decision of the NLRC to include the award of back wages to respondent.

ISSUE: Whether or not Sambajon is a permanent teacher and entitled to his differentials.

HELD: Yes. Basing on ART. 281. Probationary Employment.–Probationary employment shall not exceed six (6) months from the date the employee started working, unless it is covered by an apprenticeship agreement stipulating a longer period. The services of an employee who has been engaged on a probationary basis may be terminated for a just cause or when he fails to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with reasonable standards made known by the employer to the employee at the time of his engagement. An employee who is allowed to work after a probationary period shall be considered a regular employee. Also, the jurisprudence provides that notwithstanding the limited engagement of probationary employees, they are entitled to constitutional protection of security of tenure during and before the end of the probationary period. The services of an employee who has been engaged on probationary basis may be terminated for any of the following: (a) a just or (b) an authorized cause; and (c) when he fails to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with reasonable standards prescribed by the employer. In the case at bar, Sambajon was illegally dismissed. The Supreme Court held that Universidad de Sta. Isabel is directed to pay Sambajon, Jr. back wages corresponding to his full monthly salaries for one semester (1st semester of SY 2005-2006) and pro-rated 13th month pay.

4. Univac Development v. Soriano, June 19, 2013.

UNIVAC DEVELOPMENT, INC., vs Soriano June 19, 2013 G.R. No. 182072

Facts:. Respondent was hired on August 23, 2004 by petitioner on probationary basis as legal assistant of the company. On February 15, 2005, or eight (8) days prior to the completion of his six months probationary period, Castro allegedly

informed him that he was being terminated from employment due to the company’s cost-cutting measures. He allegedly asked for a thirty-day notice but his termination was ordered to be effective immediately. Thus, he was left with no choice but to leave the company. A Complaint for Illegal Dismissal was filed by respondent against petitioner.

(Petitioner denied the allegations of respondent and said that respondent was informed of the standards required for regularization. Respondent allegedly expressed his intention to leave the company because he wanted to review for the bar examinations and that he was informed of his unsatisfactory performance in the company. Respondent did not report for work on February 16, 2005. Thus, he in fact abandoned his job by his failure to report for work.)--- for recit purposes.

LA: Dismissed. No illegal dismissal. He was informed of his unsatisfactory performance and as a law graduate, he is presumed to know that his probationary employment would end. However, he was entitled to eight days backwages.

NLRC: affirmed the LA decision in its entirety. He was presumed to know prior to employment the reasonable standards required for regularization. Petitioner was found to have validly exercised management prerogative.

CA: There is illegal dismissal. Petitioner failed to apprise respondent of the standards required for regularization, coupled with the fact that it failed to make an evaluation of his performance, making his dismissal illegal. Petitioner failed to show proof that respondent’s performance was poor and unsatisfactory constituting a just cause for termination and that he was not informed of the standards required for regularization.

Issue: W/N respondent was illegally dismissed.

Held: Yes. There is illegal dismissal. In order to invoke "failure to meet the probationary standards" as a justification for dismissal, the employer must show how these standards have been applied to the subject employee. No performance evaluation was conducted to prove that his performance was indeed unsatisfactory.

The power of the employer to terminate a probationary employee is subject to three limitations, namely: (1) it must be exercised in accordance with the specific requirements of the contract;

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LABOR RELATIONS : CASE SET 10 (1ST HALF)(2) the dissatisfaction on the part of the employer must be real and in good faith, not feigned so as to circumvent the contract or the law; and (3) there must be no unlawful discrimination in the dismissal.

Petitioner’s failure to specify the reasonable standards by which respondent’s alleged poor performance was evaluated as well as to prove that such standards were made known to him at the start of his employment, makes respondent a regular employee.

Respondent’s termination from employment is without just and valid ground. Neither was due process observed, making his termination illegal. He is entitled to the twin relief of reinstatement and backwages granted under the Labor Code. Due to strained relations, separation pay should be awarded in lieu of reinstatement.

________________________________________________________________

(in relation to Art. 281:

LABOR CODE, Implementing Rules of Book VI, Rule I, Section 6

Probationary employment shall be governed by the following rules:

(c) The services of an employee who has been engaged on probationary basis may be terminated only for a just or authorized cause, when he fails to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with the reasonable standards prescribed by the employer.

(d) In all cases of probationary employment, the employer shall make known to the employee the standards under which he will qualify as a regular employee at the time of his engagement. Where no standards are made known to the employee at that time, he shall be deemed a regular employee.)

5. Abbott Laboratories v. Alcaraz, July 23, 2013.

ABBOTT LABORATORIES, ET AL. V PEARLIE ANN F. ALCARAZG.R. NO. 192571 JULY 23, 2013

FACTS:The respondent Alcaraz was the Regulatory Affairs and Information Manager of Aventis Pasteur Philippines who showed interest in applying as a Medical and

Regulatory Affairs Manager, a position that was published by the petitioner Abbot Laboratories in the newspaper. When the petitioner formally offered the position to the respondent, the latter accepted the position. It was on May 23, 2005 that Walsh, Almazar and Bernardo formally handed to the respondent a letter terminating her employment with the detailed explanation for her termination. The respondent then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with damages against the petitioner and its officers. The Labor Arbiter upheld the termination of probationary employment of the respondent holding that the termination was justified with no evidence showing that the officers of the Abbot Lab acted in bad faith when terminating her services.The NLRC annulled and set aside the ruling of the Labor Arbiter which prompted the petitioners to file before the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction. Meanwhile, the action of the petitioner on its motion for reconsideration of the CA’s resolution in the second CA petition was denied that became final on January 10, 2011 because the petitioner failed to file a timely appeal on the said decision.

ISSUE/S:Whether Alcaraz was validly terminated from her employment.

HELD/RULING: Yes. A probationary employee, like a regular employee, enjoys security of

tenure. However, in cases of probationary employment, aside from just or authorized causes of termination, an additional ground is provided under Art. 295 of the Labor Code. A different procedure is applied when terminating a probationary employee; the usual two-notice rule does not govern. Section 2, Rule I, Book VI of the Implementing Rules of the Labor Code states that “if the termination is brought about by the failure of an employee to meet the standards of the employer in case of probationary employment, it shall be a sufficient that a written notice is served the employee, within a reasonable time from the effective date of termination.”

As the records show, Alcaraz’s dismissal was effected through a letter dated May 19, 2005 which she received on May 23, 2005 and again on May 27, 2005. Stated therein was the reasons for her termination, i.e., that after proper evaluation, Abbott determined that she failed to meet the reasonable standards for her regularization considering her lack of time and people management and decision-making skills, which are necessary in the performance of her functions as Regulatory Affairs Manager. Undeniably, this written notice sufficiently meets the criteria set forth above, thereby legitimizing the cause and manner of Alcaraz’s dismissal as a probationary employee under the parameters set by the Labor Code.

6. Colegio de Santisimo Rosario v. Rojo, September 4, 2013.

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LABOR RELATIONS : CASE SET 10 (1ST HALF)GR. No. 170388 September 4, 2013COLEGIO DEL SANTISIMO ROSARIO AND SR. ZENAIDA S. MOFADA, OP, PETITIONERS, vs.EMMANUEL ROJO,* RESPONDENT.Facts:

Colegio del Santisimo Rosario (CSR) hired respondent as a high school teacher on probationary basis for the school years 1992-1993, 1993-1994 and 1994-1995. CSR, through petitioner Sr. Zenaida S. Mofada, OP (Mofada), decided not to renew respondent’s services. Thus, respondent filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal. He alleged that since he had served three consecutive school years which is the maximum number of terms allowed for probationary employment, he should be extended permanent employment. Citing paragraph 75 of the 1970 Manual of Regulations for Private Schools (1970 Manual), respondent asserted that "full- time teachers who have rendered three (3) consecutive years of satisfactory services shall be considered permanent." petitioners argued that respondent knew that his Teacher’s Contract for school year 1994-1995 with CSR would expire on March 31, 1995. Accordingly, respondent was not dismissed but his probationary contract merely expired and was not renewed. Petitioners also claimed that the "three years" mentioned in paragraph 75 of the 1970 Manual refer to "36 months," not three school years. And since respondent served for only three school years of 10 months each or 30 months, then he had not yet served the "three years" or 36 months mentioned in paragraph 75 of the 1970 Manual.

Labor ARbiter:

Rojo is a Regular employee. The LA ruled that "three school years" means three years of 10 months, not 12 months. Considering that respondent had already served for three consecutive school years, then he has already attained regular employment status. Thus, the non-renewal of his contract for school year 1995-1996 constitutes illegal dismissal.

NLRC:

Affirmed the LA’s Decision with modification. It held that after serving three school years, respondent had attained the status of regular employment especially because CSR did not make known to respondent the reasonable standards he should meet.

Court of Appeals:

Affirmed LA and NLRC decisions. Rojo has attained the status of a regular employee after he was employed for three consecutive school years as a full-time teacher and had served CSR satisfactorily.

Issue:

Whether or not Rojo has obtained a status of a regular employee upon the completion of a 3-year probationary period.

Held:

Rojo is a regular employee. Supreme Court ruled that cases dealing with employment on probationary status of teaching personnel are not governed solely by the Labor Code as the law is supplemented, with respect to the period of probation, by special rules found in the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools (the Manual). With regard to the probationary period, Section 92 of the 1992 Manual provides:

Section 92. Probationary Period. – Subject in all instances to compliance with the Department and school requirements, the probationary period for academic personnel shall not be more than three (3) consecutive years of satisfactory service for those in the elementary and secondary levels, six (6) consecutive regular semesters of satisfactory service for those in the tertiary level, and nine (9) consecutive trimesters of satisfactory service for those in the tertiary level where collegiate courses are offered on a trimester basis. (Emphasis supplied)

In this case, petitioners’ teachers who were on probationary employment were made to enter into a contract effective for one school year. Thereafter, it may be renewed for another school year, and the probationary employment continues. At the end of the second fixed period of probationary employment, the contract may again be renewed for the last time.

That teachers on probationary employment also enjoy the protection afforded by Article 281 of the Labor Code is supported by Section 93 of the 1992 Manual which provides:

Sec. 93. Regular or Permanent Status. - Those who have served the probationary period shall be made regular or permanent. Full-time teachers who have satisfactorily completed their probationary period shall be considered regular or permanent. (Emphasis supplied)

The above provision clearly provides that full-time teachers become regular or permanent employees once they have satisfactorily completed the probationary period of three school years.The use of the term satisfactorily necessarily connotes the requirement for schools to set reasonable standards to be followed by teachers on probationary employment.

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LABOR RELATIONS : CASE SET 10 (1ST HALF)Citing Cagayan Capitol College v. National Labor Relations Commission, it held that respondent has satisfied all the requirements necessary to acquire permanent employment and security of tenure viz:

1. The teacher is a full-time teacher;

2. The teacher must have rendered three (3) consecutive years of service; and

3. Such service must be satisfactory.

Rojo has attained the status of a regular employee after he was employed for three consecutive school years as a full-time teacher and had served CSR satisfactorily. Aside from being a high school teacher, he was also the Prefect of Discipline, a task entailing much responsibility. The only reason given by Mofada for not renewing respondent’s contract was the alleged expiration of the contract, not any unsatisfactory service. Also, there was no showing that CSR set performance standards for the employment of respondent, which could be the basis of his satisfactory or unsatisfactory performance. Hence, there being no reasonable standards made known to him at the time of his engagement, respondent was deemed a regular employee and was, thus, declared illegally dismissed when his contract was not renewed.

7. Tamson’s Enterprises Inc.et. al. v. CA, March 16, 2011 (repeated case) 8. Hacienda Primera Development Corporation v. Villegas, April 11, 2011

HACIENDA PRIMERA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and ANNA KATRINA E. HERNANDEZ,Petitioners, - versus - MICHAEL S. VILLEGAS, Respondent

FACTS: Petitioner Hacienda hired respondent Michael S. Villegas as General Manager of Amorita Resort. He was hired as a probationary employee for three (3) months. The employment contract contained the following terms and conditions:

1. Salary of P60,000.00 net per month for the first three (3) months and upon his regularization, P70,000.00 net per month.

2. Six (6) round trip tickets (TAG-MLA-TAG) per annum.3. P2,500.00 cell phone bill allowance.4. Fifteen (15) days vacation leave and fifteen (15) days sick leave

upon permanency.5. Pro-rated 13th month pay starting December 2006.6. A 3-month probationary period starting January 200[7].7. Board and lodging in the resort.

8. Medical Insurance. Respondent started working for petitioner on January 1, 2007. On March

14, 2007, he received a call from Paramount Consultancy and Management telling him to report back to Manila. There, he learned that his services were terminated. He, thus, asked for a written notice of termination, but did not receive any. Hence, the complaint for illegal dismissal. Petitioner Hacienda, on the other hand, stated that respondent was hired as probationary employee. It explained that respondents services were terminated because he failed to qualify for regular employment. It claimed that respondent failed to conceptualize and complete financial budgets, sales projection, room rates, website development, and marketing plan in coordination with the Sales and Marketing Manager.

LA: Labor Arbiter in favor of respondent. Illegally dismissed.

NLRC: National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) partially granted the appeal. Not illegally dismissed.

CA: set aside the above NLRC decision and reinstated that of the LA.

ISSUE: WON RESPONDENT IS ILLEGALLY DISMISSED AS A PROBATIONARY EMPLOYEE

HELD: YES. There are two grounds to legally terminate a probationary employee. It may be done either: a) for a just cause; or b) when the employee fails to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with reasonable standards made known by the employer to the employee at the start of the employment.

In this case, petitioner Hacienda fails to specify the reasonable standards

by which respondents alleged poor performance was evaluated, much less to prove that such standards were made known to him at the start of his employment. Thus, he is deemed to have been hired from day one as a regular employee. Due process dictates that an employee be apprised beforehand of the condition of his employment and of the terms of advancement therein.

9. Aililing v. World Express Corp. April 25, 2012( repeated case) 10. Phil. Daily Inquirer v. Magtibay, July 24, 2007

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LABOR RELATIONS : CASE SET 10 (1ST HALF)PHIL. DAILY INQUIRER VS MAGTIBAY

Facts: PDI hired Magtibay, on contractual basis, to assist, for a period of five months from February 17, 1995, the regular phone operator. Before the expiration of Magtibays contractual employment, he and PDI agreed to a fifteen-day contract extension, or from July 17, 1995 up to July 31, 1995, under the same conditions as the existing contract.After the expiration of Magtibays contractual employment, as extended, PDI announced the creation and availability of a new position for a second telephone operator who would undergo probationary employment. Apparently, it was PDIs policy to accord regular employees preference for new vacancies in the company. Thus, Ms. Regina M. Layague, a PDI employee and member of respondent PDI Employees Union (PDIEU), filed but later withdrew paving the way for Magtibay.After the usual interview for the second telephone operator slot, PDI chose to hire Magtibay on a probationary basis for a period of six (6) months. The signing of a written contract of employment followed.On March 13, 1996, or a week before the end the agreed 6-month probationary period, PDI officer Benita del Rosario handed Magtibay his termination paper, grounded on his alleged failure to meet company standards. Aggrieved, Magtibay immediately filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and damages before the Labor Arbiter. PDIEU later joined the fray by filing a supplemental complaint for unfair labor practice.Magtibay anchored his case principally on the postulate that he had become a regular employee by operation of law, considering that he had been employed by and had worked for PDI for a total period of ten months, i.e., four months more than the maximum six-month period provided for by law on probationary employment. He also claimed that he was not apprised at the beginning of his employment of the performance standards of the company, hence, there was no basis for his dismissal. Finally, he described his dismissal as tainted with bad faith and effected without due process.PDI, for its part, denied all the factual allegations of Magtibay, adding that his previous contractual employment was validly terminated upon the expiration of the period stated therein. Pressing the point, PDI alleged that the period covered by the contractual employment cannot be counted with or tacked to the period for probation, inasmuch as there is no basis to consider Magtibay a regular employee.

Issue: WON A PROBATIONARY EMPLOYEES FAILURE TO FOLLOW AN EMPLOYERS RULES AND REGULATIONS CANNOT BE DEEMED FAILURE BY SAID EMPLOYEE TO MEET THE STANDARDS OF HIS EMPLOYER THUS EMASCULATING PETITIONERS RIGHT TO CHOOSE ITS EMPLOYEES.

Ruling: No. The right of a laborer to sell his labor to such persons as he may choose

is, in its essence, the same as the right of an employer to purchase labor from any person whom it chooses. The employer and the employee have thus an equality of right guaranteed by the Constitution. If the employer can compel the employee to work against the latters will, this is servitude. If the employee can compel the employer to give him work against the employers will, this is oppression.

Within the limited legal six-month probationary period, probationary employees are still entitled to security of tenure. It is expressly provided in the afore-quoted Article 281 that a probationary employee may be terminated only on two grounds: (a) for just cause, or (b) when he fails to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with reasonable standards made known by the employer to the employee at the time of his engagement.

11. Alcira v. NLRC, June 9, 2004

RADIN C. ALCIRA vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, MIDDLEBY PHILIPPINES CORPORATIONG.R. No. 149859, June 9, 2004

Facts: Petitioner Radin C. Alcira was hired by respondent Middle by as engineering support services supervisor on a probationary period for six months. Despite the indication of probationary period in the appointment paper, the dates indicated in the copies in the possession of the petitioner and the respondent, were different, May 20, 1996 and May 27, 1996, respectively. On November 20, 1996, unhappy with petitioner’s performance, respondent Midde by terminated the former’s services. But according to the petitioner he is already a regular employee effective November 16,1996, using Article 13 of the Civil Code that one month is composed of 30 days, six months total 180 days. Hence, using May 20, 1996 as the reference point, it was already considered a dismissal since it was made after the lapse of his probationary employment.

The labor arbiter dismissed the complaint on the ground that: (1) respondents were able to prove that petitioner was apprised of the standards for becoming a regular employee; (2) respondent Mamaradlo's affidavit showed that petitioner "did not perform well in his assigned work and his attitude was below par compared to the company's standard required of him" and (3) petitioner's dismissal on November 20, 1996 was before his "regularization," considering that, counting from May 20, 1996, the six-month probationary period ended on November 20, 1996.

Issue: WON petitioner is a regular employee at the time of his severance from employment.

17

LABOR RELATIONS : CASE SET 10 (1ST HALF)Held: Article 281 of the Labor Code states that: PROBATIONARY EMPLOYMENT . — Probationary employment shall not exceed six (6) months from the date the employee started working, unless it is covered by an apprenticeship agreement stipulating a longer period. The services of an employee who has been engaged on a probationary basis may be terminated for a just cause or when he fails to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with reasonable standards made known by the employer to the employee at the time of his engagement. An employee who is allowed to work after a probationary period shall be considered a regular employee.

In addition, Section 6 (d) of Rule 1 of the Implementing Rules of Book VI of the Labor Code (Department Order No. 10, Series of 1997) provides that: In all cases of probationary employment, the employer shall make known to the employee the standards under which he will qualify as a regular employee at the time of his engagement. Where no standards are made known to the employee at that time, he shall be deemed a regular employee.

The invocation of Article 13 of the CC is incorrect. In CALS Poultry Supply: (O)ur computation of the 6-month probationary period is reckoned from the date of appointment up to the same calendar date of the 6th month following.

The number of days in each particular month was irrelevant, petitioner was still a probationary employee when respondent Middleby opted not to "regularize" him on November 20, 1996.|||

It was held that respondent Middleby substantially notified petitioner of the standards to qualify as a regular employee when it apprised him, at the start of his employment, that it would evaluate his supervisory skills after five months. Conversely, an employer is deemed to substantially comply with the rule on notification of standards if he apprises the employee that he will be subjected to a performance evaluation on a particular date after his hiring. The labor arbiter when he ruled that in the instant case, petitioner cannot successfully say that he was never informed by private respondent of the standards that he must satisfy in order to be converted into regular status. This runs counter to the agreement between the parties that after five months of service the petitioner’s performance would be evaluated. It is only but natural that the evaluation should be made vis-à-vis the performance standards for the job.

It is settled that even if probationary employees do not enjoy permanent status, they are accorded the constitutional protection of security of tenure. This means they may only be terminated for just cause or when they otherwise fail to qualify as regular employees in accordance with reasonable standards made known to them by the employer at the time of their engagement.

The severance from work of the petitioner can be regarded as dismissal, but cannot be deemed as illegal. Middleby was clearly able to justify to the end its employment relationship with petitioner.

12. Mercado v. Ama Computer College (Probi status of fixed term employees) (Repeated case)

Art. 282

1. Concepcion v. Minex Import Corporation, January 24, 2012

Concepcion vs. Minex Import Corp.G.R. No. 153569, January 24, 2012

FACTS: Respondent Minex is engaged in the retail of semi-precious stones, selling them in kiosks or stalls installed in various shopping centers within Metro Manila. It employed the petitioner initially as a salesgirl, rotating her assignment among nearly all its outlets. It made her a supervisor in July 1997, but did not grant her any salary increase.

On October 1997, respondent assigned the petitioner to the SM Harrison Plaza kiosk with the instruction to hold the keys of the kiosk.

Later on a total of P50,912.00 was missing from the cabinet of the said kiosk. After the preliminary investigation, the Assistant Prosecutor rendered a resolution finding probable cause for qualified theft and recommending the filing of an information against the petitioner.

Petitioner was then charged with qualified theft by the respondent. She was thus eventually dismissed.

Petitioner on the other hand complained against the respondents for illegal dismissal in the Department of Labor and Employment.

Respondent claimed that Concepcion’s dismissal would be justifiable for loss of trust and confidence in the light of the finding of probable cause by the DOJ and the City Prosecutor and the filing of the information for qualified theft against her.

The petitioner argues, however, that there was no evidence at all upon which Minex could validly dismiss her considering that she had not yet been found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified theft.

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LABOR RELATIONS : CASE SET 10 (1ST HALF)ISSUE: Was there a just cause for the petitioner’s dismissal?

HELD: Yes. Art. 282 (pars. 3 & 4) of the Labor Code provides:

3. Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative;

4. Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer or any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representatives;

“The employer is not expected to be as strict and rigorous as a judge in a criminal trial in weighing all the probabilities of guilt before terminating the employee. The quantum of proof required for convicting an accused is thus higher – proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt – than the quantum prescribed for dismissing an employee – substantial evidence.”

“It is also unfair to require an employer to first be morally certain of the guilt of the employee by awaiting a conviction before terminating him when there is already sufficient showing of the wrongdoing. Requiring that certainty may prove too late for the employer, whose loss may potentially be beyond repair.”

2. Dreamland Hotel and Resort v. Johnson, March 12, 2014(Repeated case)

3. Grand Asian Shipping Lines Inc., v. Galvez, January 29, 2014

Grand Asian Shipping Lines vs Galvez GR No. 178184 January 29, 2014

FACTS: Respondents filed with the NLRC separate complaint for illegal suspension and dismissal, underpayment/nonpayment of salaries/wages, overtime pay, premium pay for holiday and rest day, service incentive pay, tax refunds and indemnities for damages and attorney’s fees against petitioner due to an alleged illegal activity being committed by respondent who would misdeclare the consume fuel in the Engineer’s Voyage Reports and the save fuel oil were sold to other vessel out at sea (at nighttime). Acting upon the anomaly, GASLI placed respondents under preventive suspension and after conducting administrative hearings decided to terminate them for breach of trust, commission of crime against employer.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondents were illegally dismissed

HELD: Yes. Respondent’s termination due to loss of trust and confidence should have a distinction between managerial and rank and file employees. Rank-and-file employees require proof of involvement while managerial employees mere

existence of a basis for belief is sufficient. Given that Galvez and Gruta have managerial positions there is some basis for the loss of employer’s confidence—regarding the overstatement of fuel consumption without any evidence to the contrary. While the others, who are ordinary rank and file employees, were not proven to have any involvement in the loss of the vessel’s fuel. Rendering their dismissals illegal. The employer bears the burden of proof in illegal dismissal cases thus the employer must first establish by substantial evidence the fact of dismissal.

4. Mirant Phil. Corp. v. Caro, April 23, 2014

Mirant (Philippines) Corporation and Edgardo Bautista vs. Joselito A. Caro

G.R. No. 181490 April 23, 2014

FACTS: Petitioner Corporation maintained around 2,000 employees including respondent Joselito Caro. Respondent was hired by Mirant Pagbilao as Logistics Officer in 1994, and at the time of the severance of his employment, rose to the ranks of Procurement Supervisor. Petitioner corporation alleged that respondent was dismissed because he was randomly selected among the employees to undergo a drug test which the latter “unjustifiedly refused.”

On January 19, 2005, the Asst. Vice President of the Corporation (Lamela) recommended that respondent be terminated from employment although the Investigating Panel issued only a recommendation that he be only terminated for four working weeks without pay. Later, respondent received a letter from the Vice President for Operations (Sliman), terminating him on the same date. It is the contention of Caro that he was illegally dismissed by petitioner corporation due to the latter’s non-compliance with the twin requirements of notice and hearing. Respondent further asserts that he was illegally dismissed due to these circumstances: (a.) He signed the notice that he was randomly selected as a participant to the company drug testing; (b.) Even the Investigating Panel was at a loss in interpreting the charge because it believed that the term “refusal” was ambiguous.

The Labor Arbiter decided in Favor of Caro but the NLRC set aside the LA.s decision. However, the Court of Appeals assailed the Labor Arbiter’s decision which found that Caro was illegally dismissed by petitioner Mirant (Philippines) Corporation.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was illegal dismissal in the case at bar?

HELD: There was illegal dismissal. Managerial prerogatives are subject to limitations provided by law, collective bargaining agreements, and the general principles of fair play and justice. In the exercise of its management prerogatives, an employer must therefore ensure that the policies, rules, and regulations on work-related activities of the employees must always be fair and reasonable and the corresponding

19

LABOR RELATIONS : CASE SET 10 (1ST HALF)penalties , when prescribed, commensurate to the offense involved and the degree of the infraction.

In the field of labor law, labor protection is upheld and a liberal stance in its interpretation is considered in order to serve the ends of substantial justice.

5. Bluer than blue Joint Ventures Co. v. Esteban, April 7, 2014.

BLUER THAN BLUE JOINT VENTURES COMPANY/MARY ANN DELA VEGA, Petitioners, vs. GLYZA ESTEBAN, Respondent.

G.R. No. 192582 April 7, 2014

FACTS:

Respondent Glyza Esteban (Esteban) was employed in January 2004 as Sales Clerk, and assigned at Bluer Than Blue Joint Ventures Company's (petitioner) EGG boutique in SM City Marilao, Bulacan, beginning the year 2006. Part of her primary tasks were attending to all customer needs, ensuring efficient inventory, coordinating orders from clients, cashiering and reporting to the accounting department.

In November 2006, the petitioner received a report that several employees have access to its point-of-sale (POS) system through a universal password given by Elmer Flores (Flores). Upon investigation, it was discovered that it was Esteban who gave Flores the password. The petitioner sent a letter memorandum to Esteban on November 8, 2006, asking her to explain in writing why she should not be disciplinary dealt with for tampering with the company’s POS system through the use of an unauthorized password. Esteban was also placed under preventive suspension for ten days. In her explanation, Esteban admitted that she used the universal password three times on the same day in December 2005, after she learned of it from two other employees who she saw browsing through the petitioner’s sales inquiry. She inquired how the employees were able to open the system and she was told that they used the "123456" password.

On November 13, 2006, Esteban’s preventive suspension was lifted, but at the same time, a notice of termination was sent to her, finding her explanation unsatisfactory and terminating her employment immediately on the ground of loss of trust and confidence. Esteban was given her final pay, including benefits and bonuses, less

inventory variances incurred by the store amounting to P8,304.93. Esteban signed a quitclaim and release in favor of the petitioner.

On December 6, 2006, Esteban filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, illegal suspension, holiday pay, rest day and separation pay.

ISSUE:

WON There was a valid illegal dismissal?

HELD:

NO!

"It is not the job title but the actual work that the employee performs that determines whether he or she occupies a position of trust and confidence."1 In this case, while respondent's position was denominated as Sales Clerk, the nature of her work included inventory and cashiering, a function that clearly falls within the sphere of rank-and-file positions imbued with trust and confidence.

6. Manila Jockey Club v. Trajano, June 26, 2013.

Manila Jockey Club vs. trajano

Facts: MJCI had employed Trajano as a selling teller of betting tickets. On April 25, 1998, she accidentally canceled a bet. To complicate things, it was also the same bet that had won the race. At that point, she realized her mistake, and explained to the second bettor that the cancellation of his ticket had not been intentional, but the result of an honest mistake on her part. She offered to personally pay the dividends should the second bettor win Race 15, which the latter accepted. To her surprise, the reliever-supervisor later approached Trajano and told her to submit a written explanation about the ticket cancellation incident. She was then placed under preventive suspension and after dismissed. She filed a illegal dismissal case on the gound that that her dismissal on the ground of unauthorized cancellation of ticket had no basis because she was also the operator of the negative machine on the day in question with the authority to cancel tickets as requested; that the

20

LABOR RELATIONS : CASE SET 10 (1ST HALF)cancellation was not intentional on her part but resulted from an honest mistake that did not amount to dishonesty; that her dismissal was without due process of law because she was not aware of any justifiable cause of her termination and that she was not notified about or furnished a copy of the notice of dismissal.

Issue: 1. Whether or not there was just cause when Petitioner (MJCI) dismissed Respondent Aimee O. Trajano from the service

2. Whether or not Petitioner MJCI complied with the due process requirement when it effected the dismissal of Respondent Trajano

Held: Trajano to have been illegally dismissed by MJCI without just or authorized cause and without due process of law. It concluded that her cancellation of the ticket was an honest mistake that did not constitute a serious misconduct or willful disobedience of the lawful orders of her employer; that such cancellation did not amount to a gross and habitual neglect of duty because her mistake was only her first offense in the nine years of service to MJCI; and that MJCI sustained no damage.16 It ordered MJCI to reinstate her to her former position without loss of seniority rights, and with payment of backwages equivalent to at least six months and other benefits..

7. Hormillosa v. Coca Cola, October 9, 2013. G.R. No. 198699 October 9, 2013REXIE A. HORMILLOSA, Petitioner, vs. COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILS., INC., represented by its Iloilo Plant Human Resource Head, ROBERTO RICHARD H. DOLAR,Respondent.

Facts:Hormillosa was employed as a route salesman by Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils., Inc. (CBPI).Due to their delicate position, route salesmen, like Hormillosa, were given a handbook entitled, CCBPI Employee Code of Disciplinary Rules and Regulations. This set of rules and regulations served as their guide in the performance of their duties. Hormillosa received his copy.

CBPI District Sales Supervisor, Raul S. Tiosayco III (Tiosayco), conducted a verification and audit of the accounts handled by Hormillosa. He discovered transactions in violation of CCBPI Employee Code of Disciplinary Rules and Regulations, specifically "Fictitious sales transactions.

Tiosayco submitted his findings and recommendations to the Regional Sales Manager, proposing the termination of Hormillosa. CBPI gave credence to the report and approved his recommendation. Subsequently, a termination letter12was issued informing Hormillosa that he was being terminated.Even after terminating Hormillosa, Tiosayco uncovered more anomalies committed by him. He found out that Hormillosa tampered a sales invoice issued to Aurelia and Cedy Tafida (Tafida Store) by placing an amount different from that which he had submitted to the Finance Department.Hormillosa filed a complaint for ULP (harassment due to union activities and union busting), Illegal Dismissal, Illegal Deduction, Illegal Grounding, Non-payment of Commission, Non-payment of 13th Month pay, Violation of CBA, Damages, and Attorney’s Fees against CBPI before the Sub-Regional Arbitration Branch No. VI (SRAB).Hormillosa averred in his position paper that prior to his dismissal, he was a member of the Board of Directors of CBPI’s employees union and he became its secretary on March 7, 1999. As secretary, he sent a copy of the new list of union officers to the management with a warning that if CBPI would not stop harassing the members of the union, it would declare a strike.He further alleged that on March 8, 1999, he was immediately placed on grounded status by Tiosayco supposedly on the basis of some anomalous transactions conducted by him per verification and audit. He claimed however, that the verification and audit were contrary to Section 2(d), Article III of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) which provides: "The Company shall coordinate with the Union authorized representative to witness the account verification that the company will conduct with respect to questionable accounts issued to Company customers by route salesman or relief salesmen under investigation." He likewise alleged that as part of the design to destroy the union, CBPI discriminated against the officers until they were pressured to resign.

Issue:Whether the termination is proper within the grounds set forth in art. 282

Held:The rule is that, in labor cases, substantial evidence or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as sufficient to support a conclusion is required.18 The CA was correct when it ruled that Hormillosa’s employment was validly terminated under paragraph (c) of the above provision. There was substantial evidence to justify his dismissal.In Bristol Myers Squibb (Phils.), Inc. v. Baban,19 the Court discussed the requisites for a valid dismissal on the ground of loss of trust and confidence as follows:It is clear that Article 282(c) of the Labor Code allows an employer to terminate the services of an employee for loss of trust and confidence. The right of employers to

21

LABOR RELATIONS : CASE SET 10 (1ST HALF)dismiss employees by reason of loss of trust and confidence is well established in jurisprudence.The first requisite for dismissal on the ground of loss of trust and confidence is that the employee concerned must be one holding a position of trust and confidence. Verily, We must first determine if respondent holds such a position.There are two (2) classes of positions of trust. The first class consists of managerial employees. They are defined as those vested with the powers or prerogatives to lay down management policies and to hire, transfer suspend, lay-off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees or effectively recommend such managerial actions. The second class consists of cashiers, auditors, property custodians, etc. They are defined as those who in the normal and routine exercise of their functions, regularly handle significant amounts of money or property.x x x xThe second requisite is that there must be an act that would justify the loss of trust and confidence. Loss of trust and confidence to be a valid cause for dismissal must be based on a willful breach of trust and founded on clearly established facts. The basis for the dismissal must be clearly and convincingly established but proof beyond reasonable doubt is not necessary.20Hormillosa, being a route salesman, falls under the second class. By selling soft drink products and collecting payments for the same, he was considered an employee who regularly handled significant amounts of money and property in the normal and routine exercise of his functions. The nature of the position of a route salesman was described in Coca Cola Bottlers, Phils. V. Kapisanan ng Malayang Manggagawa sa Coca-Cola-FFW and Florention Ramirez,21 where it was written.Clearly, Hormillosa occupies a position of trust. As correctly pointed out by the CA, there was a high degree of trust and confidence reposed on him and when this confidence was breached, the employer was justified in taking the appropriate disciplinary action.With regard to the second requisite for dismissal on the ground of loss of trust and confidence, the Court finds that Hormillosa committed acts which warranted his dismissal from employment.

8. Chuanico v. Legacy Consolidated Plans, October 9, 2013.

Chuanico v Legacy Consolidated PlansGR No. 181852. October 9, 2013

FACTS:

Respondent Legacy Consolidated hired petitioner Chuanico as Assistant Vice-President for legal services. He served as in-house counsel for the company and its

subsidiaries under the supervision of Atty. Cruz, the Senior Vice-President for Legal Affairs.

Atty. Cruz wrote Atty. Chuanico a memorandum, requiring him to explain why no administrative action should be taken against him for mishandling two cases. First, for belatedly drafting an answer to a complaint for Bank of East Asia without coursing it to his superior and second, for failure to prepare a complaint-affidavit for the Rural Bank of Paranaque.

Respondent then dismissed Atty. Chuanico for serious misconduct, willful disobedience to lawful orders, gross habitual neglect, and willful breach of trust. This prompted him to file a complaint for illegal dismissal.

The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision finding respondent guilty of illegal dismissal. On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the LA’s decision. The NLRC held that the respondent failed to present evidence to prove that Atty. Chuanico violated company rules or his superior’s order nor was he given any notice of the alleged violations. Respondent then filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, which held that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that respondent guilty of illegal dismissal. However, it affirmed the awards given to Atty. Chuanico. Petitioner then moved for reconsideration, which was denied, hence the present petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Chuanico was illegally dismissed for mishandling the cases assigned to him

DOCTRINE: To be a valid cause of dismissal, the loss of trust must be based on a willful breach of such trust and founded on clearly established facts.

HELD:

The respondent charged Atty. Chuanico with having mishandled the drafting of an answer and the preparation of a complaint affidavit. It, however, failed to present proof of such mishandling. As the LA found, respondent did not present the draft-answer Atty. Chuanico prepared and demonstrate why it regarded the same as haphazardly done. Furthermore, respondent did not contest the fact that Atty. Chuanico was only given one day within which to finish the draft-answer. Consquently, he could not be expected to do more than an adequate pleading.

In the second case, the former handling lawyer of Rural Bank said in a sworn statement that he had been unable to prepare a complaint-affidavit for failure to

22

LABOR RELATIONS : CASE SET 10 (1ST HALF)produce a witness. Furthermore, the case was turned over to Atty. Cruz and not to Atty. Chuanico.

Atty. Chuanico was dismissed due to willful breach of trust. Settled is the rule that under Article 282 (c) of the Labor Code, the breach of trust must be willful. Ordinary breach will not be enough. A breach is willful if it is done intentionally and knowingly without and justifiable excuse, as distinguished from an act done carelessly, thoughtlessly or inadvertently. Willful breach was not proved in this case.

9. Duncan Association of Detailman-PGTWO v. Glaxo Welcome Phils, September 17, 2004

DUNCAN ASSOC. of DETAILMAN-PTGWO v GLAXO WELLCOME PHILS. INC

Facts:

Tecson was hired by Glaxo as a medical representative on Oct. 24 1985. Contract of employment signed by Tecson stipulates, among others, that he agrees to study and abide by the rules of the company; to disclose to management any existing future relationship by consanguinity or affinity with co-employees with competing drug companies and should management finds that such relationship poses a possible conflict of interest to resign from the company. Company’s Code of Employee Conduct provides the same with stipulation that management may transfer the employee to another department in a non-counterchecking position or preparation for employment outside of the company after 6 months.

Tecson was initially assigned to market Glaxo’s products in the Camarines Sur Camarines Norte area and entered into a romantic relationship with Betsy, an employee of Astra, Glaxos Competition. Before getting married, Tecson District Manager, reminded him several times of the conflict of interest but marriage took place in Sept 1998. In Jan. 1999, Tecson’s superior informed him of conflict of interest. Tecson asked time to comply with the condition that either he or Betsy resign from their respective positions. Unable to comply with the condition, Glaxo transferred Tecson to the Butuan Surigao City-Agusan Del Sur sales area. After his request against transfer was denied, Tecson brought the matter to Glaxo Grievance Committee and while pending, he continued to act as medical representative in the Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte sales area. On Nov. 15, 2000, The National Conciliation and Mediation Board ruled that Glaxo’s policy was valid.

Issue:

Whether or not the policy of pharmaceutical companies prohibiting its employees from marrying employees of any competitor company is valid.

Ruling:

On Equal Protection

Glaxo has a right to protect its trade secrets. The prohibition against personal or marital relationships with employees of competitor companies upon Glaxos employee is reasonable under the circumstances because relationships of that nature might compromise the interest of the company. That Glaxo possesses the right to protect its economic interest cannot be denied.

It is a settled principle that the commands that the commands of equal protection clause are addressed only to the state or those acting under color of its authority. Corollary, it has been held in a long array of US Supreme Court Decisions that the equal protection clause erects to shield against merely private conduct, however, discriminatory or wrongful.

The company actually enforced the policy after repeated demands to the employee to comply with the policy. Indeed, the application of the policy was made in an impartial and even-handed manner, with due regard for the lot of the employee.

On Constructive Dismissal

Constructive dismissal is defined as a quitting, an involuntary resignation resorted to when continued employment becomes impossible, unreasonable, or unlikely; when there is a demotion in rank or diminution in pay; or when a clear discrimination or insensibility or disdain by an employer becomes unbearable to the employee. None of these conditions are present in that case.

The challenged policy has been implemented by Glaxo impartially and disinterestedly for a long time. In the case at bar, the record shows that Glaxo gave Tecson several chances to eliminate the conflict of interest brought about by his relationship with Betsy, but he never availed of any of them.

10. Star Paper Corporation et al. v. Simbol, April 12, 2006

Star Paper Corporation vs. Simbol

Facts:23

LABOR RELATIONS : CASE SET 10 (1ST HALF)Petitioner is a company engaged in trading paper products. Respondents were regular employees of the company. Based on the evidence presented by the petitioner, respondent met Alma Dayrit, whom he later married. Prior to the marriage, Josephine Ongsitco informed them of the company policy which required that one of them should resign from work if they decided to get married. Respondent resigned pursuant to the policy. However, the version of the respondents stated that they did not resign voluntarily; they were compelled to resign in view of an illegal company policy. They later filed a complaint for unfair labor practice and constructive dismissal and alleged that the company policy is illegal and violative of the Labor Code. The complaint was dismissed by the Labor Arbiter for lack of merit, ruling that the company policy is an exercise of management prerogative. The NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the NLRC and declared the said company policy as illegal and ordered the reinstatement of the respondents.

Issue:Whether or not the company policy is a valid cause for the dismissal of its employees?

Held:No. There must be a compelling business necessity for which no alternative exists other than the discriminatory practice. To justify a bona fide occupational qualification, the employer must prove two factors: (1) that the employment qualification is reasonably related to the essential operation of the job involved; and (2) that there is a factual basis for believing that all or substantially all persons meeting the qualification would be unable to properly perform the duties of the job.

Petitioners’ sole contention that “the company did not just want to have two or more of its employees related between the third degree by affinity or consanguinity is lame. That the second paragraph was meant to give teeth to the first paragraph of the questioned rule is evidently not the valid reasonable business necessity required by law.

Petitioners failed to show how the marriage of the respondents could be detrimental to its business operations. The policy is premised on the mere fear that employees married to each other will be less efficient. The absence of a statute expressly prohibiting marital discrimination in our jurisdiction cannot benefit the petitioners. That protection given to labor in our jurisdiction is vast and extensive that we cannot prudently draw inferences from the legislature’s silence. For failure to present undisputed proof of reasonable business necessity, we rule that the questioned policy is an invalid exercise of management prerogative.

11. Ace Promotion and Marketing Corp. v. Ursabia, September 22, 2006

Ace Promotion and Marketing Corporation v. Ursabia

Facts:

Sometime in August 1994, petitioner Ace Promotion and Marketing Corporation hired respondent Reynaldo Ursabia as a company driver. On July 6, 2001, respondent failed to report for work. Gerry Garcia, area manager, issued a Memorandum dated July 9, 2001 asking the respondent to explain why there should be no disciplinary measure will be taken upon his alleged abandonment of work on July 6, 2001.The said memorandum was personally served to respondent but refused to acknowledge the same, hence, petitioner sent it through registered mail to respondent’s last known address. The next day, Garcia noticed some damage on the vehicle assigned to respondent, hence, he issued another memorandum asking again the respondent to explain and why he should not be terminated for his actions. Service of the said memorandum was done through registered mail to respondent’s last known address. Sometime in July 2001, an anonymous note with threat was discovered among the stocks of petitioner. The said note was examined by the PNP Crime Laboratory and allegedly showed that the handwriting of respondent has significant similarities with the said hand written note. On July 6, 2001, respondent went to petitioner’s office was served with a termination letter but this again was refused to receive the same prompting petitioner serve it by registered mail to respondent’s last known address. Displeased with his termination, respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and non-payment of other monetary benefits

Labor arbiter held that respondent was dismissed by petitioner for the following misdemeanors: (1) abandonment, (2) destruction of company property, and (3) leaving a note which petitioner interpreted to be a threat. It ruled that the dismissal was illegal because no hearing was conducted to allow the respondent to confront petitioner’s witnesses. The NLRC, on the other hand ruled that the dismissal was valid because respondent is guilty of abandonment but this was reversed by the Court of Appeals. The latter held that the termination of respondent is not valid because his failure to report for work for a single day did not constitute abandonment and that the criminal case for grave threats and malicious mischief filed against respondent was dismissed.

Issue:

Whether or not there exists a just cause to dismiss respondent?

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LABOR RELATIONS : CASE SET 10 (1ST HALF)Held:

The court ruled that the respondent should be dismissed for willful disobedience of the memoranda issued by the petitioner. To be validly dismissed on the ground of willful disobedience requires the occurrence of at least two requisites: (1) the employee’s assailed conduct must have been willful or intentional, the willfulness being characterized by a wrongful and perverse attitude; and (2) the order violated must have been reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee and must pertain to the duties which he had been engaged to discharge. In the instant case, the failure of respondent to answer the July 9 and 10, 2001 memoranda of petitioner is clearly intentional. He reported to and loitered outside petitioner’s premises but never made any oral or written reply to the said memoranda. This shows respondent’s wrongful and perverse attitude to defy the reasonable orders which undoubtedly pertain to his duties as an employee of petitioner.

12. Concepcion v. Minex Import Corporation, January 24, 2012 (repeated case)

13. St. Lukes Medical Center Inc. v Notario October 20, 2010(repeated case)

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