labrel cases (v vi vii)

8/13/2019 Labrel Cases (v VI VII)

1/29

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 85333 February 26, 1990

CARMELITO L. PALACOL, ET AL., petitioners,vs.PURA FERRER-CALLEJA, Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations, MANILA CCBPI SALES FORCEUNION, and COCA-COLA BOTTLERS (PHILIPPINES), INC., respondents.

Wellington B. Lachica for petitioners.

Adolpho M. Guerzon for respondent Union.

GANCAYCO, J.:

Can a special assessment be validly deducted by a labor union from the lump-sum pay of its members, granted undera collective bargaining agreement (CBA), notwithstanding a subsequent disauthorization of the same by a majorityof the union members? This is the main issue for resolution in the instant petition for certiorari.

As gleaned from the records of the case, the pertinent facts are as follows:

On October 12, 1987, the respondent Manila CCBPI Sales Force Union (hereinafter referred to as the Union), as thecollective bargaining agent of all regular salesmen, regular helpers, and relief helpers of the Manila Plant and MetroManila Sales Office of the respondent Coca-Cola Bottlers (Philippines), Inc. (hereinafter referred to as theCompany) concluded a new collective bargaining agreement with the latter. 1 Among the compensation benefitsgranted to the employees was a general salary increase to be given in lump sum including recomputation of actualcommissions earned based on the new rates of increase.

On the same day, the president of the Union submitted to the Company the ratification by the union members of thenew CBA and authorization for the Company to deduct union dues equivalent to P10.00 every payday or P20.00every month and, in addition, 10% by way of special assessment, from the CBA lump-sum pay granted to the unionmembers. The last one among the aforementioned is the subject of the instant petition.

As embodied in the Board Resolution of the Union dated September 29, 1987, the purpose of the special assessmentsought to be levied is "to put up a cooperative and credit union; purchase vehicles and other items needed for the

benefit of the officers and the general membership; and for the payment for services rendered by union officers,consultants and others." 2 There was also an additional proviso stating that the "matter of allocation ... shall be at thediscretion of our incumbent Union President."

This "Authorization and CBA Ratification" was obtained by the Union through a secret referendum held in separatelocal membership meetings on various dates. 3 The total membership of the Union was about 800. Of this number,672 members originally authorized the 10% special assessment, while 173 opposed the same. 4

Subsequently however, one hundred seventy (170) members of the Union submitted documents to the Companystating that although they have ratified the new CBA, they are withdrawing or disauthorizing the deduction of anyamount from their CBA lump sum. Later, 185 other union members submitted similar documents expressing thesame intent. These members, numbering 355 in all (170 + 185), added to the original oppositors of 173, turned the


2/29

tide in favor of disauthorization for the special assessment, with a total of 528 objectors and a remainder of 272supporters. 5

On account of the above-mentioned disauthorization, the Company, being in a quandary as to whom to r emit the payment of the questioned amount, filed an action for interpleader with the Bureau of Labor Relations in order toresolve the conflicting claims of the parties concerned. Petitioners, who are regular rank-and-file employees of the

Company and bona fide members of the Union, filed a motion/complaint for intervention therein in two groups of161 and 94, respectively. They claimed to be among those union members who either did not sign any individualwritten authorization, or having signed one, subsequently withdrew or retracted their signatures therefrom.

Petitioners assailed the 10% special assessment as a violation of Article 241(o) in relation to Article 222(b) of theLabor Code. Article 222(b) provides as follows:

ART. 222. Appearances and Fees.

xxx xxx xxx

(b) No attorney's fees, negotiation fees or similar charges of any kind arisingfrom any collective bargaining negotiations or conclusion of the collectiveagreement shall be imposed on any individual member of the contracting union;Provided, however, that attorney's fees may be charged against union funds in anamount to be agreed upon by the parties. Any contract, agreement orarrangement of any sort to the contrary shall be null and void.

On the other hand, Article 241(o) mandates that:

ART. 241. Rights and conditions of membership in a labor organization.

xxx xxx xxx

(o) Other than for mandatory activities under the Code, no special assessments,

attorney's fees, negotiation fees or any other extraordinary fees may be checkedoff from any amount due to an employee without an individual writtenauthorization duly signed by the employee. The authorization should specificallystate the amount, purpose and beneficiary of the deduction;

As authority for their contention, petitioners cited Galvadores v. Trajano , 6 wherein it was ruled that no check-offsfrom any amount due employees may be effected without individual written authorizations duly signed by theemployees specifically stating the amount, purpose, and beneficiary of the deduction.

In its answer, the Union countered that the deductions not only have the popular indorsement and approval of thegeneral membership, but likewise complied with the legal requirements of Article 241 (n) and (o) of the Labor Codein that the board resolution of the Union imposing the questioned special assessment had been duly approved in ageneral membership meeting and that the collection of a special fund for labor education and research is mandated.

Article 241(n) of the Labor Code states that

ART. 241. Rights and conditions of membership in a labor organization.

xxx xxx xxx

(n) No special assessment or other extraordinary fees may be levied upon the members of a labororganization unless authorized by a written resolution of a majority of all the members at a general


3/29

membership meeting duly called for the purpose. The secretary of the organization shall record theminutes of the meeting including the list of all members present, the votes cast, the purpose of thespecial assessment or fees and the recipient of such assessments or fees. The record shall beattested to by the president;

Med-Arbiter Manases T. Cruz ruled in favor of petitioners in an order dated February 15, 1988 whereby he directed

the Company to remit the amount it had kept in trust directly to the rank-and-file personnel without delay.

On appeal to the Bureau of Labor Relations, however, the order of the Med-Arbiter was reversed and set aside bythe respondent-Director in a resolution dated August 19, 1988 upholding the claim of the Union that the specialassessment is authorized under Article 241 (n) of the Labor Code, and that the Union has complied with therequirements therein.

Hence, the instant petition.

Petitioners allege that the respondent-Director committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when she held Article 241 (n) of the Labor Code to be the applicable provision instead of Article 222(b)in relation to Article 241(o) of the same law.

According to petitioners, a cursory examination and comparison of the two provisions of Article 241 reveals that paragraph (n) cannot prevail over paragraph (o). The reason advanced is that a special assessment is not a matter ofmajor policy affecting the entire union membership but is one which concerns the individual rights of unionmembers.

Petitioners further assert that assuming arguendo that Article 241(n) should prevail over paragraph (o), the Unionhas nevertheless failed to comply with the procedure to legitimize the questioned special assessment by: (1)

presenting mere minutes of local membership meetings instead of a written resolution; (2) failing to call a generalmembership meeting; (3) having the minutes of three (3) local membership meetings recorded by a union director,and not by the union secretary as required; (4) failing to have the list of members present included in the minutes ofthe meetings; and (5) failing to present a record of the votes cast. 7 Petitioners concluded their argument byciting Galvadores .

After a careful review of the records of this case, We are convinced that the deduction of the 10% special assessment by the Union was not made in accordance with the requirements provided by law.

Petitioners are correct in citing the ruling of this Court in Galvadores which is applicable to the instant case. The principle "that employees are protected by law from unwarranted practices that diminish their compensation withouttheir known edge and consent " 8 is in accord with the constitutional principle of the State affording full protection tolabor. 9

The respondent-Union brushed aside the defects pointed out by petitioners in the manner of compliance with thelegal requirements as "insignificant technicalities." On the contrary, the failure of the Union to comply strictly withthe requirements set out by the law invalidates the questioned special assessment. Substantial compliance is notenough in view of the fact that the special assessment will diminish the compensation of the union members. Their

express consent is required, and this consent must be obtained in accordance with the steps outlined by law, whichmust be followed to the letter. No shortcuts are allowed.

The applicable provisions are clear. The Union itself admits that both paragraphs (n) and (o) of Article 241 apply.Paragraph (n) refers to "levy" while paragraph (o) refers to "check-off" of a special assessment. Both provisionsmust be complied with. Under paragraph (n), the Union must submit to the Company a written resolution of amajority of all the members at a general membership meeting duly called for the purpose. In addition, the secretaryof the organization must record the minutes of the meeting which, in turn, must include, among others, the list of allthe members present as well as the votes cast.


4/29

As earlier outlined by petitioners, the Union obviously failed to comply with the requirements of paragraph (n). Itheld local membership meetings on separate occasions, on different dates and at various venues, contrary to theexpress requirement that there must be a general membership meeting. The contention of the Union that "the localmembership meetings are precisely the very general meetings required by law" 10 is untenable because the lawwould not have specified a general membership meeting had the legislative intent been to allow local meetings inlieu of the latter.

It submitted only minutes of the local membership meetings when what is required is a written resolution adopted atthe general meeting. Worse still, the minutes of three of those local meetings held were recorded by a union directorand not by the union secretary. The minutes submitted to the Company contained no list of the members present andno record of the votes cast. Since it is quite evident that the Union did not comply with the law at every turn, theonly conclusion that may be made therefrom is that there was no valid levy of the special assessment pursuant to

paragraph (n) of Article 241 of the Labor Code.

Paragraph (o) on the other hand requires an individual written authorization duly signed by every employee in orderthat a special assessment may be validly checked-off. Even assuming that the special assessment was validly levied

pursuant to paragraph (n), and granting that individual written authorizations were obtained by the Union,nevertheless there can be no valid check-off considering that the majority of the union members had alreadywithdrawn their individual authorizations. A withdrawal of individual authorizations is equivalent to no

authorization at all. Hence, the ruling in Galvadores that "no check-offs from any amounts due employees may beeffected without an individual written authorization signed by the employees ... " is applicable.

The Union points out, however, that said disauthorizations are not valid for being collective in form, as they are"mere bunches of randomly procured signatures, under loose sheets of paper." 11 The contention deserves no meritfor the simple reason that the documents containing the disauthorizations have the signatures of the union members.The Court finds these retractions to be valid. There is nothing in the law which requires that the disauthorizationmust be in individual form.

Moreover, it is well-settled that "all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of the LaborCode ... shall be resolved in favor of labor." 12 And as previously stated, labor in this case refers to the unionmembers, as employees of the Company. Their mere desire to establish a separate bargaining unit, albeit unproven,cannot be construed against them in relation to the legality of the questioned special assessment. On the contrary, the

same may even be taken to reflect their dissatisfaction with their bargaining representative, the respondent-Union, asshown by the circumstances of the instant petition, and with good reason.

The Med-Arbiter correctly ruled in his Order that:

The mandate of the majority rank and file have (sic) to be respected considering they are the onesdirectly affected and the realities of the high standards of survival nowadays. To ignore themandate of the rank and file would enure to destabilizing industrial peace and harmony within therank and file and the employer's fold, which we cannot countenance.

Moreover, it will be recalled that precisely union dues are collected from the union members to bespent for the purposes alluded to by respondent. There is no reason shown that the regular uniondues being now implemented is not sufficient for the alleged expenses. Furthermore, the rank andfile have spoken in withdrawing their consent to the special assessment, believing that theirregular union dues are adequate for the purposes stated by the respondent. Thus, the rank and filehaving spoken and, as we have earlier mentioned, their sentiments should be respected.

Of the stated purposes of the special assessment, as embodied in the board resolution of the Union, only thecollection of a special fund for labor and education research is mandated, as correctly pointed out by the Union. Thetwo other purposes, namely, the purchase of vehicles and other items for the benefit of the union officers and thegeneral membership, and the payment of services rendered by union officers, consultants and others, should besupported by the regular union dues, there being no showing that the latter are not sufficient to cover the same.


5/29

The last stated purpose is contended by petitioners to fall under the coverage of Article 222 (b) of the Labor Code.The contention is impressed with merit. Article 222 (b) prohibits attorney's fees, negotiations fees and similarcharges arising out of the conclusion of a collective bargaining agreement from being imposed on any individualunion member. The collection of the special assessment partly for the payment for services rendered by unionofficers, consultants and others may not be in the category of "attorney's fees or negotiations fees." But there is noquestion that it is an exaction which falls within the category of a "similar charge," and, therefore, within thecoverage of the prohibition in the aforementioned article. There is an additional proviso giving the Union Presidentunlimited discretion to allocate the proceeds of the special assessment. Such a proviso may open the door to abuse

by the officers of the Union considering that the total amount of the special assessment is quite considerable P1,027,694.33 collected from those union members who originally authorized the deduction, and P1,267,863.39from those who did not authorize the same, or subsequently retracted their authorizations. 13 The former amount hadalready been remitted to the Union, while the latter is being held in trust by the Company.

The Court, therefore, stakes down the questioned special assessment for being a violation of Article 241, paragraphs(n) and (o), and Article 222 (b) of the Labor Code.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The Order of the Director of the Bureau of LaborRelations dated August 19, 1988 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, while the order of the Med-Arbiter datedFebruary 17, 1988 is reinstated, and the respondent Coca-Cola Bottlers (Philippines), Inc. is hereby ordered to

immediately remit the amount of P1,267,863.39 to the respective union members from whom the said amount waswithheld. No pronouncement as to costs. This decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Cruz, J., took no part.


6/29

Verceles vs BLR G.R. No. 152322; February 15, 2005

FACTS:

Private respondents Rodel E. Dalupan, et al are members of the University of the East Employees Association (UEEA).On 15 September 1997, they each received a Memorandum from the UEEA charging them with spreading falserumors and creating disinformation among the members of the said association. They were given seventy-two hoursfrom receipt of the Memorandum to submit their Answer. Through a collective reply, they denied the allegations and furthersent a letter informing the officers of UEEA informing them that the memorandum was vague and without legal

basis. UEEA issued another memorandum giving the private respondents another se venty -t wo hours fromre cei pt within whi ch to prope rl y r epl y becau se the collective reply letter was not responsive to the firstmemorandum. Their failure would be construed as an admission of the truthfulness and veracity of the charges. The samewas stilldenied by the respondents.

O n 0 9 O c t o b e r 1 9 9 7 , E r n e s t o Ve r c e l e s , i n h i s c a p a c i t y a s p r e s i d e n t o f t h e a s s o c i at ion, through a Memorandum, informed Rodel Dalupan, e t a l . , t h a t t h e i r membership in theassociation has been suspended and shall take effect immediately upon receipt thereof. A result of which, acompl ain t for i ll eg al su spen si on wa s fi le d by th e pr ivat e respondents before the Department of Labor andEmployment, National Capital Region(DOLE-NCR). The Regional Director of the latter rendered a decision adverse tothe petitioners. The petitioners appealed to the BLR-DOLE, but the same and the motion for reconsideration were denied. Whenappealed before the Court of Appeals, said petition was still denied due course for lack of merit. Hence, the petitionis now elevated to theSupreme Court by way of petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the assent of 30% of the members of the union is required toconfer jurisdictionupon the BLR or LRD in intra-union conflicts.

RULING:The Court ruled in the negative. The 30% support requirement needed to report violations of rights and

conditions of union membership, as found in the last

paragrapho f A r t i c l e 2 4 1 o f t h e L a b o r C o d e , i s n o t m a n d a t o r y . T h e c o u r tr e i t e r a t e d i t s pronouncements made in the case of Rodriguez vs Dir., BLR, as followshe assent of 30% of the union members is not a factor in the acquisition of jurisdiction by theBure au of Labor Rel at ions is furn ished by Ar ti cl e 226 of th e same Labor Code, which grants original andexclusive jurisdiction to the Bureau, and the Labor Relations Division in the Regional Offices of the Department of Labor,over"all inter-union and intra-union conflicts, and all disputes, grievances or problems arising from or affecting labormanagement relations,"makin g no re fer ence wha tsoeve r to an y such 30%-support requirement. Indeed, the officials mentioned aregiven the power to act "onall inter-union and intra-union conflicts (1) "upon request of either or both parties" aswell as (2) "at their own initiative."

NOTE:Kindl y rel at e th is ca se to qu es ti on # 1. Th e an sw er is NO. Pl ea se refer to th e ab ov e ruling


7/29

SMCEU-PTGWO vs SMPPEU-PDMPPosted on March 14, 2013 by legendphil

FACTS:

San Miguel Corporation Employees Union Philippine Transport and General Workers Organization (SMCEU-PTGWO) filed with DOLE-NCR a petition seeking the cancellation of San Miguel Packaging Products Employees

Union Pambansang Diwa ng Manggagawang Pilipinos (SMPPEU -PDMP) registration and its dropping from the

rolls of legitimate labor organizations on the ground that the latter instituted fraud and falsification, and non-

compliance with registration requirements in obtaining its certificate of registration. SMCEU-PTGWO also alleged

that PDMP is not a legitimate labor organization, but a trade center; hence it cannot directly create a local or chapter.

The RD of DOLE-NCR issued an order dismissing the allegations of fraud, misrepresentation, and irregularity in the

submission of documents for certification of registration purposes by the SMPPEU-PDMP. However, on the ground

that PDMP is indeed a trade center, SMPPEU, not complying with the 20% membership requirement, was orderedto be dropped from the rolls of legitimate labor organizations.

On the appeal made by SMPPEU-PDMP to the BLR, the BLR reversed and set aside the decision of the RD stating,

among others that, although PDMP is a trade union center, it is also a legitimate labor organization capable of

creating or charter a local as per the Department Order No. 9; hence, the 20% membership requirement does not

apply on SMPPEU- PDMPs case.

SMCEU-PTGWO elevated the case to the CA via Rule 65, but the latter dismissed the case and affirmed the

decision of the BLR.

I SSUE:

Whether or not a trade union center can charter a local.

HELD:

No. A trade union center is not one of those entities empowered by law to create or charter a local.

RATIO:

Department Order No. 9 mentions two labor organizations either of which is allowed to directly create a local or

chapter through chartering a duly registered federation or a national union. Department Order No. 9 defines a

chartered local as a labor organization in the private sector operating at the enterprise level that acquired legal

personality through a charter certificate, issued by a duly registered federation or national union and reported to the

Regional Office.
http://theoverroad.wordpress.com/2013/03/14/64/http://theoverroad.wordpress.com/author/legendphil/http://theoverroad.wordpress.com/author/legendphil/http://theoverroad.wordpress.com/2013/03/14/64/


8/29

In sum, although PDMP as a trade union center is a legitimate labor organization, it has no power to directly create a

local or chapter. Thus, SMPPEU-PDMP cannot be created under the more lenient requirements for chartering, but

must have complied with the more stringent rules for creation and registration of an independent union, including

the 20% membership requirement.

SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION EMPLOYEES UNION PHILIPPINE TRANSPORT AND GENERAL WORKERSORGANIZATION (SMCEU PTGWO) vs. SAN MIGUEL PACKAGING PRODUCTS EMPLOYEES UNION PAMBANSANGDIWA NG MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO (SMPPEU PDMP)| 12 September 2007| J. Chico-Nazario

Short Version: SMCEU-PTGWO challenges the legitimacy of SMPPEU-PDMP, a charter of PDMP, as a labororganization. The Court held that PDMP cannot create a charter because it is merely a trade union center. Tradeunion centers are not given by the Labor Code or any statute the power to create locals or charters therefore,

SMPPEU-PDMP must comply with the strict requirements provided for in Art. 234, LC.

Nature: Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, assailing CA decision affirming thedecision of the petitioner Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) of DOLE which upheld the Certificate of Registration ofrespondent SAN MIGUEL PACKAGING PRODUCTS EMPLOYEES UNION PAMBANSANG DIWA NG MANGGAGAWANGPILIPINO (SMPPEU PDMP); and its resolution denying petitioners MR

Characters in the case

-Petitioner(s): SMCEU-PTGWO is the incumbent bargaining agent for the bargaining unit comprised of the regularmonthly-paid rank and file employees of the three divisions of San Miguel Corporation (SMC), namely, the SanMiguel Corporate Staff Unit (SMCSU), San Miguel Brewing Philippines (SMBP), and the San Miguel PackagingProducts (SMPP), in all offices and plants of SMC, including the Metal Closure and Lithography Plant in Laguna. Ithad been the certified bargaining agent for 20 years (1987 to 1997).

-Respondent(s): SMPPEU-PDMP is registered as a chapter PDMP.

Facts

PDMP issued a charter certificate to respondent on 15 June 1999. In compliance with registrationrequirements, respondent submitted the requisite documents to the BLR for the purpose of acquiringlegal personality.Upon submission of its charter certificate and other documents, respondent was issued Certificate ofCreation of Local or Chapter by the BLR on 6 July 1999.


9/29

Respondent filed with the Med-Arbiter of the DOLE Regional Officer in NCR (DOLE-NCR), three separatepetitions for certification election to represent SMPP, SMCSU, and SMBP. All three petitions weredismissed, on the ground that the separate petitions fragmented a single bargaining unit.17 August 1999: petitioner filed with the DOLE-NCR a petition seeking the cancellation of respondent'sregistration and its dropping from the rolls of legitimate labor organizations, accusing respondent ofcommitting fraud and falsification, and non-compliance with registration requirements in obtaining its

certificate of registration.o It alleged that respondent violated Articles 239 (a), (b) and (c) and 234 (c) of the Labor Code.

Moreover, petitioner claimed that PDMP is not a legitimate labor organization, but a trade unioncenter, hence, it cannot directly create a local or chapter.

14 July 2000: DOLE-NCR Regional Director Maximo B. Lim issued an Order dismissing the allegations. Hefurther ruled that respondent is allowed to directly create a local or chapter. However, he found thatrespondent did not comply with the 20% membership requirement and, thus, ordered the cancellation ofits certificate of registration and removal from the rolls of legitimate labor organizations.Respondent appealed to the BLR who granted the petition. The BLR ruled that as a chartered local union,respondent is not required to submit the number of employees and names of all its members comprisingat least 20% of the employees in the bargaining unit where it seeks to operate. Thus, the revocation of itsregistration based on non-compliance with the 20% membership requirement does not have any basis inthe rules.The BLR also held that although PDMP is considered as a trade union center, it is a holder of a RegistrationCertificate issued by the BLR on 14 February 1991, which bestowed upon it the status of a legitimate labororganization with all the rights and privileges to act as representative of its members for purposes ofcollective bargaining agreement. On this basis, PDMP can charter or create a local, in accordance with theprovisions of Department Order No. 9.BLR denied petitioners appeal. CA affirmed BLR decision holding that Department Order No. 9 providesthat a registered federation or national union may directly create a local by submitting to the BLR copiesof the charter certificate, the local's constitution and by-laws, the principal office address of the local, andthe names of its officers and their addresses. Upon complying with the documentary requirements, thelocal shall be issued a certificate and included in the roster of legitimate labor organizations. Thus there isno need for SMPPEU to show a membership of 20% of the employees of the bargaining unit in order to berecognized as a legitimate labor union.

Issue: WON respondent is a legitimate labor organization even if it failed to comply with the 20% requirement asprovided in Art. 234, LC. NO.

Dispositive: Petition GRANTED. CA REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.

Ruling

A legitimate labor organization is defined as "any labor organization duly registered with the DOLE, andincludes any branch or local thereof."Why does the Labor Code demand strict compliance with the requirements on registration?

o Registration requirements are intended to afford a measure of protection to unsuspectingemployees who may be lured into joining unscrupulous or fly-by-night unions whose solepurpose is to control union funds or use the labor organization for illegitimate ends.

o A legitimate labor organization is entitled to specific rights under the Labor Code, 21 and areinvolved in activities directly affecting matters of public interest. Legitimate labor organizationshave exclusive rights under the law which cannot be exercised by non-legitimate unions, one of


10/29

which is the right to be certified as the exclusive representative of all the employees in anappropriate collective bargaining unit for purposes of collective bargaining.

o The acquisition of rights by any union or labor organization, particularly the right to file a petitionfor certification election, first and foremost, depends on whether or not the labor organizationhas attained the status of a legitimate labor organization.

Records show that respondent was chartered by PDMP. Article 234, LC provides that an independent

labor organization acquires legitimacy only upon its registration with the BLR. However, the creation of abranch, local or chapter is treated differently.

o In Progressive Development Corporation v. Secretary, Department of Labor and Employment , theCourt declared that when an unregistered union becomes a branch, local or chapter, some of t heaforementioned requirements for registration are no longer necessary or compulsory. Whereasan applicant for registration of an independent union is mandated to submit, among otherthings, the number of employees and names of all its members comprising at least 20% of theemployees in the bargaining unit where it seeks to operate, as provided under Article 234 andSec. 2, Rule III, Book V of the Implementing Rules, the same is no longer required of a branch,local or chapter. The intent of the law in imposing less requirements in the case of a branch orlocal of a registered federation or national union is to encourage the affiliation of a local unionwith a federation or national union in order to increase the local union's bargaining powersrespecting terms and conditions of labor.

Petitioners argue that PDMP is not a legitimate labor organization, thus cannot form a charter. The Courtheld that the personality of a labor organization cannot be attacked collaterally. It may be questioned onlyin an independent petition for cancellation in accordance with Section 5 of Rule V, Book V of theImplementing Rules.

Heres the twist: PDMP is a trade union center, THEREFORE IT CANNOT CREATE LOCALS OR CHARTERS.

Trade union center was never mentioned in the Labor Code. It first appeared only in the ImplementingRules of Department Order No. 9 which defined a trade union center as any group of registered nationalunions or federations organized for the mutual aid and protection of its members; for assisting suchmembers in collective bargaining; or for participating in the formulation of social and employment

policies, standards, and programs, and is duly registered with the DOLE in accordance with Rule III,Section 2 of the Implementing Rules.While a "national union" or "federation" is a labor organization with at least ten locals or chapters oraffiliates, each of which must be a duly certified or recognized collective bargaining agent, a trade unioncenter, on the other hand, is composed of a group of registered national unions or federations.

o The Implementing Rules, as amended by Department Order No. 9, provide that only "a dulyregistered federation or national union" may directly create a local or chapter.

DO 9 defines a "chartered local" as a labor organization in the private sector operating at the enterpriselevel that acquired legal personality through a charter certificate, issued by a duly registered federation ornational union and reported to the Regional Office in accordance with Rule III, Section 2-E of these Rules(Sec. 1 (i), Rule 1, Book V of the Implementing Rules, as amended by DO No. 9)RA 9481 or "An Act Strengthening the Workers' Constitutional Right to Self-Organization, Amending forthe Purpose Presidential Decree No. 442, As Amended, Otherwise Known as the Labor Code of thePhilippines" lapsed into law on 25 May 2007 and became effective on 14 June 2007. This law furtheramends the Labor Code provisions on Labor Relations, including trade union centers in Art. 234. However,it still makes no mention that such organizations can create a local or a charter. [ Expressio unius estexclusio alterius , the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another . Expressium facit cessare tacitum .What is expressed puts an end to what is implied. Casus omissus pro omisso habendus est . A person,object or thing omitted must have been omitted intentionally. ]

o Therefore, since under the pertinent status and applicable implementing rules, the powergranted to labor organizations to directly create a chapter or local through chartering is given toa federation or national union, then a trade union center is without authority to charter directly.


11/29

o WHY? To prevent circumvention of labor union requirements. As a legitimate labor organizationis entitled to specific rights under the Labor Code and involved in activities directly affectingpublic interest, it is necessary that the law afford utmost protection to the parties affected.


12/29

Atty. Marino et. al. vs. Dr. Gamilla et. al.

G.R. No. 149763, July 7, 2009

FACTS:

Petitioners are among the executive officers and directors of University of Santo Tomas Faculty Union

(USTFU) while respondents are composed of UST faculty and USTFU members. The dispute arose when UST and

USTFU, represented by petitioners herein, entered a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) whereby UST faculty

members belonging to the CBA unit were granted additional economic benefits and at the same time stipulated a 10%

check-off over said benefits to cover union dues and special assessment fo r Labor Education Fund and attorneys fees.

Respondents filed with the Med Arbiter a complaint assailing, among others, the check- off for union dues and attorneys

fees collected under the MOA for being violative of the rights and conditions of membership in USTFU. DOLE

Regional Director, by virtue of an order consolidating all the complaints by the respondents, rendered among others adecision in favor of the latter and ruled that the check-off collected as negotiation fees were invalid. Both the BLR and

CA, on appeal, AFFIRMED said decision and ordered to return to the general membership the amount collected by way

of attorneys fees; hence this petition.

ISSUE:

Is the check- off of union dues and special assessment of attorneys fees inserted in the wri tten authorization

ratifying the MOA benefits valid?

LAW:

Article 222(b) and 241(n) and (o) of the Labor Code, as amended

RULING:

NO. The economic benefits package granted under the MOA did not constitute union funds from whichattorneys fees could have been validly deducted. Under Article 222(b), attorneys fees may only be paid from union

funds; yet the amount to be used in paying for the same does not become union funds until it is actually deducted as

attorneys fees from the benefits awarded to the employees. What the law requires is that the funds be already deemed

union funds even before the attorneys fees are deducted or paid therefrom; it does not become union funds after the

deduction or payment. To rule otherwise will also render the general prohibition stated in Article 222(b) nugatory,

because all that the union needs to do is to deduct from the total benefits awarded to the employees the amount


13/29

intended for attorneys fees and, thus, convert the latter to union funds, which could th en be used to pay for the said

attorneys fees. Furthermore, t he inclusion of the authorization for a check-off of union dues and special assessments for

the Labor Education Fund and attorneys fees in the same document for the ratification of the MOA gran ting the

economic benefits package, necessarily vitiated the consent of USTFU members for there was no way for any individual

union member to separate his or her consent to the ratification of the MOA from his or her authorization of the check-

off of union dues and special assessments. As it were, the ratification of the MOA carried with it the automatic

authorization of the check-off of union dues and special assessments in favor of the union. Substantial compliance is

not enough in view of the fact that the special assessment will diminish the compensation of the union members. Their

express consent is required, and this consent must be obtained in accordance with the steps outlined by law, which must

be followed to the letter. No shortcuts are allowed.

OPINION:

I concur with great conviction. . .

The instant case is a pure demonstration of a finesse and intelligent attempt to circumvent the law; but not

good enough under the watchful eyes of our magistrate. A check-off provision is in effect an encumbrance over the

wages/salaries of the worker, and under our laws, the salaries/wages of the labor should be left unencumbered except

for legal purposes or as a consequence of benefits received. The very nature of a check-off warrants regulation from the

State which is, among others, what is ought to be achieved by Article 222 and Article 241. An attempt to stale mate a

worker by incorporating a check-off provision in an agreement for additional benefits cannot stand in the eyes of law. A

separate consent is essential, to validate and authorize a stipulation for fees and cannot be incorporated in an agreement

granting benefits for the very reason that the two are just not meant for each other and one cannot give and at the same time takewhat has been give n .


14/29

Galvadores v. Trajano

September 15, 1986

Melencio-Herrera, J.

Petitioners: CARLOS P. GALVADORES, ET AL.

Respondents: CRESENCIANO B. TRAJANO, Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations, MANGGAGAWANG KOMUNIKASYON SA PILIPINAS (FIWU), PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE COMPANY (PLDT), and JOSE C.ESPINAS

Facts:

Petitioner employees of PLDT and members of respondent Free Telephone Workers Union(Union), question the legality of the check-off for attorney's fees amounting to P1M, more or less,of respondent Atty. Jose C. Espinas (hereinafter referred to as "Respondent Counsel") from themonetary benefits awarded to PLDT employees in a deadlocked collective bargaining agreementnegotiations between the PLDT and the Union.

The case stemmed from the following facts: Atty. Espinas hired on a case to case by the Union on contingent fee basis. He received a letter

from the Union President reading:o The Free Telephone Workers Union once again request you to appear as counsel in the

on going labor dispute at PLDT. In consideration of your services therein, the union bindsitself to compensate you for your fees and expenses therein on a contingent basis. The

amount shall be 10% of any improvement, with retroactive effect, of the PLDT's lastoffer to the deadlock in CBA negotiations which we know will result in a compulsoryarbitration. A supporting board resolution will later confirm the letter.

The Minister of Labor and Employment assumed jurisdiction over all unresolved issues in thebargaining deadlock and proceeded to resolve the same by compulsory arbitration.

o Minister of Labor awarded across-the-board wage increases in addition to the Christmasbonus of 1/2 month pay per employee and other fringe benefits. As will be noted, therewere improvements obtained from PLDT's "last offer."

The Executive Board of the Union passed a resolution requesting PLDT to deduct P115.00 peremployee for the legal services extended by Atty. Espinas.

Employees, initially numbering 600 and finally 5,258, filed a letter-complaint before the MOLEthrough their authorized representative, Galvadores, assailing the imposition of P130.00 (latercorrected to P155.00) per employee as attorney's fees of respondents counsel.

o Employees took the position that the attorney's fees were not only unreasonable but alsoviolative of Article 242(o) of the Labor Code; and that the deductions cannot given legaleffect by a mere Board resolution.

o Union and Counsel, on the other hand, proferred the argument that the attorneys feesbeing exacted pertained to his services during compulsory arbitration proceedings andcannot be considered as negotiation fees or attorney's fees within the context of Article242(o) of the Labor Code.

o Employees proposed a solution offering to pay P10/employee, but Atty. Espinas refused.


15/29

In the meantime, PLDT filed notice that assessment had been withheld from the differential paydue petitioners but that the same would not be turned over to the Union without prior MOLEauthority so as not to involve management in the intra-union disagreement.

The Minister of Labor referred the dispute to the Bureau of Labor Relations for being intra-unionnature. Several hearings were held by that Bureau.

The Union filed a Manifestation to the effect that about 6,067 members of the Union ratified the

resolution of the legislative council in a plebiscite called for that purpose. On the basis thereof,Counsel moved for the payment of his legal fees. The employees questioned the plebiscite on the ground that Question No. 2, which reads:

Question No. 2. Do you approve of the use of P1 million (P500,000.00 to bewithdrawn from PECCI and another P500,000.00 from IBAA) from our CBAnegotiation fund together with the attorney's fees (P1 million) that was collectedand to be loaned to the MKP/FTWU as our counterpart of the seed money tostart the housing program as agreed by the PLDT management and our unionpanel and included in the award of the MOLE?

o was misleading and deceptive as it assumed that there was no dispute regarding thededuction of attorney's fees from the monetary benefits awarded to PLDT employees.

Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations dismissed employees' complaint for lack of meritreasoning that "the outcome of the plebiscite negates any further question on the right of theunion counsel to collect the amount of P115 from each of the employees involved."

o This Decision that is assailed by petitioners principally on the ground that the individualwritten authorization of an the employees must first be obtained before any assessmentcan be made against the monetary benefits awarded to them pursuant to Article 242(o)of the Labor Code; and that assuming that Respondent Counsel is entitled to attorney'sfees, the same should be taken from Union funds.

o Union and Counsel argue that compulsory arbitration is a "mandatory activity" and anexception to Article 242(o) of the Labor Code, and that the Union members approved thequestioned deduction in the plebiscite of January, 1984, under the condition that P lM ofthe same would be made available for the Union's housing project.

Issue: WON the compulsory arbitration is a mandatory activity

Held: NO. The provisions are clear. No check-offs from any amounts due employees may be effectedwithout individual written authorizations duly signed by the employee specifically stating the amount,purpose and beneficiary of the deduction. The required individual authorizations in this case are wanting.In fact, petitioner employees are vigorously objecting. The question asked in the plebiscite, besides notbeing explicit, assumed that there was no dispute relative to attorney's fees.

Ratio:

Relevant provisions: o Article 222(b) of the Labor Code provides:

Article 222. Appearance and Fees. (b) No attorney's fees, negotiation fees or similar charges of any kindarising from any collective bargaining negotiations or conclusion of thecollective bargaining agreement shall be imposed on any individualmember of the contracting union; Provided, however, that attorney'sfees may be charged against union funds in an amount to be agreedupon by the parties. Any contract, agreement or arrangement of any sortto the contrary shall be null and void.

Article 242 of the same Code reads:


16/29

o Art. 242. Rights and conditions of membership in a labor organization. The following arethe rights and conditions of membership in a labor organization:

(o) Other than for mandatory activities under the Code, no special assessment,attorney's fees, negotiation fees or any other extraordinary fees may be checkedoff "from any amount due an employee without individual written authorizationduly signed by the employee. The authorization should specifically state the

amount, purpose and beneficiary of the deduction. The Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code also provide that deductions from wages ofthe employees may only be made by the employer in cases authorized by law, includingdeductions for insurance premiums advanced by the employer on behalf of the employees as wellas union dues where the right to check-off is authorized in writing by the individual employeehimself.

Contrary to Union's and Counsel's stand, the benefits awarded to PLDT employees still formedpart of the collective bargaining negotiations although placed already under compulsoryarbitration. This is not the "mandatory activity" under the Code which dispenses with individualwritten authorizations for check-offs, notwithstanding its "compulsory" nature. It is a judicialprocess of settling disputes laid down by law. Besides, Article 222(b) does not except a CBA, laterplaced under compulsory arbitration, from the ambit of its prohibition. The cardinal principleshould be borne in mind that employees are protected by law from unwarranted practices thatdiminish their compensation without their knowledge and consent.

Decision: Decision rendered by Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations SET ASIDE. The attorney'sfees herein involved may be charged against Union funds pursuant to Article 222(b) of the Labor Code,as may be agreed upon between them.

- Migs Cardenas


17/29

VENGCO vs TRAJANO(May 5, 1989)

[AMBROCIO VENGCO, RAMON MOISES, EUGENIA REYES, RAFAEL WAGAS and 80 others per attachedlist, petitionersvs. HON. CRESENCIANO B. TRAJANO, in his capacity as Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations andEMMANUEL TIMBUNGCO,respondents.]

Ponente: Medialdea, J.Nature: Petition for certiorari

FACTS:-The Management of the Anglo-American Tobacco Corporation and the Kapisananng Manggagawasa Anglo-American Tobacco Corporation (FOITAF) entered into a compromise agreement.

-The company is to pay the union members 150k for their claims arising from unpaid emergency cost of livingallowance (ECOLA) and other benefits which were the subject of their complaint before the Ministry of Labor.

-Timbungco (Union President) received the money in installments and distributed it among the members.Vengco et al (union members) aver that Timbungco was not authorized to get the money and that 10%attorneys fees had been deducted from the 150k without their written authorization in violation of 241 (o).They demanded accounting from Timbungco which the latter did not give.

-Vengco et al filed a complaint against Timbungco with the Ministry of Labor.

- Timbungco alleged among others, that he was authorized by a resolution signed by the majority of the unionmembers to receive and distribute the 150k among workers; that the 10% attorney's fees was in relation tothe claim for payment of ECOLA before the MoL which is totally distinct and separate from the negotiation ofthe CBA; and that the deduction was in accordance with Section II, Rule No. VIII, Book No. III of the Rules andRegulations implementing the Labor Code and therefore, no authorization from the union members isrequired.

-Med Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of merit

-Vengco et al appealed to the Bureau of Labor Relations

-Director Trajano of the Bureau of Labor Relations granted the appeal and ordered Timbungco to render a fullaccounting of the 150k and to publish in the unions bulletin board the recipient union mems and therespective amount they received

-Timbungco filed a MfR.Vengco et al filed opposition to said motion.

-Officer in Charge Calaycay set aside the decision and ordered an audit examination of the Books of Account ofthe union.


18/29

-Vengco sought recon contending that the examination of the books of accounts of the union is irrelevantconsidering that the issue involved in the case does not consist of union funds but back pay and thatTimbungco did not remit the money to the union treasurer so the amount was not entered in the records ofthe union.

-Trajano denied the motion for recon and affirmed the audit of the Books of Account.

-Hence this petition

ISSUES1. WON Timbunco is guilty of illegally deducting 10% attorneys fees from backwages YES.2. WON Trajano gravely abused discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in ordering examination of unionbooks instead of affirming his previous order expelling Timbungco and ordering him to render accounting -YES

RATIO:1. Art.241 states that no attorneys fees may be checke d off from any amount due an employee without

individual written authorization duly signed by employee which states amount, purpose, andbeneficiary of deduction. Attorneys fees may not be deducted except for mandatory activities 1. Here,the amicable sett lement entered by management and union cant be a mandatory activity. Althoughunion did claim for ECOLA before Ministry of Labor, this case never reached its conclusion in view ofthe parties agreement. It was also not shown that Atty. Sebastian was inst rumental in forging thesaid agreement. Also, Timbungco says that the Kapasiyahan gave him authority to deduct but theKapasiyahan was defective (it was not dated, pages were not captioned, did not state purpose) and sothe signatories were not properly apprised and had no knowledge of the deduction. The Kapasiyahanmerely indicated intention of workers to get claim on first week and cant confer authority uponTimbungco authority to receive benefits for them. Lastly, BookIII,RuleVIII,SecII of IRR (cited byTimboncgo) which disposes of the written authorization, does not apply because such applies whentheres judicial or administrative proceedings for recovery of wages. In this case, the benefits consistof unpaid ECOLA2 which are distinct from wages. Also, the payment of benefits were effectedthrough settlement and not administrative proceedings.

2. Timbungco should bear consequences and be expelled. Also, the issue does not touch on union duesor funds and money turned over was not given to the treasurer nor entered into the books, thusorders have no basis.

DISPOSITIVE:

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is granted. The assailed Orders dated May 23, 1983 of Officer-in-ChargeVictoriano R. Calaycay of the Bureau of Labor Relations, and April 2, 1986 of respondent Director CresencianoB. Trajano of the same Bureau are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the latter's decision dated December 29,1982 is hereby reinstated. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

VOTE : 1st Division. Narvasa, Cruz, and Grio-Aquino, JJ., concur. Gancayco, J., is on leave.

1 Judicial process of settling dispute laid down by the law2 Allowances are benefits over and above basic salaries.


19/29

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 146073. January 13, 2003]

JERRY E. ACEDERA, ANTONIO PARILLA, AND OTHERS LISTED IN ANNEX A, [1] pet i t ioners- appel lants , vs. INTERNATIONAL CONTAINER TERMINAL SERVICES, INC. (ICTSI),NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and HON. COURT OFAPPEALS, respondents-appel lees .

D E C I S I O N

CARPIO -MORALES, J .:

For consideration is the petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision of the Court of Appealsaffirming that of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) which affirmed the decision of the

Labor Arbiter denying herein petitioners- appellants Complaint -in-Intervention with Motion for Intervention.The antecedent facts are as follows:

Petitioners-appellants Jerry Acedera, et al. are employees of herein private respondent InternationalContainer Terminal Services, Inc. (ICTSI) and are officers/members of Associated Port Checkers &Workers Union-International Container Terminal Services, Inc. Local Chapter (APCWU-ICTSI), a labororganization duly registered as a local affiliate of the Associated Port Checkers & Workers Union(APCWU).

When ICTSI started its operations in 1988, it determined the rate of pay of its employees by using304 days, the number of days of work of the employees in a year, as divisor .[2]

On September 28, 1990, ICTSI entered into its first Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) with APCWU with a term of five years effective until September 28, 1995 . [3] The CBA was renegotiated and

thereafter renewed through a second CBA that took effect on September 29, 1995, effective for anotherfive years .[4] Both CBAs contained an identically-worded provision on hours and days of work reading:

Article IX

Regular Hours of Work and Days of Labor

Section 1. The regular working days in a week shall be five (5) days on any day from Monday to Sunday, as may bescheduled by the COMPANY, upon seven (7) days prior notice unless any of this day is declared a specialholiday .[5] (Underscoring omitted)

In accordance with the above- quoted provision of the CBA, the employees work week was reducedto five days or a total of 250 days a year. ICTSI, however, continued using the 304-day divisor incomputing the wages of the employees . [6]

On November 10, 1990, the Regional Tripartite Wage and Productivity Board (RTWPB) in theNational Capital Region decreed a P17.00 daily wage increase for all workers and employeesreceiving P125.00 per day or lower in the National Capital Region .[7] The then president of APCWU,together with some union members, thus requested the ICTSIs Human Resource Department/PersonnelManager to compute the actual monthly increa se in the employees wages by multiplying the RTWPBmandated increase by 365 days and dividing the product by 12 months . [8]
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/146073.htm#_ftn1http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/146073.htm#_ftn1http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/146073.htm#_ftn2http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/146073.htm#_ftn2http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/146073.htm#_ftn2http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/146073.htm#_ftn3http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/146073.htm#_ftn3http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/146073.htm#_ftn3http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/146073.htm#_ftn4http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/146073.htm#_ftn4http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/146073.htm#_ftn4http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/146073.htm#_ftn5http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/146073.htm#_ftn5http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/146073.htm#_ftn5http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/146073.htm#_ftn6http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/146073.htm#_ftn6http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/146073.htm#_ftn6http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/146073.htm#_ftn7http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/146073.htm#_ftn7http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/146073.htm#_ftn7http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/146073.htm#_ftn8http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/146073.htm#_ftn8http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/146073.htm#_ftn8http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/146073.htm#_ftn8http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/146073.htm#_ftn7http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/146073.htm#_ftn6http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/146073.htm#_ftn5http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/146073.htm#_ftn4http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/146073.htm#_ftn3http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/146073.htm#_ftn2http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/146073.htm#_ftn1


20/29

Heeding the proposal and following the implementation of the new wage order, ICTSI stopped using304 days as divisor and started using 365 days in determining the daily wage of its employees and otherconsequential compensation, even if the employees work week consisted of only five days as agreedupon in the CBA .[9]

In early 1997, ICTSI went on a retrenchment program and laid off its on-call employees . [10] Thisprompted the APCWU-ICTSI to file a notice of strike which included as cause of action not only theretrenchment of the employees but also ICTSIs use of 365 days as divisor in the computat ion ofwages .[11] The dispute respecting the retrenchment was resolved by a compromise settlemen t[12] whilethat respecting the computation of wages was referred to the Labor Arbiter . [13]

On February 26, 1997, APCWU, on behalf of its members and other employees similarly situated,filed with the Labor Arbiter a complaint against ICTSI which was dismissed for APCWUs failure to file itsposition paper . [14] Upon the demand of herein petitioners-appellants, APCWU filed a motion to revive thecase which was granted. APCWU thereupon filed its position paper on August 22, 1997 .[15]

On December 8, 1997, petitioners-appellants filed with the Labor Arbiter a Complaint-in-Interventionwith Motion to Intervene .[16] In the petition at bar, they justified their move to intervene in this wise:

[S]hould the union succeed in prosecuting the case and in getting a favorable reward it is actually they that would benefit from the decision. On the other hand, should the union fail to prove its case, or to prosecute the casediligently, the individual workers or members of the union would suffer great and immeasurable loss. [t]heywanted to insure by their intervention that the case would thereafter be prosecuted with all due diligence and wouldnot again be dismissed for lack of interest to prosecute on the part of the union . [17]

The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, decision is hereby rendered declaring that the correct divisor in computing the daily wage and otherlabor standard benefits of the employees of respondent ICTSI who are members of complainant Union as well as theother employees similarly situated is two hundred fifty (250) days such that said respondent is hereby ordered to paythe employees concerned the differentials representing the underpayment of said salaries and other benefitsreckoned three (3) years back from February 26, 1997, the date of filing of this complaint or computed fromFebruary 27 1994 until paid, but for purposes of appeal, the salary differentials are temporarily computed for oneyear in the amount of Four Hundred Sixty Eight Thousand Forty Pesos (P468,040.00) .[18]

In the same decision, the Labor Arbiter denied petitioners- appellants Complaint -in-Intervention withMotion for Intervention upon a finding that they are already well represented by APCWU . [19]

On appeal, the NLRC reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter and dis missed APCWUs complaintfor lack of merit . [20] The denial of petitioners- appellants intervention was, however, affirmed .[21]

Unsatisfied with the decision of the NLRC, APCWU filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals while petitioners-appellants filed theirs with this Court which referred the pet itio n[22] to the Courtof Appeals.

The Court of Appeals dismissed APCWUs petition on the following grounds: failure to allege whenits motion for reconsideration of the NLRC decision was filed, failure to attach the necessary appendicesto the petition, and failure to file its motion for extension to file its petition within the reglementaryperiod . [23]

As for petitioners- appellants petition for certiorari, it was dismissed by the Court of Appeals in thiswise:

It is clear from the records that herein petitioners, claiming to be employees of respondent ICTSI, are already wellrepresented by its employees union, APCWU , in the petition before this Court (CA-G.R. SP. No. 53266) althoughthe same has been dismissed. The present petition is, therefore a superfluity that deserves to bedismissed. Furthermore, only Acedera signed the Certificate of non-forum shopping . On this score alone, this
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/146073.htm#_ftn9http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/146073.htm#_ftn9http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/146073.htm#_ftn9http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/146073.htm#_ftn10http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/146073.htm#_ftn10http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/146073.htm#_ftn10http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/146073.htm#_ftn11http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/146073.htm#_ftn11http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/146073.htm#_ftn11http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/146073.htm#_ftn12http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/146073.htm#_ftn12http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/146073.htm#_ftn12http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/146073.htm#_ftn13http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/146073.htm#_ftn13http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/146073.htm#_ftn13http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/146073.htm#_ftn14http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/146073.htm#_ftn14http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/146073.htm#_ftn14http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/146073.htm#_ftn15http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/146073.htm#_ftn15http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/146073.htm#_ftn15http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/146073.htm#_ftn16http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/146073.htm#_ftn16http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/146073.htm#_ftn16http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/146073.htm#_ftn17http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/146073.htm#_ftn17http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/146073.htm#_ftn17http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/146073.htm#_ftn18http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/146073.htm#_ftn18http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/146073.htm#_ftn18http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/146073.htm#_ftn19http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/146073.htm#_ftn19http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/146073.htm#_ftn19http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/146073.htm#_ftn20http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/146073.htm#_ftn20http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/146073.htm#_ftn20http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/146073.htm#_ftn21http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/146073.htm#_ftn21http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/146073.htm#_ftn21http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/146073.htm#_ftn22http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/146073.htm#_ftn22http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/146073.htm#_ftn22http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/146073.htm#_ftn23http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/146073.htm#_ftn23http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/146073.htm#_ftn23http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/146073.htm#_ftn23http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/146073.htm#_ftn22http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/146073.htm#_ftn21http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/146073.htm#_ftn20http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/146073.htm#_ftn19http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/146073.htm#_ftn18http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/146073.htm#_ftn17http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/146073.htm#_ftn16http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/146073.htm#_ftn15http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/146073.htm#_ftn14http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/146073.htm#_ftn13http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/146073.htm#_ftn12http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/146073.htm#_ftn11http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/146073.htm#_ftn10http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/146073.htm#_ftn9


21/29

petition should likewise be dismissed. We find that the same has no merit considering that herein petitioners havenot presented any meritorious argument that would justify the reversal of the Decision of the NLRC.

Article IX of the CBA provides:

REGULAR HOURS OF WORK AND DAYS OF LABOR

Section 1. The regular working days in a week shall be five (5) days on any day from Monday to Sunday, as may be scheduled by the COMPANY, upon s even (7) days prior notice unless any of this day is declared a special holiday.

This provision categorically states the required number of working days an employee is expected to work for aweek. It does not, however, indicate the manner in which an empl oyees salary is to be computed. In fact, nothing inthe CBA makes any referral to any divisor which should be the basis for determining the salary. The NLRC,therefore, correctly ruled that xxx the absence of any express or specific provision in the CBA that 250 days shouldbe used as divisor altogether makes the position of the Union untenable.

x x x

Considering that herein petitioners themselves requested that 365 days be used as the divisor in computing theirwage increase and later did not raise or object to the same during the negotiations of the new CBA, they are clearlyestopped to now complain of such computation only because they no longer benefit from it. Indeed, the 365 divisorfor the past seven (7) years has already become practice and law between the company and itsemployees .[24] (Emphasis supplied)

x x x

Hence, the present petition of petitioners-appellants who fault the Court of Appeals as follows:

I

. . . IN REJECTING THE CBA OF THE PARTIES AS THE SOURCE OF THE DIVISOR TO DETERMINE THEWORKERS DAILY RATE TOTALLY DISREGARDED THE APPLICABLE LANDMARK DECISIONS OFTHE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT ON THE MATTER.

II

. . . [IN] DISREGARD[ING] APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT WHEN IT RULEDTHAT THE PETITIONERS-APPELLANTS ARE ALREADY IN ESTOPPEL.

III

. . . IN RULING THAT THE PETITIONERS-APPELLANTS HAVE NO LEGAL RIGHT TO INTERVENE INAND PURSUE THIS CASE AND THAT THEIR INTERVENTION IS A SUPERFLUITY.

IV

. . . IN HOLDING, ALTHOUGH MERELY AS AN OBITER DICTUM , THAT ONLY PETITIONER JERRYACEDERA SIGNED THE CERTIFICATE OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING .[25]

The third assigned error respecting petitioners- appellants right to intervene shall first be passedupon, it being determinative of their right to raise the other assigned errors.
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/146073.htm#_ftn24http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/146073.htm#_ftn24http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/146073.htm#_ftn24http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/146073.htm#_ftn25http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/146073.htm#_ftn25http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/146073.htm#_ftn25http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/146073.htm#_ftn25http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/146073.htm#_ftn24


22/29

Petitioners-appellants anchor their right to intervene on Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,Section 1 of which reads:

Section 1. Who may intervene .- A person who has legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of eitherof the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated to be adversely affected by a distribution or otherdisposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to

intervene in the action. The court shall consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice theadjudication of the rights of the original parties, and whether or not the intervenors right may be fully protected in aseparate proceeding.

They stress that they have complied with the requisites for intervention because (1) they are theones who stand to gain or lose by the direct legal operation and effect of any judgment that may berendered in this case, (2) no undue delay or prejudice would result from their intervention since theirComplaint-in-Intervention with Motion for Intervention was filed while the Labor Arbiter was still hearingthe case and before any decision thereon was rendered, and (3) it was not possible for them to file aseparate case as they would be guilty of forum shopping because the only forum available for them wasthe Labor Arbiter .[26]

Petitioners-appellants, however, failed to consider, in addition to the rule on intervention, the rule onrepresentation, thusly:

Sec. 3. Representatives as parties.- Where the action is allowed to be prosecuted or defended by a representative orsomeone acting in a fiduciary capacity, the beneficiary shall be included in the title of the case and shall be deemedto be the real party in interest. A representative may be a trustee of an express trust, a guardian, an executor oradministrator, or a party authorized by law or these Rules. . . [27] (Emphasis supplied)

A labor union is one such party authorized to represent its members under Article 242(a) of theLabor Code which provides that a union may act as the representative of its members for the purpose ofcollective bargaining. This authority includes the power to represent its members for the purpose ofenforcing the provisions of the CBA. That APCWU acted in a representative capacity for and in behalf ofits Union members and other employees similarly situated, the title of the case filed by it at the Labor

Arbiters Office so expressly states.

While a party acting in a representative capacity, such as a union, may be permitted to intervene in acase, ordinarily, a person whose interests are already represented will not be permitted to do thesame [28] except when there is a suggestion of fraud or collusion or that the representative will not act ingood faith for the protection of all interests represented by him . [29]

Petitioners-appellants cite the dismissal of the case filed by ICTSI, first by the Labor Arbiter, and laterby the Court of Appeals . [30] The dismissal of the case does not, however, by itself show the existence offraud or collusion or a lack of good faith on the part of APCWU. There must be clear and convincingevidence of fraud or collusion or lack of good faith independently of the dismissal. This, petitioners-appellants failed to proffer.

Petitioners-appellants likewise express their fear that APCWU would not prosecute the casediligen tly because of its sweetheart relationship with ICTSI . [31] There is nothing on record, however, tosupport this alleged relationship which allegation surfaces as a mere afterthought because it was never

raised early on. It was raised only in petitioners- appellants reply to ICTSIs comment in the petition atbar, the last pleading submitted to this Court, which was filed on June 20, 2001 or more than 42 monthsafter petitioners-appellants filed their Complaint-in-Intervention with Motion to Intervene with the Labor

Arbiter.

To reiterate, for a member of a class to be permitted to intervene in a representative action, fraud orcollusion or lack of good faith on the part of the representative must be proven. It must be based on factsborne on record. Mere assertions, as what petitioners-appellants proffer, do not suffice.

The foregoing discussion leaves it unnecessary to discuss the other assigned errors.
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/146073.htm#_ftn26http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/146073.htm#_ftn26http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/146073.htm#_ftn26http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/146073.htm#_ftn27http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/146073.htm#_ftn27http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/146073.htm#_ftn27http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/146073.htm#_ftn28http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/146073.htm#_ftn28http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/146073.htm#_ftn29http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/146073.htm#_ftn29http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/146073.htm#_ftn29http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/146073.htm#_ftn30http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/146073.htm#_ftn30http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/146073.htm#_ftn30http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/146073.htm#_ftn31http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/146073.htm#_ftn31http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/146073.htm#_ftn31http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/146073.htm#_ftn31http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/146073.htm#_ftn30http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/146073.htm#_ftn29http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/146073.htm#_ftn28http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/146073.htm#_ftn27http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/146073.htm#_ftn26


23/29

WHEREFORE, the present petition is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, J., (Chairman), Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Corona, JJ., concur.


24/29

Golden Donuts, Inc. v. NLRC [G.R. Nos. 113666-68, January 19, 2000.]

FACTS: Private respondents were the complainants in three consolidated cases submitted

with the Labor Arbiter. Complainants were members of the KMDD-CFW whose CBA with

the corporationexpired. During the negotiations, the management panel arrived late causing

the union panel to walk out. The management addressed aletter of apology to the union and

requested for negotiations to resume. The union panel did not show up despite letters from

management advising the former of the CBA meetings. The union struck. A compliant was

filed by Golden Donuts to declare the strike illegal. Counsel for the union and strikers

pleaded for a compromise whereupon both parties would desist from continuing their cases

against each other. The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision upholding the dismissal of private

respondents and ruling that they were bound by the compromise agreement entered into by

the union with petitioners. Private respondents appealed to the NLRC, claiming that the

union had no authority to waive or compromise their individual rights and they were not

bound by the compromise agreement entered into by the union with petitioners.

ISSUE: Whether or not a union may compromise or waive the right to security of tenure

and money claims of its minority members, without the latters consent.

HELD: No. Absent a showing of the unions special authority to compromise the individual

claims of private respondents for reinstatement and backwages, there is no valid waiver of

the aforesaid rights. The judgment of the Labor Arbiter based on the compromise

agreement does not have the effect of res judicata upon private respondents who did not

agree thereto since the requirement of identity of parties is not satisfied. A judgment upon

a compromise agreement has all the force and effect of any other judgment and is

conclusive only upon parties thereto and their privies. Private respondents have not waived

their right to security of tenure nor can they be barred from entitlement of their individual

claims. Since there was no evidence that private respondents committed any illegal act,

petitioners failure to reinstate them after the settlement of the strike amounts to illegal

dismissal.
http://cofferette.blogspot.com/2009/01/golden-donuts-inc-v-nlrc-gr-nos-113666.htmlhttp://cofferette.blogspot.com/2009/01/golden-donuts-inc-v-nlrc-gr-nos-113666.html


25/29

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Baguio City

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 161933 April 22, 2008

STANDARD CHARTERED BANK EMPLOYEES UNION (SCBEU-NUBE), petitioner,vs.STANDARD CHARTERED BANK and ANNEMARIE DURBIN, in her capacity as Chief ExecutiveOfficer, Philippines, Standard Chartered Bank, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J . :

For resolution is an appeal by certiorari filed by petitioner under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailingthe Decisio n1 dated October 9, 2002 and Resolution 2 dated January 26, 2004 issued by the Court of

Appeals (CA), dismissing their petition and affirming the Secretary of Labor and Employment's Ordersdated May 31, 2001 and August 30, 2001.

Petitioner and the Standard Chartered Bank (Bank) began negotiating for a new Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) in May 2000 as their 1998-2000 CBA already expired. Due to a deadlock in thenegotiations, petitioner filed a Notice of Strike prompting the Secretary of Labor and Employment toassume jurisdiction over the labor dispute.

On May 31, 2001, Secretary Patricia A. Sto. Tomas of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE)issued an Order with the following dispositive portion:

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Standard Chartered Bank and the Standard

Chartered Bank Employees Union are directed to execute their collective bargaining agreementeffective 01 April 2001 until 30 March 2003 incorporating therein the foregoing dispositions andthe agreements they reached in the course of negotiations and conciliation. All other submittedissues that were not passed upon are dismissed.

The charge of unfair labor practice for bargaining in bad faith and the claim for damages relatingthereto are hereby dismissed for lack of merit.

Finally, the charge of unfair labor practice for gross violation of the economic provisions of theCBA is hereby dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

SO ORDERED .3

Both petitioner and the Bank filed their respective motions for reconsideration, which were denied by theSecretary per Order dated August 30, 2001 .4

Petitioner sought recourse with the CA via a petition for certiorari , and in the assailed Decision datedOctober 9, 200 25 and Resolution dated January 26, 2004 ,6 the CA dismissed their petition and affirmedthe Secretary's Orders.

Hence, herein petition based on the following grounds:
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/apr2008/gr_161933_2008.html#fnt1http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/apr2008/gr_161933_2008.html#fnt1http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/apr2008/gr_161933_2008.html#fnt1http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/apr2008/gr_161933_2008.html#fnt2http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/apr2008/gr_161933_2008.html#fnt2http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/apr2008/gr_161933_2008.html#fnt3http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/apr2008/gr_161933_2008.html#fnt3http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/apr2008/gr_161933_2008.html#fnt3http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/apr2008/gr_161933_2008.html#fnt4http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/apr2008/gr_161933_2008.html#fnt4http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/apr2008/gr_161933_2008.html#fnt4http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/apr2008/gr_161933_2008.html#fnt5http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/apr2008/gr_161933_2008.html#fnt5http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/apr2008/gr_161933_2008.html#fnt5http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/apr2008/gr_161933_2008.html#fnt6http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/apr2008/gr_161933_2008.html#fnt6http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/apr2008/gr_161933_2008.html#fnt6http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/apr2008/gr_161933_2008.html#fnt6http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/apr2008/gr_161933_2008.html#fnt5http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/apr2008/gr_161933_2008.html#fnt4http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/apr2008/gr_161933_2008.html#fnt3http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/apr2008/gr_161933_2008.html#fnt2http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/apr2008/gr_161933_2008.html#fnt1


26/29

I.

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN DECIDING THAT THERE WAS NO BASIS FOR REVISINGTHE SCOPE OF EXCLUSIONS FROM THE APPROPRIATE BARGAINING UNIT UNDER THECBA.

II.

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN DECIDING THAT A ONE-MONTH OR LESS TEMPORARYOCCUPATION OF A POSITION (ACTING CAPACITY) DOES NOT MERIT ADJUSTMENT INREMUNERATION .7

The resolution of this case has been overtaken by the execution of the parties' 2003-2005 CBA. Whilethis would render the case moot and academic, nevertheless, the likelihood that the same issues willcome up in the parties' future CBA negotiations is not far-fetched, thus compelling its resolution. Courtswill decide a question otherwise moot if it is capable of repetition yet evading review.[8]

The CBA provisions in dispute are the exclusion of certain employees from the appropriate bargainingunit and the adjustment of remuneration for employees serving in an acting capacity for one month.

In their proposal, petitioner sought the exclusion of only the following employees from the appropriatebargaining unit all managers who are vested with the right to hire and fire employees, confidentialemployees, those with access to labor relations materials, Chief Cashiers, Assistant Cashiers, personnelof the Telex Department and one Human Resources (HR) staff .9

In the previous 1998-2000 CBA ,10 the excluded employees are as follows:

A. All covenanted and assistant officers (now called National Officers)

B. One confidential secretary of each of the:

1. Chief Executive, Philippine Branches

2. Deputy Chief Executive/Head, Corporate Banking Group

3. Head, Finance

4. Head, Human Resources

5. Manager, Cebu

6. Manager, Iloilo

7. Covenanted Officers provided said positions shall be filled by new recruits.

C. The Chief Cashiers and Assistant Cashiers in Manila, Cebu and Iloilo, and in any other branchthat the BANK may establish in the country.

D. Personnel of the Telex Department

E. All Security Guards
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/apr2008/gr_161933_2008.html#fnt7http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/apr2008/gr_161933_2008.html#fnt7http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/apr2008/gr_161933_2008.html#fnt7http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/apr2008/gr_161933_2008.html#fnt9http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/apr2008/gr_161933_2008.html#fnt9http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/apr2008/gr_161933_2008.html#fnt9http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/apr2008/gr_161933_2008.html#fnt10http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/apr2008/gr_161933_2008.html#fnt10http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/apr2008/gr_161933_2008.html#fnt10http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/apr2008/gr_161933_2008.html#fnt10http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/apr2008/gr_161933_2008.html#fnt9http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/apr2008/gr_161933_2008.html#fnt7


27/29

F. Probationary employees, without prejudice to Article 277 (c) of the Labor Code, as amendedby R.A. 6715, casuals or emergency employees; and

G. One (1) HR Staf f 11

The Secretary, however, maintained the previous exclusions because petitioner failed to show that the

employees sought to be removed from the list qualify for exclusion .12

With regard to the remuneration of employees working in an acting capacity, it was petitioner's positionthat additional pay should be given to an employee who has been serving in a temporary/acting capacityfor one week. The Secretary likewise rejected petitioner's proposal and instead, allowed additional pay forthose who had been working in such capacity for one month. The Secretary agreed with the Bank'sposition that a restrictive provision would curtail management's prerogative, and at the same time,recognized that employees should not be made to work in an acting capacity for long periods of timewithout adequate compensation.

The Secretary's disposition of the issues raised by petitioner were affirmed by the CA .13 The Courtsustains the CA.

Whether or not the employees sought to be excluded from the appropriate bargaining unit are confidentialemployees is a question of fact, which is not a proper issue in a petition for review under Rule 45 of theRules of Court .14 This holds more true in the present case in which petitioner failed to controvert withevidence the findings of the Secretary and the CA.

The disqualification of managerial and confidential employees from joining a bargaining unit for rank andfile employees is already well-entrenched in jurisprudence. While Article 245 of the Labor Code limits theineligibility to join, form and assist any labor organization to managerial employees, jurisprudence hasextended this prohibition to confidential employees or those who by reason of their positions or nature ofwork are required to assist or act in a fiduciary manner to managerial employees and hence, are likewiseprivy to sensitive and highly confidential records .15

In this case, the question that needs to be answered is whether the Bank's Chief Cashiers and AssistantCashiers, personnel of the Telex Department and HR staff are confidential employees, such that theyshould be excluded.

As regards the qualification of bank cashiers as confidential employees, National Association of TradeUnions (NATU) Republic Planters Bank Supervisors Chapter v. Torre s 16 declared that they areconfidential employees having control, custody and/or access to confidential matters, e.g ., the branch'scash position, statements of financial condition, vault combination, cash codes for telegr

labrel cases (v vi vii)

Documents