Labor Relations Cases

1. KNITJOY MANUFACTURING, INC., PETITIONER, VS. PURA FERRER-CALLEJAISSUE:

I. Whether or not petitioner KNITJOY'S monthly-paid regular rank-and-file employees can constitute an appropriate bargaining unit separate and distinct from the existing unit composed of daily or piece-rate paid regular rank-and-file employees.

II. Whether or not the inclusion in the coverage of the new CBA between KNITJOY and CFW of the monthly-paid rank-and-file employees bars the holding of a certification election among the said monthly paid employees.

DOCTRINE: I. While it is true that the policy of the DOLE is to favor a one company-one union scenario

which finds basis in Section 2, Rule V, Book V of the Rules Implementing the Labor Code, there are, nonetheless, some exceptions thereto, as where the bargaining history requires the formation of another bargaining unit. Besides, such a policy must yield to an employee's Constitutional right to form unions which includes the freedom to join a union of one's choice.Otherwise stated, the one company-one union policy must yield to the right of the employees to form unions or associations for purposes not contrary to law, to self-organization and to enter into collective bargaining negotiations, among others, which the Constitution guarantees.

II. In the latter case, KNITJOY and CFW are guilty of contumacious conduct. It goes without saying then that the new CBA cannot validly include in its scope or coverage the monthly-paid rank-and-file employees of KNITJOY. It does not bar the holding of a certification election to determine their sole bargaining agent and the negotiation for and the execution of a subsequent CBA between KNITJOY and the eventual winner in said election.

2. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS) and WINSTON F. GARCIA, in his capacity as GSIS President & General Manager, petitioners, vs.KAPISANAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA GSIS, respondents.ISSUE: Whether or not the strike conducted by the GSIS employees were valid.DOCTRINE: The 1987 Constitution expressly guaranteeing, for the first time, the right of government personnel to self-organization to complement the provision according workers the right to engage in "peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law.". It was against the backdrop of the aforesaid provisions of the 1987 Constitution that the Court resolved Bangalisan v. Court of Appeals. In it, we held, citing MPSTA v. Laguio, Jr., that employees in the public service may not engage in strikes or in concerted and unauthorized stoppage of work; that the right of government employees to organize is limited to the formation of unions or associations, without including the right to strike.As regards the right to strike, the Constitution itself qualifies its exercise with the provision "in accordance with law." This is a clear manifestation that the state may, by law, regulate the use of this right, or even deny certain sectors such right. Executive Order 180 which provides

guidelines for the exercise of the right of government workers to organize, for instance, implicitly endorsed an earlier CSC circular which "enjoins under pain of administrative sanctions, all government officers and employees from staging strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walkouts and other forms of mass action which will result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public service" by stating that the Civil Service law and rules governing concerted activities and strikes in government service shall be observed.

3. UNITED PEPSI-COLA SUPERVISORY UNION (UPSU), petitioner, vs. HON. BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA and PEPSI-COLA PRODUCTS, PHILIPPINES, INC. respondents.ISSUE:

I. Whether the route managers at Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc. are managerial employees.

II. Whether Art. 245, insofar as it prohibits managerial employees from forming, joining or assisting labor unions, violates Art. III, §8 of the Constitution.

DOCTRINE:

I. To qualify as managerial employee, there must be a clear showing of the exercise of managerial attributes under paragraph (m), Article 212 of the Labor Code as amended. Designations or titles of positions are not controlling. As to the route managers and accounting manager, we are convinced that they are managerial employees. Their job descriptions clearly reveal so (Worker's Alliance Trade Union (WATU) v. Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc., Nov. 13, 1991)Distinction is evident in the work of the route managers which sets them apart from supervisors in general. Unlike supervisors who basically merely direct operating employees in line with set tasks assigned to them, route managers are responsible for the success of the company's main line of business through management of their respective sales teams. Such management necessarily involves the planning, direction, operation and evaluation of their individual teams and areas which the work of supervisors does not entail.The route managers cannot thus possibly be classified as mere supervisors because their work does not only involve, but goes far beyond, the simple direction or supervision of operating employees to accomplish objectives set by those above them.

II. The distinction between top and middle managers, who set management policy, and front-line supervisors, who are merely responsible for ensuring that such policies are carried out by the rank and file, is articulated in the present definition. When read in relation to this definition in Art. 212(m), it will be seen that Art. 245 faithfully carries out the intent of the Constitutional Commission in framing Art. III, §8 of the fundamental law.

*Framer’s Intent: MR. LERUM. My amendment is on Section 7, page 2, line 19, which is to insert between the words "people" and "to" the following: WHETHER EMPLOYED BY THE STATE OR PRIVATE ESTABLISHMENTS. In other words, the section will now read as follows: "The right of the people WHETHER

EMPLOYED BY THE STATE OR PRIVATE ESTABLISHMENTS to form associations, unions, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged."

The guarantee of organizational right in Art. III, §8 is not infringed by a ban against managerial employees forming a union. The right guaranteed in Art. III, §8 is subject to the condition that its exercise should be for purposes "not contrary to law." In the case of Art. 245, there is a rational basis for prohibiting managerial employees from forming or joining labor organizations.

4. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE),Petitioner, vs.KAWASHIMA TEXTILE MFG., PHILIPPINES, INC., Respondent.ISSUE:

I. Whether a mixed membership of rank-and-file and supervisory employees in a union is a ground for the dismissal of a petition for certification election in view of the amendment brought about by D.O. 9, series of 1997, which deleted the phraseology in the old rule that "[t]he appropriate bargaining unit of the rank-and-file employee shall not include the supervisory employees and/or security guards;"

II. Whether the legitimacy of a duly registered labor organization can be collaterally attacked in a petition for a certification election through a motion to dismiss filed by an employer such as Kawashima Textile Manufacturing Phils., Inc.

DOCTRINE:

I. A labor organization composed of both rank-and-file and supervisory employees is no labor organization at all. It cannot, for any guise or purpose, be a legitimate labor organization. Not being one, an organization which carries a mixture of rank-and-file and supervisory employees cannot possess any of the rights of a legitimate labor organization, including the right to file a petition for certification election for the purpose of collective bargaining. It becomes necessary, therefore, anterior to the granting of an order allowing a certification election, to inquire into the composition of any labor organization whenever the status of the labor organization is challenged on the basis of Article 245 of the Labor Code xxxxBut then, on June 21, 1997, the 1989 Amended Omnibus Rules was further amended by Department Order No. 9, series of 1997 (1997 Amended Omnibus Rules). Specifically, the requirement under Sec. 2(c) of the 1989 Amended Omnibus Rules - that the petition for certification election indicate that the bargaining unit of rank-and-file employees has not been mingled with supervisory employees - was removed. The petition for certification election notwithstanding the mixed composition of its members is granted.

II. Sec. 4. A new provision is hereby inserted into the Labor Code as Article 238-A to read as follows:

"Art. 238-A. Effect of a Petition for Cancellation of Registration. - A petition for cancellation of union registration shall not suspend the proceedings for certification election nor shall it prevent the filing of a petition for certification election. In case of cancellation, nothing herein shall restrict the

right of the union to seek just and equitable remedies in the appropriate courts."

Furthermore, under Section 12 of R.A. No. 9481, employers have no personality to interfere with or thwart a petition for certification election filed by a legitimate labor organization, to wit:

"Art. 258-A. Employer as Bystander. - In all cases, whether the petition for certification election is filed by an employer or a legitimate labor organization, the employer shall not be considered a party thereto with a concomitant right to oppose a petition for certification election. The employer's participation in such proceedings shall be limited to: (1) being notified or informed of petitions of such nature; and (2) submitting the list of employees during the pre-election conference should the Med-Arbiter act favorably on the petition."

5. SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION SUPERVISORS AND EXEMPT UNION AND ERNESTO L. PONCE, President V. HONORABLE BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA IN HIS CAPACITY AS UNDERSECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENTISSUE:

I. Whether Supervisory employees 3 and 4 and the exempt employees of the company are considered confidential employees, hence ineligible from joining a union.

II. If they are not confidential employees, do the employees of the three plants constitute an appropriate single bargaining unit.

DOCTRINES:

I. On the first issue, this Court rules that said employees do not fall within the term "confidential employees" who may be prohibited from joining a union.Confidential employees are those who (1) assist or act in a confidential capacity, (2) to persons who formulate, determine, and effectuate management policies in the field of labor relations. The two criteria are cumulative, and both must be met if an employee is to be considered a confidential employee — that is, the confidential relationship must exist between the employee and his supervisor, and the supervisor must handle the prescribed responsibilities relating to labor relations. The exclusion from bargaining units of employees who, in the normal course of their duties, become aware of management policies relating to labor relations is a principal objective sought to be accomplished by the ''confidential employee rule." The broad rationale behind this rule is that employees should not be placed in a position involving a potential conflict of interests. "Management should not be required to handle labor relations matters through employees who are represented by the union with which the company is required to deal and who in the normal performance of their duties may obtain advance information of the company's position with regard to contract negotiations, the disposition of grievances, or other labor relations matters."

The Court held that "if these managerial employees would belong to or be affiliated with a Union, the latter might not be assured of their loyalty to the Union in view of evident conflict of interest. The Union can also become company-dominated with the presence of managerial employees in Union membership."

II. The fact that the three plants are located in three different places, namely, in Cabuyao, Laguna, in Otis, Pandacan, Metro Manila, and in San Fernando, Pampanga is immaterial. Geographical location can be completely disregarded if the communal or mutual interests of the employees are not sacrificed.An appropriate bargaining unit may be defined as "a group of employees of a given employer, comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of employees, which the collective interest of all the employees, consistent with equity to the employer, indicate to be best suited to serve the reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the collective bargaining provisions of the law."A unit to be appropriate must effect a grouping of employees who have substantial, mutual interests in wages, hours, working conditions and other subjects of collective bargaining.

6. SUGBUANON RURAL BANK, INC. v. HON. UNDERSECRETARY BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENTISSUE:

I. Whether or not the members of the respondent union are managerial employees and/or highly-placed confidential employees, hence prohibited by law from joining labor organizations and engaging in union activities.

II. Whether or not the Med-Arbiter may validly order the holding of a certification election upon the filing of a petition for certification election by a registered union, despite the petitioner's appeal pending before the DOLE Secretary against the issuance of the union's registration.

DOCTRINES:

I. Petitioner's explanation does not state who among the employees has access to information specifically relating to its labor relations policies. Confidential employees are those who (1) assist or act in a confidential capacity, in regard (2) to persons who formulate, determine, and effectuate management policies [specifically in the field of labor relations].9 The two criteria are cumulative, and both must be met if an employee is to be considered a confidential employee — that is, the confidential relationship must exist between the employee and his superior officer; and that officer must handle the prescribed responsibilities relating to labor relations.Art. 245 of the Labor Code does not directly prohibit confidential employees from engaging in union activities. However, under the doctrine of necessary implication, the disqualification of managerial employees equally applies to confidential employees. The

confidential-employee rule justifies exclusion of confidential employees because in the normal course of their duties they become aware of management policies relating to labor relations. It must be stressed, however, that when the employee does not have access to confidential labor relations information, there is no legal prohibition against confidential employees from forming, assisting, or joining a union.

II. One of the rights of a legitimate labor organization under Article 242(b) of the Labor Code is the right to be certified as the exclusive representative of all employees in an appropriate bargaining unit for purposes of collective bargaining. Having complied with the requirements of Art. 234, it is our view that respondent union is a legitimate labor union. Article 257 of the Labor Code mandates that a certification election shall automatically be conducted by the Med-Arbiter upon the filing of a petition by a legitimate labor organization. Nothing is said therein that prohibits such automatic conduct of the certification election if the management appeals on the issue of the validity of the union's registration. On this score, petitioner's appeal was correctly dismissed.

7. MERALCO vs Secretary of LaborISSUE: Whether or not security guards may join rank-and-file or supervisors union.DOCTRINE: While therefore under the old rules, security guards were barred from joining a labor organization of the rank and file, under RA 6715, they may now freely join a labor organization of the rank and file or that of the supervisory union, depending on their rank. We are aware however of possible consequences in the implementation of the law in allowing security personnel to join labor unions within the company they serve. The law is apt to produce divided loyalties in the faithful performance of their duties. Economic reasons would present the employees concerned with the temptation to subordinate their duties to the allegiance they owe the union of which they are members, aware as they are that it is usually union action that obtains for them increased pecuniary benefits.Thus, in the event of a strike declared by their union, security personnel may neglect or outrightly abandon their duties, such as protection of property of their employer and the persons of its officials and employees, the control of access to the employer's premises, and the maintenance of order in the event of emergencies and untoward incidents.

8. Central Negros Electric Cooperative vs DOLEISSUE: Whether or not employees of CENECO who withdrew their membership from the cooperative are entitled to form or join CURE for purposes of the negotiations for a collective bargaining agreement proposed by the latter.DOCTRINE: The right of the employees to self-organization is a compelling reason why their withdrawal from the cooperative must be allowed. As pointed out by CURE, the resignation of the member- employees is an expression of their preference for union membership over that of membership in the cooperative. The avowed policy of the State to afford full protection to labor and to promote the primacy of free collective bargaining mandates that the employees' right to form and join unions for purposes of collective bargaining be accorded the highest consideration.

Thus, member employees of a cooperative may withdraw as members of the cooperative in order to join labor union. Membership in a cooperative is voluntary; inherent in it is the right not to join.

NOTES: (San Jose Electric Service Cooperative vs. Ministry of Labor)

An employee therefore of such a cooperative who is a member and co-owner thereof cannot invoke the right to collective bargaining for certainly an owner cannot bargain with himself or his co-owners. Employees of cooperatives who are themselves members of the cooperative have no right to form or join labor organizations for purposes of collective bargaining for being themselves co-owners of the cooperative. However, in so far as it involves cooperatives with employees who are not members or co-owners thereof, certainly such employees are entitled to exercise the rights of all workers to organization, collective bargaining, negotiations and others as are enshrined in the Constitution and existing laws of the country.

9. INTERNATIONAL CATHOLIC IMMIGRATION COMMISSION vs CALLEJA ISSUE: Are the claim of immunity by the ICMC and the IRRI from the application of Philippine labor laws valid?DOCTRINE: There are basically three propositions underlying the grant of international immunities to international organizations. These principles, contained in the ILO Memorandum are stated thus:

1) international institutions should have a status which protects them against control or interference by any one government in the performance of functions for the effective discharge of which they are responsible to democratically constituted international bodies in which all the nations concerned are represented; 2) no country should derive any national financial advantage by levying fiscal charges on common international funds; and3) the international organization should, as a collectivity of States members, be accorded the facilities for the conduct of its official business customarily extended to each other by its individual member States.

The theory behind all three propositions is said to be essentially institutional in character. "It is not concerned with the status, dignity or privileges of individuals, but with the elements of functional independence necessary to free international institutions from national control and to enable them to discharge their responsibilities impartially on behalf of all their members. The raison d'etre for these immunities is the assurance of unimpeded performance of their functions by the agencies concerned.

10. NATIONAL UNION OF WORKERS IN HOTELS, RESTAURANTS AND ALLIED INDUSTRIES- MANILA PAVILION HOTEL CHAPTER vs. SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENTISSUE: Should employees on probationary status at the time of the certification elections be allowed to vote?DOCTRINE: As Airtime Specialists, Inc. v. Ferrer-Calleja holds:

In a certification election, all rank and file employees in the appropriate bargaining unit, whether probationary or permanent are entitled to vote. This principle is clearly stated in Art. 255 of the Labor Code which states that the "labor organization designated or selected by the majority of the employees in an appropriate bargaining unit shall be the exclusive representative of the employees in such unit for purposes of collective bargaining." Collective bargaining covers all aspects of the employment relation and the resultant CBA negotiated by the certified union binds all employees in the bargaining unit. Hence, all rank and file employees, probationary or permanent, have a substantial interest in the selection of the bargaining representative. The Code makes no distinction as to their employment status as basis for eligibility in supporting the petition for certification election. The law refers to "all" the employees in the bargaining unit. All they need to be eligible to support the petition is to belong to the "bargaining unit."

11. HEIRS OF TEODOLO M. CRUZ, (represented by ARSENIA, FREDESWINDA, TEODOLO, JR., ERLINDA, EDGARDO and MYRNA, all surnamed CRUZ). MARY CONCEPCION and EDGARDO CRUZ, petitioners, vs. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELALATIONSISSUE: Whether the amicable settlement is valid.DOCTRINE: The interests of the individual worker can be better protected on the whole by a strong union aware of its moral and legal obligations to represent the rank and file faithfully and secure for them the best wages and working terms and conditions in the process of collective bargaining. As has been aptly pointed out, the will of the majority must prevail over that of the minority in the process, for "under the philosophy of collective responsibility, an employer who bargains in good faith should be entitled to rely upon the promises and agreements of the union representatives with whom he must deal, under the compulsion of, law and contract. The collective bargaining process should be carried on between parties who can mutually respect and rely upon the authority of each other." Where, however, collective bargaining process is not involved, and what is at stake are back wages already earned by the individual workers by way of overtime, premium and differential pay, and final judgment has been rendered in their favor, as in the present case, the real parties in interest with direct material interest, as against the union which has only served as a vehicle for collective action to enforce their just claims, are the individual workers themselves. Authority of the union to waive or quitclaim all or part of the judgment award in favor of the individual workers cannot be lightly presumed but must be expressly granted, and the employer, as judgment debtor, must deal in all good faith with the union as the agent of the individual workers. The Court in turn should certainly verify and assure itself of the fact and extent of the authority of the union leadership to execute any compromise or settlement of the judgment on behalf of the individual workers who are the real judgment creditors.

12. BENJAMIN VICTORIANO, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ELIZALDE ROPE WORKERS' UNION and ELIZALDE ROPE FACTORY, INC., defendants, ELIZALDE ROPE WORKERS' UNION, defendant-appellant.ISSUE: Whether Appellee has the freedom of choice in joining the union or not.

DOCTRINE: By virtue of a closed shop agreement, before the enactment of RA 3350, if any person, regardless of his religious beliefs, wishes to be employed or to keep his employment he must become a member of the collective bargaining union. Hence, the right of said employee not to join the labor union is curtailed and withdrawn.To that all-embracing coverage of the closed shop arrangement, RA No.3350 introduced an exception, when it added to Section 4 (a) (4) of the Industrial Peace Act the following proviso: "but such agreement shall not cover members of any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor organization". Republic Act No. 3350 merely excludes ipso jure from the application and coverage of the closed shop agreement the employees belonging to any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members with any labor organization. What the exception provides is that members of said religious sects cannot be compelled or coerced to join labor unions even when said unions have closed shop agreements with the employers; that in spite of any closed shop agreement, members of said religious sects cannot be refused employment or dismissed from their jobs on the sole ground that they are not members of the collective bargaining union. It does not prohibit the members of said religious sects from affiliating with labor unions. It still leaves to said members the liberty and the power to affiliate, or not to affiliate, with labor unions. If, notwithstanding their religious beliefs, the members of said religious wets prefer to sign up with the labor union, they can do so. If in deference and fealty to their religious faith, they refuse to sign up, they can do so; the law does not coerce them to join; neither does the law prohibit them from joining, and neither may the employer or labor union compel them to join.

13. TANCINCO vs. PURA FERER-CALLEJAISSUE: Whether the order of segregation (exclusion) of 56 votes of the petitioner’s union by the respondent is tantamount to grave abuse of discretion.DOCTRINE: The petition is impressed with merit. The record of the case shows that public respondent categorically declared as arbitrary, whimsical and without legal basis the grounds relied upon by ANGLO in disenfranchising the 56 voters in question.The finding does not have a leg to stand on. Submission of the employees names with the BLR as qualified members of the union is not a condition sine qua non to enable said members to vote in the election of union's officers. It finds no support in fact and in law.It is true that under article 242(c) of the Labor Code, as amended, only members of the union can participate in the election of union officers. The question however of eligibility to vote may be determined through the use of the applicable payroll period and employee's status during the applicable payroll period that is, the payroll of the month next preceding the labor dispute in case of regular employees and the payroll period at or near the peak of operations in case of employees in seasonal industries. Besides, their act of joining the election by casting their votes on May 26, 1986 after the May 10, 1986 agreement is a clear manifestation of their intention to join the union. They must therefore be considered ipso facto members thereof.

14. RICARDO R. MANALAD vs.DIRECTOR CRESENCIANO B. TRAJANOISSUE: WON the election of officers should be annulledDOCTRINE: It is pointless and unrealistic to insist on annulling an election of officers whose terms had already expired. The SC would have thereby a judgment on a matter which cannot have any practical legal effect upon a controversy, even if existing, and which, in the nature of things, cannot be enforced. We agree with the petitioners that disobedience to a resolution of this Court should not be left unpunished. However, before the alleged disobedient party may be cited for contempt, the allegations against him should be clearly established. The contentions of petitioners, even disregarding some evidential deficiencies, do not adequately establish the basis for contempt. On the contrary, respondents have satisfactorily answered the averments thereon.At this juncture, it would further be appropriate to remind petitioners that even if the disqualification of private respondents could be justified, the candidates of petitioners certainly cannot be declared as the winners in the disputed election. The mere fact that they obtained the second highest number of votes does not mean that they will thereby be considered as the elected officers if the true winners are disqualified.

15. DEL PILAR ACADEMY, EDUARDO ESPEJO and ELISEO OCAMPO, JR., petitioners, vs.DEL PILAR ACADEMY EMPLOYEES UNION, respondents.ISSUE: Whether or not the UNION is entitled to collect agency fees from non-union members, and if so, whether an individual written authorization is necessary for a valid check off.DOCTRINE: The collection of agency fees in an amount equivalent to union dues and fees, from employees who are not union members, is recognized by Article 248(e) of the Labor Code, thus:Employees of an appropriate collective bargaining unit who are not members of the recognized collective bargaining agent may be assessed reasonable fees equivalent to the dues and other fees paid by the recognized collective bargaining agent, if such non-union members accept the benefits under the collective bargaining agreement. Provided, That the individual authorization required under Article 241, paragraph (o) of this Code shall not apply to the non-members of recognized collective bargaining agent.When so stipulated in a collective bargaining agreement or authorized in writing by the employees concerned, the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules recognize it to be the duty of the employer to deduct the sum equivalent to the amount of union dues, as agency fees, from the employees' wages for direct remittance to the union. The system is referred to as check off. No requirement of written authorization from the non-union employees is necessary if the non-union employees accept the benefits resulting from the CBA.Accordingly, no requirement of written authorization from the non-union employees is needed to effect a valid check off. Article 248(e) makes it explicit that Article 241, paragraph (o), requiring written authorization is inapplicable to non-union members, especially in this case where the non-union employees receive several benefits under the CBA.The employee's acceptance of benefits resulting from a collective bargaining agreement justifies the deduction of agency fees from his pay and the union's entitlement thereto. In this aspect, the legal basis of the union's right to agency fees is neither contractual nor statutory, but quasi-

contractual, deriving from the established principle that non-union employees may not unjustly enrich themselves by benefiting from employment conditions negotiated by the bargaining union.

16. EVANGELINE J. GABRIEL VS. THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENTISSUE: WON the deductions made by petitioner-company is valid.DOCTRINE: The check-off provision in question is illegal because it was never submitted for approval at a general membership meeting called for the purpose and that it failed to meet the formalities mandated by the Labor Code.In check-off, the employer, on agreement with the Union, or on prior authorization from employees, deducts union dues or agency fees from the latter's wages and remits them directly to the union. It assures continuous funding for the labor organization. As this Court has acknowledged, the system of check-off is primarily for the benefit of the union and only indirectly for the individual employees. The pertinent legal provisions on check-offs are found in Article 222 (b) and Article 241 (o) of the Labor Code.Art. 222 (b) states:No attorney's fees, negotiation fees or similar charges of any kind arising from any collective bargaining negotiations or conclusions of the collective agreement shall be imposed on any individual member of the contracting union: Provided, however, that attorney's fees may be charged against unions funds in an amount to be agreed upon by the parties. Any contract, agreement or arrangement of any sort to the contrary shall be null and void. Art. 241 (o) provides:Other than for mandatory activities under the Code, no special assessment, attorney's fees, negotiation fees or any other extraordinary fees may be checked off from any amount due to an employee without an individual written authorization duly signed by the employee. The authorization should specifically state the amount, purpose and beneficiary of the deduction.

17. HOLY CROSS OF DAVAO COLLEGE, INC., petitioner, vs.HON. JEROME JOAQUIN, in his capacity as Voluntary ArbitratorISSUE: Whether or not an employer is liable to pay to the union of its employees, the amounts it failed to deduct from their salaries — as union dues (with respect to union members) or agency fees (as regards those not union members) — in accordance with the check.DOCTRINE: A check-off is a process or device whereby the employer, on agreement with the union recognized as the proper bargaining representative, or on prior authorization from its employees, deducts union dues or agency fees from the latter's wages and remits them directly to the union. Indeed, this Court has acknowledged that the system of check-off is primarily for the benefit of the union and, only indirectly, of the individual laborers.No provision of law makes the employer directly liable for the payment to the labor organization of union dues and assessments that the former fails to deduct from its employees' salaries and wages pursuant to a check-off stipulation. The employer's failure to make the requisite

deductions may constitute a violation of a contractual commitment for which it may incur liability for unfair labor practice. 23 But it does not by that omission, incur liability to the union for the aggregate of dues or assessments uncollected from the union members, or agency fees for non-union employees.The obligation to pay union dues and agency fees obviously devolves not upon the employer, but the individual employee. It is a personal obligation not demandable from the employer upon default or refusal of the employee to consent to a check-off. The only obligation of the employer under a check-off is to effect the deductions and remit the collections to the union. The principle of unjust enrichment necessarily precludes recovery of union dues — or agency fees — from the employer, these being, to repeat, obligations pertaining to the individual worker in favor of the bargaining union. Where the employer fails or refuses to implement a check-off agreement, logic and prudence dictate that the union itself undertake the collection of union dues and assessments from its members (and agency fees from non-union employees); this, of course, without prejudice to suing the employer for unfair labor practice.