JURISDICTION

SECRETARY OF LABOR OR HIS AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE

(ARTICLE 128) Visitorial and Enforcement Power. — (a) The Secretary of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized representatives, including labor regulation officers, shall have access to employer's records and premises at any time of the day or night whenever work is being undertaken therein, and the right to copy therefrom, to question any employee and investigate any fact, condition or matter which may be necessary to determine violations or which may aid in the enforcement of this Code and of any labor law, wage order or rules and regulations issued pursuant thereto.

(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of Articles 129 and 217 of this Code to the contrary, and in cases where the relationship of employer-employee still exists, the Secretary of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized representatives shall have the power to issue compliance orders to give effect to the labor standards provisions of this Code and other labor legislation based on the findings of labor employment and enforcement officers or industrial safety engineers made in the course of inspection. The Secretary or his duly authorized representatives shall issue writs of execution to the appropriate authority for the enforcement of their orders, except in cases where the employer contests the findings of the labor employment and enforcement officer and raises issues supported by documentary proofs which were not considered in the course of inspection.

An order issued by the duly authorized representative of the Secretary of Labor and Employment under this article may be appealed to the latter. In case said order involves a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Secretary of Labor and Employment in the amount equivalent to the monetary award in the order appealed from.

(c) The Secretary of Labor may likewise order stoppage of work or suspension of operations of any unit or department of an establishment when non-compliance with the law or implementing rules and regulations poses grave and imminent danger to the health and safety of workers in the workplace. Within twenty-four hours, a hearing shall be conducted to determine whether an order for the stoppage of work or suspension of operations shall be lifted or not. In case the violation is attributable to the fault of the employer, he shall pay the employees concerned their salaries or wages during the period of such stoppage of work or suspension of operation.

(d) It shall be unlawful for any person or entity to obstruct, impede, delay or otherwise render ineffective the orders of the Secretary of Labor or his duly authorized representatives issued pursuant to the authority granted under this Article, and no inferior court or entity shall issue temporary or permanent

injunction or restraining order or otherwise assume jurisdiction over any case involving the enforcement orders issued in accordance with this Article.

(e) Any government employee found guilty of violation of, or abuse of authority, under this Article shall, after appropriate administrative investigation, be subject to summary dismissal from the service.

(f) The Secretary of Labor may, by appropriate regulations, require employers to keep and maintain such employment records as may be necessary in aid of his visitorial and enforcement powers under this Code.

Jurisprudential References

Under prevailing jurisprudence, the so-called exception clause in Art. 128 (b) of the Labor Code has the following elements, which must all concur to divest the regional director of jurisdiction over workers' claims:

(a) that the employer contests the findings of the labor regulations officer and raises issues thereon;

(b) that in order to resolve such issues, there is a need to examine evidentiary matters; and

(c) that such matters are not verifiable in the normal course of inspection.

(Bay Haven, Inc., et al. vs. Florentino Abuan, et al., G.R. No. 160859, July 30, 2008; Ex-Bataan Veterans Security Agency, Inc. vs. Secretary of Labor, G.R. No. 152396, November 20, 2007; Batong Buhay Gold Mines, Inc. vs. Dionisio Dela Serna, G.R. No. 86963, August 6, 1999; SSK Parts Corporation vs. Teodorico Camas, G.R. No. 85934, January 30, 1990)

Failure either to file the appeal or post the bond within the prescribed period renders the order final and executory. Article 128(b) of the Labor Code clearly provides that the appeal bond must be "in the amount equivalent to the monetary award in the order appealed from". The records show that petitioner failed to post the required amount of the appeal bond. His appeal was therefore not perfected.The rule is that, to perfect an appeal of the Regional Director's order involving a monetary award in cases which concern the visitorial and enforcement powers of the Secretary of Labor and Employment, the appeal must be filed and the cash or surety bond equivalent to the monetary award must be posted within ten calendar days from receipt of the order. Failure either to file the appeal or post the bond within the prescribed period renders the order final and executory. (Secretary of Labor and Employment, et al. vs. Panay Veteran's Security and Investigation Agency, Inc., et al., G.R. No. 167708, August 22, 2008; Francisco Guico, Jr. vs. Secretary of Labor, G.R. No. 131750, November 16, 1998)

DOLE's power does not apply where the employer-employee relationship has ceased, or has never existed. The provision is quite explicit that the visitorial

and enforcement power of the DOLE comes into play only "in cases when the relationship of employer-employee still exists". This clause signifies that the employer-employee relationship must have existed even before the emergence of the controversy. Necessarily, the DOLE's power does not apply in two instances, namely: (a) where the employer-employee relationship has ceased; and (b) where no such relationship has ever existed. The first situation is categorically covered by Sec. 3, Rule 11 of the Rules on the Disposition of Labor Standards Cases issued by the DOLE Secretary. In this situation, the claim has to be referred to the NLRC because it is the NLRC which has jurisdiction in view of the termination of the employer-employee relationship. The same procedure has to be followed in the second situation since it is the NLRC that has jurisdiction in view of the absence of employer-employee relationship between the evidentiary parties from the start. People's Broadcasting (Bombo Radyo Phils., Inc.) vs. Secretary of the DOLE, et al., G.R. No. 179652, May 8, 2009)

The determination of the existence of employer-employee relationship is still primarily lodged with the NLRC. It can be assumed that the DOLE in the exercise of its visitorial and enforcement power somehow has to make a determination of the existence of an employer-employee relationship. Such prerogatival determination, however, cannot be coextensive with the visitorial and enforcement power itself. Indeed, such determination is merely preliminary, incidental and collateral to the DOLE's primary function of enforcing labor standards provisions. The determination of the existence of employer-employee relationship is still primarily lodged with the NLRC. This is the meaning of the clause "in cases where the relationship of employer-employee still exists" in Art. 128(b). (People's Broadcasting (Bombo Radyo Phils., Inc.) vs. Secretary of the DOLE, et al., G.R. No. 179652, May 8, 2009)

Regional directors have jurisdiction over labor standards violations based on findings made in the course of inspection of an employer's premises. Under Article 128 (b) of the Labor Code, as amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 7730, the DOLE Secretary and her representatives, the regional directors, have jurisdiction over labor standards violations based on findings made in the course of inspection of an employer's premises. The said jurisdiction is not affected by the amount of claim involved, as RA 7730 had effectively removed the jurisdictional limitations found in Articles 129 and 217 of the Labor Code insofar as inspection cases, pursuant to the visitorial and enforcement powers of the DOLE Secretary, are concerned. The last sentence of Article 128 (b) of the Labor Code recognizes an exception to the jurisdiction of the DOLE Secretary and her representatives, but such exception is neither an issue nor applicable here. (Tiger Construction and Dev't. Corp. vs. Reynaldo Abay, et al., G.R. No. 164141, February 26, 2010)

It is conceded that if there is no employer-employee relationship, whether it has been terminated or it has not existed from the start, the DOLE has no jurisdiction. Under Art. 128 (b) of the Labor Code, as amended by RA 7730, the first sentence reads, "Notwithstanding the provisions of Articles 129 and 217 of this Code to the contrary, and in cases where the relationship of employer-employee still exists, the Secretary of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized representatives shall have the power to issue compliance orders to give

effect to the labor standards provisions of this Code and other labor legislation based on the findings of labor employment and enforcement officers or industrial safety engineers made in the course of inspection." It is clear and beyond debate that an employer-employee relationship must exist for the exercise of the visitorial and enforcement power of the DOLE. (People's Broadcasting Service vs. DOLE Secretary, et al., G.R. No. 179652, March 6, 2012)

No limitation in the law was placed upon the power of the DOLE to determine the existence of an employer-employee relationship. No procedure was laid down where the DOLE would only make a preliminary finding, that the power was primarily held by the NLRC. The law did not say that the DOLE would first seek the NLRC's determination of the existence of an employer-employee relationship, or that should the existence of the employer-employee relationship be disputed, the DOLE would refer the matter to the NLRC. The DOLE must have the power to determine whether or not an employer-employee relationship exists, and from there to decide whether or not to issue compliance orders in accordance with Art. 128 (b) of the Labor Code, as amended by RA 7730. (People's Broadcasting Service vs. DOLE Secretary, et al., G.R. No. 179652, March 6, 2012)

The DOLE, in determining the existence of an employer-employee relationship, has a ready set of guidelines to follow, the same guide the courts themselves use. The elements to determine the existence of an employment relationship are: (1) the selection and engagement of the employee; (2) the payment of wages; (3) the power of dismissal; (4) the employer's power to control the employee's conduct. The use of this test is not solely limited to the NLRC. The DOLE Secretary, or his or her representatives, can utilize the same test, even in the course of inspection, making use of the same evidence that would have been presented before the NLRC. (People's Broadcasting Service vs. DOLE Secretary, et al., G.R. No. 179652, March 6, 2012)

The determination of the existence of an employer-employee relationship by the DOLE must be respected. The expanded visitorial and enforcement power of the DOLE granted by RA 7730 would be rendered nugatory if the alleged employer could, by the simple expedient of disputing the employer-employee relationship, force the referral of the matter to the NLRC. The Court issued the declaration that at least a prima facie showing of the absence of an employer-employee relationship be made to oust the DOLE of jurisdiction. But it is precisely the DOLE that will be faced with that evidence, and it is the DOLE that will weigh it, to see if the same does successfully refute the existence of an employer-employee relationship. If the DOLE makes a finding that there is an existing employer-employee relationship, it takes cognizance of the matter, to the exclusion of the NLRC. The DOLE would have no jurisdiction only if the employer-employee relationship has already been terminated, or it appears, upon review, that no employer-employee relationship existed in the first place. (People's Broadcasting Service vs. DOLE Secretary, et al., G.R. No. 179652, March 6, 2012)

The Court, in limiting the power of the DOLE, gave the rationale that such limitation would eliminate the prospect of competing conclusions between the DOLE and the NLRC. The prospect of competing conclusions could just as well

have been eliminated by according respect to the DOLE findings, to the exclusion of the NLRC, and this We believe is the more prudent course of action to take. This is not to say that the determination by the DOLE is beyond question or review. Suffice it to say, there are judicial remedies such as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 that may be availed of, should a party wish to dispute the findings of the DOLE. It must also be remembered that the power of the DOLE to determine the existence of an employer-employee relationship need not necessarily result in an affirmative finding. The DOLE may well make the determination that no employer-employee relationship exists, thus divesting itself of jurisdiction over the case. It must not be precluded from being able to reach its own conclusions, not by the parties, and certainly not by this Court. Under Art. 128 (b) of the Labor Code, as amended by RA 7730, the DOLE is fully empowered to make a determination as to the existence of an employer-employee relationship in the exercise of its visitorial and enforcement power, subject to judicial review, not review by the NLRC. (People's Broadcasting Service vs. DOLE Secretary, et al., G.R. No. 179652, March 6, 2012)

(ARTICLE 129) Recovery of Wages, Simple Money Claims and Other Benefits. — Upon complaint of any interested party, the Regional Director of the Department of Labor and Employment or any of the duly authorized hearing officers of the Department is empowered, through summary proceeding and after due notice, to hear and decide any matter involving the recovery of wages and other monetary claims and benefits, including legal interest, owing to an employee or person employed in domestic or household service or househelper under this Code, arising from employer-employee relations: Provided, That such complaint does not include a claim for reinstatement: Provided, further, That the aggregate money claims of each employee or househelper does not exceed five thousand pesos (P5,000.00). The Regional Director or hearing officer shall decide or resolve the complaint within thirty (30) calendar days from the date of the filing of the same. Any sum thus recovered on behalf of any employee or househelper pursuant to this Article shall be held in a special deposit account by, and shall be paid on order of, the Secretary of Labor and Employment or the regional director directly to the employee or househelper concerned. Any such sum not paid to the employee or househelper, because he cannot be located after diligent and reasonable effort to locate him within a period of three (3) years, shall be held as a special fund of the Department of Labor and Employment to be used exclusively for the amelioration and benefit of workers.

Any decision or resolution of the Regional Director or hearing officer pursuant to this provision may be appealed on the same grounds provided in Article 223 of this Code, within five (5) calendar days from receipt of a copy of said decision or resolution, to the National Labor Relations Commission which shall resolve the appeal within ten (10) calendar days from the submission of the last pleading required or allowed under its rules.

The Secretary of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized representative may supervise the payment of unpaid wages and other monetary claims and benefits, including legal interest, found owing to any employee or househelper under this Code.

Jurisprudential References

Executive Order vests in Regional Directors jurisdiction, "[t]he provisions of Article 217 of this Code to the contrary notwithstanding", it would have rendered such a proviso — and the amendment itself — useless to say that they (Regional Directors) retained the self-same restricted powers, despite such an amendment. It is fundamental that a statute is to be read in a manner that would breathe life into it, rather than defeat it. At any rate, and as we have observed, the language of Executive Order No. 111 is comprehensive enough to extend to the resolution of employer-employee controversies covered by Article 217. (Briad Agro Development Corporation vs. Dionisio Dela Serna, G.R. No. 82805 & 83225, June 29, 1989)

The exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter is confirmed by the provisions of Article 129 which exclude from the jurisdiction of the Regional Director or any hearing officer of the Department of Labor the power to hear and decide claims of employees arising from employer-employee relations exceeding the amount of P 5,000.00 for each employee. (SSFBWA vs. Secretary of Labor, G.R. No. 93550, October 4, 1991)

The principle of continuous jurisdiction of the regional director, as applied by the Secretary of Labor to the suit filed by herein private respondents on March 14, 1989 prior to the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6715, is therefore incorrect. While a subsequent law cannot generally produce a retroactive effect as to affect pending litigation (Article 4, New Civil Code), it is an equally accepted axiom in statutory construction that: where at the time an action is filed in court the latter has no jurisdiction over the subject matter thereof but a subsequent statute clothes it with jurisdiction before the action is decided, the statute is in the nature of a curative law with retroactive operation to pending proceedings and cures the defect of lack of jurisdiction of the court at the commencement of the action. (Rajah Humabon Hotel, Inc. vs. Cresenciano B. Trajano, G.R. Nos. 100222-23, September 14, 1993)

The visitorial power of the Secretary of Labor to order and enforce compliance with labor standard laws cannot be exercised where the individual claim exceeds P 5,000.00, can no longer be applied in view of the enactment of R.A. No. 7730 amending Article 128 (b) of the Labor Code. (Francisco Guico, Jr. vs. Secretary of Labor, G.R. No. 131750, November 16, 1998)

The Servando ruling, in effect, expanded the jurisdictional limitation provided for by RA 6715 as to include labor standards cases under Article 128 (b) and no longer limited to ordinary monetary claims under Article 129. (Batong Buhay Gold Mines vs. Dionisio Dela Serna, G.R. No. 86963, August 6, 1999)

The jurisdiction of the Regional Director is upheld notwithstanding the fact that the amounts awarded exceeded P 5,000.00. The present law, RA 7730, can be considered a curative statute to reinforce the conclusion that the Regional Director

has jurisdiction over the present labor standards case. Well-settled is the rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the law in force when the action was commenced, unless a subsequent statute provides for its retroactive application, as when it is a curative legislation. Curative statutes are intended to supply defects, abridge superfluities in existing laws and curb certain evils. They are intended to enable persons to carry into effect that which they have designed and intended, but has failed of expected legal consequence by reason of some statutory disability or irregularity in their own action. They make valid that which, before the enactment of the statute, was invalid. (Batong Buhay Gold Mines vs. Dionisio Dela Serna, G.R. No. 86963, August 6, 1999)

ARTICLE 276(g) When, in his opinion, there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry, indispensable to the national interest, the Secretary of Labor and Employment may assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify the same to the Commission for compulsory arbitration. Such assumption or certification shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike or lockout as specified in the assumption or certification order. If one has already taken place at the time of assumption or certification, all striking or locked out employees shall immediately return to work and the employer shall immediately resume operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. The Secretary of Labor and Employment or the Commission may seek the assistance of law enforcement agencies to ensure the compliance with this provision as well as with such orders as he may issue to enforce the same.

LABOR ARBITER AND THE COMMISSION (NLRC)

Labor Arbiter

ARTICLE 223. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission. — (a) Except as otherwise provided under this Code, the Labor Arbiters shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within thirty (30) calendar days after the submission of the case by the parties for decision without extension, even in the absence of stenographic notes, the following cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural:

(1) Unfair labor practice cases; (2) Termination disputes; (3) If accompanied with a claim for reinstatement, those cases that workers may file involving wages, rates of pay, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment; (4) Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising from the employer-employee relations; (5) Cases arising from any violation of Article 264 of this Code, including questions involving the legality of strikes and lockouts; and (6) Except claims for Employees Compensation, Social Security, Medicare and maternity benefits, all other claims, arising from employer-employee relations, including those of persons in domestic or household

service, involving an amount exceeding five thousand pesos (P5,000.00), regardless of whether or not accompanied with a claim for reinstatement. (b) The Commission shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all

cases decided by Labor Arbiters.

(c) Cases arising from the interpretation or implementation of collective bargaining agreements and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies shall be disposed of by the Labor Arbiter by referring the same to the grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration as may be provided in said agreements.

(SECTION 10, Republic Act 8042) . Money Claims. — Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the Labor Arbiters of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within ninety (90) calendar days after the filing of the complaint, the claims arising out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment including claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages. Consistent with this mandate, the NLRC shall endeavor to update and keep abreast with the developments in the global services industry.

Jurisprudential References

Under Art. 217 (Article 223), it is clear that a labor arbiter has original and exclusive jurisdiction over termination disputes. On the other hand, under Article 261, a voluntary arbitrator has original and exclusive jurisdiction over grievances arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company policies. As a general rule then, termination disputes should be brought before a labor arbiter, except when the parties, under Art. 262, unmistakably express that they agree to submit the same to voluntary arbitration. (Negros Metal Corp. vs. Armelo J. Lamayo, G.R. No. 186557, August 25, 2010)

The jurisdiction of a court or quasi-judicial or administrative organ is determined by the issues raised by the parties, not by their success or failure in proving the allegations in their respective. Reception of proof is not a condition precedent to the assumption of jurisdiction, for precisely jurisdiction must exist before evidence can be taken, since the authority to receive it is in itself an exercise of jurisdiction. To affect the jurisdiction of said court, or organ, the main requirement is that the issue raised be a genuine one. In other words, the question posed must be one that is material to the right of action or which could affect the result of the dispute or controversy. (Associated Labor Union vs. Jose C. Borromeo, G.R. No. L-26461, November 27, 1968)

In construing the above provision, the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter and the Voluntary Arbitrator or Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators over the cases enumerated in the Labor Code, Articles 217, 261 and 262, can possibly include money claims in one form or another. While a voluntary arbitrator is not part of the governmental unit or labor department's personnel, said arbitrator renders arbitration services provided for under labor laws. Generally, the arbitrator is

expected to decide only those questions expressly delineated by the submission agreement. Nevertheless, the arbitrator can assume that he has the necessary power to make a final settlement since arbitration is the final resort for the adjudication of disputes. (Ludo & Luym Corp. vs. Ferdinand Saornido, G.R. No. 140960, January 20, 2003)

It is clear from . . . [Section 29 (Dispute Settlement Procedures) of the Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean Going Vessels, promulgated by the POEA] that the interpretation of the DOLE, in consultation with their counterparts in the respective committees of the Senate and the House of Representatives, as well as the DFA and the POEA is that with respect to disputes involving claims of Filipino seafarers wherein the parties are covered by a collective bargaining agreement, the dispute or claim should be submitted to the jurisdiction of a voluntary arbitrator or panel of arbitrators. It is only in the absence of a collective bargaining agreement that parties may opt to submit the dispute to either the NLRC or to voluntary arbitration. It is elementary that rules and regulations issued by administrative bodies to interpret the law which they are entrusted to enforce, have the force of law, and are entitled to great respect. Such rules and regulations partake of the nature of a statute and are just as binding as if they have been written in the statute itself. (Estate of Nelson R. Dulay vs. Aboitiz Jebsen Maritime, Inc., et al., G.R. No. 172642, June 13, 2012)

As a rule, labor arbiters and the National Labor Relations Commission have no power or authority to grant reliefs from claims that do not arise from employer-employee relations. They have no jurisdiction over torts that have no reasonable causal connection to any of the claims provided for in the Labor Code, other labor statutes, or collective bargaining agreements. While it is true that labor arbiters and the NLRC have jurisdiction to award not only reliefs provided by labor laws, but also damages governed by the Civil Code, these reliefs must still be based on an action that has a reasonable causal connection with the Labor Code, other labor statutes, or collective bargaining agreements. (Evelyn Tolosa vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 149578, April 10, 2003)

Not every controversy or money claim by an employee against the employer or vice-versa is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the labor arbiter. A money claim by a worker against the employer or vice-versa is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the labor arbiter only if there is a "reasonable causal connection" between the claim asserted and employee-employer relation. Absent such a link, the complaint will be cognizable by the regular courts of justice. Actions between employees and employer where the employer-employee relationship is merely incidental and the cause of action precedes from a different source of obligation is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the regular court. (Eduardo G. Eviota vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 152121, July 29, 2003)

We disfavor delay in the enforcement of the labor arbiter's decision. Once a judgment becomes final and executory, the prevailing party should not be denied the fruits of his victory by some subterfuge devised by the losing party. Final and executory judgments can neither be amended nor altered except for correction of

clerical errors, even if the purpose is to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or of law. Trial and execution proceedings constitute one whole action or suit such that a case in which execution has been issued is regarded as still pending so that all proceedings in the execution are proceedings in the suit. (Marmosy Trading, Inc., et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 170515, May 6, 2010)

The law and the rules are consistent in stating that the employment permit must be acquired prior to employment. The Labor Code states: "Any alien seeking admission to the Philippines for employment purposes and any domestic or foreign employer who desires to engage an alien for employment in the Philippines shall obtain an employment permit from the Department of Labor." (WPP Marketing Communications, Inc., et al. vs. Jocelyn M. Galera, G.R. Nos. 169207 & 169239, March 25, 2010)

A labor arbiter may only take cognizance of a case and award damages where the claim for such damages arises out of an employer-employee relationship. (Ronilo Sorreda vs. Cambridge Electronics Corp., G.R. No. 172927, February 11, 2010)

This provision [Article 217 (c)] requires labor arbiters to refer cases involving the implementation of CBAs to the grievance machinery provided therein and to voluntary arbitration. (Miguela Santuyo, et al. vs. Remerco Garments Manufacturing, Inc., et al., G.R. No. 174420, March 22, 2010)

To recapitulate, if a complaint is brought before the DOLE to give effect to the labor standards provisions of the Labor Code or other labor legislation, and there is a finding by the DOLE that there is an existing employer-employee relationship, the DOLE exercises jurisdiction to the exclusion of the NLRC. If the DOLE finds that there is no employer-employee relationship, the jurisdiction is properly with the NLRC. If a complaint is filed with the DOLE, and it is accompanied by a claim for reinstatement, the jurisdiction is properly with the Labor Arbiter, under Art. 217 (3) of the Labor Code, which provides that the Labor Arbiter has original and exclusive jurisdiction over those cases involving wages, rates of pay, hours of work, and other terms and conditions of employment, if accompanied by a claim for reinstatement. If a complaint is filed with the NLRC, and there is still an existing employer-employee relationship, the jurisdiction is properly with the DOLE. The findings of the DOLE, however, may still be questioned through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. (People's Broadcasting Service vs. DOLE Secretary, et al., G.R. No. 179652, March 6, 2012)

National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)

(ARTICLE 224) Powers of the Commission. —

(a) To promulgate rules and regulations governing the hearing and disposition of cases before it and its regional branches, as well as those pertaining to its internal functions and such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Code;

(b) To administer oaths, summon the parties to a controversy, issue subpoenas requiring the attendance and testimony of witnesses or the production of such books, papers, contracts, records, statement of accounts, agreements, and others as may be material to adjust determination of the matter under investigation, and to testify in any investigation or hearing conducted in pursuance of this Code;

(c) To conduct investigation for the determination of a question, matter or controversy within its jurisdiction, proceed to hear and determine the disputes in the absence of any party thereto who has been summoned or served with notice to appear, conduct its proceedings or any part thereof in public or in private, adjourn its hearings to any time and place, refer technical matters or accounts to an expert and to accept his report as evidence after hearing of the parties upon due notice, direct parties to be joined in or excluded from the proceedings, correct, amend, or waive any error, defect or irregularity whether in substance or in form, give all such directions as it may deem necessary or expedient in the determination of the dispute before it, and dismiss any matter or refrain from further hearing or from determining the dispute or part thereof, where it is trivial or where further proceedings by the Commission are not necessary or desirable; and

(d) To hold any person in contempt directly or indirectly and impose appropriate penalties therefor in accordance with law.

A person guilty of misbehavior in the presence of or so near the Chairman or any member of the Commission or any Labor Arbiter as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same, including disrespect toward said officials, offensive personalities toward others, or refusal to be sworn or to answer as a witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition when lawfully required to do so, may be summarily adjudged in direct contempt by said officials and punished by fine not exceeding five hundred pesos (P500) or imprisonment not exceeding five (5) days, or both if it be the Commission or a member thereof, or by a fine not exceeding one hundred pesos (P100) or imprisonment not exceeding one (1) day, or both if it be a Labor Arbiter.

The person adjudged in direct contempt by a Labor Arbiter may appeal to the Commission and the execution of the judgment shall be suspended pending the resolution of the appeal upon the filing by such person of a bond on condition that he will abide by and perform the judgment of the Commission should the appeal be decided against him. Judgment of the Commission on direct contempt is immediately executory and unappealable. Indirect contempt shall be dealt with by the Commission or Labor Arbiter in the manner prescribed under Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court; and

(e) To enjoin or restrain any actual or threatened commission of any or all prohibited or unlawful acts or to require the performance of a particular act in any labor dispute which, if not restrained or performed forthwith, may cause grave or irreparable damage to any party or render ineffectual any decision in favor of such party: Provided, That no temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out of a labor dispute as defined in this Code shall be issued except after hearing the testimony of witnesses, with opportunity for cross-examination, in support of the allegations of a complaint made under oath, and testimony in

opposition thereto, if ordered, and only after a finding of fact by the Commission, to the effect:

(1) That prohibited or unlawful acts have been threatened and will be committed and will be continued unless restrained, or have been committed and will be continued unless restrained, but no injunction or temporary restraining order shall be issued on account of any threat prohibited or unlawful act, except against the person or persons, association or organization making the threat or committing the prohibited or unlawful act or actually authorizing or ratifying the same after actual knowledge thereof;

(2) That substantial and irreparable injury to complainant's property will follow;

(3) That, as to each item of relief to be granted, greater injury will be inflicted upon defendants by the granting of relief;

(4) That complainant has no adequate remedy at law; and

(5) That the public officers charged with the duty to protect complainant's property are unable or unwilling to furnish adequate protection.

Such hearing shall be held after due and personal notice thereof has been served, in such manner as the Commission shall direct, to all known persons against whom relief is sought, and also to the Chief Executive and other public officials of the province or city within which the unlawful acts have been threatened or committed charged with the duty to protect complainant's property: Provided, however, That if a complainant shall also allege that, unless a temporary restraining order shall be issued without notice, a substantial and irreparable injury to complainant's property will be unavoidable, such a temporary restraining order may be issued upon testimony under oath, sufficient, if sustained, to justify the Commission in issuing a temporary injunction upon hearing after notice. Such a temporary restraining order shall be effective for no longer than twenty (20) days and shall become void at the expiration of said twenty (20) days. No such temporary restraining order or temporary injunction shall be issued except on condition that complainant shall first file an undertaking with adequate security in an amount to be fixed by the Commission sufficient to recompense those enjoined for any loss, expense or damage caused by the improvident or erroneous issuance of such order or injunction, including all reasonable costs, together with a reasonable attorney's fee, and expense of defense against the order or against the granting of any injunctive relief sought in the same proceeding and subsequently denied by the Commission.

The undertaking herein mentioned shall be understood to constitute an agreement entered into by the complainant and the surety upon which an order may be rendered in the same suit or proceeding against said complainant and surety, upon a hearing to assess damages, of which hearing complainant and surety shall have reasonable notice, the said complainant and surety submitting themselves to

the jurisdiction of the Commission for that purpose. But nothing herein contained shall deprive any party having a claim or cause of action under or upon such undertaking from electing to pursue his ordinary remedy by suit at law or in equity: Provided, further, That the reception of evidence for the application of a writ of injunction may be delegated by the Commission to any of its Labor Arbiters who shall conduct such hearings in such places as he may determine to be accessible to the parties and their witnesses and shall submit thereafter his recommendation to the Commission.

ARTICLE 276(g) When, in his opinion, there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry, indispensable to the national interest, the Secretary of Labor and Employment may assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify the same to the Commission for compulsory arbitration. Such assumption or certification shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike or lockout as specified in the assumption or certification order. If one has already taken place at the time of assumption or certification, all striking or locked out employees shall immediately return to work and the employer shall immediately resume operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. The Secretary of Labor and Employment or the Commission may seek the assistance of law enforcement agencies to ensure the compliance with this provision as well as with such orders as he may issue to enforce the same.

BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS

Bureau of Labor Relations

(ARTICLE 231) Bureau of Labor Relations. — The Bureau of Labor Relations and the Labor Relations Division in the regional offices of the Department of Labor shall have original and exclusive authority to act, at their own initiative or upon request of either or both parties, on all inter-union and intra-union conflicts, and all disputes, grievances or problems arising from or affecting labor-management relations in all workplaces whether agricultural or non-agricultural, except those arising from the implementation or interpretation of collective bargaining agreements which shall be the subject of grievance procedure and/or voluntary arbitration.

The Bureau of shall have fifteen working days to act on all labor cases, subject to extension by agreement of the parties, after which the bureau shall certify the cases to the appropriate Labor Arbiters. The 15-working day deadline, however, shall not apply to cases involving deadlocks in collective bargaining which the Bureau shall certify to the appropriate Labor Arbiters only after all possibilities of voluntary settlement shall have been tried.

The Bureau shall have fifteen (15) calendar days to act on labor cases before it, subject to extension by agreement of the parties.

Jurisprudential References

The BLR has the original and exclusive jurisdiction on all inter-union and intra-union conflicts. We said that since Article 226 of the Labor Code has declared that the BLR shall have original and exclusive authority to act on all inter-union and intra-union conflicts, there should be no more doubt as to its jurisdiction. As defined, an intra-union conflict would refer to a conflict within or inside a labor union, while an inter-union controversy or dispute is one occurring or carried on between or among unions. (Emilio E. Diokno, et al. vs. Hans Leo J. Cacdac, et al. G.R. No. 168475, July 4, 2007; Genaro Bautista vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 123375, February 28, 2005)

Section 226 of the Labor Code clearly provides that the BLR and the Regional Directors of DOLE have concurrent jurisdiction over inter-union and intra-union disputes. Such disputes include the conduct or nullification of election of union and workers' association officers. There is, thus, no doubt as to the BLR's jurisdiction over the instant dispute involving member-unions of a federation arising from disagreement over the provisions of the federation's constitution and by-laws. (Allan S. Montaño vs. Ernesto C. Verceles, G.R. No. 168583, July 26, 2010)

(ARTICLE 235) Registry of Unions and File of Collective Agreements. — The Bureau shall keep a registry of legitimate labor organizations.

The Bureau shall also maintain a file of all collective bargaining agreements and other related agreements and records of settlement of labor disputes, and copies of orders, and decisions of voluntary arbitrators or panel of voluntary arbitrators. The file shall be open and accessible to interested parties under conditions prescribed by the Secretary of Labor and Employment, provided that no specific information submitted in confidence shall be disclosed unless authorized by the Secretary, or when it is at issue in any judicial litigation or when public interest or national security so requires.

Within thirty (30) days from the execution of a Collective Bargaining Agreement, the parties shall submit copies of the same directly to the Bureau or the Regional Offices of the Department of Labor and Employment for registration accompanied with verified proofs of its posting in two conspicuous places in the place of work and ratification by the majority of all the workers in the bargaining unit. The Bureau or Regional Offices shall act upon the application for registration of such Collective Bargaining Agreement within five (5) calendar days from receipt thereof. The Regional Offices shall furnish the Bureau with a copy of the collective bargaining agreement within five (5) days from its submission.

The Bureau or Regional Office shall assess the employer for every Collective Bargaining Agreement a registration fee of not less than one thousand pesos (P 1,000.00) or in any other amount as may be deemed appropriate and necessary by the Secretary of Labor and Employment for the effective and efficient administration of the Voluntary Arbitration Program. Any amount collected under this provision shall accrue to the Special Voluntary Arbitration Fund.

The Bureau shall also maintain a file, and shall undertake or assist in the publication, of all final decisions, orders and awards of the Secretary of Labor and Employment, Regional Directors and the Commission.

GRIEVANCE MACHINERY AND VOLUNTARY ARBITRATION

(ARTICLE 271) Grievance Machinery and Voluntary Arbitration. — The parties to a Collective Bargaining Agreement shall include therein provisions that will ensure the mutual observance of its terms and conditions. They shall establish a machinery for the adjustment and resolution of grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of their Collective Bargaining Agreement and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies.

All grievances submitted to the grievance machinery which are not settled within seven (7) calendar days from the date of its submission shall automatically be referred to voluntary arbitration prescribed in the Collective Bargaining Agreement.

For this purpose, parties to a collective bargaining agreement shall name and designate in advance a voluntary arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators, or include in the agreement a procedure for the selection of such voluntary arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators, preferably from the listing of qualified voluntary arbitrators duly accredited by the Board. In case the parties fail to select a voluntary arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators, the Board shall designate the voluntary arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators, as may be necessary, pursuant to the selection procedure agreed upon in the collective bargaining agreement, which shall act with the same force and effect as if the voluntary arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators have been selected by the parties as described above.

(ARTICLE 272) Jurisdiction of Voluntary Arbitrators or Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators. — The Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide all unresolved grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies referred to in the immediately preceding article. Accordingly, violations of a Collective Bargaining Agreement, except those which are gross in character, shall no longer be treated as unfair labor practice and shall be resolved as grievances under the Collective Bargaining Agreement. For purposes of this article, gross violations of Collective Bargaining Agreement shall mean flagrant and/or malicious refusal to comply with the economic provisions of such agreement.

The Commission, its Regional Offices and the Regional Directors of the Department of Labor and Employment shall not entertain disputes, grievances or matters under the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators and shall immediately dispose and refer the same to

the Grievance Machinery or Voluntary Arbitration provided in the Collective Bargaining Agreement.

ARTICLE 273. Jurisdiction Over Other Labor Disputes. — The Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators, upon agreement of the parties, shall also hear and decide all other labor disputes including unfair labor practices and bargaining deadlocks.

Jurisprudential References

Under Art. 217, it is clear that a labor arbiter has original and exclusive jurisdiction over termination disputes. On the other hand, under Article 261, a voluntary arbitrator has original and exclusive jurisdiction over grievances arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company policies. As a general rule then, termination disputes should be brought before a labor arbiter, except when the parties, under Art. 262, unmistakably express that they agree to submit the same to voluntary arbitration. (Negros Metal Corp. vs. Armelo J. Lamayo, G.R. No. 186557, August 25, 2010)

Article 261 of the Labor Code provides that violations of a CBA, except those which are gross in character, shall no longer be treated as unfair labor practice and shall be resolved as grievances under the parties' CBA. Moreover, "gross violations of CBA" under the same Article referred to flagrant and/or malicious refusal to comply with the economic provisions of such agreement, which is not the issue in the instant case. (Flight Attendants and Stewards Ass'n. of the Phil. vs. Phil. Airlines, Inc., et al., G.R. No. 178083, July 22, 2008)

Under this provision [Article 261], voluntary arbitrators have original and exclusive jurisdiction over matters which have not been resolved by the grievance machinery. (Miguela Santuyo, et al. vs. Remerco Garments Manufacturing, Inc., et al., G.R. No. 174420, March 22, 2010)