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A popular Government,without popular information or the means of

acquiring it,is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or

perhaps both.Knowledge will forever govern ignorance;And a people who mean to be their own

Governors,must arm themselves with the power which

knowledge gives.

JAMES MADISON to W. T. BARRYAugust 4, 1822

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THE INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES

MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF

UNITED NATIONS

PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

Edited by William H. Lewis

93-25645

93 1~NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY

McNair Paper Seventeen

June 1993

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N ATIONAL DEFFENSE LAIVFRSITY 03 Premdep'it Licuitnani ;Cci-cral Paul G. Cerjan 0 t u President: Aniltassador Httvi itd K. WalkcrINiSTITUTE FOR NATh)N.SAt STRATEGIc sTrU)iFs 0 DI)reiu'r: SitallE. Johnsoin

Publicatioins D~irectorate 03 Fort I asic' J. MI(Nair 0 Waslttucin. DC2031i4AR)~.i 0 Phone,~: ?~202 475-191l i 0 fazx: (20i2) 475-110F2"0 Dire'in r. [rcdenck 1'. Kie Lv0/iputt Otjji. itot Lieutenanit Co iiiw I lirr\"0 Owl, ,f. uFct hitain lirajicliý I orvec C. \law"- 0 ,lo' Kathicti A- A. Lic iidiI,

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( ' Ocih ,K' Juan A. Medrauii

William 1H. Lewis 4v a Professor, The Elliott School, GeorgeWashington University. Previously, he was a Senior Fellow, Institutefor National Strategic Studies, National lDefense University.

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policy. dletnsc rcsourICc fnanagcnwict. International allaii,ýts. i\ i-iiitarN ica

ttins'. military tcchtioloje,v. 1a1nd joinit. cniihincd, Mnd coalition1 Opcraiiins.

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Contents

INTRODUCTION 3Dr. William H. Lewis, George Washington University

MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF UNITED NATIONSPEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS 7

Ambassador Howard Walker. Vice President, NDU

COMMAND, CONTROL AND COALITIONOPERATIONS 9

Richard ConjuiughtonAn Historical Perspective /0The Realtionship between Peacekeeping

and Peace Enforcement /1Command and the Commander 15The Essence of Decision-Making in

Coalition Operations 18A Politico-Military Interface for the Future 20Conclusion 22Notes 23

DEFINING A ROLE BEYOND PEACEKEEPING 24John Mackinlay

Limitations of Peacekeeping Prototype 25

Post Cold War Developments 28Problems for the Peacekeeper 30Second Generation Operations 32Obstacles to Reform 38

COMMAND AND CONTROL ISSUES FOR THE MILITARYPLANNER (Discussion) 41 a ,09-9-91n For

N". S 3A&I;D,"1 S 6 1 a.

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CRITICAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE MILITARYCOMMANDER kDi.ýcussion) 53?

John Sewall 53General I.C. Douglas 54Colonel Bruce Osbo-n 58Lieutenant Colonel Bill Spracher oIMajor George Stcuber 07General Discussion 73

THE UN CONTRIBUTION TO INTERNATIONALPEACEKEEPING 85

The Htimiorhle Thomas R. Pickering.Permanent Representative to the United Nations

US Security Interes s After the Cold War S,5Mult'latendr vs. Regional Use of Force 8("Legitimacy" and the Use of Force 91Article 43 Agreements 92Delegation of Enforcement 93Security Council Oversight of Military Action 94The UN and Coalition Forces 95Enhancing Preventive Diplomacy 96Conclusion 98

MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF

UNITED NATIONS

PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

II

PEACE-KEEPING FORCES AND OBSERVER MISSIONS

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Introduction

by

Dr. William H. LewisGeorge Washington University

THE ACTIONS BY THE UNITED NATIONS Security Council in the matteroif Iraq's attempt to annex Kuwait have lead some obsciveis toconclude that the United Nations is now well positioned to playa consequential role in the maintenance of international orderThe coalition formed to meet Iraq's aggression included thirty-seven member states from five continents. This successful actionrepresented a significant precedent for future preventivediplomacy and collective security actions by the world body. Asone senior Canadian official somewhat exuberantly observed, apowenul message has rmeen sent: "the Liiiicd Natioms, cawi a.s iiwas intended, safeguard world order and security."

The organization had been playing a stellar role in the causeof peace for a number of years. Prior to the 1990-91 Gulf War.the United Nations had been accorded recognition for itscontributions to peace and stability. In September 1998. theNobel Peace Prize was awarded for the organization's efforts inthe field. At the time of the award, observer forces were inAfghanistan and Pakistan monitoring Soviet troop withdrawalsfrom Afghanistan; 350 men were on duty in the Gulf to serve asa buffer between Iraq and Iran in compliance with a UnitedNations cease-fire resolution; concomitantly, the Secretary-General was organizing a peacekeeping unit for deployment to

3

4 V~' tt-L.I V H Li\~kN

Nalifibia. anld wAas preparing tor I uture twiI'(.t eclne in t' i~i

in (thc Weswni Sahara. Kainipuchea, and Cennral Aincrika'Fhe inv~asion of Kuwait by the force, oft Saddaiii lluem on

Auc-ust 2. 1 990) was a qualitalti~ely di! terent situatoikm, h 's% e' rAs President Bohii~i noed. it represented tile Ii rst imajor onrNi, i t)confront thie inieritatiotial comnmunity in thle pnst-C(old Wýarperiod. The crisis Nko uld ultiniatelx require (the (rg-aii/atol it?)n

ttia.5Ni'e miilitary itloirls to force thle expulsioni ()I Iraki ftorce\from Kuwkait.

Even niore critically. int the ýwu~e if the \x~ir. ilhe Se,:urn\ýCouncil took ,everal putlitie actiolts agaitist fraqt.1ht! could 'wncais precedent itn deal ing with future acts of agg resso . %tst"

P Creation of a special atgen,, to monitor thldi tuc oof lraq\s chemical, ioocallo a IdtuClear % eapott',.

o- fDetnnination of thle circunmstances jitd thle conditiotisUnder which Iraq m ay ex port its (iit and relatled prodlucts-.and

by Baghdad of its Kurdishli ad Shliite c tmmuitit ie11S.

These were more thian onerous cease-fire Londitiolls; ratheir. t1twstgnalled thle Security Council's detennittation to pettalie thieIraqi regime wvith lenns that were thle po~litical and legalequivalent of the Versailles Treaty. Onl the other hand. tile moodoft high expectation regarding future United Natitons perforitiancein thn.; cau-se 'it peace encountered in thle United States was tnotwidely shared by other member states. The new-found unityamong the permtanentt member-- of the Security Council has beenlgreeted with ambivalence by other,., many feeling themselvesthreatened by Amncrican 'hegemony' 4ir pot'-ltially marginabledby the "Big Five.'

To address these developmnents and their implicatio~ns for theUS military, thle Institute for National Strategic StudieN of' theNational Defense University organi7ed a series of' cotnferencesand special seminars, beginning in October 1991. The meetingsbrought together an outstanding group of senior tofficials, officers

of HaLe rank., xnd uianotial securil ~ ~ tIt. Ihei-arecent fileetin, III the wnert a 1IIie-d1IY WHiIIIAr o '11rHA (iifd!Nocm1 iher P, 7.I992- assessed prc blelis' ccojiri ciued hi ( lit.N at ion ninitarN leaders &, thcy CII.!aged IInI~ ~inkisso:I't. '[heiir oh'\eratiow,\ trequentk cN id pro~ ide uNetlu

inshi Iq--rdngprtohleinl" 01 (.tt1111,1\ WIL ciiiOdadc'ntF1.Toi make the resu~lts of these inweww,ne a,,1ibllei to1 .1 \\ci

audience, xý e arc ro-puhltisiiig lh-2 prex i o wl\ puhl i stdprocedlings as~a \cNairfPaper. IiilioNlcý Iiex~ ditio ý%e'iic ,ccdd

the keviti ce address hý Anihvasachcr Thm i as R . Pi ken tie. tlrciI n1ited States Penilanent Reprcsentauctox e 1 th I filted Natiimdc.p2.eCn -,t th10 opellig conlerenwe held onl ( K tclbr '1) IM .) Ili'addendum i,, pailicularlx aILuahie viw n Ohw u-rriit dill coltp)olicy. ZOOue Ln hOILCN Ll~inimrc t iigt I S ( ix 4?nlltcCliI in threheld III inteitcir6(al '~ckei Uild c.0111ic0 res 410imii

MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF UN PEACEKEEPING

Military Implications of United NationsPeacekeeping Operations

Ambassador Howard Walker

Vice President, NDU

IT IS MY _REAT I'LEASURE on behalf of General Ceran, tlhePresident of the University. to welcome you lo this third in aseries of workshops sponsored by the National Deelnse,ýniversity'\ Institute for National Strategic Studies oin "FutureSecurity Roles of the United Nations." Since our last workshopoil th1is subject itt September when Ambassador and !onner UNUnder Secretary, Ron Spiers, talked to us. interest ill thatsubject has grown in the US. partly as a result of PresidentBush's speech at thie United Nations in which he committed tieUnited States to increased support for UN peacekeeping. Interesthas grown at a time when the consequences of UN peacekcepinghave exploded in cost mid in complexity of operation. We seein Bosnia and Somalia today civil wars that are brutal and thatare difficult to control. Injecting UN peacekeeping operations intothose situations has far-reaching hutnan and material costs.Equally important for us at this titue in our history and for othercountries, intervention has uncertain consequences and outcomesthat affect the willingness of some goveniments and their cilit.ensto participate. Thal makes it all the more important that weunderstand as fully as we can the nature of peacekeepingoperations and the consequences for the US of militaryinvolvement.

We are very fortunate to have with us today to lead tilediscussion on this subject two gentlemen with impressivecredentials.

Mr. Richard M. Connaughton was educated at Duke ofYork's Royal Military School, at Sandhurst, and at St. John'sCollege at Cambridge University where he took a Master ofPhilosophy Degree in International Relations, and was also aDefense Fellow. He was commissioned in the Royal ArmedService Corps in 1961 and spent seven years in the Far Eastseconded to the Brigade of Ghurkas. He commanded squadrons

WILLIAM H LEWIS

and rcgiments in Germany, thereafter served as instructor at theBritish and Australian Army Command and Staff Colleges. Hewas head of tile British Army's defense studies program. Heretired as colonel two nmonths ago and is currently working as acOn}SUltanlt in the field of national and international relations. Mr.Connaughton is tile author of a number of publications on tilesuhjcect of military security.

The other panelist is Mr. John Mackinlay who is seniorresearch associate at the Thomas J. Watson Institute forInternational Studies at Brown University. After finishingSandhurst. he joined the armny in 1964 and retired a year ago. Hedeveloped his interest in international military cooperation whileon the staff of the commnander of the Multinational Force andtObservers in the Sinai. He was the author of The Peacekeepers.,an assessment of peacekeeping operations at the Arab-Israeliinterface which compares UN and non-UN peacekeepingoperations from both military and poilitical points of view. He iscurrently researching new guidelines for multilateral militaryoperations in the post Cold-War era. This Ford Foundationproject, which Mr. Mackinlay directs, is entitled: "SecondGeneration Multinational Forces."

MILITARY IMPLICATIO )NS OF UN IpEACEKEEIPING

Command, Control and Coalition Operations

Richard M. Connaughton

MY TASK IS TR) DISCUSS ASPECTS of Command. Cont011 and CoalitionOperations. Coalition Operations as a plausiblc means ofcollective security is a fact of life. Whereas responsible states areunlikely to declare unequivocally their eschewing of unilateralmilitary action, the interplay of economic and politicalramificatioms alone would indicate that multilateral military actionwill be the norm for the future. in the ending of the Cold Warwe have rediscovered the possibility of employing military Poweras a positive instrument of foreign policy. This paper isdeliberately directed at UN-type operations rather than atmultilateral ad hoc arrangements.

I have often thought that the coupling of Control toCommand - and here I mean it in its military sense - impliesa parity between the two funictions. It suits my purpxose today tocontest that assumption. Command concerns tile direction,coordination and control of military forces. Control is thereforebut an adjunct to the function of command; it is impossible tocommand successfully without exercising control. Control isessentially a mechanism through which the commander, assistedby his staff. directs, organises and co-ordinates those forces forwhich he is responsible. I propose to concentrate this short studyupon multilateral military command.

The other side of the Command and Control coin is tilepxolitical face. But here the relative importance between the twofunctions is the reverse to that seen in the military dimension.Political command is essentially an American phenomenon,therefore being a national rather than multinational consideration.That i.; not to say the exercise of national command has nointernational implications. The great grey area which warrantsserious study is the political control of military coalition

;" ui ! I . . . I I .... IN ......... ,

10? WILLIAM H. LEWIS

operations.Our topic has been finessed to examine military command

and political control of coalition operations. The five paramieterselected to form the basis for this short analysis and futurediscussion are:

,.An Historical Perspective.,-The Relationship between Peacekeeping and Peace

Enforcement.Command and the Commander.

• The Essence of Decision-Making in Coalition Operations.A Politico-Military Interface for the Future.

AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

If we had seen the end of history, what is happening out there inthe world today must be something of a revival. Coalition orAlliance warfare has been a recurring feature of past conflicts.Perhaps I should add that a coalition differs from an alliance

£ principally in degree; the latter tends to be more formal andlonger lasting. The great 'British' victory of 1815 over theFrench at Waterloo was achieved by Wellington with only thirty-eight percent of his force originating from the British Isles.

In the previous century, Winston Churchill's ancestor, theDuke of Marlborough, rarely recruited more than a quarter of hisarmy from Britain. In those days it was traditional to hire troopsfrom the minor states of Europe for a campaigning season whichfitted in between the Spring and Autumn. Successful generalswere invariably successful diplomats as well as being politicallyastute. Marlborough was a past master in the manipulation of thekings and princes of Europe as well as controlling andcommanding his representative foreign generals. It was no easytask, requiring exhaustive diplomacy. In the close season, heworked with the political committees in London to ensure that hewould want for nothing when the improving weather presaged theresumption of hostilities. As ever, good quality intelligence wasa primary consideration. Marlborough had succeeded inobtaining the services of a spy within Louis XIV's inner circlele Conseil d'en Haute, an all-informed group of no more than adozen of France's most influential courtiers and diplomats. Theexistence of the Versailles mole is a reminder to us of the

MILITARY IMPLICATIONS (IF UN PEACEKEEPING It

importance of so-called human intelligence and that inadequacieshere will undermine the effectiveness of the military operation.

The problem is that generals of Marlborough's quality onlyappear once or twice in a century. What we must studiouslyavoid is the recommendation and putting in place of a structurewhich only Marlborough can make work.

So we cai, tick off a number of enduring prerequisites, asimportant today as they were then. Perhaps what we should beasking ourselves is, what weight should we atach to historicalexample'? We have to understand that history does not reallyrepeat itself. There will be similarities between events, but thosewill be balanced by dissimilarities. It is too simplistic to assertthat coalitions are not new, without pausing to acknowledge thatthe circumstances in which they took place in the past wereinvariably different from today. A state of war would usuallyhave existed, there were probably agreed missions, agreedpreliminary plans, a known enemy and specified objectives.

j What history does is to provide us with the challenge ofachieving as many of the above objectives as possible throughabstract peacetime planming.

There is anl important role for historians to play in thedecision-making process. The aforementioned revival of historywill serve to emphasize that ethnic, religious and national groups'behavior will often have a rationale rooted deep in their past.History is an arrow in the quiver of appraisal, One part of thatbalanced appraisal is to divorce ourselves from our westernpreconceptions, to step into the shoes of those whom we need tocomprehend, and to observe tile world from where they stand.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PEACEKEEPINGAND PEACE ENFORCEMENT

Normally. a few definitions would be in order, but I fear that thisis an area notoriously difficult to define. In his paper Agenda for !Peace, the UN Secretary-General. Dr. Boutros-Ghali made a rareattempt, for one within the UN. to define peacekeeping and itsassociated activities. Unfortunately, the result has been to furthercloud the issue. So much so, for example, that tile term'peacemaking' has been rendered so amnbiguous that it is

12 WILLIAM H. LEWIS

recommended that its use he discontinued. To he fair, many of

today's UN peace-inspired operations are resisting templatecategorization and this is a trend which will continue to he afeature of the future. The safest ploy is to adopt a functionalapproach to the peace-associated business.

The first function is Peace Enforcement, or MilitaryIntervention. The victorious allies who had crafted and unveiledthe Charter of the United Nations in 1945 had made a consciouseffort in Chapter VII of the Charter to address the principalweakness of the Covenant of the League of Nations--the absenceof an enforcement mechanism with which to defeat aggression.However, their subsequent conduct emphasized the point thatthese had been nations united in war against a common enemy.With the enemy defeated. there was no longer a honding agent.Competing ideologies developed, and east and west went theirseparate ways. With them went the prospect of achieving acollective enforcement regime, frozen out by the Cold War.

Instead, and over a period of time, there emerged somethingnot provided for within the Charter and our second function.traditional peacekeeping. The fundamental difference betweenthe enforcement/intervention and peacekeeping functions has beendescribed by Alan James:

Yet when compared with military intervention, there is a distinctionbetween the two (which) was seen to lie in their attitudes towardsthe associated issues of force and consent, collective securityrelying. ultimately on the mandatory use of force, whilepeacekeeping eschewed force, except in self-defense, and requiredthe consent of the host state for the admission of UN personnel.

For convenience, peacekeeping settled comfortably under theumbrella of Chapter VI of the UN Charter, The PacificSettlement of Disputes. Peacekeeping developed into the field ofspecialism of what tended to be the smaller and non-aligned Istates.

Strangely, only in the Congo, 1961-63, has the understandingthat weapons are to be used purely in self-defense beencomprehensively prejudiced. However, we are undoubtedlymoving towards an uncertain, more v, lent future where thelightly trained but willing conscript will prove unequal to thetask. We have the evidence of the limitations of conscripts from

MILITARY IMPLICATIONS (IF UN PEACEKEEPING 13

conflicts in Vietnam and Afghanistan. Recently, the Finnishcommander at UNIFIL, General Haggliind, stressed that theconcept of enforcing peace should not be opposed:

...it simply requires different forces amd a completely differentconcept. An intention to deter and enforce require forceswhich are as frightening as possible. For this kind of missiongreat-power battalions, professional soldiers and all the meansat their disposal are preferable.

The combatants in the target country will frankly not beimpressed by the security guarantees offered by those whom theyconsider to be militarily inferior. This is not to say thattraditional peacekeeping should not continue where it canfunction. New problems demand new solutions. One newsolution is the concept of preventive deployment. Here, the useof force, if necessary, is implicit. This is therefore our thirdfunction, what I will describe as aggravated peacekeeping. lyingsomewhere between Chapters VI and VII and what DagHammarskjold appropriately described as Chapter V11/2 .

The European coalition operation in Bosnia is notintervention, nor what is accepted as traditional peacekeeping. Itis a new category of humanitarian activity mounted with. intheory. the permission J-f the parties involved. The force'sresponse to aimed fire will be less passive than what hasprevailed in the past. It is for this reason that it has the potentialto fall within the ambit of Chapter VI'>,L

What the Yugoslavia crisis has done has been to beg seriousquestions of the modus operandi, and to expose a number of thenegative aspects of the UN. The Organization has found itselfoverstretched and. in the case of Bosnia, unable to mount a majormilitary operation. The procedure whereby headquarters andforces are assembled on the principle of equitability, geographical Idistribution and providing for the employment of up to one-thinr'women, has clearly been found wanting. But, in the past, the UNhas got by, its skimpy military st.. ", 'g upon the ad hoc hotplan, supported by what Sir Brian Urquhart has described as acobbled together 'Sheriff's Posse.'

Major military players will expect as a minimum for theirown troops, the presence of a robust, coherent and practised

14 WILLIAM H. LEWIS

centre core headquarters. Chapter VI1½ and Chapter VII-scaleoperations cannot be commanded or controlled without a propermilitary structure. Since the European Community is paying theBosnian UNPROFOR 2 'peacekeeping' bill, they have their way,but soon the strained civil-military relationship within the UNwill have to be addressed.

In the first 40 years of the UN's life, it undertook 13peacekeeping operations. In the four years from 1988, it hasequalled that total. It is not simply the evaporation of ideologicalsparring which has prompted the exponential increase in UNpeacekeeping activity. It is also a reflection of changinginternational attitudes. For example, it was a sovereign right thatstates were free to act as they chose within the confines of theirown borders. When opprobrious behaviour was challenged byother states, Article 2(7) of the UN Charter was employed as theauthority to continue to behave badly. The effectiveness ofArticle 2(7) first began to erode in relation to South Africa in the1960s. That it has lost much of its psychotic sanctity wasapparent in 1991 when 20,(XX) NATO troops were deployed intonorthern Iraq without Iraq's consent and without significantprotest from world opinion. It would seem thal if care is takenin the presentation of cases for legitimate military intervention --they will invariably be in support of regional actors - then itneed not be seen within the UN's General Assembly as a colonialimposition. It is unfortunate that there does appear to be acontinuing need to remind the major ac!or that the authority formilitary action has its source of origin in New York and not inWashington.

Understandably, the increase in both UN commitments andthe nature of some of those commitments will be reflected in agreater demand for professional forces. particularly logisticians.Those forces will be called upon to intervene in the conventionalfighting which is a feature of inter-state conflict and the 'brutal.ethnic, religious, social, cultural or linguistic strife' described byDr. Boutros-Ghali as the unconventional features apparent inintra-state conflict. There will be difficulties in presentation. andreserves of diplomacy will be taxed, but if the old order of statesis to be employed to face the new order's disorder, then itrequires headroom within the UN for essential contlingencyplanning. We should set aside our unreasonable sensitivity in

MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF UN PEACEKEEPING 15

involving the Military Staff Committee in the planning processand follow the lead taken by the Western European Union.Diplomacy has to release more responsibility aild ;•uthority to themilitary. The fact of the matter is that, while soldiers can bediplomats, diplomats cannot he soldiers.

COMMAND AND THE COMMANDER

Command of a coalition operation will be vested in thenominated commander from either a framework state or securityorganization. The framework state will often be the majorinvestor in the enterprise, the state normally providing the largestnational military contribution, a large proportion of theinfrastructure support, and a significant percentage of theoperation's costs. I have in mind here a deployed US UnifiedCommand and, for convenience, will describe this as the UnifiedCommand Model. There is some attraction in relating the UnitedStates to this model, but these models are by nature generalrather than specific. We should not assume either that the USAwill always be the dominant player or that the USA template isentirely appropriate to other framework staies.

The military commander is the key ingredient in the workingof an effective coalition. The award of high command cannot betempered by charity, by the concept of Buggins's turn, for everyheadquarters with the remotest prospect of leading aninternational military operation requires at the apex of its pyramidthe right man at the right time. If coalitions are to surviveinternal and external political/military pressure and tensions, thehope will be that they are of short duration. In the world warsthere was time to test the many generals who had risen tocommand positions as peacetime trainers and administrators.Those who did not succeed were removed. Coalitions will notenjoy this validatory period. Moreover, there are practicaldifficulties in having a general removed who is not one of yourown nationals, so it is more than likely that the militarycommander who embarks upon the operation will, for better orfor worse, be there at the end.

It seems that the modern coalition commander requires aminimum of four basic qualities; he has to be adept in the skills

I

16 Wit LIAM H, LEWIS

of operational decision-making, the science of management, theart of leadership. and to possess the gift of intellect. Thesequalities are of course a permutation of attributes which go backin history. 'Management' is akin to control and it can be takento mean control, but there is a subtle difference which can beillustrated with reference to the question of media relations. Thecommander, through his staff, will manage those members of thepress corps amenable to such management, and will control thosewho are not. But the one quality of the moment is that ofintellect. It is today's prerequisite. Its absence will filter outthose who in the past would have climbed the ladder of successthrough undoubted qualities of confidence, charisma and naturalleadership. If a future coalition commander lacks intellect, hewill be uiable to hold his own in a highly charged political anddiplomatic environment, his essential media image will heirr,,--,"ed and h- is unlikely to be able to comprehend the abidinghuman aspects in dealing with and tasking with equanimity amultiplicity of national representatives - all with their ownnational, political points to score and careers to enhance. And allthis before we consider the enemy!

Effective command can best be achieved through a formedheadquarters with a proven track record. The nominatedcommander's own joint staff are practised in playing a full partin the success, or failure, of their commander's plans. They area team which it is difficult to conceive can be improved by theintroduction within the core of additional, token, representativestaff officers. I am not referring here to liaison officers. Liaisonofficers should, as a matter of routine, already be in place in anyheadquarters liable to be earmarked to command coalitionoperations. The commander and his staff have the benefit ofknowing one another, their strengths and weaknesses, and shouldhave developed an effective working relationship. Oneinstinctively senses when the atmosphere in a headquarters isright, aware that internal and external pressures will be addressedwith quiet confidence and that the staff's entire energy is

dedicated to the support of their commander. All this is. ofcourse, to talk of the ideal. Compromise will be the rule ratherthan the exception.

If, therefore, I am suggesting that the commander and hisown Joint Headquarters Staff, or what we shall call the Combined

I-. .. ... . . • • _ i _ mm m m


Task Force Headquarters (CTFHQ), are an indivisible entity.what should be the relationship between the commander and thesubordinate, national military representatives (MILREPS)': Theanalogy I shall use in illustrating the Unified Command Modelis that of a galaxy of national, non-operational headquarterswhose relative position to CTFHQ is indicative of theirimportance to the operation. In support of the framework statewill he a secondary state. The relationship between theframework state and the secondary state will be determined by anumber of factors which can be collectively described aLsIempathy.' The function of the secondary' state is no sinecure.It is essentially the coalition's Union representative, the one voiceand opinion the Commander must find the time to consider.Above all, the commander of the secondary state's forces mustensure that the relationship between the framework state and theother supporting states remains that of allies, not as a groupingof auxiliaries. The secondary state's national headquarters in ourhy-pothetical galaxy is the closest to the core headquarters.Indeed, in the Gulf, the British MILREP was invited into GeneralSchwarzkopf's CTFHQ.

Time marches on, but I think it useful to put down a numberof bullets to describe the command relationship between CTFHQand the national staffs:

c CTFHQ and national staffs remain rigorously distinct.

tý The commander is advised to conduct separate. bilateraldiscussions on specific issues with his constellation ofnational commanders. It is most important that the nationalcommanders do have the opportunity to reinforce what theyfeel their capitals want, as well as convey their own personalthoughts. If the commander consults his allies individuallyrather than en masse (time permitting). he avoids competitionfor his ears, he can detect problems, nervousness, and sensepolitical complications. What has to be studiously avoidedduring this dialogue is the generation of a sense offavouritism, suspicion and conspiracy. When the round iscomplete. the commander directs his staff to design what isin effect a collaborated plan which is then presented by the

18 WILLIAM H. LEWNS

CTFHQ staff to the assembled national commanders. Thecommander, therefore, has the benefit of knowing theanswers to questions which might arise and is also consciousthat he is not presenting proposals which are unacceptable tothe national commanders.

s, There are advantages in the subordinate Joint Task ForceHeadquarters (JTFHQ) being formed and commanded byrepresentatives of the framework state. It is self-evident thatthe framework state should also be responsible for the toolsof command - e.g., communications.

There is a further model which I shall describe as the NATOModel. This model refers to an existing internationalheadquarters, but one with its won integral, political, regulatorycouncil. An obvious example is the Allied Command EuropeRapid Reaction Corps (ACERRC). The headquarters sent intoBosnia to command British, Canadian, Spanish and Frenchbattalion groups on Operation UNPROFOR 11 is a subordinate,debaptised NATO headquarters. The variation on the theme is

obviously necessary due to French participation, particularly thenomination of Major General Phillipe Morillon to command theforce.

I am not proposing an embryonic UN Headquarters Modelbecause I feel it would be unworkable in practice. It is not somuch the beguiling influence of the UN's composition rules butrather the reality that, on occasions, constituent members wouldbe debarred from participating due to a conflict of nationalinterest. Crises will never be the same. The solution may welllie in a menu of on-call, formed national or internationalheadquarters, called forward to command the operation basedupon that headquarter's suitability.

THE ESSENCE OF DECISION-MAKINGIN COALITION OPERATIONS

I shall not dwell on this subject, but it does require discussion inorder to construct a foundation for the finale.

It is crises which spawn coalitions. Coalitions will rarely beformed entirely from one of the myriad, regional, collective


security organisations. There are two principal, positive' reasonsfor states to throw their hat into the coalition ring. Either thecrisis impinges upon a -ital national interest, or the state sees itas its international responsibility to act. Coalitions can only beheld together when there is unity of purpose. an unequivocal aim,and an agreed mission statement. A flaw was apparent in thedecision-making process during Operation Provide Comfort. aliasHaven, a 1991 humanitarian operation aimed at providing reliefto Iraq's Kurds. In this case, the responsible Unified Commandwas US EUCOM. supported by contingents made available fromother states. EUCOM, however, had a national mission:

Combined Task Force Provide Comfort conducts multinationalhumanitamian operations to provide relief to displaced Iraqi civiliansuntil International Relief arrives.

Indeed, EUCOM's commander. General Shalikashvili. was thej Command's deputy who. despite commanding an international

operation, received his orders from his national headquarters. Inthe House of Commons, Prime Minister John Major emphasisedthat without suitable assurances on the safety of Iraq's Kurds,British troops would not be withdrawn. It was not operationallypossible for British troops to remain in Northern Iraq without thesupport of American forces. However, there was a crucialdisparity between General Shalikashivili's mission statement andthe conditions John Major deemed to be necessary before Britishforces were to be withdrawn:

...firstly, an effective UN force on the ground: secondly, clearwarnings to Iraq that any renewed repression will meet theseverest response: thirdly. a continuing deterrent militarypresence in the region to back up those warnings, and themaintenance of sanctions against Iraq. Without those we willnot leave.

But the American Supreme Commander, his mission statementhaving been satisfied, had begun the initial, partial withdrawalfrom Northern Iraq. The timing was unfortunate because itserved to undermine the Kurdish leaders' negotiating positionwith Iraq. The point is obvious. The decision-making process

20) W'ILLIAM H 1f\A Is

is influenced hy domestic aid external factors which have i) hCcollaborated into cto.ialition ainiis and miission atiinets•i Thesuccess of futurc coalition operations should inot he dependentupon ministers communicating inoriniAl y with their o alitionpartners (on1 an ad hoc. otne-to-lne basis. We are in danger o)ibeing lulled into a false sense of security. Coalitions will nolalways he as straightforward as those seen in the Gulf and inNorthern Iraq. In both cases, the adequate though loosecommand and control relationships were not severel tlesIed.

A POLIIICO-MILITARY INTERFACE

FOR THE FU,'TURE

It appears to be ,i acceptable practice to excuse discordance

within a coalition as the inevitable manifestation of pIoliticaldecisions being made at diflerent times in different place.. Ifsuch a state of aflairs is not addressed, then Unified CommandModel Operationts are destined to continue in (he manner oi theworst case UiN federal peacekeeping operation. We shallcontinue to observe national defense ttministers with 'hands On'

aspiration, directing their own national lonnalion'. somletilltesunheknown to the commanders.' We shall see rank inflationwhereby the seniority of the senior representative o,1 nationalteams exceeds what is justified. Such is the perfidy of nationalmaneuvering in anticipation of achieving an unjustified positioncloser to or at thie coalition high table. There can be littleargument that there has to be a structure through whichcollaborated and singular. political control can be exercised.Foreign political leaders are reassured when they can see that

adequate political control has been imposed upon a conmnanderwho is not of their nationality. In addition, the apparentcollectivisation of the decision-making process has presentationaladvantages. The resultant military action is identified not withthe administration organisation or collective defense agreementwhich mandates the essential authority to the military coalition.

The singular line of political direction to the coalitioncommander will represent a distillation of the views of the

national representatives within the coalition. If we adopt aNATO-style organization and apply its principles to such ad hoc

coalitions which emerge in the future then. in theory at least, the

MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF LIN PEACEKEEPING 21

politicians will have a forum fromn which to exert control, leavingthe conunander free to command, unshackled from past, penly,political distractions. Constituent coalition members will berepresented at ambassadorial level, convened centrally yet atsome distance from the conflict.

The line diagram would look something like this:

SC in Coalition Operations

N.fifti Co.. of CTFUQ MILREPS Fo-djoýCagotahs A~b.• ,,ss.4.

The line between the Council of Ambassadors to CTFHQ isnot a one-way street. It is naive to believe that national capitalsand coalition Ambassadors will not talk to their MILREP; indeed,for national decision-making as well as for routine andadministrative matters such dialogue is essential. There may bereason and opportunity to collocate MILREPS with the Councilof Ambassadors. The function of MILREP is firstly, to representthe national military interest, exercising the veto if required and,secondly, to maintain the Force in the Theatre including medicaland personnel matters, national logistics and public relations.Operational discussions, however, must go through the chain ofcommand. Similarly, national units within formations will wishto talk to their MILREPs, but this is not the route for operationaldecision-making. There must obviously be concern that theproposed Council might fail to reach agreement due to a conflictof national interests. However, the implications of politicalprevarication are such that the absence of a working structuresuch as the one described here, might rcsuft in the failure of thecoalition's military mission.

22 WILLIAM H. LEWIS

CONCLUSION

We have an unusual situation whereby we have been discussingwhat is for us a new ball game, yet one for which we have notcompiled the rules. We have barely acknowledged the necessityfor purple planning before new horizons of political awarenessand diplomatic liaison are demanding attention. Sooner, ratherthan later, most here will be drawn into the planning process,execution or conflict termination ot UN or UN-mandatedcollective security initiatives. Coalitions involve compromise anda willingness to concede on issues of national sovereignty. Whenallied intransigence is at its most frustrating. it is as well toremember that we too are someone else's ally.

What is inescapable is the momentum driving the associatedstudy of peace-associated military operations. It is all very wellpointing to the somewhat obvious need for UN reform. Thechallenge lies in the formulation of acceptable procedures for thecommand and control of a new generation of peacekeeping andpeace enforcement operations. What is more, procedures have tobe practised. Politicians require to be persuaded of the need toraise the political profile, to play their part in coalition crisismanagement exercises, to acquaint themselves with options andlikely areas where decisions will ultimately have to be made.What price WINTEX '94?


NOTES

1. Joining a coalition can also be for negative reasons, such as attempting to

stop one coalition member dominating the operation, or preventing one set of

outcomes.

2. National interference behind commanders' hacks comes in a number of

guises. It is useful to distinguish between micro-management during military

operations (such as Carter in Tehran rescue bid) as distinct from political

control over the identification of strategic objectives and interference as a

consequence of domestic, public opinion regarding either methods used or

casualties inflicted or received.

I

24 WILLIAM H LEWIS

Defining A Role Beyond Peacekeeping

John Mackinlay

AFTER THE COMPARATIVE STABILITY of the Cold War, violenceis spreading contagiously through Yugoslavia and the multi-ethnic states of the formner Soviet Union. Rural and urbancommunities have been torn apart by factional conflict and inter-ethnic haired, unleashing all fhe misery of massive populationdisplacement and its long term destabilizing effects.

Political disarray at NATO prevented an effective responseby the European nations and negative memories of the Sovietempire inhibited a wider involvement by Russian forces.Although the UN has to some extent been able to overcome thepolitical obstacles to an international response, it failed toorganize an effective multinational force which had the militarycapabilities needed to police fragile agreements on the groundand protect isolated minorities from the brutalities of localfactions. A similar lack of military effectiveness diminisheschances of a successful outcome in Cambodia and Somalia. UNplanning staff in New York have once again applied the ad hocprocedures used to assemble a peacekeeping force to situationswhich demand a much more sophisticated approach. Although"peacekeeping" relies on pre-conditions which are notably absentin these contingeŽncies, in each case UN troops arrived piecemeal,in the planning expectation of a best case scenario.

This paper argues that the concept of peacekeeping as amultipurpose conflict resolution device is already overextendedand cannot be adapted any further to meet the dynamiccontingencies of the future. In reality the UN peacekeepers have,with mixed results, already crossed the threshold of traditionalpeacekeeping operations into a new range of second generationtasks. It is now time to spell out these tasks with greaterdefinition and develop an internationally agreed doctrine toreplace the ad hoc methods of the Cold War period.


LIMITATIONS OF THE PEACEKEEPING PROTOTYPE

United Nations peacekeeping developed as an instrument of adeeply divided Security Council during the Cold War. As aresult there were important constraints in its application. Theterm "Peacekeeping" has no internationally authorized definition,not only because it does not appear in the UN Charter, but alsobecause it has taken different forms to meet a number of differentcrises. It has also been misapplied outside the UN context todescribe non UN multinational and unilateral interventions aswell as UN operations which do not have any of the acceptedcharacteristics of peacekeeping.

The UN refers to peacekeeping as "an operation involvingmilitary personnel, but without enforcement powers, undertakenby the United Nations to help maintain or restore internationalpeace and security in areas of conflict." Under-Secretary-Generalfor Peacekeeping Operations, Marrack Goulding, developed thisdefinition:

United Nation field operations in which international personnel.LiviliaM and/or military, are deployed with the consent of the partiesand under United Nations command to help control and resolveactual or potential international conflicts or internal conflicts whichhave a clear international dimension.

This definition and its related military concept of operations havebeen widely accepted among the major UN contingentcontributing countries to describe the constrained, mainlyinterpositional, peacekeeping forces which were deployed duringthe period of the Cold War.

The principles of interpositional peacekeeping are derivedfrom the regulations for the Second United Nations EmergencyForce (UNEF 2) deployed to the Suez in the wake of the 1973Arab-Israeli war. They were the product of previous UNexperience and became the model for operations that followed.They gave guidance on:

> the need for support by the mandating authority, theSecurity Council;t> the requirement that the operation be deployed only withthe consent of the warring parties;

26 WILLIAM H. LEWIS

r, the command and control of the Force by the UN;t the composition of the Force; the restriction that force beused only in self-defense; andt. the need for complete impartiality.At all times, the Force had to have the full confidence and

backing of the Security Council. In practice, this was not alwaysforthcoming. A divided Security Council resulted in mandateswhich were sometimes based on a minimal area of commonagreement. Often, following the deployment of a peacekeepingoperation, no further adjustments could be made to the mandateand this reduced its effectiveness and credibility in the field andgave the appearance of weakness. Mandates tended to berestrictive in scope and sometimes vaguely expressed to avoiddisagreement among the permanent members. As a result thepeacekeepers' operational flexibility was reduced which limitedtheir ability to adapt their role to the needs of a changingsituation..Although the mutually agreed disinterest of the SecurityCouncil in the day to day conduct of operations gavepeacekeepers impartiality in the Cold War scenario, it alsoremoved from them the operational sophistication needed to meetchanging situations with an effective military presence in thefield.

UN peacekeeping forces tended to operate only with the fullcooperation of the parties concerned. Peacekeepers did not havethe military means to enforce a mandate from the SecurityCouncil. The coos~.: : and cooperation of the interested partieswas therefore esscL,;z: for success. This meant that a Forcecould only be deployed once the conflict began to stalemate orstabilize and a political will prevailed between the parties to seekan alternative to violence. Peacekeepers could not operatesuccessfully until these conditions were met, particularly in thebuffer zones where they supervised a strip of 'no-mans land,'which prior to their arrival was the site of an intense conflictbetween opposing, but easily identifiable, conventional forces.

According to the Secretary General's report (3) the "Forcewould be under the command of the United Nations, vested inthe Secretary-General, under the authority of the SecurityCouncil. The command in the field would be exercised by aForce Commander appointed by the Secretary-General with theCouncil's consent. The Commander would be responsible to the


Secretary-General. The Secretary-General would keep theSecurity Council fully informed of developments relating to thefunctioning of the Force. All matters which could affect thenature or the continued effectiveness of the Force would bereferred to the Council for its decision." This principle ofcommand has largely remained intact.

The "Force would be composed of a number of contingentsto be provided by selected countries, upon the request of theSecretary-General. The contingents would be selected inconsultation with the Security Council and with the panicsconcerned, bearing in mind the accepted principle of equitablegeographic representation." By tacit agreement this excludedpermanent ,,-embers of the Security Council from participating inpeacekeeping operations, although there have been exceptions.Consequently, peacekeepers were drawn from middle level orsmall powers, some with only a limited military capability. Theconstrained and reactive tasks of peacekeeping did not demandmore than this. In principle nations with small undevelopedmilitary forces could, without threatening the parties involved,provide infantry units while nations with more sophisticatedmilitary powers provide the support units.

Peacekeepers would not use force except in self-defense.Self-defense would include resistance to attempts by forcefulmeans to prevent it from discharging its duties under the SecurityCouncil's mandate. The definition of a defensive weapon wasnot explained which has left the choice open to manifoldinterpretations on a case by case basis. The rules of engagementalso tended to vary from force to firce and in some forces.particularly in the early phase of deployment, varied betweencontingents. But the significant factor is the constant assumptionthat the parties to the conflict would comply with the Council'sdecisions, which allowed UN military plarmers to assume a bestcase scenario at the outset of every operation. Once deployed,the UN peacekeepers tended to report on. but not intervene in,violent incidents or violations of peace agreements. Escalatingthe response beyond the use of force in self-defence was regardedas enforcement. Without the power or authority to take problem-solving action, except at a very local level, peacekeepers had torely more on their symbolic international presence and the moral

28 WILLIAM H. LEWIS

pressures arising from the disapproval of the internationalcommunity.

In view of these limitations there was never much pressureon the UN planning staff to develop the capability to deploy orconduct an effective military operation. It is even possible thatthe largely civilian staff in the UN's Field Operations andExternal Support Activities Office did not appreciate whatadditional military planning skills were needed to meet a lessthan best case scenario. Although Force Commanders andindividual staff officers published critical accounts of planningfailures, particularly in the initial phases of deployment, therewas no institutional process to capture these lessons and the sameproblems and mistakes occurred again at the initial phase of newforces. The strongest reason not to improve the system was thefeeling in New York that, notwithstanding their short termdiscomforts and lack of effectiveness, the UN military presencewas marginal to the success of the process.

POST COLD WAR DEVELOPMENTS

The end of the Cold War removed some of the political tensionsin the UN that had limited the scope and application ofpeacekeeping. No longer subject to superpower confrontationand competition, the Security Council became increasinglyeffective with an enhanced ability to negotiate peace agreementsin longstanding conflict zones. Peace forces were deployed withmore explicit and firmly stated mandates than in the past.Changes also occurred in the longstanding indifference of theSecurity Council nations. The United States began to considerpeacekeeping as a policy option, and has already taken steps inthe Pentagon to plan for future involvement. The Soviet Unionreversed its former cautious attitude which had inhibited thescope and conduct of some operations and earmarked armedforces for international peacekeeping roles. Both of thesenational shifts have opened the prospect of direct great powerinvolvement in UN multinational forces.

But as the UN Security Council developed its sense of

governance and began to address more challenging threats tosecurity, the change from a bi-polar to a multi-polar globalstructure generated a new range of conflict. Problems that had


been artificially stabilized in the hi-polar world were nowexacerbated by the collapse of the Soviet Union. In addition toregional conflict, multi-ethnic states began to disintegrate and

intemJ rather than inter-state conflicts proliferated.Humanitarian emergencies worsened and fragile governmentsemerged to fill the vacuum created by superpower withdrawals.The range of UN tasks had, de facto, been extended beyond therecognized limitations of "peacekeeping." In addition to thetraditional roles of conventional observer missions andpeacekeeping. UN forces were now involved in operations wherethe best case scenario could no longer be relied on: supervisingcease-fires between irregular forces, assisting in the maintenanceof law and order, protecting the delivery of humanitarianassistance, the denial of an air space and the guarantee of rightsof passage. In many of these operations local factions wouldcontinue to resist the presence of UN troops in defiance ofagreements made on their behalf in the distant environment ofGeneva, Paris and London.

This surge in demand exhausted the capacity of the middlenations which habitually provided contingents, which included:Australia, Austria. Canada, Ireland, the Nordic countries. Polandand Fiji. Not only was there now a need to expand the pool ofpeacekeepers to include annies with more sophisticated assets.but also moral reasons why it was no longer acceptable for themajor military powers to stand back and allow a group of smallernations pay the price, in casualties as well as national resources.for their longstanding involvement in what should have been aninternational effort.4

Prior to the Gulf War, peace negotiating successes in the UNwere already beginning to outstrip the willingness of members.and the capacity of the small secretariat staff, to provide andorganize adequate multinational forces to supervise these new andcomplex agreements. Within the UN, member nations insisted onIa ponderous system of authorization and funding that encumberedthe launching of UN peace forces, to an extent that in some casesonly leading elements could be made available at the criticalearly stages of a ceasefire.

The widening gap between the UN's growing list ofnegotiated agreements and its ability to underwrite them with

30 WILLIAM H. LEWIS

effective forces was revealed during the early stages of the Gulfconfrontation. Although the UN had become the focal point atwhich the international community coalesced its support for someform of effective military action against Iraq. It soon becameclear that there was no way in which the Security Council coulddirect or the UN Secretariat conduct a dynamic military campaignon the scale required. The collective membership, in some casesunder pressure from the United States, had set aside their nationaland domestic interests to authorize the use of collective fortceunder Security Council Resolution 678, but the coalition of forcesthat formed never seriously considered the idea of submittingthemselves to a UN command. Whether or not this reluctancestemmed from a desire to impose a pax americana in the Gulf isoutside the scope of this argument. The bare facts were that novestiges of a command organization, not even a map room,existed in the UN which could direct the operations of aneffective military force. Since the outset of the Cold War tie UNhad abandoned the development of any machinery to execute theenforcement measures of Chapter VII, and after years of neglectany residual military staff capability, as opposed to theorganization of peacekeeping events, had long since turned todust. Although "peacekeeping" forces continued t! deploy toNamibia, Cambodia. Somalia and Croatia under the sanmeplanning assumptions as before, in reality there was now a muchgreater need for them to be militarily effective.

PROBLEMS FOR THE PEACEKEEPER

The absence of an effective response-doctrine for these newcontingencies encouraged a new vocabulary, "peace-doing"epithets and buzzwords. These concealed a lack of any logicallydeveloped concept of military operations which could beappropriate to the rapidly changing situation. Words like "peace-making" and "peace-enforcement," used freely without anyunderlying doctrinal agreement as to what they meant, have

developed opposite meanings in Brussels and in New York.Blurred by overexposure, the word "peacekeeping" had lost itsformer definition. In addition to its institutionally acceptedmeaning, it was now being used loosely to describe militaryactivities which lay beyond its strictly defined UN parameters.


Hard and fast principles of consent were crumbling as newoperations deployed to countries where a UN presence wasevidently not universally accepted: to Croatia and Bosnia wherearmed local opposition from all parties resisted UN attempts toprotect threatened communities, and to Cambodia where thearmed forces of the Khmer Rouge refused to submit themsel' :to the cantonment processes of the Paris Agreement. In additiot.,greater use was being made of existing alliances. In May 1991,a Security Council authorized multinational force (Operation SafeHaven) flew into Northern Iraq against the wishes of Baghdad toassist and protect relief deliveries to the Kurds. In fall 1992. theSecurity Council authorized operations to deny the use ofairspace by the Iraqis over Southern Iraq and in anotherresolution by the Bosnian Serbs around Sarajevo.

In June 1992, the UN Secr,•tary-General issued a reportentitled the "Agenda for Peace" outlining proposals forstrengthening UN peace mechanisms. These included preventivemeasures, as well as a return to the original theme of the UNCharter in which agreements were negotiated that provided forarmed forces to be available "on stand-by" for enforcementactions. In the short term the creation of "peace enforcementunits" would allow the UN to respond to challenges beyondpeacekeeping. The "Agenda for Peace" was the first step towardsthe development of a UN operational capability that could meeta second generation of new tasks. To be capable of exercisinga wide range of military responses as situations escalate anddeescalate, future operations would require the assets of majorpowers to enable a more a sophisticated range of response.These could be subordinated to an integrated command system.

On the ground at the violent interface these separate strandsof development tended to place the peacekeeper (or moreaccurately the UN soldier) in a much more exposed position. Hewas still being deployed under the same ad hoc military staffprocedures in which essential operational decisions were left tocontingent level interpretation and the slow arrival or completeabsence of logistic support in some theaters (for example initiallyin Somalia) prevented the establishment of an effective militarypresence. In the best case scenario it did not matter much, nowit did.

32 WILLIAM H LEWIS

The concept of peacekeeping in the widely accepted but rigidform of the traditional prototype cannot he adapted any further.An emerging era of multipolar international restructuring hasbrought with it a new range of operational tasks for the UN.These are no longer predicated on the logic of universal consent,and cannot safely assume the traditional scenario of anuncontested UN presence. They constitute a second generationof UN activities.

Second generation operations are already a fact of life. Theyfall between the techniques of peacekeepers and observers, andenforcement. The term "Second Generation" operations refers toa growing range of contingencies. sometimes incorrectlydescribed as "peacekeeping" in which UN forces face anexpanded range of tasks. These are distinct from peacekeepingbecause UN forces involved do not necessarily enjoy the supportof all the parties involved locally and consequently will have totake much more rigorous steps to achieve a standard of militaryeffectiveness that ensures their personnel safety and achieves theconditions required in the mandate. In some second gencrationtasks, authorized under an enforcement mandate, heavy weaponssystem including armored vehicles, combat aircraft and warshipsmay be deployed.

SECOND GENERATION OPERATIONS

The rapidity of these developments has opened a doctrinal gapwhich is not covered by an international agreement. There is aprocedural vacuum on how to translate the bare statements of asecond generation mandate into a workable operational plan onthe ground. In the Watson Institute project on Second GenerationMultinational Operations we have found a growing consensusamong NATO and national defense staff that the generic categoryof UN operations can now be more accurately sub-divided intonine distinct tasks. These can be explained in the form of acontinuum starting with Observer Missions and Peacekeeping andescalating to Sanctions and High Intensity Operations. Belowthey have been arranged in three levels.

o Level One (Monitors and Supervision) comprises the well-defined tasks of observer missions and peacekeeping forces.


c- Level Two (Reinforced Military Presence)describes livecategories of operation which usually occur in conflictbetween communities within a state, rather than -,:tweenstates. Although UN multinational forces will be strongerand more effective, they will continue to operate under strictlimitations of using the minimum amount of force requiredto achieve the immediate objective. This level isdistinguished from Level One by the higher requirementormilitarily effective contingents and the presence of someheavier weapon systems in the UN force.

> Level Three operations (Military Intervention) refer toenforcement operations where UN military forces with asubstantial heavy weapons capability are uscd to redress amajor threat to international peace and security. They aredistinguished from Levels One and Two by the likelihoodtthat incidents between UN forces and the sanctioned partyare likely to occur at a very high level, typically betweentroops formations, combat aircraft or warships and notbetween small groups on the ground. Level Two operationsare continuing to develop in their characteristics and scope.This is certainly the most dynamic area of UN operationalactivity.

There is unlikely to be a clearly defined boundary between eachtask. Within the authority of a single mandate a UN force maycarry out several of the tasks defined below. A!thnotigh t-hein the continuum are shown in their likely order of operationalintensity and the consequently increasing scale of UNcommitment, this escalating order is not rigid. For example, itmay be possible for a Level Two task to amount to a far largerand more intensive commitment than a Level Three sanction task.

Level One Operations

Observer Missions. A UN observer can be military or civilian,usually having the status of an officer, whose principle task is toobserve and report on a developing situation, or on the executionof a peace agreement reached between conflicting parties.

34 WILLIAM H. LEWIS

Observers are usually unarmed; in some exceptionalcircumstances that may carry personal weapons. In addition totheir supervisory and monitoring tasks observers may bedeployed in a early warning role where a nation or ethnic groupis seriously threatened by the aggressive actions of a neighboringparty, in this case observers may be stationed at the mutualboundary or interface. Their task will be to provide timely andimpartial information to the internal community through the UNof any tnreatening moves and developments. In some cases itmay be necessary for the observers to act as a "trip wire" that islinked to a multinational deterrent force, lying outside theimmediate area of tension which tacitly underwrites theirpresence.

Peacekeeping. A peacekeeping operation, as defined by theUN Secretariat and leading contributor nations, refers to theoperations of multinational forces, usually authorized andorganized under the auspices of the UN, to help maintain andrestore international peace, without recourse to enforcementaction. In relation to the parties in conflict peacekeeping forcc:;are usually small and lightly armed. To be successful, they mustrely on the consent of the parties and effectiveness of the politicalagreements which underwrite their presence and function in thepeace process. They cannot rely on their military strength if theagreement breaks down, or a significant element of the opposedparties refuses to cooperate.

Level Two Operations

Preventive Deployment. Preventive deployment refers to theaction by a UN multinational group or force at the interface orzone of potential conflict where tension is rising between parties.The use of preventive deployment does not rely first on a truceor peace plan having been agreed between the parties. AlthoughUN contingents or observers will deploy with the consent or atthe request of, one or all parties involved, it is unlikely that theirspecific task will have been agreed except in principle betweenparties. A preventive interpositional deployment may beorganized from several national contingents on the same principleas a conventional peacekeeping force. Contingents may carryweapons necessary for protective tasks as well as self-defence.


The force will not be strong enough to resist a deliberate attackby one party or another, or restore territory unlawfully seized.Here the internal boundary or likely interface in dispute may beoverrun in conflict. It is not, therefore, desirable to deploy UNassets which cannot be swiftly removed.

Internal Conflict Resolution Measures. These are the actionstaken by a UN multinational force to restore and maintain anacceptable level of peace and personal security in an internalconflict. Their successful application relies first of all on asubstantial level of local support for some form of conflictresolution to take place. UN forces involved in internal conflictresolution will be called on to provide a wide number of tasksthat will vary considerably in each case. The following tasks arecommon to most situations:

i, Provide Liaison between Parties"t, Oversee Multi Party Ceasefire"" Cantonmentc- Disarmingc, Custody of War Suppliest. Supervising the Reconstitution of Host Nation Police andDefense Forces

Militarv Assistance to an Interim Civilian Authority. Theprovision of military assistance to an interim civil authorityusually follows a successfully conducted ceasefire. Once a "safe"ceasefire has brought hostilities to a level which allows theresumption of civil order, the tempo of military activity will alter.The intense military activities related to the assembly anddisarmament of the parties will move into a less L.,'namic phasein which the UN forces' military capability may be subordinatedto the requirement of an interim civil authority. The overall taskof the UN military force will be to supervise or police the Iprovisions of a peace agreement and ensure the lead up to an

election or transfer of power is conducted in a free and fairmanner. UN forces involved in military assistance to an (interim)civil authority will be required to provide an extremely widevariety of support. The following tasks are common to mostsituations:

t, Assist in the maintenance of law and order

36 WILLIAM H LEWIS

c, Assist in the provision of security prior to. and during, anelectionr. Help to maintain the smooth running of essential services(power, water, communications, etc.)t, Assist in the plaming for, reconstitution of. tile nationaldefense forcest> Assist ii. the relocation and rehabilitation of displacedelements of the populationc, Supervise and assist in the clearance and removal ofunexploded ordnance and mines

Protection 9.ý" Humanitarian Relief Operations. Mosthumanitarian relief is delivered safely and effectively wvithoutmilitary assistance. Even in countries where conflict threatensdelivery, supply is largely continued by negotiated agreementsbetween local parties and the supervising agency responsible forcoordinating relief. In some UN operations, humanitariansupplies are delivered with the ad hoc assistance of militaryaircraft and logistic vehicles. The protection of humanitarianrelief referred to in this section concerns the erganization of amultinational military relief protection force. The scale ofresponse often dictates the need for a stand-alone operation, as inthe case of Northero Iraq (1991). In every relief protectionoperation it is expected that the delivery of supplies will becontested locally and that the normal process of lead agencynegotiation has proved inadequate, necessitating that a jointmultinational task force be organized for delivery. Theseactivities focus around three primary tasks:

> Setting up a mounting baset, Providing security for victim population at delivery site> Secure tactical delivery.

Guarantee and Denial of Movements. International operationsmay be authorized by the Security Council to guarantee or denymovement by ships, aircraft and vehicles in particular areas androutes. They may involve the coordinated presence of warshipsand combat aircraft in the disputed region. Operations toguarantee rights of passage may be mounted to ensure thefreedom of ships to pass through a threatened sea lane, or foraircraft to reach an encircled city or community. International

E* U i 1 ~ I- Ei UI ~ * I .'U • - - .... • -. ., -


operations to deny movement usually focus on the denial of airmovement to a regime or government. The concern of the UNmay be to prevent the harassment of an unprotected populationby the use of combat aircraft or to prevent the delivery ofweapons or explosive ordnance onto a civil target. In both cases.these operations may involve highly sophisticated and capablewarships and combat aircraft. The safe operation will require thecoordinated offensive use of electronic emissions, as well asregular high level intelligence assessments. Their day-to-daydeployment will need to be decided by an internationallycomprised joint force HQ. It is likely that substantial elementsof the force will be provided from an existing military alliance.Operations in this category are distinguished from Level ThreeSanctions by their shorter duration, more defined local focus and,therefore, less need for a region-wide consensus.

Level Three Operations

Sanctions. Sanctions, as referred to in the UN charter, usuallyconcern denial of supplies, diplomatic and trading privileges andfreedom of movement to an identified aggressor. They areusually only applied when diplomacy ard less confrontationalmethods of conflict resolution have failed. Used on their ownwithout other restraining or coercive measures, sanctions do notusually cause an aggressor to reserve or withdraw from an illegalor war-like activity. However, if applied successfully, sanctionscan reduce the war-fighting capability of an aggressor. Toachieve a significant level of effectiveness, sanctions must beimposed with the consent of a widely based group of nationsincluding the unanimous support of the regional and neighboringstates of the aggressor.

High Intensity Operations. High intensity enforcementoperations, as referred to in the UN charter, are the ultimatesanction of the UN Security Council to counter a serious threatto international security. They are only used when all othermeans of conflict resolution have been exhausted. They mayinvolve a major operation of war against an identified aggressorstate. The most powerful combat aircraft, warships and firesupport capabilities in service may be deployed, but only the

38 WILLIAM H. LEWIS

minimum offensive action consistent with achieving theenforcement objective may be used.

OBSTACLES TO REFORM

In the climate of post-Cold War instability, Level Two operationswill continue to be the most dynamic in scope and anincreasingly important commitment for defence planners.However they lie in a wholly uncharted dimension of militaryactivity; at present, it is not possible to do more than distinguishthem conceptually from Level One and Level Three.

The importance of having an effective military presence inLevel Two contingencies in two-fold. Firstly, it cannot heacceptable to the international community, in particular to theSecurity Council, to have their collective writ thwarted locally bysmall, unrepresentative schisms acting selfishly or even for venalreasons, particularly when this threatens a widely agreed peaceprocess. Secondly, UN contingent-providing nations will notallow their troops, aircraft and warships to be vulnerably exposedin ad hoc military actions, tenuously coordinated on theassumption of a best case scenario, when that assumption is nolonger valid.

Establishing an effective military presence does not meanlowering the threshold for the use of force; it is not a proposal tofight for peace. The benefits of an effective military presence liein operational flexibility. A traditional peacekeeping forceinvariably has the characteristics of a military garrison, operatingfrom static administrative bases from which it can only deploy insmall numbers, for a short duration, in a limit and relativelyunsupported operational role. The weakness of this modusoperandi is that when the mandate of such a force is unlawfullyopposed, even at a very local level (for example a boy beside thetrack halts the column with his AK-47), it is left with few optionsexcept to become dangerously confrontational, or back off. Asthe elements move further away from their administrative base,their options are reduced. To overcome this inflexibility, a moreeffective military force must be capable of:

,< Operating in small patrols for several days out of base atplatoon and company strength.4 Providing requisite transport, logistics, communications

I uI .... . .. . . . ... .. iii IEE E I .. ,tII .. . .... m LL .. .. ..LJ


and medical cover for these extended out of base operations< Concentrating swiftly in locally superior strength< Hardening the base areas to sustain random snipingattacks4 Coordinating out of base operations with the activities ofother UN agencies, NGOs and foreign national assets alsopresent4 Calling on high level political support in a localconfrontational situationWith these capabilities, an isolated UN patrol faced by the

boy beside the track can now:.4 Be quickly reinforced if necessary,o Be logistically sustained in situ for as long as necessary4 Bring in political or military representatives of theobstructing party's own affiliation to talk down the impasse,4 Escort electoral and aid agencies to unlawfully cut off orthreatened communitiesAll the above capabilities, far from relying on the use of

armed force, make it a less likely option by giving the isolatedpatrol commander greater flexibility of response. They alsoensure a much more rigorously policed peace agreement whichhas a chance of standing up to local evasion and sabotage.

However, to make any significant headway in achieving sucha capability will first require the UN Secretariat and the leadingcontributor nations to improve or radically alter: planning andpreparation procedures, contingent selection criteria, commandand HQ staff selection criteria and logistic flexibility. One of thechief obstacles to this desirable revolution in their operatingstandards is the absence of a concept development capability inthe UN Secretariat. Few senior officials, whose formativeexperience is derived from the contingencies of peacekeeping inthe Cold War era have sufficient knowledge of militarypracticalities which would enable them to see the dangers of theimpending situation. This is aggravated by a caucus within theUN which maintains that the institution already has thesecapabilities and that the experiences of the Congo, Lebanon andCyprus equip them to take on Level Two operations or disregardthem as a special requirement. Beyond the Secretariat, there isthe institutional unwillingness of members to pay for sufficient

40 WILLIAM H. LEWIS

effective military forces to take part in anything more than a bestcase scenario.

In conclusion, we are left with the disturbing prospect that inview of the intractable official attitude towards improving theeffective standard of military operations and the increasinglyharmful consequences of ad hoc planning, we are more likely towitness a major debacle, costing UN lives and damaging UNcredibility, than a determined effort to improve operatingstandards. If this happens, it may through sustained publicoutcry, fortuitously achieve the much needed revolution in theUN's military efficiency; but, conversely, it may stail a publicreaction against the UN, in favor of unilateral military action.*and set back the development of a UN response to the contagionof intrastate conflict for many years.

1


Command and Control Issues forthe Military Planner

THE FOLLOWING IS A DISCUSSION of the two paperspresented in Session 1:

QUESTION: Mr. Connaughton, very early on in yourpresentation, you used the word "intelligence", I believe the UNwas very nervous about the word "intelligence" because itimplied, traditional peacekeeping would be seen as less neutral bybeing in the intelligence acquisition game and thereby servicingwar plans. As a legacy of the past, do we need to bury it andface the need for "intelligence" to meet the needs of futureoperations'?

RICHARD CONNAUGHTON: What we have to achieve withinthe coalition is perhaps a healthier sharing between states of theirintelligence. In the past, one used to concentrate on learningabout one's enemies, whereas now I think we're going to have tobe canny in working out who our future coalition partners aregoing to be. Therefore, you want a fair amount of intelligenceon your friends as well as your enemies. If you go back in timeto look at someone like E.H. Cam who wrote The 20 YearsCrisis, he said the problem of collective security requirements isthat people say you need them but they never tell you how andwhy it is to be achieved. I think, today, we can say weunderstand how and why it can be achieved. One of the problemswithin the United Nations is that we've had an awful big fund ofintelligence, communication, and logistic capabilities under theumbrella of the Security Council's Penn Five, but, in the past, ithad been unacceptable to use. Now, we should have a muchmore conclusive environment within the United Nations forsharing intelligence.

42 WILLIAM H. LEWIS

QUESTION: Richard Connaughton talked about conuiwaid aidcontrol and John Mackinlay raised issues of the conceptualapproach to what has been so far called peacekeeping operations.I wholeheartedly agree with many of their remarks, though I seethere are several difficulties. I should like to present thepolitical side of the coin. The first issue is the question ofcommand and control. I think that it is far easier to organize ona regional basis than it would be on a UN system. I seeenormous difficulties for the United Nations to accept the kind ofarrangements which Richard Connaughton has suggested, whichsuggestion is based on the experiences of the Korean Campaignas well as Desert Shield and then Desert Storm. 1 wonder ifeither experience is applik:ble to the UN? Secondly, on JohnMacinlay's statement on the changing role for the UN, what heis doing is introducing a new concept of operations in the UN.Who is going to manage these operations? The Security Councilis not able to handle it. The Security Council has to be altered.What needs to be done with the Security Council to improve itsmanagement of these operations? They have not proved to bevery agile in managing what is called traditional peacekeeping.They rely entirely on the UN Secretary-General, who togetherwith his staff, are very heavily occupied. At the military advisorlevel, who is going to manage this? Who is going to make inputin management of operations, both at the Security Council andSecretariat levels? How is the Secretary-General going to runthis office'? My own submission is that it is worth seriousquestioning that the UN, which is primarily a political body, willbe able to adjust itself to be able to manage the middle level ofoperations. I would submit, strongly, that we consider the choiceof regional arrangements which I believe should be preferableand should be the first to which we should turn. Finally, I thinkit is extremely questionable whether we could change troopstrained for regular peacekeeping in the middle of an operation to I

! assume secondary tasks.

JOHN MACKINLAY: I agree with you. The United Nationsas an institution is not yet capable of managing a Level-Threeoperation. I also agree with you that the Security Council whichis a political body is quite unsuitable to direct military operation.You have to have a consensus and you need then to translate that


consensus into a plan which staff officers can make somc sewscof on the ground. That machinery is not there. I think I wouldbuild on your own point that it is in the mid-level of operationswhere the UN is, after all, already swimming in this waler-withwhat success I think it is a bit early to say. I think it is in thisarea we need to build up capability. I think President Bush'srecent remarks to the General Assembly were very positive and1 hope those remarks survive the U.S. election process. I thinkthere is some evidence in the Pentagon and in the NationalSecurity Council that there is a plan to go forward from there.The answer to your question is this-how you are going to doit-you build from what you've got, you improve what you'vegot, you make your military element, which is already in theUnited Nations, far more effective by introducing staff officersfrom capable military armies who have necessary experience.Build up that element inside the UN so that you have in effect alittle replica of the NATO headquarters. Then you can turn tothem and translate political decisions into something whichamounts to a military plan, which is not something that can bedone at the moment.

RICHARD CONNAUGHTON: You raise the subject ofregional systems and getting them involved. I think in principalwe've got to go along with the regional systems and the biggerpowers have got to have some bilateral/mulitlateral agreementswhereby we can bring into those regions--very mucii as the U.S.unified command does-the political and military power whichthat region lacks. Increasingly, we've got to look at presentation.What you have to studiously avoid is the impression that we areexporting the North "Brezhnev Doctrine" to the South. And Ithink that is a very important point which we need to focus on.You talk about management of operations, there is machinery outthere-the Military Staff Committee. The fact is the MSC is inthe Charter of the United Nations. The membership of the MSCis anachronistic, but the Charter does provide for the co-optingof interested parties on the Committee. There is no earthlyreason why the MSC should not be tasked to provide theSecretary-General the essential information he needs to makemeaningful decisions. The Security Council is going to work;

44 WILLIAM H. LEWIS

it's a fudge, but I think that once the will is there within the UNto mike it work, what you've got to do is the same that wc in theBritish Army have got to do in looking at the nature of futureconflict and that is forget what we've got, forget what equipmentwe've got. forget what manpower we've got and start with afresh piece of paper and start designing what we need for thefuture.

QUESTION: My question is on the Military Staff Committee.The instrument is there and it would appear that this would he auseful vehicle to do the mundane things that soldiers need tohave done for them before they are committed operationally.Coming up with common symbology for maps, references,certain basic logistic contingency requirements, all of thesemundane things of soldiering that tend to be overlooked when acrisis arises and politicians create a military force, ad hoc. Youhave obviously thought a great deal about the Military StaffCommittee. but you seem to assume it is an anachronism.

RICHARD CONNAUGHTON: I think you are right. but it

comes back to the will of states. If we have a change of will ofthe major states. then I think we could probably pick up the balland run with it. We are aware that the British and the Frenchand the Pentagon have a view that they don't wish to embracethe possibilities that are afforded by the Military StaffCommittee. The major hang-up is the question of command.Operations, I think, divide the three functions: the preparation,the action, and the aftermath. What we need to do is use theMSC at the beginning, in terms of preparation and contingencyplanning. But I do believe the positions which were takenperhaps six months ago, may well now today have to bereviewed and revised to see if we cannot use the Military StaffCommittee effectively to help us deal with looming problemsahead.

QUESTION: John do you feel the same way about the', potentials of the military Staff Committee?

JOHN MACKINLAY: No. I really failed to encounter aconvincing statement of support from the five embassies who


•c,•l bc mro st instr, .rnta- i, rsusc;1t!inn! the MSC. I think it,grown to be a bit like the Beefeaters in the Tower of Londonwho are an extremely attractive tourist item, but their realfunction, militarily speaking, has disappeared. It will now beextremely difficult to resuscitate the MSC, almost as difficult asto resuscitate the Beefeaters in the Tower of London. And Ithink rather than trying to, let's go for something which is aliveand build on something which is functioning.

QUESTION: First, I want to draw attention to navalcooperation in the UN context. I think that's a vastly overlookedsubject. Second, yesterday the Security Council authorizednations to establish a naval blockade in the Adriatic. The CSCEis a UN-recognized regional organization, and it could havecalled upon the EC, NATO, or tire WtEU tu direct the operationssince the Helsinki Summit identified these three organizations asones that could be called upon for peacekeeping. Third, the UNcould direct forces for peacekeeping operations. I personallybelieve the NATO naval on-call mediterranean force couldbecome the naval on-call force for UN. This could beaccomplished without getting to the standing force idea. Iwonder if John Mackiniay had given any thought to this indeveloping spectrum of different missions that the UN militaryundertake.

JOHN MACKINLAY: On naval operations, first of all, this isan expanding area and you'd be pleased to know that inProvidence, Rhode Island, not very far, after all from Newport,we are actually collaborating very closely with the Naval WarCollege on these things. It is a very interesting area which isgoing to become much bigger than it is at present. As todelegation options, we have examples of this already. It is notan option the UN readily will embrace. As we saw in theresolution that was handed to the United States for Desert Storm,it is still an extremely unpopular political option, especially in theGeneral Assembly. Now, I think it is something that we will seehappening in Level-Three and the back end of Level-Twooperations where the United Nations simply hasn't the neededmilitary personnel. It simply writes a blank check and hands

S. . . . . . .. -•; m ... 1m. ..... ..B J .~ . ' . . .. . . .. ..

46 WILLIAM H. LEWIS

responsibility to another organization-hopefully not the CSCE,because I don't think you'll get much of a change from them.The poini about owi-t.-lt urces, I agree with what you are saying,but there is one point that is worth considering. When a countrysends its contingent, that is a highly political affirmation of thatoperation. If the British send a contingent to Bosnia, that is avery strong signal of support. If you remove that option fromcountries who are members by saying you've all got to pay ussubscriptions anyway and there's none ot this business about I'mgoing to support A but not B, I thins, that will create a lot ofpolitical anxiety among leaders who may very well wish tosupport an operation in Bosnia but not one in South America.That is always going to be the problem with on-call forces andstanding forces where you just snap your fingers at a country andanticipate they will make forces available without any argument.

QUESTION: I think we should clarify thought about thetundt-mentals of the UN Charter and the terminology we use.We need to recogni:'e the fact that in Korea and in the DesertStorm operations the UN dio not authorize anything; the sourceof authority for the actions that were taken was Article 5 I. whichis also in Chapter 7. Those were operations of collectivcself-defense blessed by the Security Council and the blessing wasnot at all necessary. I think we should be very careful not to mixup actual enforcement actions undertaken by the Security Counciland directed by them-which is the conception underlying theCharter-and actions of self-defense most of which never haveany UN blessing but which are perfectly legitimate. I also agreewith those speakers that have said that the Security Council andthe Secretariat are quite incapable of managing militaryoperations beyond the peacekeeping level. We should.oncentrate our thinking and forward planning on the institutionswhich have worked and can work rather than deceiving ourselvesand our publics in trying to whip up an enormous tidal wave ofapprobation. which is a charade.

RICHARD CONNAUGHTON: It is an environment of shiftingsand and you must deal with choices that are appropriate to thatmoment. It was appropriate in Desert Storm to give the UnitedStates a blank check and let them direct the operation. I don't


think you :'!e goin-, to get a blank check again. It is better toappreciate that world opinion may well not again allow theUnited States to run a military operation such as Desert Storm.

QUESTION: But remember the United States and other majorpowers can make the decision that their security is threatened bydevelopments say in Yugoslavia and no approval is required bythe Security Council.

RICHARD CONNAU(HTON: I think the problem withArticle 51 is that it's been so blatantly abused in the past; hutunder the Charter. having taken Article 51 action, the statesthemselves are obliged to report back to Secretary-General as towhat action they have taken.

RESPONSE: That's purely informative. T-c Security Councilcan't stop an operation of self-defense except by proclaiming thatit's become a breach of the peace, violation of the peace and thattakes a veto.

QUESTION: I would like to raise a question with regard tocommand and control and the need for a clear statement ofobjectives in tenns of future United Nations operations. F'vebeen very much attracted to some of the suggestions by thespeakers, but let's take a hard case, Somalia. In terms of (INintervention how would you establish a clear mandate ofobjectives when the majority of UN members are only interestedin a humanitarian or relief operation at a time when it is clearthat there is anarchy'! There is no government in control, and apeace enforcement action is needed to control the environment.How do you get the political side of the house and the militaryside of the house agreeing on overall objectives and a reasonableplan for implementation?

RICHARD CONNAUGHTON: I think we should not assumethat states will automatically intervene in world affairs, becauseyou see in the past, we've looked at intervention in terms ofjustification and that really, I think, is the reason why so manyinterventions have failed. Justification by itself does not go far

48 WILLIAM H LEWIS

enough. Interventions have to be launched from a rationale whichcomes from the brain rather than from the heart.

JOHN MACKINLAY: 1 can understand the problem ofSomalia, but the question is, where can the UN successfullyoperate? Was it possible to successfully operate militarily withinSomalia where we have seen a reversion to warlordism? Wouldwe have to go in there and fight the whole array of tribes andwarlords'? I think really if you do analysis, you may well cometo the conclusion that you could not achieve anything militarilyin Somalia and, therefore. what you've got to do is look atalternative sets of coercive measures. I personally believe that ifno one can make a case for setting up a UN protectorate. thenSomalia was the case. But it does seem to me that the world canonly really digest perhaps one major crisis at any one time andI'm afraid that Somalia coincided with a lot of what's goingwrong in the world. Somalia. I suppose, doesn't have any oil,it's got some rather horrifying pictures but where does the cloutcome.? I think Europe has really awakened to the importance o•Yugoslavia and, by Jove. I think we are now beginning to Iookat Yugoslavia and the Yugoslavian problem with some renewedinterest and vigor. I would, however, say that I thinkBoutros-Ghali's comments pointing fingers at the West saying"You're looking at Yugoslavia, you're not really looking atSomalia," was I think unfair, because certainly Western Europehad brought down a curtain of indifference about what was goingon in Yugoslavia until. I think, the penny dropped. Here, wemight have a real domino effect sucking into the implosion, stateslike Greece and Turkey. So I suppose that's a round about wayof saying that I think, on occasion, you've got to accept thatintervention is not going to work.

JOHN MACKINLAY: I understand that another element ofyour question is really how do you interest nations in securityissues, when their real interest is in the humanitarian side. I hadto preach this message in the rather stony fields of Thatcher'sBritain. Trying to interest people in the Ministry of Defence insending British soldiers to countries which have absolutely noforeign policy interest is a pretty difficult thing to do. And it'sequally difficult to do in this country. I don't know how a

MILITARY IMPLICATIONS ()F UN PEACEKEEPING 4v

politician is going to persuade "Joe Six-Pack ho apparenlIlruns a garage somewhere in Arkansas. how lie r, eoiilg it was.h

to be involved in a country like Cambiodia. I presented thisquestion to an Austrian ambassador, a country which is Iotallydedicated to this sort of activity, and he had a ýery goodexplanation for it, but it wasn't the sort of elevator word-bile thatyou could use in discussion here today.

The answer to your question, I think, is two-told. One is that theeducation process has to start in defense stalfs. It is, tirsI ot all.a political problem. You can't do much about that, hut I thinkthe media, actiallv is highly instrumental in triggering ott acountry's response to a situation like the Kurds perched up ontheir hills in the Turkish horder. And then the defense stalf andthis is happening already.

The fact is that there is no other way to intervene in these placesexcept under the aegis of the UN. In reality, your country and mycountry really are not lawfully mandated it) do this any longer.and the sooner people in the defense planning area understandthat and start thinking very seriously about the fact that they haveto assign defense planning to participation in these very messyinternational operations. The third point is that you are talkingabout secufity and not humanitarian relief. You are going tohave to become involved in this process with a different set ofnations because the people who have the capability to respondreally very well, like the Nordic nations, to the humanitarianelement of these problems are not always the same people whocan provide you with the military infrastructure to meet securityrequirements.

QUESTION: You said you were sowing these seeds on veryrocky ground during the Thatcher Administration at the time theBritish army was also under great pressure to reduce the budget.Did any in the army staff see peacekeeping as an opportunity tomaintain a relevance in the budgetary battles that every nationfaces?

JOHN MACKINLAY: No. Because, the reduction had just

50 WILLIAM H. LEWIS

occurred in the British army and was driven by a need to reducedefense spending, whereas most people who write about thesethings prefer to reduce an army commensurately with declining'interests in foreign policy issues. Obviously, you have a list oftasks and you have a list of troops who have to carry them out,and you can't adjust the right hand column without adjusting tileleft-hand coluni. That really has not been done. And so theargument never even got there. And you if you went into theMinistry of Defence, Britain was the one country in the whole ofthe NATO alliance where, until about three months ago, youcould go and ask for the UN desk or spend a long timeburrowing through the Ministry of Defence directory and neverfind it because there wasn't one. The argument never reachedthe sophistication of your question. It just wasn't a question.

QUESTION: Mr. Connaughton talked about the skills acommander would have to have in the field to implementoperations, and in taking that with Mr. Mackinlay's second levelactivities, which strike me more as policing functions rather thantraditional military operations, a major question arises: How domilitary officers coming out of conventional training have skillsto manage these kinds of operations? Neither of the speakers hassaid anything explicitly, but it seems that, implicitly, the role ofcommand is to separate the belligerents and remain passive in theface of the dynamics of the conflict. Is this an appropriate rolej,,r traditional military commanders or are they. in fact, on atontinuous basis conflict mediators for the belligerents at a localle el? And if so, where do they get the training to do this. Isthis the responsibility of the sponsoring country? Is this afunction of the United Nations'? Where do these militarycommanders get the skills to deal with an essentiallynon-traditional military situation?

JOHN MACKINLAY: Is this a military role? Yes, comingfrom the army that I conie from, it certainly is. But in the U.S..it probably isn't quite so clear cut because yours is an armywhere the infantry do the infantry things and the cavalry do thecavalry things and they don't have to go to Northern Ireland onceevery three years where they have to clear their mind about someof these ideas and have to function on the ground. I think that


in the case of the U.S., you have a problem.

Nevertheless, it is a military role, and I would advise people inthe Pentagon who are interested in preserving the size of both theinfantry and the cavalry to become a little more flexible, becauseits a very useful second string to have on your bow. A,.otherreason why it is a military role is because who else are you goingto send to that God-forsaken "pitch up" against the Thai borderin Cambodia to patrol with your blue flag along those tracks,which could very easily be mined. And if you're going to tellme it's the police, I want you to nominate for me a police forcethat we all know that is capable of sending constables that couldsurvive under those conditions and behave in the correct way. Idon't know (if a police force in my country that could possiblydeploy policemen into that situation.

How to train them'? Well you could train a military officer to doalmost anything. The fact is you've got to start off by wantinghim to train. I think that if President Bush's suggestion to theGeneral Assembly about converting Ft. Dix into an area wherethese things could be done practically, that is the sort of directionwe should be taking. Why haven't we got a United Nations staffcollege'? We've got a staff college for practically every allianceand former military activity there is, but it seems so obvious thatwe should have one to train staff officers. When the officer hasthat qualification you know the man is fit to take part on a UNstaff. We should have schools which go into the Level-Two andLevel-Three areas because both are really much more difficult.

RICHARD CONNAUGHTON: In terms of using military forcein the manner in which you are suggesting, either it is intuitiveor you have to train for it. I think you have also to address theaftermath. And one thing that the military services can assistwith is the humanitarian side of operations. I think forgovernmental organizations this is relatively easy. There is noreason why today we shouldn't be looking at governmentorganizations to give them the infrastructure and military supportthey need. The problem area is going to be Non-GovermnentalOrganizations (NGOs). you know, the well intentioned people

52 WILLIAM H. LEWIS

who took a lot of medical support and, actually, in terms ofraising follow-on funds. have to seem to be untarnished. I wouldagree with John that the British have a tradition of beinginolved in this area. And it is an area which any other statecould actually start to begin working on.

I

II!


Critical Considerations forthe Military Commander

THE FOLLOWING DISCUSSION FEATURED the insights andcomments of military officers with personal experience incarrying out UN peacekeeping operations:

JOHN SEWALL: The focus in this session will be onimplications for military planners who are asked to undertake apeacekeeping mission for the UN-whether it is an individualobserver operation, in the traditional ideal world of peacekeeping,or one involving small size units or even larger size units in whathas been described this morning as Level-Two or Level-Threeoperations. Permit me to introduce the members of the panel.Brigadier General Ian Douglas is currently the Canadian MilitaryAttache here in Washington. BG Douglas has had experience atthe practitioner field level when he was involved in apeacekeeping operational tour in Cyprus. He has commandedthree mechanized commandos of the fourth Canadian mechanizedbrigade group in Germany. He has also commanded theCanadian airborne regiment in "Petawawar." BG Douglas wasChief of Staff of the UN Peacekeeping Mission in CentralAmerica from December '89 until December '90. and has servedas peacekeeping advisor in military headquarters in Ottawa.

Alos on the panel is Colonel Bruce Osbom, who is with theAustralian Mission to the United Nations in New York. In termsof UN experience, Bruce was posted as the land staff officer in

the Directorate of Joint Operations of Headquarters of theAustralian Defence Force and was, in that capacity, responsiblefor management of Australian participation in both policy andoperational aspects of UN peacekeeping operations. He has mostrecently (January '91) been posted to New York as the militaryadvisor to the Australian Mission to the United Nations.

54 WILLIAM H. LEWIS

Lieutenant Colonel Bill Spracher is a Foreign Area Officer or"FAO," which is a specialty in the United States Army thatconcentrates on training and schooling in regional specialties.You will find that a good percentage of US observers inpeacekeeping have been, in fact, FAO officers. He is a militaryintelligence officer who has also been an instructor at West Point.Bill spent a lot of time in Panama. As a Latin Americaspecialist, you might wonder why he ended up in the WesternSahara. That may indicate something about US planning, whichwe hope to correct. At any rate, he was military assistant to theforce commander, United Nations Mission for the Referendum inWestern Sahara, MINURSO.

Major George Steuber is currently a student at Ft.Leavenworth, at the US Army Command and General StaffCollege. He also is a Foreign Area Officer whose specialty is SEAsia. He went to the Royal Thai Army Command and StaffCollege and spent a considerable amount of his career in thePacific region. Most recently, he was in SE Asia with the UnitedNations advanced mission in Cambodia and the UN TransitionalAuthority in Cambodia (UNTAC). He was an operations officerfor Team Delta, the military liaison detachment established at theKhmer People's National Liberation Armed Forces Headquarters,and then he moved to Phnom Penh. Lastly, he became Lt GenJohn Sanderson's personal representative in Kamponton Province.

With these brief introductions let me turn to our first panelexpert, General Douglas.

GENERAL I.C. DOUGLAS: None of what I heard thismorning from the academic side of the house disagreed in anyway, shape or form, seriously, with what I had experienced.Therefore, I would hope to offer you some practical observationswhich we can apply to the rather more academic solutions thatwere put forward this morning. I will try to be frank withoutbeing rude because some of the problems we encountered insetting up the new mission in Central America were caused byindividuals in the United Nations in New York. New York hasmany good people; they also have some not so good people,which is the same with any bureaucracy. But what you don'thave in UN missions is the military hierarchy needed to make thedecisions for you when it affects the soldier in the field. You

• - 7- . . .-. .. I .. _ . ... . ' .. . I Lu - 'E.. . .. .. .


have got to go along with what is fundamentally a civilianhierarchy. This sometimes flies in the face of the militaryrequirement.

I will go over very quickly and generally the chronology ofwhat I saw as we deployed down into Central America, how ourmandate changed and we went from being a level-one mission toa level-two mission without any appreciation of the differencesby Headquarters New York. That should become clear as wetalk about some of the problems we faced as we went from asimple observer mission to one that had to interpose itselfbetween the Contras and the Sandinistas, who didn't talk to eachother-indeed who were still shooting each other in someplaces-and try to bring some sense to the whole situation andeventually to demobilize the Contra army. The reconnaissancefor ANOOKA was carried out by an ad hoc team, and if there isone word to describe UN operations as far as I saw it was "adhocery". The military staff was not capable, based on theirnumbers. They were overwhelmed by the jobs in front of them.Initially, you had reconnaissance teams made up of membersfrom different countries who went down to study the situation.They came back and formulated the plan which was rubberstamped by headquarters staff. The staff themselves were notcapable of formulating what I would call a proper militaryestimate. The mandate which we were given was "missionimpossible". It was to patrol and prevent the crossing of frontiersof the signatory states for military purposes by either side,including the movement of weapons and military equipmentacross the borders. Any one who has looked at the borders ofthose two countries will know that is impossible unless you havean army of some 50,000 to 100,000 men. The idea of putting amission in there. I think, was a calculated risk and absolutelyright. In other words, you had the five Central Americancountries who had agreed to the efforts, and the UN decided toput the mission in there regardless of how impossible it was witha view ultimately of demobilizing the Contras, which indeedworked out.

We went down there and started setting up the organizationas best we could, setting up headquarters, setting up observationposts along the border, setting up our network with the Contras,

-T

56 WILLIAM H. LEWIS

who indeed controlled a good part of the border, and with theSandinistas. We never did, in my tour of duty, come to gripswith the problem on the Salvadorean border which hassubsequently been resolved by other missions. When we becameaware of the fact that the demobilization of the Contras was totake place, we were told that we. the observer mission, wouldhave to do it, and if we really needed it, the UN was prepared togive us a platoon of military policemen to accomplish it. Thiswas a civilian estimate. We did a very rough military estimateand decided it would take at least one and probably tworeinforced battalions to do what was required. It needed alogistics organization which didn't exist in the observer mission,and it needed fantastic amounts of helicopter support.

The UN's response when we said we needed logistics was."Well you observers are getting $65 a day. why don't you justbuy what you need'?" This was a complete misconception of howyou have to support sometmng which has gone rmm an observermission to putting battalions and companies of soldiers into thefield. Headquarters in New York never did comprehend that.What we had to do was completely ad hoc the logisticsorganization, which was to steal observers who were of alogistics persuasion, get a contracting officer out of the UN, andset up our own organization. My fleet of trucks was a fleet ofbanana trucks, which I leased from the Great Pacific BananaCompany in Honduras. The helicopters, we rented. Everythingwas ad hoc, and we made it with the skin of our teeth. In oneparticular site in the Nicaraguan jungle, every observer camedown with a parasite that was potentially fatal; it would take atleast a year for them to be cured and. indeed, some of them arestill suffering from it today. We're just lucky we didn't losesome men to the parasite. All of this is to say the structure tosupport the military in the United Nations, be it from anoperational military point of view or from a logistics view, is notthere. That problem has to be resolved.

The solution, as I would see it, lies in the restructuring,remandating of the military advisory staff to the Secretary-General. The analogy I make is to an organization called AMIFL,the Allied Command Europe Mobile Force, which has existed for40 years in NATO. The idea of the large standing UN force hasbeen discussed ad nauseum and has been rejected over the years.


1 don't think you can have a large division or indeed corps-sizedforce that stood ready for UN operations. but what you do needis a properly constituted, experienced and mandated miliary staffthat can do a number of things. It can do the planning, it canlook after the staff lists, it can look after the skeletal SOPs, it canlook after the training of the units which are earmarked indifferent countries for UN operations. It might be a brigadesized force with fifteen countries volunteering to contribute to it.Perhaps some would not be suitable to a particular country;maybe that particular country would not wish to go into aparticular operation. You establish sufficient flexibility in thenumbers of units you have established to meet such acontingency so that you do not have to ad hoc everything fromthe bottom up. I think that an oiganization of some 26 to 30military people could organize that. Now perhaps; they wouldn'tdeploy as AMFL brigade headquarters, but they would be able todo the planning and to brief the brigade and/or divisionheadquarters getting ready to go into any area of the world. Ithink that such an arrangement is essential if you are going toimprove whatever we are going to get out of the Secretary-General's staff, which at the moment is ad hocery for everymission.

There are training requirements that we have for UN fbrces.The best qualified UN type organization is a general purposemilitary unit. You can take a well-trained unit that's ready to gointo operations in NATO, if you will, and you can turn theminto a peacekeeping force very quickly. You cannot do it theother way around. You can't develop a peacekeeping force andthen turn it into a general purpose force without extensiveretraining and re-equipping. That is one of the tenets on whichwe have established our UN contribution over the years. We sendtrained combat-ready forces. Notwithstanding that. you will needsome training, but not very much. You have to train in yourstaff colleges to make sure your officer corps is ready to take off

that warrior's perspective or viewpoint in life, and put on that ofthe peacekeeper, of the mediator or whatever the situation callsfor. We figure we can do that in our staff college with a weeks'course; before observer missions, we have a two-week programwhich we feel is sufficient to bring the individual up to standard

58 WILLIAM H. LEWIS

on such things as sensitivities of the area, area studies, that sortof thing. Beyond that, of course, you have language studies, butthe training requirement as opposed to what has been suggestedby others that we have peacekeeping academies, peacekeepinguniversities, is not seen as needed in the Canadian army. Thebottom line is that the units have to be ready to go to Level-Twoand Level-Three operations which involves your general purposetraining and equipped organizations.

COLONEL BRUCE OSBORN: I thought it might be usefulto look at this from the New York Headquarters perspective. Isuspect, as is always the case, a number of perspectives on thispeacekeeping business exist and I think it totally proper toconsider this subject from all angles. One thing is clear-all ourperceptions of peacekeeping have changed dramatically. Firstly.it is abundantly clear to me that, since 1988, the world aroundus has changed dramatically in every shape and form. Whowould have predicted where we would be today four years ago.Yet, in many respects, the United Nations really has not changed.This is no direct criticism of those who lead the UN, but is areflection of the f.,- that the UN is a bureaucracy. To changethe system is going to take some time. I also do not wish todampen anybody's enthusiasm, but my own view is that it'sgoing to change incredibly slowly. The one thing that impressedme after I got to New York was to find out how political theUnited Nations was. It is wrong for any nation to think it can goto New York because of who they are and change the systemovernight. There are 179 member states, soon to become 180,who all go to the United Nations it seems to me, to look aftertheir own vested interests. They very much have an interest inthe world and they'll pursue those interests, but to a large extentthey are pursuing them for their own benefit. Now that in itselfis not wrong. I see my country pursuing the same course, but thereality is that you are working in a political organization wheredecisions are made through committees, that is by consensus.Now you don't have to be terribly intelligent to realize that thesystem is very slow. Decisions normally end up being watereddown to something which is diluted.

The United Nations, since the end of the Cold War, I wouldhave thought would have been terribly open and transparent.


Instead, you would believe that the Cold War is at its height atthe present time in the United Nations. The things whlich wewould expect to be readily available to us in terms of informationis not available-just the opposite is the case. It strikes me thatthe principal problem is that many of those who were part andparcel of the old United Nations are still there, and they haven'tbeen able to adapt to the realities of the new world. You noticeI didn't say "New World Order".

If I might quickly address the Agenda for Peace-and I'msure some of my colleagues might have different views-Irepresent my country in the Special Committee on PeacekeepingOperations, a committee of 34 nations which really, in apractical way, considers peacekeeping perhaps more than anyother organization in the UN. Most recently, as late asyesterday, the Special Committee was considering the item ofpeacekeeping, and I might offer some impressions as to wherethe Agenda for Peace report is going. In the area of preventivediplomacy, there is broad support for enhanced preventivediplomacy. Indeed, it is the most popular part of the Secretary-General's report. I think it is popular because people see theprospect of finding a solution to a problem, before it becomes aconflict, as the way to go. My own view is there will heprogress in that area. But it is going to be slow because fir theSecretary-General to have a capability to make independentassessments and decisions on a timely basis requires enornousresources. He is not going to have adequate resources to providethe information, and he, therefore, is going to rely on memberstates. Nevertheless, he is still going to need some sort ofindependent assessment capability to make those decisions.

In the area of peacekeeping, there is broad support forenhanced peacekeeping capabilities within the United Nations.There are many subareas in this report, but by and large there is Isupport for funding arrangements to be made more readilyavailable. In the area of preventive deployment, there islukewarm support. Many countries. and particularly thenon-aligned countries and those countries who see themselves asbeing the object of preventive deployments are concerned aboutissues of national sovereignty. There is also a question amongstthe membership at large relating to the neutrality of the United

60 WILLIAM H- LEWIS

Nations in various situations. My own view is--listening to mycolleagues in and around New York-that it might work incertain circumstances. For example, if another Saddam Husseincomes along, I think that's a set of circumstances where militaryaction will be acceptable.

But let us discuss another more clouded area, the question ofenforcement action under Article 43. Here. the reality is that themajority of the membership. as I see it, is opposed to that sort ofactivity at the present time. I suggest that it is not going to goanywhere for some considerable period of time. Now, I knov.that's a very bold statement. but that's the reality of the currentpolitical environment. It may change dramatically ifcircumstances change.

I just wanted to briefly touch upon Headquarters plazuing.The reality is that planning for peacekeeping operations does notoccur in the United Nations. At best. we have developed aconcept, and that concept becomes the basis on which thingshappen. But. in the real sense of planning, it just simply does notoccur. I personaily. and many of my colleagues, see this lack ofproactive planning as being the findamental problem which theUnited Nations faces, and in my view. it is costing enormoussums of money and, indeed, putting service personnel's lives atstake. The Security Cuncil. on the 29th of October, recognizedsomething which the Committee of 34 had been calling for overmany years, namely, that there needs to be some enhancement ofthe planning capability. But yet having said that, there rtmainsgreat resistance to it. At a time when we are talking aboutexpanding the capabilities of the United Nations, it seems to methat in the case of Somalia, and in the case of UNPROFOR (thatis Yugoslavia) the members of the United Nations were notwilling to provide the needed resources. And I mention thatbecause 1 think ýhe membership has reached saturation point interms of what it is prepared to support. I know that. for instance.my country and many others, at a time when our defense forcesare downsizing and our defense budgets and overall budgets arebeing reduced, are asked to do more and more in terms ofdeploying for peacekeeping. The reality is that many of uscannot afford to do much more, and that's an important point totake on board.

The other point is that it is obvious to mnany of the


developing countries that the United Nations-sorry, the strongermembers of the United Nations-are prepared to deploypeacekeeping forces to countries in their region to deal withproblems that affect them directly. I guess the people beingdiscussed see it as a "rich mnan-poor man" approach. The otherreality in terms of resources is simply that none of us have an,spare logistics sitting on thie shelf, except perhaps for sonme of thelarger countries. I mean the reality is we just do not have sparelogistics units in Australia. They are civilianizing us to thegreatest extent possible. We just do not have the sort of'organization which Somalia calls for. Somehow. the UnitedNations has got to deal with that problem. And the final pointI'll make is that many members of the United Nations are criticalof the Security Council. because they see it increasingly making

decisions without consultation with the rest (if the INorganization. I will simply put it up thie flagpole that at a timewhen we're trying to change things. these other countries aremore and more concerned that the Security Council is acting asthe s)le decisionmaking body of the United Natilons.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL BILL SPRACHER: I plan to giveyou a fairly recent perspective from ground level in a smallmission that probably epitornizes all the kinds of problems we aretalking about and some others that are unique to it. I will (try tosteer away from political issues, but in my role as the militaryassistant to the force commander in the Western Sahara. I couldnot avoid politics. UN Mission for the Referendum in WesternSahara (MINURSO) is a very small and not very well knownmission of the United Nations. It was established in Septemberof 1991, and initially it was a limited observer mission, to be inthe field for a few months. The peace process was expected tomove along fairly expeditiously. The peace process has notmoved along as anticipated and MINURSO remains a limited Iobserver mission. And that goes at the heart of a lot of theproblems I wish to address. Initially, it was envisioned thatMINURSO would have a military force of 1.695 personnel, 550of whom would be military observers. As of the time I left atthe end of July 1992, we had around 350 military. 230 of whomwere military observers. The military component was given the

62 WILLIAM H. LEWIS

mandate to monitor and verify the cessation of hostilities betweenMoroccan and Polisario forces, the withdrawal of Moroccanforces and the confinement of Polisario forces as agreed upon byboth parties. This was in a peace plan signed in 198U. And,finally, to establish a climate of confidence, security and stabilityconducive to the holding of a referendum.

Briefly, Morocco. which is one of the parties to the conflict.considers Western Sahara as another of its provinces. Moroccansjust refer to it as "Sahara". Morocco effectively occupies thewestern two-thirds of that territory. The Polhsario guerrillas.basically Saharawi indigenous peoples, who had been fighting forthe independence nf the territory, occupy the eastern one-third ofthe area. It is almost like a World War I situation; theMoroccans have built a berm. 2,0A(1 kilometers long right downthe center of the territory. They occupy it much like a MaginotLine with a little less technology perhaps from the World War Itime frame So, in one way, this is a very primitive type militaryset-up. Nevertheless, there were a lot of military clashes over theyears, most recently ;mmediately before the cease-fire went intoeffect, i.e., in September of 1991, when the Moroccans conductedair strikes against Polisario in an attempt to establish goodpositions before the cease-fire. Since the MINURSO militaryforce has been deployed, small though it is, it has beensuccessful in preventing an outbreak of hostilities. There havebeen no casualties as a result of fire, most of the casualties havebeen a result of land mines. So even though it is a limitcddeployment, and even though the mandate is very ambitious, forthat pi•itioaI of the mandate that this limited military force wasestablished to meet, they have been very successful.

Initially, a referendum was to be held as early as January1992. 1 got there in the middle of February. I said "Well howdid the refrendum go?" They said "It didn't," and it still hasn'tbeen conducted-although as I understand since I departed therehas been some progress, mainly from the New York end ratherthan on-site.

There are 26 countries represented in the small MINURSOmilitary force. This force has the distinction of being the firstUN military force that has observers from all five permanentmembers of the Security Council. We also had the distinctionof being the first UN mission that was charged to not just


monitor elections but actually to organize and implement areferendum. Now that was not our objective as a military force;we were deployed to create a climate of confidence so this couldhappen. We think we did the job, but, for whatever reasons, wehad not progressed as fast as we would have liked. I was thesenior US military observer. We had a contingent of 30. Threecountries were tied for the largest contingent, the other two beingFrance and China. We had all four Services of the USrepresented. The Army was the executive agent, and of half ofthose thirty, 15 were from the Army and five each were from theother three Services. All were individual observers. All werefanned out to one of the ten team sites or one of the three sectorheadquarters, and a handful worked in the force headquarters.This is not the kind of mission where we had actual infantrybattalions on the ground. The only contingents that operated asnational contingents were our good friends the Australians. who

j had an outstanding signals contingent of approximately 45 lolks.They've been in the peacekeeping business a long time, and theywere invaluable in helping us new guys on the block figure outhow to survive in a desert environment.

The Canadians had not only the force commander at the time.but also when I got there all the clerks and movement controlpersonnel. The largest contingent, interestingly, was the Swissmedical unit, which, when I arrived, had about eighty folksbuilding several clinics. Switzerland is not a member of theUnited Nations. but for those kinds of humanitarian efforts, theyparticipate-and they were first class. The medical support wasthe best kind of support we had over there.

Problems: I do not want to be pessimistic, so I will give thebad stuff first and end up with the good stuff. I was pan of thesecond contingent of Americans to arrive. This is a newexperience for Americans. There were a lot of lessGns to be Ilearned on the training, equipping, preparing, pre-briefing and all

that sort of thing. The US Army has figured it out now, and Ithink we've got a good system in place. I do not think some ofmy fellow observers knew where the Western Sahara was untilthey got off the plane. They were by and large volunteers, andthey learned very quickly. Those things are getting fixed. Notonly were the Australians helpful, but also the Canadians, who

64 WILLIAM H. LEW IS

were there in large numbers----we borrowed heavily from theirlittle booklets on peacekeeping operations. They had equipmentrecoonition manuals, all these kinds of things. So we plagiari/edfrom thetn now we're starting to produce our own. Thal's tlhekind of thing that is essential for observers to do their joV, well.MINURSO had no air conditioning in the force headquarters.

We were in a modified elementary school and it was prettymiserable. There was no air coi)dilioniltg anywhere whenamved. I ant happy to say I spent a large portion of time thereworking on livitng and working conditions. The Caiuadialcompamy. Weather Haven. hrought in shelters andt we spent about

three months empla,,ing those. The site folks went out on mttobilepatr :.i riding in Nissan four by four vehicles, -radin ,, violalionson both sides. These were primarily unauthori/ed overflighls,unaulhoried niovements. and the most serious during the firstfew months I was there. u|tauthori/ed forlilications--herinconstruction by the Moroccans.

I will echo what has Keen said before. Logistics was thebiggest problem. I was brieled before I went over there thatlogistics was the Achilles heel of 'tMINURSO; when I departedsix months later, it was still the Achilles heel. In the initial plail.there wats supposed to be a Polish lopislics haltalion. We fough.for months to get that, and it never arrived. It got to. the pointwhere we would have liked to have had a Polish logistics squad,just a couple of truck drivers, but we could not get them, Iknow that the UN is stretched thin arid I knoI,. there are politicalcon|siderations. hut we had at Canadian two-star general whopulled his hair out trying to convince New York that withoutelfective logistics you carntot do your job. So, what did wehave? We had individual ohservers who were "humping" fuelbarrels, who were escorting trailers carrying fuel, who werespending probably as mucht time doing logistics duties just to

support their own tearn site as the. were assuming militaryoperational duties. That c.ulnot continue. We were veryinnovative. We could do things on our own initiative, but youcannot do that on a penmuient basis ani still dto your operationalmission.

I won't get into problems witli cooperation by the variousparties to tihe conflict because that's really a political issue.However. that also affects the mentalily of observers when they


are reporting violations and they are left with the perception thatthese things are going into a dark hole somewhere and no one ateither UN Headquarters or in the Security Council is taking noteof these. Now, we were sort of in a vacuum: we did know agreat deal about what was going on in New York, and I guessfrom a purely objective military standpoint that was all to thegood. But, I think it would help observers if they knew a littlebit more about the policy implications of what they are doing,and if they knew at least something about what their owncountry's position is regarding a particular conflict. I think theycould do their job better. The military force, which was the onlygame in town-and I think pretty much still is-unfortunately,got blamed by the parties for some of these political failures.When you are out there talking to a Polisario leader or aMoroccan general and you're wearing a blue beret and theyperceive that the UN is not objective, they blame you.

Many times my boss had to explain to them, "A have anarrow military mandate. This is what I'm here to do, that'swhat I'm doing, and just transmit your concerns about thepolitical impasse back to New Ycrk".

Finally, we had numerous mine incidents. There are minesin the Western Sahara left over from the days when the territorywas a Spanish colony. There were mines emplaced by theMoroccans around this berm; there are mines emplaced by thePolisario, who sneak up and steal the Moroccan mines andreplant them without marking where they are located. Theproblem was that we did not know where they were. and theMoroccans did not share minefield data they had. One of ourvehicles ran over an anti-tank mine and, if anybody wants to seewhat an anti-tank mine does to a Nissan four by four, I've gotsome pictures up here I can show you. We have an Air Forceofficer walking around with a purple heart as a result of thatincident. We were very lucky, and I'm pleased with that.

Finally, we end up on some good points. I think Nhis mission

was sort of the epitome of what can be done in a post-Cold Warenvironment. Here we have former antagonists working together.We were flying in all-Soviet aircraft, purchased on contract; wehad helicopters flown by Soviet crews; we had cargo planesflown by Romanian crews, and VIP aircraft flown by

66 WILLIAM H. LEWIS

Czechoslovakian crews. I asked why we had all these "Easternbloc" aircraft, and they said those countries were the lowestbidders and had a lot of aircraft they were trying to get rid of.The aircraft worked very well.

I want talk a little bit about professional development towrap-up. I think a tour like this, no matter how manyfrustrations are experienced, is outstanding training for a linemilitary officer. I cannot really say I'm a line military officer.I'm more of a pol-mil person, a Foreign Area Officer, andGeneral Sewall is right some of the Foreign Area Officers whowere in the Sahara did very well because they were trained indealing with national sensitivities, cultural awareness, languagesand all that kind of stuff. But we had a large number of folkswho were just line officers, and it was hard to find enoughpersonnel who spoke Arabic, French, and Spanish. That's howI got there, by the way, as a Latin America specialist who hadworked for a Peruvian general who spoke French and Spanishquite well, but who could not speak not much English. althoughthat was the working language of the mission--so I got somegood Latin American training there in the Western Sahara. I alsowould say with respect to special forces personnel that, they dovery well in this kind of assignment because they're used tobeing deployed in small numbers or individually to foreign areas.They have the necessary skills; they have the little manuals tieddown in their pants pockets-you know, little phrase books, allthat kind of stuff. Little things that, had we been in thepeacekeeping business a long time, we would have figured out.I think the US is now on the road to being very good at this typeof activity. From a professional developnenr standpoint.however, I said I was there six months, and the reason this wasa six month TDY tour was partially because of the uncertaintyregarding the future of this particular mission. I think forcontinuity purposes it should have been a one year tour, and Itold my bosses that I, as a bachelor, would have loved to spendone year in the Sahara. Some of the young officers who weremarried and were loaned by Ft. Bragg were ready to go back totheir regular units after six months.

I asked my personnel assignments officer for an evaluationwhen I returned. I said what does a UN assignment do to aguy's career; he said, "Well, one time probably wouldn't hurt


any, but I wouldn't do it on a repetitive basis." That's the kindof mentality we have to deal with when we attempt to get goodfolks who have this experience and want to go back foradditional UN assignments. Now. I am not saying that weshould do like some countries (like Ireland), some of whosemilitary personnel have concentrated their entire careers from onemission to the other. But I think we have to educate ourleadership at least here in the United States that this is the future.this is the kind of thing that militaries are going to do in theforeseeable future. It is better to send 30 military personnel outthan an entire brigade or an entire division. A final note: themorale of our people in MINURSO, despite the frustrations. washigh because we kept stroking them, and asking them "Have anyof our folks been killed by mine incidents'?" We came close afew times, but the fact that the ceasefire is holding, I think, isreason for patting our people on the back and saying a limitedmilitary observer mission can do some very good things.

MAJOR GEOR(;E STEUBER: Well, having served sixmonths on one of those Level-Two peacekeeping operations witha low level of military competence. I can say that there are somemajor problems that, if not resolved, are going to have somegrave consequences for UN missions in the future. I think thefirst thing that needs to be addressed when you have a UNmission of the comprehensive scope of Cambodia is that the UNpolitical and military leadership needs to decide what they aregoing to do to achieve success. It was not done in Cambodia,and, by the sound of it, has not been done in most of the otherUN missions. That is absolutely crucial. What do you do whena representative of the Australian army is shot at while flying ina United Nations helicopter (bright white with black UnitedNations over it and blue UN flags) and you pinpoint who hasdone it'! What happens when the Khmer Rouge keeps stallinga peace settlement that they have signed and nobody is willing to

take the political and economic sanctions necessary to stop that'?These have to be addressed before you ever put anybody on theground. and they obviously have not been addressed.

Coordination between United Nations agencies: Our mission

68 w1L.M - '.W!•

in Cambodia as UNAMIC, United Nations Advanced Mission inCambodia and United Nations Transitional Authority inCambodia, UNTAC. was literally to take over the country: tostop four fighting factions from continued fighting and take overthe ministry of foreign affairs, the ministry of the interior, theministry of finance, and everything else and run a country untilnational elections were held, and Cambodia could becomeCambodia again.

To accomplish this, we had to take four fightingfactions--l(X)% of them, some 220,0(00 soldiers-regroup them,canton them. disarm them, and demobilize 70% of them. And todo this, we were given II infantry battalions spread throughoutthe country, in a country that no longer has an infrastructure,does not have telephones, does not have roads, does not haverailroads. does not have anything. Rather a large order. Andagain without consensus on how to achieve this. it is ratherdifficult to do it.

Planning: There was no planning to speak of for UNTAC.I got to Cambodia on the 8th of December 1991, one month afterthe initial group had come into country, and I deployed to myfield site on the Thai-Caniboxdian border on the 22nd. Inbetween, we played musical headquarters. We changedheadquarters three different times because the civilian componentcouldn't agree with the military component on where we shouldput a headquarters--that's after they had already been there fora month.

Logistics: We got there and they said. "Well, you're gettingsubsistence allowance, why should we support you'? Go buy it."Well, that's fine if you've got a place to buy it. but Cambodia'sbeen at war for 20 years and the places to buy things are verylimited. The things you can buy are even more limited. Thatpresents a bit of a problem. There really was no planning. Wedeployed on the 22nd of December to three team sites (we werejust observers at the time). five members to an observer teamplus three Australian communicators and support. By the wayI'd like to put in a plug for the Australians. If the Australians hadnot been in that mission, UNTAC and UNAMIC would havefailed in January at the latest, rather than having plugged alongminimally successfully for one year now. The Australians savedour butts, they provided us with security; they sent medics with


each one of the teams, so if we had stepped on one of the threeto four million mines emplaced out there, somebody would havebeen able to take care of us, because the UN mission obviouslycould not.

They deployed us without maps. Now I'm here to tell youthat if you go into ant area, it would be nice to know where youare. It would be nice to know where you are going to site thesecamps to canton some 220-odd thousand people. I tried for twomonths to secure maps and, finally. I had to go back down toPhnom Penh and man-handle the S-3 and literally threaten his

life so that I could get money to buy them on the black market.They were not available thrnugh UN channels. That's ludicrousto say the least. A little bit of planning would have been nicegoing in. Logistics did not get any better when I left at the endof six months. The last thing I did before I left was get in acommandeered Toyota four-by-four, load 18 five-gallon water

I jerrys in the back and drive 240 kilometers to my team site sothat I could give them the first water they had had in two weeks.That's not good after six months.

The Staff: The staff was really unique. We had a chief ofstaff who spoke Polish, and some very broken French, but noEnglish. Needless to say, he was not really in charge of the staff.My team leader was an Argentinean officer whom I admiredgreatly. He taught himself to speak, read and write English inthe six months that he was there, but to start out, he spoke none.One of my Australian's parents were Chilean. and he spoke alittle Spanish at home, so we used him to speak to my teamleader. Again, it does not make for really good crisp executionof a mission if you cannot speak to your team leader.

Now we overcame those sorts of things, but staff planning iscritical. As long as you have a staff that is made up ofpolitically appointed officers, there is no way of establishingresponsibility for executing the mission, and that's a critical item

as you may well imagine. That need not happen.I'm here to tell you that General Sanderson, the commander

of the UNTAC mission, was absolutely hamstrung by theinability to appoint the people that he needed for critical stafffunctions. The other thing is this: just because a gentlemanwalks through the door and has a specific rank on his shoulder

.41

70 WILLIAM H. LEWIS

and holds a specific position within his military does not meanthat he knows a damned thing about a military operation. Thereare some people out there who are totally incompetent. It is nottheir fault. They mean well and, for their own operations, theymight even do a good job.

We are talking about a 20,000-person operation in Cambodiaspread out over an entire country. That is a large undertakingand it demands that the people in key staff positions becompetent. One way to get around that is through staff training.I think it is crucial that a school be established that will train UNstaff officers. I believe that, because I am currently at theCommand and General Staff College-and I believe we turn outa good product--most of the other staff colleges represented bythe officers here today turn out good products. We have manyhundreds of foreign officers that attend such colleges.

That does not mean that a foreign staff officer is going to beon a UN mission. It does mean that somewhere in his military

j career. he will be in a functioning position. If you have a UNstaff training school, hopefully, the UN will also prepare somedoctrine on how it will conduct its field operations. That doctrineneeds to be taught at a UN staff college so that when a missiongoes into an area, that staff can function effectively. InCambodia we have a signals mission. The Australians providedthe national contingent. We have engineers; the New Zealanderscame in and did that mission. The French provided us with ourinitial airlift. Those were national contingents. Give me anational contingent headquarters; they will at least have commonoperating doctrine and know how to do things, and I can then puta staff officer from another nation at the head of it. Twodifferent ways to meet the need, but it is absolutely essential, thatthose things be done.

Execution: Again, as long as you have political people insenior staff level positions that are not held accountable for whatthey're doing and cannot be fired by the commander forincompetence, you will have very poor execution. The threetypes of people I encountered on a UN operation were: thosethat knew how to do the job and were motivated to do the job;those that would have liked to do the job, but lacked the tools;and those that, quite frankly, did not give a damn and weredrawing $110-4145 a day to go back to their country rich. Now


that's a terrible indictment, but, that's what's going on out there.That needs to stop. If the United Nations becomes a competentmilitary organization, you can stop that. If you provide thatmilitary force with good logistics, and a good workable plan, Iwon't need to pay an observer $145 a day. And quite frankly,that's not necessary anyway. because in Cambodia at $145 a dayI could own large portions of Cambodia. You know it only takesabout $15.00 a day maximum if you want to live like a king inCambodia, unless you're living in Phnom Penh--which, by theway, is where the UN headquarters happens to be, and that's whyit is at $145 a day.

These things are not necessary. If I have a good functioningmilitary organization, I can take care of my people withoutpaying those kinds of dollars. And those kinds of dollars distortthe economy. We do more harm in Cambodia and other smallcountries by paying these people these exorbitant sums. TakeKompong Thor province. You have an Indonesian battalionthere now; they aren't being paid $145 a day, but their normalpay plus the increment that they get from the United Nationswould make them millionaires in Cambodia. As a result, youcannot buy chickens on the market anymore and you cannot buyrice. So what do the Cambodians get? They get the crackedbroken rice that nobody else will buy; they get the scrawnychickens they raise or that nobody else will take. You createanotkier problem by just deploying a United Nations force. TheIMF was looking at this problem. Unfortunately, because of alack of coordination between agencies, nothing ever got doneabout this. These are some really key problems that go with aUnited Nations mission. That's why it is imperative thatplanning go on before you ever commit anybody to this type ofoperation.

Training: The United States has a pretty good training

program for Foreign Area Officers. When I went to the ThaiCommand and General Staff College on the Thai border, most ofthe people in the military commands along the border wereclassmates of mine, at least at the junior and mid-officer level.It helped greatly with coordination. I worked with the KhmerPeoples National Liberation Armed Forces initially. They arelocated on the Thai border, and all speak Thai. Not a problem.

72 WILLIAM H. LEWIS

I didn't need an interpreter. There aren't any interpreters inCambodia anymore. Pol Pot destroyed the educational system.

The only people you'll find there that are bilingual are thoseof the older generation. They speak French, and some that hadassociated with Americans speak English; but the whole middlelevel of population-all your junior leaders-speak neitherFrench nor English. So somebody, if you're going in as anobserver team, had better have access to good interpreters or beable to speak the language. That's really key in training.

As far as major units, I absolutely agree, a well-trainedinfantry or armor or mechanized infantry unit can go iii and doany mission you want them to do. And they can do so easilywith a minimum amount of training. They need to know thehistorical background of the conflict so they do not do stupidthings, as well as the motives of the factions that are in theconflict. They need to know a little bit about the local culture,so they do not do culturally unacceptable things.

For example. at Battambang, a freak wind came up. TheUnited Nations team suddenly heard small arms fire breaking outat the far end of town. Batlambang is not a very secure area and.as this small arms fire increased in intensity and started rollingtowards the team location, they believed they were under majorground attack. They started to get on the radio, were ready to callfor an extraction, when some of the folks on the roof of the hotelwhere they were located looked outside and saw in fact that theCambodians were just firing up in the air to "stop the wind".That's a normal Cambodian practice. When it is windy, when astorm approaches, they shoot in the air and the wind stops.hopefully.

Such a practice can cause problems. If you have untrainedUN people in a situation like that, they may respond with firingof their own. So the cultural sensitivities need to be part oftraining for mission participants. You need to have your people iunderstand that they are going into an austere environment. Oneof the things that UNTAC did was they deployed some policealong the border between Cambodia and Vietnam. And aftertwo weeks of one policeman crying his eyes out every single day.they decided that maybe that was a bad idea and repatriated him.You take any police officer out of a major metropolitan area andtell him he's got to do these sorts of things in the wilds of


Cambodia, or the wilds of Somalia, it poses major problems. AnAustralian constable from the "out back" would probably be ableto do that sort of thing-and, in fact, they do that son of trainingin other areas-but you have to think about who you are tryingto put in what situation and then again this goes back toplanning. What forces are applicable and where should they begoing? What should their jobs be*? I think that President Bush'sspeech to the United Nations, in which he said that the UnitedStates would be very happy to provide a training center and totry and establish a sLhool for training United Nations staffers, isa very necessary thing and I applaud that. I hope that the UnitedStates goes forward with that.

One final comment. Cambodia has three to four millionmines in it. One of the essential things that you need to teachpeople is to watch where they step. We lost a number ofBangladeshis out of the UNTAC mission almost every other day."I was putting Cambodian civilians in my Nissan and rushingthem to the nearest medical facilities because they had stepped onmines. It is a horrible problem. All sides have been plantingmines for 20 )ears. You can no longer assume that just becausean area is a nice grassy knoll, there aren't mines underneath thatgrass. Secondary growth also impedes mine clearing operations.Mine clearing is absolutely critical, and mine awareness is evenmore so.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

THE CHAIR: I do want to just put a little note of balance here.There is a certain tone, suggesting we are heating up on the UN.This was not the purpose of the presentations made. But I thinkeven those who are here from the UN would probably admit thatthere is a reform process underway and that it is needed. Fairenough. The Institute for National Strategic Studies is interestedin what the United States needs to do to improve its ownperformance, to contribute better and to make UN peacekeepingor peace enforcement or Level-Two or Level-Three more

74 WILLIAM H. LEWIS

effective. I think those of you who have read Chairman Powell'scomments know his preference. I do not want to misquote him,but certainly we learn in our United States schools the need foroverwhelming force for achieving decisive results. We have acultural problem, I would submit, in terms of adjusting themanner in which we operate to be more effective in this sort ofpolitical-military environment. I would foresee us doing more inthe future.

QUESTION: I am from the Department of PeacekeepingOperations, so it has been very interesting for me to listen to thediscussions. I am responsible, among other things, for trainingin the United Nations. The issue has been raised a number oftimes-that training is very essential for futurepeacekeepers-and I agree with that. But let me offer someadditional points. When we talk about United Nationspeacekeeping, we are talking about United Nations' operations.In fact the operational issue in a country is rather limited.because when the forces are there, what are we going to do'? Weare dealing with supervision, monitoring, escorting, etc. In fact,what we need is planning for the deployment of the force. Thelogistical planning is essential for us- indeed, it is crucial. Theother point I would mention is the standby forces. When we aretalking about standby forces, it depends on the contributors. IfI am talking about standby forces from Sweden, it meanssomething else for me than if you're talking about standby forcesfrom the United States. We have standby forces within theNordic community dealing with peacekeeping that can be madeavailable within 14 days. But, in the US, we are talking about24 hours, 48 hours or 72 hours. I think also the culture ofvarious countries differs quite a lot. If we have infantry battalionfrom a country somewhere other than Western Europe. and wehave an infantry battalion from the Wes.ern Europe, there is adifference.

I think it is important for us within the UN to think abouthow standby forces can reach a certain operational level. Itmeans for infantry battalions saying they have to do thefollowing things: equipment attached to the battalion,communication equipment, vehicles, and units must beself-contained for approximately two weeks. It is very difficult


for us to get these kinds of units today. It is easy for us to getunits if they are coming just with the uniforms. But it is mostimportant to get medical units and logistics units, air wings, the

air transport and so on. I think we have to plan for what I calldiffering models of standby forces. This has implications fortraining. First, we can never confine training only to the militarypeople. We need to provide training to the civilians, as well.Because we need to remember today peacekeeping forces are a

combination of civilian and military components. One of thedifficulties within existing peacekeeping operations,is thatcivilians do not always understand the military approach to anoperation and vice versa. The other point is that we always saythat we need to train the troop-contributing countries that aregoing to provide the United Nations with forces, but we havealso to train the host country. It is important to train thesepeople. to inform them of the objectives of peacekeeping theforce. I do not know how many times I heard from one of thecountries: "What is the purpose of the peacekeeping force? Isit an occupation force?" People do not understand peacekeepingforces are not a true military force. It is a military unit used ina political context. We cannot develop peacekeeping curricula forthe United States and send it to Nigeria. But we can provide thenucleus, and they have to fill in the blanks. There are todayseveral training institutions around the world dealing withpeacekeeping. We have them in Europe, some in the Nordiccountries, as has been mentioned. We have them in Auwtia, wehave them in Poland, and we have Canada and Australia. AndI think what we have to do, if not to unify the training, at leasttalk the same language.

Concerning new missions, you do not know what has beendone so far when we talk about Somalia. We present training intwo ways. First, what we do is to send to the advanced party inthe country a disk with the training program. They have to alter

the training program in accordance with the local conditions,because we are not sure about them up in the Headquarters. Atthe same time, the contingent's commanders, when they come toUN Headquarters, are briefed about the mission and at the sametime they are briefed how to train their people. It is notnecessary to train well-educated staff officers, battalion

.i

76 WILLIAM H LEWIS

commanders. etc. The key persons in all the training, particularltin these kinds of peacekeeping operations we are dealing withtoday, are platoon and squad leaders because they have to takethe most difficult decisions in the field, There are six videos indevelopment. These videos deal with training. The point wasthat we found out a lot of countries know nothing aboutpeacekeeping and even less about training. The first video dealswith the causes and roots of a conflict; tdie second deals with thehistorical evolution of peacekeeping; the third deals with hlowyou can use an original center for training; the fourth. with hovkto train the UN soldier. the fifth. with how to train a UNobserver, the sixth, with how to train an election monitor.Hopefully. these six videos will have been completed by the endof the year, and we can get some money it) have them translatedinto French and Spanish. As you can see. training is veryessential for us. anu I think we have done somethli•2 to enhanceit.

CHAIR: Thank you very much tbr your comments. I might justask the panel whether they might wish to respond.

RESPONSE: Again, in a context of a balanced perspective. Iwould like to make the point, my remarks mniiht have soundedlike UN bashing, but it is not. What I felt I did in CentralAmerica was the most positive thing I have done in my life, barnone. From getting people like Dr. Ortega together withCommandante Franklin. to get them working on a peace process.to demobilizing an entire army. to destroying 20-odd-thousandwealwns. It was very positive and it could not have happenedwithout the United Nations. Your point on the military

component. what seems to be missing is what we in the militarysee as essential in any of these operations as we go from Level-One to -Two to -Three; you must have those principles of unityof command which is not necessarily there. And when you getto a sort of Level One operation, perhaps such as the elections inHaiti and what have you. where the military commander wassubordinate to the mission commander, fair enough. But whenyou go above that to Level-Two and -Three. unity of militarycommand must he present, or we're going to lose soldiers andlose the operation. Your point on training is well taken. Senior

MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF UN PEACEKEEPING -7

officers training, staff officers training, are essential. We thinkwe can handle this in the context of our normal olticerdevelopment training, and we must do it, We Canadians hawent'done it terribly well. hut we are improving upon it. Yourobserver training especially, a thing which must be done for aweek or two weeks depending on the background of the officerand the mission, that also has to be done. We do not see therequirement for a Canadian peacekeeping acaderny. which isbeing pushed by some people in Canada. I see us continuing toparticipate in the high( level academy learning tor would-bechiefs of staff. force commanders and that sort of thing. It isquite important. It, indeed, in the case of the United States. 't isrequired to make a political statement to underscore the poini thata peacekeeping academy or a special organiiation is required. Icertainly would understand that. But I do not think with theprofessionalism 'hat exists in the United States Army as I kntmit you need a special peacekeeping academy.

SECOND RESPONSE: I wouldn't disagree, but there is justsomething I would like to add. One of the problems the UNfaces is getting forces into the field quickly. One of the realproblems, of course, is not only getting the military into the field,but getting the UN in the [p)sition to where it can second itsmilitary staff so that it begins to perlorimn essential headquarterstaff functions. One of the problems with the UN having 12missions currently in the field-soon to be 13, of which two ot

those missions are the second and third largest evermounted-the reality is that the United Nations has diluted itsexpertise in many of it's specialiled logistics areas in theSecretariat because it was required to send it's experts to tihefield. There is great sense, in my view, to rmlating key staff roimvarious countries through all of the positions in the UnitedNations Secretariat dealing with peacekeepi~ig. Whether it befinance, logistics, or operations. it makes sense to me that all ofus provide people. I think many of us are willing to do so.

THIRD RESPONSE: I'd like to cover the civilian training sideof the house. One of the problems we had was our civilian staffrotated too often. In the time I was in the field, we had three

?S WILLIAM H LEWIS

chief procurement officerp and four chief finance officers. Ytoucannot get any continulty as a result. A lot of thesefolks-because the Ui, aas stretched thin-were on their firstfield assignment. They nad no background training on the areawhatsoever. Complicating ihat was what was mentioned earlierabout unity of cominaid. I know the UN is not a militaryorganization, hut they need to establish clearly, who is in charge.When you have a situation as we had in the Weste.i Saharawhere the military flirces were doing their thing, all those othersupport groups existed only on paper. George IStueberl talkedabo'lt the prohlenis with police. We had no problems. We hada police chief who was the chief of nothing. He was there all byhinmielf. Then we had an assistant special representative who wasresident for two weeks, then lie wenl to train up thie new special,..presentative.

From a military perspective, the senior man was our forcecommander. But the civilians look at that soil of thing in adifferent way. When we went to a lower level acting forcecommander, regular general level, we had an assistant specialrepresentative who was roughly at the sante pay grade aid a thiefadministrative off, , who was just a little bit helow that pa>grade-and no rilie really said who wa.s in charge. No" i know\xial UN wiring diagrams say and all that, hut to try to explain(o s-,ne young military officers who are accustomed to kno'wiinMho is in charge and who you go to if you have a problem i.difficult when the concept is "put . It these guys in a room, lock

the do•r, and see who comes out (t, top." This is not a verygood way to run things. The civiliait:s !,ced to train, the m ilitary:iced lo train; arid one of the things that needs to he in thecurriculum is how to deal with each other, Low to use yourpowers of persuasion rather than just giving all order andexpecting somebody to carry it out. Our force ctminnander had apolicy: whcn new ohservers cane in they' would serve ainimum u )1 thiriy days out ont a tearn site before they would geta job in the force or sector headquarters. I know youi cannotafford to do that when you're lookintg at a platoon leade: wltogets a short notice requirementl to go out and take a Kala.shlniko\vaway fromn a 16 yeutr old Cantodian teenager or somethintg likethal, hilt we were in a different situation and planimtin wai, donw'for us. We did our own stall trailnlinI, or we would have been


very hard pressed to graduate from Level-One to a Level-Twooperation largely because the political planning was based on thefalse assumption that political successes would be achieved.

FINAL RESPONSE: Two comments. First, on civil-militarystaff training. As currently configured, a military operation thathas a military headquarters supported by a civilian staff isunworkable. It is unworkable for a couple of reasons. First, thecivilians have different rules. They work until maybe noonSaturday and then they go home for Saturday and Sunday. Whenyou are out in the field you need support 24 houiN t day, -evendays a week. Second, civilians do not know military "things".I had a secretary from Switzerland; she was just a sweet lady, butshe didn't know about military vocabulary, about operations oranything else, and she was holding down what would have beena position for a master sergeant in an operations cell. There wereoperations that weren't planned in UNTAC because there was alack of experience and expertise there. Third, let's say you startout at Level-One and things get nasty. How are you now goingto deploy those civilians into a Level-Three operation? Moreimportantly, they have absolutely no expertise running a Level-Three type operation. That needs to be cured at the UNHeadquarters level, and it needs to be done quickly, because thereare a lot of Level-Twos out there that could tecome nasty. Thenext question involves training. The training ttnat I amadvocating lor staff is not to bring Canadiwis and US officersand other people up-to-speed on how to do staff work, becausewe already do a pretty good job on that. But \v hen you are goingto deploy a staff on a military operation, it is bad policy to getthem on the ground where they meet for the first lime. I wouldmuch rather have a place where once y-,u have identified thatyou'll have a mission going out, you have identified what thatmission is to accomplish and what they are allowed and notallowed to do. I would like to send them someplace-maybeFort Dix-where I can give them simu.itior training so that theycan work together as staff groups to produce the staff pr(ductsrequired-the intelligence products, the logistics planningproducts, the operational product-before they get on the ground.and they have all the real life alligttors biting them so that they

80 WILLIAM H. LEWIS

do not know what they are doing. I think that's absolutely key.More iniportantly, 1 think this is an easy one to solve. Often yousee that there are north-south antipathies. If you have a stafftraining school, that brings officers up to speed regarding goodstaff procedures, that is a professional carryover that can be usedwhen they go back to their nations.

QUESTION: My question concerns MINURSO. I didn't actuallygo to MINURSO myself, but my colleague Jack Chopper whoworks with me did. And he did actr-.!Iv testify to the Senate andat the General Assembly on his findings. He has quite a story totell. He visited the Polisario through Algeria.and he visited theMoroccan side at the request of the Norwegians after the caucuswe had in Morocco. On the latter journey.he was arrested twicein the area, and he returned with the impression that the UNobservers are a boxed-in fbrce, comparatively speaking. He citesthe fact that the hotels they live in are actually prescribed areas.and he wasn't able to enter them and tell that you lived on theMoroccain side because it is fenced off by the police. You cannotfly a UN flag. You have a fault with your violation reportswhich do not actually reach the percentage of actual reports thatcome into public scrutiny. It is vastly less than the number (ifviolation reports that you wrote. So I have two questions. Arethey really boxed in? Or is this our imagination'! Do they reallyenjoy the freedom of movement which is granted to them underthe mandate!

RESPONSE: I cannot speak for what has happened since I leftthe end of July. but you are right, we are somewhat boxed-in byone side of the conflict. I did not want to get into a "who shotJohl" comment, saying one side is cooperating with the UnitedNations and the other is not. Those kinds of comments have beenraised to New York. and for whatever reason, we are stillconrstrained by the Moroccans. It is true. they probably wouldn'tlet that fellow into the hotel. You see the Moroccans do notconsider, what they call D-Day as having occurred yet. Theytreat the UN force there as being a guest. And for a guy like mefrom the Unuited States I resented being monitored all the time,having people go through my hotel room while I'm at work.These s•,ls of issues have been raised to New York. What is

MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF UN PEACEKEEPING SI

being done about it, I do not know. We are moving just abouteverywhere we want to go except the Moroccans do not let usinto their strong points along the berm, and the general who is incharge of those forces, told our force commander: "A willpersonally escort you into that strong point as soon as my kinggives me permission to do so." Now,that's above tie level of ourmilitary force to resolve. We also talked about the mineproblem. Despite the fact that the Moroccans say that they aresharing minefield data with the UN Observer Force, we werepretty well convinced that we were not getting a lot of minefielddata that they do have about the mines they put out, even thoughsome of them may have shifted in the sands over the years. Theyare also not sharing infornation about the total disposition oftheir forces. These problems have all been made known to NewYork, but the perception of the observers on the ground is thatthere is not a whole lot of arm twisting going on back at theSecurity Council level.

I know it is very debilitating when you spend a lot of timepreparing draft Secretary-General's reports for the military forceinputs that talk about logistics problems and movementrestrictions, and then the final product is a very watered downthing. The last one that came before I left didn't even containthe word logistics anywhere in the entire report. Which, to me.if I was an ambassador at the United Nations and I read thisthing or sat in on Security Council deliberations trying to decidewhether to approve that report or not. 1 would say: "Hey! thingsmust be hunky dory in MINURSO." Yes, we are somewhatbo)xed in by one side over there. For whatever reason, and it isnot as though we've accepted that and laid down and rolled overand said, "well that makes our job easier we do not have to doas mu'-h patrolling." We have tried to deal with that with somelimited success. I do not know what the situation is at present.

ADDITIONAL COMMENT: The situation you describe isanalogous to the situation in Cambodia. When we deployed oneteam to a site, they were kept under armed guard, virtual housearrest. They were allowed no contact with any of theCamboxdians. They were never allowed into the headquarters ofthe Khmer Rouge. They have no idea if that is really the HQs

82 WILLIAM H LEWIS

for the KR; it most probably is not. They did not allow any UNhelicopters into the area for two months. My team went into thearea under the auspices of the "CIANOOK" faction and were toldby the commander of the Khmer Rouge 616 division that hewould kill me and my entire team. There was never any actiontaken by the United Nations concerning this incident. This goesback to my initial point. Before a mission goes in. the UnitedNations leadership needs to decide how they propose to achievethe mission's goal. What economic, political, and militarypressure will they exert? And they also have to spell out whatis failure. When do you cut your losses and say the organizationis not going to be able to achieve the mission, and anything elsewe throw at it is a waste of resources? That again, has not beendone. I raised those questions with General Sanderson early onin the mission when it was painfully obvious that the KR had nointention of cooperating with the peace agreement and before wehad deployed I I battalions and 15,000 people. Decisions on howto fulfill the mission and criteria for success and failure shouldhave been made. So it goes back to the planning, the realconcept of what the mission is going to achieve and how it willbe achieved.

FURTHER RESPONSE: To substantiate the two examples thatwere made, you are always faced with this problem. We hadthem playing games with us and our freedom of movement.which was agreed to by all concerned but was not granted. Wehad to press, cajole, educate them, and finally over allprotestations, take a militarily calculated risk to get into theImales Valley, which was the home of the Contras, who didn'twant us to go there. Anyway, when we came back we hadcomplaints all over the place from the United States Embassy.Our mission was not in concert with what they wanted, but wepushed and made a military decision, and took a calculated riskwhich was described by some as being foolhardy. But once thatwas done and contact had been made. it all unfolded from there.You've got to keep pressing and that's where the militaryestimate process and the ability and the desire and the necessityof taking risks comes in.


THE CHAIR: Let me try briefly to indicate our conclusions fbrUS military planners in signing up to a UN operation-whetherit is level-One, Level-Two, level-Three, individual observer,small size unit, or large size unit.

First, well trained US units do not need a major reorientationof their training program in terms of predeployment training, but,they will need sensitivity training or cultural training to get themimmersed in the social, cultural milieu into which they willdeploy.

Second. you certainly have to know what kind of mission itis-whether it is Level-One, Two-, or Three-. Training alone isnot going to satisfy Level Three. We probably need to buttressour approach to education about UN operations in ourprofessional military education. We do a little bit of it at present.but I do not think we do it terribly well. We need to enhance itin the Command and General Staff College, because majors andlieutenant colonels are going to be out there doing the job asindividual observers or whatever. We must do it at the WarColleges, as well, because their graduates may be the forcecommanders or key staff officers, etc. I believe it was GeneralDouglas who mentioned the importance of reconnaissance. TheUN technical surveys should be done jointly. The nations that aregoing to participate should go on the technical survey with theUN officials, so that there are no unresolved issues between thenations that are going to contribute forces and the UN.

We, the United States, want to make sure that we have thisreservoir of skills and talent. I know the Army does it in theFAO program, but we need to make sure all the Services aredeveloping a similar reservoir. As a result, we will know whowe've got, where they've been, whether they can be called onagain, etc. But. it has to contribute to a person's career. Andthat probably means the United States military has to go througha little acculturation. Participation in peacekeeping operationsshould be rewarded and should contribute to a one's career. Itwe say that, but do not do it, nobody's going to want to sign upfor a peacekeeping mission.

As to selection of people for peacekeeping missions, I donot know whether you need a psychological profile, but I can see

94 WILLIAM H. LEWIS

some situations as very stressful, which means that you've got tohave the right person there. I am also struck by the need for aprofessional UN staff officers' course. I think our Presidentsuggested that in his speech. Personally, I think we can build onthe approach.

I


The UN Contribution toInternational Security

Ambassador Thomas R. PickeringUS Permanent Representative

to the United Nations

THE FUTURE SECURITY ROLE of the UN is, to put it mildly,a speculative topic. In reality it requires three separate forecasts:one, about the dominant security concerns of the coming years;another concerning the use of multilateral security tools relativeto regional or unilateral ones; and a third regarding the specificcontributions the UN might make.

Triple forecasts are better assignments for futures traders andrisk averse diplomats, for whom the act of speculation alwaysquickens the pulse. But when, as now, the world is in upheaval,you need a certain amount of speculation just to get to the end ofeach day. Unfortunately today it looks like I will he startingearly. With that comment I will venture some thoughts on thevery intriguing subject you have chosen, with the understandingthey will be treated as personal musings with no official status.

US SECURITY INTERESTS AFTER THE COLD WAR

Over the last two years it has grown increasingly evident that theend of the Cold War removed from the international politicalsystem its central organizing principle. In his speech to theGeneral Assembly last month, and in statements prompted byIraq's invasion of Kuwait and the UN's response, President Bushoffered a replacement. The essence of the President's vision is aNew World Order. He has described it in the following words:

The New World Order does not mean surrendering our sovereigntyor forfeiting our interest&. It really describes a responsibilityimposed by our successes. It refers to new ways of working withother nations to deter aggression and to achieve stability, to achieveprosperity and, above all, to achieve peace. It springs from hopesfor a world based on a shared commit ment to a set of principlesthat undergird our relations - peaceful settlement of disputes.

86 WILLIAM H. LEWIS

solidarity against aggression, reduced and controlled arsends. andjust treatment of peoples.

What are the security implications of a transition from theCold War to the kind of New World Order the President hasdescribed'? If one looks at US post-Cold War security intereststhrough a UN window one way to describe the view is to talkabout two adjacent cirdes separated by a rather perneableborder. In the first circle are core US security interests:protection against direct attack; protection of US citizens abroad;aid and support of allies; maintenance of unmolested internationalcommunications and commerce; assurance of access to vita!resources; insulation of essential interests from the effects offoreign wars - such as the tanker escorts late in the Iran-IraqWar-, and so on.

In the second circle are the general and broad goals, valuesand principles which are the essence of that civil intenationalsociety whose vision President Bush invokes by speaking of aNew World Order or a "Pax Universalis". It embraces the rule oflaw, non-aggression and the pacific settlement of disputes.respect for sovereignty, defense of human rights. control ofarsenals, curbs on proliferation and in general a disciplined.cooperative approach to common security. This morning I wantto explore a narrow but extremely important question at the heartof the UN's role in strengthening and enforcing those principles,that is, the UN authorized use of forve.

MULTILATERAL VS. REGIONAL USE OF FORCE

As a point of departure let me say that the centrality of the UNSecurity Council to the shaping and legitimizing of the responseto Iraqi aggression has raised expectations, hence politicalpressure, for a comparable Council role in other crises.Expectations that the UN will swiftly act on the Haitian coup, thecivil wars in Yugoslavia, and in Liberia last year, illustrate thepoint. In many such crises, UN action may indeed be appropriateand helpful (particularly where, as in Haiti, its prior involvementclearly makes it an interested party. But the larger point is thatthe Charter never intended the Security Council to be its only orfull time court of first resort. Indeed, Article 52 explicitly


mandates regional efforts to resolve or redress threats to peaceand security before resort to the UN. And that is a good thing.The forceful and immediate OAS response to the overthrow ofthe Aristide government in Haiti, and the constructiveengagement of the EC and CSCE in the Yugoslav situation,suggest cohesion and solidarity arising from shared regional,political and cultural interests permit a wider scope for action.Even in Liberia, where the ECOWAS effort to bring peace hasnot been aided by regional Anglophone-Francophone divisions,the recent Yamasoukro I11 agreement is a major step towardending hostilities and bringing new elections.

Having said that, it is best to remember that none of thesesituations is resolved and the future is likely to bring crises thatare not regionally containable, reinforcing the need for a selectiveapproach to Security Council crisis management. One value ofregional groups in this respect is that their greater willingnessto act eventually bolsters the Security Council's role at such timeas it may become necessary.

One of the things that drives this global/regional question isthe character of conflict itself. Readers of the daily summariesprepared by the intelligence community know that most entriesdescribe conflicts within states not between them. In the postDesert Storm period that is an instructive fact. It reminds us thatthreats to regional stability will not result primarily from themiscalculations of expansionist powers. As the Middle East andYugoslavia daily demonstrate, regional stability after the ColdWar--as it was before it--is largely shaped by essentiallyparochial concerns of an ethnic, religious, political, economic andsocial character. This may cause some nostalgia about theneatness and clarity of the Iraqi threat, which from both apolitical and a strategic perspective was more a caricature of theCold War with a legal overlay and an ostentatious villain than auseful metaphor for the untidy challenges and conflicts ahead.

A daily dilemma facing the UN's security rule in this contextis that, while the rule of law and the role of order are morecomfortably complementary after the Cold War, they are notequivalent. Our humanitarian and political interest in seeing anorderly resolution in Yugoslavia may not conflict with, but itcertainly exceeds ,any responsibilities conferred by relevant

8$ WILLIAM H LEWIS

international law. Similarly. international law has little positiveand nothing dispositive to say about the responsibilities of otherstates in the event of coups and anarchy or bloodshed within aneighbor's borders except to the extent that a potential forspillover arises. In fact the rule of law would permit-though it isunpleasant to ponder - a world convulsed by extraordinarilydestructive but utterly legal conflict. (The OAS SantiagoDeclaration about the non-acceptability of governmental changeby coup represents an important exception and step forwardDOW under test in Haiti).

This dilemma is not helped by the fact that the common lawof states as well as the covenants and treaties agreed betweenthem permit competing and conflicting claims. Nowhere is thismore evident than when the international community is forced iochoose between the rights of states and the rights of peoples. Asyou know. Security Council resolution 678 authorized action toenforce Article 2 of the UN Charter's prohibition against the use

j of force against another state. As you also know, resolution 688found that persecution of Iraqi Kurds posed a danger iointernational peace and security, a finding which in the majoritys view superseded another principle of the same Article(paragraph 7), prohibiting intervention in the domestic affairsof member states.

Yet the fact that 688 was very difficult to negotiate,notwithstanding both the genocidal issues and the presence ofthe "spillover threat" effect. and the subsequent resistance to veryforceful resolutions on Yugoslavia and Haiti suggests two thingsto me. First, there is work to do before the Security Council isready regularly to serve as global crisis manager. much lesstribune of the New World Order: and second. that we mustremain open to alternative regional and even unilateral tools toserve the "order" as well as the "law and justice" agendasexpressed by the President.

In a sense this approach to security leads us back to firstprinciples. Part of the "work" we have to do is the same thatour membership in the UN and other international institutions hasalways required. It is the toilsome task of nurturing aninternational society of common values, to inform and vitalize theorderly world the President calls for and which we all wish tolive in. Civil order in the US benefits from the absorptive power

MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF UN PEA( LKEEPING

of shared values and a common culture which can dulldifferences, lessen rivalries and make most of us stake-holders inthe status quo.

The absence of a parallel culture internationally, howevertolerable during the Cold War, is now a source of frustration, asattested by the Council's recent failure to adopt a strongresolution calling for the restoration of Haitian dnemocracy out ofconcern for the non-intervention doctrine in the hemisphere.While the collapse of communism has eliminated the majorglobal clash of values it has had an opposite effect on othernationalist, tribal, religious, economic and ethmic conflicts thaihave been there for some time and may even reenergizeNorth-South economic discord. For this reason. we are unlikelyto see the rapid elaboration of international law or Securit)Council practice to provide assured external guarantees forminority rights, democratically elected goveninents. or hungrypeople caught in a civil war when a significant number otCouncil members do not see such principles as leading to orderbut subversive of it, at least suiversive of an order based on tirndoctrines of state sovereignty and non- intervention.

For an evolving but ambitious global security system I thinkthe answer to this problem is to be pragmatic: that is. we try tobridge the gap between "order" and "law" when we can: we seekto fill it in on the infrequent occasions when that is possible- andwhen neither approach suffices, we look outside the UN foranother forum or tool. Let me give an example of eachapproach. For the first respoinse, the case of the Kurds andresolution 688 points in the right direction. The resolution didnot explicitly mandate Operation Provide Comtfort. Instead, itdeclared that the situation constituted a threat to internationalpeace and security and called for member states to give assistanceto the Secretary General's humanitarian efforts. With these twoelements and the fact that Iraq was a country already undersubject to Chapter VII enforcement, 688 was enough to open alegal space for the coalition to provide relief and support for theKurds, a space which was not challenged by those Permanent andother Council Members otherwise opposed to a more frontalapproach on non-intervention grounds.

Regarding the seCtend approach - bridging the gap between

90 WILLIAM H LEWIS

the wider goals of a New World Order and the more modestrequirements of current international law - a very helpful startwould be early Congressional ratification of the InternationalCovenant of Legal and Political Rights. Given the very largenumber of signatories already, UniteJ States accession to thattreaty would strengthen the standing of the democratic, civil andminority rights embodied in it. A similar but possibly moredifficult undertaking would be to examine ways it strengthensuch weaknesses in international humanitarian law as the rightsof afflicted peoples for access to humanitarian relief duringwartime.

On this question of nonn-building and its relation to securityit is revealing to look again at regional organizations. Forexample. the OAS now has a legal instrument authorizing strongaction, including use of economic and diplomatic sanctions, toreverse coups against democratically elected governments. Ofcourse, the UN lacks anything comparable, but so does the CSCEs Paris Charter, the EC's Rome Treaty, the Western EuropeanUnion's Charter nor even NATO. Yet the notable thing aboutEurope is that failure to agree on a security identity has notprevented it from acting in an increasingly coherent.increasingly forceful way towards Yugoslavia. The "watch wh:itwe do not what we say" quality of Europe on Yugoslavia. andthe Security Council on Iraq and to a lesser extent the OAS onHaiti all leads to the not very surprising discovery that in thedevelopment of new security system, necessity is the primarymother of invention.

The third response to the limitations of the UN is tounderstand when it may still be necessary to bypass it. Neitherthe exercise of our rights under Article 51. of careful engagementin support of the principles of the New World Order require usto act under explicit UN authority. Nor is it difficult to imaginecircumstances where either the fast-breaking nature of the threator the inability of the Security Council to reach a decision arguefor rapid unilateral or regional action.

Nonetheless, the Security Council now has a more credibleand central status. We have done much to bring this about. Wehave done so in the belief that in the post-Cold War wofid, giventhe marginal nature of most threats to our wider environment, wehave a great deal to gain from an effective and influential


Security Council. It strikes me theun that we should stri',e toshape our policies and their expression to protect that investment.

With the exception of the Korean War, the subject otf UNauthorized entorcement actions and their legal ard practicalfeatures is an unwritten text. Nor is the job of writing th:•! textaided by the fact that the threats we must deal with fit awkt ardlyinto any imaginable UN based structure. And neither will theUN - however strengthened - easily embrace the potentially widesecurity mission of a New World Order. So we should look tothe UN to deliver a pan of the solution at best. The regionalorganizations will add their part, backed up by the SecurityCouncil if necessary. And we must. as I have noted, keep openthe door when necessary for national actions.

On the other hand. two key elements of a new approach •osecurity will be legitimacy and flexibility, assets robustl)ydeveloped by the UN in its management of the Iraqi challenge.

"LEGITIMACY" AND THE USE OF FORCE

As a starting point, we need to understand what consfiluies"legitimacy" for an armed action hoping to secure its politicalflank. For ourselves and our allies, Resolution 678 authoriiing"all necessary means" to secure Iraq's immediate andunconditional withdrawal, was close to an ideal formulation. Itgave a UN license for the use of force without restriction as toits mainer or extent, or terms for its cessation ,both important

military and political considerations.Not surprisingly these sante attributes gave discomfort to

many other UN members. The Secretary General himself hascommented that while the war against Iraq was "made legitimateby the Security Council" it "was not a UN victory" since thatcould have resulted only from "hostilities controlled anddirected by the UN". One need not share Perez de Cuellar'sview to appreciate his point: the most iron- clad legal justificationmay not buy us that more evanescent political commodity calledlegitimacy. For example, the ambiguity of the phrase "allnecessary means" meant that actions necessary for Desert Storm'ssuccess might in the view of the Council majority have exceeded

92 WILLIAM H. LEWIS

the intent of 678. While that did not occur it created an

uncovered risk. Another consideration is that bro-,Jly licensinga few countries to use force in the Council's nanie enablesdetractors to argue that the action is the project of a lewgoverunents unrepresentative of the world community.

For military action comparable in scale to Desert Storm, theredoes not seem an obvious answer to this problem since anysignificant degree of UN direction and control could haveimposed disabling constraints. On the other hand. we hope anidbelieve that the scale of Iraq-Kuwait is unlikely to be repeated inthe foreseeable future, nor are immediate US interests likely to beso directly and vitally engaged. Moreover, Council cohesionnurtured by the Iraq experience could carry over to other issues.If this proves true, there may be scope for enhancing the SecurilyCouncil's role in future peace enforcement.

ARTICLE 43 AGREEMENTS

One way the Charter offers to do that is by negotiation ofArticle 43 agreements between the Security Council and

countries it selects. Paragraph I of Article 43 questsmember states to:

Undertake to make available to the Security Council. on its call.and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements. armedforces. assistance and facilities, including right of passage.necessary for the purpose of maintining peace and security.

My own reading of Article 43 suggests several relevant points:

First. the conclusion of such an agreement need not confer an 4automatic. mandatory obligation to provide troops to the SecurityCouncil, but could instead simply state their availability subjectto certain terms or procedures.

Second. Article 43 is silent on command arrangements: thephrase "on its call" does not necessarily mean "at its direction."

Third, by specifying "assistance and facilities" the languagepermits members to satisfy their obligations by means other thanprovision of combat troops - a useful flexibility.

MILITARY IMPLICATI()NS OF tIN PEACEKEEPING.

Fourth, paragraph 3 specifies that agreements shall be at tileinitiative of the Security Council, a helpful limiting factor thatensures selectivity.

Finally, paragraph 3 also stales that agreements maN bebetween the Council and individual memhers or groups ofmembers,. oftering a potential basis for associations bet',een theSecurity Council and regionally based alliances. Since alliancesoffer a more functional basis for concerted militarv action thana chance grouping of UN member states, this too could be auseful feature.

D)ELEGATION OF ENFORCEMENT

A vital question about "43' is whether, and what kind. ofcommand arrangements it implies. In my vieý, 43 agreementsare not incompatible with signatories exercise of wide militarylatitude when those agreements are invoked. In this sense thatagreement might be less a format for direct Council control thanan expression of its general capacity to enforce decisions ,-dhence a means of deterrence. In fact. agreements with powerfulmembers or groups of members might have a psychologicalimpact similar to a classic mutual assistance pact, :;trengtheningrespect for decision under Articles 39 (power ofrecommendation). 41) (provisional measures) and 41 (emiarg•oes.diplomatic and other sanctions) and by extension. for statementsof the Secretary General or the Council President. On the otherhand of course, the reality of the Pernanent Member veto wouldremain a factor in this as in any other efforl to extend theCouncil's scope.

As we consider different approaches to the UN we need tobear in mind that the notion of such delegated enforcement is notalien to the Charter but explicitly anticipated in three places.Article 48 empowers the Council to determine which membersshall conduct the action required to carry out its decisions "forthe maintenance of international peace and security". Article 53permits the Council to utilize "regional arrangements or agenciesfor enforcement action under its authority". Finally, Article 106authorizes the victorious World War 11 allies to consult with a

94 WILLIAM H. LEWIS

view to joint action necessary to maintain peace and security,although as a practical matter 106 is widely regarded as anoutdated anachronism and an effort to revive it would be bothimpractical and divisive.

SECURITY COUNCIL OVERSIGHT OFMILITARY ACTION

Notwithtstanding the legadity of delegated enforcement, we shouldallow for the possibility that the Council will not absent itself socompletely from command and control as it did in resolution 67X.As you know, Chapter VII provides vehicles for Councilinvolvement:

Articte 42 permits it to act by air, sea or land forces to giveeffect to its decisions when Article 41 measures are deemedinadequate:

Article 46 calls for the Council to develop plans for theapplication of armed force with the assistance of a MilitaryStaff Committee (MSC);

Article 47 details the MSC's terms of reference, whichinclude advice to the Council on arms control, readinessplanning, general matters of command as well a:; strategicdirection of forces.

Any move in this direction will raise concerns among troopcontributors. The chapter's emphasis on the MSC is especiallyproblematic: no state whose troops are engaged in hostilities islikely to allow their direction by a group to which it does notbelong or whose members have necessarily also contributedtroops. This is also the need to ensure that committed troops arenot subject to life-threatening surprises by changes in the politicalparameters governing their use, or by a breach in security or byother factors arising from activities which might be implied bythe words "strategic direction". Thirdly, unless the reference tostrategic command (47.3) is interpreted in some static sense, thetechnology of modem warfare probably makes it obsolete: itrequires flexible, decentralized decisionmaking and instantaneous


communication - neither is well suited to decision by UNcommittee.

Yet there may by ways of partially employing Articles 42and 47 while inoculating them against their most intrusivepotential and these may he worth exploring particularly in theconteyxt of small scale or low intensity conflict. For example, amore explicit articulation of war aims may sometimes bedesirable. More specific goals do not mean more modest one,but they do make the Security Council more accountable foractions to secure them. A war aims statement might also specifyminimum terms for cessation of hostilities - as distinct fromterms for an overall settlement. A general statement ofpermissible means would add legitimacy by further distinguishingpeace enforcement from other use of force, though suchpronouncements would only be advisable to the extent they didnot expose troops to additional risk. We may also wish toexplore arrangements whereby peace enforcers could reportregularly and in person to the Council itself or a sub-group of theCouncil. While not altering command relationships. such aconsultative link could be a helpful tool for preserving consensus.

THE UN AND COALITION FORCES

One of the questions our security community will need toconsider is the issue of command and operationalintegration of the forces which might be employed to giveeffect to a Security Council decision. This requires atrade-off between the need to avoid over-identification witha few countries, and the exigencies of the unity ofcommand, rapid deployment, coordinated movements, andso on. Before going beyond the level of joint actionemployed in Desert Storm, in many substantive respects aNATO operation, are we persuaded that there are militarilyand politically satisfactory answers to many unanalyzedquestions about non-NATO coalition warfare'? It was thissort of appreciation for the unexpected that prompted thiscomment from George C. Marshall in 1938:

L

96 WILLIAM H. LEWIS

With us, geographical location and the international situation makeit literally imnpossible to find definite uiswers for such questions as:Who will be our enemy in the next war: in what theater oloperations will it be tought: and what will be our nationd objectiveat the time?

But today's planners have a tougher task: not only do we notknow the identity of our future adversaries, neither do wenecessarily know who are our friends-in the sense of coalitionpartners--will be. Yet joint arrangements for defeating a capablefoe will require substantial unity of command and control, andthe standard peacekeeping command foinal--decentralizedcotmmand across national sectors--may not suffice under thefluidity of combat conditions. A techimologically advanced butweakly united UN tfrce might even be at a disadvantage againsta low-tech but well directed opponent. Such considerationssuggest that a significant level of interoperability may be neededfor UN-authorized military operations. Between forces of vastlydiffering capabilities with no history of cooperations,. whichwould seem to require achieving a sorl of "UN standard"paralleling that of peacekeeping. It could involve such things asdoctrine, rules of engagement, training and joint exercises,command and control, IFF systems, intel-sharing, language:logistic supporl and so on. Achieving all of this would meanunheard of levels of military opemiess and may be difficult forgovernments to accept outside an alliance context. A furtherdetailed look at most of these issues in house would be a usefulbeginning step to help flesh out the contours of the new order weseek.

ENHANCING PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY

At your request, these remarks have focussed on the use-of-forceaspects of the UN's security roles. Let me conclude by returningto more familiar ground: The UN and conflict avoidance. In thecommunique of the London Summit the (G7 leaders committedthemselves to shoring up the basis for UN preventive diplomacy--a theme the President revisited when he addressed the General


Assembly last month.To fulfiil this goal tile institution will need to shilt to a

higher gear. Useful steps could include:

I. Informal inormnation sharing, by ourselves and othermember states, to keep the Secretary General fully intornedof existing or potential situations which could lead tointernational friction: (this is now occurrng within thecontext of resolution 687's Iraqi NMD inspection pn'lradi).

2. Requiring disputants or potential disputants to keep theSecretary General and through him the Security Council,fully informed of all pertinent facts:

3. Supporting the enhanced use of special representatives ingood offices and quiet diplomacy missions to help resolveissues which may lead to conflict;

4. And finally, inviting the Secretary General and theCouncil to give early consideration to the use of UN forcesas a mears of forestalling conflict before hostilities occur,such as by deployment to the borders of a threatened state.This may well involve elements of traditional peacekeepingand of peace enforcemenI as well.

On the subject of peacekeeping itself, as you know we are ina major growth phase. The UN has undertaken more missions inthe last three years than in its first 43. The scope and variety offunctions has grown as will. It is time to strengthen iheorganized structure of peacekeeping planming and management inorder to keep up with the heavier workload.

It is also time to put peacekeeping financing oil a more stablelongterm footing commensurate with its importance to globalsecurity--and our won. A step) in the right direction within theUS would be to take a hard look now at creating a substantialpeacekeeping account possibly within, or in relationtship to, theDepartment of Defense budget, in recognition of the clearsecurity purposes of peacekeeping expenditure.

98 WILLIAM H. LEWIS

CONCLUSION

From time to time as history turns remarkable corners, writersuse the term "arnus mirabilis", or "miraculous year" to expresstheir amazement. These are indeed amazing times. They are not,however. from a security [oint of view, miraculous. There is noshortage of causes which human beings will kill ar die for Norwill we now retire all of the classic tools for pursuing anddefending our interests. Nor will others. But I would submitthat the UN's capacity to serve common security concerns hasnever been greater nor more susceptible to constructive thinkingor influence.

t

McNair Papers

The McNair Papers are published ait Fort Leslev J1. Mc.Nair,home of the Institute for National Strategic Studies and theNational IDefense UniversitY. An ArmY post since 1794, the firtwas given its present name .:, 1948 in honor of' LieutenantGeneral Leslev Juttns Mcltair. Genteral tAh Nair. kiw un as"Educator of the Armx'" and trainer of some three million troops.was aibout to take commantitd of Allied g.rounfi fores in Europcunder Eisenhower. when lhe was killed in comba t ii Normandy.?5 .lul 1944.

I.Joseph P. Lorenz. Eglpt and the Nevi Arab Coalition. Fehruarv 10QX9.2. John E. Endicott. (;rutd Strategy a fnd the I't -ifi -t Reg'ion, May I 9X9.3. Eugene V. Rostow. President. Prime minister, or CttnstituntlitlaMonarch~'. October 1999.4. Howard G. DeWolt. SW) and Arms ('ontrol. Novembher 198k).5. Martin C. Lihicki. What'Makes Industries 5trawek'it, Novemher 19891.6. Melvin A. Gcxminai- Gorbath- aenttd Soviet Pour v inl ill( IbotWvorld, Fehruary 1990.7. John Van Oudenaren. "The Tradition ot Change in Soviet FotreignPolicy." and Francis Conte. "Two Schools (it Soviet DipjotnaCv.' 1t)(Ic'ldrstat;Jing Soviet IForu'ipn Policy' . April 19940.8. Max G. Manwaring and Court Prisk. A Stwtot'~ic t ietv ofIInSUJ`kOnCiCs: Insights fromn El Salvador. May 1990)9. Steven R. Linke. Mlanaging Crises tin I)t/'nse Induistry v. ThPEPCON and Avtex Cast's. June 1990).10. Christine M. Helms. Arabism anid Islam: Stateless% Nations antiNtitionlt'ss States. Septeimher 19904.11. Ralph A. Cossa. Iran; Soviet interests, US Contctrns, July, 199)0.12. Ewan Jamieson. Frie'ntd or Ally.0 A Qnt'stion fur Newý Lealanfd. Mayv1991.13. Richard J. Dunn 1ll. From ('tt vsbur e to tilt' G ulf anti W 'vt'itti

Copingý irlt Re volutionarv Tt'u bnolog'jual ('hunget'in Ltand War./art'.14. Ted Greenwood. U1.S and NAl() Force StruttUrT' anti Military

us oWvRn..zRn "RIncO

Opti eantonis ti the Medi tc 'an euti, June 190.15. Oscar W. Civatt. Jr.. Rid aria' s Quest trI .ci unflv .4pti ,h', (i/UWar, February 1993.16. William C. Bodie. Alosiniis %c'at Ahrtoua St (w, ,,l'i'* tinPost-soviet Larujioe. Junie 1993.17. Will imi H. Lewis ( ed.). lfi/it a I hp/iait.iauimi (q nitc U aut to

Peacct'keeiii Operationls. Junie 119;3.18S. Sterling DI. Sessions wuid Carl R . Jo nes. .ot Ociii I a fi I)Storm (Cast. Study'. July 1903.1l). Eugene V . Rt st w . Should rd h'l 4-1 of h Uni~ted Nations('hatter Re Raised From the IOead/ July 1993

2.Will iamn T. J ohnscii anid Thit wi Dure i- 'it nn Jeltre v Sir lt tDaniel N. Nelson:, Withiun C. Rodie. muu aMies; McCarthv. FLit, i/ianSeturitv lonard the Year 20(00. Aug~ust 1993.2 1 . Edwin R . Carlisle. ed.. Oi) 'c/op illm Batt/etici I IC 111oh liii t it 'x1iic

1 990/s. Augoust 1993.22. Patrick C lawson. IHom IHas Saddani I IOsstiii .siili it'd, Lwltwi ,pi

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