kovarik diploma thesis eu dissuasion iran final version

7/24/2019 Kovarik Diploma Thesis EU Dissuasion Iran Final Version

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MASARYKOVA UNIVERZITAFAKULTA SOCILNCH STUDI

Katedra mezinrodnch vztah a evropskch studi

Obor Mezinrodn vztahy

EU dissuasion strategy against Iranian nuclear

program

Magistersk diplomov prce

Mgr. Michal Kovk

Vedouc prce: Mgr. et Mgr. Petr Vilmek, Ph.D.UO: 273475 Obor: Mezinrodn vztahy Imatrikulan ronk: 2010 Brno, 2013


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I thereby proclaim, that the diploma thesis EU dissuasion strategy against Iranian nuclear

program has been created individually and all sources used in the thesis are listed in the

bibliography.

Prehlasujem, e som magistersk prcu na tmu Aplikcia stratgie odradenia EU voi irnskemu jadrovmu programu vypracoval samostatne a pouil som iba zdroje uveden v zoznameliteratry.

V Brne, 20.4.2013

..


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I would really like to thank my supervisor, Mgr. et Mgr. Petr Vilmek, Ph.D., for his patienceand straightforwardeness when supervising my diploma thesis. I would also like to express my

great gratitude to the Member of European Parliament, RNDr. Pavel Poc for having the

opportunity to see how the foreign policy of the EU is realized on institutional basis. Without

his assistant Mr. Josef Novotn jr., I would not be able to meet important members of Czechdiplomatic staff who work hardly on implementing the dissuasion efforts of the EU in reality.

Without expert view of Mgr. Josef Kraus, the data entry would not be so precise. Of course, my

big thanks goes to my parents and family as well, their support is invaluable.


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Table of contents

1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................6

2. Summary of Iranian nuclear program development .............................................................9

2.1. Suspicions from military orientation of Iranian nuclear program ................................ 10

2.1.1. Military and technological dimension of contemporary Iranian nuclear program . 11

2.2. Potentially nuclear Iran as a threat and contemporary ways of facing it ...................... 13

3. Dissuasion strategy ........................................................................................................... 16

3.1. Deterrence strategy the essence of any strategic thinking ......................................... 16

3.1.1. When does deterrence fail? .................................................................................. 20

3.2. Dissuasion strategy .................................................................................................... 21

4. Dissuasion strategy of EU towards Iran ............................................................................ 24

4.1. Problems of EUs dissuasion efforts........................................................................... 24

4.2. EU foreign policy and dissuasion strategy .................................................................. 25

4.2.1. Raising Iranian costs ........................................................................................... 26

4.2.2. Lowering the anticipated gains ............................................................................ 28

4.3. Is the EU, in case of dissuading Iran, from Venus? ..................................................... 28

5. The Predictioneers Game a serious game ....................................................................... 30

5.1. The ideological world of those, who play games in social sciences............................. 30

5.2. Introduction of the software - the rules of game ......................................................... 32

6. Entry data for the simulation of Iranian nuclear program................................................... 35

6.1. Policy continuum ....................................................................................................... 35

6.2. Actors ........................................................................................................................ 39

6.2.1. Actors inside Iran ................................................................................................ 40

6.2.2. International organizations .................................................................................. 44

6.2.3. State actors .......................................................................................................... 46


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7. Simulation results ............................................................................................................. 52

7.1. Alternative settings of miscellaneous parameters........................................................ 52

7.2. End-rule parameter .................................................................................................... 53

7.3. Issue forecasts ............................................................................................................ 54

7.4. Actor relationship ...................................................................................................... 58

7.5. Power of actors .......................................................................................................... 59

7.6. Interpretation of simulation results ............................................................................. 61

8. Evaluation of EUs dissuasion efforts............................................................................... 64

9. Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 67

10. Bibliography ................................................................................................................... 70

10. 1. Primary sources....................................................................................................... 70

10. 2. Secondary sources ................................................................................................... 70

Abstrakt ................................................................................................................................ 78

Abstract ................................................................................................................................ 79

Number of characters excluding bibliography: 157 030


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1. Introduction

The Iranian nuclear program is one of the issues that is persisting in the background of main

world news for at least a decade. The ambiguity surrounding this issue has arisen to a hugeextent. The issue has been securitized by many actors, prominently by Israel and partially by

the USA as well. When some issue is securitized by the global superpower, it certainly attracts

attention of many other powers. There is no exception in case of the European Union.

The EU is interested in Iranian nuclear program from many reasons, however two rather

obvious reasons are worth mentioning. The first one is that France and Great Britain, two

nuclear powers and two important EU member states, have a huge interest in stopping nuclear

proliferation. The second reason is that the EU as an institution proclaims that preventing anyfurther nuclear proliferation is one of its foreign-policy objectives.

Efforts to prevent Iran going nuclear, to stop any further nuclear proliferation, can be

considered as strategic-level efforts. The issue of how actors of international system handle the

Iranian nuclear program is a hot issue for strategic studies, which after the end of Cold War

suffered from identity crisis. Analysis and evaluation of the way, how particular actors are

trying to prevent another actor from doing something, they do not desire, is the job of strategic

studies par excellence. This thesis is written through the prism of strategic studies, uses the

tools used by strategic studies analysts and tries to reach conclusions at the strategic level.

As was mentioned above, the issue of Iranian nuclear program is not a new issue. Solving

the quagmire is high on agenda of many actors. This thesis will analyze the way how the EU is

approaching the issue. The reasons why the author of the thesis had chosen the EU are several

the EU is the most important trading partner for Iran, thus its influence over Iran is notneglectible. The EU is very important in negotiating process with Iran, as the European

ministry of foreign affairs Baroness Ashton is leading the negotiations. Also, it is analyticallyvery interesting to analyze European foreign policy from the strategic perspective, namely from

the perspective of dissuasion strategy.

The concept of dissuasion is not new, however thinking about dissuasion as a standalone

strategy alongside the deterrence strategy is a controversial and rather interesting standpoint.

This paper is not trying to solve the discussion whether dissuasion is a standalone strategy or

not, although the term dissuasion strategy will be commonly used. This paper considersdissuasion strategy as an overture before using the deterrence strategy after the goals of

dissuasion are not achieved.


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The topic of this thesis is application of dissuasion strategy of EU towards Iran in context of

its nuclear program. The aim of this thesis is then very easily deductible to identify andevaluate dissuasion efforts of the EU in context of Iranian nuclear program. This aim implies

these research questions:

What tools of dissuasion are currently applied by the EU towards Iranian nuclear

program?

o How will these tools affect the Iranian nuclear program in the future? What is the effectiveness of dissuasion tools that EU applies towards Iranian nuclear

program?

The character of research questions implies that the thesis can be considered a standard

evaluation study 1. The standard evaluation study evaluates applied policies using the theoretic

framework and effects of the applied policy shows using the predictions and alternative

scenarios (Van Evera 1997: 91). The first research question is focusing on description of foreign

policy tools of EU applied in effort to change the pace of Iranian nuclear program development.

The description will be based on broad conceptualization of dissuasion strategy tools and will

strictly follow the framework of this conceptualization. The sub question of first research

question is very important for answering the second research question. Answer to the sub

question will be brought by using the prediction software designed by Professor Bruce Bueno

de Mesquita. The second research question will then use the results of prediction to evaluate

the EUs dissuasion efforts.Effectiveness of dissuasion will be measured by adherence to thegoals that will be defined by policy continuum.

The core of the thesis will thus be the prediction of future development of Iranian nuclear

program, that is going to be based on the prediction made by The Predictioneers Game software.

The results of prediction will be used to evaluate contemporary dissuasion efforts and to

simulate possible alternatives. As will be explained in the chapter dedicated to introduction of

The Predictioneers game software, the software offers us a simulation of relations between

actors based on mathematical procession of input data, using the principles of game theory.

Using the results, the author of this thesis can see the possible future development of relations

between actors and their relative power, thus better evaluating the dissuasion efforts.

1 Van Evera (1997: 91) shows several examples of standard e valuation studies, such as Charles Glasers AnalyzingStrategic Nuclear Policy, Robert JervissThe Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy, Shai Feldmans Israeli Nuclear Deterrence or John Mearsheimers A Strategic Misstep: The Maritime Strategy and Deterrence in Europe.


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The thesis will thus follow the standard structure of any other evaluation study. At the

beginning, the contemporary status of Iranian nuclear program will be described. Then, the

dissuasion strategy will be conceptualized. After conceptualizing the framework of dissuasion

strategy, this framework is going to be applied on the EUs foreign policy efforts aimed towardsIranian nuclear program. Then, The Predictioneers Game will be introduced and the simulation

itself will be realized. After the results of simulation are described, these are interpreted and at

the end of the thesis, the dissuasion efforts of the EU can be evaluated using the prediction

results. The prediction results will always be used as illustrative, not binding.

Stephen Walt in his critique of using the formal models in strategic studies shows many

weak points of these models and claims that they are practically useless for broadening or

creating theories. On the other hand, he admits, that using formal models can be very effective

for improving the accuracy of existing theories and for testing their deductive logics (Walt

2000: 42). Using the formal models for supporting detailed parts of arguments based on game

theory is their strongest point even according to de Mesquita (de Mesquita, Morrow 2000: 61).

Lisa Martin adds, that one of the strong characteristics of formal models is their ability to create

a coherent set of alternatives and insights (Martin 2000: 63). As The Predictioneers Game is

one of the most advanced formal models available, this thesis will use it strictly with the

compliance to de Mesquitas and Walts arguments about formal models limits.

There are two important points to be made in order to make the thesis as transparent as

possible. Firstly, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita himself did very similar simulation in 2009 during

his TED lecture 2. He predicted Iranian nuclear development in 2 years horizon, thus findings

of his simulation can be evaluated retrospectively. All the important points that he predicted

were fulfilled with chilling accuracy.

The second important point for thesis transparency is that several parts of the thesis,

particularly the conceptualization of dissuasion strategy and contemporary development of

Iranian nuclear program, were used in an analytic paper made by the author during his stay inthe European Parliament in late 2012. The paper he wrote there was used as analytic material

for delegation of European parliament to Iranian parliament and for subsequent analysis of

European foreign policy targeted on Iranian nuclear program. The simulation, interpretation

and evaluation used in this thesis are purely original and have never been performed before.

2 Available here: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ts5MKtXNpMQ
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ts5MKtXNpMQhttp://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ts5MKtXNpMQhttp://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ts5MKtXNpMQhttp://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ts5MKtXNpMQ


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2. Summary of Iranian nuclear program development

It is no surprise that the Iranian nuclear program reaches deep into the history and exceeds

all the state forms that Iran experienced in the period from 1957 till today. Iran's nuclear program has formally started on 5th M arch 1957, when under the supervision of Eisenhowers program "Atoms for peace" agreement on cooperation in research and the peaceful use of

nuclear energy was signed between the United States and Iran 3. The USA wanted to ensure

investment opportunities in Iran's civilian sector, in particular in the field of health care and the

use of radioactive substances in the health sector (Greg 2010: online text).

Iran began quickly finding the application for these modern technologies and has already

built Tehran Research Centre in 1967, which was a 5 MW research reactor fueled by highly-enriched uranium, while the reactor itself was brought from the USA. A year later, Iran joined

the NPT and is still its signatory today (ibid). The last decade of Shahs government was marked by the grandiose plans, including plans for Iran to build up 23 nuclear power stations till year

2000 (Squassoni 2006: crs-1), while these grandiose intentions were not perceived to be

negative, because Iran's did not attempt to enrich its own uranium and was willing to buy the

fuel for those reactors from the USA (ibid.).

Islamic revolution brought changes probably to all the possible aspects of Iranian life, the

nuclear program not being neglected. The change of regime and mood in Iran meant rapid

restriction of foreign cooperation on its nuclear program, which is even today being interpreted

by Iranian elites as an impulse not to be dependent on the foreign imports and to try build-up

own sources of nuclear fuel. As a consequence of several other circumstances namelyKhomeinis disapproval for nuclear energy, exodus of nuclear physicists and destruction ofIraqi nuclear facility by Israel in 1981 4, the Iranian nuclear program was put to the backyard of

Iranian domestic policy.

Iran resumes its nuclear program evidently when ayatollah Khamenei came to power, who

was openly supporting the resurrection of Iranian nuclear research. The decision to resume the

program was probably fueled by the fact, that Iraq continued in its nuclear program although

its facilities were destroyed in the previous attack. This decision was probably strengthened by

the raising US presence in the region. Since the mid 90ties Iran actively cooperates with Russia

3 It is an interesting fact that not only Iran is an example of an actor that had initially been supported by the UnitedStates, and then was securitized later on as a threat. From a theoretical point of view, in particular, from the

standpoint of neoliberal approaches in international relations, it can be a remarkable challenge for theoretical gripand interpretation.4 Thus destroying the direct threat for Iran.


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and builds its own nuclear power plant in Busher, while the fuel to the power plant was supplied

by Russia. Iran built a huge network of uranium ore mines, enriching centers and research

reactors. At the beginning of the new millennium, worries of the USA, the EU and later even

Russia begun to rise, as Iranian real activities were in the sharp contrast with its proclamations

(ibid). David Albright, president of Institute for Science and International Security, assumes,

that Iran produces approximately 2, 77 kg low-enriched uranium per day, which means, that

approximately 25 kg highly-enriched uranium, which is amount needed to produce a bomb, is

able to produce in time of several months. The production of centrifuges near Qom is one of

the newer unclear Iranian activities, as this facility is not able to produce enough commercially

useful fuel, but it is able to produce amount of fuel necessary for one to two bombs per year

(ibid).

After the unsuccessful negotiations in Almaty between Iran and P5+1 powers at the

beginning of April 2013 (Pawlak, Torbati 2013a: on-line text), Iran announced opening of two

new uranium facilities. Low-grade uranium ore will be extracted at the Saghand mines and

turned into purer uranium, known as yellowcake, at nearby Ardakan. According to Iranian state

television, the Saghand uranium mine and Ardakan facility are the largest in the country and

will be able to produce 60 tones of yellowcake a year. (Iran unveils uranium activities at

Saghand and Ardakan 2013: on-line text, compare Torbati, Dahl 2013: on-line text).

2.1. Suspicions from military orientation of Iranian nuclear program

Today, it is not clear, whether there was any decision made in Iran, as far as the construction

of nuclear weapon is concerned (Bowen, Brewer 2011: 923, compare Radzinsky, Perkovich

2010, Hendel 2012). Activities of Islamic republic as well as the way, in which Iran informs

the international community about its actions; imply that Iran probably tries to reach the nuclearhedging capability 5, if that was considered being necessary 6.

5 Trying to obtain nuclear hedging capability means to follow the strategy of having (or at least pretending to have)real possibility of quick acquisition of nuclear weapon. This capability is based on having enough technology to

produce the weapon in matter of weeks. (Bowen, Brewer 2011: 924).6 When using the theory of deterrence, it is plausible to think, that actually by obtaining the nuclear hedgingcapability, Iran would follow the logic of virtual deterrence. Virtual deterrence as a concept was developed in 1984

by Jonathan Schell. This concept of deterrence is necessary to analyze in the context of those who try to reach thenuclear disarmament. Schell claimed that superpowers can easily reach the total zero of their nuclear arsenalsand the mechanism of deterrence can easily continue on because the nuclear weapons can not be uninvented. The ability of the state to build a nuclear weapon in a short time is enough for credibility of deterrence (Baylis2000: 81). It is plausible to think, that Iran by reaching the nuclear hedging capability would follow the logic ofvirtual deterrence.


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The fact, that Iran is trying to reach the nuclear hedging capability, is deductible from three

basic facts. Firstly, Iran tried to profit as much as it was possible from its status of non-nuclear

weapon state of NPT, which allowed it to acquire nuclear fuel from other states, as until 2002

there were no significant doubts about Iranian intentions to built stable network of nuclear

power plants, that would lower its dependency on the energy from the oil and raise the overall

input of energy, that the growing country needs. Secondly, Iran has a repeated tendency to cover

its nuclear activities and facilities before the eyes of IAEA and when those are revealed, it has

tendency to cooperate unsatisfactorily with the agency. Thirdly, simultaneously with the

nuclear program is the missile program developed and in both programs high Iranian military

officials have a decisive word (Bowen, Brewer 2011: 924).

Although, there is no proof, that Iran has made a decision to turn its nuclear program in the

military direction, Iran has several reasons for doing so. The Ayatollah regime is facing external

pressures since its installation to power either it is a threat of intervention from Husseins Iraq, or from the USA that intervened in Afghanistan and later on in Iraq. There is a reasonable

worry on the Iranian side that the USA and western world actually want to uninstall the

contemporary regime. From that point of view Iran chooses the deterrence logic to deter the

possible external intervention by having its own nuclear weapons (ibid: 925). Taming

successfully the complicated technological process of making a functional nuclear weapon has

an unneglectible political potential successes on the field of technology and science are always positively welcome by the general public and it can serve as a popularity booster for ayatollahs regime in Iran. Notwithstanding the fact, that there is also a religious dimension theneighboring Sunni Pakistan actually tamed this process, whilst the Shia Iran has not yet done

so (ibid).

2.1.1. Military and technological dimension of contemporary Iranian nuclear program

Iranian advances in the field of uranium enrichment surely bypass the Iranian proclamation

to use its uranium for peaceful purposes (Radzinsky, Perkovich 2010: 14). The only functional

nuclear power plant in Iran the Busher plant is using the fuel supplied from Russia (Bowen,Brewer 2011: 926), while the Darkhovin power plant is not even being built, so there is no

reason to enrich uranium in such high amounts as is being done in Iran. In 2009, Iran announced

to IAEA its intention to build uranium enrichment facility in Fordow. This facility shall have

the capacity of 3000 centrifuges in 16 cascades, so it will be able to produce 5% isotope ofuranium 235, whilst in Natanz enrichment facility Iranian scientists were able to work out 20%


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isotope of uranium 235 7 (ibid). If Iran wanted to enrich uranium as a fuel for nuclear power

plant, it would need much bigger capacities, than those in Fordow, Natanz and Qom. Those

capacities available 8 are however enough to produce sufficient amount of highly enriched

uranium for constructing one or two nuclear bombs per year (ibid).

Since august 2007 the IAEA regularly reports about possible military dimension of Iranian

nuclear program in several basic areas. It is not only the specific way of uranium enrichment,

that raises doubts, it is also the work of Iranian nuclear physicists on conversion of uranium

hexafluoride UF 69 to metallic uranium and its further manufacture to the semispherical shape

that is a process necessary to construct the bomb 10 . Blueprints that describe the precise process

of such a conversion, are originating in Pakistan, while Iran claims that these blueprints were

delivered together with the blueprints for centrifuge construction and it did not ask for such

information (ibid: 930).

IAEA brought information that Iran is working on such a type of detonation systems, which

are suitable for creation of special vectored explosion that would force an object of

a semispherical shape in a certain direction. Iran presents those researches as works on

conventional military explosives. There are several hints available, that Iran is working on re-

entry vehicles in its missile research that could be put on the existing Shahab-3 missiles.

However, to prove the intention of re-entry vehicle construction is very problematic (ibid).

Today, Iran has a capacity for production such an amount of low enriched uranium, which

would by sufficient for two nuclear bombs construction when enriched to 90% levels of

enrichment. Capacities to enrich uranium in Iran are continuously built up and the way in which

Iran informs about its activities only confirm ambiguity of its intentions. The fact, that Iran is

7 When the uranium is enriched to the levels of 20%, it is considered as highly enriched uranium, which is acategory of uranium that is suitable for nuclear weapon production as reaching the 90% level of enrichment isincomparable easier from the 20% level, than reaching 20% level of enrichment from the natural state of 0.7%yellowcake.8 The nuclear power plants are burning the low enriched isotope of uranium 235, while construction of nuclearweapon requires the highly enriched isotope of U235. The difference is in the amount there is not much amount

of uranium needed for nuclear weapon construction, while the nuclear power plants demand waste amount of lowenriched uranium. Thats why relatively low number ofcentrifuges is needed for acquiring low amounts of highlyenriched uranium it only takes longer time.9 Uranium hexafluoride is in the form of gray crystals, when in the room temperature and standard pressure, itshighly toxic and aggressively reacting with water (thus with water vapor present in the air) and highly corrosivefor the majority of metals. For any practical use, it is necessary to convert it to metal.10 To successfully initiate the chain reaction in the nuclear bomb, it is necessary to reach the critical mass ofuranium in certain area. The critical mass does not depend on the amount of uranium atoms, but on their idealarrangement, so the probabi lity that the released neutrons emitted from the uranium nuclei would hit anotheruranium nuclei and start the uncontrolled chain reaction leading to nuclear explosion, is maximized. The idealshape of the uranium material, which is needed for achieving the critical mass, is a sphere. Technology of the

simplest nuclear weapon is as follows two semi spheres, that are by simple detonation smashed together, createa critical mass of uranium in which the chain reaction is initiated by small amount of beryllium (Physics 10-Lecture07: Nukes 2006: on-line video)


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working on supplementary researches necessary for nuclear weapon construction only proves,

that Iran is minimally trying to achieve the nuclear hedging capability.

2.2. Potentially nuclear Iran as a threat and contemporary ways of facing it

As was indicated above, there is a consensus in academic literature, that nobody can for sure

label Iranian nuclear program as a peaceful or military. This chapter brings a summary of

literature contemplating ways how to treat the potentially nuclear Iran, how to prevent it from

obtaining the nuclear weapon or how to potentially deter it in case it obtained the weapon.

Firstly, literature is consistent on the argument, that in time Iran acquires nuclear weapon,

the unstable bipolar confrontation would commence in the Middle East. This argument is broadly contemplated in Erich Edelmans paper The dangers of Nuclear Iran(Edelman et al2011). Considering the fact, that Israels nuclear arsenal11 is and for long time still would bequantitavely and qualitatively superior to any of possible Iranians arsenal, Teheran for long

time being will be unable to reach strategic parity and will constantly be exposed to the threat

of preemptive strike of Israel on Iran. During any crisis the Iranian leaders would have to face

the cla ssical dilemma use them or lose them and would possibly try to get out of this dilemma

by first strike (Edelman et al 2011: on-line text). The willingness of Israel to commence thefirst strike has roots in the fact that Israel is very small in total land area and minimum nuclear

explosions on its soil would mean unrepairable destruction and loss for the state. For Israel it is

more reasonable to commence the first disarming strike and then face the possible conventional

response by advanced antimissile defense, rather than risk failure of this defense and be attacked

in the Iranians first nuclear strike. Last, but not least, preemptive strikes are genetically

incorporated to Israeli strategic culture (ibid).

Acquisition of nuclear weapon on the Iranian side would probably start massive wave ofhorizontal proliferation of WMDs in the Middle East (Congressional Commission on the

Strategic Posture of the United States 2009: on-line text, compare Edelman et al 2011: on-line

text, Hendel 2012: on-line text). Its improbable that the process of WMD proliferation would be anyhow rapid in this region, as acquisition of nuclear weapon is a process very demanding

on advanced technologies and finances. Edelman supposes that the most probable candidate for

nuclear weapon acquisition is Saudi Arabia, which on one hand has enough resources and on

11 Estimates say that Israel possesses between 100 to 150 nuclear weapons, several of them being thermonuclear.


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the other hand would gain considerable external support with her nuclear program. Iran and

Saudi Arabia are for long geopolitical and ideological rivals and Saudi Arabia would face an

internal pressure to answer to the potential Iranian nuclear capacity. This internal pressure

would originate in S audis security worries and Saudis attempt to hold on their position ofArabic world leader, to which they promote themselves (Edelman et al 2011: on-line text).

On one hand the threat of potentially nuclear Iran is in the systemic level by creating theinstable bipolarity and legitimizing further massive proliferation, on the other hand potentially

nuclear Iran is perceived as a specific threat for Israel. Majority of contemporary Israeli leaders

is convinced that Israel can not afford the risk of coexistence alongside the nuclear Iran, leaders

of which continually declare their wish for erasing Israel from the world map (Hendel 2012:

on-line text).

There are two main argumentative lines in the literature, considering the policy proposals

that would effectively treat the potential threat in form of nuclear Iran. The first line originates

in the Israeli strategic culture of preemptive strikes and in the belief, that the problem shall be

eliminated at the beginning. Matthew Kroenig argues, that diplomatic negotiations and

sanctions have absolutely the opposite effect that is their intention they affirm Iranian regimein its quest to acquire a nuclear weapon. He points on the risks of deterrence of potentially

nuclear Iran as the deterrence would be extremely expensive and not effective as Iran is highly

unpredictable in its doings. He argues, that effective deterrence of Iran 12 would require intensive

investments to conventional and nuclear presence of the USA in the region for long decades on.

Kroenig doubts the willingness of the USA to afford such investments in their contemporary

fiscal situation (Kroenig 2012: on-line tex t). Thats why Kroenig, after weighting all thearguments, proposes the preemptive strike on nuclear facilities in Iran as a solution (ibid).

Colin Kahl, however, makes a different stance in an article, that was published in Foreign

Affairs as a react ion on Kroenigs text. Despite the fact that Kahlcriticizes Kroenig for

incoherencies in argumentation as well as in the aims of proposed preemptive strike, he also points out on the consequences of potential preemptive strike on the stability of today very

unstable region. Not only the risk of new escalation in Afghanistan and Iraq is on the table,Kahl points out on the possibility of peaks in oil prices, that would happen in case of conflict

between the USA and Iran (Kahl 2012: on-line text). Kahl refutes Koenigs argument ofexpensive deterrence by claim, that actually the USA are present in the area in a sufficient

12 However, Kroening does not specify whether nuclear or non nuclear Iran is to be deterred.


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manner even today and till the oil flows from the region to the USA there is no need to be

worried about their future military presence there (ibid).

Those two articles present two extreme positions, that are being in academic as well as in

medial area 13 presented. There are much less articles and opinions, that try to point out that the

Iranian nuclear program is actually peaceful. Some articles point out on the dangers of useless

securitization of the problem (Berzegar 2010). Discursively, the arguments preferring

preemptive strike or diplomatic solutions, are most commonly articulated.

One of the newest and probably most interesting additions to the discourse is the analytic

paper of The Iran Project group, which works in cooperation with the Wilson Center think-tank. It is a strict neorealist analysis of possible gains and losses in case of preemptive attack

on Iran. As possible gains the authors consider damaging or destroying the main Iranian

enriching facilities, partial damaging of Iranian military capabilities, strengthening the

credibility of US threats and huge deterrence for any future proliferation anywhere else in the

world. As possible losses the authors consider the retaliation of Iran either symmetric orasymmetric on several actors, potential dissolution of hardly built worldwide consensus oncondemnation of Iranian nuclear program, rising the probability that Iran will at the end become

the nuclear state, global political and economic instability leading to problems in oil supply,

further damages to Israeli and US reputation and strengthening the credibility of anti-American

terrorist movement. Overall, the paper concludes, that potential gains from the preemptive

attack are not worth the potential losses caused by this attack (Weighing Benefits and Costs of

Military Action against Iran 2012: 11).

Since 2002, Islamic republic of Iran continually builds up its nuclear program with

proclaimed peaceful usage. The international community as well as IAEA, however, bring

evidence proposing, that Iran is building capacities for nuclear bomb construction and further

nuclear weapon construction. Iran, by its ambiguity in cooperation with IAEA and together

with its highly hostile stance towards Israel and the USA, rises suspicions that not only it wantsto use nuclear power as an energy source, but it also wants to have capacities to build a nuclear

weapon. Considering the situation, the policy proposals differ variously, the majority of them

being either a preemptive strike or using several dissuasion methods. The military alternative,

however, is confronted with high level of condemnation in the academic as well as medial

arena.

13 For more info refer to Vick 2012, Zakaria 2009, Zakaria 2012 those articles are only illustrative. As this topicis highly medially interesting, nearly all important media cover this topic on the daily basis and bring tons ofcomments and analysis in this field.


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3. Dissuasion strategy

3.1. Deterrence strategy the essence of any strategic thinking

Strategic studies were constituted during the cold war in an effort to provide analytical

capacity to the governments, which was needed for survival in the new nuclear age. Strategic

studies attempted to scientifically grasp the art of strategy, which has its roots in the works of

Chinese military thinker Sun-Tsu. Strategies, as opposed to the tactics, are not intended to

achieve a specific objective, but they help determine the objectives of specific actors that may

help them to impose their interest. Some authors even simplify the relationship between strategy

and tactics by comparing it to the relationship between the methodology and method; or by

claiming that the strategy is a set of individual tactics in order to achieve the objective laid down

by a specific policy.

The study of strategy was institutionalized after the World War II, until then the strategy

was considered to be an art and was exclusively the prerogative of the military officials. Carl

von Clausewitz can be considered as a traditional strategist of modern times, who, as one of the

first thinkers, began reflecting the relationship between politics and war as an instrument of

those politics. It was the end of World War II in the form of two nuclear explosions over

Hiroshima and Nagasaki that effectively meant "re-organizing" all knowledge about the

strategy and unify all existing strategies in one main strategy a strategy of deterrence. As waswritten by Bernard Brodie, in the first great work dedicated to nuclear arms, before the nuclear

weapon saw the light of the world, task for strategists was to win the potential war. As soon as

nuclear weapons came on the scene, the main task for strategists was to prevent the potential

war (Brodie 1946: 69).

At this point, the strategy was inspired by the tactics. The concept of deterrence ishistorically one of the most commonly used in the context of military art and, finally, is also

present in nature itself. Many mimicry in nature do not tend solely to protect (e.g. by making

invisible) a creature, but also possibly to induce the impression that the creature has such

offensive capacity 14 , which would create impression that any attack would inflict such high

losses that the attack itself appears to be disadvantageous. The traditional example in modern,

pre-nuclear era, is the role of British Navy in deterring potential invasion on the islands. During

14 Traditionally these offensive-like capacities include mimicry imitating poisonous animals.


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The Second World War the German commanders realized that to successfully invade the British

Isles, it is necessary to eliminate the power of the British Navy, which would have been only

possible by achieving air dominance above the islands. Therefore, the Germans were forced to

carve out air supremacy first and fought the legendary Battle of Britain. This example shows,

that actually the deterring potential was in the hands of British Navy.

The example above, however, shows that the deterrence as a tactical concept has never been

flawless and it was not possible to fully rely on the fact that the adversary will ultimately be

deterred from his intentions. Nuclear weapons, however, bring a huge change in terms of

concept and tactics of deterrence got promoted to a single strategic objective conflict prevention.

Since 1946, when it was significantly conceptualized, the deterrence strategy underwent

several changes. These changes were mainly of doctrinal character, however the principle

remained always the same (Khudhurov 2011, Morgan2003: 9, Payne, Walton 2002: 167). Thestrategy of deterrence is working with the simple logic of the relative gains and losses from any

activities of the adversary. If the losses of attacker excess his expected gains, such an attacker

looses the reason of aggressive action itself he is effectively deterred. The general deterrencethus works as a prevention from conflict escalation as is defined by Zartmann (Zartmann, Faure

2005: 3-5).

The key to functioning deterrence strategy lies however in the actor credibility credibilityof the fact that the particular actor will use his deterrent when the situation occurs. In other

words for deterrence to work it was necessary that the USSR believed the US threat of potential attack against the USSR in moment when USSR commenced attack on the US. For

creation of credibility of the deterrence several doctrines of deterrence were stipulated.

The first important nuclear deterrence doctrine was the doctrine of massive response by

Eisenhowers administrative. The massive response meant, that the USA declared their

willingness to realize nuclear attack against aggressor in non-defined manner and non-definedtime frame. The massive response doctrine considered the all-out nuclear attack on the Soviet

Union or China in moment, when there is an aggression in Western Europe. However, the

possibility of nuclear response of such a weight was not doctrinally restricted for this

occasion 15. USA do not specify the circumstances, under which they would be willing to

undergo massive response (Payne-Walton 2002: 167).

15 It is questionable, how much this doctrine was perceived as credible from the USSR or China. During the Koreanwas, the USA declared willingness to use nuclear weapons as a defense for South Korea, however they did not usethem in moment, when China went to war and caused considerable losses for the UN forces. The threat of nuclear


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The massive response as a concept looses its meaning in moment, when an aggressor is able

to realize successful first disarming or decapitating attack and thus neutralize capabilities of

defender to realize retaliatory nuclear attack. The strategic parity between USSR and the USA

forced the USA to change its nuclear doctrine to the doctrine of flexible response . This doctrine

created a possibility to use nuclear weapons in Western Europe and did not create a commitment

to use nuclear weapons against the soviet territory if that was not necessary. This doctrine

created a possibility of war-time deterrence (ibid).

The nuclear parity between the USA and the USSR and a slight numerous advantage of the

USSR over the USA created a period of general strategic stability, which is also known as a

reign of doctrine of mutually assured destruction. In this period, the efforts to slow down or

restrict the nuclear arming arose 16 . One of the pioneers of significant disarmament efforts is the

NPT 17 treaty. Metaphorically speaking, the NPT opened doors for future SALT I and SALT

II18 and later on for advanced nuclear disarmament treaties, START I and START II 19 .

One of the most important redefinitions of American approach to deterrence was the

introduction of Reagans Strategic Defense Initiative. Its aim was to create a new anti-ballisticmissile system, which would through the defensive means protect the US territory (Khudhurov2011: 17). President Reagan thought about an alternative, that the SDI would be offered to

Soviets and the logics of mutually assured destruction would forever be buried in the history

(Such 2004: 101).Existence of nuclear weapons has a serious impact on deterrence theory. Strategic

implications of deterrence theory are as follows: the military strategy became a diplomacy of

attack seemed to be effective during the armistice talks (Payne Walton 2002: 166). From this point of view, thedoctrine of massive response probably wanted to raise the credibility of US nuclear deterrent, however the USunwillingness to realize restricted nuclear attack when China went to war can be interpreted as failure ofdeterrence, which could later on undermine the credibility of the US deterrent.16 The issue of nuclear disarmament is one of the greatest issues connected with the deterrence theory, however as

this issue is not much relevant to the issue of Iranian nuclear program, there is not much space dedicated to it inthis thesis. It is advisable to follow a publication by Petr Such and Petra Kuchykov Vvoj a vsledky proceskontroly zbrojen a odzbrojovn: marnost nad marnost? (Such, Kuchykov 2005).17 The Treaty of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The aim of the treaty, that has unrestricted validitysince 1995, is to freeze to contemporary status of nuclear weapons and technology proliferation. The aim of theTreaty is also the future nuclear disarmament and reaching a treaty about total nuclear disarmament under strictand effective international control. The treaty identifies the IAEA as a control institution. Iran is one of thesignatories of NPT (Zvick 2005: 132-142).18 Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. This is an overall term used for several treaties signed between the USA andthe USSR that practically prohibited placement of national anti-missile defences, the quantitative and qualitativerestriction of anti-ballistic missile systems. SALT II was the first nuclear arms treaty which assumed realreductions in strategic forces to 2 400 of all categories of delivery vehicles on both sides (Vilmek 2005: 17-19).19 Strategic arms reduction treaties the first international treaties that reached an effective reduction andelimination of nuclear arsenal, even in restricted amount. The START I negotiations were very important in timesof Soviet Union dissolution and settled the issues of returning nuclear weapons placed in former Soviet republics back to Russia (Kuchykov 2005: 49-51).


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violence (Schelling 1967: 1-34), engulfing the military, political, diplomatic, economic,

psychological, ideological and cultural dimensions (Stojar 2008: 71). Deterrence is not only a

matter of military might, but is present in all dimensions of foreign and defense policies.

It is the different doctrinal setting for use of nuclear weapons that should guarantee that the

deterrence strategy could enjoy high level of credibility. The end of the Cold war, however,

significantly eroded the credibility of the deterrent of several actors. Some, like the United

Kingdom, were quite aware of the loss of credibility of their nuclear threat and quickly

unilaterally acceded to a minimal deterrence state 20 . The loss of credibility of the traditional,

Cold-war, strategic deterrent was caused by increasingly more frequent articulation of so-called

nuclear taboo . The nuclear taboo, in a very simplified form, points to the fact that, if necessary,

none of the actors in real life is able to fulfill the obligations arising from the nuclear doctrines.

Put in other words no rational actor is able to run into a nuclear apocalypse. If nuclear tabooreally works, the nuclear deterrent has zero credibility and deterrence strategy fails and ceases

to be valid. The end of the cold war and the beginning of the 21st century has brought many

changes in the field of strategic thinking.

The emergence of new threats, a significant change in the international environment, the

assymetrisation of conflict, change from bipolar to unipolar/multipolar 21 world and many other

factors probably forever condemn the strategy of deterrence to the second-class strategy. It may

really seem, that the deterrence strategy has devalued, however when approached deeply, the

principle of deterrence is still essential for any strategic thought. However, it is not the strategy,

through which it is possible to achieve foreign policy objectives effect ively.

The contemporary international and security environment requires different approaches.

Tools of the soft power( Nye 2002, 2004, 2011) got to the arsenal of analysts and top politicians, which significantly has begun to change objectives, which were to be achieved.

Changing objectives means changing the strategy of achieving them. The 21st Century thus

means the emergence of dissuasion strategy.

20 Today, Britain owns approximately 180 nuclear weapons carried by nuclear submarines. SLBMs form the only part of Britains nuclear deterrent.21 Contemporary character of the international system is a topic of long and probably inconclusive discussionsabout its polarity setting. Several academics claim that actually the system is unipolar/hegemonic, lead by the

USA, while others claim that the system is actually multipolar, being ruled by several powers that maintain the balance of power in the system. The author of this paper does not want to make any authoritative conclusions inthat matter.


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3.1.1. When does deterrence fail?

The deterrence is mainly a psychological process, it is not a consequence of some particular

strategic equilibrium. In several conditions, any balance of military strength can not ensure, that

one of the actors would decide to attack. According to Payne and Walton, the success of

deterrence is dependent on character of the deterred actor (Payne, Walton 2002: 171). Several

authors however stress out the main factor for deterrence rationality of deterred actor (Lebow,Stein 1989, compare Harvey 1995, Payne, Walton 2002).

Bradley Thayer brings a unique view of rationality through evolutionary approach to

research in strategy and international relations. The basic Thayers argument is, that anybody even those in charge, do not have the so-called Cartesian brain. Cognitive abilities ofhuman brain are impressive as well as limited. The rationality of political leaders, mainly in

totalitarian or authoritative regimes, is different than the rationality of political leaders in more

or less democratic countries. Authoritative leaders have, from evolutionary point of view,

significantly lower level of empathy than the rest of society which they are leading and thatswhy they are prone more to make decisions for sacrificing their own people for higher good

(Thayer 2007: 316-320) 22 .

There are several criteria, through we can assess the success or failure of deterrence. The

deterrence failed in moment, when the deterring had to use force. We can also talk about

deterrence failure in moment, when the deterring actor did not achieve his political aims. There

is a common consensus on fact, that the deterrence has failed when the war, which ought to be

deterred, begun. It is more difficult to assess the success of deterrence in case of general

deterrence, because absence of conflict does not mean success of deterrence (Khudhurov 2011:12). Lebow and Stein claim, that the deterrence is successful when an attacker, contemplating

usage of military strength, steps back from his intentions because of threats used by deterring

actor (Lebow, Stein 1989: 222). Generally speaking, it is difficult to assess success or failure

of deterrence. The reliability of deterrence is dependent on rationality of actors and on their

intentions, thats why the so-called tailored deterrence is becoming more and more important.(Payne, Walton 2002: 175-179).

22 However, this argument is not bullet-proof. Although authoritative leaders do not posses the so-called Cartesian brain, the low amount of empathy enables them to make cold-blooded calculations. Their desire to remain in powercan make them very sensitive to any kind of deterrence.


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3.2. Dissuasion strategy

During the cold war, the dissuasion strategy was promoted very carefully or not at all. This

concept is, on one hand, very young the official documents mention the dissuasion only afterthe terrorist attacks from Sept ember 2001 (Khudhurov 2011: 33). On the other hand, however,the concept of dissuasion is similarly old as the developed concepts of deterrence strategy. For

the first time the dissuasion was mentioned in the classical work of Glenn Snyder (Snyder

1960). On relatively short space he sums up the underlying logic of deterrence and introduces

significant argument for future evolution of dissuasion logic. Snyder argues that deterrence does

not solely depend on the threat and the capacity to punish a possible aggression. Deterrence can

be achieved through capacities, which will allow us to deny gains of our potential adversary.

Snyder is the first, whos talking aboutdeterrence by denial and deterrence by punishment (ibid: 163). It is noteworthy that in his further papers he does not work with this idea and,

metaphorically speaking, the idea of dissuasion is buried for another forty years.

During the cold war, the concepts of indirect use of force were the closest ideas to the

concept of dissuasion strategy. One of the pioneers of the concept of indirect use of force is

Thomas Schelling. He makes a distinction between the use of force and the potential that is

hidden in the actual possession of military capacities. A latent violence the ability to causeharm to an actor, can be used as an instrument of foreign policy, which Schelling labels as the

diplomacy of violence. Diplomacy of violence is not based on the actual use of force, even

though the military strength and the potential for causing harm in some way, is demonstrated

by a symbolic act of violence, while it evokes fears in the some another actor, that military force

could be used in its entirety against him himself. Diplomacy of violence in Schellings terms,is indeed rather supplementary to the goal of general deterrence deterrence by punishment(Schelling, 1967: 1-34).

A significant theoretician of indirect use of violence is Edward Luttwak. For the concept of

indirect use of violence he uses term armed suasion . Armed suasion are all responses, political

and tactical, induced by all parties (allies or neutral states, opponents) to the existence,

demonstration, handling or symbolic use of any instrument of military power, apart from

whether these responses reflect or do not reflect the intention of the Parties possessing this

power (Khudhurov 2011: 27). Armed suasion differs notably from the diplomacy of violencein relation to the actors. Armed suasion considers as a key the way, how the military force is

understood by the actor exposed to its influence. So, the armed suasion is close to the


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contemporary understanding of dissuasion strategy by its emphasis influencing the perception

of possible gains achieved by the actor, against whom is armed suasion applied.

A significant shift in the concept of indirect use of force is achieved in the work of Dietrich

Fischer "Dissuasion: toward an active peace policy". As the title suggests, the indirect use of

force dissuasion Fischer defines as persuasion of potential opponent without fetching thefear that peaceful relations are more acceptable for both sides, as is the war (ibid: 30). The

purpose is to convince the actor that the war is disadvantageous for him, and that can be

achieved in several ways. An actor's willingness to enter a war can be reduced by increasing

his losses or by a reduction in his gains. At the same time it is possible to increase the

attractiveness of peace by maintaining favorable trade relations, cooperating in the field of

research, cultural exchanges or assistance in case of natural disasters (ibid: 31). Fischer focuses

on maintaining the attractiveness of the peace argument more than on the argument of reducing

potential gains from a possible enemy attacks and so actually the strategy of dissuasion by

Fischer is a peace strategy.

As has already been indicated above, the proper dissuasion strategy was properly

conceptualized in the last decade. In their paper Dissuasion Strategy, Andrew Krepinevich and

Robert Martinage, fruitfully sum up the contemporary consensual definition of dissuasion

strategy as well as the tools that are used by this strategy. They define the dissuasion as actions

taken to increase the targets perception of anticipated costs and/or decrease its perception of

the likely benefits from developing, expanding, or transferring a military capability that would

be threatening or otherwise undesirable from the perspective of dissuading actor. (Krepinevich,

Martinage 2008: vii). An alternative definition of the present strategy of dissuasion can be

definition brought by Castillo, which defines dissuasion as discouragement of state from

competition between each other, because it is too expensive or completely unfavorable.

(Castillo 2007: 174).

An essential tool for dissuasion strategy, as is apparent from definitions mentioned above,is the increasing perception of costs of taking the intended action by dissuaded actor. This

increase in costs may be in the economic, diplomatic and political area. The most effective tool

in economic area of dissuasion are costs associated with efforts to catch up with the

technological superiority of the dissuading actor. There are three possible ways of raising the

costs in the diplomatic area States may be forced to commit publicly to various types of formalinspections of arms and nonproliferation commitments. The second area of increasing

diplomatic costs may be official contemplation about placing different kinds of weapon systemsin order to protect against a dissuaded actor and the third area is the "labelling" of the actor as


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"rogue", which can significantly reduce the prestige of the dissuaded actor. Increasing military

expenses on the side of dissuaded actor can be achieved by demonstrating willingness to take

pre-emptive strikes 23 (Krepinevich, Martinage 2008: ix).

In addition to an increase in costs, which would dissuaded actor had to bear, mineralization

of expected profits of the dissuaded actor is part of the strategy as well. This objective can be

achieved by persuading the target actor about the fact that the eventual use of the obtained

capacity has no chance of success. The aim is thus to arouse doubts about the importance of

eventual development of capacities, as their future use will not have the desired effect. A second

possibility, how to minimize the expected profits on the side of dissuaded actor is to change the

nature of the match between actors actor fundamentally either by developing revolutionarynew capacities or operating procedures, or both.

As well as in the case of deterrence strategy, dissuasion strategy does not always work.

Authors propose several possible procedures, how to increase the chance of success of

dissuasion strategies. One of the biggest risks facing the deterrence strategy is reliance on

rationality of deterred actor and the application of those procedures, which would certainly be

effective when applied to us, as they are equally rational, as we are. The risk, inherently present in such a logic, is dissuasion strategy trying to overcome by focusing on the perception

of gains and losses on the side of dissuaded actor. Using his perception of gains and losses, it

is possible to tailor the extent of dissuasion strategy. (ibid: xi).

One of the options to increase the chances of success is to consider whether to implement

this strategy overtly or hideously. Under certain circumstances open discouragement can turn

against discouraging, authors use unsuccessful US effort to dissuade EU from installing the

Galileo system as an example. As soon as the US would dissuade openly, it would convince

EU further in successfully finishing the program. (ibid: 55).

The imaginary cherry on the cake of an eventual success of dissuasion would be the

prevention of overspill of capacities from the dissuaded project to another one, which wouldeventually threaten the dissuading actor again. (ibid: xii). The strategy also puts great demands

on the efficiency and reliability of intelligence services, as it relies on knowledge of the

capacities and perceptions of the opponent.

23 A very interesting note is made by authors in the context of raising the perceived costs in the military area theyclaim, that potential preemptive strike against some actor can serve as an dissuading step against other actors aswell (Krepinevich, Martinage 2008: ix).


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4. Dissuasion strategy of EU towards Iran

The aim of this chapter is to categorize several foreign policy activities of EU in relation to

Iran, using the framework of dissuasion strategy, as is outlined in the chapter above. Thischapter will also try to analytically evaluate those foreign policy activities in the light of general

dissuasion of Iran.

At the time of significant ideological dispute between the USA and EU, Robert Kagan

(2003) wrote a short publication, in which he used the now classic paraphrase "the USA are

from Mars, while the EU is from Venus". In this metaphor he sums up the most important

foreign policy backgrounds for both huge actors. The US tend for solutions and responses to

foreign challenges from a position of strength and in their negotiations, they rely on an elementcalled "hard power", which is the ability to influence the outcome by means of its own military,

technological, economic, and diplomatic potential. On the contrary, in the case of foreign policy

challenges, the EU tends to react rather from a position of moderate, prudent player. The EU

relies on "soft power", on the ideological impact, the ability to lead by example and to strive to

solve problems by eliminating the root causes of problems rather than the elimination of their

consequences.

How does it work in the case of Iranian nuclear program? Is still a metaphor of EU

originating from Venus valid? In this case, the answer may not be clear at all. Why to compare

the attitude of the EU to Iran just with the attitude of the US? The reasons are several on theone hand there are reasons of a purely academic character, on the other hand there are reasons

rather obvious and objectively given. From an academic point of view, the most influential

actor, after the US, is actually the EU, although in the real world it doesn't seem so. Objective

reasons for comparison come from the fact that the EU is currently a partner with the US in the

issue of the Iranian nuclear program.

4.1. Problems of EUs diss uasion efforts

In the chapter dealing with the definition of the strategy of deterrence and dissuasion

strategies, emphasis has been put on the fact that the actors credibility is the key for success.In the case of the EU, credibility of its dissuasion efforts is being significantly undermined by

inconsistency of the foreign policies of member states of the EU. It is important to realize that,as many other important EU policies, policy against the Iranian nuclear program is shaped in


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the direction of "bottom-to-up". In 2003, the United Kingdom, France and Germany, jointly

with Iran, have agreed on issuing the so called Tehran Declaration24 content of which is notyet fulfilled and powers still try to fulfill at least some points of it. Tehran Decl arations agenda,however, was taken over by the EU as an institution. So the position of the EU against Iran has

not arisen at pan-European level, but originated as the implementation of the positions of three

member states. No wonder though, that there are still many member states, that have different

position against Iran on bilateral level and at the end they undermine credibility of EUsdissuasion efforts.

Another problematic point of EUs dissuading efforts is inconsistency.In paragraphs belowthis inconsistency will be subjected to rather academic analysis, at this point, however, it is

necessary to emphasize the perception on the part of actors in the negotiations themselves.

Threse Delpech, a participant in the French negotiating teams sumsup individual points thatmake the diplomatic efforts made by the EU against Iran complicated. The first point is,

according to her, lack of understanding of the way of thinking of people on the top positions in

Iran. The EU, according to her, does not understand that Iran plays a classic power game in

which repeating trials of negotiations, despite their uselessness, are considered a sign of

weakness. The second point is the ambiguity with respect to compliance with the terms of

individual agreements and, in particular, failure to comply with omissions in the deadlines. This

is related to the next point - crossing the red lines on the part of Iran, without EU somehow

reacting to it. The last point of the low credibility of dissuasion efforts of EU from the

perspective of Therese Delpech is also the absence of any plan in case if diplomatic efforts

really failed (Pellaud 2012: 42-43).

4.2. EU foreign policy and dissuasion strategy

As mentioned in the chapter above, dissuasion strategy relies on two basic procedures in an

effort to dissuade the target actor from doing the activity that the dissuading actor does not

want. First procedure is an attempt to raise the costs of undesired activity and the second is the

reduction of the expected gains from the realization of unwanted activity. If a parent wants to

effectively discourage his teen child from going on problematic disco, he forces his child to

24 Tehran Declaration, also known as the E3+ Iran agreement from 2003, is joint declaration of the United

Kingdom, France, Germany and Iran, concerning the future evolution of Iranian nuclear program. In thisdeclaration, Iran obliges to open all his nuclear facilities in exchange for elaborate cooperation with E3 on the

peaceful nuclear program.


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wash the dishes (increases the costs) and at the same time, conditions the participation of the

child in the disco by going with him (reduces expected profits). In this situation, the child would

probably goes nowhere. Similar logic applies in the context of the Iranian nuclear program the EU foreign policy steps should try, fully in accordance with the logic of dissuasion, to make

Iran's nuclear program as expensive as possible and at the same time try to limit the eventual

profits from Iran's acquisition of nuclear hedging capability or nuclear weapons minimal. The

following lines will be analyzing to what extent the EU follows this logic.

4.2.1. Raising Iranian costs

It is possible to increase the costs of dissuaded actor in three basic areas. The most intuitive

area is, of course, the economic area and then subsequently diplomatic and military areas of

raising costs. The EU is most active in the area of rising the economic costs of Iran. Due to the

fact that Iran is not a member of the WTO, the EUs external trade with Iran is realized through

the general import regime. This mode, however, is subject to the restrictions imposed with UN

Security Council sanctions 25 on Iran. Specific restrictions of EU towards Iran in the field of

foreign trade are regulated directly by the Council of the EU, specifically by decisions Nos

423/2007, 618/2007 and 1110/2008, which are in fact list of products export of which to Iran is

banned. These Council decisions are subsequently backed up by a decision of the European

Commission from imposing additional sanctions on Iran by 2010 (EU Sanctions regime: online

text)

Basically, the economic dimension of increasing costs in respect to the Iranian nuclear

program is realized by extensive sanctions policy of the EU. The EU is the most important actor

in the issue of trade sanctions against Iran, because the EU is the largest trading partner of the

Islamic Republic of Iran. The EU launched a regime of sanctions against Iran in 2010, reflecting

the US model penalties relating to, in particular, the ban on investment and assistance in Iran'senergy sector and at the same time prohibiting many European firms doing business with Iran.

It was in the 2010, that the list of sanctioned individuals, companies, banks and organizations,

accounts of which were frozen, was created (The lengthening list of Iran sanctions 2012: online

text). The highlight of the EU's sanction activities became a complete ban on import of

petroleum products from Iran, the validity of is dated to the summer of 2012.

25 Resolutions 1737, 1747, 1803, 1929


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Sanctions of the EU can be divided into two basic categories general sanctions andindividual sanctions. In both cases, it is possible to categorize those sanctions as targeted

sanctions. General sanctions are just sanctions aimed at the oil industry, and their logic is pretty

simple reduce the gains of Iran from its oil exports, which automatically and significantlyaffects its own nuclear program, as it is resource-intensive and must be funded from other

sources. This assumption led the US and the EU to the oil embargo. The problem, however, is

the fact that the Iranian export of oil products to the USA and to the EU is not significant. The

loss of profits from oil, therefore, are not so high as to cause a significant increase in the cost

of Iranians nuclear program (Singh 2012: online text).

Individual sanctions then include those sanctions that are targeted to individual persons,

organizations or companies. It is important to mention that Iranian Revolutionary Guards, their

commanders as well as several members of the clergy are on the lists as well. In addition to the

ban on travel to the EU, their accounts in the EU are frozen as well, which largely restrict their

freedom of action.

The real effect of the economic sanctions, however, is difficult to assess. Their basic purpose

to increase the cost of the nuclear program itself is difficult to prove. What is obvious judging from the inflation and the growing social tensions is the fact that Iran is losing liquidity

and it is difficult for Iran to purchase material for its own nuclear program, as it is lacking

enough foreign exchange as it is impossible to purchase in Iranian currency Rial (Torbati,

George 2012: online text). So far the effect of sanctions can be assessed as rather a complication

in meeting the objectives of the nuclear program, than any significant increase in the costs

associated with the program itself.

The second area of rising the costs of Iranian nuclear program, is the diplomatic area. In this

area is the EU active only indirectly and only through the policy of sanctions. The undisputable

part of the diplomatic dissuasion are the individual targeted sanctions towards the leading

figures of the regime. Assessing their effect is practically impossible, but it is reasonable toassume, that their effect is actually close to zero. Economic sanctions have their indirect

diplomatic effect rising social dissatisfaction raises the pressure on the regime leaders. Social pressure of the Iranian citizens can then by used from the EU perspective in a traditional

argument your people are getting tired by your nuclear program . However, it is plausible toassume, that Iranian leaders would not take this argument seriously.

The last area of rising the costs of Iranian nuclear program is the military area. In this area

the EU has actually no tools, how to effectively realize any dissuasion policy. Thats why themilitary dissuasion is orchestrated indirectly by trying to raise overall Iranians costs on its own


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military installations by imposing embargos on arms and dual-use materials (Council decision

2010/413/CFSP: on-line text). However, any links of arms embargo to the Iranian nuclear

program are problematic and the results do not seem to indicate, that there are any links at all.

4.2.2. Lowering the anticipated gains

This part of the dissuasion strategy of EU towards Iran should have been realized as a policyof carrots. Even today the EU stillfavors the so-called dual track policy towards Iran policyof negotiations and sanctions 26 , however as the time progresses, the EU is lowering its voice in

case of promises about help with Iranian civilian nuclear program. It was the policy of carrots,that was intended to show, that actually the peaceful civilian nuclear program would be more

advantageous for Iran, than the military one. Refraining from the emphasis of the possible

positive impact of EU on Iran thus means, that the EU does not develop its policy of lowering

the perception of gains from achieving nuclear hedging capability or even from constructing

the nuclear weapon.

The USA, unlike the EU, are doing some business in the area of the reduction of the expected

gains on Iranian side. They actively advocate installation of anti-missile systems in Saudi

Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, which would, together with the Israeli missile defenses

exponentially expand the anti-missile capacities in the region and effectively lowering any

chances of success of potential Iranian nuclear strike. If the probability of success of Iranian

nuclear attack was minimal to zero, Iran would think twice about whether it affords to possess

a nuclear weapon.

4.3. Is the EU, in case of dissuading Iran, from Venus?

The EU, together with the USA, are the most active actors, concerning the variety of

sanctions imposed against Iran for its nuclear program. The classic metaphor about the USA

being from Mars and the EU being from Venus thus does not seem to apply here, as both actors

stand behind their positions and use a wide variety of tools of forcing Iran to change its

behavior. However, it seems that the EU is not following the dissuasion logic thoroughly.

26 This policy is usually called as a policy of sticks and carrots, while carrots are the EUs efforts to restartnegotiations with Iranian nuclear program and also EUs promise to supply advanced civilian nuclear technologyto Iran in case, that Iran would agree on the terms about its nuclear program.


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The only foreign policy tool of the EU are the sanctions. Although those sanctions are really

very harsh, their impact does not indicate any shift in Iranian way of thinking. One of the

reasons can be actually in the fact, that the EU does not follow the logic of dissuasion strategy.

The EU yet again uses the element of soft power it relies on the indirect effect of sanctions.This indirect effect is mainly reduction of money flow to the nuclear program by cutting the

profits from oil exports that were lowered by the sanctions. Another effect is the production of

social pressure on the government, which is based on the unsatisfactory economic situation in

the country. The EU does not use the military tools of raising the costs and practically ignores

the second area of dissuasion strategy lowering the perceived gains. Thats why it seems onceagainst, that the EU is from Venus more, than from Mars.


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5. The Predictioneers Game a serious game

The core of this paper is represented by the simulation of development of Iranian nuclear

program that is realized using the software developed by Professor Bruce Bueno de Mesquita27

.De Mesquitas prediction software was developed since early 80ties, while it was really a verysimple program that worked with the weighted mean of the input data. Later on de Mesquita

added his own algorithms and created a very useful tool for serious prediction of events in

complicated social reality. As any other tool of social sciences research, even software The

Predictioneers Game is meaningful only in situations, when applied as a part of some

paradigmatic approach, which is introduced in the lines below.

5.1. The ideological world of those, who play games in social sciences

The game theory, which is widely used as a leading principle in The Predictioneers Game

software, has roots in one of the largest paradigmatic approaches in understanding of

international relations in the realism 28 . Those, who are using realistic premises in analyzingthe international system, they believe, that the international system is anarchic. Units of the

system (actors), namely the states fight for their own survival, using the balance of power.(Waltz 2001). Actors in the international system are egocentric they crave their own survivaland their own interests. If we accept those basic inputs for analysis of the international system,

such a system is easily predictable.

In his huge work dedicated to paradigmatic framing of his software, B.B.de Mesquita

uniquely adds his points to decades lasting (neo) realistic debate. He brings a unique opinion

on the proclaimed need of survival of an actor of international system as a need that forms basic

interests of this actor. Its perfect ly clear that states want to survive and thats why they alwaysact in a way that would ensure their survival. Logics, however, says that if states always behave

27 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita is a professor of political sciences and a managing director of Alexander HamiltonCenter for Political Economy at New York University. He is the author of simulation models that use the gametheory principles, which are used by the intelligence as well as by policymaking community in the USA. Hismodels are also used in the private sector when a complex negotiations are taking place. He is a member of theAmerican Academy of Arts and Sciences, the Council on Foreign Relations, a former Guggenheim Fellow, the2007 recipient of South Koreas DMZ Peace Prize, and the recipient of many other academic honors for histeaching and his research. He has written several important books, such as Principles of International Politics, The

Strategy of Campaigning, and The Logic of Political Survival. (Bruce Bueno de Mesquita: on-line text)28 To put it more precisely, game theory has roots in neorealism, however it is not the gist of this paper to elaboratein the international relations theories.


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in order to survive, they should be immortal, unless they are defeated in a death-to-death fight

with another state. History is, however, full of examples of the so-called state suicides (de

Mesquita 2002: 7), when states behaved totally opposing their need for survival. Where is the

problem then?

The problem does not lie in the concept of survival, but in the perception of who wants to

survive. Is it a state that tries to survive, or are the elites to blame? De Mesquita claims, that

actually the interest to survive is in the hands of the elites individuals, who lead the state.Thus, concept of elites survival is not only the concept about their existential survival, but

mainly about their survival in the function. The concept of survival as a main and basic

behavioral motivator of actors of international system is brought to individual level by de

Mesquita and interpreted as an motivation of individuals to act in the name of their own ego.

For The Predictioneers Game, however, the main ideological concept, is the

abovementioned game theory. The game theory examines the strategic interaction of individual

players, while the most important characteristics of those players is the fact, that all theirdecisions are based on weighting other players decisions. Strategic interaction can be

perfectly compared to the game of chess. A player, before moving his stone, takes into

consideration not only implication of the upcoming move, but also implication of all the

possible future moves of the opponent and after weighting of these the decision is finally made.

Research of the strategic interaction is thus important for study of international relations and

for making predictions (ibid: 10).

Probably the least scientific part of the ideological world of those, who test theeffectiveness of policies using the mathematic models, is the part about human nature . When

considering the strategic interactions, the individual actors (players) are considered to be

rational and egocentric (de Mesquita 2009: 13). The level of altruism in the society is so low,

that from the point of strategic interactions is actually irrelevant. Maybe there are some people,

who are capable of throwing themselves on a grenade, to save their mates, but they actuallydisqualify themselves from the game and they are no longer useful from the point of game

theory (ibid) 29. In the game theory, rationality is an ability to make decisions in order to reach

29 An interesting add-on to the debate about the human nature is done by the evolutionary approach in internationalrelations. Evolutionary approach supporters interpret the roots of several key phenomena in international relationsthrough the Darwinian evolution and genetics framework. From their point of view the ultimate goal of anindividual is to secure enough resources for survival and reproduction, thus survival of its own genome. There aretwo main schools that work with this premise the school of individual selection and the school of group selection.Individualists say, that every individual wants to acquire enough resources for own reproduction and thus is using

those tools that would suffice its demands. An actor is, according to individualists, trying to maximize its absolute fitness (physical ability to carry genome). The group selection supporters claim, that the genome survives evenwhen some individuals sacrifice themselves for the sake of the whole group genome is carried on a group basis,


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the wanted consequences. In other words rational decision is a decision that was made withsome intention. According to de Mesquita, irrational are only children younger than two and

schizophrenics. Children younger then two are unable to fully understand the consequences of

their doings and schizophrenics are doing things not from their own free will (de Mesquita

2009: 17-18). Any actor, that is able to make decision with some intentional consequence, is

rational actor.

The main ideological roots of B.B. de Mesquita in making his simulation software are in the

neorealist tradition of thinking about the international relations, which is enriched by his own

original argument, that actually the survival need must be analyzed on the individual level, as

individuals are those, who want to survive, not the states. Those individuals do the decisions,

those individuals have their egocentric interest on survival. Thats why it isimportant, whenmaking any prediction, to consider the reasons of each and every individual, who act rationally,

primarily caring about own profit. Thus, de Mesquita was unable to free himself from the

realistic and neoralistic school of international relations, while several aspects of actors in his

view can be best interpreted through the lenses of evolutionary approach. The own interest on

survival and rationality are two main concepts, that constitute the world of thought, in which

The Predictioneers Game was created.

5.2. Introduction of the software - the ru

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