koffi annan

The Impact of Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking on

Governance, Development & Security in West Africa

Expert Meeting

Summary of Proceedings

Dakar, Senegal, 18-20 April 2012

Table of Contents

The Impact of Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking on Governance, Development & Security in West Africa


Executive Summary 2

Background 2

Main Observations 3

Key Recommendations 5

I. Sustained Political Engagement 5 II. Policy Formulation 6 III. Knowledge 7 IV. Capacity 9

Additional Information 9

The Impact of Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking 10on Governance, Development & Security in West Africa

Tables 16

Table 1: Organized Crime, Drug Trafficking and Related Challenges in West Africa: A Decade of DevelopmentsTable 2: Ratification of and Accession to Relevant UN Conventions in West AfricaTable 3: Political System and Conditions in West AfricaTable 4: Socio-Economic Conditions in West Africa

Abbreviations 20


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Summary of Proceedings

Expert Meeting



Executive Summary

Over the past decade significant gains have been made in West Africa in terms of peace and democratic consolidation, and some countries have been witnessing an exceptional pace of economic growth. Despite these gains, concerns are mounting regarding the impact of drug trafficking and other forms of organized criminal activity on political governance and economic and social development across the region. The structure of the political economy in even the most developed countries in West Africa continues to attract and nurture illicit activity. Meanwhile, institutions remain weak and easily corruptible; poverty and unemployment, especially among the young remains high, and access to basic services, such as health and education, limited. These vulnerabilities coupled with West Africa’s convenient location halfway between drug production and consumer markets, have facilitated the rapid expansion of organized criminal activity. At the same time, West Africa is also facing the harsh realities of consumption, with heroine, crack cocaine and methamphetamines entering local markets. In some countries, laboratories producing methamphetamines have been discovered; in others, the cultivation and subsequent consumption and/or trans-shipment of cannabis continue to spread. Many fear that increased consumption of hard drugs or competition for control of the transhipment markets could lead to increased levels of crime and violence, particularly in underdeveloped urban areas largely populated by unemployed youth.

Given the current situation in the region, the absence of public debate on drug trafficking and organized crime; limited progress on implementing the regional instruments aimed at addressing drug trafficking, organized crime and drug abuse1; increasing levels of consumption of hard drugs; and the dearth of regionally-led policy relevant research, the main recommendation tabled at the expert meeting was the establishment of a mechanism along the lines of the Latin America Commission on Drugs and Democracy. The mechanism would accompany implementation of existing initiatives and serve as a platform for supporting research, public outreach and advocacy on drug trafficking, organized crime, drug abuse, and related issues. A proposal for such a mechanism is currently being drafted on the basis of the meeting outcome.

Background

Recognizing the need for a better understanding of the impact of drug trafficking and organized crime on governance, security and development across the region, New York University’s Center on International Cooperation (CIC), the Kofi Annan Foundation, the ECOWAS Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA), and the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center [KAIPTC] jointly organized a meeting in Dakar, Senegal, from April 18-20, 2012. The meeting brought together some 40 experts from governments, multilateral and civil society organizations, and academia from across West Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, North America and Europe.

The purpose of the meeting was threefold. It sought to:

i. Garner a better understanding of the perceived impact of drug trafficking and organized crime on governance, security and development in West Africa, and identify gaps in knowledge.

1 In December 2008, ECOWAS Heads of State and Government adopted the Political Declaration on the Prevention of Drug Abuse, Illicit Drug Trafficking and Organized Crime in West Africa and the Regional Action Plan to Address the Growing Problem of Illicit drug Trafficking, Organized Crime and Drug Abuse in West Africa.


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ii. Assess the effectiveness and/or shortcomings of different policy and operational responses currently pursued by different actors in relation to existing and emerging challenges.

iii. Discuss potential entry points and key components of a renewed strategy to address the problems identified (for example, through the establishment of a regionally-led mechanism) and discuss different options for moving forward.

Over the course of three days, participants assessed the scope and reach of drug trafficking and organized crime in West Africa and identified areas for practical knowledge-generation and exchange. They took stock of progress made on regional, national and international commitments to respond to the current situation.

In particular, discussions focused on:

• The perceived impact of drug trafficking and organized crime on governance, development and security, and the variation of impact across countries.

• Tools and mechanisms used by different stakeholders to monitor and assess impact and how these, in turn, influence responses.

• Challenges to current efforts to build resilience against drug trafficking and organized crime.

• Concrete steps to support implementation of the current response architecture and overcome existing challenges.

Main Observations

Despite progress on different fronts, West African states continue to face enormous challenges, including insecurity, fragile political systems, poverty, slow economic growth, health pandemics, and vulnerability to climate change. Recurring violence and political crises have been part of these problems, with Mali and Guinea-Bissau providing the most recent examples. Drug trafficking and organized crime are compounding political and socio-economic

challenges, and threatening to reverse important peace and development gains made in recent years. Indeed, countries across West Africa continue to provide criminal networks with a fertile operational environment, serving as bases for the onward transhipment of drugs to other regions.

Recent years have seen important drug seizures en route to West Africa, or in different countries in the region (e.g. Sierra Leone, Gambia, Ghana, Mali, Senegal), yet West Africa continues to be used as a transit area for cocaine and heroin from Latin America and South Asia. While most of the drugs are destined for Europe and – to a lesser extent – the United States, an increasing amount reportedly remains in the region. Cannabis is produced locally and mostly marketed and consumed within the region. In recent years, authorities have discovered production sites for synthetic drugs, such as methamphetamines. Despite a shortage of available systematic data, drug consumption and abuse rates appear to be increasing. Yet, drug treatment and rehabilitation services are sparse, available only in a few countries, notably Ghana and Nigeria, and are predominantly provided through overburdened mental health care systems.

On Power, Politics and Illicit Monies

A predominant focus of the meeting was on the nexus between public authorities and organized criminal groups across the region. Examples were provided of how government, traditional authorities, political parties, judicial and law enforcement officials have become involved in organized crime for political or personal gain, or through coercion; and the numerous challenges inherent in responding to these links. Underlying many of these challenges is the nature of the political economy and the fragility of political systems across West Africa. Governments have struggled to put in place (or in some cases, avoided) mechanisms to protect politics from patronage and clientelism. Impunity regarding political corruption only serves to exacerbate this situation.

West African economies are believed to benefit from illicit financial flows, which, given the predominance of


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cash-based economies in the region, is easily hidden or moved into the formal economy. In the context of poor or non-existent delivery of basic services, organized criminal activities are often deemed legitimate sources of funding for services, at times providing income and employment or investment in local communities. The corrosive longer-term effects, however, outweigh these short-term positive gains. In particular, drug money can create false pockets of political legitimacy; it can harm the performance of legitimate economic sectors, distort economic performance, and ultimately enrich a few at the expense of many. In addition, increased levels of money laundering are placing pressure on the financial reputation of countries in the region and can ultimately increase the cost of borrowing for both the public and private sectors in international markets. Another concern is the degree to which legitimate business inadvertently facilitates organized criminal activity, including money laundering, in predominantly cash-based economies.

On Crime and Punishment

Drug trafficking in West Africa involves both local and foreign criminal networks, which forge alliances to carry out their activities. These networks are highly sophisticated and have access to huge resources, as evidenced by their ability to shift operations in response to effective law enforcement efforts. West African organized criminal networks operate cells worldwide to facilitate the supply of goods, with Diaspora communities playing important roles (e.g. Nigerian diaspora in Brazil). Like criminal groups elsewhere, they infiltrate or threaten political elites and dispirited public servants to protect and expand their business. To launder the proceeds, they often use shell companies, for example, in the construction or mining sectors, or through car rental services.

Organized crime-related impunity remains a major problem in West Africa. While political interference in high-profile cases and the general corruptibility of institutions remains significant, like elsewhere, law enforcement and broader criminal justice systems are struggling to adapt to new challenges posed by sophisticated organized criminal networks. Different legal systems within the region pose a

barrier to speedy cross-jurisdictional collaboration; porous borders present as many challenges as does working with a welter of border security agencies.

Analysis of the few drug-trafficking related convictions has been limited (e.g. cocaine-related cases in Sierra Leone, Ghana and, more recently, Gambia) not least because case files, detainees and sound intelligence are often difficult to access. At the same time, a large number of drug-related cases involve middlemen or mules, or small-scale cannabis-related peddlers and consumers. Focus on this lower level of operations places enormous pressure on criminal justice systems, shifting much needed attention away from higher level criminals and political corruption on the one hand, and increasing drug consumption on the other.

Some countries are making progress in responding to money laundering. Conversely, limited progress has been made in recovering assets.

On Responses

The region boasts a top-down, multi-layered architecture for responding to drug trafficking and organized crime, covering regional, national and local levels. While the current Praia Action Plan Against Drugs and Organized Crime is comprehensive in scope, implementation and support thereof have lagged behind and limited progress has been registered. Thus, broad consensus was reached at the meeting that a mechanism is needed to track the implementation of international and regional responses. Such efforts need to be accompanied by much more rigorous and cross-disciplinary research. More specifically and in line with the principle of shared responsibility, significant progress needs to be made to monitor challenges to implementing the existing regional architecture and to ensure the necessary level of political engagement for dealing with these challenges within and beyond West Africa.

A number of states have taken steps toward addressing the problem of drug trafficking. Examples include reviewing of penal codes, and establishment of anti-drug commissions


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and anti-money laundering frameworks (see table 1). Yet, in many cases, the implementation of such efforts has been lagging due to lack of political engagement, insufficient human, material, and financial resources, and limited exchange or flow of information.

The role of the UN and traditional development assistance was also debated, with strong emphasis placed on the need for ongoing and future initiatives to reflect the multifaceted nature of drug trafficking and organized crime. This would include linking efforts aimed at strengthening the capacity of law enforcement, security and intelligence services to efforts aimed at responding to underlying political, social and economic challenges, including through development assistance. It would also require more targeted political engagement and use of leverage to support on-going efforts in the region.

Existing mechanisms for collaboration between regional organizations such as ECOWAS (and its specialised institutions, such as GIABA) and representatives from civil society organizations and academia were highlighted as positive, although much emphasis was placed on the need for closer institutional collaboration to improve information gathering and enhance understanding of the scope of the issues. Strategies should pay attention to agents of change at all levels and seek ways to connect these actors.

The meeting further discussed evidence and operational examples from within and beyond the region (Latin America in particular) to determine the benefits and weaknesses of different approaches to tackling drug trafficking and drug consumption. While West African participants noted that countries in the region do not experience the levels of drug-related violence of Mexico, Brazil, Jamaica, and Colombia, Latin American participants cautioned that violence would emerge as the competition for the spoils of trafficking heightens.

Participants placed strong emphasis on the capacity gaps within regional organizations, such as ECOWAS and its specialized institutions such as GIABA, government services, donor partners, and civil society in the

understanding of the dynamics of drug trafficking and organized crime. Academia was singled out as being largely silent on organized crime, especially drug trafficking and consumption, and how these issues relate to governance, development and security. This silence is due in part to the lack of investment in tertiary education in general in West Africa, and the glaring lack of political space for academia and think tanks to set and challenge policy agendas.

Key Recommendations

Participants tabled a range of recommendations for future action, clustered around four key areas that should be implemented in conjunction with each other. There was broad agreement that unless progress is made on the first recommendation – sustained political engagement – it will be difficult to make progress on the others.

I. Sustained Political EngagementII. Policy FormulationIII. Knowledge IV. Capacity

I. Sustained Political Engagement

Regional and national efforts to respond to drug trafficking and organized crime should be supported by an independent, regionally-led group of “champions” along the lines of the Latin America Commission on Drugs and Democracy or the Global Commission on Drug Policies. The group would accompany the efforts of regional and international bodies already underway. It could be charged with advocating on issues pertaining to drug trafficking, drug consumption and organized crime through engagement with political and economic elites across the region, launching awareness campaigns, monitoring progress of the implementation of current initiatives, fund raising for research, information and lessons sharing within the region and between West Africa and other regions, and exploring new and innovative partnerships with the private sector, including social media and information technology companies. Members of the group could include prominent leaders engaged or previously engaged in regional and international affairs, business, the arts, and the media.


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Participants also discussed the feasibility of an international initiative, such as a Panel of Experts, tasked by the UN Security Council to investigate and monitor illegal drug trafficking in West Africa. Such a panel could investigate the involvement of political elites in organized criminal activity. Similar mechanisms have been used in the past to address illegal trafficking of natural resources and sanction violations, among other issues.

Issue Area Summary of Core RecommendationsSustained political engagement at the regional and national levels to ensure that the challenges related to drug trafficking and consumption receive the necessary attention and responses based on systematic evidence gathering and support.

Recommendations

• Establishment of a multi-level and multi-faceted consortium like the Latin America Commission on Drugs and Democracy or the Global Commission on Drug Policies.

• Establishment of an Independent, Council-mandated Expert Group to monitor the involvement of political elites in illicit activity.

II. Policy Formulation

Although national governments and regional actors in West Africa have signed various protocols and issued ambitious statements (see table 1), implementation is slow and, in some cases, has not advanced at all. There is limited commitment at the regional and national levels to ensure that drug trafficking receives broad public attention. As such, the fight against drug trafficking and organized crime should become a priority.

The dynamics of organized criminal groups, their reach, investments and engagement in both legitimate and illicit activities, all point to the need for joint action. Governments must collaborate with all sectors of society through a process of mutual learning, review and assistance. Local authorities, non-governmental organizations, the private sector, academia, regional and international organizations, and the media are all relevant actors. Multi-sectoral, top-down strategies must be complemented by and coordinated with bottom-up initiatives.

Efforts that are too narrowly focused often give a false impression of progress. Instead of diminishing the scope and strength of criminal networks, some counter measures

merely contribute to the relocation of organized crime. To avoid this unintended effect, local or national responses should consider broader efforts at the regional level and exchange experiences with partners in other regions, such as Latin America and the Caribbean.

Organized criminal networks rely on secrecy and depend on corruption to protect their activities from government and law enforcement agencies. Consequently, there is a strong need for increasing transparency and taking a stance against corruption and organized criminal activities (see table 3).

Governments and external assistance providers should address the connection between crime reduction and law enforcement initiatives, on the one hand, and social and economic development priorities on the other. Law enforcement efforts should be accompanied by drug treatment and rehabilitation programs. However, external support continues to favour law enforcement approaches.

Finally, and in support of existing ECOWAS initiatives, a comprehensive update of West African international commitments regarding organized crime, drug trafficking

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and consumption needs to be conducted and made publicly available; a review of penal codes and codes of procedure, judicial action, sentencing for drug-related offences, judicial training, and so forth is also urgently needed.

Issue Area Summary of Core RecommendationsStrengthen regional and multi-stakeholder capacity to monitor the effectiveness of policy responses and prepare for unintended consequences.

Recommendations

• Under the principle of shared accountability, develop more effective mechanisms aimed at ensuring accountability of both international and regional actors when policy implementation lags behind.

• Strengthen policy formulation processes, including through investment in more rigorous and multi-disciplinary research (and researchers) within the region.

• Strengthen top-down and bottom-up policy links between crime reduction/law enforcement policy initiatives and social and economic development priorities and community needs.

• Ensure that regional initiatives are coherent with broader international efforts to mitigate unintended effects.

• Support national and regional efforts underway to review and align current policy responses and ensure they are consistent with other obligations and commitments.

III. Knowledge

While the expansion of organized crime and drug trafficking is widely acknowledged, little is known about the impact on governance, development and security, and how they differ from one country to another. Thus, there is a need to strengthen and improve the reliability and validity of data. It will also be imperative to address the full spectrum of issues, without focusing exclusively on enforcement or a specific type of narcotic, such as cocaine.

Research should be conducted on how the spoils of criminal activity and drug trafficking are infiltrating and influencing various levels of society. There is a need to improve our understanding of the degree to which drug money is influencing calculations made by actors within the political and economic spheres, and how local communities engage with and perceive drug traffickers.

The linkages between the collection and subsequent use of data must be improved. State agencies should, where appropriate, facilitate access to databases on drug seizures, arrests and convictions. Researchers, in turn,

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should move beyond general assumptions as much as possible and conduct evidence-based primary research at the local, national and regional levels, using consistent and transparent sets of indicators.

To identify issues for decision-making and priorities for action, stakeholders should seek out or contribute to research on the topics needed for informed policy making. Local knowledge offers useful perspectives and should be systematically included in the research process.

Increasing public awareness is key. It can help build pressure and social resilience for political change and also serve as a check against political involvement in drug trafficking and organized crime. Greater efforts should be made to inform citizens about the health, economic and security risks associated with drug trafficking and consumption. This requires working with the media and research institutions to reach and educate a broader audience.


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Issue Area Summary of Core RecommendationsDevelop a more systematic, regionally-led research agenda on issues pertaining to drug trafficking in West Africa. Current research gaps include:

General

• Systematic, up to date and, above all, accessible information on the types of drugs being trafficked and routes used in West Africa; and the criteria for understanding the vulnerability to drug trafficking and its impact on related challenges such as unemployment, violence and drug abuse across the region.

• Population-based household surveys on perceptions of drug trafficking (local groups/individuals vs. foreign groups/individuals), drug consumption and drug-related violence are imperative for the development of initial baselines.

Governance and the Rule of Law

• Criteria for assessing the degree to which drug-related money is infiltrating politics and formal and informal governance structures; for determining how the spoils of organized criminal activity and, particularly, drug trafficking are filling gaps in the presence and commitment of the state; and how they are undermining the legitimacy of formal and/or informal state institutions.

• Criteria for understanding formal responses to drug trafficking and consumption (for example, the motivation and incentives of drug enforcement officials and health officials – i.e. how they are setting benchmarks and targets to combat drug trafficking and consumption).

• Regular monitoring and analysis of trial proceedings, trial transcripts, judicial and administrative commissions of inquiry to better understand gaps in current systems, how responses have been formulated and how they are being implemented.

• Analysis of the diversity of offences and scales of sentencing in legislation across the region; of witness protection challenges in organized crime, drug trafficking and money laundering-related cases; of challenges related to asset recovery in traditional societies, and the challenges and limitations of capacity building efforts in this area.

Economic development

• Criteria for developing a more informed understanding of the impact of drug trafficking and organized crime on formal and informal economies in West Africa and how these change over time.

• Systematic information on variations of laundering of drug money within and across countries in the region; how money laundering is nurtured by the informal economy and potential longer-term developmental impacts of money-laundering.

• Systematic information on how illicit actors interact with legitimate business.

General Monitoring and Assessment of Impact

• Criteria for assessing the mid- and long-term impact of regional, sub-regional and international responses to drug trafficking and related issues in the region.

IV. Capacity

Despite significant international and regional investments in training and capacity building in West Africa (for fighting organized crime and trafficking or counter-terrorism, anti-corruption, anti-money laundering, border control, governance, rule of law, justice and security sector reform or financial management) capacity gaps are still substantial. At a time of dwindling resources and

in line with broader international policy shifts, a deeper understanding of challenges and the limited impact of training and capacity building efforts in these areas needs to be achieved to enable the development of more effective responses.

Significant investment (human and financial) is required to develop more sustainable capacities within government

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agencies (for example, developing career enhancement opportunities within specialized policing units, developing specific modules on organized crime, drug trafficking and its consequences for training newly elected officials, political parties, parliamentarians, and civil servants). The mapping of current drug trafficking capacity building initiatives might be an opportune way to go about identifying gaps, challenges and opportunities.

Investment in the monitoring capacity of civil society and the media is important for responding to drug trafficking and organized crime. Effective monitoring can help track and advance the impact of policy responses and prepare for unintended consequences. Similarly, strategies should be devised to increase the costs of colluding with criminal networks.

Issue Area Summary of Core Recommendations

• Before making huge investments in additional capacity building efforts, an extensive mapping exercise in necessary to determine the current focus of drug trafficking and organized crime-related capacity building initiatives, where capacity building efforts are perceived to have had an impact, how that impact is measured, and where capacity gaps and challenges lie.

• Over time, significant investment (human and financial) is required to develop more sustainable capacities within specialized units, parliamentary committees, political parties, civil servants, social service agencies, civil society and the media on drug trafficking and organized crime-related issues.

• The region needs to develop the capacity to conduct systematic research in different areas (see issue area III), particularly on the impact of drug trafficking on governance and development, and more specifically on drug consumption and variations in impact and response across the region. Such initiatives should be anchored in academic and other research institutes across the region.

Additional Information

Agence France PresseANGOP (Angola Press) Au Fait MarocCentre Afrique PresseConakry Times (Guinea)C.R.I.D.E.M. (Mauretania) Dallas Morning NewsIbrabiga (Burkina Faso)

Jeune AfriqueLa Libre (Belgium)Radio NetherlandsSenego (Senegal)Slate AfricaBBC West AfricaBBC Radio

To date, the expert meeting has received coverage in the following media outlets:

http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5h-6BPEpU2pa6hxnyLkEQ1Q2_imRw?docId=CNG.bc2f0f3d5a7864b494f6f1e354c43f1f.91

http://www.portalangop.co.ao/motix/fr_fr/noticias/africa/2012/3/17/est-urgent-agir-pour-refrener-trafic-drogue-Afrique-Ouest-experts,a51a45dd-450c-424d-b98c-46be6949930d.html

http://www.aufaitmaroc.com/monde/afrique/2012/4/25/afrique-de-louest-transit-mais-aussi-consommation-de-drogues-en-hausse

http://centrafrique-presse.over-blog.com/article-il-est-urgent-d-agir-pour-refrener-le-trafic-de-drogue-en-afrique-de-l-ouest-104017782.html

http://www.conakrytime.com/Accuel-Conakrytime.270.0.html?&cHash=6d617f6e52&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=264&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=3346

http://www.cridem.org/C_Info.php?article=628701

http://www.dallasnews.com/news/nationworld/mexico/20120422-lucrative-european-market-luring-latin-drug-traffickers-to-west-africa.ece

ibrabiga.blogspot.com

http://www.jeuneafrique.com/ArticlePersonnalite/ARTJAWEB20120420174233/Type:Interview/senegal-guinee-mali-nigerial-afrique-n-est-plus-seulement-un-acteur-passif-dans-le-trafic-de-drogue-la-consommation-augmente.html

http://www.lalibre.be/actu/international/article/734366/le-trafic-de-drogue-ravage-l-afrique-de-l-ouest.html

http://www.rnw.nl/afrique/bulletin/afrique-de-louest-transit-mais-aussi-consommation-de-drogues-en-hausse

http://actu-senegalaise.senego.com/

http://www.slateafrique.com/86231/afrique-de-louest-transit-mais-aussi-consommation-de-drogues-en-hausse


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Background Paper


“The cartels have not yet corrupted the government’s senior levels, but sooner or later they will, because they have millions of dollars and you need to be a saint to reject them.”1

Summary

In less than one and a half decades West Africa has become a major transit and re¬packaging hub for cocaine and heroine flowing from the Latin American and Asian producing areas to European markets.2 While organized crime and drug trafficking already existed in the region, the phenomenon rapidly expanded in the mid-2000s as a result of a strategic shift of Latin American drug syndicates towards the rapidly growing European market in part due to the operational ‘successes’ of U.S. law enforcement agencies in mitigating the flow of drugs into the United States.3 West Africa presented an ideal choice as a logistical transit center: its geography makes detection difficult and facilitates transit; the region boasts well-established networks of West African smugglers and crime syndicates; and a vulnerable political environment. The latter has its roots in the region’s colonial history and includes endemic poverty as well as a combination of weak institutions and systems, instability, and ill-equipped and corruptible political party representatives, law enforcement and intelligence officers, and judicial authorities.

In some countries, the legacy of civil wars led to diminished human capital, social infrastructure and productive national development assets. They also gave way to a rise in the number of armed groups operating in the region and the circulation of small arms and light weapons (SALW). Many of these challenges are slowly being overcome, with countries across the region enjoying transitions to, and consolidation of democratic rule in addition to positive economic growth. Yet, at the same time, new threats have emerged, compounding existing political and security

challenges in West Africa. These threats include drug trafficking, and increasingly, drug consumption, broader organized criminal activity such as human trafficking, illicit logging, illicit capture of resources, piracy, money-laundering, and terrorism. Combined with intense urbanization and youth unemployment, these threats and challenges are having a corrosive effect on democratic institutions and processes, security and economic development across the region and driving violence and reemergence of conflict.

Conversely, research shows that the evidentiary base underpinning perceptions of challenges remains weak, as do mechanisms to assess and respond to vulnerabilities, threats and challenges that enable organized crime and drug trafficking. Indeed, despite several positive developments, there is still limited evidence of effective, strategic responses to the multi-faceted challenges posed by organized crime and drug trafficking in the region. While declarations and action plans from within and beyond the region abound, many continue to lament the absence of a comprehensive strategic framework that goes beyond mere technical assistance to more effectively encompass the underlying global, regional and national political economy factors that enable organized crime and drug trafficking in the region. Operational level strategies are also said to be weak, not least because they are developed on the basis of weak and siloed analysis. Existing strategies tend to omit the importance of ensuring that security centered efforts are accompanied by efforts aimed at strengthening political institutions and processes, justice and health institutions, and responding to widespread youth unemployment. Even less focus and investment is being placed on developing the capacity of civil society and academia to monitor and analyze trends and effects of organized crime and trafficking across the region. Meanwhile, the private sector remains largely removed from current debates on the issues.

In this regard, the objective of the expert meeting will be to focus on the impact of organized crime (and drug trafficking in particular) on governance, security and development across West Africa in order to:


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i. Garner a better understanding of the perceived impact of drug trafficking and organized crime on governance, security and development in West Africa; and identify gaps in knowledge.

ii. Assess the effectiveness and/or shortcomings of different policy and operational responses currently being implemented by different actors in relation to identified and emerging challenges.

iii. Identify potential entry points and key components of a renewed strategy to address the problems identified, for example, through the establishment of a regionally-led mechanism; and discuss different options for moving forward.

More specifically, the meeting will focus on responding to several questions that remain unanswered. For example, what mechanisms and tools are currently being used to track, monitor and assess the impact of organized crime and drug trafficking on key areas such as governance, security and development? How are the findings of these processes used to inform the development of integrated strategic and operational responses at the national and regional levels (particularly regarding law enforcement, citizen security, justice, and health)? How do academia, civil society and the private sector engage with public policy makers to inform decisions? What gaps in knowledge and strategic and operational responses currently exist, and how might they be more effectively addressed and supported? By whom (international, regional, national levels) and how?

The meeting is a joint effort of the Kofi Annan Foundation, ECOWAS-GIABA, NYU’s Center on International Cooperation (CIC), and the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center (KAIPTC). Participants will include experts from West Africa, Latin America, North America and Europe.

Background

Neither organized crime nor drug trafficking are new to West Africa, yet the degree to which they have grown in

the region over the past decade is. Indeed, the enormous value of drugs and other illicit goods and services vis-à-vis the value of local economies in West Africa has allowed traffickers to penetrate the very highest levels of government, the justice and security services and the economy, and are said to be wreaking havoc on already weak political, economic and social structures.4 In response to strong evidence that in some countries drug money was infiltrating the highest levels of power, in 2007 the African Union adopted an Action Plan and accompanying Mechanism on Drug Control and Crime Prevention. The stated primary goal of the Action Plan was to reverse “the current trends of drug abuse and trafficking, organized crime, corruption, terrorism and related challenges to socio-economic development and human security and to achieve tangible improvement in the social and personal well-being of the people of Africa and their communities.”5 Spurred by the growing number of drug seizures in the region (which indicated the degree to which West African countries were serving as cocaine and heroin transit routes), ECOWAS shortly followed suit, adopting a range of declarations, action plans and policies to respond to the growing threat of drug trafficking in the region.6 More recent evidence points to the progression of the West African drug scene from a mere transit hub for cocaine to processing and amphetamine production; to the expansion of the trade routes through the Sahel and Sahara and a purported increase in cooperation between drug-traffickers and terrorist groups such as AQIM.7

Over the past few years, the UN Security Council has been periodically appraised of the growing threat posed by drug trafficking in Africa and more recently, West Africa and the Sahel Region, leading to several important UN Security Council Presidential Statements (PRSTs). The latter include the PRSTs of December 2009 (under Burkina Faso), February 2010 (under France) and February 2012 (under Togo). Each has highlighted the danger that drug trafficking and other forms of organized crime represent for regional and international security.8 Meanwhile, the United Nations Office for West Africa (UNOWA) has increasingly used its convening authority, political leverage and transnational reach to raise awareness of the impact of transnational threats in West Africa, especially drug


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trafficking, and to broker support from the international community for responses designed to mitigate those threats.9 Other UN agencies such as UNODC continue to develop assessments and provide technical assistance to institutions across West Africa. In addition to these efforts, many bilateral donors have launched different initiatives to support the region either at the multilateral or bilateral levels. Some of the initiatives such as the West Africa Coastal Initiative (WACI) are being implemented in partnership with ECOWAS, while others are being implemented directly by the supporting partners.10 The African Union, the European Union, AFRICOM, a range of bilaterals from Western Europe and North America, private and semi-private security actors are also engaging is some form or other.

Yet, despite all these efforts to respond to organized crime and drug trafficking, concerns continue to be raised in the region and beyond, suggesting that efforts to respond to challenges to date have had limited impact. For example, concerns regarding the criminalization of politics have not dissipated.11 In settings such as Guinea-Bissau, the highest levels of political and military leadership became embroiled in a fight over access to resources, including the spoils of cocaine trafficking, resulting in the assassination of the President in 2009.12 Across the region, political parties are increasingly accused of using illicit monies emanating from the drug trade to fund electoral campaigns. Weak or inexistent party campaign financing, asset disclosure and anti-money laundering regulatory frameworks and implementation mechanisms make it extremely difficult to confirm these claims, providing even more fodder for political polarization.13

Underpinning some of these political challenges is the reality that in some West African states the underlying political settlement is still relatively weak, in the sense that different stakeholders have not been able to devise an acceptable system through which “competing political and economic interests are channeled by means of state institutions in a routine, smooth and violent-free manner.”14 In this regard, the easy access to resources that drug trafficking and other forms of organized criminal activity allow can place additional pressures on vulnerable

political and social systems and has the potential of increasing the risk of polarization and violence, including around electoral contest and particularly in countries that have recently emerged from conflict.15 In addition, in settings where access to power and resources is still limited to informal and clientelistic relations, the spoils of drug trafficking can inadvertently enhance the legitimacy of both formal and traditional political and economic elites. In many cases the absence of the state and weak service delivery means that organized crime and drug-related rents represent the only source of resources and therefore a blind eye is turned to their illicit nature. Such important subtleties in state-society relations make it all more difficult to assess impact and formulate coherent and effective policy responses.

Meanwhile, drug trafficking and associated corruption is perceived to be having an increasing impact on economies in West Africa. The size of the informal sector across the region and the fact that most of the economies function on a cash basis presents significant challenges to assessing impact. Notwithstanding, there is increasing evidence that vast sums of money have been laundered in real estate, tourism and casinos in Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal, for example, and that most of the other countries in the region are also being flooded by illicit funds stemming from drug trafficking and other illicit activity. As a recent ECOWAS/GIABA report highlighted, the main problem appears to stem from the top of the pyramid, where large quantities of funds fall into the hands of important political operators who are aided by external groups such as Diaspora communities, and work with intermediaries such as large scale cash smugglers, banks, businesses and important international traders. In the long run, economic dependence on illicit drug money and the penetration of drug trafficking into the highest levels of power leaves few incentives to combat the trade, even if legitimacy vis-à-vis the general population is low.

While the security, economic and political impacts of organized crime and drug trafficking have been discussed in many different forms and fora over the past decade, much less is known about their longer-term developmental impacts. For example, increasing concern


13

is being voiced in relation to the increase in actual drug consumption in countries across the region. Until recently, drug consumption in West Africa and in other parts of sub-Saharan Africa had been linked to either marijuana and/or khat, and was officially recognized as a problem and one of seven actionable priorities in the African Union’s 2007 Revised Plan of Action on Drug Control and Crime Prevention.16 Since then, however, consumption of cocaine and heroine on the continent is said to have spiraled, not least because many of the cartels operating in the region prefer to pay for services in kind.17 Indeed, the UNODC has noted a “tremendous increase” of drug use in the region, estimating that a third of the cocaine that passed through the region was being consumed locally and that by mid-2011 as much as 400 kilograms (880 pounds) of heroin had been consumed in West Africa in 2011. According to the regional representative, these levels of consumption have become “a huge issue for public heath.”18 The health and welfare problems associated with drug consumption have been prioritized in different policy frameworks. Conversely, the region (and broader continent) currently lacks national level policies that focus on harm reduction as well as the necessary treatment centers, and the resources necessary to establish and sustain them. This situation is exacerbated by a serious lack of data on consumers across the region, including the degree to which drug consumption is exacerbating existing health problems such as HIV-AIDS.

Underpinning many of these challenges is a weak empirical base. Policy and operational responses should be developed on the basis of a sound understanding of the nature and extent of organized crime and trafficking across the region. They should also be based on a sound understanding of their structural impact, particularly on political and economic governance, citizen security and development and in relation to specific contexts. However, most assessment and analysis has been narrow in focus. For example, policy-oriented organized crime literature generally fails to make reference to how organized crime interacts with formal political institutions (forms and structures of government, political parties, legislatures etc.) or traditional decision-making structures. Meanwhile, studies of democracy and political transitions have “traditionally sidestepped the question of organized crime

and drugs and have focused primarily on the emergence of formal democratic institutions …and markets…as well as the relationship between them.”19 To many, this has produced “an analytical and political myopia when it comes to studies of, and responses to topics such as organized crime and drug trafficking that operate outside this formal arena.”20 Similarly, over the past decade, strategic and security experts have increasingly focused on the study of organized crime, particularly its transnational dimension and potential linkages to transnational terrorism. However, they appear to be equally myopic on the political dimension of these issues, leading to policy and operational responses grounded in a narrow interpretation of security, and limited consideration of the political, social and economic aspects of organized crime and drug trafficking.21

This ‘myopia’ means that international and regional initiatives often fail to consider the aforementioned issues. When they are considered, it is usually through the prism of one of the many conflict and political economy analysis tools developed over the past decade. For understandable reasons, not least the firewall of sovereignty, operational responses seldom touch on the structural political issues that tend to be at the core of the problems at hand. A brief review of some of the judicial processes or commissions of inquiry that have been implemented to address several of the high-profile cocaine smuggling cases in West Africa has shed light on the fact that very few political actors have been tried and sentenced for their involvement in drug trafficking even when there is sufficient evidence pointing to their involvement.22 When important political figures involved in illicit activity are eventually caught, it is often due to the policies and pressures implemented and exercised by third countries.

Conversely, responses continue to be formulated from a security/law enforcement perspective, with little consideration for a state’s underlying political and cultural dynamics, questions of oversight, legitimacy, and the potential impact of different responses on state-society relations or on general health and welfare. In relation to post-conflict settings, more recently analysts have stressed the need to engage in longer-term initiatives, including


14

strengthening institutions such as political parties as a means to “ensure structural and normative transformation of the political economy and remove the comparative advantage that violent criminal entrepreneurs and organizations enjoy.”23 However, most actors engaged in peacebuilding or statebuilding efforts fail to consider these institutions in their program activities. On the other hand, political party assistance providers rarely coordinate some of the important work they have carried out on issues such as political corruption and party campaign financing with actors involved in investigating organized crime. Many of the same critiques can be made in relation to the manner in which key social issues, particularly health, tend to be omitted from any of these efforts.

Finally, there is a broad perception in the region that many of the existing initiatives are broadly conceived outside West Africa and that there is limited ownership of the existing policy framework and operational responses in the region. Both civil society and the media have had limited opportunity to discuss these challenges with key decision makers in the region hence further reducing ownership of and response to the issues.

Conclusion

Regional actors and the broader international community continue to issue statements and declarations on organized crime and drug trafficking in the region suggesting that despite efforts to date, significant concerns remain. This lack of progress recently led the Permanent Representative of Togo to the United Nations to lament in February 2012 that “none of these efforts appears to have had a major deterring impact on the development of trafficking networks in West Africa and the Sahel region. On the contrary (…), the situation may have now become worse than before these initiatives were carried out.”24 He also acknowledged though that “many officials across the region who are concerned about the effects of the drug trade have their hands tied, not least because they “are often confronted by people and networks more powerful than they are, and with other priorities.” A sounder and more comprehensive base for monitoring and assessing the impact of drug trafficking and organized crime

across the region might help ensure that efforts are more effectively channeled, and that leaders, both traditional and formal, governmental and non-governmental, are more strategically accompanied in their efforts.

In this regard, in June 2011 and in reference to the situation in West Africa, the Global Commission on Drug Policy stressed that for responses to be effective, they need to “integrate existing approaches (security and judicial) with social, development and conflict prevention policies – and involve governments and civil society alike.”25 Over the past five years, the UN Office in West Africa has made several calls for such a strategic shift. In light of more recent developments in West Africa and the Sahel region and in a letter addressed to the President of the Security Council, the President of Togo recently reiterated these calls. A regionally led and multi-faceted mechanism may indeed help secure these necessary shifts.


15

Endnotes 1The Minister for Foreign Affairs of a West African country (Feb. 2009). 2 West Africa includes Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo. 3According to recent research, it appears to have stabilized today at some 50-60 tons annually, with a wholesale value of close to US$ 2 billion, representing some 25-30% of the European cocaine market. 4For example, as much as 80 metric tons of cocaine, worth $1.2 billion, might pass through West Africa to Europe this year, Manuel de Almeida Pereira, legal adviser to the Vienna-based anti-crime unit of the UN, said in an interview on May 17. Bloomberg News, West Africa’s Cocaine Trade Has Doubled in Five Years, UN Agency Estimates. Drew Hinshaw - May 25, 2011.5CMDCCP/EXP/3 (III) Para. 1.1 Fundamental Objectives. 6Between 2001 and 2007, cocaine seizures in West Africa increased from approximately 273 kilos to an estimated 47,000 kilos (see Cockayne 2011). ECOWAS has taken a number of policy and operational steps to address many of the challenges enumerated above. For example, in 2008, ECOWAS, in collaboration with the UNODC and other partners, organized a Ministerial conference to consider and approve a regional action plan (The Praia Plan of Action) and a political declaration against illicit drug trafficking and organized crime for the region. The action plan and the political declaration were adopted and endorsed by the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of States and Government in December 2008. Another initiative developed in the wake of the increased infiltration of drug-related monies in politics in the region and the lack of relevant regulatory frameworks and accountability mechanisms is the Praia Declaration on Elections and Stability in West Africa which includes a provision on preventing the financing of political parties and their campaigns by criminal networks, particularly drug trafficking networks.7Kwesi Aning (2011), Security Links between Trafficking and Terrorism in the Sahel in Africa South of the Sahara, London: Routledge. 8Encouraged through the 2010 PRSTs to ensure that drug trafficking is “mainstreamed as a factor in conflict prevention strategies, conflict analysis, integrated missions assessment and planning and peacebuilding support” in February 2011, the UN Secretary-General established a Special Task Force on Organized Crime and Trafficking co-chaired by the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) and UNODC. It is still early days to determine whether the Task Force will provide the much-needed support suggested in the PRSTs, particularly since it is quite removed geographically from the crux of the problem (West Africa, Central Asia, Central America etc.). Notwithstanding, it could provide much needed support and analysis to UN offices strategically placed in the region such as UNOWA, and potentially support the development of a similar capacity within ECOWAS. 9James Cockayne and Camino Kavanagh (2011). 10The WACI is a program co-led by UNODC, UNDPA, UNDPKO and Interpol. The WACI is helping ECOWAS establish Transnational Crime Units in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Cote d’Ivoire, and Guinea-Bissau.11Across the region, parties are increasingly accusing each other of using drug-related monies to fund their campaigns and gain advantage over their adversaries. See, for example, the polarization that has emerged in Ghana following suggestions by the head of the Narcotics Control Board that some political parties have been using drug-related monies to bolster their position ahead of the 2012 elections. No progress has been made in the country to adopt party financing legislation despite the challenges the lack of legislation gives rise to.12James Cockayne (2011).13Kwesi Aning, Comprehending West Africa’s Security Dilemmas: State Fragility, Narco-Terrorism and Oil Politics. Forthcoming. 14See, for example, Lassana Gberie (2010), ISS Situation Report on Sierra Leone.15James Cockayne and Camino Kavanagh, CIC Annual Review of Political

Missions 2011, Thematic Essay on Transnational Threats (forthcoming).16See Priority Area 2.5 in CMDCCP/EXP/3(III), p.9. 17CPPF Summary Note, Meeting on Drug Trafficking in West Africa, July 2009. 18Bloomberg News, West Africans Consume One-Third of Trafficked Drugs, UN Drugs Office Says, 20 June 2011.19Yashar (2010).20Yashar (2010).21Interviews Washington D.C. and N.Y Oct. 2010.22For example, in Sierra Leone the former Minister of Transport and Aviation was alleged to have been linked to a broad cocaine network that his brother was involved in, including in relation to the seizure of 700 kilos of cocaine in 2008. The Attorney General and Minister of Justice allegedly blocked his arrest after it had been ordered. In his report on the case in which 16 people, including several Latin Americans, were sentenced, Judge Nicholas Browne-Stone implied that the government had been guilty of obstruction of justice in preventing the trial of the former Minister and noted that in his view “the state prosecution was withholding vital evidence and was prepared to jeopardize the case in order to save one person [the minister], constituting an act of perjury.” See Lansana Gberie (2010), ISS Situation Report, Sierra Leone: Business More than Usual.23Cockayne (2009).24See S/2012/83, Letter dated 8 February 2012 from the Permanent Representative of Togo to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General.25Global Commission on Drug Policy, p. 14.


16

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Proj

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EU D

rugs

Act

ion

Plan

200

9-20

12EC

/326

/09

2000

2001

2002

2004

2003

2008

2007

2006

2010

2009

2011

2012

2005

Tabl

e 1:

Org

aniz

ed C

rim

e, D

rug

Traffi

ckin

g an

d Re

late

d Ch

alle

nges

in W

est A

fric

a: A

Dec

ade

of D

evel

opm

ents


17

Acce

ssio

n to

Uni

ted

Nat

ions

Con

vent

ions

1988

UN

ITD

2000

UN

TOC

(

)

x

()

2003

UN

CAC

(

)x

(

)

Benin

Burkina Faso

Cape Verde

Côte d’Ivoire

Gambia

Ghana

Guinea

Guinea-Bissau

Liberia

Mali

Niger

Nigeria

Senegal

Sierra Leone

Togo

Ra

tifica

tion

and

acce

ssio

n(

)Si

gnat

ory

but n

o Ra

tifica

tion

xN

on-S

igna

tory

and

no

ratifi

catio

n

*Ca

nnab

is, i

nclu

ding

her

b, p

lant

, see

d an

d re

sin

Tabl

e 2:

Rat

ifica

tion

of a

nd A

cces

sion

to R

elev

ant U

N C

onve

ntio

ns in

Wes

t Afr

ica

Wes

t Afr

ica

Regi

onal

Act

ivit

ies

Intr

a-Re

gion

al A

ctiv

itie

sEx

tra-

Regi

onal

Act

ivit

ies

In

tern

atio

nal A

ctiv

itie

s

Inst

utio

nal

Arr

ange

men

ts

Act

ion

grou

p ag

ains

t mon

ey

laun

deri

ng(G

IABA

)

UN

Offi

ce fo

r W

est A

fric

a(U

NO

WA

)

Mar

itim

e A

naly

sis

and

Ope

rati

ons

Cent

er-N

arco

t-ic

s (M

AO

C-N

)

WH

O M

edic

al

Prod

ucts

Ant

i-Co

unte

rfei

ting

Task

For

ce(IM

PACT

)

Wes

t Afr

ica

Coas

t In

itia

tive

(WA

CI)

UN

OD

C, D

PKO

, D

PA/U

NO

WA

, In

terp

ol

UN

Tas

k Fo

rce

on O

rgan

ized

Cr

ime

and

Traf

-fic

king

AIR

COP

Join

t A

irpo

rt In

terd

ic-

tion

Tas

k Fo

rce

(JA

ITF)

WA

Join

t Ope

ra-

tion

s In

itia

tive

(WA

JO)

WA

Dru

g Re

gula

tory

A

utho

rity

Net

wor

k (W

AD

RAN

)

Inte

rpol

Glo

bal

Secu

rity

Init

ia-

tive

(G

SI)

ECO

WA

S W

est A

fric

an

Ant

i-Cor

rupt

ion

Aut

hori

ties

N

etw

ork

Tabl

e 1:

con

tinu

ed


18

Cons

titut

ion

and

Elec

tora

l Leg

isla

tion

Elec

tora

l law

/cod

e/de

cree

(yea

r)19

9920

0120

10N

/A19

9619

9619

9119

9819

8620

0620

1020

1019

9220

0220

00

Law

/cod

e on

pol

itica

l par

ties

(yea

r)

2001

2001

N/A

N/A

N/A

2000

1991

1991

N/A

2005

2010

N/A

1989

2002

N/A

Law

/cod

e on

pub

lic fu

nds/

part

y

finan

ce

N/A

2009

N/A

2004

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

2011

N/A

N/A

2010

N/A

N/A

N/A

Ant

i-mon

ey la

unde

ring

law

2006

2006

2002

2006

2003

2007

2006

2004

2002

2006

Polit

ical

Par

ty F

inan

ce1

Is th

ere

a ba

n on

fore

ign

dona

tions

?

No

No

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Is th

ere

a ba

n on

ano

nym

ous

dona

tions

?

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

N/A

N/A

N/A

Is th

ere

a ba

n on

sta

te re

sour

ces

as s

ourc

e?

Yes

N/A

Yes

Yes

N/A

Yes

N/A

Yes

Yes

N/A

Yes

N/A

N/A

Yes

N/A

Is th

ere

a ba

n on

any

oth

er

(illic

it) s

ourc

es?

No

No

Yes

No

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

Yes

No

Is th

ere

a ce

iling

on

dono

r

cont

ribut

ions

?

Yes

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

Is th

ere

a ba

n on

vot

e bu

ying

?Ye

sYe

sYe

sYe

sYe

sYe

sYe

sYe

sYe

sYe

sYe

sYe

sYe

sYe

sYe

s

Mus

t par

ties

regu

larly

repo

rt o

n

finan

ces?

Yes

Yes

N/A

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Mus

t cam

paig

n fin

ance

s be

repo

rted

?

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Mus

t rep

orts

reve

al d

onor

iden

tity?

Y/N

No

Yes

Yes

N/A

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Is fi

nanc

ing

info

rmat

ion

mad

e

publ

ic?

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

N/A

Yes

Yes

No

Y/N

No

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Corr

uptio

n Pe

rcep

tion

Inde

x (C

PI) 2

011

and

Pres

s Fre

edom

2

CPI (

0 - h

ighl

y co

rrup

t; 10

– v

ery

clea

n)

33

5.5

2.2

3.5

3.9

2.1

2.2

3.2

2.8

2.5

2.4

2.9

2.5

2.4

CPI R

ank

(tot

al: 1

82)

100

100

4115

477

6916

415

491

118

134

143

112

134

143

Pres

s fr

eedo

mPa

rtly

free

Part

ly fr

eeFr

eeN

ot F

ree

Not

Fre

e F

ree

Part

ly

free

Part

ly

free

Part

ly

free

Free

Part

ly

free

Part

ly

free

Part

ly

free

Part

ly

free

Part

ly

free

Benin

Burkina Faso

Cape Verde

Côte d’Ivoire

Gambia

Ghana

Guinea

Guinea-Bissau

Liberia

Mali

Niger

Nigeria

Senegal

Sierra Leone

Togo

Tabl

e 3:

Pol

itic

al S

yste

m a

nd C

ondi

tion

s in

Wes

t Afr

ica

1 Sour

ce: I

nter

natio

nal I

nstit

ute

for D

emoc

racy

and

Ele

ctor

al A

ssis

tanc

e (ID

EA):

http

://w

ww

.idea

.int/

polit

ical

-fina

nce/

inde

x.cf

m2 So

urce

: Tra

nspa

renc

y In

tern

atio

nal:

http

://cp

i.tra

nspa

renc

y.or

g an

d Fr

eedo

m H

ouse

: htt

p://

ww

w.fr

eedo

mho

use.

org


19

Popu

latio

n Fi

gure

s3

Popu

latio

n (2

010)

in m

illio

n

peop

le

9.1

170.

496

231.

825

101.

64.

115

1616

213

5.4

5.8

2010

Urb

an p

opul

atio

n (%

of to

tal)

4220

6150

5852

3530

6233

1750

4338

43

2010

Pop

ulat

ion

ages

0-1

4 (%

of to

tal)

4445

3241

4439

4341

4347

4943

4443

40

2010

Ref

ugee

pop

. (co

untr

y

of o

rigin

)

442

1,14

525

41,7

582,

242

20,2

0311

,985

1,12

770

,129

3,66

380

315

,642

16,2

6711

,275

18,3

30

Econ

omic

Per

form

ance

4

Coun

try

inco

me

leve

lLo

wLo

wL-

ML-

MLo

wL-

MLo

wLo

wLo

wLo

wLo

wL-

ML-

MLo

wLo

w

GD

P gr

owth

(ann

ual %

)

1997

-200

1

5.1

5.0

6.2

2.3

5.4

8.4

4.9

3.2

7.1

5.0

8.7

6.0

3.3

5.5

2.4

GD

P gr

owth

(ann

ual %

)

2002

-200

6

3.8

3.5

3.6

3.8

6.2

4.7

-0.3

3.0

4.6

4.5

-1.2

7.0

2.2

3.2

3.2

GD

P gr

owth

(ann

ual %

)

2007

-201

1

3.0

9.2

5.4

3.0

5.0

6.6

1.9

3.5

5.5

4.5

8.8

7.9

4.2

4.9

3.4

Hum

an D

evel

opm

ent (

HD

) and

Hea

lth5

2011

HD

Inde

x (t

otal

: 187

)16

718

113

317

016

813

517

817

618

217

518

615

615

518

016

2

2011

Mea

n ye

ars

of s

choo

ling

3.3

1.3

3.5

3.3

2.8

7.1

1.6

2.3

3.9

2.0

1.4

5.0

4.5

2.9

5.3

2009

Lite

racy

(% o

f tot

al, a

ge

15+)

42N

/A85

5546

6739

5259

N/A

N/A

6150

41N

/A

2009

Acc

ess

to e

lect

ricity

(%

of p

op.)

24.8

14.6

N/A

47.3

N/A

60.5

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

50.6

42.0

N/A

20.0

2011

Life

exp

ecta

ncy

(in y

ears

)56

.155

.474

.255

.458

.564

.254

.148

.156

.851

.454

.751

.959

.347

.857

.1

2009

HIV

rate

(% o

f tot

al, a

ge

15-4

9)

1.2

1.2

N/A

3.4

2.0

1.8

1.3

2.5

1.5

1.0

0.8

3.6

0.9

1.6

3.2

Benin

Burkina Faso

Cape Verde

Côte d’Ivoire

Gambia

Ghana

Guinea

Guinea-Bissau

Liberia

Mali

Niger

Nigeria

Senegal

Sierra Leone

Togo

3 Sour

ce: T

he W

orld

Ban

k (p

opul

atio

n ag

es):

http

://da

ta.w

orld

bank

.org

and

Fre

edom

Hou

se: F

reed

om H

ouse

: htt

p://

ww

w.fr

eedo

mho

use.

org

4 Sour

ce: T

he W

orld

Ban

k (e

cono

mic

per

form

ance

): ht

tp://

data

.wor

ldba

nk.o

rg5 So

urce

: Hum

an D

evel

opm

ent R

epor

t 201

1: h

ttp:

//hd

r.und

p.or

g/en

/med

ia/H

DR_

2011

_EN

_Tab

le1.

pdf a

nd T

he W

orld

Ban

k (H

IV ra

te):

http

://da

ta.w

orld

bank

.org

L-M

Low

er M

iddl

e In

com

e

Tabl

e 4:

Soc

io-E

cono

mic

Con

diti

ons

in W

est A

fric

a


20

AIRCOP Airport Communication Project

AML Anti-Money Laundering

APD African Union Plan of Action on Drug Control

AU African Union

AUPA AU Plan of Action on Drug Control & Crime Prevention

BCEAO Banque Centrale des Etats de l’Afrique de l’Ouest

CCP Container Control Program

CEN Customs Enforcement Network

CND Commission on Narcotic Drugs

COCAF Cocaine Africa

COCAIR Cocaine Route Operation

COPOLAD Cooperation Program between LA & EU on Anti-Drugs Policies

CPI Corruption Perception Index

CTF Counter-Terrorism Financing

DT Drug Trafficking

EC European Council

ECOWARN ECOWAS Early Warning and Response Network

ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States

ECPF ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework

EU European Union

FATF Financial Action Task Force

GDP Gross Domestic Product

GIABA Action Group Against Money Laundering in West Africa

GSI Global Security Initiative

HD Human Development

HLP High-Level Panel

HR Human Rights

IMoLIN Intl. Money Laundering Information Network

IMPACT Intl. Medical Products Anti-Counterfeiting Task Force

INCB Intl. Narcotics Control Board

Interpol Intl. Criminal Police Organization

ISWG Intelligence Sharing Working Group

JAITF Joint Airport Interdiction Task Force

LA Latin America

LAC Latin America and the Caribbean

LW Light Weapons

MAOC-N Maritime Analysis and Operations Center - Narcotics

ML Money Laundering

MoU Memorandum of Understanding

PRST Presidential Statement

RES Resolution

StAR Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative

TOC Transnational Organized Crime

TREATNET Network of Drug Dependence Treatment & Rehabilitation

UN United Nations

UNCAC UN Convention Against Corruption

UN DPA UN Department of Political Affairs

UN DPKO UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations

UN ECOSOC

UN Economic and Social Council

UNGA UN General Assembly

UNITD UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narc. Drugs & Substances

UNODC UN Office on Drugs and Crime

UNOWA UN Office for West Africa

UNTOC UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime

UNSC UN Security Council

WA West Africa

WACI West Africa Coast Initiative

WACSI West Africa Cooperative Security Initiative

WADRAN West Africa Drug Regulatory Authority Network

WAEMU West African Economic and Monetary Union

WAJO West Africa Joint Operations

WB World Bank

WCO World Customs Organization

WDR World Drug Report

WHO World Health Organization

Abbreviations


21

koffi annan

Documents