kobusch 2010, food safety network ... - regulatory...
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Alexander Kobusch, M.A.
University of Tuebingen
Institute of Political Science [email protected]‐tuebingen.de
Linking the levels: independence and influence in the Euro‐pean two‐tiered network of food safety agencies Paper presented at the Third Biennial Conference "Regulation in the Age of Crises" of the ECPR Standing Group on Regulatory Governance, University College Dublin, June 17‐19, 2010.
Abstract Some major food crises in the 1980s and 1990s rendered the need for a coherent Euro‐
pean regulatory system in the sector of food safety apparent. Especially the BSE‐crises stipu‐lated comprehensive reforms of the legal framework, attribution of competencies, and or‐ganisation of regulatory regimes. As part of the process, both on the European and the na‐tional level more or less independent agencies have developed which are supposed to de‐liver independent, transparent, and excellent scientific expertise to decision makers. Thus a “two‐tiered European regulatory system” (Eberlein/Grande) has emerged which can never‐theless be characterised as fragmented. In spite of extensive legal and institutional reforms and some observable tendencies towards an institutional convergence, differing institutional solutions have been chosen on both levels which in the end still produce differing scientific advice.
These concerns are addressed by Regulation (EC) 178/2002, which establishes a common European Food Law and sets up the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA). Article 30 ex‐plicitly mandates EFSA to anticipate diverging scientific opinions without granting EFSA a final say in these cases. The agency itself considers the building of a network with and among the Competent National Authorities (CAs) by 2011 and the development of a harmo‐nised risk assessment standard by 2016 as major steps towards providing a coherent Euro‐pean expertise and thus a smoothly functioning regulatory system.
The focus of the research paper is twofold. Firstly, the paper aims at exploring the shape of the network between EFSA and the CAs. I propose a connection between the concept of (in)formal independence of agencies (Gilardi; Maggetti; Wonka/Rittberger) and their posi‐tion measured by their centrality and betweeness within the network. Thus the national in‐stitutional choice is linked to the European arena. It is assumed that EFSA is not likely to be the single central player in the network, but a structure of multiple cliques with EFSA as one of several brokers will develop. Secondly network governance features as main theme in the envisaged development of harmonised risk assessment standards. I assume the actions and potential influence of the single actors to be dependent on their position in the network. Consequently the form of the network and EFSA’s potential to govern the network should have implications on the standards developed by the network.
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1. Introduction Topic of the paper
This research paper1 is set out two examine the network‐building between the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) and the national Competent Authorities (CAs) in the EU Mem‐ber States. After severe food crises in the 1980s and 1990s the whole institutional structure in food safety governance across the EU and its Member States underwent major reforms. Both on the national and on European level (more or less) independent agencies were estab‐lished which in the most cases have to perform the risk assessment for food and feed. In‐stead of granting EFSA a Europe‐wide final say in scientific questions, the Authority is made responsible for identifying possible scientific disaccords among the CAs and for mediating these conflicts. Additionally, EFSA is tasked to establish a network between the CAs in order to foster cooperation and data exchange between them and to reach in the long term har‐monised risk assessment procedures and standards across Europe. This could turn European and national scientific expertise more coherent and thus avoid political conflict over differing science in food safety regulation.
Research interest of the paper Despite extensive institutional reforms national regulatory designs display a high degree
of variation. While some Member States orientated their institutional choices towards the European model (and the Irish and British system even inspired the European institutional set‐up), other Member States made very specific choices or hardly changed their structures at all. Unlike most studies in Europeanization, this paper is not concerned with the reasons and development paths that lead to varying structures2, but more with the consequences that different institutional choices have for the emergence of an inter‐agency network have. Based on a first empirical sample on the inclusion of national risk assessment bodies within EFSA‘s scientific panels, I will highlight some patterns of national designs being linked to fre‐quency of representation within the panels. My hypothesis is that similar regulatory struc‐tures to those of EFSA facilitate cooperation and understanding among the agencies. Thus structures should have an impact on the involvement in EFSA‘s scientific panels. Methods of Social Network Analysis (SNA) are used to visualise and analyse the dataset. I will then, build‐ing on these first empirical results, propose a wider research design that tries to link the na‐tional choices to the characterisation of the inter‐agency network on European level. The differences in agency structures should both have an impact on the governance of the net‐work and the governance by the network. My main hypothesis is that the autonomy a na‐tional agency enjoys domestically will influence its position in the European network (gov‐ernance of the network), which in turn will impact its chances to take influence in the formu‐lation of European risk assessment standards (governance by the network). At the same time, strong ties of national bodies to EFSA and other national bodies should enhance the efficiency and thus the acceptance, reputation and eventually independence of integrated authorities.
1 Earlier versions of this paper have been presented to the UCD Postgraduate Legal Research Workshop in
December 2009 in Dublin and at the ECPR Joint Sessions Workshops, Workshop on Social Network Analysis in March2010 in Münster. I am thankful for the many helpful comments by the discussants and participants.
2 For a discussion of design developments and competing visions of path dependency and Europeanization cf. (Abels/Kobusch 2010).
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Structure of the research paper Based on first empirical evidence presented, I aim at developing further research hy‐
pothesis assuming a connection between agency autonomy and influence in the European regulatory network.
Section 2 shortly outlines the reforms on European and national level that followed the BSE crisis. While major reforms were undertaken on the European level, only some Member States orientated their regulatory regimes towards the European model. As a consequence a fragmented regulatory space emerged that can be described as “two‐tiered regulatory sys‐tem” (Eberlein/Grande 2005). This system is marked by the parallel functioning of risk as‐sessment agencies both on European and on national level, which poses certain challenges for the provision of a coherent scientific expertise. Drawing from theories of regulation I will introduce a framework to describe agencies according to their role in the regulatory process.
In Section 3 I will focus on the institutional design of EFSA demonstrating how concerns about reputation and acceptance have influenced the institutional design of the authority. Based on delegation theory I give a brief account of theoretical perspectives that can explain the design chosen. Facing the fragmented regulatory space described in Section 2, EFSA’s task in establishing an inter‐agency network is introduced, which aims at harmonising risk assessment standards in order to reduce scientific conflict. Finally, EFSA‘s and national bod‐ies are characterised according to their role within the regulatory process and groups of spe‐cific designs are introduced.
In Section 4 I turn to the Social Network Analysis. Based on membership data concerning EFSA‘s scientific panels the structure of an inter‐institutional two‐level network is sketched. In order to reduce the complexity of the modelled network some reflections about the ana‐lytical boundaries of the network are presented. This is mainly based on the decision, which institutions are to be included in the case sample. I then turn to the question, how the dif‐ferent levels of representation in the network can be interpreted.
Section 5 is devoted to the development of further research hypothesis supported by the empirical data. Here I will elaborate further on the idea of a connection between formal agency independence and the position held in the network. The main line of reasoning is that the more independent an agency domestically is, the more central will be the position occupied in the network and consequently the higher are the chances to influence the for‐mulation of a harmonised risk assessment standard.
2. The Emerging European Food Safety System BSE crisis puts expertise into crisis
For several decades food safety policy did not receive much attention by the public and the scientific community. Due to numerous food crises in the 1980s and 1990s food policy and food safety issues were pushed on the political agenda. Major reforms were triggered by the BSE crisis, which “created a window of opportunity for the development of a more inter‐nally integrated food safety policy (and consumer health policy in general)“ (Ugland/Veggeland 2006, 618).
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The confession of British Secretary for Health Stephen Dorrell on March 20th 1996, that there might be a link between BSE and a new variant of the Creutzfeldt‐ Jakob‐Disease (nvCJD), put the regulatory regime in Great Britain and on the European level under pres‐sure. Both the British government and the European institutions were confronted with se‐vere accusations. Among others a lack of relevant expertise in committees, the systematic exclusion of critical scientists, lack of timely information of the public, and the blending of science and politics were criticised (Baggot 1998, 64‐72; Bartlett 1998, 238‐244; Buonanno 2006, 262‐263; Chalmers 2003, 534; Chambers 1999, 99; Jasanoff 1997, 226). While the Brit‐ish “BSE Inquiry” of 1997 reached more modest conclusions the inquiry report by the Euro‐pean Parliament even suggested misinformation, biased scientific selection, and political pressure by the British government in order to prevent further investigations and major drops in consumer demand for British beef.
The reconfiguration of European food safety regulation On the European level the BSE crisis intertwined with the Intergovernmental Conference
on the revision of the Maastricht Treaty that was opened on March 29th. While the Confer‐ence debated on the future directions of the Common Market, the BSE crisis endangered the negotiations as Britain threatened not to cooperate (Baggot 1998, 61; Hellebø 2004, 134‐135). Following the conclusions of the „BSE Inquiry“, the Parliament reinforced the pressure on the Commission warning to have a vote of no confidence if the Commission would not react until the end of 1997. Eventually, the Commission started a process that would totally amend the European food safety regulation:
The Commission issued a Green Paper (1997) and White Paper (2000) on food safety which eventually led to the introduction of the General Food Law (Regulation (EC) 178/2002 2002)
By Reg. (EC) 178/2002 the European Food Safety Agency (EFSA) was established which provides expertise and coordinates European risk assessments
The responsibility for food safety was transferred from Directorate‐General Agricul‐ture to the newly established DG Health and Consumers (DG Sanco), thus separat‐ing the promotion of industrial interests (DG Agri) from consumer interests (DG Sanco)
Food safety as part of public health became a horizontal issue which has to be con‐sidered in all EU policies
A clear‐cut distinction between risk assessment as purely scientific task (to be per‐formed by EFSA) and risk management as political responsibility (to be performed by the Commission, Council and Parliament) has been drawn. In some Member States this model has been followed.
On national level responsibilities were equally rearranged and several independent agencies were founded
Reforms within the Member States Despite these reforms on the supranational level, very different risk regulation regimes
have developed in the Member States. While the General Food Law lays down certain prin‐ciples on food safety regulation it does not provide for any guidelines on the design of na‐
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tional authorities or inter‐institutional relations. In a very complex manner thus differing regulatory designs have been implemented in the Member States (Federal Institute for Risk Assessment 2009). While some Member States changed the very foundation of their regula‐tory system others stuck to their established structures. Especially the new Member States in Central and Eastern Europe had to make major efforts to adapt their food law and regula‐tory capacities to the demands of the internal market framework – and yet have not all completed this process. Anyways, in most Member States agencies have been set up which are formally independent but accountable to either the ministry of agricultural or health (with some exceptions). Some states opted for a solution with an agency or service directly incorporated in one of the ministries.
This heterogeneous institutional design on the different levels raises some major issues:
Differing risk assessments based on differing assessment methodologies might lead to scientific conflict that spills over in the political domain of risk management
Differing risk assessment results might make consumers unsure and thus raise dis‐trust in the safety of the food chain
In cases of political bodies conducting risk assessments, a mingling of science and policy and biased choices for certain experts and results endangers the trustworthi‐ness of scientific results
As a consequence national bodies might distrust each other and not accept foreign risk assessments without conducting own studies
Especially the smaller Member States do not possess the capacities and resources to conduct extensive risk assessments and need either to rely on European or na‐tional expertise from another Member State
Policy‐Making conditions in the fragmented regulatory system As demonstrated, reputation and trust become major attributes for actors in the specific
regulatory space introduced here. Much has been written about these specialised bodies (Majone 1997; Thatcher 2002; 2005; Thatcher/Stone Sweet 2002) whose widespread emer‐gence has been termed „agencification“ (Christensen/Lægreid 2005). The European Food Safety Agency is a classic example of such a specialised authority. It embodies as one of the EU‘s third generation agencies some innovative features and counts to one of the most in‐fluential ones on the European level. Nevertheless, it is not equipped with regulatory com‐petencies. Both (a) institutional considerations and (b) political interests of the Member States and the European institutions led to this specific design.
(a) The General Food Law foresees a clear‐cut separation within the regulatory process. Accordingly the process is split into risk assessment, risk management, and risk communica‐tion (Regulation (EC) 178/2002 2002, Art. 3 (10)‐(13)). While EFSA in this account is the solely responsible body for risk assessment, all risk management decisions are reserved for the democratically accountable institutions (Council, Commission and European Parliament). In this regard and compared to some national bodies EFSA has a very limited mandate. (b) Fur‐thermore, it is not the will of Member States to delegate far‐reaching competencies to an European agency:
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“In spite of functional pressures to delegate powers upwards, the bulk of the formal powers are still located at the national level. On the one hand, thus far the political resistance of Member States has not allowed any far‐reaching transfer of regulatory powers to a supranational ‘regu‐latory state’; while, on the other hand, the EU framework of rules to which member state regu‐latory regimes are subject does not fully match the functional need for uniform EU rules. [...] The European agencies’ modest endowment with formal powers and resources also shows that these agencies are not oriented towards replacing the corresponding national institutions as some sort of ‘European regulatory state’” (Eberlein/Grande 2005, 95).
The Member States understandingly were not interested in establishing „an oracle of Delphi spelling out the ‘truth‘ in all scientific matters, but rather they wanted to preserve an oppor‐tunity for the incorporation of national perspectives on risk assessment“ (Alemanno 2009, 24). Consequently, EFSA is neither equipped with regulatory powers nor are its opinions le‐gally binding for the Commission.
Thus, the described fragmented regulatory arena with EFSA as hub in its centre bears some specific characteristics that heavily influence the organisation and coordination of risk assessment. At the latest with the introduction of the General Food Law, national risk as‐sessments can no longer stand for themselves but have to take other national or European results in account. Similarly, the organisational set‐up has become embedded in a larger European structure. Eberlein and Grande have adopted the Multi‐level governance approach (Hooghe/Marks 2001; Marks et al. 1996) to regulatory politics. In their account the nucleus of implementing the European treaties is still on the national level but at the same time na‐tional structures are „embedded in a transnational regulatory structure“ (Eberlein/Grande 2005, 98). As a consequence they perceive the centre of gravity for regulation in empirical terms neither on the national nor on the supranational level. The system is more likely based on „two‐tier regulation” in which the European level formulates aims and the scope of poli‐cies while the national level is responsible for concretising the aims and choosing the means for implementation. The European authorities could thus be seen as “regulators of the regu‐lator” (Eberlein/Grande 2005, 99). In any account this does not imply a dominant role for network governance per se, which is only one form of governance among others. The most important mode of governance remains the hierarchical one:
„Governance in the European multi‐level system depends on the combination and diffusion of two governance mechanisms […]: the hierarchical coordination via supranational decision‐processes (majority decisions and hierarchical order) on the vertical dimension on the one hand, and non‐hierarchical coordination by voluntary cooperation on the horizontal level on the other hand“ (Börzel 2006, 83 – translated by AK).
Despite Börzels assertion for the general framework of governance in the EU, risk assess‐ment is differing from other regulatory process step in one important aspect: we cannot perceive of it as being subject command‐and‐control mechanisms nor to a „shadow of hier‐archy“ (Héritier/Lehmkuhl 2008). Food safety regulation can clearly be understood in the terms of Lehmkuhl and Héritier as a new mode of sectoral governance (Héritier/Lehmkuhl 2008, 1) and surely the overall process is subject to hierarchy in the sense of Börzel. But when we are focussing on risk assessment as specific step – and as in the European and some national cases separated from risk management and thus the political realm – we can‐not argue in favour of such a shadow: neither EFSA nor national institutions are equipped to interfere in the risk assessment process in the interlinked arena of European two‐level regu‐
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lation3. Of course, there might be political interference in single Member States, especially in the cases of integrated regulatory designs without separation of risk management and risk assessment. On the European level and in the arena linking the two levels, anyhow, there is no actor with the capacity to dictate a specific scientific result as „true“, nor to promote a similar institutional design or harmonized assessment standards. Again, as Héritier and Lehmkuhl (2008, 4‐7) argue on grounds of delegation theory, of course the principals have leverage on the agents and might bring in political interests, but the very nature of the Euro‐pean fragmented level‐linking regulatory system hinders hierarchical instruments to unfold within the network of agencies as the national or European principals will have no grasp on agents in other Member States in the risk assessment realm.
As a consequence, this realm might even be understood as deliberative arena where we find ideal conditions for deliberative arguments advanced e.g. by Joerges and Neyer (1997) or Gerstenberg and Sabel (2002). Bargaining and power are not the prevailing instruments within this arrangement. Rather reputation, commitment and trustworthiness are enabling characteristics for national bodies to bring forward their results and interests. As being heav‐ily based on science, arguments constitute the main mechanism to legitimise a certain posi‐tion. Even within the organisation of science, that is more of a political task then the scien‐tific work itself, we cannot observe political power to dominate this arena. Rather arguments of efficiency and sound science prevail.
A Framework Characterising Agencies Usually agencies are understood as integral part of regulatory processes as in the famous
definition by Selznick, who is heavily inspired by the American regulatory system: regulation is “sustained and focused control exercised by a public agency over activities that are socially valued” (Selznick 1985, cited in Scott 2006, 653). Similarly, Baldwin, Scott and Hood define regulation as “the promulgation of an authoritative set of rules, accompanied by some mechanism, typically a public agency, for monitoring and promoting compliance with this rules” (cited inJordana/Levi‐Faur 2004, 3‐4).
Anyhow, as will be shown in the empirical part of this paper agencies are not in all cases the cornerstone in food regulation regimes in the EU Member States. Levi‐Faur takes ac‐count of this point and formulates broader without reference to certain institutional bodies:
“[R]egulation is the promulgation of prescriptive rules as well as the monitoring and enforce‐ment of these rules by social, business, and political actors on other social, business, and politi‐cal actors. These rules will be considered as regulation as long as they are not formulated di‐rectly by the legislature (primary law) or the courts (verdict, judgment, ruling and adjudication). In other words, regulation is about bureaucratic and administrative rule making and not about legislative or judicial rule making” (Levi‐Faur 2010, 9).
Seen as such bureaucratic and administrative rule‐making, regulation is a specification of the wider governance‐framework. According to the definition by James Carporaso governance is “collective problem solving in the public realm”. The attention is directed towards “the prob‐lems to be solved and to the processes associated with solving them, rather than to the rele‐vant agents” (Carporaso 1996, 32‐33). Regulation specifies both certain instruments used
3 The regional level as third level in the multi‐level governance framework is not touched upon by EFSA. The
organisation and supervision of regional bodies, that are usually responsible for monitoring, inspections and enforcement, remains a competence of the Member States.
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(Baldwin/Cave 1999, 34‐62) and certain actors (in our case bureaucratic‐administrative authorities; cf. Levi‐Faur above; Baldwin/Cave 1999, 63‐75). In this sense regulation only focuses on a certain part of the ideal‐type policy‐cycle, namely the policy implementation where legislative acts and goals are transposed into rules and enforcements formulated by administrative rather than legislative bodies. Hence, within the European Union’s political system regulation constitutes one of several governance or “policy modes” (Wallace 2005). Nevertheless, regulation may become a question of governance itself: “Much of the aca‐demic and public discussion of regulation nowadays deals with the governance of regulation itself (or regulating regulation) rather than governance via regulation.“ (Levi‐Faur 2010, 20). This holds also true for this research paper with its focus on the institutional design and gov‐ernance of food safety regulation in the EU and its Member States.
In this vein, Levi‐Faur‘s definition of agencies also opens a perspective on comparing (regulatory) agencies with regard to the stages of the regulatory process the agencies par‐ticipate in:
A “regulatory agency is a non‐departmental public organization mainly involved with rule mak‐ing, which may also be responsible for fact‐finding, monitoring, adjudication, and enforcement. It is autonomous in the sense that it can shape its own preferences; of course, the extent of the autonomy varies with its administrative capacities, its ability to shape preferences independ‐ently, and its ability to enforce its rules. The autonomy of the agency is also constituted by the act of its establishment as a separate organization and the institutionalization of a policy space where the agency's role becomes ‘taken for granted’. Note that rule making, fact finding, moni‐toring, adjudication, and enforcement capacities are defining characteristics of regulatory agen‐cies, but also that other organizations, both within and outside the state, can acquire and suc‐cessfully deploy these characteristics” (Levi‐Faur 2010, 15).
Implicitly this definition includes different stages of the regulatory process: (1) fact‐finding, (2) rule‐making, (3) monitoring, (4) enforcement and (5) adjudication. This is an important insight as it allows characterising different agencies according to their scope of functions and their role within the regulatory process. At the same time it highlights to more carefully dis‐tinguish between agencies and regulatory agencies. Regulatory agencies are only those „mainly involved with rule making“ or other inspections and enforcement. In this sense with have both agencies (among which EFSA is) and regulatory agencies in the field of food safety. Many studies on agencies are for methodological reasons based on comparison of agencies with similar structures and competencies.4 This paper, on the contrary, is focused on only a single policy field and includes all national agencies and bodies in this sector regardless of their internal design and competencies. Thus, a characterisation of agencies is necessary to understand their varying roles in national policy‐making. For example, in the case of the European design the functions (2) rule‐making, (3) monitoring and (4) enforcement remain with the risk managers (Commission, Council and Parliament) while EFSA is responsible for (1) fact‐finding only.5
Building upon the classical (and ideal‐type) policy cycle (definition of the problem, agenda‐setting, policy formulation, policy implementation and policy evaluation as the main
4 Maggetti (2007, 276), for example, based his sample on “consistent comparability within the agencies’ or‐
ganizational models“ and “on the most institutionalized agencies and those that benefit from the greatest powers“.
5 Adjudication (5) lies with the European Court of Justice (ECJ) whose involvement is not addressed in this paper.
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steps of the process ‐ e.g.Birkland (Birkland 2001, 221‐223)) a framework for describing and characterising agencies emerges. Regulation as understood here is then the transposition of policies into rules and enforcements by administrative bodies distinguished from legislative or judicial institutions and consequently the policy implementation part of the process. As explained we further divide this process in four steps (fact‐finding, rule‐making, monitoring and enforcement) according to the agency definition by Levi‐Faur. This is very much in line with the assertion regulation not being limited to rule making but also including rule moni‐toring and enforcement (Hood et al. 2001, 6). Taking the separation of risk assessment and risk management into account, we can identify the fact‐finding as a task of risk assessment while the remainders are classical risk management responsibilities. As this paper is exclu‐sively dealing with the risk assessment process and does not draw on the distinction be‐tween monitoring and enforcement, I will further simplify these tasks to a single task belong‐ing to the risk management. Rule‐making in turn I will keep as a separated step as this high‐lights some features in the national division of responsibilities. We can then easily attribute national bodies to the single steps (1) fact‐finding, (2) rule‐making and (3) monitor‐ing/enforcement.
3. EFSA‘s design: Independence fostering reputation The problem of credible commitments in democracies
The establishment of a European food safety agency was already proposed in the early 1990s. Anyways, the European Commission judged this not necessary. So why would the food crises change this necessity? This question is linked to the rationale behind establishing independent agencies. Analogously to Ronald H. Coase’s question why firms exist although the market is the perfect mechanism for establishing prices and output‐volume (Coase 1937, 388), Majone asks why non‐majoritarian institutions emerge in democratic polities, where all policies are to be decided by elected personal (Majone 2001a, 59). Majone makes an argu‐ment largely inspired by Douglas North’s transaction‐cost approach. Political markets are marked by a number of characteristics: the inherent missing of information concerning the situation and others’ preferences (North 1990, 355‐356); high costs in preparing, negotiat‐
Figure 1: Regulatory Functions within the Policy Cycle
Problem Definition
Agenda‐Setting
Policy Formulation
Policy Implementation
PolicyEvaluation
Fact‐finding Fact‐Finding Rule‐Making Monitoring
Risk Management
Risk Assessment
Risk Management
RiskManagement
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ing, and implementing political contracts (North 1990, 362); and finally and most severe the inability to make credible commitments due to temporal inconsistency and changing coali‐tions (Gilardi 2002, 875‐876; Majone 2001a, 61; North 1990, 361). Non‐majoritarian institu‐tions can be installed in order to solve these problems. Either, they are designed to lower the transactions‐costs by facilitating and professionalizing the collection of information and delivery of expertise or they can solve the cooperation‐dilemma by enabling credible com‐mitments. As these institutions by definition are not elected they do not follow temporal inconsistencies or election turnouts and thus “restrict the self‐interest of the ruler” (Majone 2001a, 61). Majone terms these rationales as “Two Logics of Delegation” (Majone 2001b). Hereby, delegation can be defined as “an authoritative decision, formalised as matter of public law, that (a) transfers policy making authority away from established, representative organs […], to (b) a non‐majoritarian institutions, whether public or private” (Thatcher/Stone Sweet 2002, 3).
Credible commitment in the case of risk assessments conducted by EFSA does not so much touch locking‐in the risk managers but rather EFSA‘s reputation as a „honest“ risk as‐sessment institution. By stressing a „sound science“‐approach, administrative and scientific independence, transparency and professional standards EFSA‘s assessments and coordina‐tion efforts are more likely to be accepted by other institutions, the regulatees and the pub‐lic in general. Furthermore, networking between EFSA and national CA‘s enables EFSA on the one hand to diffuse these standards within the network and at the same time to foster its own credibility.
EFSA at a glance: Restoring confidence in expertise Bringing Majone’s logics of delegation and the specific case of food safety regulation to‐
gether, there are many good reasons to think of European food safety policy as reinforcing credible commitment and consumer trust (Borrás et al. 2007, 589; Hellebø 2004, 125). Within the policy process science holds a privileged position. Due to its impartial, intersub‐jectiv and objective character science is more comprehensively involved in the policy process than other forms of societal knowledge. The various crises of food safety have also been crises of expertise as science was endangered to lose its character as it was intruded by po‐litical and industrial interests. At the same time, the growing importance of science puts its own legitimacy under pressure: as Peter Weingart argues: the “scientification of politics” would necessarily lead to the “politicization of science” (Weingart 1999, 160) as any measure backed by science could only be opposed by “better” counter‐science. Thus, scientific diver‐gence will be stressed and maybe even artificially constructed in order to legitimise opposing political measures. But this endangers the foundations of science, where truth and objectiv‐ity are central categories. This is where the separation of risk management from risk assess‐ment is believed to relieve science from political pressure. In consequence, commitment, reputation and trust become central categories for agencies as they enhance the legitimacy of the bodies and their output.
From a legitimacy perspective EFSA’s institutional design reflects several rationales. (a) Input‐Dimension: When drafting the White Paper on Governance the Commission was ad‐vised to render the supply of expertise more transparent by stating which bodies, institu‐tions and commissions provide expertise and by establishing guidelines how experts are se‐
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lected6 (Liberatore 2001, i‐ii). (b) Output‐dimension: In the efficiency rationale of delegation a specialised body will deliver more professional and better results as its competency and continuity grows. This should directly also improve the acceptance by the public, as the body’s work becomes more effective and efficient (Thatcher/Stone Sweet 2002, 18). Since quality thus becomes a mean for an agency to legitimate its existence by its own work (Fischer‐Appelt 1999, 200), the agency will be interested in fostering the quality of its out‐put. (c) Throughput‐dimension: As the agency is missing the standard legitimacy by election it can substitute this by legitimising its processes. Consequently, the principal or the agent itself might focus on rendering processes more transparent and open to stakeholders (Borrás et al. 2007; Thatcher/Stone Sweet 2002, 19).
(1) EFSA lacks regulatory competencies. This is motivated both in order not to establish a scientifically supreme body on European level and to take the separation of risk assessment from risk management serious, which features prominently in Article 3 of the founding Regu‐lation (EC) 178/2002.
Figure 2: The institutional design of EFSA
(2) The administrative independence of EFSA is one of the main founding principles in
order to avoid any capture by industrial interests. Concerning the administration of EFSA the main steering body is the Management Board (see figure 1). Different from other agencies in the European Union the principle of one seat per Member State is here not valid. Instead the Management Board consists of 15 members, of which is one the representative of the
6 Important is also EFSA‘s openess for public interests trhough the interface of the Stakeholder platform and
public calls on important issues. As this paper does not deal with the participatory dimension I will not fur‐ther elaborate on these mechanisms (cf. Borrás et al. 2007).
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Commission. The candidates are selected solely on basis of their experience and professional capacity (Reg. (EC) 178/2002, Art. 25(1)). This system minimises the potential for political bargaining among the Member States as the members don’t act as representatives of their states of origin (Vos 2003, 125). This design heavily influences other aspects of EFSA’s work as the Management Board is the central cornerstone of the authority: it establishes the in‐ternal rules of procedure and the budget code, elects the Executive Director, appoints the members of the scientific committees, steers the work of the agency by deciding on the an‐nual work program and the multi annual strategic plan, and influences the operational work by deciding on the budget and staff of the agency (Reg. (EC) 178/2002, Art. 25‐28 and 43). The one‐country‐one‐seat‐principle constitutes the Advisory Forum. But even in this body the logic behind the composition is not so much bringing in Member States interests but rather a coordination and information exchange between European and national level (Alemanno 2008, 8). The Forum advices the Director but its main function is to be “a mecha‐nism for an exchange of information on potential risks and the pooling of knowledge. It shall ensure close cooperation between the Authority and the competent bodies in the Member States” (Reg. (EC) 178/2002, Art. 27(4)). For the networking function of EFSA the Advisory Forum takes a key role.
(3) Regarding the scientific independence, EFSA does not have an own scientific staff. All scientists directly employed by the EFSA are situated in the secretariat and are only sup‐posed to assist the scientific committees. This has a double function of constantly exchang‐ing the scientific experts and to appease the Member States by clarifying that there is no genuine “European” expertise based in an independent agency. Rather the experts are re‐garded as national ones. By public advertisement on the internet experts are hold to apply for the position in one of the scientific committees. These positions are not paid, only an allowance is granted. Every three years the positions are renewed. Nevertheless a reapplica‐tion is possible and also common. Every expert has to hand in a Declaration of Interest (DoI) which is published on the internet. This way the public constitutes a fire‐alarm mechanism and can make statements in case of conflict of personal interests. In this case the involve‐ment of the expert can be limited to certain functions (for example exclusion from chair or rapporteur; exclusion from certain fields of evaluation; cf. Executive Director 2009; Management Board of the European Food Safety Authority 2007).
(4) Concerning transparency and participation of the public, EFSA has already within the founding regulation been given strict rules concerning publication of documents (Art. 38). These rules were further elaborated by the Management Board. The very comprehensive archive of documents on the web page of EFSA demonstrates the authority to take these rules serious. In addition, all sessions of the Management Board are accessible as live stream on the web. In general the sessions are also open to the public. An archive of all requests directed to EFSA gives stakeholder the possibility to access every text of requests and the status of the considerations. Hardly any other food safety agency publishes as much of its work and communicates to the public more transparently than EFSA.
EFSA as hub in a broad inter‐agency network As a consequence of this specific design and missing control‐command mechanisms, EFSA
only dispose of soft mechanisms when it comes to scientific divergence. Article 30 of the founding Regulation (EC) 178/2002 mandates EFSA to perform an observing function. The Authority is held to monitor the risk assessment of Member States in order to identify as
13
early as possible potential scientific conflicts (which might be a sign of scientific uncer‐tainty)7. In this case EFSA gets into dialogue with the national authorities and stipulates an exchange of data. For this purpose an interagency intranet, the so called “EFSAnet”, has been put in place where Member States file their risk assessments. The way the mediation is structured highlights that the political actors do not expect EFSA to solve every conflict, but unsolved disputes will be made transparent and can be considered in the risk management phase.
In order to facilitate its task EFSA is furthermore mandated to maintain a list of national institutions working in food safety (Regulation (EC) 178/2002, Article 36). This expresses the will to “balance” EFSA and national authorities (Recital 52). Article 36 gives EFSA the right to confer certain task on national institutions which underpins its conception as central node in the network. The Advisory Forum is the institutional expression of this will. Within EFSA the Scientific Committee and Advisory Forum have established a steering group on cooperation. The task of the group is to keep the Forum up to date what the units are working on. This is necessary in order to give the Forum the information needed to coordinate the work of EFSA and national authorities. The group initiated several ESCO (“European Scientific Coopera‐tion”) Working groups which individually conduct projects. In 2006 the Advisory Forum for‐mulated two very ambitious goals in the “Strategy for Cooperation and Networking between the EU Member States and EFSA” (Advisory Forum of the European Food Safety Authority 2006). Until 2011 a functioning network shall be in place, by 2016 it envisages the use of harmonized risk assessment standards by all authorities. In 2006 and 2007 this Strategy was supported by the creation of “Focal Points” in the Member States. These institutions which are usually the ones responsible for the national risk assessment serve as an interface for EFSA in the Member States (see the list in the Annex identifying the national Focal Points). On side of EFSA the Advisory Forum manages the contact to the Focal Points as the members are usually representatives of these institutions.
As shown, EFSA does not have a final say in potential conflicts and its assessments do not constitute superior binding science. Possible normative effects of EFSA’s opinions and as‐sessments might emerge anyway. In this account it will be difficult for Member States and European institutions to dissent EFSA as a hub in and backed by a broad network of scientific excellence ‐ especially if EFSA succeeds in harmonising risk assessment standards. Alemanno calls this the emergence of EFSA’s soft power (Alemanno 2008, 19‐20; 2009). The network established by EFSA might provide enabling structures for both the European Authorities and the CAs as scientific expertise gains coherence and support:
„Cooperation will only be successful if there are clear mutual benefits. The main benefits antici‐pated from cooperation include sharing the burden of risk assessments, easy access to expertise not available at home and, in general, making the most efficient use of sparse and finite re‐sources. These benefits will only be fully realised once there is knowledge on and confidence in scientific assessments carried out elsewhere“ (Advisory Forum of the European Food Safety Authority 2006, 3).
7 This mechanism reflects the lessons learned from the BSE‐crises where conflicts had been covered. Accord‐
ing to Article 7 persisting uncertainty might trigger the precautionary principle which is not a mechanism at the disposal of EFSA but features in the general part of the Regulation (EC) 178/2002 since it is meant to be used by the risk managers. This underlines the understanding of risk assessment as a sound science task which is not meant to be framed by precaution.
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Fact‐finding Fact‐Finding Rule‐Making Monitoring
8 A list of abbreviations can be found in the Annex, where all risk assessment institutions are listed again and
in the Almanac by the BfR which is accessible online.
Figure 3: Selected national regulatory designs in comparison to the European setting8
Sepe
rated Mod
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EU EFSA Focal Point
EC RASSF EP Council
FVO (Inspections)
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Austria AGES Focal Point RASFF (Agency)
BMLFUW BMG (Ministries)
BAES (Integrated in AGES)
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Denmark MLFL (Ministry)
DVFA RASSF
DPD (Subordinated authorities)
DTU Focal Point (Technical University)
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France MAAP MEIE RASFF MSS (Ministries)
Afssa (Agency) Focal Point RASFF
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Germany BMELV BMU (Ministries)
BfR Focal Point UBA (Agencies)
BVL RASFF (Federal Office)
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Netherlands LNV VWS (Ministries)
VWA Focal Point RASFF (Agency)
CVI RIKILT RIVM (Independent Research Org.)
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Sweden RK MZ (Ministries)
SLV Focal Point RASSF JV (Agencies)
SVA (Research Institute)
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United Kingdom DEFRA (Ministry)
FSA Focal Point RASSF (Agency)
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Using the framework established earlier and the institutional design of the European regula‐tory regime outlined, the European model can be characterised as in figure 3. In order to make possible an interpretation of the empirical evidence presented in the next Section, the regulatory design of some Member States is presented within the same framework. The in‐sight on national food regulation systems is drawn from the „EU Food Safety Almanac“ (Federal Institute for Risk Assessment 2009). The cases are selected according to the data and the points that will be presented in the next section. Based on the distinction of risk management and risk assessment, we can identify two ideal‐type models. Dreyer et al. iden‐tify in their study three models of which two shall be used here: This study identifies three different models based on risk governance in the food sector. A crucial criterion employed, which is also a key aspect of our study, is the relation between risk assessment and risk management: (1) a bi‐institutional or separate model in which responsibilities are separated between institutions; (2) a structurally more integrated model with nevertheless usually functionally‐divided responsibilities (cf. in detail Dreyer et al. 2006). Out of the seven coun‐tries exemplified here, only two follow the integrated system. This does not reflect the pro‐portion in total, as of 27 Member States only nine opted for a separated system (the ones introduced her plus Finland, Hungary, Slovakia and Poland). Nevertheless I have chosen these examples as they will be needed in the next section. For a broader discussion of na‐tional designs and a clustering of specific country‐groups cf. Abels/Kobusch (2010).
4. The structure of the European inter‐agency network Network‐Building by EFSA
EFSA‘s approach to network building is not one‐dimensional but includes a whole bundle of activities (Advisory Forum of the European Food Safety Authority 2006, 5‐7):
Linking national CAs through the establishment of Focal Points. This cooperation lies at the heart of the networking and is steered by the Advisory Forum
Active exchange of information between Member States and EFSA. This is mostly done by the working groups in EFSA‘s Directorate „Scientific Cooperation and Assis‐tance“
An online exchange platform „EFSAnet“ where national CAs are currently uploading their risk assessments to both make them accessible for other CAs and give EFSA a chance to monitor for possible conflicts
ESCO pilot projects that preferably including a large, a small and a new Member State
Courses in risk assessment
Study tours between Member States to increase the level of mutual trust an knowl‐edge transfer. These should especially involve the new Member States
A database of national experts who can on an ad‐hoc base be invited to panel ses‐sions
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Fostering the common use of risk assessment methodologies across Europe
Harmonisation efforts within international organisations to transcend the EU boundaries
Network building between communication units in the CAs to give coherence to in‐formation of the public
Another important element ‐ perhaps the most central ‐ not enumerated by the Advisory Forum are the Scientific Panels of EFSA themselves. Although not directly foreseen as net‐work mechanism, they can provide for an important and regular interpersonal exchange between employees of national risk assessment institutions. In this account the reasoning is straight forward: regular meetings and interpersonal exchange in the panels, usually com‐prising about 20 members, will both better the mutual understanding and establish direct communication possibilities between the national CAs. When I first assessed the EFSA data‐base on its panels I was very surprised how many members are actually employed by na‐tional risk assessment bodies although the call is open to the scientific community. There are very good reasons to even speak of an „epistemic community“ of experts (Haas 1992). In his seminal article Haas explicitly states control over knowledge and information as import di‐mension of power for state action (ibid., 2). According to his definition an „epistemic com‐munity is network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence“ who have „(1) a shared set of normative and principal beliefs [...]; (2) shared causal beliefs [...]; (3) shared notions of validity [...]; and (4) a common policy enterprise [...] out of conviction that human welfare will be enhanced“ (ibid., 3). The selection process by which EFSA and the Commission appoint the experts is based on experience and professional standards. Thus, we even have a gatekeeper who assures the coherence of this epistemic community. More‐over, EFSA‘s goal to develop and diffuse common risk assessment standards will even rein‐force the community as this will stiffen the shared causal beliefs and notions of validity (cf. Executive Director 2009).
The concept, furthermore, clearly shares some ideas with the approach presented here: „To the extent to which an epistemic communities consolidates bureaucratic power within national administrations and international secretariats, it stands to institutionalize its influ‐ence and insinuate its views into broader international politics“ (Haas 1992, 4). The argu‐ment presented here is pretty much alike: the more the network becomes institutionalised (by common standards and methodologies) the more likely a coherent expertise will be fol‐lowed by decision‐makers and the harder they can reject it. The conditions under which epistemic communities according to Haas can gain power are exactly those policy‐makers face in food safety regulation: raising uncertainties and growing complexity of the processes to be regulated.
The structure of the network: case selection Starting with the case sample, the attributes of the agencies and organisations involved
are very diverse. While Maggetti for example builds his insights on de‐facto independence on a cross‐sector, cross‐country comparison based on comparable agencies’ organisational models and focuses on the most institutionalised agencies (Maggetti 2007, 276), this ap‐proach where the units of analysis are most similar is not possible in this analysis. The units of analysis are more or less dictated by the policy sector – and actually even not that obvious in every national case. On the original dataset used here I opted for a snowball‐like ap‐
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proach: at the heart of the sampling lay the scientific panels of EFSA, which build the corner‐stone of the Authority‘s work. As explained above the experts are selected from an open online call for applications. Every member of a committee has to file a Declaration of Interest (DoI) in order to avoid any conflict of interest and thus save the scientific independence of EFSA. These DoI are published on EFSA‘s homepage.
Constructing the sample For every Member of the one of the Scientific Panels the Name, the Affiliation to a (or
various) Panel(s) and to the employing Institution was noted9. Additionally the host country of the employing institution was added. After clearing the sample, 533 differing individual members (actors) with affiliation to 301 differing institutions including EFSA‘s panels (events) remain. Every actor‐event dyad was then coded with a 1 if the actor takes part in the event (is employed in the institution or member in the Panel) and a 0 otherwise. From this results a two‐mode network establishing actor‐event relations with a set of actors N=(n1,n2,...,n533) as one mode and a set of events M=(m1,m2,...,m301) as second mode. Each actor of the set N is linked to at least two events in M as every actor has at least one employer and is mem‐ber of at least one of EFSA‘s panels yielding a minimum of 1066 relations (the following part heavily draws from basic introductions to SNA, cf. Jansen 2006; Scott 2000; Wasser‐man/Faust 1994).
In a second step, I transformed the actor‐event network to an event‐event network. Therefore the actor‐event matrix A with 533 rows and 301 columns is transposed yielding the event‐actor matrix A‘ (301 rows by 533 columns). From these two matrixes A and A‘ one can derive by matrix multiplication at the event overlap matrix Xm consisting of 301 columns and rows each where Xm=A‘ A. While the actor‐event matrix A and event‐actor matrix A‘ are two‐mode with unvalued and undirected relations10 the event overlap matrix yields valued and undirected11 relations. The final even‐event matrix has the advantage that it is only one‐mode (only the set of events M is included) and thus accessible for standard techniques of network analysis.
Visualizing the sample This form of sampling rather resembles a snowball‐approach where all actors/events
connected to a specific set of actors/events are deemed to be part of the network. The re‐sulting matrix data is then analysed using Ucinet and NetGraph (Borgatti 2002; Borgatti et al. 2002). The thus resulting network is nevertheless still very complex and hardly of theoretical value.
9 According to this sample, EFSA‘s Scientific Panels in total consist of 619 individual memberships. 14 Mem‐
bers were deleted from the list as they made use of their information protection right not to publish the DoI. Afterwards, identical entries of members holding several memberships were combined and their af‐filiation merged. This gives the above mentioned total of 533 differing individual members that are em‐ployed in 301 differing institutions mainly in EU‐Europe including EFSA‘s panels.
10 The relations in the matrices A and A‘ are unvalued because they can only take the values 0 (non‐present) and 1 (present) for an actor being non‐member or member of an event. Furthermore the relations are undi‐rected because in the present case the direction is not of interest. We do not have sending and receiving in‐stitutions but solely membership (this might be different with e.g. information or resource exchange).
11 The relations are valued because multiple members of a national employer may be member of an EFSA panel. Thus the variables can take any positive integer the relation of an event with another event, where xij Ɛ (1,2,...,n). The diagonal of the matrix with xii denoting the relations of an event to itself yields the number of actors in the event.
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Figure 4: The ungrouped event‐event network comprising institutions linked to EFSA
Yellow nodes in this visualisation are the EFSA panels the national institutions are marked
blue. The size of the nodes symbolises the number of ties an actor holds – the so called „de‐gree“. The larger the node, the more ties it holds with differing institutions12. This ranges from 41 in the case of the panel „PRAPER Networking Group on Pesticide Monitoring“ to 1 in the case of small institutions or private consultants. It becomes quite obvious that further manipulations are necessary in order to reduce the complexity.
In a further step I decided to group universities and private consultants as two groups as they are not of special interest in the context presented here. I then build a group out of the EFSA panels as the differentiation between panels is not necessary for the moment. I then clustered institutions according to the country they are situated in. The single clusters are coloured. The resulting visualisation shows how many national institutions (except universi‐ties and private consultants) are linked with EFSA.
12 Depending on the data, there is a difference between the number of different nodes (institutions) linked
and the number of members of the institution. Thus, two national experts from one institution only account for one degree between EFSA and that institution. Nevertheless, this relation has the strength 2. Thus, val‐ued network data can assign different strengths to the relations.
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Figure 5: The grouped and clustered event‐event network of institutions linked to EFSA
Here, first tendencies become visible: larger Member States tend to have more institutions represented within the panels. Smaller states and especially the Central and Eastern Euro‐pean countries have fewer institutions linked13. A special case is Austria, where only one institution is linked to EFSA: this is AGES, which includes 18 former Federal Offices and thus holds a single degree with EFSA (of strength 15). In a further step I was interested in which institutions are most tightly integrated with EFSA. Thus, step by step I raised the tie strengths still visible up to a (deliberate) margin of 10. Thus only institutions sending at least 10 experts to EFSA are displayed. The numbers next to the relations account for the value of the relation. For example, Affsa has 35 of its members related to panels of EFSA14.
The most „active“ agencies within the framework are Affsa (with a tie strength of 35), BfR (20), the Technical University of Denmark15 (19), RIVM (17), AGES in Austria and INRA in France (15), the Swedish Chemicals Agency (14), SLV in Sweden and FSA and the Chemicals Regulation Directorate in the UK (11). If we consider resources and country size as interven‐
13 The few links that are directly established between national institutions without first connecting EFSA are
due to individual persons who work for more than on national institutions (e.g. risk assessor and lecturer of a university).
14 For the abbreviations used, please refer to EFSA’s design in figure 2 and to the Annex enumerating all na‐tional bodies mentioned here.
15 The Technical University of Denmark has not been grouped with the other universities in view of its specific function within the Danish regulatory system.
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ing variables, one is surprised not to find any institution from Spain or Italy in this group, which both follow an integrated approach to risk regulation (the Spanish institute INIA ac‐counts for tie strength 7, the National Health Institute in Rome only for 5).
Figure 6: National Institutions holding more then ten links with EFSA
At the same time the Technical University of Denmark and RIVM in the Netherlands, both situated in rather mid‐sized Member States, are surprisingly strongly integrated. Comparing these finding to the Framework developed earlier, the results are mixed. First of all, we find a great proportion of those Member States following an institutionally separated model. Among the 27 Member States only 9 adopted this design. The regulatory designs of three Member States have to be characterised as rather fragmented while the remaining 15 are structurally integrated (cf. Abels/Kobusch 2010 for detailed discussion). Among the 7 most active institutions displayed in figure 6 five are situated in countries with separated regula‐tory designs, drawing a clear‐cut line between risk management and risk assessment. This is quite a match giving empirical evidence to the assertion that similar design with regard to EFSA and the European setting facilitate cooperation and mutual understanding. Addition‐ally, for Sweden as surprisingly strongly tied in and the UK as lesser integrated than ex‐pected, there are some explanations: Sweden is characterised by a highly professionalised administration that is deeply devoted to neutrality (cf. Abels/Kobusch 2010, 21‐23). The same holds true for the UK. But in the British case, many members of EFSA‘s panels are em‐ployed at the universities, which is not visible here due to the grouping. This highlights the decentralised character of British science. In fact, experts from Britain are in the majority in EFSA‘s panels (61) followed by Germany (58), France (55), Italy (38), the Netherlands (37),
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(30), Denmark (25) Spain (22) and Austria (19). Thus, we can see differences in the participa‐tion according to which relations we measure: ungrouped individual‐event relations or grouped event‐event data.
The results presented here have first tentative character. Anyhow, the data used can eas‐ily interpreted by using diverse measures and techniques of Social Network Analysis. For the time being, the mere interpretation by visualization shall offer enough insights to build wider research framework on it. For the arguments that follow in the next section a further mathematically inspired analysis is (at the moment) not necessary.
5. Further research directions Who is the hub?
„Network“ has become an omnipresent term both within politics and the social sciences. Both the General Food Law and the EFSA itself use the term "network" in order to describe the task of connecting national agencies and authorities. Because of the widespread use of the term, it appears nevertheless necessary to ask, whether we are really dealing with a network. In this sense it is important to distinguish between a metaphorical and an analytical understanding of the term. While most researchers concerned with agencies use the term network in a metaphorical way, I want to use the term first of all in reference to the analyti‐cal methods of Social Network Analysis (SNA) (Brandes/Schneider 2009)(Brandes/Schneider 2009). The results presented here give good evidence that at least an inter‐personal network is emerging. For the institutional side this is less straight‐forward. In a private session of the Management Board in January 2010, the inter‐personal character was stressed: „The inter‐action is depending too much on personal contacts and could benefit from a more struc‐tured approach. However, when introducing such approach it should be light and gentile and bureaucracy and heavy procedures should be avoided“ (Management Board of the European Food Safety Authority 2010, 2). Also, the role for national agencies is not that clear: „In summary, the Rapporteur highlighted that EFSA had a well‐defined role at EU level but cur‐rently the national agencies have not. Clarity about such a role at the EU level might be beneficial to the National Agencies, EFSA and DG SANCO“ (ibid).
When asking whether we are dealing with a network, the answer from a SNA perspective would certainly be positive. By a formal definition a “social network is a set of socially‐relevant nodes connected by one or more relations. Nodes, or network members, are the units that are connected by the relations whose patterns we study” (Marin/Wellman 2010). The question is nevertheless, whether the relations between EFSA and the national CAs ac‐count for a certain degree of density and stability over time that promise an analytical value from employing the term and using methods of network analysis. So far, the approach seems valuable.
When analytically and methodically accepting that EFSA and the CAs establish a network, the next question focuses on the general type of the network. From studying the General Food Law and the strategies on networking disseminated by EFSA one could easily under‐stand the network as a hub‐and‐spoke model with EFSA managing the relations with the national agencies which are not connected to each other. The data presented here, of course, underlines this conception. This is due to the character of the data as inevitably rela‐
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tions with EFSA were assessed in the data‐set. Contrary to this vision of a hub‐and‐spoke model, also a network of a clustered character with multiple smaller groups of intense con‐tact that are more loosely connected to each other is possible. In this model EFSA would be one but not the only central player (compare the blue highlighted node in figure 7). Conse‐quently, in a next research step the limitations of the data‐set in this respect shall be tran‐scended.
Figure 7: Ideal‐type network configurations
First of all, direct relations of the personal of the CAs within EFSA‘s panel establish a two path connection between CAs. In this vision, CAs are enabled to establish direct links to each other by using the acquaintance of the employees through EFSA. Employees meeting within EFSA‘s bodies are more likely to also communicate outside these structure. The higher the common representation in the panels is, the higher should also be the chances of contact outside of EFSA. Secondly, the cooperation within the EFSA framework should enable CAs to foster common projects without using EFSA‘s structures. Thus, a network without EFSA as hub could emerge. So far in the literature there is no reference to this point, but some pre‐liminary interviews and a statement by the German (BfR) and the French (AFSSA) food safety agency to deepen mutual collaboration suggest this assumption to be valid (Agra Informa 2009).
More data for better results? In order to test these assertions the data‐set can be expanded in four directions. (1) Build‐
ing on the data present so far indirect relations can be measured by „geodesic distances“ (Wasserman/Faust 1994, 110). Geodetics are the shortest walks between two nodes. In a network where all nodes are connected every actor (node) can reach every other actor, only the distance they have to walk differs. Geodesics are important to the measurement of cen‐trality and the question, whether some nodes build a cohesive subgroup. All this calculations are possible by mathematically manipulating the data presented here. (2) Nevertheless, also the size of the data set can be expanded. The DoI not only include information on the em‐
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ployer of the scientific experts, but also membership in other risk assessment bodies and management committees. First insights show, that especially the senior scientists are bound into a wide area of institutions within EU‐Member States, non Member States and interna‐tional organisations. Especially the relatively strong presence of American experts (n=11) highlights this aspect. Furthermore, the ties to management bodies can give important in‐sights on the practical validity of a separation between risk assessment and risk manage‐ment. So, a promising next step is to also code this data. (3) A weak spot of SNA is that the interpretation of the results heavily grounds on assumptions. The empirical evidence of af‐filiation can easily be overestimated as „having contact“ although experts may sit on a board together but not sharing any further interests or contact. Thus, further data shall be gener‐ated by both questionnaires and interviews. Here, qualitative data can perfectly interlock with the quantitative data and provide a measure of control. This also enables to distinguish between different relations16. (4) Also the data set can be expanded in a longitudinal per‐spective. As DoI are also accessible for the scientific experts holding their positions 2006‐2009, developments within the network can be sketched. In 2012 membership in the scien‐tific panels will be again renewed. This might offer the possibility to compare the network structure for three points in time (2006‐2009; 2009‐2012; 2012‐2015) and trace evolution processes.
Linking the levels: does domestic independence determine positions in the network
Theoretically, the various measurements for the centrality of an actor can be interpreted as an actor’s influence in the network. An agency with many direct connections (ties) can very easily communicate with other nodes in the network without interferences. As commu‐nication paths become longer the interferences grow, but there is still an indirect relation. Nevertheless, there might be central brokers on the path who can easily filter the communi‐cation or sneak in own interests. In the same instance the costs for maintaining connections grow with their number. Indirect connections, though in general more vulnerable, bear the advantage that the maintenance costs can be externalised to other actors. Usually the be‐tweenness measure is used to determine an actor’s structural autonomy. The higher the autonomy the more the central actor can monopolize the control of information and re‐sources and thus set the agenda (Jansen 2006, 127‐156).
This directly raises the question how the position of an actor is determined. This question cannot be answered by means of network analysis since the method describes only the form of the network at a given point of time t. My suggestion is that the position in the network is directly linked to the autonomy/independence and resources an agency has been granted in the national setting. The higher the autonomy of an actor the more easily the agent can take the initiative in dealing with partners. The higher the resources (in terms of staff and fi‐nance) the more connections can be hold and maintained. Thus, the domestic individual characteristics (or better – because theoretically more sound – the relative distribution among all agencies) of each actor are linked to the relational characteristics in the network.
16 On a very general level, ideal‐types of relations between actors can either be communication (that is the
exchange of information, norms or consensus‐building) or instrumental (that is the exchange of material goods and services) (Scott 2000, 30).
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From the data presented here it, there is some evidence to further elaborate on the ar‐guments unfolded. The actors with the most ties are situated in the largest Member States (France, Germany, UK). At the same time, also Denmark, the Netherlands, Austria and Swe‐den are very present (figure 6.). Here, one might wonder why exactly these countries have tightly involved agencies. One possible explanation was assessed in this paper by focusing on institutional structures (separated vs. integrated model). 4 of the 6 enumerated countries follow the separated logic. But still, this evidence is somewhat weak. It seems promising to refine on the classification by switching from a two‐model approach to a discrete measure for the autonomy/independence of agencies. I assume a link between formal independence and position in the network to exist.
How to determine independence? There are several approaches to quantify empirically the independence of bureaucratic
organizations or agencies (Gilardi 2005; 2008; Verhoest et al. 2004; Wonka/Rittberger 2009). Differing results are usually linked to different concepts and operationalizations of agency autonomy or independence (Wonka/Rittberger 2009, 2). Verhoest et al. also see this as main reason why any attempt to link agency independence to agency performance has so far been inconclusive (Verhoest et al. 2004, 102). Anyways, most attempts to build an index of agency independence build on the same elements of institutional designs.
First of all, two major concepts try to either grasp the formal (or de jure) independence or the behavioural (or de facto) independence of organizations. Maggetti draws on this work and investigates into the connection between formal and de‐facto independence. His start‐ing point is that formal independence not necessarily has to be linked to effective agency action. He rather understands de‐facto independence as
“effective independence of agencies as they manage day‐to‐day regulatory actions […]. Auton‐omy means, above all, to be able to translate one’s own preferences into authoritative actions, without external constraints […]. Therefore, I assume that the de facto independence of RAs can be seen as synthesis of two components: the self‐determination of agencies’ preferences, and their autonomy throughout regulatory competencies, that is during the activity of regulation” (Maggetti 2007, 272)17.
It is very plausible to take rather de‐facto independence as central indicator for agency ef‐fectiveness in its regulatory tasks where authoritative agency action is touched. Neverthe‐less, some major arguments point rather to using a formal index in this case risk assessment tasks:
risk assessment is conducted prior to any regulatory decision
risk assessment is probably not subject to as much exterior pressure as discrete regulatory decision‐making
17 Maggetti (2007) concludes from fuzzy‐set analysis that formal independence is neither a necessary, nor a
single sufficient condition for de‐facto independence. Rather it is sufficient in combination of a certain age of an agency and the number of veto players in the national system. De‐facto independence from the regu‐latees on the other hand is linked to low formal independence as an agency can either serve the politician (low formal independence) or the regulatees (high formal independence).
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at least EFSA is not very open to industrial lobbying activity18
as risk assessment is usually not occupied with single decisions both political and industrial pressure is limited
network building is even more remote from regulatory decision‐making, thus moni‐toring and intervention costs for principals should be comparatively high as benefits from intervention will be very limited
What I suggest is that any major political intervention or lobbying from industry is very unlikely in this case and probably any additional constraints will limit the discretion of the involved CAs. To rely on formal independence also seems appropriate concerning the items of the index. Some of the aspects of the institutional design measured by the index can eas‐ily be interpreted as enabling a successful networking strategy:
the Executive Director and the Management Board dispose both of a certain amount of discretion to act and hold office for an extended period of time in order to implement a long term strategy
the agency has a certain control both over the use of resources and the allotment of personal, thus the agency can build an effective interface for networking activities
the agency has a certain amount of discretion in its field of competency and can de‐cide on networking issues without checking back with government
Starting from the “Two Logics of delegation” formulated by Majone one can establish some assumptions on agency autonomy. First of all, when uncertainty concerning future events rises, so does the incentive for the principal to delegate more tasks to the agent (Epstein/O'Halloran 1994, 709). The rationale behind this is that the agent can react more flexibly and consequently efficiently to changing states of the world and also raising cost of collecting information are internalized by the agent19. At the same time, with an increase in delegation the installed control mechanism will also become more intense. This way, the principal tries to avoid the agent exploiting the additional competencies. As Christensen and Nielsen show, this theoretical assumption holds the empirical test (2010, 200). McCubbins uses the notion of “substantive discretion” to indicate the net autonomy an agency has (McCubbins 1985, 740). Thus, most simply, the formal independence of an agency derived from its founding statute can be defined as the delegated autonomy minus the procedural controls installed (Thatcher/Stone Sweet 2002, 5; Verhoest et al. 2004, 104). Both aspects are included in the index developed by Gilardi. For the time being, I will thus employ the Gi‐lardi index to measure the formal independence of the national agencies.20 Yet, I have not
18 A representative of a major European beverage company stated, that the companies rather try to get in
touch to Commission officials as here the political decisions are taken. Additionally the access to the Com‐mission seems to be rather easily to establish compared to EFSA, which is very cautious not to get in too much contact with the regulatees.
19 Another reason might be a blame‐shifting strategy: „By charging an agent with the implementation of a general regulatory mandate, legislators not only avoid the time and trouble of making specific decisions, the avoid or at least disguise their responsibility for the consequences of the decision ultimately made“ (Fiorina 1982, 47).
20 The index is problematic in some aspects. Especially the question of weightening the single dimensions is not easy. Gilardi emphasises that he does not weight the single items at all, but he implicitly does by build‐ing dimensions consisting of a varying number of items and afterwards taking average values (Gilardi 2002, 881‐883; 2007, 140‐143).
27
decided how to integrate my second assumption, that resources available will influence the position.
Gilardi presented some independence measures on food safety agencies in 2002. Unfor‐tunately, the data is limited to seven countries and no longer up to date.21 Only Sweden (SLV 0.48), Belgium (AFSCA 0.44), UK (FSA 0.41) and France (0.37) are ranked. In 2005 he pub‐lished average values over different sectors also comprising food safety. The countries with the most independent agencies overall were Ireland, United Kingdom, Sweden, France, Norway and Denmark. While the Netherlands range in the mid, Austria and Germany (sec‐ond lowest) scored rather low (Gilardi 2005, 141). So far, compared to the findings in Section 4, this evidence is only partly conclusive. Belgium did not feature among hosting one of the important agencies at all, Germany and France as central players contradict the argument brought for because their agencies, according to Gilardi, are among the lesser autonomous. Solely Sweden and Britain are somewhat matching the assumptions. But anyhow, this no reason to dismiss the assumptions made, as the data has definitively has to be updated in order to give a conclusive account. Still, the data presented also suggest country size, re‐sources and staffing22 to have major influence. In same way this needs to be balanced in the data‐set.
Position, position, position... Is it all about position? In the last paragraphs, I linked the individual attributes of the actors and the attributes of
the relations between the actors. The attributes of the agencies are determined by the insti‐tutional design laid down in their founding regulations. These attributes of the agencies will determine the position hold in the network. I assume different positions in the network to offer different possibilities and constraints for the actor holding this position. The more ties a position provides, the higher is the centrality in the network. At the same time the position will raise higher costs, as the ties have to be maintained by a sufficient number of employees and a certain amount of resources.
And does it influence the formulation of standards? When it comes to the development of common assessment standards, the second major
goal of EFSA, the chance of every actor to bring in its interests should also be linked to its position. Generally it is not to be expected that one actor can push through its own standard as the system is missing any shadow of hierarchy. Rather, the system constitutes a competi‐tive market where every agency tries to promote its own standard in order to avoid adaption costs and to promote its own interests. EFSA itself probably tries to centralize important parts of the (scientific) framing in order to establish a scientific point of reference. The nu‐merous participatory procedures and working group meetings related to assessment stan‐dards hint to a very long process of both negotiation and deliberation.
The difficulties in harmonising risk assessment standards became very clear in the Man‐agement Board‘s private session in January 2010: „The German member (DE) mentioned the
21 For example, in 2002 the agencies in Germany and the Netherlands were not yet founded, thus Gilardi ac‐
counts for 0 independence as the task lay with the government; cf. Abels/Kobusch (2010, 34‐37). In his 2008 publication on delegation and regulatory agencies, unfortunately Gilardi did unfortunately not provide for new figures on food safety agencies concerning the cases selected here (Gilardi 2008).
22 For example staffing ranges from 1.400 in the Austrian case of AGES to 8 in the case of the Hungarian MÉHIB. Cf. the case studies on Austria and Hungary in Abels/Kobusch (2010, 19‐25).
28
complexity of EU cooperation processes [and] competition for scientific expertise [...]. The main comments by Board members included the need for EU risk assessment and harmo‐nised risk assessment methodologies [...]. Areas that were not as effective included har‐monisation (due to lack of agreement at MS level) [...]. Further progress is required however and closer cooperation between national risk assessment authorities and EFSA units particu‐larly in relation to risk assessment approaches was desirable“ (Management Board of the European Food Safety Authority 2010, 1).
Following the above assumptions the chances of a central actor should be considerably higher to influence the results than those of a peripheral actor. By means of their position central actors can more easily process information and raise allies via their relations. Sec‐ondly, there is not only an individual but also a collective dimension. As the overall density of the network grows and ties become closer the more efficient should the cooperation be. On the one hand by means of socialization, learning and mutual adoption the interests of the agencies involved should become more homogenous (Knill/Tosum 2009, 7). On the other hand mere efficiency mechanisms should be at work because more information becomes available and can be more easily exchanged. This should not only have consequences for the development of risk assessment standards but also for example for the detection of emerg‐ing risk, risk notifications and single risk assessment processes.
...and policy? When we shift attention to the outcome of the whole process, the mere development of
standards has not any effect on policy outcomes, as long as the risk assessments based on these standards are not central to the decision‐makers choice. But, the more coherence the scientific expertise has, the higher should be the chances that the decision‐maker will follow the assessment: on the one hand the relations of the actors in the risk assessment situation should become denser as interactions in the network increase which should increase the reputation of both EFSA and the national agencies. On the other hand the specific risk as‐sessments will become more coherent and thus more authoritative. As a consequence the risk managers‘ set of available actions might become smaller in the sense that the pressure to follow the risk assessors increases.
At a first glance, this framework might seem scientifically unsound, as I conclude from in‐dividual attributes on structural ones. Nevertheless, this is quite common for the social net‐work perspective that “emphasizes multiple levels of analysis. Differences among actors are traced to the constraints and opportunities that arise from how they are embedded in net‐works“ (Hanneman/Riddle 2005, ch. 7). As the development of standards is in this view tied to the structure of the network, so is the structure of the network to the individual charac‐terisation of the actors involved. This is not very usual in network analysis as network rela‐tions cannot be purely deducted from individual characteristics as they result from charac‐teristics between actors. Nevertheless, the conclusions I draw seem to be valid because
the independence of actors should be linked to the centrality of positions they hold, as actors with similar characteristics will hold similar positions (Marin/Wellman 2010).
the chances an actor has in influencing the formulation of standards depends on the characteristics of the position it holds (Marin/Wellman 2010).
29
This way, the design establishes a connection between “conventional data” (the actors and their attributes) and “network data” (the relations between actors) (Hanneman/Riddle 2005, ch. 1) and thus both describes the form of the network and explains it origin.
6. Conclusion: Developing harmonized standards – a question of positions? This paper presented work in progress. Starting from a very detailed analysis of EFSA’s in‐
stitutional design (Kobusch 2008) and assistance to a study conducted by the German Fed‐eral Institute for Risk Assessment (2009) I have identified differing expertise by risk assess‐ment institutions as a major challenge to the legitimacy of expertise in the political process. EFSA’s institutional design foresees some mechanisms to avoid scientific divergence. As most important mechanism appears the network‐building by EFSA. By 2011 EFSA is supposed to establish a well functioning network between national risk assessment institutions. By 2016 this network is supposed to have developed harmonized risk assessment methods and stan‐dards.
I started out in Section 2 with the observation that we are facing a fragmented regulatory space in European food safety regulation. Despite major reforms on the European level, regulatory designs on national level exhibit a great variance of structural designs. In order to grant some comparability for differing agencies I then introduced two main models for risk assessment: a separated and a integrated one. This mainly reflects the (non‐)separation be‐tween risk assessment and risk management in the regulatory process. The hypothesis was that similar structures with EFSA should facilitate participation in EFSA‘s scientific panels. I then shortly turned to EFSA to show how problems arising from the fragmented regulatory space are reflected in EFSA‘s internal design (Section 3). Credible commitments and reputa‐tion become major resources in this space, where no „shadow of hierarchy“ prevails. EFSA‘s task to establish an interagency network largely aims at overcoming the coordination prob‐lems in the regulatory space. Based on an original data‐set on membership in EFSA‘s scien‐tific panels I established an inter‐institutional affiliation network using techniques of Social Network Analysis (Section 4). Comparing the different institutional models with the strong‐est integrated agencies in the network showed only partly conclusive. Accordingly I spelt out further research directions assuming that the functioning of the network and the prospect of developing common assessment standards is linked to varying degrees of institutional inde‐pendence of national risk assessment bodies in the domestic setting (Section 5). The further research hypotheses formulated are as follows:
1. In European food safety regulation a network between EFSA and national Competent Authorities is evolving. This can be characterised as a cluster‐model. Thus the position of each actor in the network influences its scope for action.
2. The position of an actor in the network depends on its independence and resources granted in the national setting. The higher the independence and resources of an ac‐tor, the higher is his centrality in the network.
3. The scope of action is depending on the position of the actor. The higher the centrality of an actor in the network, the higher are his chances to exceed influence in the net‐work.
30
4. The influence an actor can exceed on the harmonisation of risk assessment standards depends on his position. The higher the centrality of an actor, the higher are his chances to influence the formulation of a standard.
5. If the network can develop a common risk assessment standard the coherence of sci‐entific opinions will grow. The higher the coherence of the scientific expertise, the higher are the chances that political decision‐makers will incorporate the expertise in their decision.
Concluding, all the assumptions made above lead to the overarching question what the con‐sequence of network‐building in food safety regulation will have on governance processes (and governance by networks) in the EU in general. The literature has made some efforts to show the changing pattern of governance according to the explosion in numbers of inde‐pendent agencies. Yet, we are missing more detailed insights what are the influences of their functioning and networking on governance. The General Food Law and EFSA in particular are prominent examples for experiments in new forms of governance. Especially in the case of risk assessment harmonization there is no “shadow of hierarchy” since none of the actors involved has the power to authorize and enforce a common standard. If EFSA is successful in developing a common standard this will demonstrate the importance of networking for the voluntary harmonization of standards. In the same instance, the success of the network would considerably strengthen the agencies and make it even harder for the Member States to bring legitimate non‐scientific factors in. Facing a coherently uttered scientific expertise Member States could hardly reason a departure from this expertise on scientific grounds but would need managerial reasons. On the one hand this would bring an end to the “politiciza‐tion of science” (Weingart) and depoliticize part of the policy‐cycle. On the other hand this newly demands for a thoroughly legitimation of the provision of expertise. Decisions could become more efficient (Majone) but at the same time a reasonable access for citizens, inter‐est organisation, business associations and stakeholder needs to be secured and transpar‐ency to be provided.
31
Appendix: Risk Assessment Institutions in Europe
Country Separation RA and RM
Institution(s) conducting RA Focal Point Members ofAdvisory Forum
European Union Fully separated EFSA EFSA EFSA Austria Largely sepa‐
rated Austrian Agency for Health and Food Safety (AGES)
AGES AGES
Belgium No separation Federal Public Service for Health, Food Chain Safety and Environment (FPS); Federal Agency for the Safety of the Food Chain (FASFC)
FPS FPS; FASFC
Bulgaria Some separation Ministry of Agriculture and Food (MZH); Ministry of Health (MH); Minis‐try of Environment and Water Bodies (MOEW); National Centre for Public Health Protection (NCPHP)
NCPHP MH; National Veterinary Service
Cyprus No separation Ministry of Health (MOH) MOH MOH
Czech Republic No separation Ministry of Agriculture(MZE); Ministry of Health (MZ)
MZE MZE
Denmark Largely sepa‐rated
National Food Institute (DTU); Faculty of Agricultural Sciences (DJF)
DTU DTU
Estonia Some separation Health Inspection Directorate (TKI); Veterinary and Food Board (VTA); Plant Production Inspectorate (TTI)
Ministry of Agriculture (PM)
PM
Finland Fully separated Finnish Food Safety Authority (Evira) Evira Evira
France Fully separated French Food Safety Agency (AFSSA) AFFSA AFSSA
Germany Largely sepa‐rated
Federal Institute for Risk Assessment (BfR); Federal Environmental Agency (UBA)
BfR BfR
Greece No separation Ministry for Rural Development and Food (YAAT); Ministry of Health and Social Welfare (YYKA); Hellenic Food Authority (EFET)
EFET EFET
Hungary Largely sepa‐rated
Hungarian Food Safety Office (MÉBIH) MÉBIH MÉBIH
Ireland No separation Food Safety Authority of Ireland (FSAI); Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (DAFF)
FSAI FSAI
Italy No separation Ministry of Labour, Health and Social Affairs (MLSPS); National Health Insti‐tute (ISS)
ISS MLSPS
Latvia No separation Food and Veterinary Service (PVD); State Plant Protection Service (VAAD)
PVD PVD
Lithuania Some separation National Food and Veterinary Risk Assessment Institute (NMVRVI); State Environment Health Centre (VASC); State Plant Protection Service (VAAT)
VASC NMVRVI; State Food and Veteri‐nary Service
32
Country Separation RA and RM
Institution(s) conducting RA Focal Point Members of Advi‐sory Forum
Luxembourg No separation Organisation for the Safety and Qual‐ity of the Food Chain (OSQCA); Agricul‐tural Technical Services Administration (ASTA); Veterinary Service Administra‐tion (ASV); Direction of Public Health (DIR SAN)
OSQCA Ministry of Agri‐culture; OSQCA
Malta No separation Food Safety Commission (FSC); Malta Standards Authority (MSA)
MSA FSC; MSA
Netherlands Largely sepa‐rated
Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority (VWA)34; Plant Protection Service (PD); Central Veterinary Insti‐tute (CVI); Institute of Food Safety (RIKILT); National Institute of Public Health and the Environment (RIVM)
VWA (BuR) VWA
Poland Some separation National Food and Nutrition Institute (IZZ); National Institute of Public Health ‐ National Institute of Hygiene (NIZP‐PZH); National Veterinary Re‐search Institute (PIWET)
Ministry of Health (MZ)
MZ
Portugal No separation Economy and Food Safety Standards Authority (ASAE); Directorate‐General for veterinary Issues in the Ministry of Agriculture (DGV)
ASAE ASAE
Romania No separation Ministry of Agriculture, Forests and Development of Rural Areas (MAPDR); Ministry of Health (MS); Ministry of Environment (MM); National Sanitary Veterinary and Food Safety Authority (ANSVSA)
ANSVSA ANSVSA
Slovakia Largely sepa‐rated
Ministry of Health (MZ); Research Institute for Food (VÚP)
Ministry of Agriculture (MP)
MP; State Veteri‐nary and Food Authority
Slovenia No separation Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Food (MKGP); Ministry of Health (MZ)
MKGP Institute of Public Health
Spain No separation Ministry of Environment, Rural and Marine Affairs (MARM); Ministry of Health and Social Policy (MSPS); Span‐ish Food Safety and Nutrition Agency (ASEAN)
ASEAN ASEAN
Sweden No separation National Food Administration (SLV); Swedish Board of Agriculture (JV); National Veterinary Institute (SVA)
SLV SLV; JV; SVA
United Kingdom No separation Food Standard Agency (FSA); Depart‐ment for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra)
FSA FSA
33
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