Knowledge and society facing the risk of bird flu

in Turkey

Berna Beyhan* and Huriye Aygoren**

*STPS, Middle East Technical University, Ankara Turkey **STS, Istanbul Technical University, Istanbul, Turkey

September, 2006

__________________________________________________________________ Abstract: Turkey first faced bird flu in October 2005. After a 20 days quarantine period, the government announced that “bird flu was completely exterminated in Turkey”. However, in January 2006 public anxiety had been alerted with the first human death and three more followed. This sad experience has brought about questions regarding to (1) the construction and communication of knowledge which is essential to the public perception of risk; (2) the perceived performance and trustworthiness of institutions and agents in terms of responding to risk related issues.

In this research, our perspective is that these questions are essential to understand the relationship between knowledge and society in terms of construction, perception and communication of risk. Mainly, three institutions are analyzed in this research: government, the representative body of medical scientists and mass media. This research is organized through two phases. In the first phase, press releases, reports and programs published by these institutions are analyzed. In the second phase we present the findings we deducted from face-to-face interviews with lay people who live in two different cities, Istanbul and Van.

__________________________________________________________________ Introduction: Turkey first faced bird flu in October 2005, however public anxiety had been alerted with the first human death and three more followed in early January, 2006. This sad experience has brought about questions regarding to, first, the construction and communication of knowledge which is essential to the public perception of risk; and second the perceived performance and trustworthiness of institutions and agents in terms of responding to risk related issues. This

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research is inspired by the desire to examine the construction, mediation and communication of different knowledge claims based on the concept of risk in Turkish Society by tracing emergence of bird flu within the society. Our study covers a period of one year i.e. from August 2005 to date.

Risk scholars agree that, even if the concept of risk is taken as purely physical, ‘such physical risks are always created and effected in social systems, for example by organizations and institutions which are supposed to manage and control the risky activity’, in addition the magnitude of the physical risks is therefore a direct function of the quality of social relations and processes (Lash and Wynne, 1992, p:4). Therefore, it can be argued that explanation and interpretation of risk attitudes mandates an examination of different knowledge claims while considering particularly different interests of and complex interrelationships between involving institutions in contemporary times.

While discussing the significance of knowledge raised in risk discourses in the late modern era, Beck (1992), emphasizes the complex interrelationhips between these entities and how knowledge, especially the scientific knowledge, gains an economic and political significance which was a rarity before, modern and pre-modern times, in effect he argues ‘in modern times being determined consciousness but in risk positions consciousness (knowledge) determines being’ (p: 23). On the other hand, for Mary Douglas (1992), the concept of knowledge in relation to risk possesses static significance since in risk situations knowledge is always insufficient and ambiguities surrounding the area are always a part of risky-situations, rather what is significant about knowledge is to what extent the knowledge represents the political regime one supports (p:19). In other words, the cultural worldviews in essence are responses to risk issues; moreover they are ‘complicit in the production of risks’ (Lupton, 1999, p: 51), thus knowledge in risk discourses should be inquired within socio-cultural processes.

Informed by these accounts, we examine Turkish society’s responses towards the risk of bird flu within the social and cultural frameworks. Moreover, as emphasized by Adam and van Loon (2000, p:3), in our research, we aimed to challenge not only ‘to analyze people’s perceptions, definitions and legitimations of risks’ but also to explore “the mutual constitution of implicit assumptions’ and ‘mediation of otherwise inaccessible knowledge”. Thus the knowledge claims raised by the social, political, scientific and economic actors and by the public in their everyday lives have been scrutinized by considering the issue’s complexity and involving the parties’ responses through their specific characteristics, interests and interdependencies.

We construct our research mainly in three distinct spheres. The first part, is a background section, we examine mainly three different institutions: the government, national and local media and Turkish Medical Association (NGO) through several media outcomes, news, TV programs, press releases, secondary resorces and face-to-face interviews.

Briefly, the socio-cultural and economic conditions of people, who experienced poultry and human deaths due to bird flu, were which the government concentrated on. In addition the government relied on the the power of mass media to communicate this constructed knowledge

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to the public. Therefore, the construction of risk by mass media was mostly in line with the government’s stance towards bird flu and limited its coverage with the concerns of the public living in urbanized areas. On the other hand, in the local media, local concerns of lay people were dominantly voiced.

Turkish Medical Association constructed risk knowledge both based on the universal scientific information as well as putting into consideration the special conditions of the country. The Association critically assessed the government’s way of managing the risk and their crical opposition was, in fact, a response to non-autonomous characteristics of science and / or scientists in Turkey

In the findings section, we examine lay people’s responses through face-to-face interviews held in two different cities, Istanbul and Van. The findings reveal that the interviewees construct and communicate risk knowledge based on a set of different factors which are dynamicly prioritized relying upon weighted importance of these for the interviewees. Hence, the public respond through perceived performance and trustworthiness of the involving institutions, their sense of ability to access to eligible information, their personal experiences, daily routines, economic and social factors, constructed social and cultural identities.

In our conclusion and further thoughts section, we compare and investigate our findings in order to articulate the interrelationships and conflicts raised by different entities. This section proposes deeper discussions on the way to explaining the risk issue in a broader context; ideally, operationalizing risk disputes in a non-western society. Theoretical Framework The relation between knowledge and risk has attracted the attention of sociologists and anthropologists over the last two decades. In social scientific literature the phenomenon of risk and its relationship with knowledge are addressed in different ways. One major approach to risk is that of cognitive science, based in psychology. According to this perspective, risks are out there in nature and they can be identified through scientific measurement and calculation and, controlled using knowledge. This perspective is mainly interested in identifying the ways in which people respond cognitively and behaviourally to risk (Lupton, 1999, p: 17-9). On the other hand, socio-cultural perspective’s emphasis on the importance of social and cultural contexts in which risk is understood and negotiated are also worth noting. In this paper our theoretical framework will be limited within the different understandings of risk and risk knowledge in socio-cultural perspectives.

One of the prominent figures in risk studies, Mary Douglas (1992) defines risk as a socially constructed interpretation; and according to her, knowledge about risk is mediated through socio-cultural processes (p: 39). In her view, risk does not depend on mere knowledge but also on what kind of people we are; between science and subjective perception of risk, therein lays culture which is an area of shared beliefs and values (Caplan, 2000, p:8). While her

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theoretical approach has been influential as a perspective which first emphasizes that risk judgements are constructed through cultural frameworks, her approach is criticized as tending to be static in some ways, especially in providing explanations for how things might change with regards to risk and danger (Lupton, 1999, p:56)

On the other hand, Beck (1992) much more prioritizes knowledge, especially expert knowledge systems. According to him (p: 23), risks “can be changed, magnified, dramatized and minimized within knowledge”, and “in risk positions consciousness determines being”; so “knowledge gains a new political significance”. Beck (p: 46) argues that the social and economic importance of knowledge and therefore the power over the media to structure and disseminate it grows simultaneously in risk society. However, throughout these arguments, Beck can be criticized for giving credence to the role of experts to define and construct risks and perspectives on risk provided by expert knowledge systems (Lupton, 1999, p:108). At this point it is important to reveal the notions of risk society and reflexivity in Beck’s analysis.

According to Beck (1992), the concept of risk must be understood within the interests and institutional designs of modernity. Along with the notions of modernity, Beck projects his thesis based on three distinctive but not mutually exclusive phases. First phase is pre-modernity (feudal era), the second is simple or first modernity and the last is reflexive modernity. In his projection, the first modernity is mapped to the industrial society and the reflexive modernity to the ‘risk society’ in which wealth distribution is replaced by risk distribution (p: 21). Beck (p: 22) defines risk “as a systemic way of dealing with hazards and insecurities induced and introduced by modernization itself”.

In Beck’s terms (1992, p: 72), “risk consciousness is neither a traditional nor a lay person’s consciousness, but is essentially determined by and oriented to the science”, because “everyday consciousness does not see, and can not perceive most of the risks such as radioactivity, pollutants or threats in the future” (p:73). What that means is that public lose their cognitive sovereignty; the harmful, threatening, inimical lies in wait everywhere, but whether it is inimical or friendly is beyond one’s own power of judgment, and is reversed for the assumptions, methods and controversies of external knowledge producers” (p: 53). But the issue is that the shifted meaning and erosion of the position and role of science in the risk society mostly results from “the science’s insistence on strict proof of causality” (p: 63), “intensive forms of specialization” and “economic cyclopia of techno-scientific rationality” (p: 60). Hence ‘the history of the growing consciousness and social recognition of risks coincides with the history of the demystification of the sciences (p:59). Therefore this failure of techno-scientific rationality in the face of growing risks lies in the origin of the critique of science and technology (p: 59). In this sense “the ‘risk society’ is also potentially a self-critical or self-reflexive society, because anxieties about risks serve to pose questions about current practices” (Lupton and Tulloch, 2002, p: 318). This situation brought about scepticisms on lay people’s side when accepting the judgements and advice of experts on face value but actively seeking their trust in them by assessing their worth and credibility (ibid.).

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Therefore we can argue that, according to Beck, people do not evaluate the risk definitions of experts as taken for granted because people are aware of conflicts and disagreements among various expert knowledge systems and therefore they try to attain as much information as possible before assessing their worth and credibility. Information and knowledge are important in risk society to define and avoid risks and so people are more dependent on knowledge and information. To Beck (p: 46), risk society is “also science, media and information society”.

However, Beck is criticized for his notion of reflexivity since it presupposes a rational calculating actor who chooses rationally between various perspectives on risk provided by expert knowledge systems (Lupton, 1999, p: 108). Moreover Wynne (1996, p: 45) argues that what Beck does is the uncritical reproduction of realists concept of scientific knowledge and therefore overlooks the lay knowledge and misconceives its relationships with expert knowledge (p: 59). According to Wynne (1992, p: 281-2) people’s experience of risks can never be a purely intellectual process, about reception of knowledge rather they experience these in the form of material social relations and they define and judge the risk, the risk information and the scientific knowledge related to this risk as part and parcel of that social package. For Wynne (p: 283), “understanding and knowledge is a function of social solidarity mediated by the relational elements of trust, dependency and social identity”. Therefore Wynne (1993, p: 324) expands the definition of the notion of reflexivity as “the process of identifying, and critically examining the basic, pre-analytic assumptions that frame knowledge-commitments”. With this definition of reflexivity, Wynne recognizes the ways in which lay people generate their own situated knowledge in constructing risks and responding to experts’ interpretations and definitions on risk (Lupton, 1999, p: 108).

Wynne (1996, p: 50) argues that public relationships with expertise and its institutions has always been reflexive in a more hermeneutical sense than the rational – calculative model. Wynne also criticizes the notion of trust in experts and their institutions; according to him the trust of public to experts and their institutions is not a positive trust but a ‘virtual’ or ‘as-if’ trust; this means that “even when people do… believe and trust in them, this trust is much more conditional and indeed more fragile than the notion of simple modernity reflects”. Thus lay relationships with expertise are routinely more skeptical, more ambivalent and more alienated from expert institutions (p: 52). Lash and Wynne (1992; p:7) highlight that lay people’s response to risk is not a response to expert knowledge systems as Beck underlines but it is multi-layered as a form of private reflexivity (Lupton, 1999, p: 109). This kind of reflexivity blurs the boundaries between the ‘private’ and the ‘public’; therefore risks may be debated at the level of expertise and public accountability, and are dealt with by individuals at the level of the local, the private, the everyday and the intimate (Lupton and Tulloch, 2001, p:14).

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Research design and methodology This study covers two phases of research. In the first phase, our research is based on secondary resources, especially on media coverage, both national and local, press releases of the government and experts, in particular, Turkish Medical Association. Second phase of the research is constructed on the base of face to face in-depth interviews to understand how lay people had constructed the knowledge of bird flu risk.

In this second phase, qualitative research methods were used, to be more specific, in-depth interviews. A range of lay people living in Istanbul and Van were interviewed. These two cities were chosen due to disparities exemplified below. Istanbul was chosen, first of all, because it is the biggest city in Turkey. Its population is ten times more than Van’s. Second, it is economically a well developed city, with its 22,1% share in total GDP. Third, the share of university and high school graduates are 7% and 14.7% respectively in Istanbul. On the other hand, the share of Van in total GDP is just 0.5 %; and education level decreases to 2.75% and 9.3% respectively1

Apart from these demographic figures; Istanbul is geographically far away – nearly 1700 kilometers - from the region where human death cases of bird flu had been occurred. However, people living in Van experienced, if not the human death cases, but the human infections. Moreover, many infected patients were treated at the university hospital in Van.

Above all, previous studies carried out by Caplan’s (2000) study of British people’s responses to the BSE (or mad cow disease) and Lupton and Tulloch’s (2002) study on risk as a part of life were the guides for our decision to choose two different locations. As expressed by Lupton and Tulloch (2003, p:10) the geographical and social context in which people made their decisions is very vital for people to construct the knowledge regarding to risk and their risk perceptions.

Our overall sampling strategy was purposeful; it was focused on purposefully selected cases. As emphasized by Patton (1990, p:169) the logic and power of this kind of sampling lie in selecting information-rich cases for study in depth. There are several different strategies for purposefully selecting information-rich cases. The logic of each strategy serves a particular evaluation purpose. Moreover there is no one and the most appropriate strategy. What strategy you choose depends on what you want to get at the end.

While doing our research in these two cities, our sampling strategy was maximum variation (Patton, 1990, 172). With this strategy, we aimed to capture and describe the central themes. However, while using this strategy, our aim was not to generalize findings of this research to all people or all groups but we looked for information that elucidates variations and significant common patterns within that variation. 1 These statistical data were taken from the Turkish Statistical Institute [www.tuik.gov.tr]

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Participants were interviewed by us; however they were reached by gatekeepers who were local residents of cities with established local social-networks. We used these gatekeepers’ pre-existing social networks and snowball-sampling for recruiting participants. In Istanbul we contacted to three gatekeepers, one is the local resident of a small providence where middle and lower middle class families are located, the second one is the owner of a textile company who provided us an access to qualified and unqualified employees; the third one is the local resident of a providence where, in general, upper middle class families prefer to live. Our aim to choose these gatekeepers was not to reemphasize the importance of social class and occupation as the primary determinant of socio cultural identity but rather to explore Beck’s (1992) notion of industrial modernity and risk modernity in an intensively urbanized metropolis like Istanbul including both high tech industries and traditional sectors. In Van, we contacted to two gatekeepers both were the local residents of the city.

We interviewed 26 people in Istanbul and 14 in Van, individually. Their ages differ between 18 and 65. All these participants were interviewed in their houses or offices. These interviews, except 5 in Istanbul and 4 in Van, were recorded, however since these nine individuals do not want us to record, we just took notes.

The interviews we used in this research were semi-structured and directed at investigating participants’ experiences and knowledge of bird flu as a risk threatening their lives in the context of their everyday lives. Although our interview schedule covers certain topics and themes, we were not strict on the structure and time while doing these interviews. We covered all topics in our interviews but also there was a scope for flexibility and we let our interviewees to explain their concerns and anxieties about the topic. We believe that, semi-structured interviews allowed for a much freer exchange between us and our interviewees.

As aware of that analysis in qualitative researches depends on clarity of purpose (Patton, 1990, p:374) and there are no absolute rules to fairly represent the data, and communicate what the data reveal given the purpose of the study (p: 372), we tried to follow the ways of analysis made previous studies on risk and risk knowledge. In this study, the data were analyzed for the ways in which the interviewees understand the risk, construct the knowledge regarding to the risk in their everyday lives and percept the risk. Our focus is to identify dominant discourses, shared values, ways and experiences and also explore the differences among perceptions and discourses of people who live in different locations and socio cultural geographies. As a conclusion, we need to emphasize that despite maximum variation sampling strategy, we cannot claim that our findings can be generalized to all Turkish population or even all population in these two cities. What we claim is limited with our argument that the in-depth data collected in this research is valuable to understand how our interviewees understand risk, expert knowledge, and how they construct and communicate the knowledge regarding to the risk of bird flu in their everyday lives in the light of their previous experiences, daily routines and cultures.

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Institutional response towards the risk of bird flu

First Wave: No human death case

Long before it was perceived as a risk to society, bird flu news were broadcasted on Turkish TV screens and newspapers mostly as a disease that affected Far East Asia; more like a reality of people living far away. The national contact or news about bird flu disease first appeared in mass media in August 2005 to inform the society about the bird flu practice and an urgent plan as a bureaucratic event recommended by European Union yet there was no real threat. 2

On the 7th of October 2005, the Turkish society was greeted with the news of the death of two thousand turkeys’ at one of the farms in Manyas, a small town in the western Anatolia. The declaration of the ministry of agriculture briefly stated that the virus caused poultry deaths was not the same virus which had brought human death cases in Asia and thus there was no threat to humans. However, the government took preventive actions such as announcing a start of the quarantine period in this particular region and culling poultries fed in farms but not in industrial poultry farms, dogs and cats on streets in order to prevent the spread of the disease to further areas.3 In the days that followed, representatives of the government, including, the Prime Minister and Minister of Agriculture blamed media channels for creating “information pollution”, thus, exaggerating the issue.4

A few days later, European Union Commission declared that, the virus caused poultry deaths was the same virus which could bring human deaths.5 This information was echoed both in the internal market, which slowed down sales of poultry meat, eggs and egg-based products, and abroad there was a ban on importing poultry from Turkey. The government however kept its stance towards moderating the anxiety smoothly by inculcating the danger as if the ‘disease was certainly limited within a particular area’ which was completely under control.6

However, on the 16th of October, CNN Turk TV announced that 6500 Chickens had died in Ağrı, a city in the eastern Anatolia7. It was reported that these chickens had been purchased from Bursa/Inegol, a town in the western Anatolia, in order to be sold in this region. Nevertheless, government representatives never made a declaration regarding to this case in particular. Later in January, The Prime Minister’s speech brought some suspicions and queries 2 CNNTurk. 2005, August, 28. Online:http://www.cnnturk.com/arama/haber_detay.asp?PID=00318&haberID=121144 3 Milliyet. 2005, October, 09. Online: http://www.milliyet.com/2005/10/09/yasam/ayas.html 4 CNNTurk. 2005, October, 10. Online: http://www.cnnturk.com/arama/haber_detay.asp?PID=00318&haberID=131373 5 European Commission Press Releases: Avian Flu in Turkey. 2005, October, 11.Reference: IP/05/1244. Online: http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/05/1244&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en 6 CNNTurk. 2005, October, 15. Online: http://www.cnnturk.com/arama/haber_detay.asp?PID=00318&haberID=132715 7 CNNTurk. 2005, October, 16. Online: http://www.cnnturk.com/TURKIYE/haber_detay.asp?PID=318&HID=2&haberID=132808

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regarding the circulation of economically absolute poultry all over Turkey by some firms. He said in his speech on national TV: “The migrating birds are not the only reason for the bird flu”.8 Such news were circulated, reported and speculated upon by a few media channels discussing the speed with which the bird flu disease had been spread all over.

From October to late December, the prevalent concern about the bird flu mostly had been reflected in the frame of the poultry industry’s reduced internal sales and exporting opportunities. Fortunately, after the end of a 21 day quarantine period, on the 9th of December the Minister of Agriculture announced that “The bird flu had been completely exterminated in Turkey”9 as a consequence of the effective operations of the ministry in the region. After this explanation, Turkey as a country sighed with deep relief until the 27th of December when there seemed to be a resurrection of the bird flu in Aralik/AGDIR, a border town in the Eastern Anatolia as was reported.10 The explanation of the ministry came just after: Since there was no industrial poultry in this region, no need to worry about this case in terms of poultry industry and ‘the society’.11

Second Wave: Four children died

A new year opened up with an unpleasant and foggy atmosphere in Turkey under the shadow of human death cases of bird flu. Four children of the same family were examined under the suspicion that they might have been infected by the virus in Van. The sample tissues were sent to the expert laboratory in Ankara (Capital city) to be examined12; however, a day later, the eldest child died. Laboratory examination did not indicate the existence of the virus in the samples, and the reason of the death was announced as pneumonia. 13. However, the doctors treating the patients in the university hospital in Van insisted upon further examination.14 Government Spokeperson, Cemil Çiçek, accused them of obtrusiveness.15 Two days later, it was correctly reported that the real reason for the human death was the bird flu virus.16 In the days that followed, two children from the same family also died due to this virus.17 There deaths served as 8 TGRT Haber. 2006, January, 28. Online: http://www.tgrthaber.com.tr/news_view.aspx?guid=bf9c1d7e-e18a-4c59-a1f4-e89907741232 9 Milliyet. 2005, December, 10. Online: http://www.milliyet.com.tr/2005/12/10/yasam/axyas02.html , CNNTurk. 2005, December, 09. Online: http://www.cnnturk.com/arama/haber_detay.asp?PID=00318&haberID=144951 10 The governorship of Igdir. Online Web Release on Bird Flu. Online: http://www.igdir.gov.tr/KUSGRIBI.DOC 11 CNNTurk. 2005, December, 27. Online: http://www.cnnturk.com/arama/haber_detay.asp?PID=00318&haberID=148815 12 CNNTurk. 2005, December,31. Online: http://www.cnnturk.com/arama/haber_detay.asp?PID=00318&haberID=149549 13 CNNTurk. 2006, January ,02. Online: http://www.cnnturk.com/TURKIYE/haber_detay.asp?PID=318&HID=1&haberID=8189 14 Devletim. 2006, January, 05. Online: http://www.devletim.com/gundem.asp?konu=28 15 NTV-MSNBC. 2006, January, 07. Online: http://www.ntv.com.tr/news/356716.asp 16 CNNTurk. 2006, January, 04. Online: http://www.cnnturk.com/arama/haber_detay.asp?PID=00318&haberID=150460 17 Hurriyet. 2006, January, 05. Online: http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/3742738.asp?gid=0 ,

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a mode of disserminating information about the disease around the country while also elevating human fear and suspicions. In this period, the news of infected poultry were reported from other regions but the reported cases of human infection were limited with in the eastern part of Anatolia. Information released, on the 9th of the January revealed that the disease was on a fast steady increase it was reported that the pandemic was now in 17 cities; and on the 12th of January it spread out over 25 cities. 18

An impending religious holiday that involves a ritual of sacrificing cattle and sheep raised the anxiety level for the public especially after people had died. Turkish Medical Association persistently warned the government to take precautions about the risky situation since the sacrificed animals would be transferred from the eastern cities to the other regions. Their claim was that the virus might be carried during the transportation of these animals.19 The Prime Minister assessed this argument as inappropriate, and his response was sharp: “The ones who are supposed to talk should talk”. In turn, the Association replied that they believed that, as a scientific institution, they had the right and expertise to talk about the issues concerning the public health and added that they were targeted as hostiles to Islam, thus they declared that the association did not appreciate those who responded to their warning with religious sensitivities.20

On the government side, even though, the ministry of agriculture had an urgent action plan to combat the bird flu disease, it was seen that the plan itself should have been revised considering the country’s specific conditions such as wide-spread back-yard poultry and internal trade in open markets, especially in the areas populated by people having very-low-income and being undereducated. Therefore, the responsible government bodies led by the Prime Minister announced that they would inform; moreover educate, the society by using all possible communicative bodies and vehicles such as imams on Friday sermons, teachers at schools and broadcast briefs from the municipality loudspeakers and the mobilization of all possible mass media channels.21 Prime minister especially asked for the media support 22and the media did so.

CNNTurk. 2006, January, 05. Online: http://www.cnnturk.com/arama/haber_detay.asp?PID=00318&haberID=150472 18 CNNTurk. 2006, January, 12. Online: http://www.cnnturk.com/arama/haber_detay.asp?PID=00318&haberID=151368; CNNTurk. 2006, January, 09. Online: http://www.cnnturk.com/arama/haber_detay.asp?PID=00318&haberID=151079 19 Hurriyet. 2006, January, 07. Online: http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/3754623.asp , Milliyet. 2006, January, 08. Online: http://www.milliyet.com.tr/2006/01/08/guncel/gun12.html 20 Turkish Medical Association. 2006, January, 20. Online: http://www.ttb.org.tr/data/kisa_haber/ocak06/gazete.php; Milliyet. 2006, January, 11. Online: http://www.milliyet.com.tr/2006/01/11/guncel/axgun02.html ; Hurriyet. 2006, January, 20. Online: http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=3815583&p=2 21 Radikal. 2006, January, 07. Online: http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=175143 22 Sabah. 2006, January, 06. Online: http://www.sabah.com.tr/2006/01/06/gnd84.html

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On the 15th of January, the death of one more child infected by the virus was reported. This case was given minute by minute updates on TV screens and in the newspapers.23 What dramatic for audiences was the father’s refusal to send his children to the hospital; since he did not have any health insurance and was not capable of paying the cost for treatment. The result was an outpour of sympathy from all corners of the society, there was also questioning on the developmental objectives of the country, and questions such as could we be a member of the EU under these circumstance arose.24 Bird flu in an unprecedented way provided a political arena to discuss issues affecting the Turkish society. 25

For the ordinary Turkish watching the whole system of culling poultry in the farming regions on television created a sense of the unreal. The destruction team wore protective gear similar to that worn by astronauts. The contrast between these individuals and the farmers was a significant one. The farmers and even the children turning over the birds for culling, were in ordinary dress with no protection, while the official being handed the supposed infected bird, was covered from head to toe to avoid, possible infection. 26

But returning to the ongoing furore between the national media, government and industrial poultry producers, government prepared a plan in order to compensate the poultry sector.27 In one of the national newspaper, it was argued that a social explosion would take place if government did not handle the poultry farming industrial in a satisfying manner.28 The industrial poultry producers on the other hand introduced some high-tech mediated applications for instance each chicken was given an identity card, this way, a consumer was able to monitor the information on a particular chicken over the internet.29 None of these however, be helped alleviate the fear harbored by the consumers who continued to reject poultry products.

In this second wave the risk of bird flu was said to be under control within the particular region in the eastern Anatolia, even though the virus continued to spread among other poultry across the country from west to east. The reason of human deaths cases in this region was not only associated with the virus itself but included poverty, illiteracy, and ignorance on issues concerning health risks and hygiene. What the minister of agriculture commented on the deaths 23 CNNTurk. 2006, January, 15. Online: http://www.cnnturk.com/arama/haber_detay.asp?PID=00318&haberID=151671 24 Milliyet. 2006, January, 20. Online: http://www.milliyet.com/2006/01/20/yazar/zbirand.html 25 Directorate General of Press and Informationj. 2006.Jan.20. Online: http://www.byegm.gov.tr/YAYINLARIMIZ/anadoluyahaberler-yeni/2006/ocak/ah_20_01-06.htm ; The Grand National assembly of Turkey. 2006. February. 01. Online: http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/gelenkagit/d022/yil04gk/gk.75.htm 26 http://www.aksam.com.tr/yazar.asp?a=9194,10,9 27 Council of Ministers Cabinet. Letters of administration. 2006.January.30,No.2006/9994. Online: http://rega.basbakanlik.gov.tr/Eskiler/2006/02/20060216-3.htm 28 Referans Gazetesi. 2006, January, 19. Online: http://www.referansgazetesi.com/haber.aspx?HBR_KOD=33637&ForArsiv=1 29 TGRT Haber. 2006, January, 21. Online: http://www.tgrthaber.com.tr/news_view.aspx?guid=6ab5eb23- 78d1-4684-95e0-e5c10fa2c20d

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was worth noting; he claimed that “deaths were caused by socioeconomic and socio-cultural reasons”.30

In the press releases of the Turkish Medical Association, the government was blamed of the spreading out the risk so rapidly. According to the association, the government was late in taking precautions, and severely attenuated the perception of risk by the mass public especially with their speeches and actions. Moreover a coordination center including experts appointed by the government was presented as the responsible body to deal with the present crisis; however expertise of Turkish Medical Association as an NGO were excluded in this process. Therefore, it is argued that the government failed to mobilize and delegate efficient human resources.31

Most of the mass media channels agreed that the deaths were due to ignorance and poverty. However, when we reviewed the local media where the disease had been experienced, we noticed different concerns in terms of perceiving and assessing the risk of bird flu. When the bird flu was first seen in Igdir before spreading out to neighboring regions, the head governor of the city claimed that the sick poultry had been transferred from the western part of Turkey (Balikesir). Along with the governor’s claim, the public was insisting that their poultry was not sick at all; what they claimed further was that it was cheaper poultry moved from the western cities that infected their produce. 32Their concern was different from that of those living in urban cities. The bird flu in with reference to urban areas could only affect the daily dietaries of individuals. On the other hand for local poultry farmers subsistent poultry farming was their families’ main source of income and the only way they could feed their children. 33 What is perhaps important to note is that poultry was also an intimate figure in their everyday lives for instance; even each chicken had a given name in the family.

In addition, unlike the national coverage which critically evaluating the inappropriate methods of culling, the main concern on behalf of the culling in that region was that “Turkey was loosing its special gene pool which was the essence of the adaptation of animals to this region’s particular conditions in hundreds of years”.34 The news coverage also provided some deeper insights about this region’s particular living conditions: “the wild and hunger wolves may

30 Milliyet. 2006, January, 07. Online: http://www.milliyet.com/2006/01/07/yazar/bila.html

31 The Association of Turkish Medical Scientists. Press Release on Avian Influenza. 2006, January, 18. Online: http://www.ttb.org.tr/avian/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=49&Itemid=38 32 Yesil Igdir Gazetesi. 2005, December, 28. Online: http://www.yesiligdir.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=1480&mode=&order=0&thold=0 33 Yesil Igdir Gazetesi. 2006, January, 06. Online: http://www.yesiligdir.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=1506&mode=&order=0&thold=0 34 Yesil Igdir Gazetesi. 2006, January, 21. Online: http://www.yesiligdir.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=1582&mode=&order=0&thold=0

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potentially attack the villages under the hard conditions of the winter”35, “please be very cautious towards smoke/gas poisoning from the stoves”36 or “do not eat snow”37.

As we have tried to illustrate, the construction of risk, risk knowledge and perception of risk differed between national and local media. National media restricted the risk with the region where human death cases had appeared, and the risk was addressed with victims and their living and social conditions; the responsibility of being at risk was burdened by the victims themselves. While the local media insisted on the value and importance of poultry, economically and culturally, for individuals and its claim was based on the argument that the virus had spread out in the region because of transferred poultry from the west to their region. In the local media case the responsibility was not burdened on the shoulders of individuals living there but on irresponsible industrial firms and their not being effectively controlled by responsible bodies.

What seemed as conceived of as responses to the risk of bird flu resonates with the claims of Mary Douglas (1992) in terms of cultural traits of risk. She argues that “the response to a major crisis digs more deeply the cleavages that have been there all the time” (p: 34) and could be traced by following the blaming claims of the different parties. According to Douglas “In individualist culture, the weak are going to carry the blame for what happens to them; in a hierarchy, the deviants; in a sect, aliens and also faction leaders” (p:36) as it was reified in this example.

The third Wave: It had eventually dropped out from the society’s agenda

The second wave concluded in the end of January with four human death cases, and visible and invisible concerns and quests brought about the risk of bird flu to the society and its institutions. The barbeque party held in the parliament building by the initiation of the prime-minister and with the association of all the ministries was an ongoing effort of the government to encourage the society to consume chicken, hence, at the same time to support the industrial poultry producers.38 However, in the days following we did not recognize the effect of this overture from the government towards the consumption behaviors of individuals. Hence, the uncertainty about the risk clearly continue to prevail and the social agenda was still full of the bird flu concerns until the country’s most celebrated anchorman, Ugur Dundar, appeared on all TV screens within a short advertorial movie shot in the leading industrial poultry farms. He was inculcating that we could consume poultry meat, eggs and egg-based products confidently if they were produced in 35 Yesil Igdir Gazetesi. 2006, February, 01. Online: http://www.yesiligdir.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=1643&mode=&order=0&thold=0 36 Yesil Igdir Gazetesi. 2005, December, 28. Online: http://www.yesiligdir.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=1475&mode=&order=0&thold=0 37 Yesil Igdir Gazetesi. 2006, February, 07. Online: http://www.yesiligdir.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=1670&mode=&order=0&thold=0

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industrial farms where hygiene conditions were strictly followed and packaged properly. 39After those brief adverts, sales started to increase40. According to a research conducted by GFK Turkey, 80 % of the participants respond that this advertorial strengthen their trust against industrial poultry producers and 76 % of those particularly emphasized Ugur Dundar”s role as the main factor41. This point of time can be addressed as the time when the closure on risk and risk definition was constructed.

Ugur Dundar was the good choice to construct the trust of individuals to industrial poultry because of his perceived identity by the society constructed along the years on television screens. His reputation historically relies on prime-time occupying television programs in which “clean society” messages are conveyed by his active involvement in the organized sudden/unexpected visits to government offices, companies and etc. For instance, his hidden camera-recordings displaying the public or government officers’ bribery instances moment by moment or the firms’ food producing processes in non-hygienic conditions are very familiar snapshots for most of the Turkish people. At the end of each program, after appreciating his efforts in the name of us, the responsible are judged first by the society’s conscious and then delivered to the hands of justice to take care the rest of bureaucratic processes.

After February, the media focus on the bird flu risk disappeared on the national level and the issue had dropped out from the society’s agenda.

Lay response towards the risk of bird flu “I am afraid” During the interviews more salient response with regards to the risk of bird flu is that people stopped consuming poultry products. This result is also confirmed by a European Commission’s research (2006, 17) on avian influenza. According to this research, unlike other European countries, in Turkey, consumers decreased their consumption of poultry meat (58%) as well as eggs and egg-based products (53%). This report suggests that reported cases of human deaths in Turkey can probably explain this exception.

Our study supports this argument, since most interviewees mentioned that they ceased consumption of poultry products after they had heard the cases of human deaths. A 29-year-old 38 TGRT Haber. 2006, January, 31. Online: http://www.tgrthaber.com.tr/news_view.aspx?guid=912f3eed-4730-4d53-a046-8df918a25dd2 39 TGRT Haber. 2006, February, 07. Online: http://www.tgrthaber.com.tr/news_view.aspx?guid=7508859f-3ce6-4345-acc2-2a8aa80c5067 40 CNNTurk. 2006, February, 10. Online: http://www.cnnturk.com/EKONOMI/haber_detay.asp?PID=40&HID=1&haberID=157090 ; Zaman Gazetesi. 2006, March, 26. Online: http://www.zaman.com.tr/?bl=yazarlar&trh=20060326&hn=262425 ; TGRT Haber. 2006, February, 18. Online: http://www.tgrthaber.com.tr/news_view.aspx?guid=275bd185-b07e-46b1-bdde-613ae149a91a 41 NTV-MSNBC. 2006, July, 03. Online: http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/news/378677.asp

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woman house wife in Istanbul said that even she knew that people who died of bird flu infection had direct contact with the infected chickens; she did not consume poultry meat and eggs as she thought that this was the most appropriate precaution at the time.

As inferred from interviews, interviewees took immediate action and what they did is the same, they firmly stopped consuming poultry. This situation resonates with the statement made by Lash (2003, 51). He argues that the contemporary individual must choose fast, and must make quick decisions, s/he does not have enough time or space to reflect but s/he must live in an atmosphere of risk in which knowledge and life-changes are precarious that was exemplified within the interviewees responses. However, what was missing in these lines of expressions is their source of reasoning?

First we noticed that they all were aware of the scientific arguments and definitions made by experts in relation to the disease for instance; they knew that poultry, even if infected, was not a health risk if cooked at certain degree and the eggs must be washed effectively and cooked very well, moreover interviewees in Istanbul acknowledged their belief that the reason for the deaths in the eastern regions were their ways of treating poultry with close contact since they almost live together with their poultries. However despite this awareness, they did not consume poultry meat and/or eggs. Therefore we argue that most of interviewees did not reflect but rather behaved in a very reflexive way; they took their own precautions which obviously were not based on the expert recommendations since from the very beginning there was no information banning people from consuming poultry products. What was interesting is that their primarily response in terms of precautions was cutting off eating the poultry meat. “We know but also we do not know” The prominent of risk studies long recognized the uncertainty as an inherent element of modern risks, since the perception of risks goes beyond everyday experiences, thus risk perception relies on the scientific methodologies of expert systems. However, as argued by Beck (1992) the failure of science to define risks and threats has the scientific institutions’ losing credibility, and hence ignite uncertainty.

In our interviews, we discovered that uncertainty revealed from the interviewees was not about the cogency or efficiency of the scientific knowledge provided; there seemed to be no dispute on such sensitivity. What surprising was, people’s lack of interest with regards to the information regarding bird flu. There was no sceptism on the recommended ways of precautions whether these were clear or effective methods, curiosity did not extend to human-to human infections either, something that science at that time was unable to guarantee against. What was indicated instead from our interviewees was not so much the information but the source. Who could they really trust as telling them the truth? Showing that it was not about scientific credibility but involving more complex societal parameters.

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A 48-year-old woman in Istanbul (teacher) noted: “we do not know who to we trust. We think by ourselves but it is not possible to solve this problem by ourselves. We know but at the same time we do not know; therefore we just speculate on it”.

The problematic notion of trust has been expressed from most of our interviewees in different ways. For instance, two of our interviewees, 32 and 45 year old working men noted that, their having seen the prime minister on TV eating poultry meat did not change their opinion since they thought that he was a privileged man but they were not, hence the chicken he ate was most likely very special, thus carefully selected, tested, etc. But they were not powerful or privileged enough like prime minister to have their poultry tested first before consuming it so they had look out for themselves.

Before going further with examining the notions of trust and uncertainties revolving around the government experts or the government, it is vital to briefly reflect in the ways interviewees felt about information emanating from scientific experts, medical doctors. In this part, we examine interviewees’ direct trust in doctors. Their answers were not incompatible with their attitudes and their responses to risk; since in general they explained their trust in doctors. However they mentioned that they did not see doctors on television. What they took as reference information was given by government and governmental representatives, experts directly associated with government.

At this point, our research has started to be more crystallized with the appearance of the notions of perceived uncertainty and trust in our data. Our interviewees frequently mentioned that there was something hidden in the case of bird flu. They thought that experts, as mentioned above, the ministry of health, government and their representatives or experts working for the government hid the real extent of the risk, its reasons and the other facts about the disease even when they knew the facts. They perceived that they were at distance to the eligible information. According to them their inability to reach legible information were mainly determined by their social class and status in the society, thus they saw themselves as victims (a case of class) as being at risk.

Literally, this sense of inability to be able to reach eligible information was first constructed upon their past experiences which were not independent from their understandings of dominant political culture and institutional framework in a broader sense. Particular reference was the Chernobyl case, among many others, which, according to them, was a reflection on the past and present governments’ (the state’s) stance towards public concerns.

Our interview data explored edified how much the Chernobyl case still lingers in the public’s memory after 20 years. Many interviewees recalled the date’s minister of internal affair’s TV speeches then, to the public in which he claimed that the explosion in Chernobyl did/would not affect the tea crops in Northern Turkey. However interviewees argued that people were affected from radiation because what they saw in their personal networks and heard from their friends or relatives supported an apparent increase in cancer cases especially in regions which were affected by radiation. Even though the ministry of health revealed in August 2006

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that after a-two-year research in the northern Turkey, they found no direct relationship between the increase in cancer cases in this region and radiation; and that the main reasons of cancer were smoking, alcohol drinks and foods contains high level of calories42. However, interviewees in Istanbul, explained their belief on that the Chernobyl disaster and hence radiation and government’s failure to deal with risk were the primary causes of cancer cases in this region. Expert vs lay knowledge This dispute between lay knowledge and expert knowledge, in this case the knowledge created by the ministry of health, exemplifies anatomy of the dispute between lay and expert knowledge in risk cases. Interviewees’ response to risk is not a response neither to expert knowledge and their failure to define risks and the ways of avoiding risks nor conflicts among experts on risks rather their response is to government’s attitudes in risk situations and their ways of dealing with risks. According to interviewees, experts may define and assess the risk and their definition may be true however the government and experts working in the field tend to hide the risk or at least they do not share all information with the public. Therefore, we believe that they construct their own risk knowledge in accordance with the information they gather in their personal networks or what they experienced first hand which may or may not be directly related to the risk or risk issues.

On the other hand, in Van, our interviewees criticized expert knowledge from a totally different perspective, for instance they had never mentioned their concerns about Chernobyl case or how experts or the government dealt with the risk in this case. However, what we saw was that their lay knowledge with regards to the bird flu risk had been fundamentally encased in their daily routines. First of all the interviewees have close contact with poultries at least have relatives or neighbors fed these animals. What interviewees mentioned was that their chickens were not ill but in anyway they were culled. Their argument was that if their animals were infected they could recognize these infected animals and take the necessary precautions. A 65 year old woman (housewife) in Van noted: “My chickens were so beautiful and healthy. But my neighbors called the officers to take them and cull. I am still sorry about them. Even I have a neighbor, even today she cries when someone talks about chickens and their being culled”.

A 25-year-old woman (housework) criticized the expert knowledge which led to the precaution of culling. She mentioned that even though the experts argued that the main reason of bird flu cases in Turkey was migrated birds, they did not take precautions to prevent the transmission of the virus from these birds to poultry but instead killed their chickens.. Since their chickens were culled, she argued that their backyards now full of insects which had never been seen before. According to them officers who tried to terminate bird flu disease in fact changed the balance of nature and caused the emergence of other threats. 42NTVMSNBC. 2006, August, 16. Online: http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/news/382548.asp

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According to us this difference between lay knowledges in geographical context is a consequence of whether collect information through direct personal experience on what is seen as the risk issue or not. In other words, for interviewees in Van, poultry is part of their lives hence they do not construct them as risky; their risk knowledge is a reflection of what they see and experience in their daily life. On the other hand what interviewees’perception in Istanbul is a reflection on how experts construct the knowledge and on subjective trustworthiness of experts. Risk and everyday life Most of the people, if not all, suddenly stopped the consumption of poultry meat however they could not stop the consumption of eggs at all that is another interesting response in our findings. Our interviewees explained their different attitudes in consuming eggs and meat comparatively saying that eggs have an inevitable place in their daily diets. They argued that they could not stop consumption of eggs, thus they chose to consume them in accordance with the advice provided by experts.

During the interviews in Van we also realized that some cultural concerns embedded in daily routines affected interviewees’ responses to risk. The first example was that a 60-year old woman’s concern about their food culture. She mentioned that in this region, every year, women prepare a special kind of pasta which is one of the main dishes in their long lived winters. By preparing the pasta, they use village eggs, and because of bird flu, she could not find “village eggs”, eggs taken from poultry who fed in the backyards and she had to use branded eggs of industrial farms. According to her the color of the food is not good.

Another important issue in the extent of interviews made in Van was that their daily diet was mainly based on meat and cereals because of long winters. The weight of vegetables and fruits in their diet is not as high as it is in the other regions. Therefore meat, eggs and milk are the basis of their diet. Thus, this kind of diet is not only a necessity but also a cultural component. “What chases us we in turn chase it” Last but not least, we need to question the role of the media in this case. We traced that media especially television was assessed as the source of reference information in risk perceptions. If something is in the media, it is real, dangerous and risky however when it disappears it is thought as terminated or ended. Interestingly, this attitude is the same both in Istanbul and Van. A 24-year-old woman (worker) summarized this situation as follows: “what chases us we in turn chase it”. However, what chases them is defined according to what they see in the media. Interviewees’ awareness of risk depends partly on media coverage. However, as inspired from this excerpt they have a sense of powerless hence they just follow what is going on and they think they are not capable to reflecting on it; what they can do is only to follow what is conveyed in the media until the item disappears.

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Another salient finding in our interviews in Istanbul with regards to the media is related to Ugur Dundar, anchorman who was seen as an advertorial to convince the public to re-consume especially poultry meat. A 48-year-old driver in Istanbul noted: “We started to eat chicken when we saw a reputable researcher/journalist Ugur Dundar on TV screen, if he was saying we could eat properly packaged chicken meat, and then we could”. Similarly for 33 years old woman working as a public relation expert in a multionational company was persuaded to start consuming poultry meat like many of others after the appearance of Ugur Dundar on national television.

However, in Van no interviewee had mentioned the role of Ugur Dundar in their risk perception or risk behavior. Even though they accept the role of media as the primary source of information, their reference on deciding to consume or not consume poultry meat was mainly due to their everyday routines, needs and even interestingly how others around them behaved towards the said risk.

This difference might be based on that interviewees who live in Istanbul are much more depended on expert knowledge while defining risk and deciding on how they avoid risk. However, whereas they do not trust information provided by the government or its related bodies as the primary expert knowledge having visibility on media, they trust in Ugur Dundar as a cultural symbol of “clean society”. They believe that he is the one, who uncovers what is hidden, who audits healthiness, cleanness, and appropriateness to rules of industries and even government bodies. Hence, his image matches what individuals look for, someone who does not hide the “truth” but uncovers it. Debate had eventually been settled For our argument, the parameters derived from the interviews so far seem useful to understand how risk was negotiated in different social settings. However, we think that the decision to consume poultry meat, eggs and egg-based products again is also important to highlight this negotiation phase.

When interviewees were asked about when and how they started to consume poultry meat and eggs or egg based products we had different answers. A 48-year-old woman (teacher) noted: “our daily diet is based especially on poultry meat; therefore we could not stop the consumption of poultry meat and eggs for long. After people around us started to consume poultry meat and since there was no more news in media regarding new human death cases from bird flu, we started to consume it again. But now we consume branded products and I bought them from well known market chains”. 43 years old man (tax officer): “when we visited my parents I saw that they had resumed eating poultry, and then we as a family also started, because it seemed that there was no more risk.” On the other hand, as emphasized by a 65 year-old-woman in Van, poultry meat is the primary source of protein for poor people; it is called a “meal for the poor”.

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It is obvious in our data that when and why interviewees had started to consume poultry meat and related products again differs person to person. Some had started because of their daily dietary, some due to economic necessities, some because of the appearance of Ugur Dundar as a trusted figure, some since the risk information had disappeared in the media coverage, and some because others in their network had already started to consume.

According to what our data provided us, interviewees were very afraid at first and they stopped the consumption of poultry meat and eggs for a while however they thought that this situation was temporary and they preferred to wait and see what would happen. However, this perception of time that is enough to wait differs among our interviews.

We argue that the filtration and construction of risk knowledge and respectively its assessment and management were the integral processes of where people situated themselves between the coordinates of ominous sensations (I am afraid) and their daily life realities (I am hungry). Their position in between these is the result of a set of complex parameters which includes both the perceived trustworthiness of accessible information, their relationship to expert knowledge and also personal experiences, how they construct their social identity, their culture, every day routines and the social realities surrounding them. Indeed, we think that the place is not stable rather it is dynamic as a consequence of the complexity of this set of parameters.

Therefore, it can be argued that interviewees responded to the risk reflexively but this reflexivity was private and resulted from a complex set of parameters and the dynamics of reflexivity were not stable during the whole case of bird flu risk in Turkey. What a 28-year-old man (worker) noted may be salient to explain our arguments: “At first we were afraid and we stopped eating poultry meat even though we had a bunch of meat in our deep freezer. However after we believed that the bird flu risk was ended we ate the meat in our deep freezer. I know that what I did is something stupid but I did not want to throw them away because of economic reasons. I am not a rich man. However, if I were rich I would not consume poultry meat, maybe for two years”. Conclusion In this paper we tried to analyze how risk knowledge with specific reference to the risk of bird flu in Turkey was constructed, mediated and communicated by the government, media and experts, and lay people.

What we acknowledged in this study can be summarized as follows. First, the government, the national media and poultry industry constructed the risk as a consequence of backyard poultry and they isolated and framed the risk in a specific region in the eastern Anatolia. According to them the human death cases was an inevitable consequence of their life style, since they had been living in close contact with poultry, as well as their being undereducated, poor and unconscious about health risks and hygiene. However, the panic could not be handled throughout the provision of information by these agents.

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What was indicated from our interviewees was not so much the information but the risk knowledge was constructed at one point of time as a consequence of a complex set of parameters, including their perception of being at risk or not, trustworthiness of agents and/or institutions, their personal experiences, daily routines, economic and social factors, their constructed social and cultural identity, etc; hence this process is dynamic rather than stable which varying between the beats of I am hungry and I am afraid.

The conclusion we derive from our research supports what Lash and Wynne (1992; p:7) argue; lay people’s response to risk is not a response to expert knowledge systems as Beck underlines but it is multi-layered as a form of private reflexivity (Lupton, 1999, p: 109). Our interviewees experienced the risk of bird flu as a form of social relations and they judge the risk and risk knowledge as a part and parcel of these social relations (Wynne, 1992, p:281-2). In other words, they privately respond to the risk; and hence, in Turkey, the risk debate did not only occurred at the level of expertise and public accountability but also at the level of the local, the private, the everyday and the intimate (Lupton and Tulloch, 2001, p:14). Further Thoughts: Where reflexivity may challenge with a non-western modernity . In the following part, mostly derived from the brief discussions reflected in institutional responses and not directly but partly implied from lay responses, we will try to discuss what Lupton and Tulloch (2001, 14) questioned regarding the reflexivity theorized by Lash and Wynne: where and how the reflexivity that challenges modernity arises occupied our mind in this research process. We believe that this can also provide us a base for further research.

The path of Turkey towards modernization is different from its western counterparts. First of all the political culture and institutions are different from those in Western countries. The coexistence of traditional and western elements within Turkish life is important to understand the context of Turkish modernization. The salient characteristic of Turkish modernity is the strong and centered state tradition. Therefore it is not surprising that such a notion of state has important implications for institutional regulations. The preoccupation of state elites with “saving the state” constitutes a substantial barrier to the development of social rights (Sozen and Shaw, 2003: 109-10). Even though the project of modernity in Turkey was started as “a total project, embracing and internalizing all the cultural dimensions that made Europe modern” (Keyder, 1997, P: 37), ideals of liberalism and individualism associated with western culture could not be practiced, therefore the battle between individualism and collectivist statism continuous to characterize the political life of the country to this date, what liberalism means, in relation to individualism, and meanings of statism are still contested (Arat, 1998, P: 118-9).

Sozen and Shaw (2003, P: 112) argue that “the patrimonical and centralized nature of political culture, coupled with the absence or weakness of any civil society, produced a relationship between the state (the ruler) and society (the ruled) resembling that of father with son”. This kind of relationship with state and society coincides with an image of state which

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controls every institution, including science, in the society. Therefore the science has never been an autonomous status in the society even though it has its own civil organizations such as Turkish Medical Association (TTB) or chambers of engineers and architects. The visibility of these organizations has always been low in media and their power has been limited. Our argument regarding this situation is that people think scientific or expert knowledge as attached to the state and governments; moreover the legitimacy crisis of strong-state tradition in the last two decades affects the responses of people in risk situations.

According to Keyman and Koyuncu (2005, P:109) in the 1990s the strong state faced serious difficulty when responding to the new societal problems and demands as an inevitable consequence of changes, including economic liberalism, started in 1980s; “the strong state turned out to be too strong in its attempt to impose itself on society, and too weak in governing its society effectively”. They identify two processes related to the legitimacy crisis of the strong state; one is the problem of maintaining its position as the primary context for politics, as a result of the shift towards civil society and culture as new reference-points in the language and the terms of politics; and the second one is the emergence of alternative modernities which involve new actors, mentalities of development and new identity claims. In this process, globalization has a strong effect since it brings “both the universalization of western values and cultural patterns, and at the same time the revitalization of local values and traditions, paving the way to the universalization of western modernity and the emergence of alternative modernities” (P: 111). In this process the strong-state which can control everything and make decisions for the sake of society has been demystified.

At this point it can be argued that special characteristics of modernization in Turkey with its strong-state tradition and the legitimacy crisis of the state occurred after 1980s with economic liberalism and globalization started in 1990s are the important elements of social package in Turkey. Individuals experience these changes in the legitimacy of the strong-state tradition or emergence of new cultural identities and mentalities or the effects of globalization in their everyday lives, practices or in their networks and alliances. Therefore what we argue is that all these personal experiences, individual efforts to construct their social and cultural identity, their relations to experts and governments, their social positions including class positions -in terms of being poor or rich or being privileged or not- but not limited with it reflect to the responses to their risk knowledge, risk perception and the ways they choose to avoid risk. Individuals do construct their risk knowledge with or without expert knowledge but in the social and cultural context they live and according to their everyday experiences.

As a consequence, non-western societies might have experienced modernity in very different ways in relation to their own internal and external dynamics, hence in their ways from modernity to reflexive modernity, it can not be expected for these societies to resemble the west as well. In Beck (1992), how the demystification of science, its failure to define risk and its internal conflicts are the presuppositions of reflexive modernity and in this way increases risks perception. In Turkey this reflexivity challenged with modernity where the legitimacy crisis of

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strong state occurs, or in other words state is demystified, since first the strong nation-state is the leitmotiv of Turkish modernization and second the state has strong control over institutions including science and hence expert knowledge, therefore its legitimacy crisis are also a reflection to the trustworthiness of expert knowledge and inadvertently increase risks in perception. References: Arat, Y. (1998). Feminists, Islamists and Political Change in Turkey. Political Psychology 19 (1):117-131 Beck, U. (1992). Risk Society: Towards a new modernity. London: Sage Caplan, P. (2000). Introduction. In P. Caplan (ed). Risk Revisited, London: Pluto Press, pp. 1-28 Caplan, P. (2000). Eating British beef with confidence: a consideration of consumers’ responses to BSE

in Britain. In P. Caplan (ed). Risk Revisited, London: Pluto Press, pp. 114-25 Douglas, M. (1992). Risk and Blame: essays in cultural theory. London: Routlage European Commission (2006). Avian Influenza. Special Eurobarameter 257 Keyder, Ç. (1997). Whither the project of modernity. In S. Bozdoğan and R. Kasaba Rethinking modernity and national identity in Turkey (pp.37-51). Seattle: University of Washington Press. Keyman, E. F. and Koyuncu, B. (2005). Globalization, alternative modernities and the political economy of Turkey. Review of International Political Economy, 12 (1): 105-128 Lash, S. (2003). Reflexivity as Non-linearity. Theory, Culture& Society, 20(2): 49-57 Lash, S. (2000). Risk culture. In Adam, Beck and von Loon (Eds.) The Risk Society and Beyond.

London: Sage Lash, S. and Wynne, B. (1992).Introduction. In Beck,U., Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity.

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Australians. Sociology 36(2): 317-334 Lupton, D. and Tulloch, J. (2001). Risk, the mass media and reflexive biography: revisiting Beck’s

knowledge, media and information society. European Journal of Cultural Studies 4 (1):5-27 Patton, M. Q. (1990) Qualitative evaluation and research methods (2nd ed.).Newbury Park, California:

Sage Sozen, S. and Shaw, I. (2003). Turkey and the European Union: Modernizing a Traditional State? Social

Policy and Administration, 37 (2): 108-120 Wynne, B. (1996). May the sheep safely graze? A reflexive view of the expert-lay knowledge divide. In

Lash, Szerszynski and Wynne (Eds.) Risk, Environment and Modernity. London: Sage Wynne, B. (1993). Public uptake of science: a case for institutional reflexivity. Public Understanding of

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