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Knowledge and Coherence in Plato's "Republic"Author(s): John UgliettaReviewed work(s):Source: Apeiron: A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science, Vol. 39, No. 4 (December2006), pp. 331-340Published by: De GruyterStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40914035 .Accessed: 01/08/2012 15:33

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Knowledge and Coherence in Plato's Republic John Uglietta

Can you have knowledge of the sensible world? The question seems rather odd. Yet Plato's account in the Republic seems to suggest a sharp division between the world as we experience it through our senses and the non-sensible world of the Forms. Our senses show us a world of impure and ever-changing images and copies, while the Forms are pure and permanent originals. Plato argues that we can have knowledge of the Forms. Yet the, at best, imperfect relationship between Forms and sensibles suggests that knowledge of sensibles may be impossible.

In her essay, 'Knowledge and Belief in Republic V-VÏÏ',1 Gail Fine offers an account of Plato's theory of knowledge that allows for knowledge of sensibles.2 Among other things, Fine sets out to show that Plato 'argues only that all knowledge requires (not that it is restricted to) knowledge of Forms; and that, restricted to sensibles, one can at most achieve belief (Fine 86). She rejects the suggestion that Plato believes in two distinct worlds, one of intelligible Forms and one of sensibles, 'leav[ing] open

1 Gail Fine, 'Knowledge and Belief in Republic V-VII', in S. Everson, ed., Companions to Ancient Thoughtl Epistemology (New York: Cambridge University Press 1990) 85-115. Citations to Fine's essay are noted in parentheses in the main text as Tine' followed by the specific page number to which I refer.

2 Fine's essay goes into great detail in elaborating Plato's theory. I do not even attempt to describe her interpretation in its entirety. Instead I review one of the most important and perhaps controversial ideas offered in her essay.

APEIRON a journal for ancient philosophy and science 0003-6390/2006/3904 331-340 $10.00 ©Academic Printing & Publishing

332 John Uglietta

the possibility that, once one knows Forms, one can apply this knowl- edge to sensibles so as to know them too' (Fine 86).

Fine argues for a 'contents analysis' rather than an 'objects analysis' of Plato's theory, suggesting that knowledge and belief are not con- cerned with different objects. She then attributes to Plato a coherence theory of knowledge. I will focus on the second issue, the suggestion that Plato offers a coherence theory of knowledge. I shall argue that Fine's coherentist interpretation of Plato's theory is not adequately supported by Plato's discussion in the Republic, especially his image of the cave, and that such an interpretation also fails to account for the importance Plato places on Forms. However, I will first describe some of the conditions on knowledge that she finds in the Republic as well as the outlines of her coherentist interpretation.3

Fine begins by identifying two conditions Plato believes must be fulfilled for one to have knowledge of something. The first is that 'in addition to true belief, knowledge requires an account or logos' (Fine 106; see Republic 531e, 534b).4 She labels this condition KL. The second condition requires 'that knowledge must be based on knowledge (KBK): I know a thing or proposition only if I can provide an account of it which I also know' (Fine 107). Fine acknowledges that this condition is more

3 While I am only arguing against Fine's coherentist interpretation here, there are other such interpretations. Francisco J. Gonzalez suggests that the coherence theory is also defended 'as an interpretation of the Divided Line' by Kenneth Sayre, Plato's Literary Garden: How to Read a Platonic Dialogue (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press 1995), 177-81, and Julia Annas, An Introduction to Plato's Republic (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), 'and more generally as a characterization of Plato's epistemology' by Alexander Nehamas, 'Episteme and Logos in Plato's Later Thought', in John P. Anton and Anthony Preus, eds., Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy: Plato, Vol. 3 (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989) 267-92, and 'Meno's Paradox and Socrates as a Teacher', in Hugh H. Benson, ed., Essays on the Philosophy of Socrates (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992) 298-316, and by M. F. Burnyeat, 'Socrates and the Jury: Paradoxes in Plato's Distinction between Knowledge and True Belief, in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 54 (1980) 173-91, and The Theaetetus of Plato (Indianapolis: Hackett 1990), 216-17. See Francisco J. Gonzalez, Dialectic and Dialogue: Plato's Practice of Philosophi- cal Inquiry (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press 1998), 229.

4 All citations to Plato's Republic are cited in parentheses in the main text with 'Republic' followed by the page reference. Citations are to Plato, Republic, translated by G.M.A. Grube and revised by C.D.C. Reeve (Indianapolis: Hackett 1992).

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explicitly adopted in the Theaetetus, however she suggests that Plato also endorses it in the Republic (see Republic 533c).

Following Fine, I will refer to the four different levels of knowledge Plato distinguishes in his image of the line (and later in the cave) as LI, L2, L3 and L4. LI is the lowest level. Here one sees only images of things such as shadows and reflections (Republic 509e). At the corresponding level in the cave, the prisoners see only shadows of imitations of objects such as statues (Republic 514a-c). Plato claims that most people do not rise above this level (Republic 515a). At the second level, L2, one sees the originals of the images seen at LI (Republic 510a). In the cave, this stage involves turning and seeing the statues and other imitations that cast the shadows seen at LI. LI and L2 make up the Visible' portions of the line and neither LI nor L2 constitute knowledge. At the third level, L3, one enters the intelligible portions of the line and knowledge becomes pos- sible. Here 'the soul, using as images the things that were imitated before, is forced to investigate from hypotheses, proceeding not to a first prin- ciple but to a conclusion' (Republic 510b). At this stage in the cave story, the prisoner escapes the cave into the sunlight where he sees first the images of real things and later real things themselves. At L3 one discov- ers the Forms and reaches a type of knowledge. However, only at L4, the highest level, does one reach the best type of knowledge. Here the soul 'makes its way to a first principle that is not a hypothesis, proceeding from a hypothesis but without the images used in [L3], using forms themselves and making its investigation through them' (Republic 510b). The prisoner from the cave here looks directly at the sun. (Republic 516b) At this stage we see or reach the Form of the good and attain the best sort of knowledge.

Once one has seen it, ... one must conclude that it is the cause of all that is correct and beautiful in anything, that it produces both light and its source in the visible realm, and that in the intelligible realm it controls and provides truth and understanding, so that anyone who is to act sensibly in private or public must see it. (Republic 517b-c)

Fine's coherentist account must describe how knowledge is possible at L3 and L4, yet not possible at LI or L2.

How then does Fine account for knowledge at L3? When we consider KL and KBK, a problem arises at L3. If we are to reason from hypotheses to conclusions at L3, the hypotheses may explain our conclusions and satisfy KL, but how will we satisfy KBK? It seems that we do not know the hypotheses, and therefore our knowledge is not based on knowledge.

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KBK is not satisfied. Here Fine offers her coherentist account. Briefly, '[c]oherentism claims that ... accounts can circle back on themselves. I explain ρ in terms of q, and q in terms of r, and so on until, eventually, I appeal again to p; but if the circle is sufficiently large and explanatory, then it is virtuous, not vicious' (Fine 109). Fine argues that, while the hypotheses used at L3 cannot be justified in terms of something more fundamental, they can be justified in the course of their use. One method of providing an account for them is to use them and show their explana- tory power in the way that a scientist might confirm a speculative hypothesis by showing how it explains a variety of phenomena (Fine 109). Following this method, the hypotheses could provide an account of the conclusions and therefore satisfy KL for the conclusions. The explanatory power of the hypotheses provides an account for them and satisfies KL for them. However KBK still seems unsatisfied for both the hypotheses and the conclusions as the contents of the account for each one are not themselves known. Fine argues:

The hypotheses are justified in terms of the conclusions, and the conclusions in terms of the hypotheses. In providing these mutually supporting accounts, one comes to know both hypotheses and conclu- sions. One does not first know the hypotheses, and then the conclusions; one comes to know both simultaneously, in seeing how well the hy- potheses explain the conclusions. (Fine 109)

In this way, KBK is satisfied for both the hypotheses and conclusions as we come to know both by 'seeing how well the whole resultant system fits together' (Fine 109). The coherence of the system containing the hypotheses and the conclusions establishes their justification.

At L4 similar problems arise and Fine proposes the same type of coherentist solution. The hypotheses used at L3 can now be justified by the more fundamental Form of the good as well as by their explanatory power. However the Form of the good itself does not seem to be known. Here the explanatory power of the Form of the good supplies it with an account and satisfies KL. The coherence of the Form of the good with the other Forms and with sensibles allows us to satisfy KBK (Fine 113). L4 knowledge is distinguished as a superior level of knowledge because the coherence achieved at L4 is more complete and accounts for more, providing a 'fuller and richer' explanation.

The combination of KL and KBK threaten a regress problem. KL demands an account, which is usually found in something more funda- mental, but by KBK this too must be known. In order to know this, we

Knowledge and Coherence in Plato's Republic 335

look further along the chain of explanation for a more fundamental account. The regress might continue along a lengthy chain with no obvious stopping point. Fine's coherentist account halts the regress by, in a sense, allowing the chain of explanation to double back on itself. One can give an account or explanation of something by showing its explana- tory power and, more importantly, we come to know the propositions in these accounts as they simultaneously prove each other through their coherence with each other. Forms and especially the Form of the good must prove and explain other Forms and sensibles but sensibles must also prove and explain Forms. If not, KL and KBK force a regress that seems to leave us without knowledge even at L3 and L4. Propositions about Forms and sensibles must reciprocally prove each other.5 This process more than allows for knowledge of sensibles, as Fine notes, it seems to require such knowledge (Fine 114).

In the remainder of this paper, I will attempt to show that Fine's coherentist account is not an accurate rendering of Plato's theory. The problems I will suggest are not problems with a coherentist account of knowledge as such. I do not propose to critique coherentism or any other type of general epistemological scheme. Rather, I wish to suggest simply that Plato is not the type of coherentist Fine describes (in the Republic), or at least that there seems to be evidence in the text that contradicts this position, as her coherentist account leads to results that do not easily reconcile with Plato's imagery. Again, I do not intend to criticize coher- entism generally. My point is not that Plato should not have argued for a coherentist account. Reasons supporting such a view would not nec- essarily suggest that he did not argue in this way just the same. Here I hope to suggest that Plato's text does not support Fine's coherentist interpretation.

The first difficulty arises when we consider the cave allegory in light of the coherentist requirement of reciprocal proof among Forms and sensibles and the different levels of knowledge and belief. For Fine, all of the stages in the cave and initially out of it must in some sense justify the Form of the good. In the cave allegory, the Form of the good is

5 One might suggest that there need not be reciprocal proof between Forms and sensibles. Rather one might think that the coherence involved is only a coherence between Forms. This seems unlikely however. If the Forms are merely hypotheses, coherence among them would seem to be of little explanatory power or proof absent some correlation with sensibles.

336 JohnUglietta

represented by the sun. Plato's description involves a slow difficult process ending with the former cave prisoner turning and looking directly at the sun. Here he understands the Form of the good. What is noticeably absent however is any suggestion that he must turn back to look at the ground or back in the cave to understand what he sees in the sun. Plato does not describe any event which suggests that upon seeing the sun, the prisoner must consider this in light of what he has already seen, evaluate it, and then conclude that it is true. Rather the imagery suggests that the Form of the good is known immediately or at least it is known on its own, without stopping to consider it in light of everything else.6

To this objection, Fine could reply that the cave dweller would not need to actually return to the cave. He will, in a sense, carry his past experiences with him in his memory. Plato describes a progression of belief and knowledge through the stages up to L4. He does not place anyone directly at L3 or L4. We might conclude that one must begin in the visible and work his way up to L4. These early stages may be essential steps to reach L4. When one reaches the sun, all of his past experiences will be in his memory and will affect the way he sees the sun. He will then automatically and immediately bring all of this experience to bear on the Forms and the Form of the good. He can then assess the coherence of all these things without returning to the cave.

To some degree, this must be correct. However, while the cave dweller will almost certainly carry some of his prior experience with him in memory, it is not clear just how much he will carry or if he will carry enough for the kind of corroboration he will need to establish upon seeing the Form of the good. Even if he does carry adequate corroborat- ing information in his memory, he does not seem to engage in the evaluative process of determining how well this all fits together. Upon seeing the sun, does he hold out the possibility that the corroboration could be inadequate to validate what he sees?7

6 The imagery is even farther from some coherentist systems. If we consider a Rawlsian reflective equilibrium, it would seem to require the cave dweller to continue to go in and out of the cave a number of times, perhaps adjusting his beliefs about the sun before settling on a final coherent and acceptable account.

7 This passage suggests the possibility of failure of corroboration upon seeing the Form of the good or perhaps failure and rejection of other ideas on the way to seeing the Form of the good. Plato may not describe these because he sees the Form of the

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Plato also offers a suggestive passage concerning the nature of learn- ing, a passage which may imply that one would not look back upon sensibles to corroborate the discovery of Forms. 'The power to learn is present in everyone's soul and ... the instrument with which each learns is like an eye that cannot be turned around from darkness to light without turning the whole body' (Republic 518c). While I am not sure how much we should try to squeeze out of this passage, it suggests a method of learning in which we, in some way, turn our back on sensibles to learn the Forms. However this may be to read too much into this passage. Perhaps Plato only urges this turning of our gaze so strongly because he realizes how deeply rooted we are in looking only to sensi- bles. He may assume that our success in turning our back on sensibles will be limited and difficult. Therefore he may suggest a complete turning without truly expecting us to succeed in achieving this.

The simultaneous justification and understanding proposed on Fine's account also seems contrary to Plato's description of the return to the cave or the philosopher's return to darkness. The coherentist account suggests that the Forms and sensibles will justify each other simultane- ously giving one knowledge of both. However when the cave dweller returns to the cave after seeing the sun, his sight is dim as he 'hasn't yet become accustomed to the darkness' (Republic 517d). Similarly the phi- losopher must 'grow accustomed to seeing in the dark' (Republic 520c). Here those who have gazed upon the sun now confront the images or copies of the objects they encountered outside the cave. The image suggests that as they turn and move away from the sun, its power wanes and they have difficulty adjusting to the new perspective. This seems quite the opposite of the response we would expect from the coherentist. If knowledge of the different things comes all at once, as they justify each other, sensibles should be as clear and coherent as Forms are once one reaches the Form of the good, even if they are now seen as copies, images or shadows.

good in a very open-ended way. That is, the Form of the good may simply be whatever will work in this situation. This view, I think, requires us to see the way the world is as good in order to understand why the Form of the good, whatever it is, will hold this position. Again, even if this is the case, it seems that there will be an evaluative step required when we assess the coherence of the whole scheme. Even if the Form of the good is the idea that works in this situation, the evaluative step is not apparent in Plato's account.

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Plato seems to treat sensibles differently than Forms, and he does so in ways that Fine's account cannot accommodate. Her account seems to go too far in enabling one to achieve knowledge, or at least too far for Plato, and allows the possibility of knowledge even without Forms. Following Fine's account, the coherence of facts or ideas allows these facts and ideas to justify each other reciprocally. This process of justifi- cation does not imply any special status for any of the elements of a system of knowledge. Any new piece of information seems capable of adding to or completing a coherent system. It remains possible then that facts or propositions about sensible things alone might cohere in a way that would establish knowledge of them.8 In this way, a person might have knowledge without having any knowledge of Forms. Therefore Fine's account fails to explain Plato's insistence on the necessity of Forms for achieving knowledge.

How might Fine account for the importance of Forms? Perhaps we need to appeal to non-sensible properties or entities because no sensible account will cohere in an adequate manner. If no account using sensibles alone can satisfy the test of coherence, knowledge of sensibles without Forms will be impossible. What type of argument might suggest this need for Forms? The Forms may possess some quality that is exclusive to non-sensible entities. This quality may be necessary for an adequately coherent account. Some problems with sensibles or with sense percep- tion may prevent the discovery of a coherent picture appealing only to sensibles. The importance of Forms may not even be a necessary feature for knowledge of the world. It may simply be a contingent feature of our world and the sensibles we encounter.

These attempts to account for the importance of Forms establish the need or priority of non-sensible Forms simply by presuming just such a need or priority. Of course, we might try sensible accounts and see that they do not work. Yet this strategy holds out the possibility of some, as of yet untried, sensible account succeeding. Plato's arguments are not adequately exhaustive to drive us to the conclusion that an account based entirely on sensibles could not succeed. However Plato does not hold out any hope that a purely sensible account could succeed.

8 While this might not constitute the best type of knowledge, which Fine claims we reach at L4. It would still be a type of knowledge, like the type we find at L3. 1 would like to thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out.

Knowledge and Coherence in Plato's Republic 339

Fine might offer a pragmatic response to this question of the need for Forms. Perhaps she could convince us that it would work well to see the world this way, consisting in a hierarchical structure with non-sensible Forms presiding over sensibles. The only thing in the text that might support such an idea could be an inference from the belief that this would be an ideal city that Plato is describing. However this response also relies on very strong assumptions about Forms and their value.

Along with the possibility of knowledge without Forms, Fine's inter- pretation also holds out another possibility that seems at odds with Plato's description. When we use a coherentist account there is no obvious completion of the coherent system. There is always the possi- bility of adding to the system with new elements that increase its coherence and explanatory power. However Plato's account suggests that the search for knowledge comes to a final end when one under- stands or discovers the Form of the good. After seeing the sun, the philosopher does not start to investigate other planets or solar systems. Why would this be such a final stopping point? Fine accounts for this by suggesting that at L4 the coherence is holistic. However on the coherentist picture, it seems that we could discover some other new property or entity that could coherently add to our picture of the world regardless of what state of knowledge we have reached. One could argue that upon reaching the Form of the good, Plato has included all that there is. This seems presumptuous, and of course, we might have believed we had done this before reaching the Form of the good or before reaching any Forms at all. Fine's account provides no means of establishing a point of completion for a system of knowledge and therefore fails to account for the finality Plato describes upon reaching the Form of the good.

These difficulties in accounting for the special role of Forms and in reconciling Plato's imagery suggest that Plato does not offer the type of coherence theory of knowledge that Fine describes in the Republic. Fine argues persuasively for the possibility of knowledge of sensibles. How- ever her coherentist account of how we achieve knowledge fails. Can knowledge be preserved? And knowledge of sensibles too? Knowledge can be salvaged and knowledge of sensibles too if we accept Fine's contents analysis and find a substitute for her coherentist interpretation. Some type of foundationalist approach seems more attuned to Plato's imagery. A foundationalist approach will also face the problem of sat- isfying KL and KBK. To satisfy these requirements, the Forms will have to be described in a way that allows them to be, in some sense, self-veri- fying. Such an account would preserve the necessity of Forms and

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perhaps the finality of the discovery of the Form of the good while perhaps still allowing knowledge of sensibles.

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