keohane and nye--globalization what's new- what's not

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1/17

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Globalization: What's New? What's Not? (And So What?)Author(s): Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr.Source: Foreign Policy, No. 118 (Spring, 2000), pp. 104-119Published by: Washingtonpost.Newsweek Interactive, LLCStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1149673.Accessed: 11/01/2011 00:55

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2/17

Gobalizatio

W hat s

N e w ?

W hat s

N o t ?

A n d S o

What?

by

Robert .

Keohane

nd

Joseph

.

Nye

Jr.

lobalization emerged as a buzzword in

the 1990s,

just as interdependence

id

in

the

1970s,

but the

phenomena

it

refers

to

are

not

entirely

new. Our

characterization of

interdependence

ore

han

20

years

ago

now

applies

o

globalization

at

the turnof the

millennium: This

vague

phrase xpresses

poorly

understoodut

widespread

eeling

hatthe

very

nature f world

olitics

is changing. Some skeptics believe such terms are beyond

redemption

or

analytic

use.

Yetthe

public

understands

he

image

of

the

globe,

and

the new

word

conveys

an

increased ense

of vulnera-

bility

to

distantcauses.For

example,

as

helicopters umigated

New

York

City

in 1999

to

eradicate lethalnew

virus,

he

press

nnounced

that

the

pathogenmight

havearrivedn

the

bloodstreamf a

traveler,

in

a bird

smuggled

hrough

ustoms,

r in

a

mosquito

hat

had

flown

into

a

jet.

Fears

of

bioinvasion ed

some

environmental

roups

o

callfora reductionn

global

radeand travel.

Likeall

popular

oncepts

meant

o covera

variety

f

phenomena,

both

interdependence

nd

globalization

ave

many

meanings.

o

understand hat

people

are

alking

boutwhen

hey

use

the terms

nd

ROBERT

.

KEOHANE

s

James

.

Duke

rofessorf

political

ciencet

Duke

University.

JOSEPH

. NYE

R.

is

dean

of

the

John

F.

Kennedy

chool

f

Government

t

Harvard

University.hisarticles drawnromheorthcominghirdditionftheir ookPower nd

Interdependence:

orld

Politics n

Transition

New

York:

ongman,

000).

104

FOREIGN

POLICY


3/17

Keohane

&

Nye

to

makethem useful

or

analysis,

we

must

begin by asking

whether

interdependence

nd

globalization

re

simply

wo words or the

same

thing,

or

whether here s

something

ew

going

on.

THE

DIMENSIONS OF

GLOBALISM

The two

words

are

not

exactly

parallel.

nterdependence

efers

o

a

condition,

stateofaffairs.t can

ncrease,

sithasbeen

doing

onmost

dimensions

incethe

end

of

WorldWar

I;

or it can

decline,

as

it

did,

at least

n

economic

erms,

during

he

Great

Depression

f

the 1930s.

Globalization

mplies

hat

something

s

increasing:

here s

moreof it.

Hence,

our

definitionstart

not with

globalization

ut

with

globalism,

a

condition

hat

can

increase r

decrease.

Globalism

s a

stateof

the

world

nvolving

etworks f

interdepen-

denceatmulticontinentalistances. he linkagesccur hroughlows

and

nfluences

f

capital

nd

goods,

nformationnd

deas,

and

people

and

forces,

as well

as

environmentally

nd

biologically

elevant

ub-

stances

such

as

acid

rain

or

pathogens).

lobalization

nd

deglobaliza-

tion refer

o the

increase r

declineof

globalism.

Interdependence

efers

o

situations

haracterized

y

reciprocal

ffects

among

ountriesr

among

ctors

n

different

ountries.

ence,

globalism

is

a

type

of

interdependence,

ut with two

special

haracteristics.

irst,

globalism

eferso networksfconnections

multiple

elationships),

ot

to

single

inkages.

We

would efer

o

economic r

military

nterdepen-

dence

between

he

United

States

and

Japan,

but

not to

globalism

between he

United

States

nd

Japan.

U.S.-Japanese

nterdependence

s

part

of

contemporarylobalism,

ut s

not

by

itself

globalism.

Second,

or a

network

f

relationships

o

be

considered

global,

t

must nclude

multicontinental

istances,

ot

simply

egional

etworks.

Distance s a continuous ariable,angingromadjacencybetween,

say,

he

United

States

and

Canada)

o

opposite

idesof

the

globe

(for

instance,

GreatBritain

nd

Australia).

ny

sharp

istinction

etween

long-distance

nd

regional

nterdependence

s

therefore

rbitrary,

nd

there

s

no

point

n

deciding

whether

ntermediate

elationships-say,

between

Japan

and

India or

between

Egypt

and

South

Africa-would

qualify.

Yet

globalism

wouldbe an

oddword or

proximate

egional

rela-

tionships.

Globalization

refers

o

the

shrinkage

of

distance on

a

large

scale

[see

box on

pages

110].

It

can be

contrasted

with

localization,

nationalization,

r

regionalization.

SPRING 2000

105


4/17

Globalization:

hat's

ew?

Some

examples

mayhelp.

Islam's

apid

diffusionrom

Arabia

cross

Asia

to what s

now

Indonesia

as

a

clear nstance f

globalization,

ut

the initialmovement f Hinduism

cross he Indian

ubcontinent

as

not.Ties

among

he countriesf

the AsiaPacificEconomic

ooperation

forum

ualify

s

multicontinental

nterdependence,

ecause

hese

coun-

tries nclude he

Americas s wellasAsiaand

Australia;

ut

ties

among

membersf

the Association f

Southeast sian

Nationsare

regional.

Globalism oesnot

imply

universality.

t the turnof the millen-

nium,

more than a

quarter

f

the American

population

used the

World

Wide

Web

compared

with one

hundredth

f 1

percent

of

the

population

of

South Asia.

Most

people

in

the world

oday

do not

have

elephones;

undredsf

millionsiveas

peasants

n

remote

illages

with

only slight

connections o

world

markets

r

the

global

low

of

ideas.

Indeed,

globalization

s

accompanied

y increasing

aps,

in

many respects,between the rich and the poor.It impliesneither

homogenization

or

equity.

Interdependence

nd

globalism

re both

multidimensional

he-

nomena.All

too

often,

hey

are

defined

n

strictly

conomic

erms,

s

if

the

world

conomy

defined

lobalism.

ut

thereare

several,

qually

important

orms f

globalism:

*

Economic

lobalism

nvolves

ong-distance

lows f

goods,

ervices,

nd

capital, swell asthe informationndperceptionshataccompany

market

xchange.

t

also

involves he

organization

f

the

processes

that

are inked o

these

flows,

uch

as

the

organization

f

low-wage

production

n

Asia

or he

U.S. and

European

arkets.

*

Militarylobalism

efers

o

long-distance

etworksf

interdependence

in

which

orce,

andthe

threator

promise

f

force,

are

employed.

good

example

f

military lobalism

s

the

balancef

terror

etween

the

United

States nd

he

SovietUnion

during

he

coldwar.

The two

countries'

trategic

nterdependence

as

acuteand

well

recognized.

Not

only

did it

produce

world-straddling

lliances,

ut

either

side

could

have

used

ntercontinental

issileso

destroy

he

otherwithin

30

minutes.

heir

nterdependence

as

distinctive ot

becauset was

totally

new,

but

because

he scale

and

speed

of

the

potential

onflict

arising

rom

it

were so

enormous.

*

Environmental

lobalism

efers o

the

long-distance

ransport

f

mate-

rialsin the

atmosphere

r

oceans,

orof

biological

substances

uch

as

pathogens

or

genetic

materials,

hat

affecthuman

health and

well-

106

FOREIGN

POLICY


5/17

Keohane

&

Nye

being.

The

depletion

f

the

stratospheric

zone

ayer

asa result

of

ozone-depleting

hemicals

s an

example

of environmental

lobal-

ism,

as is the

spread

f the

AIDSvirus romwest

equatorial

frica

around

he world

ince the

end

of

the

1970s.

Some

environmental

globalism

may

be

entirely

atural,

ut

much

of

the recent

hange

as

been induced

y

human

ctivity.

* Social ndculturallobalismnvolves hemovement f ideas, nfor-

mation,

images,

and

people

(who,

of

course,

carry

ideas

and

information

ith

hem).

Examples

nclude

he

movement

f

religions

or

the diffusionof

scientific

knowledge.

An

important

acet

of

social

globalism

nvolves

the imitationof

one

society's

practices

and institutions

by

others:

what some

sociologists

refer to as

isomorphism.

ften,

however,

ocial

lobalism

as

ollowed

military

and

economic

globalism.

deas,

nformation,

nd

people

follow

armies

and

economic

lows,

and in

doing

so,

transform

ocieties

and

markets.At its

most

profound

evel,

social

globalism

ffects

the

consciousnessf

individuals ndtheir

attitudes

oward

ulture,

politics,

and

personal

dentity.

ndeed,

ocial

and

cultural

lobalism

interactswith

other

types

of

globalism,

ecause

military,

nviron-

mental,

and

economic

activity

convey

information nd

generate

ideas,

which

may

then

flow

across

geographical

nd

political

boundaries. n the currentera, as the growthof the Internet

reduces osts

and

globalizes

ommunications,

he

flow of

ideas s

increasinglyndependent

f

other

ormsof

globalization.

This divisionof

globalism

nto

separate

imensionss

inevitably

somewhat

rbitrary.

onetheless,

t is

usefulor

analysis,

ecause

hanges

in

the

various

imensionsf

globalization

o not

necessarily

ccur

imul-

taneously.

ne can

sensibly

ay,

or

instance,

hat

economic

lobaliza-

tiontookplacebetweenapproximately850and1914,manifestedn

imperialism

nd

increased

rade

and

capital

lows

between

politically

independent

ountries;

ndthatsuch

globalization

as

argely

eversed

between

1914

and

1945.

That

s,

economic

lobalism

osebetween

850

and

1914

and ell

between

1914

and

1945.

However,

military

lobalism

rose o

new

heights

during

he

two

world

wars,

s

did

many

aspects

f

social

globalism.

The

worldwide

nfluenza

pidemic

of

1918-19,

which

took

30 million

lives,

was

propagated

n

part

by

the

flows

of

soldiers

aroundthe world.So did

globalism

decline or risebetween

1914

and

1945?

It

depends

on

what

dimension

of

globalism

one

is

examining.

SPRING

2000

107


6/17

Globalization:

hat's

ew?

CONTEMPORARY

GLOBALISM

When

people

peak

olloquially

bout

lobalization,hey ypically

efer

o

recent

ncreases

n

globalism.

n this

context,

omments

uch

as

global-

ization

s

fundamentally

ew

make ensebutare

nevertheless

isleading.

We

prefer

o

speak

f

globalism

s a

phenomenon

ith

ancient oots nd

of

globalization

sthe

process

f

increasinglobalism,

ow

or in

the

past.

Theissue snothowoldglobalisms,butrather ow thin r thick

it is

at

any

given

ime.As an

example

f thin

lobalization,

heSilk

Road

provided

neconomic nd

culturalink

between

ncient

Europe

nd

Asia,

but heroute

was

pliedby

a

small

roup

f

hardy

raders,

nd he

goods

hat

were raded ack

and orthhada direct

mpact rimarily

n

a

small

and

relatively

lite)

stratum

f

consumers

long

he road. n

contrast,

thick

relationsf

globalization,

s

described

y

political

cientist

David

Heldand

others,nvolvemany elationshipshatare ntensive swellasextensive:

long-distance

lows

hat are

arge

and

continuous,

ffecting

he

lives

of

many people.

The

operations

f

global

inancial

markets

oday,

or

instance,

ffect

eople

rom

Peoriao

Penang.

Globalization

s

the

process

by

which

globalism

ecomes

ncreasingly

hick.

Globalism

oday

is

different

rom

globalism

f

the

19th

century,

when

European

mperialism

rovided

muchof its

political

tructure,

and

higher

ransport

nd

communicationsosts

meantfewer

people

weredirectlynvolved.But is thereanythingaboutglobalismoday

that is

fundamentally

ifferent

rom

just

20

yearsago?

To

say

that

something

s

fundamentally

ifferent s

always

problematic,

ince

absolute

iscontinuitieso

not

exist

n

human

history.

very

ra

builds

on

others,

and

historians an

always

ind

precursors

or

phenomena

f

the

present.

Journalist

homas

Friedman

rgues

hat

contemporary

globalization

oes

farther,aster,

eeper,

nd

cheaper..

.

The

degree

of thickening fglobalismmaybegivingrise o threechangesnotjust

in

degree

but

in

kind:

ncreased

ensity

of

networks,

ncreased insti-

tutional

elocity,

nd

ncreased

ransnational

articipation.

Density

of

Networks

Economistsuse

the term

network

ffects o refer o

situations

where

a

product

becomes more

valuable once

many people

use

it-take,

for

example,

the

Internet.

Joseph Stiglitz,

former

chief

economistof

the

World Bank,has arguedthat a knowledge-basedconomy generates

powerfulpillover

effects,

often

spreading

ike fire and

triggering

ur-

108 FOREIGN POLICY


7/17

Keohane

Nye

ther

innovationand

setting

off chain

reactions

f

new

inventions.

Moreover,

s

interdependence

nd

globalism

avebecome

hicker,

ys-

temic

relationships

mong

different

networkshave become

more

important.

hereare

more nterconnections.

ntensive

conomic

nter-

dependence

ffects

ocial

and

environmental

nterdependence;

ware-

ness of

these

connections n

turn

affects conomic

elationships.

or

instance, he expansion f tradecan generatendustrialctivity n

countrieswith ow

environmental

tandards,

obilizing

nvironmental

activists o

carry

heir

message

o

these

newly

ndustrializing

ut

envi-

ronmentally

ax

countries. he

resulting

ctivities

may

affect

nviron-

mental

interdependence

for instance,

by

reducing

ross-boundary

pollution)

but

may

generate

esentmentn

the

newly

industrializing

countries,

ffecting

ocialand

economic elations.

The

worldwide

mpact

f

the

financial risis

hat

began

n

Thailand

inJuly1997illustrateshe extentof thesenetworknterconnections.

Unexpectedly,

what

irst

appeared

s an

isolated

anking

nd

currency

crisis n a

small

emerging

arket

ountry

had

severe

global

effects.

It

generated

inancial

panic

elsewhere

n

Asia,

particularly

n

South

Korea

and

Indonesia;

rompted

mergency

meetings

at the

highest

level of

world inance

and

huge

bail-out

ackages

rchestrated

y

the

International

Monetary

und

IMF);

nd ed

eventually

o

a

wide-

spread oss of confidence n emergingmarkets nd the efficacyof

international

inancial

nstitutions.

Beforethat

contagious

oss of

confidence

was

stemmed,

Russia

ad

defaulted n its

debt,

anda

U.S.-

based

hedge

und

had to

be

rescued

uddenly

hrough

plan

brokered

by

the

Federal

ReserveBank

of

New

York.

Even

after

recovery

ad

begun,

Brazil

equired

n

IMF

loan,

coupled

with a

devaluation,

o

avoid

inancial

ollapse

n

1999.

Economic

lobalism

s

nothing

new.

Indeed,

he

relative

magnitude

f

cross-bordernvestmentn 1997wasnot unprecedented.apitalmar-

kets

were

by

some

measures

ore

ntegrated

t the

beginning

han

at the

end of

the 20th

century.

he net

outflow f

capital

rom

Great

Britain

in

the

four

decades

efore

1914

averaged

percent

of

gross

domestic

product,

ompared

ith 2

to 3

percent

or

Japan

ver

the

last

decade.

The

financial

risisof

1997-99

was

not the

first

o

be

global

n

scale:

Black

Tuesday

n

Wall

Street in

1929

and the

collapse

of

Austria's

Creditanstaltbank in 1931 triggereda worldwide inancialcrisisand

depression.

n

the

1970s,

skyrocketing

il

prices

prompted

he

Organiza-

tion

of

Petroleum

Exporting

Countries

o lend

surplus

unds o

developed

SPRING 2000

109


8/17

Globalization:

hat's

ew?

D i s t a n c e :

I t s

o t

Q u i t e

e a d

The

Death

f

Distance s the battle

cry

of

the

information

ge.

In

some

domains,

his

refrains

true;

sa

generalization,

owever,

t is

a half-truth.

irst,

participation

n

global

nterdependence

as

ncreased,

ut

many

people

f

the

world

re

only

enuously

onnectedo

any

ommunications

etworks

hat ran-

scend heir tates,reven heirocalities.Many easantillagesnAsia,Africa,

andLatin

Americare

only

onnectedo

the

world sa whole

hrough

low

nd

often hin

economic,

ocial,

nd

political

inks.Even or

those

people

inked

extensively

o

global

ommunications

etworks,

t

is

more

ccurate

o

say

hat

the

significance

f

distance aries

reatly y

ssue

rea.

For

instance,

conomic

globalism

as been most

markedn

financial

markets.

Distance s

indeed

rrelevant-except

or

time

zones-if

a stock

can be sold

nstantaneously

n

New

York r

Hong

Kongby

an

investorn

Abidjan

o one inMoscow.

ndeed,

f the stock ssold

online,

t

may

be

only

a

fiction

hat

it

was sold n

the New York

tock

Exchange.

ut

physical

goods

movemore

lowly

han

capital,

ecause

utomobilesnd

cut flowers

cannotbe

transformednto

digits

on

a

computer.

rdersor

such tems

can

be sent

without

regard

o

distance,

ut the

carsor

flowers

ave to

move

physically

rom

Tokyo

r

Bogoti

to

Jakarta

r

Calgary.

uch

movements

taking lace

asterhan

ever-flowersare

now

sent

housandsf

miles

by

et

aircraft-but t isbynomeansnstantaneousrcheap.

Variabilityy

distance

pplies

o

cultural

lobalism

s well.

The

actual

movement f

ideasand

nformation

s

virtually

nstantaneous,

uthow

well

new

concepts

are

understood

nd

accepted

depends

on

how

much

the

assumptions,

ttitudes,

nd

expectations

f

different

roups

f

peoplevary.

We can

refer o

these

differencess

cultural

istance,

hich

has been

shaped y

past

migrations

f

people

and

deas nd

s,

in

turn,

onstrained

y

nations,

and

banks in

those

countries

made

a

profit

by

relending

hat

money

to

developing

countries in

Latin

America

and

Africa

(which

needed the

money

to

fund

expansionary

iscal

policies).

But the

money

dried

up

with the

global

recession

of

1981-83:

By

late

1986,

more

than

40

countries

worldwide

were

mired

n

severe

externaldebt.

But

some

features

of the

1997-99

crisis

distinguish

t

from

previous

ones.

Most

economists,

governments,

and

international

financial

institutionsfailed to anticipatethe crisis,and complexnew financial

instruments

made t

difficult o

understand.

ven

countries hat

had

pre-

110

FOREIGN

POLICY


9/17

Keohane

&

Nye

geography.

he

U.S.

president

an talk

simultaneously

o

people

n

Berlin,

Belgrade,

uenos

Aires,

Beijing,

Beirut,

Mumbai,

nd

Bujumbura-but

he

same

wordswillbe

interpreted

erydifferently

n

these

even

cities.

Likewise,

U.S.

popular

ulture

may

be

interpretedyyouth

n

some

cultures

s

validat-

ing fundamentally

ew

valuesand

ifestyles,

utviewed n

other

ettings

s

nothing

more

hantrivial

ymbols,xpressed

nly

n

baseball

aps,

T-shirts,

andmusic.Andfor omeyouthnthe same ity, uchasTehran,uch ymbols

are

representative

f

the Great

atan,

rof

liberation. ultural

istance

esists

homogenization.inally,

lementsof social

globalism

hat

rely

on

the

migration

f

people

re

highly

onstrained

y

distancend

by

egal

urisdictions,

because

ravel

emains

ostly

or

most

people

n

the

world,

nd

governments

everywhere

eek o control

nd imit

migration.

Similar

ariabilityy

distance

ccurswithenvironmental

lobalism.

We

may ive on onlyone earth, utpollution f riversdirectly ffects nly

those

downstream,

nd

he

poisonous

ir

of

many

ities

n

the

former

oviet

empire

nd

developing

ountriess

lethal

mostly

o

people

within ocal

and

regional

asins.

The most

ethal

pollution

s local.

Even

global

phenomena

such

as

the

depletion

f the ozone

ayer

nd

global

warming

aryby

latitude

and

climatic

actors.

There s also

great

variabilityy

distance n

military lobalism.

Only

a

few

countries

ave

ntercontinental

issiles,

nd

only

the United

Stateshas

the logistical ndcommand ndcontrolcapabilitiesorglobal eachwith

conventional

orces.Most

countries re

ocalor

at

best

regional

owers.

At

the same

ime,

weak ocal

actors

an

useother

networksf

globalism

o cause

damage.

ven

nonstate

ctors an do

so,

as

witnessed

hena

transnational

terrorist

roup

ombedhe World

Trade

Center

n

New York.

-R.O.K. &

J.S.N.

viously

been

praised

or

their

sound

economic

policies

and

performance

were

no less

susceptible

o the

financial

contagion

triggered

y

specula-

tive

attacksand

unpredictable

hanges

n

market

entiment.

The

World

Bank

had

recently

published

a

report

entitled

TheEast

Asian

Miracle

(1993),

and

investment

lows to

Asia had

risen

rapidly

o a new

peak

in

1997,

remaining

high

until

the crisis

hit.

In

December

1998,

Federal

Reserve

Board

Chairman

Alan

Greenspan

said: I

have

learnedmore

about how this new internationalinancial

system

works n

the last

12

months

than

in

the

previous

20

years.

Sheer

magnitude,

complexity,

SPRING

2000

111


10/17

Globalization:

hat's ew?

xxx

OWN,-

MRS,

May

I

interconnect

you?

and

speeddistinguishontemporarylobalization

romearlier

eriods:

Whereashedebtcrisis f the1980swasaslow-motionrainwreck hat

took

place

overa

period

f

years,

he Asianmeltdowntruckmmedi-

ately

and

spread

ver

a

period

f months.

The

point

s that he

increasing

hickness

f

globalism-thedensity

f

networksf

interdependence-is

ot

just

a

difference

n

degree.

Thick-

nessmeans hatdifferent

elationships

f

interdependence

ntersectmore

deeply

t more

points.

Hence,

he effects

f

events

n

one

geographical

area,

n

one

dimension,

anhave

profound

ffects

n

other

geographical

areas,

n otherdimensions. s in scientificheories f

chaos,

nd n

weather

ystems,

mall vents

n

one

place

canhave

catalytic

ffects,

o

thattheir

consequences

ater,

nd

elsewhere,

revast.

Such

systems

re

difficulto

understand,

nd heir ffects re hereforeften

unpredictable.

Furthermore,

henthesearehuman

ystems, eople

areoftenhardat

work

rying

o outwit

others,

o

gain

an

economic, ocial,

or

military

advantage

recisely y

acting

n

unpredictable

ays.

As

a

result,

lobal-

ismwilllikelybe accompaniedy pervasive ncertainty.herewillbe

continual

ompetition

etween ncreased

omplexity

nd

uncertainty,

112

FOREIGN POLICY


11/17

Keohane

&

Nye

andefforts

y governments,

arket

articipants,

ndothers

o

compre-

hend

and

manage

hese

ncreasinglyomplex

nterconnected

ystems.

Globalization,herefore,

oes

not

merely

ffect

overnance;

t is

affected

by governance.

requent

inancial

rises f

the

magnitude

f the

crisis

f

1997-99

ould ead o

popular

ovements

o

limit

nterdependence

nd

o

a reversalf

economic

lobalization.

haotic

ncertainty

stoo

high

a

price

formostpeople o payforsomewhatigher verageevelsof prosperity.

Unless ome f

its

aspects

anbe

effectively

overned,

lobalization

ay

be

unsustainablen its

current

orm.

Institutional

elocity

The

information

evolutions at

the

heart

f

economic

nd

social

lobal-

ization.t

hasmade

ossible

he

transnational

rganization

f

work

nd

he

expansion

f

markets,

hereby

acilitating

new

international

ivision f

labor.As AdamSmith amouslyeclaredn TheWealthfNations, the

division f

labors

limited

y

the

extentof

themarket.

ilitarylobalism

predated

he

information

evolution,

eaching

ts

height

during

World

War

I

andthe

cold

war;

utthe

nature f

military

nterdependence

as

been

ransformed

y

information

echnology.

he

pollution

hat

has

con-

tributedo

environmental

lobalism

as its

sourcesn

the

coal-oil-steel-

auto-chemical

conomy

hat

was

argely

reated etween

he

middle

f

the19thand20thcenturiesndhasbecome lobalizednlyrecently;ut

the

information

evolution

may

have

a

major

mpact

on

attempts

o

counter

ndreverse

he

negative

ffects f

this orm f

globalism.

Sometimes

hese

changes

are

incorrectly

iewed in

terms

of

the

velocity

of

information

lows.

The

biggest

hange

n

velocity

ame

with

the

steamship

nd

especially

he

telegraph:

he

transatlantic

ableof

1866

reducedhe

time

of

transmission

f

information

etween

London

and

New York

y

over

a

week-hence,

by

a

factor f

abouta

thousand.

Thetelephone, ycontrast,ncreasedhevelocityofsuchmessagesy

a few

minutes

since

elephone

messages

o not

require

ecoding),

nd

the

Internet,

s

compared

ith

the

telephone,

y

not

muchat

all.

The

real

difference

ies in

the

reduced ost

of

communicating,

ot in

the

velocity

f

any

ndividual

ommunication.

nd

the

effects re

herefore

felt

in

the

increased

ntensity

ather

han

the

extensity

f

globalism.

n

1877

it

was

expensive

to

send

telegrams

across

the

Atlantic,

and in

1927 or even 1977 it was expensiveto telephone transcontinentally.

Corporations

nd

the

rich

used

transcontinental

elephones,

but ordi-

nary

people

wrote

letters

unless

there was

an

emergency.

But

in

2000,

if

SPRING

2000

113


12/17

Globalization:

hat's

ew?

you

have

access

o a

computer,

he

Internets

virtually

reeand

ranspa-

cific

telephone

alls

may

cost

only

a fewcents

per

minute.The

volume

of

communicationsas

ncreased

y

many

orders f

magnitude,

nd

he

intensity

f

globalism

asbeen

able o

expand

xponentially.

Markets

eact

more

quickly

han

before,

because

nformation

if-

fusesso

much more

rapidly

nd

huge

sumsof

capital

can

be

moved

at a

moment's

otice.

Multinational

nterprises

ave

changed

heir

organizational

tructures,

ntegrating roduction

more

closely

on a

The

ncreasing

hickness

f

globalism-the

ensity

f

networks

f

nterdependence-

is

notjust

a diferencendegree.

transnational

asis

and

entering

into

more

networks

and

alliances,

as

global

capitalism

has become

more

competitive

and more

subject

to

rapid

change.

Nongovernmental

rga-

nizations (NGOs)have vastly

expanded

heirlevels of

activity.

With

respect

o

globalism

nd

velocity,

herefore,

necan

distinguish

between

he

velocity

of

a

given

communication- message

elocity -

and

institutional

elocity.

Message

elocity

has

changed

ittlefor

the

population

entersof

relatively

ich

countries ince

the

telegraph

became

moreor

lessuniversal

oward

he end

of the

19th

century.

ut

institutional

elocity-how

rapidly system

and the

units

within it

change-is

a functionnot so muchof

message

elocity

hanof the

intensity

of

contact-the

thickness f

globalism.

n

the

late

1970s,

the

news

cycle

wasthe

same

as it

had

been

for

decades:

eople

ound

out the

day's

eadlines

y

watching

he

evening

news

and

got

the

more

complete

tory

and

analysis

rom

he

morning

aper.

Butthe

introduc-

tion of

24-hour

able

news

n

1980and

the

subsequent

mergence

f

the

Internet

ave

made

news

ycles

horter

ndhave

put

a

largerremium

on smalladvantagesn speed.Untilrecently,ne newspaper id not

normally

scoop

nother

by

receiving

and

processing

nformation

an

hour

earlier

han another:

As

long

as the

information

ould be

processed

efore he

daily

paper

went o

bed,

t

was

timely.

But in

2000,

an

hour-or

even a

few

minutes-makes

critical

difference

or

a

cable

television

network n

termsof

being

on

top

of

a

story

r

behind

he

curve.

nstitutional

elocity

has

accelerated

morethan

message

elocity.

nstitutional

elocity

eflects ot

only

ndividual

ink-

agesbut networks ndinterconnectionsmongnetworks.This

phe-

nomenon

s

where

he

real

change

ies.

114

FOREIGN

POLICY


13/17

Keohane

&

Nye

Transnational

articipation

nd

Complex

nterdependence

Reduced

costs of

communications ave

increased he

number

of

participating

ctorsand

increasedhe

relevance

f

complex

nterde-

pendence.

This

concept

describes

hypothetical

worldwith

three

characteristics:

ultiple

channels

between

societies,

with

multiple

actors,

not

just

states;

multiple

issues,

not

arranged

n

any

clear

hierarchy;nd heirrelevancef thethreat ruseof forceamong tates

linked

by

complex

nterdependence.

We used he

concept

of

complex

nterdependence

n

the

1970s

prin-

cipally

o

describe

merging

elationships

mong

pluralist

emocracies.

Manifestly

t

did not

characterize

elations

etween he

United

States

andthe

Soviet

Union,

nor

did it

typify

he

politics

of

the

Middle

East,

East

Asia,

Africa,

or

even

parts

of

Latin

America.

However,

we

did

argue

hat

nternational

onetary

elations

pproximated

ome

aspects

of

complex

nterdependence

n the 1970sandthatsomebilateralela-

tionships-French-German

nd

U.S.-Canadian,

or

example-approx-

imated ll

three

conditions f

complex

nterdependence.

n a

world

of

complex

nterdependence,

e

argued,

olitics

would

be

different.

he

goals

and

nstruments

f

state

policy-and

the

processes

f

agenda

et-

ting

and

ssue

inkage-would

all

be

different,

s

would

he

significance

of

international

rganizations.

Translatednto the language f globalism,he politicsof complex

interdependence

ould

be one

in

which

evelsof

economic,

nviron-

mental,

and

social

globalism

re

high

and

military lobalism

s low.

Regional

nstances f

security

ommunities-where

tates

have

reliable

expectations

hat

orce

will

not

be

used-include

Scandinavia

ince he

early

20th

century.

Arguably,

ntercontinental

omplex

nterdepen-

dence

was

imited

during

he

coldwar o

areas

rotected

y

the

United

States,

such

as

the

Atlantic

security

ommunity.

ndeed,

U.S.

power

and

policy

werecrucial o the constructionf

postwar

nternational

institutions,

anging

rom

NATO

to

the

IMF,

which

protected

nd

sup-

ported

omplex

nterdependence.

ince

1989,

the

decline

of

military

globalism

nd

the

extension

of

social

and

economic

globalism

o

the

former

oviet

empire

have

implied

he

expansion

f

areas f

complex

interdependence,

t

least

o the

new

and

aspiring

members f

NATO

in

Eastern

Europe.

Moreover,

conomic

and

social

globalism

eem

to have

created incentives for leadersin South America to settle territorial

quarrels,

ut

of fear

both of

being

distracted

rom

tasksof

economic

and

social

development

and

of

scaring

away

needed

investment

capital.

SPRING

2000

115


14/17

Globalization:

hat's

ew?

Even

today

omplex nterdependence

s far romuniversal.

Military

forcewas

used

by

or

threatened

gainst

tates

hroughout

he

1990s,

from he

Taiwan trait

o

Iraq,

rom

Kuwait

o the

former

Yugoslavia;

from

Kashmir

o

Congo.

Civil warsareendemic n

muchof

sub-Saha-

ranAfricaandsometimes ave

escalated

nto

international

arfare,

s

when he

Democratic

epublic

f

Congo's

ivilwar

engulfed

ive

neigh-

Interstateuse

and threat

of

military

orce

have

virtually

disappeared

n

certain

areas

of

the

world.

boring

ountries. he

information

revolution and the voracious

appetite

of television

viewers

or

dramatic visual

images

have

heightened global

awarenessof

some

of thesecivil

conflictsand

made hem

more

mmediate,

on-

tributing

o

pressure

or

humani-

tarianntervention,s in Bosnia ndKosovo.The various imensions

of

globalization-in

this

case,

the

social and

military

dimensions-

intersect,

ut the

results renot

necessarily

onducive

o

greater

ar-

mony.

Nevertheless,

nterstate

se and

threatof

military

orce

have

virtually

isappeared

n

certain

reas f the

world-notably

among

he

advanced,

nformation-era

emocracies

ordering

he

Atlantic

and

he

Pacific,

s well as

among

a

number

f

their

ess

wealthy

neighbors

n

Latin

Americaand

increasingly

n

Eastern-Central

urope.

The dimension f

complex

nterdependence

hathas

changed

he

most ince

he

1970s

s

participation

n

channels f

contact

among

oci-

eties.There

hasbeen

a vast

expansion

f such

channels

sa result f

the

dramatic

all n

the

costsof

communication

ver

arge

istances.t is

no

longer

ecessary

o

be a rich

organization

o

be

able

o

communicaten

a real-time

basiswith

people

around

he

globe.

Friedman alls this

change

he

democratizationf

technology,

inance,

nd

nformation,

because iminishedostshavemadewhatwereonceluxuriesvailable

to a

much

broader

ange

f

society.

Democratization

s

probably

he

wrong

word,

however,

ince in

markets

money

votes,

and

people

tart

out with

unequal

takes.

There

is no

equality,

or

example,

n

capital

markets,

espite

he new

financial

instruments

hat

permit

more

people

to

participate.

Pluralization

might

be a

better

word,

uggesting

he

vast

ncreasen

the

number nd

variety

f

participants

n

global

networks.

he

number f

international

NGOsmorethan

quadrupled

romabout6,000to over

26,000

in the

1990s

alone.Whether

hey

are

arge rganizations

uchas

Greenpeace

116

FOREIGN

POLICY


15/17

Keohane&

Nye

or

Amnesty

nternational,

r the

proverbial

three ookswith

modems

anda fax

machine,

GOs

annowraise

heirvoicesas neverbefore.

n

1999,

NGOs

orldwide

sed he

Internet

o coordinate massive

rotest

against

he WorldTrade

Organization

eeting

n Seattle.

Whether

these

organizations

an

forge

a coherentand credible oalition

has

become

he

key

political

question.

Thisvastexpansionf transnationalhannels fcontact, tmulticon-

tinental

distances,

enerated

y

the media nda

profusion

f

NGOs,

as

helpedexpand

he

thirddimension

f

complex nterdependence:

he

multiple

ssues

onnecting

ocieties.

More

ndmore ssues

re

up

or

grabs

internationally,ncluding

egulations

nd

practices-ranging

rom

phar-

maceutical

esting

o

accounting

nd

product

tandardso

banking egu-

lation-that were

formerly

egarded

s the

prerogatives

f national

governments.

he

Uruguay

ound

of

multilateralrade

negotiations

f

the late 1980s and

early

1990s focusedon services,once

virtually

untouched

y

international

egimes;

nd

the

financial risis f

1997-99

ledto

both

public

nd

private

ffortso

globalize

he

transparent

inancial

reporting

hathas

become

revalent

n

advancedndustrializedountries.

Increased

articipation

t a distanceand

greater

pproximation

f

complex nterdependence

o not

imply

he

end

of

politics.

On

the con-

trary,

ower

emains

mportant.

ven n

domains

haracterized

y

com-

plex interdependence,oliticsreflects symmetricalconomic, ocial,

and environmental

nterdependence,

ot

just

among

statesbut

also

among

onstate

ctors,

nd

hroughransgovernmental

elations.

om-

plex

interdependence

s

not a

description

f the

world,

but rather

n

ideal

concept

abstracting

rom

reality.

t

is, however,

n

ideal

concept

that

ncreasingly

orresponds

o

reality

n

many

parts

f the

world,

ven

at

transcontinental

istances-and

hat

corresponds

ore

closely

han

obsolete

mages

f

world

olitics

s

simply

nterstateelations

hat ocus

solely

onforceand

security.

So what

really

s new n

contemporary

lobalism?

ntensive,

r

thick,

network

nterconnectionshathave

ystemic

ffects,

ften

unanticipated.

Butsuch hick

globalism

s

not

uniform:

t

varies

y

region,

ocality,

nd

issue

area. t is

less

a

matter

f

communications

essage

elocity

han

of

declining

ost,

which

does

speed

up

what

we call

systemic

nd nsti-

tutional

velocity.

Globalization

shrinks

distance,

but

it

does not make

distanceirrelevant.And the filtersprovidedby domesticpoliticsand

political

institutions

play

a

major

role in

determining

what

effects

glob-

alization

really

has and

how well

variouscountries

adapt

to it.

Finally,

SPRING

2000

117


16/17

Globalization:

hat's

ew?

reduced ostshave enabled

more

actors o

participate

n

world

politics

at

greater

istances,

eading

arger

reas f

world

olitics

o

approximate

the

ideal

ype

of

complex

nterdependence.

Although

he

system

f

sovereign

tates s

likely

o continueas

the

dominanttructure

n

the

world,

he

content f world

olitics

s

changing.

More

dimensions

han

ever-but not

all-are

beginning

o

approach

ur

idealizedonceptof complexnterdependence.uchtrends anbe set

back,

perhaps

ven

reversed,

ycataclysmic

vents,

s

happened

n

earlier

phases

f

globalization.

istory lways

as

surprises.

ut

history's

urprises

always

ccur

gainst

he

background

f

what

has

gone

before.

he

surprises

of

the

early

21st

century

will,

no

doubt,

be

profoundly

ffected

y

the

processes

f

contemporary

lobalization

hatwe

have ried

o

analyze

ere.

WANT TO KNOW MORE?

Interdependence

ecame

buzzwordn

the

1970s,

hanks

n

part

o the

landmark

works of

two

economists:

Richard N.

Cooper's

The

Economics

of

Interdependence:

conomic

Policy

in the

Atlantic

Community

New

York:

McGraw

Hill,

1968)

and

Raymond

Vernon's

Sovereignty

t

Bay:

The

Multinational

pread

of

U.S.

Enterprises

(NewYork: asicBooks,1971).PoliticalcientistsRobertO.Keohane

and

Joseph

S.

Nye

Jr.

have

published

number

f

works n

the

topic,

including

Transnational

Relations

and

World

Politics

(Cambridge:

Harvard

University

Press,

1972)

and

Power

and

Interdependence:

World

Politics in

Transition

Boston:

Little,

Brown,

and

Company,

1977;

orthcoming

hird

dition,

New York:

ongman,

000).

Technological

nd economic

change

did not

stop

in

the

1980s,

even

as the

little

old

war

was

refocusing

ublic

ttention,

oundation

resources, nd academic ashionson the moretraditional ecurity

agenda.

With

the

cold

war's

nd,

the

resulting

rowth

n

interdepen-

dence

became

o clear

hat

ournalist

homas

Friedman's

ell-written

book

on

globalization,

he

Lexus and

the

Olive

Tree

(New

York:

Farrar

Straus

and

Giroux,

1999)

became a

bestseller.

Friedman

engaged

Le

Monde

iplomatique's

gnacio

Ramonet n a

lively

debate

over

globalization

n

the

Fall

1999

issue

of

FOREIGN

POLICY.)

William

Greider

presents skepticalpost-cold-wariew in his One

World,

Ready

or

Not:

The

Manic

Logicof

GlobalCapitalism

New

York:

imon

&

Schuster,

997).

118

FOREIGN

POLICY


17/17

Keohane

&

Nye

The most

complete

academic

urvey

f

globalization

o date

is

the

magisterial

Global

Transformations:

Politics, Economics,

and

Culture

(Stanford:

tanford

University

Press,

1999),

by

David

Held,

Anthony

McGrew,

David

Goldblatt,

nd

Jonathan

Perraton. askia

Sassen

presents

n

interestingociological erspective

n

Globalization

and Its

Discontents:

Essays

on the New

Mobilityof

People

and

Money NewYork: ewPress, 997).Frances airncrossakesasome-

what

breathless

iew

of

the

informationevolution

n

The Death

of

Distance:

How

the Communications evolutionWill

Change

Our

Lives

Boston:

Harvard usiness chool

Press, 997).

Margaret

.

Keck

and

Kathryn

Sikkink's

book

Activists

Beyond

Borders:

Advocacy

Networks n International olitics

(Ithaca:

Cornell

University

Press,

1998)

offers historical

erspective

n

the evolution

of

global

norms,

and

Jared

M.

Diamond's

Guns, Germs,

and

Steel:

The

Fates

of

HumanSocieties NewYork:W.W.Norton&

Company,

997)exam-

ines the various

imensions f

globalism

ver

a

span

of centuries.

Karl

Polanyi's

The

Great Transformation

New

York:

Farrar&

Rinehart, 944;

Beacon

Press, 985)

remains classic

ccount f the

rise

and

fall of

19th-century

conomic

globalism.

Dani

Rodrik's

Has

Globalization one

Too Far?

(Washington:

nstituteor

International

Economics,

997)

updates

hese

concernsor

the current ra.

Jeffrey

G.

Williamson'shapter,Globalizationnd he LaborMarket, nPhilippe

Aghion

and

Jeffrey

G.

Williamson, ds.,

Growth,

Inequality

and

Globalization:

heory,

History,

and

Policy

(Cambridge: ambridge

University

ress, 998)

s

an

excellent ourceor

mportant

istoricalata.

For

inks to

relevant

Web

sites,

as

well as a

comprehensive

ndex

of

relatedFOREIGN

POLICY

articles,

ccess

www.foreignpolicy.com.

SPRING 2000 119

keohane and nye--globalization what's new- what's not

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