karl marx’s dialetics and the marxist criticism of law · through the substantial studies...

Rev.DireitoPráx.,RiodeJaneiro,Vol.9,N.4,2018,p.2267-2292.ViníciusCasalinoDOI:10.1590/2179-8966/2018/29868|ISSN:2179-8966

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KarlMarx’sdialeticsandtheMarxistcriticismoflawAdialéticadeKarlMarxeacríticamarxistadodireito

ViníciusCasalino11Pontifícia Universidade Católica de Campinas, Campinas, São Paulo, Brasil. E-mail:[email protected]:https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0003-3315.Thearticlewassubmittedon3/08/2017andacceptedon16/01/2018.

ThisworkislicensedunderaCreativeCommonsAttribution4.0InternationalLicense


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Abstract

The article seeks to understand in depth the peculiarities of KarlMarx’s materialistic

dialectic, as opposed to the idealistic, Hegelian dialectic. Grounded in Capital, it

highlights the absence of more accurate methodological concerns within theMarxist

critiqueof law,which leads to theadoptionofdiscrepantandcontradictorypremises,

methods and viewpoints. The conclusions indicate the urgency of the debate on the

Marxian-dialectical method and the importance of its rigorous incorporation into the

Marxistcritiqueoflaw.

Keywords:Marxismandlaw;DialecticsofKarlMarx;EvgenyPashukanis.

Resumo

O artigo busca compreender de modo aprofundado as peculiaridades da dialética

materialista, de Karl Marx, em oposição à dialética idealista, hegeliana. Com

fundamento em O capital, ressalta a ausência de preocupações metodológicas mais

acuradas no interior da crítica marxista do direito, o que redunda na adoção de

premissas,métodoseconclusõesdiscrepantesecontraditórias.Asconclusõesindicama

urgência do debate sobre o método dialético-marxiano e a importância de sua

incorporaçãorigorosaàcríticamarxistadodireito.

Palavras-chave:Marxismoedireito;DialéticadeKarlMarx;EvgeniPachukanis.


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"Althoughthisisnomorethanamererepetitionoftheproductionprocessonthesamescale,thismererepetitionorcontinuityimprintsupontheprocesscertainnewcharacteristicsor,rather,dissolvestheapparent

characteristicswhichitexhibitedwhenitproceededinisolation."KarlMarx.

Introduction

OneofthegreatmeritsofPachukanis,recognizedbyalmostallofthosewhohavegone

into General theory of law and Marxism, is the methodological rigor with which he

proceeded the critical analysis of themain categories that form the general theoryof

law.1This characteristic canbedetected,evidently, already in theessentialnucleusof

histhought,whichconsists intheoriginalapproximationbetweentheformof lawand

the form of the commodity.2 Thus, instead of placing its analysis in the relatively

abstract context of the relations between infrastructure and superstructure,

understanding law as a mere ideological expression3, or introducing juridical form,

abruptly,inthecontextofclassstruggle,Pachukanisfollowsthemethodologicalstepsof

Marxandassociatesthelawtothecommodity,thatis,totheelementaryformofwealth

inthecapitalistmodeofproduction.Withthis,heunveilsthemythicalfigureofthelegal

subject,centralelementtothegeneraltheoryof law,discovering itsconcreteorigin in

the "guardians of the commodities", that is to say, in the people urged to take their

valuesofusetothemarkettomaketheexchange.

Besidesasubstantial concernwithmethodologicalproblems,which ledhimto

thecriticalanalysisofthecategoriesthatformthegeneraltheoryoflawinthelightof

theMarxianpresentationinCapital,Pachukanisdemonstratesaformalconcernaswell,

ashereservesachapterofhisworkforthepresentationofthemethodsofconstructing

1CerronicomparesPachukanis'worktothatofStutchkainthefollowingterms:"Buttwoelementsatleast,profoundlydifferentiatehisperspectivefromthatofStutchka.Thefirstreferstoasharperaccentuationofthe objective (extraconsciential) character of the whole juridical problematics (...) The second elementconcernsagreatermethodologicalacumen,which is inserted inadeeperphilosophicalcultureandaverypenetratingmeditationon themethodof Capital. It is notby chance that Pachukanis is perhaps the firstMarxistscholartoworkonthebasisofthe1857Introduction,atextbyMarxthatforalongtimestoodasideinthetraditionofMarxistexegesis"(CERRONI1976,65,myemphasis).2 In thepreface to the2ndedition, Pachukanisnotes: "ComradeP. I. Stutchkahasquitewell definedmyapproach to thegeneral theoryof lawas 'anattempt toapproximate the formof law to the formof thecommodity'.As faras I can judge fromthecomments, this idea,notwithstandingoccasional reservations,wasrecognizedinitsfoundationsasaccurateandfruitful"(PACHUKANIS,2017,p.60;2003,p.36).3 As does, for example, Reisner. Cerroni explains: "In 1912, Reisner gives this definition of law: it is anideology that ‘relies,withinourconsciousness,mainlyon theconceptof truth, justiceandequality in thedistributionandequalizationofmenandthings"(Cerroni,1976,p.51).


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the concrete in the abstract sciences.4 Based on the Contribution to the Critique of

PoliticalEconomy,aMarx’s textrarelyusedatthetime,theRussianauthorpointsout

three fundamental questions: first, the importance of starting from the simple to the

complex,fromthepureformtothemoreconcrete,sothat, inthecaseofthejuridical

science, the State is a point of arrival and not of departure; second, the need of

consideringthattheconceptsthatthesocialscienceuseshaveahistory,thatistosay,

theyarenot formsof thought createdby thehumanmind,but correspond toprecise

andhistoricallydelimitedsocialrelations–as,forexample,theconceptofvalue,oflaw,

etc.;andfinally,theMarxianobservationthattheunderstandingofthemeaningofpast

socialformations isgiventhroughtheanalysisof later,andthereforemoredeveloped,

configurations,suchascapitalistsociety.5

Although Pachukanis's work has meant a monumental advance in

methodologicalconcernswithintheMarxistcritiqueofhistime6,thereisnowacertain

"paradox."Curiously,eventheMarxisttraditionthatwasformedinthewakeofGeneral

Theory of Law and Marxism, failed in making significant progress on methodological

issues.ThenotesdrawnupbytheRussianauthorweretakenascorrect,adequate,and

above all, sufficient, and no further notesweremade. Thus, central categories of the

Pachukan apparatus, such as the figure of the subject of law, the pre-eminence of

private law vis-à-vis the public, the extinction of juridical form, etc., are taken in a

relatively uncritical7 way, without any major concern with regard to a necessary and

indispensablecritical-methodologicalevaluationofPachukanis'sowntheory.Theresult

couldnotbemoredisheartening:theMarxistapproachestolawhaveenteredavicious

circle, within which they remain "spinning" about aspects constantly reiterated and

ruminatedtoexhaustion.

Thepurposeofthisarticleistodrawattentiontothisproblemwhichhasbeen

overlookedby theMarxist critiqueof law:questionsconcerning theelucidationof the

"method" used by Marx, and which require a necessary analysis of the particular

4Chapter01ofTheGeneralTheoryofLawandMarxism(PACHUKANIS,2017,pp.81-86;2003,pp.63-70).5Pachukanispointsout:"Only inthiscasewillweconceive lawnotasanaccessorytoanabstracthumansociety, but as a historical category that corresponds to a defined social environment, built by thecontradictionofprivateinterests"(PACHUKANIS,2017,p.86,2003,70)-(“Apenasnessecasoconceberemoso direito não como acessório de uma sociedade humana abstrata, mas como categoria histórica quecorrespondeaumambientesocialdefinido,construídopelacontradiçãodeinteressesprivados”)6ThefirsteditionofTheGeneralTheoryofLawandMarxismwaspublishedin1924.7 In the context of theMarxist debate, of course.When compared to the traditional theory of law, theMarxistcritiqueemergesattheforefrontofallanalysisinvogue.


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contoursofhisdialectic,havenotyetbeendulysolvedinother"fields"ofMarxism,such

asphilosophy,economics,politics,etc.,tobegivenasdefinitively"solved"andsetaside.

On thecontrary, thiswork is still ongoingand theMarxistapproaches in theambitof

law can not afford to simply ignore it. For this reason, the object of this analysis

comprisesapartofthesetofresearchesthathavebeendevelopedaroundtheMarxian

dialectic, with the aim of identifying certain elements that are peculiar to it. The

hypothesismaintained is that theMarxist critiqueof lawneeds to incorporate into its

fieldof intereststheproblematicsoftheMarxianmethod,otherwise itwillbestuck in

constantlyreiteratedcategories,or,worsestill,itwillloseitselfinaradicaleclecticismof

premises ,methods and conclusions so disparate that they approach dangerously the

postmodernapproach,soinvogueintraditionaltheory.Therefore,ananalyticalclipping

ofBookIofCapitalwasestablished,whichconsistspreciselyofthepresentationofthe

conversionofthelawsofmercantilepropertyintolawsofcapitalistappropriation.Inthe

lightofthispassage,theconceptualmeaningoftheformofprivatecapitalistpropertyin

Pachukaniswasanalyzed,inordertotestifytowhatextenthispointofviewapproaches

moreorlesstheMarxianperspective.Theconclusionpointstoacertainmethodological

insufficiencyof thePachukaniananalysis. Finally, themethodused canbenoneother

but Karl Marx's dialectical-materialist one, whose fundamental features are

incorporatedinCapital.

1.(Ancient)ProblemsofMarx’sdialectics

Theproblems related toKarlMarx’s dialectic are ancient.Already in the afterword to

thesecondeditionofhisgreatwork,in1873,theauthoraffirmed:"Themethodapplied

inCapitalwas littleunderstood,asalreadyshownbythecontradictory interpretations

thatwerepresentedaboutthebook"(MARX,2013,p.88,1962,p.25).Equallyancient

aretheattemptstoapproximatehismethodtothatofHegel.Atthesameoccasion,ina

toneofcomplaint,heremarks:"TheGermancommentatorsnaturallycryoutagainstthe

Hegeliansophistry"(MARX,2013,p.88;1962,p.25).Sincealways,however,theauthor

struggles to claim the autonomy of his dialectical method. After mentioning extracts

fromacritiqueofCapital,heobserves: "Indescribing socorrectlymy truemethod, as


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well as thepersonal application Imakeof the latter,what elsedid the authordobut

describethedialecticalmethod?"(MARX,2013,p.90,1962,p27,myitalics).

Afteraperiodofrelative"disinterest,"inwhichstrictly"economic"debatesover

Marx's work prevailed, "philosophical" subjects returned to the scene, especially

through the substantial studies elaborated by Karl Korsch (2008) and Georg Luckács

(2003),publishedinthe1920s8.However,if,ontheonehand,theywereengagedinthe

rescueof thedialectics,especiallywithregard toanecessary reincorporationofHegel

intotheMarxistdebate,ontheother, they failed in facing, inadetainedandrigorous

way,thecomplex issuesposedbythechallengeofunravelingtheconceptualcontours

of a specificallyMarxiandialectic. Thisone, in turn, far fromantagonizingor repelling

theanalysisofeconomic forms,presupposesthemasconstitutiveelementsof itsown

wayofbeing.Inthissense,itdoesn’tseemlikeanexaggerationtoaffirmtheimportant

role played by Isaak Illich Rubin (1987), in presenting, also in the 1920s, theMarxian

theoryofvalueinanon-autonomousway.

However,afewyearswouldhavetopass,still,sothatamoreaccuraterescueof

therelationsbetweeneconomicsanddialecticsinMarx'sthoughtwouldcometolight.

Inthemid-1950s,RomanRosdolsky (2001) focusesontheGrundrisse (MARX,2011)to

extract from there important indications of how theMarxian method is structured,

especiallywithregardtotheintimaterelationsitmaintainswithHegel'sLogic.9Indoing

so, Rosdolsky deals with specifically "economic" themes (money, capital, etc.), which

are, after all, the very object of Marx's "draft." However, it is only from the 1960s

onwards,perhapsduetoawelcomedeparturefromacademicstudiesinrelationtothe

politicalvicissitudesof thetime,thatemerges inthe intellectualMarxistscenea"new

reading" of Marx, whose objective is to face certain challenges linked to the

interpretationof theMarxianwork inarelativelyautonomousway,withoutgivingthe

"official"interpretationsuntilthenestablishedanaccount.

This"newhorizon"gaverisetoamoredirectconfrontationwiththeproblems

concerning the dialectical method that Marx "applied" to the economic questions.

HelmutReichelt,oneoftheexponentsofthis"newreading",capturedtheproblemina

perspicaciousway:8Checkout:(ANDERSON,2004),mainlychapter03.9"ThereisnothemetreatedmorecarelesslybycommentatorsofMarx'seconomictheorythanthatofhismethodand,particularly,ofhisrelationtoHegel"(ROSDOLSKY,2001,p.15).Acurrentapproachtotheissueis found in: (ARTHUR,2016), in thewholework,especialy inchapter05 (CapitalofMarxandtheLogicofHegel).


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InthemeantimetheinteresthasbeenturningmoreandmoretoMarx'slatework,but itseemsthatnotonestepclosertotheexpectedclarificationofmethodological problems has been reached. Neither did Rosdolsky'scommentarychangemuchinthisregard.AlthoughhesaysthatexactlytheDraft shows us howmuch the "structuring ofMarx's Capital is dialecticalfrombeginningtoend,"itis,afterall,nothingmorethananassertion.Oneof the weaknesses of his book consists especially of the fact that it onlydrawsattentiontotheuseofHegeliancategoriesand, inthesamebreath,reproduce almost without commentaries whole passages that aredistinguished by their highly speculative formulations and, therefore,extremelylackingininterpretation.ThisnaturallygivesrisetothequestionifRosdolskywouldnothaveequallyincurredthesuperficialityhecensured;if–althoughheaffirmsthis–hehasreallyabandonedthepositionheseesin the dialectics present in Capital only a stylistic ingredient that remainsexternaltothesubjecttreated(REICHELT,2013,p.24).

According to this "new reading", the more precise understanding of the

dialectical elements of theMarxian exposition necessarily passes through the internal

scrutinyofhiswork,that is, throughtherevelationofthedialecticaldeterminationsof

the categories bymeans of which the critique of political economy is structured and

presented. In other words, it is not enough to delimit the contours of this or that

concept,or topoint itoutas thepreciseorigin in theHegeliandialectics;10 it is,much

more,tocatchtheinternallogicoftheexhibitionand,fromthiscapture,tounderstand

itsconstitutivecategoricalnexusinsuchawaythatthislogicitselfsignifiestheobjectof

thepresentation,thatis,thecapitalistmodeofproductionanditscorrespondinglawsof

production and circulation, which, from there, can then be apprehended as concrete

thought.

Thereis,however,aparadoxicalelement intheeffortundertakenbythe"new

reading". The impulse to overcome the limitations that are found, for example, in

Rosdolsky, that is, themerelyexternalapprehensionof thedialecticalelementsof the

Marxian exposition, instead of leading to the "dive" in the internal logic of the

presentationwhichisCapital, ledtoanotherobject,whichis,theGrundrisse,thatisto

say,thedraftofthecritiqueofpoliticaleconomy,andnotthiscriticismconsidereditself.

Reicheltisclearinthisregard:

This conception is suggested exactly by the Draft of Capital. While fromCapital,ifnecessary,individualtheoremscanstillbeextractedanddiscussed

10"Evengenerallycarefulresearchers,likeVorländer,believedtheycoulddemonstratethatMarx'inrealityhadonlyflirtedwithHegelianconceptsintwoparts'(thoughtheysoonaddedathird).Theyfailedtoadvisethatdecisivecategoriesoftheirmethod,repeatedlyused,comedirectlyfromHegel'sLogic.Itisenoughtorecall the Hegelian origin and themethodological importance of a fundamental differentiation forMarx,betweenmediationandimmediacy"(ROSDOWKSKI2001,p.16).


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onthehorizonofspecializedsciencewithoutbeingsooncaught inflagrantviolation of the whole conception, in the Grundrisse of the critique ofpoliticaleconomy,intheDraftofCapital,thisisnolongerpossible.Inthemit appears much more clearly than in Capital that the "Hegelian way ofexpressing, difficult to understand", is an integral component of Marxiancriticism. Inthem,the intertwinementofthemestraditionallyattributedtoeconomicsciencewithaformofexpositionofthesethemesorientedintheHegelianlogicissonarrowthatitbecomesunfeasibletoapproachthethingseparately(REICHELT,2013,p.25).

Butthepresentedparadoxispreciselythis:woulditnotbeanessentialaspect

of theMarxian dialectics to conceal the traces of methodological rules? Would the

hiding of the "Hegelian way of expressing, difficult to understand", that is verified in

Capital,notbeaspecificelementofMarx'sdialectics,aparticulatityjusttodistinguishit

fromHegel'sdialectic?Intheprefaceof2001,Reicheltobserves:

During the preparation of this research on the logical structure of theconcept of capital inMarx, presented in the formof a dissertation as thefirst attempt to reconstructMarx's dialecticalmethod inCapital, I did notrealize a central indication: soon after the publication of the writing AContribution to the Critique of Political Economy, in the year 1859, MarxwrotetoEngels,sayingthatthecontinuationwouldbe"muchmorepopularandmethodbetterhiddenthan inPart I" (III.3 /49).That is,Marxdidnotmake it easy for his readers: on theonehand, he presents aworkwith ahighlevelofscientificexigence;ontheotherhand,he"hides"preciselythemethodbywhichhisscientificityisdefined.GerdGöhlerhasalreadynotedthatdialecticshassuffereda"reduction"inCapital,andindeeditispossibleto prove that, already in the second edition of Capital, Marx simplyscratched out methodological passages that are essential to theunderstanding of his procedure. Reasons, amplitude and meaning of this"reduction"havenotyetbeenclarified.However,ifwewanttoinvestigateitandreconstructthemethod,evidentlyitisneededtosticktothewritingsinwhichitpresentsitself,sotospeak,"nothidden",namely,inthedirectlypreparatory works for Capital, that is, especially in the so-called Draft ofCapitalandintheoriginaltextofthewritingContributiontotheCritiqueofPoliticalEconomy(REICHELT,2013,p.11).

So, the construction of the meaning of the Marxian dialectic does not pass,

precisely, by presupposing as an essential element of its method precisely the

requirementthatitremains"hidden"?Or,asReicheltpointsout,wouldMarx"scratch"

entirepassageswithimportantmethodologicalreferencessimplydueto"carelessness"?

Hard to believe. Would it not be urgent, then, to begin the confrontation with the

questions related to the "reasons, amplitude, andmeaning of this 'reduction'”,which

“havenotyetbeenclarified”?11

11Aboutthis"concealment",alsosee:(REICHELT,2011).


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Inthisway,whatisproposedinthisarticleisakindof"inversion"regardingthe

presuppositions of the "new reading", that is, the extraction of theMarxian method

from the rigorous reading ofCapital. Andnot only that, but also the considerationof

what fundamental element of his dialectic consists precisely in "hiding" the method,

causingmethodologicaldeterminationsto"spring"fromtheveryexpositionofcontent,

withoutengagingwithanexplicitpresentationofthisorthatmethodologicalrule.12

This does not mean, of course, to suggest a contempt, underestimation, or

apartness fromthemonumental theoreticaladvancesproducedby the"newreading."

Rather, the opposite. It is a matter of incorporating them into the analysis of the

questionsaboutthepeculiaritiesoftheMarxiandialecticpresentinCapital,but"making

thewayback,"thatis,byintroducingtheacutemethodologicalobservationsextracted

from the analysis of the Grundrisse and the Contribution to the Critique of Political

EconomytotheapprehensionofthemethodbywhichMarxpresentedhismasterpiece.

It is,therefore,amatterofinterpretingtheDraft inthelightofCapital,andnotthisin

thelightofthatone.

What is sought is, in short, a deeper understanding of the particular

characteristicsofMarx'sdialectic,thatis,thescopeofthespecificcategoricalformsand

contentsofhis"method",especiallyinoppositiontotheidealistic,Hegeliandialectic.It

is not, however, a matter of asserting, as is usually done, that the author of Capital

simply "inverted"Hegel'sdialectic, thereby removing the "idealist" featurespresent in

there. It is a matter, as Jorge Grespan suggests, of acknowledging that they are two

distinct, opposing dialectics, with their own presuppositions and particular

characteristics:

Accordingto thisknownand,undoubtedly,crucial text, it isnot thecaseofmerely depurating the "rational" dimensionof theHegeliandialecticinordertoobtainwhatismaintainedfromitinMarx.Theseare two distinct dialectics. Moreover, "not only diverse" but alsodirectly "opposite". Thus, the procedure of obtaining the "rationalcore" is defined as an "inversion", bywhichwhat is "upside down"assumesitstrueposition(GRESPAN,2002,p.30,emphasismine).

12ItisworthrememberingthatanessentialpartofMarx'sdialecticconsistsinacircumstantialpresentationof methodological elements at strategic moments, such as, for example, the classic paragraph thatconcludesChapter17ofBook IofCapital: "Moreover,with the formofmanifestation 'valueandpriceoflabor' or 'wage', in contrast to the essential relation thatmanifests itself, that is,with the value and thepriceof laborpower, thesameoccursaswithallformsofmanifestationanditshiddenbackground.Theformer reproduce themselves in an immediately spontaneous way, as ordinary forms and currents ofthought;thesecondhastobefirstdiscoveredbyscience.Classicalpoliticaleconomycomesveryclosetothetrue relationof things, butwithout formulating themconsciously. She cannotdo itwhile she is coveredwithherbourgeoisskin"(MARX,2013,p.612,1962,564,emphasismine).


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2. The conversion of the laws of mercantile property into laws of capitalist

appropriation

Obviously, the approach to methodological problems present in Capital is Herculean

work,tobedonecollectivelyandoveralongperiodoftime.Thelimitsofthisarticledo

not allow a more extensive and systematic analysis of the subject. Precisely for this

reason,itisnecessarytoestablisha"cut"withinwhichtheproblemcanbeplacedmore

preciselyandtheissuesmoreadequatelyfaced.

In this sense, there isapassage fromBook IofCapital thatcanbeconsidered

one of those fundamental moments in whichMarx explicitly presents a canon of his

method. This is the beginning of Section VII (The Process of Capital Accumulation),

specificallyChapters21(SimpleReproduction)and22(Transformationofsurplusvalue

into capital),where the expositionof the conversionof property laws that govern the

productionof commodities in lawsof capitalistappropriation is. In item01of this last

chapter,Marxobserves:

Insofarasthesurplusvalueofwhichiscomposedtheadditionalcapitaln.1resulted from the purchase of the labor force for a part of the originalcapital, a purchase which obeyed the laws of the exchange of goods andwhich,fromthelegalpointofview,presupposesonly,ontheworker’spart,thefreedispositionofhisowncapacities,andonthepartofthepossessorofmoneyorgoods,thefreedispositionofthevaluesthatbelongtothem;insofar as the additional capital n. 2 etc. is no more than the result ofadditionalcapitaln.1and,therefore,theconsequenceofthatfirstrelation;as every single transaction is continually obeys the law of commodityexchange,accordingtowhichthecapitalistalwaysbuysthelaborpowerandtheworker always sells it – and,we supposehere, for its real value - it isclear that the lawof appropriation or lawof private property, foundedonthe production and circulation of commodities, changes, obeying its owninternal and inevitable dialectic, into its direct opposite. The exchange ofequivalents,whichappearedastheoriginaloperation,twisted(gedreht)tothepointthatnowtheexchangeiseffectiveonlyinappearance,for,firstofall, the very part of the capital exchanged by labor force is nothingmorethan a part of the product of other people's work, appropriated withoutequivalent;secondly, itsproducer,theworker,notonlyhastoreplenish it,butalsohastodosowithanewsurplus.Therelationofexchangebetweenworker and capitalist thus becomes mere appearance belonging to theprocessofcirculation,inamereform,foreigntothecontentitselfandwhichonlymystifies it.Thecontinuousbuyingandsellingof theworkforce is theform.The content is in the fact that the capitalist continually exchangesapart of the already objectified work of others, which he does not ceaseappropriating without equivalent, by a greater quantity of other people'slivinglabor.Originally,therightofpropertyappearedbeforeusfoundedontheworkitself.Attheveryleast,thissupposedhadtobeadmitted,becauseonlythepossessorsofgoodswithequalrightsconfrontedwitheachother,


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butthemeansofappropriatingthegoodsofotherswasonlythealienationof theirownmerchandise,and this couldonlybeproduced through labor.Now,onthecontrary,propertyappearsonthesideofthecapitalist,astherighttoappropriateotherpeople’sunpaidlabororitsproduct;onthesideofthe worker, as the impossibility of appropriating his own product. Thedivisionbetweenpropertyandlaborbecomesanecessaryconsequenceofalaw that apparently derived from the identity of both. Therefore, howevermuch the capitalist mode of appropriation appears to violate the generallawsofcommodityproduction, itdoesnotderiveatall fromtheviolation,but, rather, from the observance of these laws (Marx, 2013, p.658-659,1962,p.609-610,myemphasis).13

The reproduction of capital means nothing more than the repetition of the

productionprocess,thatis,thereiterationofthemovementcarriedoutbytheamount

of value initially thrown into circulation and converted intomeansof production, raw

materials, and labor power. Once the commodities resulting from the first act of

productiongave their "back flip", that is, theywereconverted intocash, thecapitalist

has in hand that amount originally invested, plus an addition, which consists of the

surplusvalue.Thecontinuationofthismovementmeansa"new"production,but,inthe

sameterms,that istosay,byreiterating the initialpresuppositions-whichconfigures,

therefore,areproductionofcapital.

Iftheamountrelatedtotheproducedsurplusvalueisentirelyconsumedbythe

capitalist, not returning to the productive circuit, occurs what Marx calls simple

reproduction; if,on theotherhand, this surplusvalueorpartof it isreintroduced into

theproductionprocess,occurs theso-calledenlarged reproductionoraccumulationof

capital. In both cases there is a reiteration of the presuppositions of existence of the

capital: private ownership of themeans of production in the hands of the capitalists;

"freedom"of theworker in twosenses, that is, separation in relation to themeansof

production and free availability of his labor power; integrationof theworker into the

meansof production through a juridical contract "freely" agreedwith the capitalist in

thesphereofcirculation.

From the point of viewof the categorial presentationof the laws that govern

capitalist production, the exposure of the reproduction of capital introduces an

13Inafootnotetothispassage,Marxnotes:"Thepropertyofthecapitalistovertheproductofthelaborofothers" is the strict consequence of the law of appropriation, whose fundamental principle was, on thecontrary, the exclusive property title of each worker over the product of his own work ', Cherbuliez,Richesseorpauvreté,cit,p.58,where,however, thisdialecticalconversion (dialektischeUmschlag) isnotproperly developed "(MARX, 2013, p.659, note no. 23, 1962, p.610, note no. 23, emphasismine). In theFrencheditionMarx'scommentappearslikethis:"L'autersentlecontre-coupedialectique,plusl'expliciquefaussement"(MARX,1971,p.27,noteno.01,myemphasis).


2278

importantelement.Ifthefirstmomentofproductionstillallowsthepresuppositionthat

capitalist and labourer are freely in the market and exchange equivalents; therefore,

that the original adjustment involves parts whose properties have their origin in the

work itself (a "perfect" juridical transaction, based on equality of positions); the

repetition of production, that is, the reproduction of capital, insofar as it implies the

continuous extraction of surplus value, results in the inexorable result that, from a

certainpointoftimeon,thetotalamountofvalueinsertedinthecircuitcamefromthe

work of others appropriated without equivalent. A relation of exploitation is

characterized,sothattheinitialassumptionofequivalencecannolongerbesustained

autonomously.14

3.Dialecticaltwistasinterversion:critic

Thecentralpointliesinthewayinwhichthis"conversion"shouldbeapprehended,that

is to say, its specific categorial sense and, from this apprehension, in inquiring what

consequences it entails, from the methodological point of view, to the general

understanding of the Marxian dialectical exposition. In other words, an objective

modificationofthelawsthatgovernthecapitalistproductionshouldbeaffirmed;or,on

thecontrary,thedissolutionofthesupposedlyessentialcharacterofthatphenomenon,

in suchaway that it startsbeingapprehendedasmereappearancemotivatedby the

movementofthecirculationwhencapturedinanisolatedway?Certainreadingsseein

this "conversion" a genuine inversion, relying, therefore, on the first of the points of

viewmentionedabove.RuyFausto,bytheway,pointsout:

Thischangeofperspective,whichinrealityrepresentsanobjectivechangeinthemeaningoftheprocess,constituteswhatMarxcallstheinterversionofthelawofappropriationorofproperty,interversionwhosetwomomentscouldbesummarizedasfollows:areturnofcapitaloreachreturnofcapitalobeysthelawofappropriationorofpropertyofthemercantileeconomies,law according towhich the appropriation of the products ismade by the

14HereisthestartingpointfortheanswertothequestionformulatedbyEdelman:"Seeingthingsclosely,wedonotknowverywellhowandunderwhatpreciselegalformstheextractionofsurplusvalueoperates.Andthissemi-ignoranceblindsustotheveryforceoftheseforms,thesetechniques,totheirconcreteandideologicaleffectiveness.Forexample,dowereallyknowthatthelaborcontractislinkedtothecapitalandhowtherighttopropertyislinkedtothelaborcontract?Weknownothingatall,exceptthebanalitieswithwhichwearecumulate:thelaborcontractintroducesa'false'equalitybetweentheparties,thewilloftheworker is a 'fiction' ... trivialitieswithwhichwe are lazily contented because of the lack of going see inpracticehowthingsreallyhappen"(Edelman,2016,p.27).


2279

exchange of equivalents and depends, in the last instance, of the properwork. But the repetition of capital returns - and therefore the repeatedfulfillment of the law of appropriation by labor and by the exchange ofequivalents – interverses (interverte) this law in the law of capitalistappropriation, appropriation without equivalent of the work of others(FAUSTO,2015,p.76).15

Wellthen,twoproblemscomeuprightaway.Firstly,towhatextentisitcorrect

to assert that "a return of capital or every return of capital obeys the law of

appropriation or of property of the mercantile economies", "according to which the

appropriationoftheproductsisdonebytheexchangeofequivalents"?

Well,inchapter5ofBookIofCapital,Marxpresentstheproductionofabsolute

surplusvalue,inwhichhemakesexplicitthedifferencebetweenthelaborprocessthat

results in the formationofvalue and thatwhich results in thevalorizationofvalue. In

thatone,theprocesscontinuesuntilthemomentinwhichthevalueofthelaborforceis

replaced by an equivalent of what was paid by the capitalist to the worker; in the

second, theprocess lengthens to suchanextent that the valueproducedexceeds the

valueofthelaborforce,surpassingthatinitialrelationofequivalenceandgivingriseto

the absolute surplus value, the "hard core" of the capitalist mode of production.16

Furthermore,inchapter14ofBookI,Marxobserves:

The extension of the working day beyond the point at which the workerwould have produced only an equivalent of the value of his labor power,accompaniedby the appropriation of this surplus labor by capital - in thisconsists theproductionof theabsolute surplus value. It forms thegeneralbasisofthecapitalistsystemandthestartingpointoftheproductionoftherelativesurplusvalue.Inthislastone,theworkingdayisfromthebeginningdividedintwoparts:necessaryworkandsurpluswork. Inordertoprolongthesurpluswork, thenecessarywork is reducedbymethodswhichpermittoproducetheequivalentof thesalary in less time.Theproductionof theabsolute surplus value revolves only around the duration of the workingday; the production of relative surplus value fully revolutionizes thetechnicalprocessesoflaborandsocialgroupings(MARX,2013,p.578,1960,pp.532/533,myemphasis).

15"Thedenialofthe lawofappropriationofthesimplecirculation,andof itsfoundation,theexchangeofequivalents,isthenconsummated.Thelawofappropriationforownworkandtheexchangeofequivalentsbecomes the lawof appropriationwithout exchange of thework of another. This iswhatMarx calls the"interversion of the laws of the property of the production of commodities into laws of capitalistappropriation"(W.23,K.I,page605.Oeuvres,ÉconomieI.Op.Cit.,P1081).Andwhatisimportantinthisinversion-andthatiswhythereisstrictlyinversion-itisthattheinversionismadebytheveryapplicationofthelawsofsimplecirculation"(FAUSTO,2015,p.276,emphasismine).16"Well,ifwecomparetheprocessofvalueformationwiththevaluationprocess,wewillseethatthelatterisnothingmore thanaprocessofvalue formation thatextendsbeyondacertainpoint. If suchaprocessdoes not exceed the point at which the value of the labor force paid by capital is replaced by a newequivalent, it is simplyaprocessofvalue formation. If itgoesbeyond thispoint, itbecomesaprocessofvalorization"(MARX,2013,p.271;1960,p.209).


2280

And,atthebeginningofSectionVII,theauthorexplains:

The transformationofanamountofmoney intomeansofproductionandlabor power is the first move made by the amount of value that mustfunction as capital. It acts in themarket, in the sphere of circulation.Thesecond phase of the movement, the production process, is completed assoon as the means of production are converted into commodities whosevalue exceeds the value of their constituent parts and, thus, contains theoriginallyadvancedcapitalplusasurplusvalue.Then,thesegoodshave, intheir turn, tobe thrownback into the sphereof circulation.Thegoal is tosell them, accomplish their value in cash, convert thatmoney into capitalagain, and so on. This cycle, always going through the same successivephases, constitutes the circulation of capital (MARX, 2013, p.639; 1960,p.589,myemphasis).

Itbecomesclear that the first "act"ofproduction, that is, the first "return"of

capital, or every "return" of capital, produces, in an autonomous way, that is,

independently of so many other returns, the surplus labor, thus, the substance of

surplus value. In this way, the overcoming of the equivalence relation, that is, the

violationofthe lawofmercantileappropriation,occurs immediately, intheproduction

ofcapital,andnotinitsreproduction.

Secondly, it does not seem appropriate to state, as Fausto does, that the

reproduction of capitalmakes the law of appropriation by self-labor and exchange of

equivalentsbecome the lawofappropriationwithoutexchangeof theworkofothers.

Because this law, it is worthy to say, the law of capitalist appropriation, is already

operating since themomentwhen the firstamountofvalue, in the formofmoney, is

exchanged for means of production, raw materials, and labor power to initiate

productiveprocessofincreaseofvalue.17Itisnotreproductionthat"violates"thelawof

equivalence;theproductionofcapitaldoesso.Therefore,itseemsmoreappropriateto

affirm that that, the reproduction, instead of printing on the process "certain new

characteristics", actually "dissolves the apparent characteristics that it had when it

passedinisolation"(MARX,2013,p.642,1960,p.592).

Thus, it is to be considered that the sortal sense of the dialectical torsion by

whichthelawofmercantileproperty"changes"intoitsdirectopposite,thatis,intothe

lawofcapitalistappropriation,mustnotbeunderstoodasan interversion inthesense

ofaessentialmodificationoftheprocess,butratherasaconversioninthematerialistic

sense,thatistosay,amodificationbywhichthephenomenonprojectedbythesphere

17Eventhoughthisamountofmoneyappearssimplyasmoneyandnotascapital.


2281

of circulation, that is, the relation of equivalence between capitalist and worker, is

perceivedasinvertedappearanceoftheexploratoryproductivemoment,thisoneofan

essentialnature.18-19

4.Dialecticaltorsionandjuridicalform:capitalistprivateproperty

Chapter22ofBookIofCapital,inwhichthetransformationofsurplusvalueintocapital

ispresented,introducessomeimportantquestionstotheMarxistcritiqueoflaw,which,

however, have passed relatively unnoticed. The conversion of the property laws that

governmercantileproductionintolawsofcapitalistappropriationimposesuponthelaw

of the society of capital certain fundamental characteristics. The way in which this

conversion is aprehended, in turn, produces an impact on the analysis of juridical

relationships,slopingit(theanalysis) intheidealisticormaterialisticsense,asthecase

maybe.

The fundamentalMarxistconceptionof law is found,evidently, inCapital20.At

thebeginningofchapter02(Theprocessofexchange),oftheBookI,Marxremarks:

The commodities cannot go tomarket andmake exchanges of their ownaccount.Wemust,therefore,haverecoursetotheirguardians,whoarealsotheir owners. Commodities are things and therefore without power ofresistanceagainstman. If theyarewanting indocility,hecanuse force; inotherwords, he can take possession of them. In order that these objectsmay enter into relation with each other as commodities, their guardiansmust place themselves in relation to one another, as persons whose willresides in thse things, andmustbehave in suchaway that eachdoesnotappropriatethecommodityof theother,andpartwithhisown,exceptbymeans of act done by mutual consent. They must, therefore, mutuallyrecognize in each other the right of private proprietors. This juridicalrelation,whichthusexpressesitselfinacontract,whethersuchcontract,bepartofadevelopedlegalsystemornot,isarelationbetweentwowills,andis but the reflexof the real economical relationbetween the two. It is thiseconomical relation that determines the subjectmatter comprised in each

18Theanalysis followsthatofGrespan:"Thepropositionof the formalprinciplesof thesimplecirculationdoesnotimplyforMarx,therefore,thatinfactexists,hasexistedorwillexistasocietyestablishedsolelyonthem.Onthecontrary,thedevelopmentofitsdeterminationsnecessarilyleadstotheconditionsinwhich,in the exchange between capital and labor force, these principles are 'twisted' and inverted. Thus, theirconservation in the sphere of circulation and their denial of valorization are distinct and equally validmomentsintheMarxianreconstitutionofcapitalistproduction.Thisproduction,takenasawhole,involvesboththedeterminationsofthecirculationofgoodsandthosethatreverseit"(GRESPAN,1999,p.117).19Itcanbeseen,then,thattheanswertoEdelman'spertinentinquirygoesbeyondsimply"goingseinginpracticehowthingsreallyhappen."Itinexorablyincludesarigorous"dip"incritical-theoreticalanalysisandanabsolutelynecessaryincorporationofthe"questionsofmethod"thatmakeupMarxianwork.20Bytheway,checkout:(CASALINO,2016).


2282

such juridical act. (MARX, 2013, pp. 159-160, 1962, pp. 99-100, myemphasis).

For Marx, the Law is a social relation characterized by the equivalence of

positions, that is to say, by the reciprocal consideration of equality, freedom and

property,whichqualifies thepossessorsofcommoditieswhentheyare in themarket.

Therelativeautonomythattheirwillsextractontheoccasionoftheexchange- inthe

senseofbeingabletodiscussprices, formsofpayment,etc.underclose limits. -gives

rise to theappearance that theymove themercantile circuit, when, in fact, they are

movedby it.Thepossessorsappearaspersons,beingsendowedwith"natural rights":

freedom,equality,autonomyofthewillandprivatepropertybasedontheexchangeof

equivalentvalues,derivedfromtheirownwork.

The first author of theMarxist camp to grasp the peculiarity of the sense of

juridical form inMarxwas,aswehavesaid,Pachukanis. InhisworkGeneral theoryof

lawandMarxism,theRussianassociates,forthefirsttime,thefigureofthepossessorof

thecommoditytothatofthesubjectoflaw,centralcategoryforthetraditionaltheories

of law. In these, however, the genesis of the person is found in idealistic

presuppositions, such as the "natural right" or the "norm" positivated by the State.

Pachukanis is thepioneer indemonstrating thematerial-economic conditionerof that

juridicalfigure:

In this way, the social bond between people in the production process,reifiedintheproductsof laborandwhichtakestheformofanelementaryprinciple, requires for its realization a particular relationship betweenpeopleasindividualswhohaveproducts,assubjects"whosewillresidesinthese things "(...) Therefore, at the same time that a product of laboracquirespropertyofcommodityandbecomesavalueholder,manacquiresavalueofsubjectofrightandbecomesholderofrights(PACHUKANIS,2017,p.120;2003,p.112).21

Nevertheless, although there are divergences in the field of Marxist

researches22,itcanbeaffirmed,withsomeconfidence,thatconceptionoflawinMarx

21Theauthornotes:"AfterMarxthefundamentalthesis,namely,thatthejuridicalsubjectofthetheoriesoflaw is in a very intimate relationshipwith theownerof the goods, it did not neednot bedemonstratedagain" (PACHUKANIS, 1988, p. .08; 2003, p.36) - “Depois deMarx a tese fundamental, a saber, dequeosujeito jurídico das teorias do direito se encontra numa relação muito íntima com o proprietário dasmercadorias,nãoprecisavaumavezmaisserdemonstrada”.22 ForMárcioNaves, for example, therewouldbe ahomologybetweenPachukanis's analysis andMarx'sanalysis: "We can say that Pachukanis's conception corresponds entirely to the reflections that Marxdevelops, especially in theGrundrisse and inCapital, related to the central place that the analysis of theformoccupiestounderstandthecapitalistsocialrelations"(NAVES,2000,p.48).


2283

advancesfarbeyondChapter02ofBookIofCapital.Infact,thespecificmeaningofthe

juridicalformfortheGermancanonlybefullyattainedattheendofBookIIIwhenthe

relations of production and circulation of capital are fully developed. The analysis of

Pachukanis,ontheotherhand,accompaniestheMarxianconceptionpresent,aboveall,

at thebeginningofBook I, that is, in thepresentationof thephenomenaofexchange

and circulation. Thus the Pachukanian point of view of private capitalist property,

although departing from the circulation of commodities, does not fully develop the

dialecticalpotentialitiesoftheconcept,thatis, itdoesnotadequatelypresenttheway

inwhich theappropriation of surplus value,which essentially consists in a relation of

exploitation,notonlycoexists,butalsocomestothesurface,thatis,itisconstitutedby

means of a social relation marked by the equivalence of values. In other words, the

absence of proper development grounded in the Marxian presentation of dialectical

conversiongivesthePachukaniananalysissomeweaknessasregardstheexplanationof

the form of private property under the regime of capitalist accumulation. See, for

example,thefollowingpassage:

Capitalistpropertyis,inessence,thefreedomtotransformcapitalfromoneformtoanotherand to transfer it fromonesphere toanother inorder toobtainmaximumeasyprofit.Thisfreedomtodisposeofcapitalistpropertyisunthinkablewithoutthepresenceofindividualsdeprivedofproperty,thatis,ofproletarians.The juridical formofproperty is innowayatoddswiththeexpropriationoflargenumbersofcitizens.Thisisbecausethecapacityofbeinga subjectof law isapurely formal capacity. Itqualifiesallpeopleasequally "worthy" of being proprietaries, but by no means makes themproprietaries. The dialectic of capitalist property is magnificentlyrepresented inMarx'sCapital, either inwhat it assumes the "immutable"formoflaw,orwhenitopensitswaythroughviolence(periodofprimitiveaccumulation) (PACHUKANIS, 2017, pp. .132-133; 2003, p.127, myemphasis).

It can be seen that the Pachukanian exposition is in accordance with Marx's

presentation, and, however, it remains insufficient. The juridical form of capitalist

property does not really contradict the fact of expropriation, as Pachukanis asserts.

However, it isnecessary togo furtheranddemonstrate forwhat reason thisdoesnot

occur, that is, toaccuratelypresentprecisely thedialectical torsion that translates the

passagefromthelawsofmercantilepropertytothe lawsofcapitalistappropriation. 23

23Theessenceofcapitalistpropertyisnotsimplythe"freedomtotransformthecapitalfromoneformintoanotherandtotransferitfromonespheretoanother."This"freedom"isanessentialcharacteristicoftheform ofmercantile property. Capitalist property preserves this freedom and adds to it the extraction ofsurplus value, that is, the relation of exploitation (Aufhebung, but in thematerialist sense). Now,where


2284

Thisdevelopmentisabsent,ingeneral,fromthePachukanianexposition,whatleadsto

the opening of certain theoretical "flanks" that allow either the frontal attack to his

theoretical position, or the insufficient and "deviant" interpretation of his strictly

Marxistpointofview.

Thus, the central problem revolves around the specific formof the relation of

capitalistproperty,whoseadequatepresentationof theconceptualelementsdepends

ontheway inwhichthedialecticalconnectionbetweenthespheresofcirculationand

production is apprehended. If this connection is apprehended in an abstract way,

shuttingone’seyestothedialecticalpeculiarityofitsconstitutivenexus,then,asMarx

affirms, theperception that theparts that are in themarket are legitimateownersof

their respectivevalue-forms (laborpowerandmoney)assumesanessential character,

so that the law of commodity exchange remains intact and the bonds of equality,

freedom and property based on labor itself are respected. If, however, the relation

betweencapitaland labor isobservedfromthepointofviewoftheproductionofthe

surplus value (retained, before the reproduction of capital), the negation of the

equivalence relation is reaped, its merely apparent nature, and, therefore, the

essentially exploratory character of capitalist production. The juridical form of the

capitalist property relation is constituted precisely through thatdialectical conversion,

sothatitsmodeofbeingconsistspreciselyinprojectingtheappearanceofarelationof

lawbasedontheequivalenceofpositions,whilekeepingobscur,however,theessential

relation,exploratory,ofextractionofsurplusvalue.

5.ThecritiqueoftheMarxistcriticismofLaw

Pachukanis'sapproximation,betweenlegalandmercantileforms,openedtheflankfor

theclaimthathis theorycouldbedescribedas"circulationist",as itwouldhavemade

thelawderivefromformsproducedbycirculation,notbyproduction,asindicateMarx’s

observations. The accusation of "circulacionism", however, was answered, at least in

thereisfreedomthereisnoexploitationandwherethereisexploitationthereisnofreedom,exceptiftheexpropriationnotonlycoexist,butalsobeconsistedof that freedom.Thencetherichnessof theMarxianpresentation of dialectical conversion, which allows us to grasp, at once, both the appearance and theessenceofcapitalistproperty.


2285

Brazil,withaformulationthattakesrootintheworkofAlthusser.Infact,itprevailson

the national scene today an interpretation of Pachukanis's work based on the

Althusserian paradigm of fierce criticism to the "Hegelian inheritance" supposedly

presentinMarx'sdialectic.Bytheway,MárcioNavessustains:

"It is true that there is, for Pachukanis, a relation of immediatedetermination between juridical form and form of the commodity, as wehave seen, but the determination in Pachukanis is, in fact, anoverdetermination.Thesphereofcirculation,whichdirectlydeterminestheforms of law, is in turn determined by the sphere of production, in theprecisesensethatonlythespecificprocessofcapitalistorganizationoflaborallowstheproductionofcommoditiesassuch,thatis,asaresultofaworkthat is limited be to pure undifferentiated expenditure of labor-power"(NAVES,2000,p.72).24

Althoughtheanswerseemsconvincing,it ismarked,however,byaproblemof

"birth": its foundation is related to the concept of overdetermination, presented by

AlthusserinForMarx:

This overdetermination becomes inevitable and thinkable, as long as isrecognized the realexistence, largely specific andautonomous, irreducibletoapurephenomenon,oftheformsofsuperstructureandthenationalandinternational conjuncture.Wemust then go to the end, and say that thisoverdetermination does not confine itself to the seemingly singular oraberrant situations of history (for example, Germany), but that it isuniversal, that economicdialectic never acts in a pure state, that never inhistory one sees those instances which are the superstructures, etc.,respectfully depart when they have done their work or dissipate as theirpure phenomenon to let advance in the real path of the dialectic HisMajestytheEconomybecausetheTimeswouldhavearrived.Neitherinthefirstnorinthelastmomentdoesthesolitaryhourofthe"lastinstance"eversound(ALTHUSSER,1979,p.99).25

Thisnotionofoverdetermination,bywhichisrecognizedthereal,largelyspecific

andautonomousexistenceoftheformsofsuperstructure,whenappliedtotheanalysis

of Pachukanis's theory, does not fail to suggest a section, that is, a rupture, between

economic relationsofproductionand juridical relations.26Thus, insteadofhighlighting

24 Inanote,theauthorexplainstheoriginoftheconceptofoverdetermination, foreigntoMarxism:"Thisconcept,ofFreudianorigin,wasusedbyLouisAlthusser inPourMarx,Paris,Maspero,1977" (ibid.,Note39).Itshouldbenotedthattheopeningtoan"ashamedstructuralism"isclear.25Ahead,heremarks:"(...)itmustfirstbesaidthatthetheoryofthespecificefficacyofsuperstructuresandother'circumstances'remainslargelytobeelaborated;andbeforethetheoryofitsefficacy,oratthesametime(becauseitisbytheobservationofitseffectivenessthatitsessencecanbeattained)thetheoryoftheessencepropertothespecificelementsofthesuperstructure"(ALTHUSSER,1979,pp.99/100)”.26ThesituationissuchthatFrançoisDossedoesnotsucceedinlocatingAlthusserinthecontextofFrenchstructuralism:"Althusserreplacesthemechanisticvulgateofthetheoryofreflexwithastructuredtotalityinwhich meaning is a function of the position of each of the instances of the mode of production. Thus,Althusserrecognizesanefficacyofthesuperstructure,whichinsomecasesmaybeinadominantposition


2286

the dialectical torsion presented by Marx (that is, the specific link through which

property based on self-labor becomes the appropriation of the work of others), it

proceedspreciselytoitsconcealment.

Now, insofar as the juridical form is determined in the “last instance” by the

productivesphere;thattherelationsoflaw,therefore,havea"relative"autonomy;the

perceptionthatmercantilepropertylaws,basedonpositionsofequivalence,areinfact

essentiallaws, isintensified,thatis,theonlyexistentintheactualrealityofcapitalism.

Thus, the whole effort of Pachukanis, who attempts to reconcile the equivalence of

circulationwiththeexploitationofproduction(althoughinnotverydialecticalway,by

the way) ends up simply ignored, since a "deviation" is made, that is, "eludes" the

confrontationoftheproblembysuggestingasecond-degreejuridicalderivation.

Inthiscontext,Faust'scriticismofBalibar'sAlthusserianinterpretation(1980)27

regarding the analysis of the reproduction of capital could help us to confront the

reading that is seen in Pachukanis's work the presence of the so-called

"overdetermination":

Infact,Balibardoesnotpresenttherelationbetweenthetwomoments(themoment of an isolated return and that of reproduction) as a relation ofcontradiction,or, ifonewishes, itdoesnotpresentthepassage intermsofaninterversion.Itwillbesearcheduselesslyinhistext–whichisexplained-thepresentationoftheinterversionofthelawsofappropriationintermsofcontradiction. The concept that presupposes the analysis of Balibar is notthatofcontradiction,butthatofruptureorcut(...)Whosayscontradiction(dialectic) says "tension", separation, but also union between two terms.Whoever says rupture, cut, says "separation": each term "outside" theother. Infact, iftherelationbetweenthetwomoments isarupture,therecanbenopositionofthepassage-acutabreakisanemptiness-andthatthereisnopositionofthepassagemeansthatthefirstmomentisoutofthesecond,thesecondcanonlyappearasaresult(inanabstractsense),whichreplaces the first (...)Well, it is only if the secondmoment, even thoughcontradictingthefirst,retainsitasadeniedmoment(or,ifonewishes,itisonly if the contradiction is thought in termsofAufhebung) thatone couldsaythattheworkingclasslosesitsproduct.Ifallthecontinuitybetweenthetwo moments is broken, even the continuity in the discontinuity thatcharacterizes the Aufhebung, only the interverted appropriation will beapprehendedandnotthe interversionofappropriation.Itisfinallytheonlyresult that Balibar obtains. An inverse error to the one who incurs theanthropologist reading of the interversion,whichmakes the firstmoment

and, inallcases,appear inarelationofrelativeautonomyincomparisonwiththeinfrastructure"(DOSSE,2007,p..394-395,emphasismine).27ThepassagethatFaustseesis:"Theseanalyzisare,therefore,thoseinwhichMarxshowsusthetransitionmovement (but this transition is a rupture, a radical innovation) froma concept of production as an act,objectificationofoneormore subjects, to a conceptofproductionwithout subject,whichdetermines incertainclassesastheirownfunctions"(BALIBAR,1989,p.230).


2287

thefoundationofthesecond-whatisabsolutelynotsupposedhere-andoftheinterversionnotanegation(alsointhelogicalsense),butasimplerealinversion (in a weak sense, without implying a logical negation) of thefoundingmovement(FAUSTO,2013,p.77/78,passim).

Faust's criticism, however, though it seeks to offer a dialectical answer to the

problem,fails toadequatelysolve it,sincehespares, tosomeextent, thematerialistic

elementsthatcharacterizetheMarxianpresentation.Assuming,aswehaveseen,that

"interversion" occurs only at the moment of reproduction; that, therefore, the

"dialectical torsion" to which Marx refers only takes place in the "second return" of

capital,FaustomakesimperfecttheMarxianpresentationoftheproductionofabsolute

surplus value, that is, precisely the moment at which capital draws from the worker

more work than the one that simply restores the value of his workforce. Now, the

dialectical torsion occurs on the occasion of the production of capital, and not of its

reproduction.

From the perspective of Faust, however, the sphere of circulation, which

sustainstheautonomousexistenceofthelawofmercantileproperty,endsupretaining

someessentiality, that is,some levelofdisconnectedrealityof theproductivemoment

(this one a fundamental element through which approach you take the apparent

characterofthatlaw).Thus,ifFausto'spointofview,ontheonehand,generatesagain,

thatistosay,itavoidstheisolatedapprehensionofinvertedappropriation;ontheother

hand, it reifies the interversionof appropriation, since it diminishes the importanceof

the production of capital in the Marxian presentation, transferring this enlightening

status(inthesenseofthinningtheappearances),atthetimeofreproduction.

Thus,itisnecessarytoreiteratesomedecisivepoints:firstly,torememberthat

the dialectical conversion by means of which the law of mercantile property is

transmuted into a law of capitalist appropriation still operates at themoment of the

productionofcapital(ofits"firstreturn"),inthewaythatexpositionofthereproduction

of capital only consummates the dialectical presentation of this torsion; secondly,

Fausto's point of view, insofar as he locates this "interversion" at the moment of

reproduction,attributestothelawofmercantilepropertysomeessentiality,therefore,

anexistencetosomeextentdisconnectedfromthemomentofproduction;finally,the

answertothecirculacionistcritiquetoPachukanis’stheory,becauseitisfoundedonthe

notion ofoverdetermination, in addition tomaking not viable a dialectically adequate


2288

argument, produces inverse effect, that is to say, conceals the rational node of the

dialectic, through which a response based on the materialist conception could be

adequatelyformulated.

Conclusion

To the question "whatmethod didMarx conceal?",28 onemust answer:his own. The

meaningofthis"concealment"stillneedstobeunraveled,butthesuggestionthatthe

object of concealment would have been the Hegelian dialectic does not make much

sense, unless one intends to be "more realistic than the King." In fact, in a letter to

Kugelmann,concerninga"well-known"figureofMarxism,Marxclarifies:

I can now understand the curiously embarrassed tone of Herr Düring'scriticism.He is usually a very presumptuous and impudent individualwhopresentshimselfasarevolutionaryinpoliticaleconomy.Hedidtwothings.He first published (starting with Carey) a Critical Fundament of PoliticalEconomy(about500pages)andthenanewDialecticofNature(againsttheHegelian).Mybookburnedhimfrombothsides.HereportedthisbecauseofhisaversiontoRoscheretc.Fortherest,partlyintentionallyandpartlyforlackof insight,hemakesmistakes.Heknowsverywell thatmymethodofdevelopment is notHegelian, since I ammaterialist andHegel is idealistic.Hegel's dialectic is the basic form of all dialectics, but only after it wasextirpatedfromitsmysticalform,andthisispreciselywhatdistinguishesmymethod(MARX,2002,p.228-229,myemphasis).

Pachukanis elevated the Marxist critique of law to another level when he

incorporated to the analysis of juridical relations a more accurate methodological

preoccupation.HeundoubtedlyworkedinthelightofMarx's"method",therefore,from

theMarxiandialectic.However,bythetimethatGeneraltheoryoflawandMarxismwas

published,inthemid-1920s,Marxismwasonlybeginningtobreakawayfromacertain

"economicist" tradition, so that the debate over the status of "dialectical method"

withinMarxianthoughtwasbeginningtotakemoresubstantialsteps.Paradoxically,the

Marxist critique that followed the footsteps of the Russian author renounced the

discussionofmethodologicalquestions, considering themasclosedandbeingcontent

withworkingwiththecategoriesalreadysolidifiedbyPachukanis,especiallythealready

reiteratedfigureofthesubjectoflaw.

28 (REICHELT,2011).


2289

Whatisinvolved,therefore,isadoublework:notonlytoreincorporateintothe

MarxistcritiqueofthelawtheconcernanddebaterelatedtotheMarxiandialectic,but

alsotopromoteanopennesstootherfieldsofMarxismtoassistinthedifficultworkof

delimitation andelaborationofmorepreciseparameterswhichpermit to identify the

particular contoursof theMarxiandialecticalmethod, asopposed toHegel's idealistic

method. Considering that Capital is par excellence the object of any analysis that is

intendedtobeserious,andthatthepresentationofformsof lawandprivateproperty

are found there as constituted and constituent elements of the movement of

production,circulationandaccumulationofcapital,oneshouldnotbesurprised,atall,

at the relevant contribution that theMarxist critiqueof lawhas tooffer. It shouldbe

recognizedthatthetaskisarduous;itisalso,however,absolutelynecessary.

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JoãoMarcos Leitão,UniversidadedoEstadodoRiode Janeiro,Riode Janeiro,RiodeJaneiro,Brasil.E-mail:[email protected]

karl marx’s dialetics and the marxist criticism of law · through the substantial studies...

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