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Volume 3 - March 2013

ANG PAG-IBIG BILANG HIGIT NA PAGTUKLAS SA PAG-IRAL SA KARANASANG MAKA-PILIPINOFR. MAXELL LOWELL C. ARANILLA, PH.D.

FRIENDSHIP AS PARADIGM OF ARISTOTELIAN EUDAIMONIAFR. LORENZ MOISES J. FESTIN, PH.D.

THE POINT: THE SELF THAT EXPERIENCES GUILT, PRIDE, AND SELF-CONTENTMENTCHRIS JULIUS D. CONJURADO

DERRIDEAN CONCEPT OF FORGIVENESSJOHN ALFORD L. MOLINA

THE PARADOX OF FAITHJAY ANTHONIE A. SANICO

EPISTEMIC HUMILITYKARLO MARKO D. VALLADORES

BOOK REVIEW: MINDFULNESS (2012)XAVIER PAUL Y. JACOME

MARVIN M. CRUZXAVIER PAUL Y. JACOME

Editors

FR. LORENZ MOISES J. FESTIN, PH.D.Moderator

STAFF

THEORIA, translated as contemplative activity or study, is what Aristotle identifies as the highest operation of man’s intellectual faculty that constitutes the highest form of life. THEORIA is the official journal of the San Carlos Seminary Philosophy Department which aims to gather articles from students, graduates and professors.

San Carlos Seminary reserves the rights to all the articles. Mass reproduction and photocopy is highly discouraged without explicit permission from the Editor.

Philippine Copyright © 2013 by San Carlos SeminaryISSN 2094-9448

March 2013 - Volume 3

Page 3

ANG PAG-IBIG BILANG HIGIT NA PAGTUKLAS SA

PAG-IRAL SA KARANASANG MAKA-PILIPINO

FR. MAXELL LOWELL C. ARANILLA, PH.D.

Sa paghahanap ng Pilipino sa katuturan ng kanyang pag-iral, laging tumatambad sa kanya ang isang katotohanan: KAMATAYAN, ang hantungan ng paghahanap ng tao sa kanyang kahulugan. Subalit para sa Pilipino at sa kultura nito, ang kamatayan ay hindi naman talaga trahedya. Ito ay hindi lamang hantungan ng buhay ng tao at kasa-kasama na ito ng tao. Para sa mga Pilipino, mayroong nagbibigkis sa namatay at namatayan: at iyon ay PAG-IBIG, ang tulay na nagdurugtong sa kapanganakan at kamatayan ng isang tao.

Malaki nga ang papel na ginagampanan ng pag-ibig sa pag-iral ng Pilipino. Bawat Pilipino ay may pinag-aalayan ng kanilang mga pagsisikap at ito ay ang kanilang iniibig o ang obheto ng kanilang pag-ibig. Para sa mga bayani ng bayan ang pag-ibig sa sariling bayan ang batayan ng kanilang pag-aalay-buhay na nakabatay naman sa katotohanang una na tayong inibig at nakatanggap ng pag-ibig sa ating bayan.

Para sa mga nakararaming Pilipino, sa pag-ibig nagpapatuloy ang ating mga loob, dumarami ito at nasasalamin pa sa mga pinagkalooban natin ng kabutihang-loob. Ang pag-ibig ang tulay sa pagitan ng pagsilang at kamatayan. Ito rin ang tulay na nagdurugtong sa buhay ng mga taong iniwanan na ng kanilang mga mahal sa buhay at ng mahal sa buhay na sumakabilang buhay na. Nagiging ganap ang pagkatao ng tao dahil sa pag-ibig sapagkat ito ang nagpapanatiling buhay sa tao. Hindi namamatay ang tao kapag siya ay umibig at iniibig. Nagpapatuloy siya sa mga relasyon o ugnayang iniwan niya. At ang relasyong ito ang higit na nagpapatirik sa kanyang pag-iral bilang isang tao, bilang isang Pilipino.


Page 4 ANG PAG-IBIG BILANG HIGIT NA PAGTUKLAS SA PAG-IRAL

Tulad ng ibang lahi, ang isang Pilipino ay palagi raw naghahanap ng kahulugan ng kanyang buhay. Likas na nga sa tao ang hanapin ang katuturan ng kanyang pag-iral subalit sa paghahanap na ito ng tao, at partikular na ng mga Pilipino, laging tumatambad sa kanya ang isang katotohanan: kamatayan.

Kamatayan ang laging hantungan ng paghahanap ng tao sa kanyang kahulugan. Masasabi ngang para sa mga biktima ng mga sakuna sa Maynila, sa Rizal, sa Pangasinan, sa Leyte, sa Bicol, sa Ormoc at sa iba pang mga bahagi ng mundo; para sa biktima ng karahasan sa Mindanao, sa Kalakhang Maynila, sa Iraq at sa kung saan-saang dako ng mundo, tila ang kahulugan ng buhay ay kamatayan. Kaya naman para sa mga dakilang pilosoper ng mga nagdaang panahon, mahiwaga ang buhay ng tao dahil puno ito ng kabalintunaan, ng di-mawawaang mga kontradiksyon, at isang kahindik-hindik na trahedya. Kabalintunaan ang buhay ng tao sapagkat ang tao ay isinisilang nang hindi niya nalalaman at namamatay nang kadalasan ay labag sa kanyang kagustuhan. Di-mawawaang kontradiskyon ang buhay ng tao sapagkat sa sandaling siya ay isinilang, nagsisimula na rin siyang mamatay. At isang kahindik-hindik na trahedya ang buhay ng tao sapagkat isinilang ang tao para lamang mamatay (Timbreza 2000:viii-ix). Wika nga ni Florentino Timbreza, na itinuturing na Ama ng Pilosopiyang Pilipino,: “Isinilang ang tao upang maghirap at mamatay. Kapag ipinanganak ang tao, siya’y magsisimula nang maghirap at maghihirap siya hanggang mamatay” (Timbreza 2000: ix).

Marami ngang kasabihang Pilipino ang magpapatunay sa pagkaabala ng Pilipino sa kamatayan (Timbreza 2000:236-238). Mga kasabihang nagpapakita na ang Pilipino ay nagtataka rin kung bakit kailangang mabuhay ng tao para lamang mamatay. Halimbawa na lamang, para sa mga Katagalugan,

Anumang isinilang ay mamamatay.

Ayon sa isang kasabihan,

Parang isang bugtong ang buhayPagkasabi mo’y wala nang saysayParang isang dula kung turinganNa may simula’t katapusan.


Page 5ANG PAG-IBIG BILANG HIGIT NA PAGTUKLAS SA PAG-IRAL

Para naman sa mga Ilokano,

Awan ti tao nga agbantay ditoy lubong. Amin a tao agtungpal ken Apo patay. No umayen ni Apo patay saanka a makagaway.

(Walang taong mananatili para bantayan ang daigdig sapagkat lahat ay mamamatay. Hindi mo matatakasan ang kamatayan sa oras na dumating ito.)

Para naman sa mga Waray,

Lakat han panuigon, lakat han kamatayon.

(Sa pagtakbo ng oras, kasunod na ang kamatayan.)

Sa Cebuano naman, sinasabing

Dagan sa kinabuhi gukod sa kamatayan.

(Nabubuhay tayong kasama ang kamatayan.)

Para sa mga Kapampangan:

Ing bie mingari yang bula a gabud na matda.

(Parang bula lamang ang buhay na biglang mawawala.)

Para sa mga Boholano,

Ang camatayon itindog ug ilingcod.

(Dumarating ang kamatayan, nakaupo man o nakatayo tayo.)

Para naman sa mga Pangalatok:

Say bilay binayes, kasanlilikha naerep.

(Pahiram lamang ang buhay na maaaring kunin anumang oras.)

Kataka-taka nga na ang tao ay nabubuhay para lamang mamatay. Sa sandali nga ng kanyang pagsilang, katitigan na niya ang kamatayan kaya naman maitatanong: Bakit kailangan pang mabuhay ng tao



kung mamatay rin naman ito? Kaya nga gumugulo sa isip ng tao ang kamatayan, ayon na rin kay Florentino Timbreza:

Sa karanasang Filipino, ang buhay ay isang malaking suliranin, isang nakalilitong katanungan na nangangailangan ng karampatang kasagutan. Bawat isa ay uhaw sa tunay na kahalagahan ng pagiging tao. Kung kayat bawat indibidwal ay hindi mapalagay. Mula nang siya’y nagkamalay hanggang siya’y mamatay, ang tao’y laging naliligalig at nababagabag. Lagi niyang hinahanap ang kalutasan o solusyon ng kanyang suliranin, na walang iba kundi ang sarili niya mismo, ang kanyang pagkatao.

…Bakit kinakailangan pang isilang ang tao kung siya’y maghihirap at mamamatay rin lamang? Ano nga ba ang tunay na kabuluhan ng pagkatao? Sino ako? Ano ang tunay na kaganapan ng aking pagiging tao? Ito ang katanungang laging bumabagabag sa kaisipan ng bawat indibidwal (Timbreza 2000: xi).

Saan nga ba nakabatay ang totoong pag-iral ng tao? “Saan nakasalalay o matutunghayan ang tunay na kaganapan ng buhay-tao? Para sa ilang mga pilosoper, matatagpuan lamang ang sukdulang kahulugan ng buhay sa ugnayang tao-Diyos; para naman sa iba, sa isang lipunang walang mga antas; at para sa iba pa, sa nirvana” (Timbreza 2000: xiv). May nagsasabi namang ang paghahanap ng kahulugan ay walang katuturan sapagkat ang buhay ng tao ay wala naman talagang kahulugan.

Subalit para sa Pilipino at sa kultura nito, ang kamatayan ay hindi naman talaga trahedya. Datapwat inaamin ng Pilipino na kamatayan nga ang hantungan ng tao at kasa-kasama na ito ng tao mula pa sa pagsilang niya, mapapansing may angking positibong pagtingin ang Pilipino sa kamatayan. Halimbawa na lamang, pansinin natin kung paano tinitingnan ng Pilipino ang pagkamatay ng isang mahal sa buhay.

Isang kaibigan ang namatayan ng lola. Nasa SM Megamall siya ng mga panahong iyon nang matanggap niya ang text message ng kanyang tatay. Sabi ng mensahe: “Iniwan na tayo ng Nanay.” Ganyan ang tingin ng Pilipino sa kamatayan. Para sa Pilipino, ang kamatayan ay pag-



alis lamang. Para sa mga Pilipino, hindi natin sinasabing patay na siya at iyon na iyon. Sinasabi nating: “Iniwan na tayo,” “Nasa itaas na siya,” “Sumakabilang buhay na siya,” at kung anu-ano pa. Sa mga palagay na ito, makikitang para sa mga Pilipino, ang taong namatay ay sumakabilang buhay lamang. Naririyan pa rin siya. Nakatawid lamang sya sa kabila. Subalit kahit nasa kabila na siya, mayroong nagbibigkis sa namatay at namatayan: at iyon ay PAG-IBIG. Kaya naman sa Pilipino, ang naiwan ay hindi basta asawa lamang o anak lamang o mga magulang lamang o mga kaibigan lamang. Para sa mga Pilipino, ang mga naiwan ay mga “mahal sa buhay.” Kaya nga siguro sa mga libing, pagkatapos ng kaunting iyakan at pagkatapos mailagay sa huling hantungan, nagbabalik ang sigla ng pamilya at ng mga bisita at muling nagkakabiruan dahil hindi naman talaga napuputol ng kamatayan ang mga ugnayan sapagkat naroroon pa rin ang pag-ibig na nagbibigkis sa namatay at namatayan.

Ngunit, ano nga ba ang koneksyon ng pag-ibig sa kamatayan at sa kahulugan ng buhay ng tao (at ng Pilipino)?

Siguro, magandang tingnan ang pag-ibig bilang tulay na nagdurugtong sa kapanganakan at kamatayan ng isang tao. Siguro, may gamit para sa atin ang kasabihang ito:

Para raw masabing ganap na ang isang tao, anuman sa mga sumusunod ay dapat niyang gawin – magtanim ng puno, magsulat ng libro, o maging magulang.

Pansinin na sa lahat ng ito, nakapaloob ang pag-ibig: sa pagtatanim ng puno, naipapakita mo ang pag-ibig sa darating na salinlahi; sa pagsusulat ng aklat, ipinakikita ang pag-ibig sa kabataan at sa mga nais pang matuto; at sa pagiging magulang, ipinakikita ang pag-ibig sa mga magiging supling. Sa unang bahagi ng paglalahad na ito, sinasabing ang tao ay umiibig at iniibig. Kaya naman, masasabing nararapat lamang magtanim ng puno ang isang tao sapagkat nakinabang na siya sa mga punong itinanim ng mga sinaunang tao; kapag siya’y nagsusulat ng kanyang mga nalalaman, ito naman ay dahil nakatanggap din siya ng kaalaman mula sa kanyang mga guro at mga magulang; at siya ay nag-aalaga ng kanyang sariling mga anak dahil una na siyang tinangkilik at inilagaan ng kanyang mga magulang. Kung baga’y ito ang tinatawag na “pay forward.” Totoo ngang ang tao’y umiibig at iniibig.



Ang pag-ibig nga ang tulay ng kapanganakan at kamatayan sapagkat ang panahong ginugol ng isang tao sa pagmamahal ang siyang kahulugan ng kanyang buhay. Nagkakaroon lamang ng katuturan ang kamatayan sa pag-ibig sapagkat sa pag-ibig nagpapatuloy ang mga ugnayan. Dahil sa pag-ibig, ang lahat ng ginagawa natin ay nagkakaroon ng katuturan. Ang ating iniibig o minamahal ang siyang hantungan at patutunguhan ng ating pagsisikap at hindi kamatayan.

Malaki nga ang papel na ginagampanan ng pag-ibig sa pag-iral ng Pilipino. Bawat Pilipino ay may pinag-aalayan ng kanilang mga pagsisikap at ito ay ang kanilang iniibig o ang obheto ng kanilang pag-ibig. Maaaring ang kanilang pamilya, ang kanilang mga anak, ang kanilang mga magulang, ang kanilang mga kababayan, ang kanilang bansa o ang kanilang lahi.

Pag-ibig at ang mga Bayaning Pilipino

Tulay nga ang pag-ibig sa pagka-Pilipino ng Pilipino at para sa mga bayani ng bayan ang pag-ibig sa sariling bayan ang batayan ng kanilang pag-aalay-buhay na nakabatay naman sa katotohanang una na tayong inibig at nakatanggap ng pag-ibig sa ating bayan. Bilang mga mamamayang Pilipino, isinasauli lamang natin o sinusuklian lamang natin ang mga natanggap natin at ibinigay sa atin. Kaya nga madalas na marinig natin sa mga bayani ng bayan na utang na loob natin sa ating bayan kung ano at sino tayo ngayon, kaya nararapat lamang na ibalik sa bayan kung anuman ang mayroon tayo ngayon. Makikita nga ito sa isinulat ng mga bayaning tulad ni Emilio Jacinto na kung saan sinasabi niya: “Ang tunay na kabanalan ay ang pagkakawang gawa, ang pagibig sa kapua, at ang isukat ang bawat kilos, gawa’t pangungusap sa talagang Katuiran” (Gripaldo 2001:106). Muli sa sulatin ni Jacinto, ipinaliwanag niya ang kahalagahan ng pag-ibig:

Sa lahat ng damdamin ng puso ng tawo ay wala nga mahal at dakila na gaya ng pagibig…

…Kung ang pagibig ay wala ang mga Bayan ay dili magtatagal, at kapagkarakang mapapawi sa balat ng lupa ang lahat ng pagkakapisan at pagkakaisa at ang kabuhayan



ay matutulad sa isang dahon ng kahoy na niluoy ng init at tinangay ng hanging mabilis…

…Ang pagkaawa sa ating mga kapua na inilugmok ng sawing kapalaran hangang sa tayo’y mahikayat na sila’y bahaginan ng ating kamuntik na kaluagan; ang pagtatangkal sa naaapi hangang sa damayan ng panganib at buhay; ang pagkakawang-gawa na lahat kung tunay na umusbung sa puso, alin ang pinagbuhatan kung di ang pagibig?

Ang tunay na pagibig ay walang ibinubunga kung di ang tunay na ligaya at kaginhawahan. Kailan pa ma’t sapinsapin ang dagan ng pinapasan ng Bayang lipos ng kadukhaan at lungkot, ay dahil sa ang tunay na pagibig ay di siyang naghahari kung di ang taksil na pita sa yama’t bulaang karangalan…

…Sa pagibig nunukal ang kinakailangang pagdadamayan at pagkakaisang magbibigay ng di maulatang lakas, maging sa pagaabuluyan at pagtutulungan ng isa’t isa, maging sa pagsasanggalang ng mga banal na matuwid ng kalahatan (Gripaldo 2001: 121-122).

Tulad ni Jacinto, may mga panuntunan din si Andres Bonifacio na may kinalaman sa pag-ibig. Ito ang kanyang sampung makabayan at maka-Diyos na panuntunan o ang Dekalogo ni Andres Bonifacio. At kabilang sa mga panuntunang ito ay ang pag-ibig sa Diyos, pag-ibig sa bayan at mga kababayan, kabutihan at pagkakawang-gawa sa kapwa, at kahandaang mamatay para sa bayang minamahal. (Gripaldo 2001: 77).

Tuwiran namang sinabi ni Pangulong Manuel L. Quezon na matatawag lamang ng isang tao ang kanyang sarili na karapat-dapat na mamamayan kung matututunan niya muna ang kanyang mga tungkulin bago niya hingin ang kanyang mga karapatan. Ipinaliwanag pa niya na madarama lamang ang patriotismong makabayan na nagtataglay ng debosyon, katapatan, at tapang, at handang mag-alay ng sariling buhay ng mga taong ang pag-ibig sa bayan ay hindi lamang nakabatay sa likas na ugnayan ng mamamayan at ng lupang tinubuan kundi nakabatay sa katotohanang ang bayan nila ang nagkaloob sa kanila ng kalayaan, katiwasayan, at katiyakang pang-ekonomiya (Gripaldo 2004: 125). At



ayon kay Quezon, kongkretong naipapakita ang pag-ibig na ito sa bayan sa pagtupad sa mga tungkulin ng isang mamamayan, pagbabayad ng tamang buwis, at pagpapanatili ng kapayapaan at kaayusan (Gripaldo 2004: 88-89). At dahil ang mga pinuno ang mas maraming nakamit o natanggap sa bayang tinubuan, sila ang mas maraming dapat isukli. Ayon nga kay Jacinto, nakabatay ang kapangyarihang pulitikal ng mga pinuno sa kanilang pag-ibig at malasakit sa kanilang mga kababayan, at walang sinuman ang may karapatan dito kung hindi ito gagamitin sa kabutihan at para sa ikabubuti ng nakararami (Gripaldo. 2004:54-55).

Gayundin naman, ang pag-ibig ay tulay din sa pagkakaisa ng mga Pilipino. Sa Panimula ng Saligang Batas ng Pilipinas, isa sa batayan ng isang makatarungan at makataong lipunan ay isang demokrasya na kung saan ang namamayani ay ang batas, ang katotohanan, ang katarungan, ang kalayaan, ang PAG-IBIG, ang pagkakapantay-pantay, at kapayapaan (1987 Saligang Batas ng Pilipinas). Siguro, masasabi ng mga Pilipino, na ang Saligang Batas ng Pilipinas ang tanging saligang batas sa buong mundo na kung saan binabanggit ang pamamayani ng PAG-IBIG bilang daan sa isang makatarungan at makataong lipunan.

Si Jacinto nga ang nagsabi na ang unang bunga ng pag-ibig ay pagkakaisa. Ito nga raw ang lakas at buhay ng isang bansa. Kapag ang mga tao ay nagkakaisa at nagmamahalan, magiging magaan ang mga pagsubok at ang kakatiting na kasiyahan ay magiging dakilang pagsasaya. At kapag ang mga tao ay totoong nagmamahalan, wala nang paniniil at wala ng pang-aapi (Gripaldo 2004: 82-84).

Sinasabing sa Pilipinas, kapag may nangyari sa kapitbahay, dumaramay ang mga kababayan o kabarangay. Natatangi raw ito sa Pilipinas na kung saan ang magkakapit-bahay ay may “pakialam” sa isa’t isa (datapwat kung minsan, natatawag itong tsismis), na kung saan may malasakit ang isa’t isa. Likas sa Pilipino na kaisang-loob niya ang kanyang mga kapitbahay. Ngunit kung tatanungin, ano nga ba ang kongkretong pagpapakita ng pag-ibig ng Pilipino sa kanyang sariling bayan ayon na rin sa kulturang Pinoy o Pilipino? Bakit nga ba maigting ang pagdadamayan sa kulturang Pilipino?



Pag-ibig at ang Kalooban ng Pilipino

Sa puntong ito, mahusay na balikan ang konseptong Pilipino na “loob.” Kailangan marahil na balikan ang kalooban ng Pilipino para mas maunawaan ang pag-ibig bilang tulay sa kaganapan ng isang Pilipino. Ano ba ang konseptong “loob”?

Sa Pilosopiya ng Tao, isa sa pinakamahalagang konsepto ay ang kalooban. Kapag loob na ang pinag-uusapan, maaari itong mangahulugang talino, kagustuhan, mga emosyon o damdamin, at mga bagay na etikal. Para sa mga Cebuano ang loob ay isinasaling buot samantalang para sa mga Ilokano, ito ay nakem. Kaya naman, kung titingnan, ipinakikita ng loob na buo ang tingin ng Pilipino sa kanyang sarili. At kung anuman ang nangyayari sa kalooban ay may epekto sa buong katawan at kaluluwa (Mercardo 2005: 37).

Totoo ngang mayaman sa kahulugan ang Filipinong salitang loob. Sa katunayan, mula sa salitang ito ay iba’t ibang salita ang nabuo tulad ng kalooban, pagloloob, panloloob, pinaglooban, pinakaloob, kaloob-looban, kaloob, loobin, pagbabalik-loob, kusang-loob, kapalagayang-loob, lamang-loob, kabutihang-loob, kasamaang-loob, utang na loob, buong-loob, tamang-loob, maling loob, malakas ang loob, mahina ang loob, maruming loob, malinis na loob, maliit na loob, malaking loob, sirang-loob, maayos na loob, panloob, at iba pa (Miranda 1988: 1).

Sa pinakadiwa nito, ang loob ay isang “lugar” na hindi nakikita. Masasabi ring ito ang “panahon” sa pagitan ng simula at ng katapusan. Ngunit sa simboliko nitong kahulugan, ang loob ay tumutukoy sa interyoridad ng isang tao (kalooban ng isang tao). Kaya naman sinasabing ang loob ay ang sentro o pinaka-ubod ng tao (Miranda 1988: 1). At ano naman ang sentrong ito? May antas ba ang kalooban ng tao tulad ng kaloob-looban, pinakaloob, kaibuturan?

Marahil tama si G. Jose de Mesa nang isulat niya na ang Loob ay ang totoong kaibuturan ng tao sapagkat ito ang pinakarurok at sentro ng katotohan ng tao. Doon matatagpuan ang pagkanilalang ng tao. Kaya naman ang loob o kalooban ng sarili, ang ubod ng pagkatao ng isang tao at doon matatagpuan ang halaga ng tao (De Mesa 1984: 52-60).

Sa katanungang kung may iba’t ibang antas ang loob, may mga nagsasabing sa Pilipino ang konseptong loob ay walang mga antas na



tulad ng id, ego at superego. Sa halip, sa Pilipino raw, ang mayroon ay kamalayan, ulirat, isip, diwa, bait at loob (Miranda 1988: 2). Kaya naman para sa Pilipino, ang loob nga ay kumakatawan ng kanyang buong pagkatao at sa kanyang pagbibigay-sarili, kailangan niyang ipakilala ang kanyang kalooban at upang makilala naman niya ang iba, kailangan ding magbukas-loob siya upang tanggapin ang kalooban o loob ng iba. Ito siguro ang tinatawag nilang pakikipagkapwa-loob o ang pagtatalaban ng “loob” sa “loob.” Ano ba ang ibig sabihin ng “pakikipagkapwa-loob”?

Ang malaking tukso raw para sa mga namimilosopiya sa konseptong loob ay ang ihalintulad ang pagkikita at pagtatalaban ng dalawang magkaibang loob bilang ugnayang “Ako-Ikaw,” o “Ako-Ito.” Subalit kung lilimiin sa wikang Pilipino, ang pagtatagpo ng “Ako-Ikaw” ay hindi sinasabing “Ako” at “Ikaw” kundi “Kita,” “Kata,” “Taka.” Dinadala tayo ng pagsasaling ito sa malalim na kahulugan ng pagtatalaban ng dalawang loob sa Pilipino. Kung pagbabatayan ang pagsasalin ng “Ako-Ikaw” sa “Kita,” “Kata,” “Taka” masasabing, sa Pilipino, ang pagtatalaban ng mga loob ay nangangahulugan ng pagkawala ng iba’t ibang loob at ang pagkakaisa ng mga loob sa iisang pag-iral. Kaya naman iba ang ibig sabihin ng “Mahal kita” sa “Ikaw ang mahal ko.” Kung kay Buber ay nananatili ang pagkakaiba ng “Ako” at ng “Ikaw,” sa kontekstong Pilipino, nawawala ang pagkakaibang ito at ang “Ako” at ang “Ikaw,” ay nagiging isa (Mercardo 2005: 59-62).

Subalit paano ba nagaganap ang pagtatalabang loob na ito o ang pakikipagkapwa-loob? Sa isang bahagi ng sulatin ni Mercado, isinalin niya ang salitang Ingles na “dialogue” bilang “pakikipagpalagayang-loob” (Mercardo 2005: 168). Siguro, magandang makita rin ang pagkakapwa-loob sa punto de vista ng “pakikipagpalagayang-loob.” Sa pang-araw-araw na pamumuhay, mapapalagay lamang ang isang tao sa kanyang kapwa-tao kapag palagay ang loob niya rito. Subalit paano ba napapalagay ang loob ng tao sa kanyang kapwa tao? Ayon na rin sa una nating nakita sa itaas ng paglalahad na ito, napapalagay lamang ang loob ng tao sa kanyang kapwa tao kapag nagkakilala na sila. Pero anong klaseng pagkilala ba ang nagaganap sa pagitan ng dalawang loob?

Iba-iba ang ginagamit na salita sa Pilipino kung ang pinag-uusapan ay ang pagkilala. Naririyan ang alam at ang kilala. Ginagamit sa Pilipino



ang salitang alam kung tumutukoy ito sa kaalaman at pag-unawa sa isang bagay. Subalit may pagka-alam nga rito, impersonal naman ang pamamaraan dito. Kapag ginagamit naman ang salitang alam, mas para ito sa mga bagay. Kapag alam mo ang isang bagay, may bahid ito ng tiwala sa sarili at damdamin na angat ka sa bagay na alam mo (Mercardo 2005: 62-65).

Samantala, ginagamit din ng Pilipino ang salitang kilala—na ang ibig sabihin ay nakikilala o nakikita ang kaibahan sa iba. Ang salitang kilala ay ginagamit sa tao at interpersonal ang dating nito (samantalang ang salitang alam ay mas impersonal at nasa antas lamang ng pagkaalam o pag-unawa sa mga impormasyon). Kapag ginagamit ang salitang kilala, para sa Pilipino, ito ay nangangahulugang palagay ang loob niya sa isang tao. Ito iyong puntong nagkaroon na sila ng panahon para sa isa’t isa kaya naman sila ay nagkakilala na. Kapag ang ugnayan ay nasa antas ng kilala na, naroon na ang pagdamay, pagiging malapit sa isa’t isa, at maging awa o pagmamahal.

Kapag “alam” natin ang isang bagay, naganap ito dahil sa tuwirang pagdanas dito o intwisyon. Kapag “kilala” mo naman ang isang tao, base ito sa panahong ginugol mo sa “pagkaalam” sa kung sino siya at ano siya para sa iyo at para sa iba. Nagaganap ang pagkilala sa isa’t isa sa isang mababaw na pagtatagpo, na nauwi sa pagkakaibigan, at kung minsan mas nauuwi pa sa pag-iibigan na minsan ay nagbubunga pa ng pagiging magkamag-anak. Kapag mas “alam” mo na ang isang tao, na bunga ng maraming oras na pagtatagpo, mas nakikilala mo na siya (Mercardo 2005: 65-66).

Subalit masalimuot ang pagkilala sa loob ng ating kapwa. At kung minsan, mas masalimuot pa ang pagkilala sa ating sariling kalooban sa pagkat ang loob, datapwat ito’y patuloy na nagpapakilala, ay hindi naman ganap na nakikilala. Marami itong dimensyon na kapag natalupan mo na ang unang balat, mayroon pang balat na mas dapat tuklasin. Kaya nga, kung nais maunawaan at makilala ang loob ng kapwa at totoong magkaroon ng pakikipagkapwa-loob, kailangang magkaroon din ng panahon at tiyaga upang totoong makikilala ito. Kailangang magkaroon ng panahong huminto upang mabigyan ng pagkakataon ang bawat loob na makapagpakilala. At ang pagpapakilalang ito ay hindi simple. Wika nga ni Miranda:



Nakikilala lamang ang loob sa pamamagitan ng pagpapakilala. Ang pagpapakilala ay nagaganap lamang sa mga sangkap na panlabas. At bagamat ang panlabas ay maaaring magkubli sa halip na maglinaw, ang panlabas na rin ang siyang natatanging daan sa pagpapakilala ng loob. At ano ang mga katangiang panlabas na ito? (Miranda 1988: 58).

Si Miranda na rin ang nagpaliwanag kung anu-ano ito. Ang mga katangiang panlabas ay kinabibilangan ng pagkakaroon nito ng katawan; kakayahan nitong magsalita; paggamit nito ng mga bagay; at paggamit ng mga simbolo (Miranda 1988: 58-63). Nakikilala ng isa’t isang loob ang bawat isa una sa pagtatagpo ng mga katawan, pagkasilay sa mukha at sa pamamaraan ng tingin. Sa mga paraang ito, maaaring makilala ng isang tao ang isa pa sapagkat may kasabihan ngang “anuman ang loob ay kailangang pangatawanan” (Miranda 1988: 58-60). Pagkatapos, pumapasok na rin ang paggamit ng salita, ng mga bagay at ng mga simbolo.

Sa mas malalim na pamamaraan, ang ugnayan sa pagitan ng loob at ng isa pang loob ay ang pagtatalaban ng “malay sa malay” na sinusundan ng “dama sa dama,” ng “ugali sa ugali,” “isip sa isip,” “bait sa bait,” “kalooban sa kalooban.”

Una muna, kailangang mamalayan ng isa’t isa ang pag-iral ng bawat isa. Pagkatapos nito, kailangang madama ng isa’t isa ang damdamin ng bawat isa. Kailangang maunawaan kung ano ang nasa damdamin ng bawat isa. Kasabay nito, pumapasok din ang pagkilala sa ugali ng bawat isa. Dito ay makikita kung ano ang pinahahalagahan ng bawat kalooban. At kasabay din nito ang pagkilala sa takbo ng isipan ng kausap sapagkat ang isip at ang puso ang nagdidikta sa ikinikilos ng isang tao. At ang lahat ng ito ay sinusundan din ng pagpapadama ng bait at ng kalooban. Ang mga ito ay nangangailangan ng panahon at atensyon upang maganap (Miranda 1988: 64-68). At ang adhikain ng pakikipagkapwa-loob ay magkaroon ng liwanag o unawa. Sa madaling salita, ang magkaroon ng pagkakaunawaan o pagkakaliwanagan. Hindi ibig sabihin nito na umaayon ang isa sa isa kundi nagkakaliwanagan lamang ang isa’t isa. Subalit kung magkaka-isang loob sila, iyon na ang rurok ng pagkikipagkapwa-loob (Miranda 1988: 62).



Ang Iba’t Ibang Mukha ng Pakikipagkapwa Loob ng Pilipino

Ang konsepto ng pakikipagkapwa-loob ay makikita sa iba’t ibang uri ng mga relasyon o ugnayan. Ilan sa mga halimbawa ng mga uring ito ay ang kapalagayang-loob na nagaganap sa pagitan ng magkapatid; kahulugang-loob sa pagitan ng magkaibigan; at kahulihang-loob sa pagitan ng mag-asawa. Sa tatlong ugnayang ito, mapapansin na nandoroon ang pagbubukas-loob ng isa’t isa, na pinananatili sa kabuuan ng relasyon. Pareho nilang sinisikap na maunawaan at matanggap ang isa’t isa. At habang nagtatagal, lalo pang nagbubukas-loob ang isa’t isa basta walang dahilan upang ipagkait ang kalooban sa isa. Kaya naman ang ugnayan sa pagitan ng magkapatid, magkaibigan at mag-asawa ay hindi istatik; mapapanatili lamang ang mga ugnayang ito sa patuloy na pagpapakilala at pagbubukas-loob (Miranda 1988: 7-72).

Tulad nga nang nasabi na sa itaas, ang pakikipagkapwa-loob ay nagbubukas sa iba’t ibang uri ng mga ugnayan. Dito rin nabubuo ang pakikipagbarkada, pakikisama, bayanihan, pagkakaroon ng suki, at ang utang na loob. Subalit may puntong sumasablay ang mga ugnayang ito kung ang pagbabatayan lamang ay ang pagiging magkakilala. Ang barkada ay maaaring maging isang pangkat ng mga hoodlum o mga kasanggang handang pumatay para sa kapwa kasangga; ang pakikisama ay maaaring magbunga ng katiwalian dahil ayaw nang kumibo ng isang tao para huwag masabihang walang pakisama; ang bayanihan ay maaaring magbunga ng kawalang-sariling palo dahil lagi na lamang umaasa sa iba; ang suki ay maaaring laging bigyan ng negosyo kahit wala nang bidding; at nang dahil sa utang na loob, pikit matang tatanggapin ang gustong ipagawa ng isang kaibigan kahit labag ito sa tama at sa kanyang kalooban.

Sumasablay nga rin ang mga ugnayang ito. Subalit maitutuwid lamang ang mga sablay na ito kung umiiral ang pag-ibig – kung ang pag-ibig na ito ay ang pagtatalaban ng eros at ng agape. Ito ang pag-ibig na handang magbigay subalit handa ring tumanggap. Ito ang pag-ibig na nais maunawaan (Eros) subalit handa ring umunawa (Agape). Ito ang pag-ibig na hindi na nakikita lamang ang “Ako” at ang “Ikaw,” kundi ang “Kita.” At dahil “Kita” na ang patutunguhan ng pag-ibig na ito, ito ang pag-ibig na inaasam ang makabubuti sa lahat at hindi sa iilan lamang.



At dahil ang pag-ibig na ito ay siyang nagdurugtong sa atin sa ibang kalooban, pumanaw man tayo, hindi pa rin tayo masasabing sawi at hindi pa rin masasabing kamatayan ang siyang tagumpay. Sa pag-ibig, nagpapatuloy ang ating mga loob, dumarami ito at nasasalamin pa sa mga pinagkalooban natin ng kabutihang-loob. Totoo ngang pag-ibig, ang tulay sa pagitan ng pagsilang at kamatayan; subalit ito rin ang tulay na nagdurugtong sa buhay ng mga taong iniwanan na ng kanilang mga mahal sa buhay at ng mahal sa buhay na sumakabilang buhay na. Nagiging ganap ang pagkatao ng tao dahil sa pag-ibig sapagkat ito ang nagpapanatiling buhay sa tao. Hindi namamatay ang tao kapag siya’y umibig at iniibig. Nagpapatuloy siya sa mga relasyon o ugnayang iniwan niya. At dito nga nagkakatotoo ang sinabi sa pelikula na hango sa aklat na Tuesdays with Morrie, “Tinatapos ng kamatayan ang buhay ngunit hindi ang mga relasyon” (Death ends life but not relationships).



Sanggunian

CBCP. 2000. Katesismo para sa mga Pilipinong Katoliko. Manila: Word & Life Publications.

__________. 2001. Lagom ng Katesimo para sa mga Pilipinong Katoliko. Manila: Word & Life Publications.

__________. 2004. Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church. Manila: Word & Life Publications.

De Saint-Exupery, Antoine, 1991. Ang Munting Prinsipe. Isinalin ni Desiderio Ching at ng isang Munting Kapatid ni Jesus. Quezon City: Claretian Publications.

Dy, Jr., Manuel, B. 2001: Philosophy of Man (Selected Readings). Makati City: Goodwill Bookstore.

Gripaldo, Rolando, M. 2001. Liberty and Love: The Political and Ethical Philosophy of Emilio Jacinto. Manila: De La Salle University Press.

__________. 2004. Filipino Philosophy: Traditional Approach. [Part I, Section 2]. Foreword by George F. McLean. Manila: De La Salle University Press.

Mercado, Leonardo, SVD. 2005 Essays on Filipino Philosophy. Manila: Logos Publications.

Miranda, Dionisio, M., SVD. 1988. Loob: The Filipino Within. Manila: Logos Publications, Inc.

Timbreza, Florentino. 2000. Quest for Meaning (Philosophy Made Easy for Filipinos). Quezon City: New Day Publishers.


Page 18

Friendship as Paradigm of Aristotelian Eudaimonia

FR. LORENZ MOISES J. FESTIN, PH.D.

There is perhaps no other theme in Aristotle’s ethics as important and central as eudaimonia or happiness. As the ultimate goal of human existence, happiness is seen as defining the significance of all other human activities. Since happiness is what every human being in the end pursues, any action has worth and value only insofar as it has a bearing on this ultimate good. And as long as what one does promotes or instantiates happiness, one can be said to be doing what is morally good.

Of course, interpreting how morally good actions bear on happiness has been a tricky issue. There are those who would like us to think that good deeds are mere means to attaining contemplation insofar as they consider this to be what constitutes happiness. Here, a clear distinction is made between the means and the end, so that the exercise of moral virtues is viewed as a way of getting into the ultimate goal.

On the other hand, there are also those who underline the idea that happiness is essentially an actualization [energeia], whereby a potentiality comes to be realized. Such a process of actualization is then viewed not simply as a means to an end but as instantiating the end itself. In this regard, the exercise of moral virtue may be viewed as forming part of what could be considered happiness. Consequently, a neat differentiation can hardly be made between what constitutes the means and what pertains to the end.

Taking into account the place of friendship in happiness, one may be led towards favoring the second interpretation. As one of the moral


Page 19Friendship as Paradigm of Aristotelian Eudaimonia

virtues included by Aristotle in his list, friendship appears to be an essential element of a happy life. According to the Stagirite, friendship is “most necessary with a view to living. For without friends no one would choose to live, though he had all other goods.” [Nicomachean Ethics, 1155a5-6]

How essential then is friendship in happiness? What role does it play in the experience and realization of human ultimate good? And in what way can friendship help us understand and spell out the nature of happiness?

These are some of the questions that I would like to address in this paper. In view of this, I have divided my paper in three parts. In the first, I argue why it is essential to view eudaimonia as actualization. In the second, I take into account the nature of friendship, pointing out the evident parallelism between happiness and friendship. And in the third part, I explain how friendship, insofar as it is paradigmatic of eudaimonia, can clarify the Aristotelian notion of happiness.

Eudaimonia as Actualization

That Aristotelian ethics is teleological can readily be explained in terms of the decisive function it assigns to human being’s ultimate goal in the assessment of an act’s moral worth. But to regard it as no different from other teleological ethical theories may not do justice to how Aristotle’s understands such an ultimate goal.

There’s no doubt that both the Hedonist and the Utilitarian approaches to ethics are likewise teleological in their perspectives. Both schools of thought relate the act’s morality with the telos [goal] it pursues. There is thus a tendency in both to look at the action simply as a means to an end, and to understand the end as defining the moral value or disvalue of an action.

Of course, the same can be observed about Aristotle’s view of the relationship between one’s deed and one’s pursuit of happiness. The former is done in view of the latter. But Aristotle’s insistence that the human ultimate end is an actualization or activity [energeia] makes


Page 20 Friendship as Paradigm of Aristotelian Eudaimonia

happiness more complex than a Utilitarian or a Hedonist would have us think. Happiness cannot simplistically be understood as a product generated and brought about by a set of actions. It certainly is the end, and even the ultimate end for that matter, but it need not be achievable only at the end – when everything has already been done or when one arrives at the conclusion of one’s life. No, happiness for Aristotle is an actualization; as such, it consists in the very acts one does. Accordingly there need not be a neat distinction between the means and the end. For what might initially constitute the means could ultimately form part of the end.

Viewing eudaimonia as an actualization makes us avoid the usual difficulty encountered in the interpretation of what constitutes it. More specifically, it helps resolve the problem in regard to the place of moral virtues and the acts pertinent thereto in the account of happiness. Because human being’s ultimate end is the actualization of his ergon or characteristic task, which Aristotle associates with rationality, the constitution and instantiation of happiness need not be limited to contemplative activity. That is because even in carrying out morally virtuous acts, one actualizes one’s rationality.

Aristotle’s notion of eudaimonia can be summed up in his succinct description of it. He defines it as an activity of the soul that has a rational principle in accordance with excellence [NE 1098a7-18]. Since there are many ways in which one can exercise and instantiate human rationality, the activity constituting happiness can likewise take many forms. And if it is possible to actualize the human being’s rational ergon in different activities, so there must likewise be a variety of excellences or virtues that can be said of human being as human being, i.e. insofar as he carries out his characteristically human task.

Already here we can see the close connection between happiness and human virtues, in that the latter are descriptive of happiness as an activity. The virtues, both moral and intellectual, characterize the activity or activities constituting happiness. It is in accordance to them that the various acts characteristic of human being as human being are carried out. Hence, it is not only when one engages in a contemplative activity in accordance with some intellectual excellence that one can be said to attain eudaimonia. Even in exercising moral virtues, one



can also be said to achieve happiness. For one also actualizes one’s rationality in doing a morally virtuous act [NE 1114b26-30].

So, for example, when a person of temperance does temperate things, avoiding the excessive desire for pleasure, he not only concretizes such a virtue into action, he also brings to bear his being rational, in that he thinks and judges rightly what he must do in a given situation and acts on it. Thus, although what he does is a practical act, his decision to so act stems from an excellent or virtuous employment of his rational faculty. In such a case, he did not only act excellently or do his action well, he has likewise pondered well on what to do, employing his reason reasonably well.

Aristotle identifies a good number of moral virtues in his list of excellent states of character. The exercise of each of these virtuous states may be considered concrete occurrences of happiness insofar as these can occasion the excellent actualization of the human characteristic task of rationality. And one of these excellent states is the moral virtue of friendship, which I believe is quite instructive of the nature of eudaimonia.

Friendship and Happiness: Parallelism and Correlation

As a moral virtue, friendship is to be understood as a good and agreeable state of character which disposes one towards engaging in friendly activities. It is similar to a talent or capacity which is actualized whenever activities pertinent thereto are done.

But unlike the other moral virtues, friendship cannot be instantiated without the involvement of another person. Indeed, one can exercise virtues such as courage and temperance when the need for them arises. But it’s pretty obvious that friendship and the activities thereof imply an interpersonal rapport between at least two people.

Friendship is thus descriptive of the disposition not only of one of the parties involved in a friendly relationship but of both parties. And we can even say that friendship refers not only to the state of character of both parties but also to the state or status – to use a more



contemporary expression – of their relationship. And this virtuous state of character and status of relationship come to be activated when the parties involved in this friendly rapport are given opportunity to meet and engage in friendly activities, perhaps celebrating the sheer fact of their being friends.

Aristotle points out, however, that there is a variety of types when it comes to friendship, and this is on account not only of the similarity or dissimilarity of the parties involved but also of the basis of their friendship. Surely, the friendly rapport between lovers differs from the loving relationship existing between husband and wife, or between parents and children. But friendship also varies on the basis of the parties’ decision to enter into a friendly bond. And Aristotle identifies three main possible motives: pleasure, utility and virtue [NE 1155b17-19]. Some people are friends on account of the pleasure they are able to draw from each other. There are also others who enter into friendly rapport for its usefulness. And there are those who become friends because of their shared trait, in that they are equally morally virtuous.

Of course, Aristotle is quite explicit in his preference for the friendship on account of virtue. In a way, this evidences his difference and disagreement with the hedonist and utilitarian stances. He argues that the true sort of friendship is one that is founded on the virtuous disposition of the parties. Friendships on the basis of pleasure or utility are called such only on account of their resemblance with the true type of friendship. They last as long as their relationship serves their motivation. But as soon as the friendship ceases to give them pleasure or be useful to the parties, the breakup eventually ensues.

Friendship among virtuous people is quite different. What occasions it is not so much the end result desired by the parties as their predisposition to associate with people in whom they can see themselves. In other words, by their virtuous disposition they are naturally inclined to flock together and give actuality to who they are as people of excellence, such that their being with one another in a way constitutes a flourishing as well as a celebration of their friendship.

Thus we see a parallel structure between eudaimonia and friendship or, for that matter, moral virtues in general. Just as moral virtues are



states of character concretized in the activities pertinent to them, so is eudaimonia essentially the human characteristic function instantiated in the activities which give actuality to such a task. In both eudaimonia and moral virtues, there is a process of actualization that takes place, in that a function or a disposition comes to be exercised. In the end, as we saw earlier, eudaimonia and the moral virtues coincide because human happiness consists in the activity of the soul in accordance with excellence. And it is precisely in performing virtuous acts that one achieves such an activity. That is why, as pointed out earlier, the constitution of eudaimonia need not be reduced to purely contemplative activity or the strictly intellectual activation of human rational function. For even in morally virtuous acts, one is effectively giving realization to such a characteristically human task.

Friendship: Archetype of Aristotelian Happiness

Among the various moral virtues, however, there is none more illustrative of eudaimonia than friendship. For aside from the parallel structure moral virtues possess in relation to eudaimonia, friendship as a virtue and the exercise thereof involves a further element of contemplation inextricably connected with the pleasure which accompanies the activities pertaining to friendly relationship.

Indeed, as Aristotle asserts, moral virtues are closely tied up with practical wisdom [NE 1114b26-30]. In fact, it is exactly on account of this intellectual virtue that one is able to act on moral virtues. Practical wisdom consists in the right employment of rationality. And it affords one to determine the action that would lead to moral virtues and lend them some concreteness and actuality. Practical wisdom thus entails some form of activity comparable to purely contemplative activity, except that its object would be the right thing one ought to do. Such intellectual activity consists in deliberation which leads to a decision to act in a certain manner.

But a further element of contemplation is implied in the exercise of friendship which makes it all the more aligned with eudaimonia. For the friendship of the virtuous gives the parties the opportunity not only to take a look at their excellent state but also to take delight therein



[NE 1169b30-1170a4]. That is why, among the virtuous, friends are considered another self [NE 1170b5-7]. Being with them allows one to see oneself because a friend is a mirror to oneself. What one sees in the other reflects who one is, so that, while this sort of friendship is not founded on the pursuit of pleasure, it nevertheless affords one the pleasure of taking delight in the virtues which one possesses oneself and which one is able to exercise with one’s friend.

Aristotle’s notion of friendship undoubtedly differs significantly from the hedonist conception thereof. While hedonism might view pleasure as an end result of a deed, Aristotle thinks that pleasure is simply a possible accompaniment of an act [NE 1175a29-b1]. Pleasure cannot exist on its own. It can only supervene on the activity one is engaged in. And that’s likewise how we must see eudaimonia. Since it is essentially an activity, happiness cannot and should not be identified with pleasure itself. Rather, it involves pleasure, in that a person who achieves happiness is able to take delight in the very activity which constitutes happiness.

This is where the uniqueness of the virtue of friendship, as a constituent element of a happy life, is most evident. Friends who mutually take pleasure in each other’s presence attain eudaimonia not only because they lend actuality to the friendly state they are in but also because they are able to contemplate the virtues they each possess. Accordingly, friendship is able to instantiate eudaimonia on two counts. Firstly, the exercise of friendship as a moral virtue represents one concrete activity that makes up eudaimonia. And secondly, one activity comprising the exercise of friendship is the contemplative-like activity of beholding the virtues possessed equally by friends, by which they take delight in the fact that they are living a good life. Here, friendship helps one to experience more deeply the pleasure that eudaimonia as an activity brings about.

Friends are thus essential to a fulfilling and happy life. Their company makes it a lot easier for one to contemplate what matters most in one’s existence, prompting Aristotle to remark, “If, then, existence is in itself desirable for the blessed man … and that of his friend is very much the same, a friend will be one of the things that are desirable.” [NE 1170b14-17]



Friendship itself can give us a clear picture of what happiness concretely entails. People celebrate their friendship by doing the very acts that brought them to such a state in their rapport. Of course, friendship takes time to develop. Initially, friends were just acquaintances. But on account of the repeated friendly activities they engage in, such as conversation and shared meals, they eventually reach a stage whereby a friendly disposition is acquired by both parties. This then makes them more inclined to socialize with each other, reinforcing their friendship each time they engage in the activities which equally interest both of them.

Friendly activities are thus not just a means to achieving the virtue of friendship. They can just as well be a manifestation and instantiation of such a virtuous state itself. For instance, sharing a meal with someone might be a means towards that someone becoming a friend of one. But it does not mean that, when they become friends, they no longer dine together. They can – and in fact they ought to – still share a meal, except that this time around such an activity no longer represents a means toward them becoming friends, for they already are friends. Instead, it becomes a celebration and actualization of the friendly disposition they have toward each other.

The same can be said of eudaimonia. In fact, its nature might even be further clarified with the employment of the analogy of sharing a meal with a friend. For once eudaimonia is achieved, the activities that brought it about become constituent elements thereof, so that it is no longer possible to distinguish between the end and means, or more specifically, between eudaimonia and the activities that form part of it. Thus, while the activities pertinent to moral virtues are essentially practical acts, this does not necessarily exclude them from forming part of what constitutes eudaimonia. Surely, eudaimonia is the actualization of human being’s rational function. But this need not be reduced to the purely and strictly intellectual activity of contemplation. For, as we have seen, even morally virtuous activities do entail the activation of the human characteristic task.

And this is where the analogy of sharing a meal with a friend can be used for clarification. As pointed out, at first dining together is a way for two people to develop their friendship. But once they become



friends, what they do together – like chatting, sharing a meal, or just hanging together – is no longer just a means toward some end. Rather, these activities become manifestation and actualization of their friendly rapport.

Morally virtuous activities are comparable to the activity of sharing a meal with a friend. Initially they might be viewed as means toward attaining eudaimonia. But when one has achieved the virtuous state, these activities become instantiations of eudaimonia. They are no longer mere aids toward getting into eudaimonia. They themselves become an expression and demonstration of the state in which a person finds himself in. And this, as pointed out earlier, is most manifest among friends who are virtuous.


Page 27

THE POINT: THE SELF THAT EXPERIENCES GUILT, PRIDE,

AND SELF-CONTENTMENT

CHRIS JULIUS D. CONJURADO

“There are moments in our lives when we had been points. These are the moments when we experience pride, guilt, or self-contentment.”

The Point: Abyss of No Dimensions

Before everything else, I would like to say that this is not a mathematical exposition, and I am not a mathematician. I chose to start with this introduction because I want to clarify certain things about the main topic of this philosophical reflection. I resolved that it is necessary so that the reader can have a proper background about what I am going to state.

Almost all of us are familiar with the notion about dimensions. We have tackled it in elementary algebra and other higher forms of mathematics. This word is frequently used to depict the measurement or size of something, like when one measures the dimensions of a building to be constructed. Some people say that there are eleven of these dimensions. For some, there are seven. Concerning our experience, at least in my opinion, we can only be aware of five dimensions, namely: length, width, height, time, and mind. As we all know, we move freely in a three dimensional space (length, width, height). Still, we are inevitably dragged by the fourth dimension of time. We cannot resist it nor go ahead of it. We can only go with its flow. Lastly, there is the dimension of the mind, which transcends every other dimension, i.e. we can think about the past or the future and


Page 28 THE POINT

other places. These things would certainly cause headache to those who are not interested. Fortunately, I would not go deeper into that topic; rather, I would stick upon discussing the first three dimensions.

Let us deal first with solids. Solids are known to exist in the first three dimensions. They are three-dimensional objects and occupy space, as we know it. These solids are made up of planes. Planes are two-dimensional objects that often appear as shapes. They are composed of lines which are one-dimensional, that is why planes look like lines when viewed from the side (try placing a coin on top of a table and look at it from the edge of a table. The coin would appear to be a straight line). Lines, on the other hand, are composed of points. This can be demonstrated by claiming that the intersection of two lines is a point. Since a line already has one dimension, then what composes it must be of a lower dimension. Lower than one dimension is zero, that is, nothing. If this is so, how can it be that a line of one dimension be made out of points with zero dimensions? It might also seem absurd to think that a being – the point – exists in the realm of nothingness. This question would be answered towards the end of our inquiry. We would first probe the reality of the central theme for this paper, that is, the point: the abyss of no dimensions.

Characteristics of a point. A point, as I mentioned above, exists in the zero dimensions. It has neither length, nor width, nor height. Being dimensionless, it cannot be measured. However, it does not follow that it cannot be seen. It is like a blackhole. It is known to be there yet it cannot be measured accurately. In order to be measured, one must be composed of parts. Since a point has no parts, it cannot be measured.

A point, being dimensionless, exists on its own. In its world, it is the only being because it itself is its own world. Unlike lines, planes, or solids that can be further divided into line segments, smaller planes, and fragmented solids, points can never be further separated. In Pointland: the point is the world, the point is the king, and the point is the citizen.

Let me further elaborate this by narrating a story from a book entitled The Story of Flatland: An Adventure in Many Dimensions. In this book, the main character is a hexadecagon (a sixteen-sided polygon) who


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lives in Flatland, that is, the world of two-dimensional beings. In the story, she (it is a female) encounters a sphere, which the Flatlanders thought can never exist because it is from a higher dimension. This event opened her eyes to the possibilities of transcending her own world. She also had the chance to encounter the king of the one-dimensional Lineland. She tried to convince him that there is a world of two dimensions but despite her proofs, he cannot believe in two dimensions because he can only see his left, right, and nothing else. Later on, the sphere led the hexadecagon to meet the Point: the king (because the voice is masculine) of Pointland. She heard the point bragging about how happy he (I would substitute ‘it’ with ‘he’) is, how perfect is his world, and the like. She tried to talk to the point and tell him about the higher dimensions that exist out there. However, unlike the king of Lineland, the point did not hear her. He is the only being in his world and, therefore, can only think of himself, hear himself, and talk to himself. The sense of others is not in his vocabulary.

This illustration is undeniably pitiful. No matter what she says, the point cannot hear her. He himself is his one and all.1 He is happy with himself, his world. He has no need for others because he would be a point even without the help of other points.

Even if it is attempted that he be forced out of his dimension, the effort would be futile because his dimension is himself. He is nothingness. He is indeed in a hopeless and helpless situation. He cannot be joined together with another point to form something else. Dedekind and Cantor2 tried to create a continuum, and thus, a line, out of indivisible points. Their theory ended up being rejected because of two reasons. First, if the points were in contact in order to create a line, the argument would be absurd because no matter how it is viewed upon, 0 + 0 cannot be equal to 1. Two zero-dimensional points can never add up to a one-dimensional line. Second, if the points are not in contact, there would be no continuum at all. There would only be spaces in between. A point will always remain alone all by himself. Still, as it was in the story, the point is not lonely; rather, he is happy with himself, and this is not necessarily a good sign.

Although it is sad to think about it, many persons are like points in the society today. Even in ourselves, we can realize that there are


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moments in our lives when we had been or are continuously mere points. These are the moments when we experience the human reality of pride, guilt, and self-contentment.

Pride: Self-absorbed Reality

Best-world Ever (mine). The point, having nothing else to do, is happily contemplating himself. Since he is all alone, he is the king of his own world – himself – even though he has nobody else to rule. He can only think of himself, thus, do it to the fullest. In other words, he is proud of himself.

It is not that it is wrong to stand up and accept who we are, rather, it is about being too preoccupied with the ‘self ’ that the voices of others cannot be heard anymore. Thinking highly of oneself, one fails to acknowledge others.

Just like the point, the proud person believes that his world is the best world because he is in it. He can never imagine a different world without him. The only world in his mind is the one in which he exists. He and his world are one and cannot be separated. That is why by being preoccupied by himself, he is prevented from seeing other worlds.

Blackhole to Nothingness. The point is like a blackhole. If another point is added upon it, that other point would just be absorbed into the first point. When points are added together, they would just be absorbed by each other. Even if he is not aware of others outside himself, he is unconsciously absorbing those who get in contact with him. He absorbs them into his world, that is, himself. His world is the realm of zero-dimensions, which is why those who get in contact with him are reduced to nothing. Nobody, then, wants to go near him (obviously for the reason that they do not want to disappear from reality) just as nobody wants to approach a blackhole.

The proud ‘self ’ is like a point by being a blackhole to nothingness. He himself is his one and all, thus, he regards others as nothing. He has no care about anyone outside himself. He thinks highly of himself


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so those who are near him appear to be nothing. They are either friends who try to help him but are overwhelmed by his boastfulness, or other proud persons who just absorbs each other into their own nothingness.

Pride makes the ‘self ’ consider that the reason why the ‘self ’ can only think of himself is that he is too high above others and he cannot see those who are too far below. What he hadn’t realized is that it is he himself who is sinking into the depths of his own ego and it prevents him from seeing others. He had become enclosed in his own world; he cannot see other beings around him.

Experiencing pride, the point becomes a blackhole to those who are around him. He is empty even though he feels to be so full that he is brimming over, covering others with his own greatness. This emptiness leads him to reduce others to nothing by dragging them with him, and his own self is secluded from the rest of reality as if he were the only being on the world. He puts the fence around himself – his own world – therefore, detaching from the rest of reality.

Guilt: From Points to Point

Detachment from the Line. The proud ‘self ’ detaches itself from the community by thinking greatly about itself. The situation is the same with the guilty person, though the reason is different.

Guilt makes the point detach from the line (here, let us assume first that the line is indeed made up of points). From the realm of one-dimensionality, the point is reduced to nothingness. From being with others, the point encloses itself in its own dimension. Nobody from outside can convince it to come out. Detaching from the line would incur a great loss not on the part of the line, because a line would still be a line even without a single point, but on the part of the point, because it would be reduced to nothingness.

The experience of guilt makes the ‘self ’ realize the wrongness of its past acts and makes it want to atone for them. Guilt helps and teaches the ‘self ’ in examining itself and in learning to choose better next time.


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However, it is a bad sign if the ‘self ’ cannot get out of its own dimension because of guilt. Truly, guilt is one of the boundary-situations, “the final and inexorable limits of our being”3, but it must not bind us into immobility. It is indeed “like a great wall which we cannot climb and through which we can never pass”4 but it must not restrict us from moving and from trying harder.

The situation of the enclosed self – the point in its own dimension – is like that of eternal isolation after death. It is said that the state of being after death is eternal solitude – nothing to see, no one to talk to, etc. The same can be said of the point in pointland, who can only see, hear, talk to, and think of itself.

Only the Self to Blame. Guilt can sometimes be mistaken as the fear of punishment. When a person commits a wrong deed, he is afraid of being punished. Often times, guilt is accompanied with fear of punishment. However, fear and guilt are two different concepts. Let us take the example of a student who is caught cheating at school for which he sets a failing mark.5 Before he comes home, he already fears the punishment he might get from his father. This is the time when fear and guilt intertwine. Once he gives the report card, his father will ask what is meant by an F in his character evaluation. By now he would be trembling with fear, awaiting the punishment he deserves. Fortunately (or perhaps unfortunately), his father would not do anything to him and would never talk about the topic. His father would just remain quiet and would not give him any penalty. He is now left by himself reflecting on what happened. He may now be free from fear of punishment but he is still suffering from the burden of guilt. He believes he deserves to be punished but, he was spared. Does he deserve to be spared from punishment? According to Merold Westphal, “in fear I am concerned about my happiness, while in guilt I am concerned about my worthiness to be happy”6. Fear is directed towards an object outside the self (the punishment) while guilt is concentrated upon the subject itself (his worthiness). Guilt, then, is an attitude towards the self.

The ‘self ’, which feels guilt, focuses upon itself. “The bearer of guilt is visited by the shudder identity with himself.”7 He encloses himself in his own world so that he can meet only his ‘self ’. This way, he throws away contact with others outside his own world. He is aware of others’


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views about him and he approves of them. “In guilt, I approve of other’s disapproval of me.”8 However, even if he acknowledges other’s opinion, it is still too painful for him, so he chooses to detach himself from the community. This way the ‘self ’ becomes a point, sealed off in his own dimension. He only has himself to blame.

“Everyday common sense initially takes ‘being guilty’ in the sense of owing something’, ‘having something on account’.”9 This makes the ‘self’ indebted to someone. But guilt still has a further significance. It is not just the accountability over something; rather, it is the responsibility of the ‘self’ over that which he owes. This responsibility makes the feeling of guilt subjective. But a question arises, “To whom is the ‘self’ indebted to?” The ‘self’ is indebted to itself. This can be proven through the notion of responsibility. As I mentioned earlier, guilt’s further significance is responsibility. This responsibility entails that it is one’s duty to do whatever it is that one ought to do. In Kantian language, duty is a self-imposed obligation, through the use of one’s own reason. Therefore, if one fails in one’s responsibility, one fails in one’s duty towards oneself. One, therefore, owes the fulfilment of one’s duty to oneself. This is also why there is an introspective question of worthiness. A guilty ‘self’ blames itself for not being able to fulfil its duty. No other selves can relieve the guilt of that ‘self’ because it itself is the one that owes something to itself. Just like an isolated point, a guilty self is unapproachable from the outside because it is a world on its own, and it is happy about it.

The matter can also be understood from a different perspective. The ‘self ’, enclosing itself from the world, cannot find anybody else to blame. It cannot even think of any other person who is as unworthy as itself, because, primarily, it can only think of itself. This is really dangerous because there is a tendency for the self to be locked forever in its own world. Nobody else can help the ‘self ’ except itself. It is just like a nightmare. You cannot be awakened by anybody else unless you seek for help (at least in forms of struggle).

Self-contentment: Locked Away in Ignorance

Self-contentment is a dangerous disposition. The ‘self ’ has a tendency to be locked forever in ignorance due to self-satisfaction. One might


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take this statement as a criticism against the Christian ideal of contentment. However, I would like to make clear that this is not so. The Christian notion of contentment is not an idle satisfaction with what one has. It is, rather, accepting what one is capable of obtaining for oneself. Still, one must strive and exert one’s effort. “Ask, and it shall be given you: seek, and you shall find: knock and it shall be opened to you.”10 Those who ask would be given what they ask for but they must, first, ask for it. It is not just a matter of accepting who one is, but of trying to be better than who one is in the past.

Contentment is not bad as long as it involves appreciating the good that one has. However, if contentment prevents one from struggling, this becomes a hindrance to the development of the ‘self ’. “Being contented (with one’s life) is neither necessary nor sufficient for being a happy person.”11 One cannot be happy just by being contented. Self-fulfilment cannot be achieved by being contented with what the ‘self ’ is. “Being contented with something only requires the absence of dissatisfaction.”12

Contented in his world, the self-enclosed point will not exert effort to look for another world. It is satisfied with its current situation. It will not try to go out of its world because it is not dissatisfied with itself. Consequently, the point would be locked away from the rest of reality. With perfect self-contentment, it becomes ignorant about other possible worlds.

Perfect Self-contentment. “To aspire is better than to be blindly and impotently happy.”13 Contented in its own world, the point stops aspiring for better things. It is afraid to go beyond what is known to it. It is indeed risky to explore the realm of the unknown. It would be a leap of faith to struggle to be better because there might be dangerous consequences resulting from trying. One may be satisfied with one’s current situation but one could be blind about the truth. The self-centered point is engulfed in fear. It doesn’t want to take dangerous risks even if it is for the sake of truth because its fear already makes it blind.

Fear is a very powerful force. It can paralyze anyone who entertains it. The ‘self ’ who doesn’t want to strive harder is “fearful of truth”


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and “intimidated into conformity”14 with what is already known. One doesn’t want to get out of one’s comfort zone, in the same way that a self-enclosed point cannot get out of its world. Fear traps it inside. It is convinced that it is better to stay in the darkness than find out what is out there in the light. Undeniably, there might be dangerous things that lie out there in the bright side. However, as long as the ‘self ’ would not go out of its cave, it could only perceive darkness. For it, this darkness means peace. And it is satisfied with living in this sort of “peace”.

Ignorance of the Point. The ‘self ’, which is satisfied with this “peace”, can be considered ignorant for “ignorance is a quality of people who do not try to find out the answers to the great mysteries.”15 It stops excelling for fear of truth. Fear disables it to be better than before. Not wanting to take the risks, the enclosed self also throws away the chance for self-fulfilment. It only awaits its own corruption in the corner of its cave of ‘peace’.

It is said that ignorance is bliss. However, I think that it is more of a curse. Ignorance is just an escape from reality. It is a failure to know what one ought to know. It is a failure of one’s responsibility, therefore, a source of guilt. It is different from innocence. The ‘self ’ uses ignorance as an excuse for not knowing the truth. Still, it is the duty of human persons to know the truth. It is laziness and fear that hold back the ‘self ’ from endeavouring.

“Happiness requires something more than the mere absence of dissatisfaction.”16 It is not enough to be contented to fulfil oneself. One needs to struggle with oneself for one to be a better person.

The point, not wanting to take the risk of going out of its own dimension doesn’t know anything outside its own world. This is the reason why it knows only itself – the only being in its world. It is contented with itself – the only thing it can think of – because it is not dissatisfied with itself. It would do no harm for one to be introspective, but one also needs to look outside the ‘self ’. Unless the point realizes its pitiful situation, there is the dangerous chance for it to be locked forever in ignorance about others outside itself. It would be contented with being guilty and proud of itself.


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Transcendence

If the point ever knew the higher dimensions, it would have strived more to be better. However, this is impossible as long as it is preoccupied with itself. It cannot be forced by those who are outside to move out of its own dimension. Touching the point would be like touching nothingness. One cannot just pull it out of his own dimension because its dimension is itself. The change must originate from the point himself. Unless this is done, it would be a point forever.

Breaking the Law of Nature. If the point would be to transcend itself, then it would be breaking the law of nature. From a point, it can become a line through excellence. A point could be a line in three ways. First, the objection against Dedekind and Cantor could be false. A line may indeed be composed of points. However, this would not just be a number of points but an infinity of points. Having infinity of points could create an infinitely long line. The sum of a number of zeroes will always be equal to zero, but the sum of infinity of zeroes would not necessarily be equal to zero.17 To talk about infinity is a different thing from talking about finite things. The point can be a line if it is united with the infinite number of selves out there. The ‘self ’ that is detached from the line can always go back.

Second, the line is also a distance between two points. Even if two points do not meet, it is the space between them that makes a line. It is their relationship with one another that breaks the law of nature. If one point relates with another (of course, this would require that the point would try to surpass itself and go beyond its own realm), they could no longer be considered a mere nothingness but a line that contributes a whole.

Thirdly, the line is also a stretched point. The explanation is similar to the first one. A point that has no dimensions can be a line if it expands itself to one-dimensionality (against the law of nature). However, this requires that the point transcend itself. It must extend its capabilities to the best it can (or even better than its best) so that it can transcend itself.

An Act of Creation. A point’s transcendence is an act of creation. From the realm of nothingness, the point emerges into dimensionality.


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It can be a creator and not just a creation. It can be the creator of itself and what it would become.

Once the point acknowledges other dimensions outside its own, the proud ‘self ’ would cease to be. It would recognize other points outside itself, which also have the capacity to transcend themselves. Guilt, even though inescapable, is still amendable. One cannot escape from being guilty of one’s responsibility, but one can avoid detaching from the line through self-forgiveness. Only the ‘self ’ can forgive guilt because it is owed to oneself. Self-contentment must be avoided because it is not sufficient for man’s pursuit of happiness. The ‘self ’ must have the “will to power” in order to transcend itself. “Until the Creative Will says to it: But I willed it thus! Thus shall I will it,”18 one cannot transcend oneself. Without this, it would be locked forever in ignorance.

Going back to the infinity of lines, the point loses its individuality. The same would happen to the self by going back to the community. As a point, that is, preoccupied with itself, one might seem to be insignificant. A point will not be a great loss to infinity of points. However, once one goes out of one’s own box, one could contribute for the greater good of all. A line would still be a line in the absence of a point but a triangle cannot be a triangle with one line missing. To be a line is always better than to be a point – the abyss of no dimensions.


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Endnotes

1 Suzanne Fox Buchele, The Story of Flatland: An adventure in Many Dimensions (2006), 96. Retrieved from http://www.southwestern.edu/academics/bwp/pdf/2006bwp-buchele.pdf (accessed 19 February 2013).

2 Rev. Fr. Lorenz Moises Festin, “Course Notes in Cosmology,” Unpublished Lecture Notes in Cosmology, (Makati: San Carlos Seminary, n.d.), 20.

3 John Wild, Existence and the World of Freedom (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963), 27.

4 Ibid., 26.

5 Merold Westphal, God, Guilt, and Death: An Existential Phenomenology of Religion (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987), 74.

6 Ibid., 76.

7 Ibid., 75.

8 Ibid., 78.

9 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Stanbough (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 260.

10 Matthew 7:7.

11 Thomas L. Carson, “Happiness, Contentment, and the Good Life,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 62 (1981): 378-392. Retrieved from http://orion.it.luc.edu/~tcarson/Happiness-Contentment-GL.pdf (accessed 21 February 2013), 378.

12 Ibid.

13 Buchele, 96.

14 Ibid., 125.

15 Ibid., 114.

16 Carson, 380.

17 C.K. Raju, Time: Towards a Consistent Theory (Dodrecht: Kluwer Academic Publichers, 1994), 12.

18 Friedrich Nietszche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (London: Penguin Books Ltd., 1969), 163.


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Bibliography

Abbott, Edwin. Flatland: A Romance of Many Dimensions. UK: Seely & Co., 1884. Retrieved from http://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/97/pg97.html (accessed 19 February 2013).

Buchele, Suzanne Fox. The Story of Flatland: An Adventure in Many Dimensions. 2006. Retrieved from http://www.southwestern.edu/academics/bwp/pdf/2006bwp-buchele.pdf (accessed 19 February 2013).

Carson, Thomas L. “Happiness, Contentment, and the Good Life.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 62 (1981): 378-392. Retrieved from http://orion.it.luc.edu/~tcarson/Happiness-Contentment-GL.pdf (accessed 21 February 2013).

Festin, Lorenz Moises. “Course Notes in Cosmology.” Unpublished Lecture Notes in Cosmology. Makati: San Carlos Seminary.

Heidegger, Martin. Being and Time. Translated by John Stanbough. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996.

Nietzsche, Friedrich. Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Translated by R.J. Hollingdale. 1961. Reprint, London: Penguin Books Ltd., 1969.

Raju, C.K. Time: Towards a Consistent Theory. Dodrecht: Kluwer Academic Publichers, 1994.

Westphal, Merold. God, Guilt, and Death: An Existential Phenomenology of Religion. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987.

Wild, John. Existence and the World of Freedom. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963.


Page 40

DERRIDEAN CONCEPTOF FORGIVENESS

JOHN ALFORD L. MOLINA

Introduction

Charles Griswold says it is surprising that “philosophy has hitherto played a relatively minor (albeit ongoing and increasingly vocal) part in the debates about the meaning of this cluster of concepts.”1

Berel Lang in his article in the American Philosophical Quarterly entitled “Forgiveness” goes further than what Griswold said in his book. Lang writes at the very beginning of his article, “Moral philosophers have largely ignored the concept of forgiveness; certainly in comparison to the attention they give the related concept of punishment…”2

It is therefore the desire of the researcher to be one with the philosophical world in broadening its horizon in regard to this concept of forgiveness, in a world where it is badly needed. A deepening knowledge and reflection on forgiveness should, the researcher believes, be given more emphasis than its opposite backward concept of punishment. There is a need to reinforce the voice of philosophy in adding to the development of humanity’s understanding of forgiveness, if there is such a thing, in a world where it is increasingly “demanded, granted or withheld.”3

Now the most common understanding of forgiveness can simply be explained in this manner: X hurts/offends Y, X realizes4 that he has committed a mistake, X then asks pardon or says sorry to Y, Y either grants or withholds pardon to X. Now if X grants pardon to Y then forgiveness occurs. We can see here that there needs to be an offender,


Page 41Derridean Concept of Forgiveness

an offended and an offense in order for forgiveness to come about. If we scrap any of the three from this most common understanding of forgiveness, then the existence thereof would not be possible. Now this most common understanding of forgiveness is what Griswold would call the model case5 of forgiveness, although he himself admits that there are certain controversies or reservations that would arise with such a terminology.

One can immediately see that in Griswold’s model case, there are conditions to be fulfilled in order for forgiveness to exist. So it is not at all surprising that the most common questions that arise when we talk about forgiveness all lead to a very complicated and conditional concept thereof. A concept of forgiveness that has too many requirements or asks too many things, something which makes this concept of forgiveness impure, at least for Jacques Derrida.

This then would be the focus or main topic that this paper would tackle: Jacques Derrida’s concept of forgiveness. Derrida considers forgiveness as one of the aporias6 together with gift, hospitality and mourning.

Jacques Derrida says that true forgiveness is unconditional forgiveness. Though he furthers his argument when he says that true forgiveness only comes about when it is in the face of those things that are impossible to forgive. For Derrida, the possibility of forgiveness only comes about in cases when it is impossible to forgive. Alternatively, to state it in a much simpler manner, forgiveness only becomes possible in the face of its impossibility. Also, forgiveness, for him, should not demand anything. Here I think it would be worth mentioning that connected to Derrida’s understanding of the concept of forgiveness is his concept of gift.

Forgiveness for him is a gift. A gift is something that is given freely by someone. It is not supposed to be demanded or asked for, otherwise, it would not anymore be a gift. If it is something that is given because one asked for it, then the term gift, at least with its ideal meaning, should not be used to call it anymore. Rather, the researcher is thinking here of other terms such as bribe, enticement, or perhaps, even reward. But the gift should be something pure and unconditionally given, i.e.


Page 42 Derridean Concept of Forgiveness

it must not be the outcome of our own efforts or capabilities. Come to think of it, if something is really a gift, then it can never be the result of our own doing.

Benedict XVI in turn also has a similar understanding of the concept of gift. He says in his encyclical letter entitled Spe Salvi “heaven is always more than we could merit, just as being loved is never something ‘merited’, but always a gift.(italic is mine).”7 Here we can see that Benedict XVI tries to apply the concept of the gift to the concepts of heaven and love.

Jacques Derrida’s Concept of Forgiveness

In this section, the researcher will focus on exploring Jacques Derrida’s concept of forgiveness as laid down to us in his two books entitled On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness and Questioning God.

When we talk about the possibility of the impossibility, the first thing that readily enters the mind is the question: what does Derrida mean by the possibility of the impossibility? Is he not committing a logical contradiction by using possibility and impossibility at the same time? The researcher would therefore like to propose in this section two possible understandings or interpretations of this phrase – the possibility of the impossibility.

In the first three parts of this section, the thoughts of Vladimir Jankélévitch and the particular case of the Shoah would be used for us to better grasp Derrida’s understanding of the same. The other parts would discuss other aspects of Derrida’s concept of forgiveness.

Forgiveness: Meta-Temporal

Vladimir Jankélévitch says that one cannot, one must not forgive the crimes of the Nazis or the crimes of the Shoah because they are imprescriptible. Farlex defines imprescriptible as “1.) The state of being incapable of prescription, 2.) A property which is held in trust is imprescriptible; that is, the trustee cannot acquire a title to it by



prescription; nor can the borrower of a thing get a right to it by any lapse of time, unless he claims an adverse right to it during the time required by law.”8 If we try to examine the two possible meanings that Farlex gives to the word imprescriptible, we will be able to get two important points that we can use to further Derrida’s response to Jankélévitch’s understanding of imprescriptibility.

The two points are time and prescription. Jankélévitch said in “Should We Pardon Them” that one reason why he refuses to forgive the Nazis is because time does not heal the pain that their crimes caused. Their crimes, as it were, are meta-temporal, beyond time, beyond its domain and its dictates. Jankélévitch states:

The time that dulls all things, the time that uses up sorrow as it erodes mountains, the time that favors pardon and forgetfulness, the time that consoles settling and healing time, does not diminish in the least the colossal slaughter; on the contrary, it never ceases to revive its horrors.9

We will see in this long quotation that Jankélévitch is at least trying to imply that the usual phase of healing cannot be applied to the particular case of the Shoah because it is a crime of “colossal slaughter.” Time, which usually heals the wounds of hurts will not work, cannot work and be applied to this case. It is as if Jankélévitch is saying that it is not for time to decide whether the moment of resentment, of punishment, and of raving and ranting is finally over. It is not a thing of time.

Derrida sees forgiveness as something out of the ordinary course of history too. It is extraordinary. It is also something which is meta-temporal in the sense that it should not be entangled with the rules, the laws of temporality; otherwise it would become a muddled form of forgiveness. Because the more forgiveness becomes entangled with the domain of rules and norms, the more it becomes impure. Derrida states “Forgiveness is not, it should not be, normal, normative, normalizing. It should remain exceptional and extraordinary, in the face of the impossible: as if it interrupted the ordinary course of historical temporality.”10

If Derrida is correct in what he is saying about forgiveness, then the reason that the crimes of the Nazis were meta-temporal is not enough



to withhold forgiveness because forgiveness too is meta-temporal. It is also something which shakes the ordinary flow and course of time. It is also something which is not time bound. So forgiveness, in the Derridean understanding could easily dampen, if not remove, the animosity that is caused by the Shoah.

The second important point that we need to consider in this section is the word prescription. Usually, it is the law that gives prescriptions. The law prescribes things that need to be done and also, those things which need to be avoided. In the case of imprescriptible crimes, prescription, i.e “all juridical criteria regarding statutory limitations usually applicable to common law crimes are in this case beside the point”11 at least in Jankélévitch’s understanding. And this is precisely the main point of imprescriptibility; that it is really about statutory limitations laid down by the law as punishments to disobediences thereto.

Jankélévitch seems to be arguing that since the Nazi crimes were imprescriptible, it follows that they are unforgivable. But there is a big difference between the words unforgivable and imprescriptible. The difference is that the former cannot be reduced to the latter. Derrida writes the “imprescriptible – namely, what is beyond ‘statutory limitations’ – is not the un-forgivable.”12 So when Jankélévitch tried to equate the term imprescriptible to the term unforgivable, he was, for Derrida, committing a very grave mistake. For one, because they are not synonyms. Another, because imprescriptibility is a concept of the law, something which, according to Derrida, the concept of forgiveness must not be confused with, lest it become a pseudo-forgiveness like reconciliation, political pardon etc.

Imprescriptibility is, according to Derrida, primarily a juridical notion. He goes on to further say that not only is imprescriptibility insufficient to justify non-forgiveness, but that it (the concept of imprescriptibility that is) does not even “belong to the order of forgiveness.”13 It is a concept which is totally detached, if not, totally different from the concept of forgiveness.

It seems evident then, that what Jankélévitch tried to envisage through the concept of imprescriptibility fails to meet his purpose of justifying the non-forgiveness of the Nazis, at least in Derrida’s view of the matter.



Expiation and Inexpiability

Jankélévitch argued, again, for the impossibility of forgiving Nazi crimes because what they did, according to him, were inexpiable; they were beyond any remuneration and expiation. What they did were, in a sense, beyond repair. Their crimes are irreparable.

Irreparability is a concept that is quite connected to the concept of inexpiability. Expiation is necessary because someone has been wronged. A certain order or relationship has been destroyed or disrupted. The purpose of expiation then is the bringing back of the broken relationship and/or the ordering of whatever was disrupted. Now it follows that if the crime, the offense that was done is beyond expiation, as in the case of the Shoah (at least in Jankélévitch’s view) then what was destroyed could not be brought back anymore, and what was disrupted could not be ordered once more. It is, in the strictest meaning of the term, not just inexpiable, but also, irreparable.

Now Derrida does not directly answer Jankélévitch’s claim on inexpiability, well, except by pointing out or asking whether expiation was really necessary for forgiveness to come about and by answering that it is not. Derrida says that expiation is not necessary for forgiveness to exist since this would immediately lead the concept of forgiveness to fall into the sphere of that which is “normal, normative, normalizing.”14 It is surprising, however, that Derrida treats expiation very minimally in his writings, though giving more importance and treatment to its other “related notion”15 irreparability.

When there is a need for expiation and reparation in the process of forgiving, then, according to Derrida we establish a “correlation…of punishing and forgiving.”16 Derrida says that when Jankélévitch declared “that forgiveness no longer has a sense where the crime has become, as has the Shoah ‘inexpiable,’ disproportionate, out of proportion with any human measure”17 he tacitly lowered the status of forgiveness to that of an economic exchange, and equaled it to its negative opposite concept of punishment.

In “To Forgive: The Unforgivable and the Imprescriptible” Derrida quotes Jankélévitch thus:



Properly speaking, the grandiose massacre [the Shoah, the “final solution”] is not a crime on a human scale any more than are astronomical magnitudes and light years. Also the reactions that it inspires are above all despair and a feeling of powerlessness before the irreparable.18

Derrida italicized the word irreparable in this quotation, he (Derrida) says, for three reasons. His first reason is a very short one, and something which the researcher thinks is not very necessary to our discussion. Derrida says that his first reason for italicizing the word irreparable is this: “‘Irreparable’ will be Chirac’s word to describe…the crimes against the Jews under Vichy.”19 The French statement goes thus “La France, ce jour-là accomplisait l’irréparable” which when translated to English means “France, that day, accomplished the irreparable.”20

The second reason that Derrida gives us for underlining the word irreparable is, the researcher believes, the most important among the three. Derrida states:

We will have to ask ourselves if the irreparable means the unforgivable; I think “No,” no more than the “imprescriptible,” a juridical notion, belongs to the order of forgiveness and means the un-forgivable.21

Derrida believes that both inexpiability and irreparability do not mean the unforgivable and, like the concept of imprescriptibility, they are also juridical concepts. Derrida asks, what do we expiate for? What is it that we need to repair? What do we need to do remuneration for? Certainly not just our actions or any other actions. What we expiate for are wrongs, misdeeds. He likewise asks the same question in regard to forgiveness. Derrida asks, what do we forgive? Certainly not just any action or deeds, but, as in the case of expiation and reparation, wrongs and misdeeds. He states:

For there to be a scene of forgiveness, such a fact or deed (fait), such an event as done, must not be only an event, something that happens, a neuter/neutral and impersonal fact, this fact will have had to have been a misdeed or wrongdoing [méfait] and a wrong done [méfait fait] by someone to someone, a harm, a fault, implicating an author who is responsible and a victim.22



Both expiation-reparation and forgiveness pertain to wrongdoings; to a harm done, a fault and a misdeed. While the former does so in view of justice, the latter does so because it does so. Take note that Derrida does not give any reason for forgiving because if he does give a reason for such an act then he would end up, like Vladimir Jankélévitch, contradicting his own statements on forgiveness. There is no reason why we should forgive; there is just the object of forgiveness – a wrong, a fault or a misdeed. And even this is quite problematic for Derrida; his constant question, one that we will never be able to escape from according to him, is the question of who and what. Or applying it to the situation at hand, what is the object of forgiveness i.e. the who or the what? Derrida says that while the question is inescapable, it is also unanswerable. So let us leave it at that and return to the issue at hand.

Now if expiation-reparation is under the umbrella of justice, then Derrida would be justified in saying that they are juridical concepts. And true enough, most of the expiations and reparations done to ameliorate or remunerate what was damaged due to misdeeds are penalties of the law. They are prescriptions of the law, punishments as it were to crimes done, punishments for defiance of the law. But this would just prove Derrida’s claim that the inexpiable and the irreparable are not the un-forgivable. Because the “only inscription of forgiveness in the law, in juridical legislation, is no doubt the right to grant clemency.”23

The granting of clemency by the sovereign fulfills what Derrida says of forgiveness. For Derrida, forgiveness is always heterogenous but always indissociable to conditions.24 Meaning, forgiveness, since it is something so pure (at least for Derrida) is always outside the realm of conditions. But due to its aporetic structure, it cannot but exist with/in the same sphere of conditions.

Derrida says of the king’s right to grant clemency: “this all-powerful sovereignty (most often of divine right) that places the right to forgive above the law, is no doubt the most political or juridical feature of the right to forgive as the right to punish.”25 The sovereign has the right to forgive offenses, misdeeds and instances of defiance to the law. This is the only instant when the king acts above the law, outside the law, as it were. It is a power inscribed by the law to the sovereign which



places the same above the law. The granting of clemency disturbs, as it were, the natural flow and process of the law. If forgiveness interrupts the flow of historical temporality, the granting of clemency, in turn, “interrupts…the order of the juridical-political.”26 Nonetheless the sovereign must be very cautious in this function of his, for it opens him up to the possibility of acting unjustly.

Derrida states “nothing can be more unjust than clemency”27 because clemency can be used for personal gains or interest. So the sovereign, according to Derrida, “should not under any circumstance, have the right to grant clemency for a crime committed where he is not the one intended”28 so as to avoid further injustice such as impunity for one. The king must never grant clemency from a third-party29 point of view because “forgiveness in general should only be permitted on the part of the victim.”30

The point is, clemency is the closest thing in the juridical-political that can get close to the concept of forgiveness. Expiation and reparation are both from the juridical-political realm, yes, but they do not pertain to issues relating to forgiveness. They pertain, as mentioned above, to punishments, to things and acts that could repair the wrong done. They are concepts of justice. But justice is quite a different thing from forgiveness. They are not opposing concepts, nor heterogenous concepts for that matter. For one can unceasingly call for justice to be done yet at the same time forgive. Derrida states “we can imagine that someone, a victim of the worst, himself, a member of his family, in his generation or the preceding, demands that justice be done, that the criminals appear before a court, be judged and condemned by a court – and yet in his heart forgives.”31

The problem with Jankélévitch’s usage and understanding of expiation is that he equates it to the concept of forgiveness. Thus when something is inexpiable or irreparable, that something is already unforgivable. But it is not. They are two different animals as it were. Derrida states “from the inexpiable or the irreparable, Jankélévitch concludes the unforgivable. And one does not forgive, according to him, the unforgivable.”32 This connection, this analogy that Jankélévitch establishes is, for Derrida, misconstrued. He continues to argue that the inexpiable or the irreparable is different, and does not, in any way



pertain to the unforgivable not just because it is against his concept of pure and unconditional forgiveness, in contradistinction with an economic forgiveness, but also because, as stated above, expiation and reparation do not belong to the sphere of forgiveness. They belong to the domain of justice.

Derrida states “I will not cease to repeat, it is only against the unforgivable, and thus on the scale without scale of a certain inhumanity of the inexpiable, against the monstrosity of radical evil that forgiveness, if there is such a thing, measure itself.”33 Jankélévitch writes in “Should We Pardon Them?” that the crimes of the Nazis or that particular crime of the Shoah is a crime against humanity and a crime beyond the borders of human measurement. So he concludes that they are inexpiable. They are beyond expiation so they are unforgivable. Derrida then asks: Is not the unforgivable the only possible correlate of forgiveness? Could it be possible that the unforgivable is the only thing that can free forgiveness from being reduced to amnesty, amnesia, acquittal, and to “some political therapy of reconciliation, in short to some historical ecology?”34

If we will adopt the position of Derrida that forgiveness should be extraordinary, that it should interrupt the very course of historical temporality, then surely the forgiveness of something venial would not suffice. Derrida would say that only a mortal sin (to use the language of the Church) would be the possible correlate of forgiveness. Imagine forgiving say the man who stepped on your toe for example, would this interrupt historical temporality?

Of course the world will not stop; else, time would not stop even if a person shouts to the top of his voice that he forgives the person who stepped on his foot. Because they are not extraordinary instances of forgiveness. They are meager compared to the atrocious crimes of this century like the Shoah, the lagers and the gulags, the apartheid etc. With the points that Derrida gave concerning the inexpiable or the irreparable, it is quite evident that not just because something is inexpiable it follows that it is the unforgivable.



Has Anyone Asked For “Their” Forgiveness?

The researcher modified the title that Jankélévitch gave to the third section of his essay “Should We Pardon Them?” which he entitled “Has Anyone Asked For Our Forgiveness?” The researcher did this modification to show the difference in Jankélévitch’s and Derrida’s understanding of forgiveness especially in this particular aspect therein.

Jankélévitch was waiting for the Germans to ask for forgiveness; for the Germans to show remorse for what happened, for what they did in the Shoah. It is as if, Derrida says, “he (Jankélévitch) was waiting, as were others, to be asked for forgiveness, implying thereby that forgiveness must be asked for, that it asks to be asked for.”35

Derrida answers this problem by giving one solution. He says:

What is essential is not that the word be said but that it be signified, that a pardon-beseeched be signified, such as a plea for mercy [grace demandée], a plea for “thank you” [“merci” demandé], and with this pardon-beseeched, before it, expiation, remorse, regret, confession, a way of accusing oneself, of pointing an accusatory and self-referential, auto-deictic finger at oneself, something that, as one says, rather quickly the animal would be incapable of, the mea culpa of the one who can beat his breast and, by recognizing his crime, dissociate himself from the guilty subject, from the subject having been guilty.36

In the long quotation above, Derrida is saying that it is not important to utter the word sorry or to say the words I ask for your forgiveness. Rather, what is important is for pardon-beseeched, i.e. pardon asked, to be signified. Is it important, asks Derrida for the word sorry to be said or for the request for forgiveness to be uttered? He says that it is not. It is more important for it to be signified.

Because one can easily say sorry. It is very easy to verbalize a request for pardon, but to signify it is not. Even Derrida did not state very clearly how we can signify pardon-beseeched. But to be sure, a pardon-beseeched that is signified is a sort of two-edged sword; for it does not only signify to the offended that forgiveness is being requested, it is



also, at the same time and to use Derrida’s own words, “pointing an accusatory and self-referential, auto-deictic finger at oneself.”37 It is an implicit and tacit way of admitting that one has wronged another without voicing the sentiment.

Now, Jankélévitch was in fact waiting for a word of remorse, and let us for the sake of this study say that he was waiting even just for a sign of repentance, from the Germans. But none came, so he says at the time he wrote “Should We Pardon Them?” However, a correspondence did indeed exist, and an exchange of letters between Jankélévitch and a certain young German named Wiard Raveling took place in 1980 and 1981. Raveling writes thus to Jankélévitch:

I myself have not killed any Jews. Having been born German is not my fault, or my doing. No one asked my permission [thus is posed from the outset the immense question, which will remain with us, the question of guilt or forgiveness according to the legacy, the genealogy the collectivity of a we and of which we (this is a comment by Derrida inserted in the letter)]. I am completely innocent of Nazi crimes; but this does not console me at all. My conscience is not clear, and I feel a mixture of shame, pity, resignation, sadness, incredulity, revolt. I do not always sleep well. I often remain awake at night, and I think, and I imagine. I have nightmares that I cannot get rid of. I think of Anne Frank, and of Auschwitz and of Todesfuge and of Nuit et Brouillard: “Der Tod ist ein Meister aus Deutschland.”38

So a letter asking or signifying pardon-beseeched did indeed come. Someone answered Jankélévitch’s question in “Should We Pardon Them?” Someone has asked for his (this according to Derrida is the “injustice or ignorance of Vladimir Jankélévitch: as if a letter addressed to him personally were the only reparation possible”39) forgiveness. The question now is, is he (Jankélévitch) going to grant forgiveness? The answer is no.

Jankélévitch answered the letter of Wiard Raveling. Here is an excerpt of that response:

Dear Sir, I am moved by your letter. I have waited for this letter for thirty-five years. I mean a letter in which the



abomination is fully assumed and by someone who has had no part in it…. You alone, you the first and no doubt the last, have found the necessary words outside the political commonplaces and the pious clichés….Thank you. No, I will not come to see you in Germany. I will not go that far. I am too old to inaugurate this new era….But you are young, you do not have reasons as I. You do not have this uncrossable barrier to cross. It is my turn to say to you: When you come to Paris, do as everyone does, knock on my door….We will sit down at the piano40

In the letter quoted above, Jankélévitch, yes appreciates Raveling’s initiative of writing but states that he cannot say yes to the request of the same that he go and visit him in Germany. The researcher would want here to focus in one particular aspect of Jankélévitch’s response. Jankélévitch says that there is an “uncrossable barrier” that exists between him and Germany. This is the reason why he cannot go and visit Raveling. What does he mean?

When we look for another term to replace uncrossable barrier, we will see that the word impossible would be able to fit. A barrier which is impossible to cross. Derrida says that what Jankélévitch is pertaining to here is not merely a geographical barrier but a conceptual one. Jankélévitch says that he cannot anymore forgive since he is already too old to inaugurate this new era.41 Old age therefore, coupled with the uncrossable barrier that Jankélévitch is pertaining to renders, as it were, the possibility of the impossibility.42 Just when forgiveness seems so near, we will realize that there is still a chasm that separates us from it.

But to be sure Jankélévitch still gives chance to the prospect of forgiveness’ existence. For he does not say that with his death also comes the death of forgiveness rather when he said to Raveling that “you are young” and that he does not have “the same reasons as” Jankélévitch, what he was really trying to imply is that even without him the history of forgiveness would go on. The history of forgiveness would not die but continue.

So after all the things and concepts that Jankélévitch tried to grapple with in “Should We Pardon Them?” Derrida states “history continues



on the background of an interruption of history, in the abyss, rather, of an infinite wound, which, in its very scarring, will have to remain an open and unsuturable wound.”43 Just when the history of forgiveness seemed to be halted with what happened in the Shoah and everytime monstrous and unforgivable crimes occur, it nevertheless continues.

Certain Aspects of Derrida’s Notion of Forgiveness

The researcher will explain very briefly five important aspects of Jacques Derrida’s concept of forgiveness.

1. Pure Forgiveness. Perhaps we already have a sufficient discussion of Derrida’s concept of Pure Forgiveness. But one more point. When we say that forgiveness is pure we just mean that it has not been entangled with all the other pseudo-forms of forgiveness or other sibling concepts of forgiveness. It is a concept of forgiveness free of conditions. It is forgiveness viewed as a gift.

Now Derrida says that the gift and forgiveness cannot be separated from each other; for even in the etymological root of the French word forgive the term gift is still present. Forgiveness in French is Le Pardon while gift is Le Don. If we try to examine the term pardon we will be able to divide it into two: par/don. Even John Caputo in his book entitled The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida: Religion without Religion would say that the concept of the gift cannot be dissociated from the concept of forgiveness.44 And this is, the researcher supposes, the very thing that makes forgiveness a pure concept, that which makes forgiveness pure – it being a gift.

2. The Possibility of Impossibility. In the section “Has Anyone asked for ‘Their’ Forgiveness?” the researcher already gave the first meaning that we can give to the possibility of the impossibility. Now he will proceed to the second interpretation we can give thereto.

The usage of two seemingly contradictory words here does not entail a logical contradiction on the part of Derrida. Derrida uses the words possibility of impossibility because it is (the thing that it is impossible to forgive that is) the only thing that can give rise to the possibility of



forgiveness. John Caputo states “The unforgivable is the only possible correlate of forgiveness and the only way for forgiveness to be a gift, which means to be itself. Forgiveness begins by the im-possible, where this ‘im-’ is not a simple negation but an intensification, driving forgiveness to the most extreme possibility, impelling forgiveness to the possibility of the impossible.”45

3. Forgiveness as Aporia. Derrida, towards the end of his days, has become more and more preoccupied with aporias. Aporia is a Greek term which originally means puzzle; though it has come to mean more like an impasse or a paradox.

When Derrida talks about aporias, he does not only pertain to forgiveness. There are four aporias that Derrida is concerned with, to be precise. But this study is concerned only with the third aporia, i.e forgiveness.

When we talk of forgiveness as aporia we only mean that the condition of its possibility is at the same time, the condition of its impossibility. For Derrida, the concept of forgiveness is so pure and unconditional, but the concept of forgiveness being such does not exempt itself from the pole of the conditional. Derrida states “[t]hat is, if we want to embody an unconditional forgiveness in history and society, we have to go through conditions. We have to negotiate between the unconditional and the conditional.”46

The two are heterogenous yet always indissociable because the unconditional must always lend itself to the conditional, since it is in the sphere of the conditional wherein the unconditional must breed itself.

4. Forgiveness: A Madness, An Unintelligibility. One might say however that a concept of forgiveness so pure would seemingly be impossible in our world. There is the tendency to acquire the disposition or belief that forgiveness would really just be good in theory but not in practice, at least in the Derridean concept of forgiveness. Or that a concept of forgiveness so pure and unconditional would, in a sense, be madness to the view of some. And the researcher would argue that Derrida would agree with them.



Forgiveness, in fact, for Derrida is not just something which disturbs the flow of historical temporality. It is also, for him, madness; it is an unintelligibility, if you may. For Derrida, the radical purity that his concept of forgiveness entails, though excessive to others, is quite necessary. He states “even if this radical purity can seem excessive, hyperbolic, mad? Because if I say, as I think, that forgiveness is mad, and that it must remain a madness of the impossible, this is certainly not to exclude or disqualify it.”47 Forgiveness for Derrida is a madness of the impossible. And even if the playing of the words possible and impossible seem barmy to the eyes of others Derrida would not yield because “[w]hat I (Derrida that is) dream of , what I think as the ‘purity’ of a forgiveness worthy of its name, would be a forgiveness without power: unconditional but without sovereignty. The most difficult task at once necessary and apparently impossible, would be to dissociate unconditionality and sovereignty.”48 This is Derrida’s dream. A forgiveness not polluted by any kind of power. A forgiveness that does not have any other thing as its sovereign. Though he himself admits that this task is difficult and apparently impossible, he hopes that one day a forgiveness such as this will be found. As he says “[w]ill that be one day? It is not around the corner as is said. But since the hypothesis of this unpresentable task announces itself, be it as a dream for thought, this madness is perhaps not so mad…”49

5. Forgiveness: If There Is Such A Thing. Derrida, in his talks and writings, usually couples the term forgiveness with the phrase if there is such a thing. This does not mean that Derrida mistrusts the possibility of the existence of forgiveness. Neither does this mean that forgiveness does not exist, had not yet existed and is not yet existing. This is rather a Derrida being cautious; lest he contradict himself by giving others the impression that he can say definitively what forgiveness is. No, he does not go to that extent.

What Derrida means by s’il y en a (the French for if there is such a thing) is that “if forgiveness happens, then this experience should not become the object of a sentence of the kind ‘S is p,’ ‘this is, this presents itself as forgiveness,’ because forgiveness should not present itself.”50 Derrida claims that the more we say that we have forgiven someone, the more that we recognize that we have consciously forgiven, then the more we will be brought back to an economy of exchange. Because



in this case, the one forgiven must also recognize that he was, indeed, forgiven his offense. The presence of exchange must be done away with in this context, at least for Derrida.

If one says that he knows what forgiveness is, that he knows how to forgive, then he will have to say, in one way or another “I forgive you.” This statement which is in the present tense implies that the “I” has the capacity, nay, the power to forgive. And with this power to forgive comes the power to manipulate the purity of the concept of forgiveness. But for Derrida, this consciousness of the being present of forgiveness and, at the same time, the I’s consciousness of his power to forgive is simultaneously the destruction thereof. Derrida says “if I say lightly, ‘I forgive you,’ this sentence in the present, with a verb in the present tense, is absolutely the destruction of forgiveness.”51

Forgiveness must not be; it must never be a present for us. It must always exceed the “very category of presence and…of objectivity”52 if we want it to be true forgiveness. Derrida even goes to the extent of saying that if forgiveness happens; if we want to have forgiveness, if there is such a thing, then it must “happen in the night.”53 Because “[t]he night is its element.”54



Endnotes

1 When Griswold says “cluster of concepts” he pertains to forgiveness together with the concepts mentioned above that are relative to it. Charles L. Griswold, Forgiveness: A Philosophical Exploration (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), xiv.

2 Berel Lang, “Forgiveness,” American Philosophical Quarterly 31 (1994): 105.

3 As stated by Simon Critchley and Richard Kearney in Jacques Derrida, On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness, trans. M. Dooley and M. Hughes (New York: Routledge, 2001), x.

4 We are not yet stating here if X realizes that he has done something wrong on his own or through another person’s intervention.

5 Griswold, xvi.

6 The Greek aporia has the original meaning of puzzle. However, it has come to mean more of an impasse or a contradiction.

7 Benedict XVI, Spe Salvi (Vatican: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2008), 53.

8 Taken from The Free Dictionary by Farlex.

9 Vladimir Jankélévitch, “Should We Pardon Them,” trans. Ann Hobart, Critical Inquiry 22, 3 (Spring 1996): 556.

10 Derrida, On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness, 32.

11 Ibid., 554.

12 Derrida, “To Forgive: The Unforgivable and the Imprescriptible,” in Questioning God, ed. John Caputo, Mark Dooley, & Michael J. Scanlon (Bloomington: Indiana University Press 2001), 25.

13 Ibid., 31.


15 Cf. Derrida, “To Forgive: The Unforgivable and the Imprescriptible,” 31.

16 Ibid., 30.

17 Ibid., 31.

18 Jankélévitch, “Should We Pardon Them,” 558.



19 Derrida, “To Forgive: The Unforgivable and the Imprescriptible,” 31.

20 Chirac as cited in Ibid.

21 Ibid.

22 Ibid., 32.

23 Ibid.

24 Griswold writes in his book, “Derrida argues that the ‘absolutely heterogenous’ elements of the unconditional and the conditional are ‘irreducible to one another’ (even though also ‘indissociable’), else we are lead to confusions such as the reduction of forgiveness to amnesty, amnesia, acquittal, and to ‘some political therapy of reconciliation, in short to some historical ecology.’” Griswold, 63.


26 Ibid.

27 Ibid.

28 Ibid.

29 Derrida is consistent in arguing, as Jankélévitch in Le Pardon, that forgiveness should only exist between two individuals, between two singularities as it were. Because once a third party intervenes forgiveness would once again end up to be amnesty, amnesia or other conditional forms of forgiveness.

30 Ibid., 34.


32 Ibid., 36.


34 Derrida, On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness, 44-45.


36 Ibid.

37 Ibid.

38 Wiard Raveling’s letter addressed to Vladimir Jankélévitch as cited in Ibid., 39.



39 Ibid., 40.

40 Jankélévitch’s response to Wiard Raveling’s letter as cited in Ibid.

41 Perhaps this refers to “the era of forgiveness.”

42 The researcher proposes this as the first meaning of what Derrida means by the possibility of the impossibility.

43 Ibid., 42.

44 Cf. John D. Caputo, The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida: Religion without Religion (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1997), 160-222.

45 John Caputo, Mark Dooley and Michael J. Scanlon, “Introduction: God Forgive,” in Questioning God, 5.

46 Derrida as cited in “On Forgiveness: A Roundtable Discussion with Jacques Derrida,” 58.


48 Ibid., 59.

49 Ibid., 59-60.

50 Derrida as cited in “On Forgiveness: A Roundtable Discussion with Jacques Derrida,” 52.

51 Ibid., 53.

52 Ibid.

53 Ibid.

54 Ibid.


Page 60

THE PARADOX OF FAITH

JAY ANTHONIE A. SANICO

“For he who strove with the world,became great with the world,

and he who strove with himselfbecame great by conquering himself;

but he who strove with Godbecame greater than all.”

- Johannes de Silentio

Man is contingent. Yet in his temporal existence, he cannot but discover a certain necessary force that encompasses his being – the Absolute. Indeed, man stands in relation to the Absolute. In Christianity, this Absolute is God and his relation to God expresses his faith. But what is faith? Can one contain it in a definition? Can one in any way possible make it intelligible? Or is one an individual who, at the end of the day, realizes that one’s faith is a paradox?

Faith is one of the existential themes pondered by Søren Aabye Kierkegaard (1813-1855). Under the pseudonym “Johannes de Silentio”, he wrote Fear and Trembling (1843) where he reflects on the figure of Abraham who undertook the trial of God, succeeded therein and became the father of faith.

“Philosophy cannot give us an account of faith,”1 Johannes writes. Thence, the author of this paper makes a preliminary confession: he may fall short in rendering a fully philosophical treatment of the problem of faith. The primary thrust of this work however is to acknowledge faith as a paradox. It involves a contradiction because


Page 61THE PARADOX OF FAITH

in believing in the “strength of the absurd”2 man regains what he has given up. Faith cannot be simply explained. It has to be experienced by the individual himself – he has to enter into a personal relationship with God.

Does man stand as an individual? Or is he a mere part of a collectivity as the Hegelian system proposes? How does he situate his faith in his context? The author seeks to answer these questions as he expounds on the three problemata Johannes addresses in his work. In his conclusion, the author shares his personal reflection on the paradox of faith. He agrees with Johannes that faith is experienced; it is lived.

Situating the Act of Faith

One of the prominent thinkers in the West in the 18th century is Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. In his opus, Phenomenologie des Geistes, he presents a system which centers on the Geist (German term for spirit) as the Absolute. The Geist encompasses and includes everything. Frederick C. Beiser writes, “it is necessary to conceive of the absolute as the whole of substance and its modes as the unity of finite and the infinite”3. From this unity, the Geist is manifested in and by the world.

Hegel envisages man in constant relation to the world and to totality. The world is not simply an object of consciousness; rather it is a being in which he man imbedded and from which he finds fulfilment. Thus, man is reduced into a mere part of a collectivity. He finds himself immersed in an ineluctable infinite totality. As a collection of individuals, the society is a manifestation of this totality. As part of this community, man’s moral criteria must mirror the established social norms. Alasdair MacIntyre writes,

Where do I find criteria? In the established social practice of a well-ordered community… Their authority is derived not from my choice but from the way in which in such a community they cannot fail to be regarded as normative. Thus Hegel’s final standpoint is that the moral life can only be led within a certain type of community, and that in such a community certain values will prove indispensable.4


Page 62 THE PARADOX OF FAITH

Hegel identifies the Absolute Geist with the God of the Judeo-Christian tradition. The Absolute Geist is immanent in the world which is manifested in mankind and in nature and on which everything depends. The Geist is independent of anything and is self-sufficient.

Søren Kierkegaard’s philosophy is basically a reaction to the Hegelian collectivism. Man according to Kierkegaard is not a mere part of a totality; he is a free and unique individual. “If the emphasis in Hegel’s philosophy is the entirety or the totality of the whole system and the interconnectedness of its components, Kierkegaard stresses the irreducibility and the irresolubility of the individual to the totality of the system”5. Hence, it is not the society that would determine his acts; it is his choice which defines him. His existence is comprised of many alternatives from which he can freely choose. He is thus a unique individual. Robert C. Roberts affirms the uniqueness of the individual: “To be an individual is to be so constituted as to be able to act with a high degree of social independency”6.

Kierkegaard names three levels of existence in which man may choose to live. The aesthetic existence is characterized by an appeal to the senses. In this level, one is driven by pleasure and is directed towards satisfying one’s sensual desires. The ethical existence is governed by reason. It is where one’s action is motivated by the sense of duty and is satisfied on the fulfilment of one’s moral obligations. The religious existence is lived out in one’s faith in God. Here, one encounters God in one’s individuality.

Kierkegaard emphasizes that man is confronted with many possibilities and he has to choose from them. Thus, each of his acts is his responsibility. This radical freedom to choose between alternatives engenders anxiety7. Under the pseudonym Vigilius Haufniensis, Kierkegaard defines anxiety in The Concept of Anxiety as “the dizziness of freedom, which emerges when the spirit wants to posit the synthesis and freedom looks down into its own possibility, laying hold of finiteness to support itself”8. Man stands before a gaping abyss of possibilities; he experiences anxiety upon recognizing that he himself defines life with the actions he makes.

Does anxiety imply a pessimistic tendency in man’s existence? And what is its significance to the act of faith? Anxiety does not lead man



to hopelessness; it compels him instead to further search for the truth. Moreover, it leads him to accept his temporal existence and the contingencies of the finite things around him. It can be a source for spiritual education. It teaches man to be ready to renounce finite things even those he holds most dear when God asks him to. Anxiety stills in him a clearer perspective of finite things of his world.

Thus the act of faith is always situated: it is an act of a free and unique individual who experiences anxiety upon choosing among the many possibilities before him; an individual who chooses to let go of what finite things he may have and who still believes that he will grasp it once more. His individuality affirms that faith is personal act, that is, an act he has freely chosen.

Taking the Leap of Faith

Upon recognizing that faith is an individual act, one ought to understand how Kierkegaard provides a concrete example thereof. Johannes de Silentio presents the story of Abraham whom God tested by asking him to sacrifice his only son, Isaac:

Some time after these events, God put Abraham to the test. He called, “Abraham!” “Ready!” he replied. Then God said: “Take your son, Isaac, your only son, whom you love, and go to the land of Moriah. There you shall offer him up as a holocaust on a height that I will point out to you.9

To this test, Abraham responded. The Book of Genesis continues,

Early in the next morning Abraham saddled his donkey, took with him his son, Isaac, and the two of his servants as well, and with the wood he had cut for the holocaust, set out for the place of which God has pointed him.10

The Scriptures narrated how Abraham and Isaac reached Moriah. As they journeyed, Isaac asked where the victim was. Abraham replied that God would provide the lamb. After setting the altar, he tied Isaac and set him atop the altar. As he was about to offer his son, the messenger of God forbade him and told him that he had proven to God



his faith. Abraham spotted a ram, offered it to God, and went home with Isaac.

Abraham’s action demands explanation. Ethically, what he attempted to do was murder. Johannes thus draws four situations in which Abraham’s behavior could be understood. In the first situation, Abraham does not conceal from Isaac what he is about to do; he even takes the risk of Isaac hating him lest his son lose faith in God. In the second situation, Abraham doubts his act and sacrifices the ram instead; Isaac eventually grows but Abraham has lost the will to live. In the third situation, Abraham questions his act and asks God to forgive his sin for willing to sacrifice his son and for neglecting his duty to him as a father. In the fourth situation, Abraham prepares everything as planned but Isaac sees him drawing the knife in despair; consequently, Isaac’s faith is lost forever.

These scenarios are relevant to the pervading theme of Fear and Trembling: the distinction between the ethical ideal and the religious ideal. The ethical centers on man’s fulfilment of his duty and obligations. It deals with the individual’s place in the society and his relation thereto. Thus, the ethical man’s actions can easily be understood in terms of social norms. The religious, on the other hand, concerns man’s relationship with God. It transcends the ethical. Thus the religious man’s actions cannot be simply justified or explained since his acts lie in his exclusive relationship with God.

The four situations present possible alternatives in which Abraham’s act can be explained in the ethical sphere. However, none of them could provide a rational explanation for Abraham’s act. At the first glance, his act can be seen as an attempt at human sacrifice which violates the ethical ideal. In regard to the command of God, MacIntyre writes,

This command is contrary, not merely to inclination but also to duty. What God commands is, from the standpoint of the ethical, simple murder. There is thus a break between the highest merely human consciousness and the divine inclusion of the apparently absurd.11

Abraham knew the consequences of what God was demanding of him. He was also aware that he was free to comply with it or not. He knew



that God’s demand goes against his ethical duties as a father. Here, one can imagine Abraham at the brink of anxiety of having to make a choice and take responsibility for it. There can be no intelligible way of understanding and obeying God’s command. What sort of father would be willing to sacrifice his own son? It is simply absurd. Yet, Abraham believed in the strength of that absurdity. He gave up Isaac yet he believed that he would still have Isaac: Johannes writes:

All along he had faith, he believed that God would not demand Isaac of him, while still he was willing to offer him if that was indeed what was demanded. He believed in the strength of the absurd … He climbed the mountain, even in that moment when the knife gleamed he believed – that God would not demand Isaac. Certainly he was surprised by the outcome, but by means of a double movement he had come back to the original position and therefore received Isaac more joyfully than the first time.12

What is that “double-movement” which Johannes refers to? It is the double-movement of faith which involves two acts: the infinite resignation and the leap of faith. The first movement is accomplished by renouncing the desires of man’s heart. With this is the pain of letting go of something dear to oneself and embracing the bereavement it entails. Thus one is reconciled with the pain and finds peace and contentment. But here comes the second type of a higher movement, which is, taking the leap of faith. Upon renouncing, one recognizes the impossibility of having it back. Yet, one holds on to the possibility of re-acquiring it. That is absurd, but one believes in the strength of the absurd. Johannes adds, “All that could save him is the absurd and this he grasps by faith. Accordingly, he admits the impossibility and at the same time believes the absurd. This he has done, through faith.”13

With this, Johannes draws the image of the knight of faith. He claims that this knight is not distinguished by his physical appearance. He looks like an ordinary man who lives ordinarily. He exists as an individual who enjoys the world and the temporary things it has to offer. Yet, he is someone who performs the double-movement of faith.

Johannes differentiates the knight of infinite resignation from the knight of faith. The former renounces the finite and the temporal,



experiences the pain of doing so and gets reconciled with the pain. He thus deepens his knowledge about himself, and this Johannes calls the eternal consciousness. This is the image of the ethical and the Hegelian system; the knight of infinite resignation makes himself understandable by his acts and he gives up his own desire for the universal. The knight of faith likewise makes the movement of resignation. But he takes a step further: he takes the leap of faith, confident that he will regain through God’s goodness what he has. He believes that nothing is impossible with God. He exemplifies the religious; thus he is beyond understanding. Eventually he experiences repetition: regaining what he has given up and appreciating it more fully and completely.

From these ideas, one explores the psychology of faith which Johannes articulates in his work. This psychology centers on the double-movement of faith: the infinite resignation and the leap of faith. What does this tell about the man of faith? He is aware of the finiteness of all things in the world and the possibility that God may take them from him any time. He, however, sees these temporal things as gifts from God and finds delight in them as such. This attitude affirms his deep personal relationship with God.

Illuminating the Paradox of Faith

At this point, it is important to consider how Johannes expounds more concretely the paradox of faith. This he accomplished by examining and answering three problemata which he himself posted. Each problema begins by accepting as true the Hegelian definition of the ethical as the universal; this is followed by presenting how this may involve a paradox, particularly in view of Abraham’s behaviour.

The first problema is this: “Is there an ethical suspension of the ethical?” Telos is the Greek term for end or goal. The Hegelian collectivism can be considered as teleological since for this system, the end of every human being is to be united with the absolute. Man thus abandons his individuality to become one with the universal. Now the question whether there can be a teleological suspension of the ethical entails another question: can there be a higher end to pursue which can



cancel out my ethical obligations? Hegel denies this possibility since the ethical is the universal which is every man’s ultimate telos. Thus, Abraham for him is a murderer since he (Abraham) tried to go against the ethical which is also the universal; Abraham had sinned before God.

Johannes claims that Abraham’s act indeed contains the suspension of the teleological. Ethically, what he has done is a murder attempt. Paradoxically, he as a single individual becomes higher than the universal (that is, the ethical). He does this by believing on the strength of the absurd. SparkNotes editors write, “Abraham suspended his ethical obligation to Isaac on behalf of some higher telos, the telos of faith”14. He committed that act both for God’s sake – because He demanded this proof of his faith – and for his own sake to prove his faith15. He encountered a temptation in the ethical itself (his ethical obligation to Isaac). This leads to another paradox: for by suspending the ethical teleologically, Abraham stands thus as an individual in an absolute relation to the absolute. He is a particular before the universal. With this, did he sin? Johannes is firm in saying that Abraham acted on God’s order and he had done so with faith.

The second problema asks the question: “Is there an absolute duty to God?” The Hegelian system proposes that all moral laws are universal which allow no exceptions. Thus the ethical is the universal. Every duty as an ethical duty is a duty to the universal, and thus to God. Hence, they must be observed for they hold as necessarily binding regardless of the circumstances. Johannes, however, argues that there is an absolute duty to God; that one, at times, would have to oppose the ethical when God demands it. He writes, “The absolute duty can then lead to what ethics would forbid, but it can by no means make the knight of faith have done with loving”16.

On acting out on account of the ethical duty, one abandons his individuality to be in the universal. The Hegelian system favors the exteriority than the interiority. It is because the former determines the latter; it is the one publicly expressed, and hence is universal. Johannes writes that in faith, the interiority is higher than and is incommensurable with the exteriority. It is where the individual relates personally and directly to God; the exteriority provides one



only an indirect relation to God. Johannes continues, “The paradox can also be put by saying that there is an absolute duty to God; for in this lie the obligation the individual relates himself absolutely as the single individual”17.

Looking at Abraham at the ethical level, his act is an obvious violation of his duty to Isaac as a father. Yet, Abraham acted out on God’s order and he did so with faith. Such a contradiction renders him incomprehensible. Yet, it is in this religious level that Johannes claims that the knight of faith is in a private relation to God. Abraham might have recognized his ethical duty and responsibility and the joy to live in harmony with these social conventions; but he was as well aware of his absolute duty to God, that by believing on the strength of the absurd, he had to move infinitely as when God commanded it. Such a command cannot be simply justified in the universal (that is, the ethical). Though others might rebuke or condemn him for his act, he knew in himself that what he had done is for God and in a way, for himself.

The third problema inquires: “Was it ethically defensible of Abraham to conceal his purpose from Sarah, from Eleazar and from Isaac?” The Hegelian system claims that man as a private individual is concealed. Thus, his ethical task is to unwrap himself from this concealment and become disclosed in the universal18. To make oneself understandable in the society, one opens oneself to others. This reality is expressed in the conventional use of language. One relates and discloses oneself by sharing one’s feelings, ideas and stories to another.

Johannes claims that the aesthetic hero, when tempted, would be silent, since he wants to protect those he loves. That goes against what the ethical hero would do in such a situation; he would be totally open to everything in his life. The former hero is free to speak himself up but he chooses not to; if he decides to explain himself, he would be intelligible. The knight of faith however has to stay silent; he has to remain concealed. He cannot speak because he cannot be understood.

Abraham thus is justified for concealing his true intention. Otherwise he would have only made himself incomprehensible. There was no rational explanation for what God had demanded of him. He is higher



than the aesthetic hero and ethical heroes by his necessary silence. In the story, Isaac asked him where the sacrificial lamb was. He just told him that God would provide19. This comprises a paradox: Abraham was able to speak without speaking anything. Had he spoken to Isaac that he would be the sacrifice, all was lost (which may closely resemble the first situation mentioned). His answer to his son was not a lie; it is in that reply that his faith shines all the more: that by the strength of the absurd, while being willing to sacrifice Isaac, he believed that God would indeed provide a lamb in place of Isaac.

The three problemata probe into the paradox which the act of faith involves entails in its relation with the ethical ideal. The religious level can actually oppose the ethical level. This also puts a great emphasis on the individual’s radical freedom to choose: by believing on the strength of the absurd, one chooses to pursue the higher end of faith; one chooses to comply with one’s absolute duty to God; and one chooses to conceal oneself for He indeed cannot be spoken. By freely deciding to give up the finite one cherishes and by believing on the strength of the absurd, one acquires it once more. With that, one becomes an individual higher than the universal; one’s relationship is unintelligible to others but it is a personal relationship between one and God.

Faith may summon an individual to abandon what his own judgement deems right and it may command him to carry what God asks him to do with unquestioning obedience. His existence is marked with temptations and tests; thus he acts with fear and trembling20 since his chosen act may indeed violate the ethical which is definitive. Yet he finds the strength to do so through his faith in God.

Reflecting on the Paradox of Faith

The moment the first rays of light streak, the dawn heralds the beginning of another day for man’s search for meaning. In his pursuit of explanations, he cannot but confront the contradictions of his existence. Twilight descends and the long day is over, the struggle stops for a moment and he finally retreats and rests in the arms of God.



But what greater trial can there be than one given by God? There he inevitably faces an absurdity: it is his God who requires him to make a sacrifice of what he loves the most. It is in dealing with these contradictions that man makes use of his unique capacity: his free will.

Man is free and his acts would define who he is. Before him lie a thousand of possible courses of actions. What makes it unbearable is the fact that in every decision he makes, he has to abandon the others. With that he has to embrace whatever consequences it may entail. He shudders with anxiety; yet the man of faith knows that it is God who is testing him and that trial is a matter between the two of them alone. He chooses to accept the test: while giving up what he must, he believes that God in His infinite goodness would not demand it.

Thus in him there is no question of God’s goodness for such is a basic tenet of his faith. He firmly believes and trusts all the more even when faith becomes paradoxical. It is from this that he can choose to pursue the higher end of faith, to follow his duty to God, and to be silent whenever necessary even at the risk of becoming misunderstood by his community.

The act of faith is personal but it is not isolated. Indeed, it is a matter of relationship between the individual and God but it is lived in the context of living together. It does not deny the existence of the society or the benefits of a community. A man of faith lives and respects the conventions and norms of his community. His faith even helps him to build, and be a part of, a community of believers.

The test of faith is part and parcel of everyday living. It need not to be grand. It can be as simple as waiting for the rain to pass or answering an examination. Everyday everyone is tested in different ways and in various situations but what is common to these trials is the invitation to trust God.

Finally, the paradox of faith through the double-movement is an affirmation of love between man and God. Man affirms his love to God through his unwavering faith: it is through this love that he can stand the test, appreciate his world and radiate this love to others. God affirms His love to man through His unswerving providence: it is through this love that He draws man incessantly to Himself, embraces



him despite his sins and even makes the ultimate sacrifice of His only begotten Son to save him. Man has faith in God in His infinite goodness. In his abiding love, God has faith in man.

There is this story of a young man who at a young age experienced the tests of faith. Born to an ordinary family, his parents had to work hard to make both ends meet. Despite their plight, his mother inculcated in him the Christian values particularly belief in God. Thus the boy first believed that someday God would give them a better life.

At the age of ten, his parents parted ways. His father ran off with another woman while his mother was left to raise the family single-handedly. Life became a tougher battle and the boy himself had to find means to help augment their meager income. With his mother and two older siblings, he believed that God would provide them what they lack. A little more than a year, the boy experienced a great trial in his life: the untimely death of his mother. Consequently, his siblings and he had to live separately among their relatives. The boy had to accept the ordeal and he still believed that they would still be reunited.

Can anyone really understand the boy? Who could explain the anxiety surging within him? At a young age, the tests of God were more than enough to shatter his soul and weaken his faith. Yet, the fact that he was able to write this paper proves that he has accepted the test, taken the leap of faith, and appreciated life as it is. He has learned one thing: to stand the storms, one must build his house on a firm rock, not on the shifting sands.

Taking the leap of faith is adhering to God. It is trusting Him unreservedly. Thus faith involves a paradox because it transcends any conceptualization. Reason may fall short in providing a full, intelligible account thereof. Nevertheless, there is a truth about man’s existence that always remains valid: Faith is a relationship between the individual man and God. It is experienced rather than theorized; it is lived rather than rationalized.



Endnotes

1 Søren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, trans. Alastair Hannay (London: Penguin Books, 1985), 35.

2 Ibid., 38.

3 Frederick C. Beiser, The Cambridge Companion to Hegel (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 7.

4 Alasdair MacIntyre, A Short History of Ethics (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1967), 201.

5 Lorenz Moises J. Festin, Course Notes in Philosophical Anthropology, (Unpublished), 54.

6 Robert C. Roberts, “Existence, emotion and virtue: Classical themes in Kierkegaard,” in Alastair C. Hannay and Gordon Marino, eds., The Cambridge Companion to Kierkegaard (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 178-179.

7 Angster is the German term for anxiety. Other cognates of this word are angst or anguish.

8 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety, trans. Reidar Thomte (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1989), 61.

9 Genesis 22:1-2. All biblical quotations are taken from the New American Bible Version.

10 Genesis 22:3.

11 MacIntyre, 210.

12 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 34.

13 Ibid., 38.

14 SparkNotes. “Fear and Trembling.” Retrieved from http://www.sparknotes.com/philosophy/feartrembling (accessed 13 February 2013).

15 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 69.

16 Ibid., 87.

17 Ibid., 82.

18 Ibid., 98.



19 Read Gen. 22: 8.

20 SparkNotes editors comment that Johannes might have taken the words from the Scriptural text Philippians 2: 12-13. St. Paul in this epistle says, “[You must] continue to work out your salvation with fear and trembling, for it is God who works in you to will and to act according to his good purpose”. In fact, this phrase which bears the title of book appears only on the discussion of the second problema. The knight of faith, in facing God’s trials, may be in fear and trembling since his act is definitive, and might oppose the social norms. Yet, he trusts that it is God who test him, and with that he cannot question or doubt.

Bibliography

Beiser, Frederick C., ed. The Cambridge Companion to Hegel. New York. Cambridge University Press, 1993.

Festin, Lorenz Moises J. Course Notes in Philosophical Anthropology. Unpublished.

Hannay, Alastair and Gordon Marino. trans. and eds. The Cambridge Companion to Kierkegaard. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

Kierkegaard, Søren. Fear and Trembling. Translated by Alastair Hannay. New York: Penguin Books, 1985.

____________. The Concept of Anxiety. Translated and edited by Reidar Thomte. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1980.

MacIntyre, Alasdair. A Short History of Ethics. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1967.

SparkNotes. “Fear and Trembling.” Retrieved from http://www.sparknotes.com/philosophy/feartrembling (accessed 13 February 2013).


Page 74

EPISTEMIC HUMILITY

KARLO MARKO D. VALLADORES

Introduction

There’s always a problem in every period or epoch that philosophy would try to answer. At this point, the 17th Century comes to mind. With all the breathtaking, mind-blowing, and ground-breaking scientific discoveries of the time, Scholasticism simply could not keep up. What further advanced its decline was the dogmatism it had imposed – an air that had left so bad an impression to modern man that the trend of time had been to rid oneself of any contact or connection from medieval philosophy.

Consequently, philosophies began to emerge hoping to propose a solution to the disturbing questions of the time. Although there has been a debate among scholars regarding what was the main issue of modern philosophy, we shall confine ourselves to Copleston’s standing that modern philosophy was caused by the reawakening of scepticism.

In order, however, to appreciate the significance of Descartes’ quest for certainty and of his looking to mathematics as a model for reasoning, it is desirable to bear in mind the revival of scepticism which was one of the aspects of Renaissance thought. When one thinks of French scepticism in the last part of the sixteenth century the name which comes first to mind is that of Montaigne (1533-92) … Montaigne revived the ancient arguments in favour of scepticism; the relativity and unreliable character of sense-experience, the mind’s dependence on sense experience and its consequent incapacity for attaining absolute truth, and our inability to


Page 75epistemic humility

solve the problems which arise out of the conflicting claims of the senses and the reason.2

One could therefore say that modern philosophy was a period “obsessed”3 with truth and certainty4. It is precisely in this light that Immanuel Kant’s contribution is given high regard – for its attempt to reconcile empiricism and rationalism.

This paper shall be thus divided into three parts: an exposition of Kant’s views, a presentation of a criticism thereof and a response thereto.

Transcendental Idealism

Kant explains his epistemological approach as thus:

I understand by the transcendental idealism of all appearances the doctrine that they are all together to be regarded as mere representations and not things in themselves, and accordingly that time and space are only sensible forms of our intuition, but not determinations given for themselves or conditions of objects as things in themselves.5

Simply put, Kant argues that man’s knowledge is limited to a world of appearances –a joint product of the manner in which the mind functions and the world outside the mind. This thus entails that we make the world of experiences.

Transcendental Idealism is also what Kant personally considers as a philosophical Copernican Revolution since it changes the attention from the medieval concept of truth as the conformity of the mind with the thing to the idea that truth is the conformity of the thing with the mind. He writes:

Up to now it has been assumed that all our cognition must conform to the objects; but all attempts to find out something about them a priori through concepts that would extend our cognition have, on this presupposition, come to nothing. Hence let us once try whether we do not get farther with


Page 76 epistemic humility

the problems of metaphysics by assuming that the objects must conform to our cognition, which would agree better with the requested possibility of an a priori cognition of them, which is to establish something about objects before they are given to us.6

Phenomena and Noumena

Whenever Kant would discuss his epistemology, two words continue to appear, phenomenon sometimes called as appearance or representation and noumenon or that which is sometimes called the transcendental object. What does Kant mean by the two?

When Kant speaks of phenomena, it simply means things-as-they appear-to-us. This, however, can be quite misleading for the term appearance may imply that Kant wishes to propose a sense of subjectivism or perspectivism but it is quite the opposite, he is concerned with truth. Dicker thus explains:

This will not mean that the knower creates or even alters things as they are in themselves. Nor will it mean that knowers need be aware of the fact that they are contributing to the content of knowledge. But it will mean that in knowing, humans unconsciously and inevitably, because of their own, built-in nature, impose on the object as known certain of its basic structural features.7

Simply said, phenomena are realities clothed in the vests that the mind inevitably makes for them. Being thus a product of the “transmutation” of reality and mind, phenomena “are the very data of experience, the material which reason makes use of and make representations of, and it is through these appearances that knowledge of objects is possible”8

With regard to the noumena, Kant refers to them as the transcendental object or as the things-in-themselves. One must bear in mind that Kant uses the term transcendental to refer to things that are beyond the human mind; unlike scholastics who made use of the term to



refer to universality. The noumena is simply the bowl which holds the ingredients for the creation of phenomena. Kant writes:

We have said above that appearances themselves are nothing but sensible representations, which must not be regarded in themselves, in the same way, as objects (outside the power of representation). What does one mean, then if one, speaks of an object corresponding to and therefore also distinct from the cognition? It is easy to see that this object must be thought only as something in general = X, since outside of our cognition we have nothing that we could set over against this cognition as corresponding to it.9

By limiting himself to phenomena, Kant believes that he will be able to free himself from the quagmire which both rationalists and empiricists find themselves in.

Some Preliminary Notes

Before proceeding further, it seems best to give a few remarks that would help us avoid confusion. First, Kant uses reason in two senses: at times he refers to the whole of cognitive function such as in the title of his first critique and secondly, reason refers to that propensity to inquire about the three transcendental ideas. We may refer to this as reason in the strictest sense. Metaphysics is also used in two different ways. The metaphysics which Kant remarks as the old matron in his first Preface is scholasticism, but in latter parts of the text it must be understood as the science of the three transcendental ideas. Lastly, one must also take note that the medieval concept of an analytical judgment is different from that of modern philosophy.

The Critique of Pure Reason

Having clarified possible and foreseeable ambiguities, we can freely proceed to discuss Kant’s approach to the epistemological



problems of his time. He begins his “architectonic” project by first agreeing with empiricists that knowledge does indeed begin with the senses but argues that the mind, as previously said, takes part in creating experiences.

The Critique of Pure Reason has two parts10. The first of this contains the Transcendental Doctrine of Elements which is divided into the Transcendental Aesthetic and Logic. The section on Aesthetics treats the mind’s capacity of sensibility while Logic treats our understanding11. The transcendental Logic has two divisions, the Transcendental Analytic which discusses what Kant calls as the twelve categories; it discusses how the mind makes use of these concepts, and the Transcendental Dialectic which talks about the three antinomies, these are areas where, according to Kant, reason’s powers fail. The last part of the Critique is the Doctrine of Method. Here Kant lays down his arguments in comparing mathematical and logical proofs and the distinction between practical and theoretical reason.

Although Kant sets the Critique as a manner of clarifying the stretches of the capacity of human reason, another purpose of the text, as previously stated, is “whether metaphysics [is] capable of extending our knowledge of reality”12 and more specifically whether man has the capacity to know things about God, human freedom and the immortality of the soul. Yet this does not mean that what Kant intends to know is whether metaphysics13 is possible but how one could go about it.

Now what does Kant mean by transcendental aesthetics? These refer to the manner through which man sees reality i.e. through space and time. To Kant, space and time are neither substances nor accidents but subjective conditions. This has two implications: first, that they are a priori; second, being intuitions, they represent only one thing.

This is followed by the Transcendental Analytic through which Kant presents the wiring of the human mind and the impositions it makes on reality. The twelve categories which the section discusses are based on the twelve forms of judgments of logic. The subsections 24-26 of the Critique seek to argue how the twelve categories are applied to the senses in general. The influence of the categories is found in that the



mind has the tendency to anticipate things. “The ability to anticipate what is given to us in sensible intuition, to require a certain formal consistency in space and over time, depends on a connection between the productive imagination and space-and-time consciousness.”14 How is this possible? Note that intuitions are the object of the categories. Since space and time are intuitions, they are subject to the power of these categories. But all representations are clothed in space and time once the mind receives them. Hence, the categories exercise their powers on human experience.

The last parts of the critique seek to present the antinomies – the quagmire in which we fall whenever we inquire into unreachable realities and the explanation of this propensity. Although, this may be of interest to others, we shall confine ourselves to these sections as these have been the most heavily criticized by Kantian scholars such as Guyer.

Criticism

Although we could enumerate a number of criticisms, we shall confine ourselves to one which is of particular interest – Gaven Kerr’s accusation against Kant’s Transcendental Idealism. In his article “Transcendental Idealism: A Hypothesis?”15 published in June 2011 by the International Philosophical Quarterly, Kerr argues that Kant’s epistemology is as more illusory than real since the Kantian theory of knowledge was not able to bridge the gap between the things outside and the mind. According to Valdez16, Kerr viewed the Kantian theory through an Aristotelian perspective. He argues that “Kant’s system gives too much emphasis on epistemic efficient causality (EEC), in which the mind creates the form of the object intuited, and utterly rejects epistemic formal causality (EFC), in which objects act on the mind formally to produce a likeness of their form in the mind”17 and that his strict representationalism is no different from Descartes pineal gland – a petty attempt to bridge the gap that he had made.

Kerr attacks Kant in two ways, first by arguing that if the only things permissible are things that are representational, how is it that there are a priori concepts that need not be represented? Furthermore, Kerr



also says that Kant seems to assume that the mind simply thinks in such a manner rather than defending it.

Response

One has to admit that Kant does seem to forget the need for a metaphysical basis for the existence of the objects that the mind hopes to grasp, at least partially in Kantian language. Yet, as Valdez would argue, such a criticism is based on a faulty assumption as well.

Kant clearly states that what he is attempting is an examination of reason in its purest form, and hence an actual world with existing objects is assumed as a given. In addition, the concern here is the mind and how it operates; any contact with external reality must therefore not be considered. In fact, he makes use of the term Copernican revolution, precisely to make us focus our attention on the knower and the knower alone. Kant also argues that this may be the only way so as not to stop at a dead end (please refer to footnote 6).

Kerr fails to see that Kant’s Copernican turn does not presume any form of “correspondence of reason to reality,” and that Kant showed that he need not do so in the first place. Kant’s investigation of reason has shown that knowledge of objects depend on the faculties and the activity of reason, and one cannot assume any form of fundamental truth that goes outside reason’s boundaries. If Kant sought to prove his theory of knowledge based on an unfounded assumption about objects, then reason “gets into trouble” and falls into the same error that transcendent metaphysics (and its accompanying theories of knowledge) has committed.18

In the end, one could say that the Critique was Kant’s way of separating from the fondling arms of any ontology that assumed knowledge of the thing-in-itself.

Conclusion

Having looked at these facts, we are therefore ready to draw a conclusion. It is now clear to us that it never entered Kant’s mind to pave



the way for subjectivism and perspectivism; rather Kant’s admittance of reason’s incapacity is a form of “epistemic humility”. Furthermore, although the mind may only function in a phenomenological world, what matters is that we can still get through the end of the day, assured that there is still a thing as certitude.

Endnotes

1 This is how Langton had called Kant’s epistemological approach.

2 Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy Vol. IV: Modern Philosophy From Descartes to Leibniz (New York: Doubleday, 1994).

3 One only need to turn to Descartes’ Meditations on the First Philosophy to get a full grasp of this obsession.

4 The issue is not exactly if truth or certainty were possible. That is considered a given. More than anything else, the issue of concern is how one arrived at the truth. The concern is the methodology towards the truth.

5 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A 369. Henceforth, CPR. I shall refer to the edition (A or B) and the page number.

6 CPR, B xvi.

7 Geroge Dicker, Kant’s Theory of Knowledge: An Analytical Introduction (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 32.

8 Earl Allyson Valdez, “The Hypothetical Status Of Kant’s Transcendental Idealism: A Response To Gaven Kerr” (2012), 12.

9 CPR, A 104.

10 The whole discussion is based on Altman’s and Copleston’s explanation of the divisions of the Critique.

11 “The science of all principles of sensibility a priori, I call Transcendental Aesthetic.” CPR, B 22. “A science of this kind, which should determine the origin, the extent, and the objective validity of such cognitions must be called Transcendental Logic.” CPR, B 48.


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12 Copleston, History of Philosophy, Vol. VI, 211.

13 Here, one must take note that Kant uses the term metaphysics in two different ways. He sometimes refers to metaphysics as a science and this he later on concludes is impossible. He does, on the other hand, consider a metaphysics, which simply refers to the attitude of the human mind.

14 Matthew Altman, A Companion to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (Washington: Westview Press, 2008), 140.

15 It is, however unfortunate that the article is unavailable to us and that we have in this case to rely on a response to the Kerr’s “accusations”. Due to this, we shall limit ourselves to one criticism.

16 Valdez, “The Hypothetical Status of Kant’s Transcendental Idealism.”

17 Valdez, “The Hypothetical Status of Kant’s Transcendental Idealism,” 2.

18 Valdez, “The Hypothetical Status of Kant’s Transcendental Idealism,” 8.


Page 83

XAVIER PAUL Y. JACOME

BOOK REVIEW

An inspiring way to look at philosophy is couched by this book entitled, Mindfulness. Fr. Raymun Festin intended the book to be written in a way that will inspire philosophy students and the reading public to appreciate the art of philosophizing. Like any other art, philosophy is a gift that can be acquired, and this is what this book intends to show.

This book is about being mindful. It seeks to explain what it means. It describes its basic features exemplified in the different ways in which past thinkers tackled philosophical puzzles and problems

This book argues that philosophy is a self-reflective activity involving serious study and soul searching. It affirms that the search for understanding makes sense only when it improves one’s mode of thinking and reforms one’s manner of living.

The main theme unfolds in five chapters. Chapter one discusses the early Greek thinkers—also known as the Presocratics—and the specific concerns that engaged their minds. In particular, Chapter one focuses on the thoughtful ways in which they conceived their insights, while grappling with the questions that agitated the Greek polymorphic mind.

Chapter two picks up the thread of the discussions in the first chapter. The term Being, the key concept in Philosophy, is formally introduced to the general discourse. Plato and Aristotle are forthwith presented as two most important thinkers who followed the lead of the Presocratics. The question about Being is not mere intellectual curiosity for Plato

Raymun J. Festin, SVD

MINDFULNESS Manila: Logos Publications, Inc., 2012.

437 pp. ISBN 978-971-510-249-0


Page 84 BOOK REVIEW: MINDFULNESS (2012)

and Aristotle. It wields an ethical bearing on their thoughts. It also influenced, to a great extent, the succeeding generation of thinkers.

Chapter three examines language as a philosophical theme. The discussion is set against the backdrop of one of the most significant shifts that occurred in the history of philosophy—a turning point that began with Rene Descartes. This phase is characterized by a change of focus in philosophical reflection. While the Presocratics contemplated the external world of nature, Descartes and the modern philosophers mulled over the self as a thinking subject and made it the starting point of their research and investigation. It spawned new challenges for philosophy, the most significant of which is the confrontation between faith and reason.

Chapter four deals with the notion of presupposition and its importance in philosophical reflection. Under normal conditions, we are unaware of the assumptions that underpin our thinking and acting. Unquestioned suppositions are of special interest for philosophers. Lastly, Chapter five tackles one of the most absorbing issues in contemporary philosophy: the theme of otherness.

The concluding part of the book ties up the discussions of the chapters and gives a brief summary of the key insights propounded. What does mindful philosophizing consists in? it is the experience of philosophizing that makes the difference. One would discover as one goes through the pages of the book to learn to appreciate and to relish the beauty of philosophy. If there is one thing which sums up the book’s insights, it is the idea that philosophic mindfulness is basically an attitude of the mind. It is a peculiar outlook that seeks to understand things by looking at them from another perspective. The early philosophers were possessed of this kind of disposition by viewing the world of nature from a different angle, they were able to come to grips with the basic character of reality. So does our so called quest for being philosophically mindful starts when one allows oneself to persevere in the search for truth and wisdom, even though the journey never ends.


Page 85

Fr. Maxell Lowell C. Aranilla, Ph.D. is professor at the Philosophy Department of San Carlos Seminary where he teaches Metaphysics, Epistemology, Philosophy of God and Philosophy of Education. He also teaches at De La Salle University in Manila.

Fr. Lorenz Moises J. Festin, Ph.D. is the dean of the Philosophy Department of San Carlos Seminary where he currently teaches Cosmology, Anthropology, Thesis Writing and Philosophical Synthesis. He also teaches at De La Salle University in Manila and San Carlos Graduate School of Theology.

Chris Julius D. Conjurado is a third year student of Philosophy at San Carlos Seminary. He comes from the Our Lady of the Pillar Seminary in the Diocese of Imus.

John Alford L. Molina earned his degree in Philosophy at San Carlos Seminary in 2013. His article in this journal is a summary of his thesis for which he received the Zwaenepoel Award for Best Thesis in 2013.

Jay Anthonie A. Sanico is a third year student of Philosophy at San Carlos Seminary. He comes from the Our Lady of the Pillar Seminary in the Diocese of Imus.

Karlo Marko D. Valladores earned his degree in Philosophy at San Carlos Seminary in 2013. His articles appear in the SCS Information, the official newsletter of San Carlos Seminary.

Xavier Paul Y. Jacome is a third year student of Philosophy at San Carlos Seminary. He served as Chairman of the Intellectual Formation Committee in 2012 and is currently co-editor of Theoria.

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karanasang maka-pilipino friendship as …scs.edu.ph/docs/theoria03.pdf · parang isang bugtong ang...

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