kant’s notion of schema and its basis in linguistic analysis

ReviewpaperUDC1:81(045)Kant,I.doi:10.21464/sp32204

Received:March24,2017

Daniela Katunar,1 Igor Eterović2

1UniversityofZagreb,FacultyofHumanitiesandSocialSciences,IvanaLučića3,HR–10000Zagreb2UniversityofRijeka,FacultyofMedicine,BraćeBranchetta20,HR–51000Rijeka

[email protected],[email protected]

Kant’s Notion of Schema and Its Basis in Linguistic Analysis

AbstractThe use of Kantian schemata as valuable theoretical elements (constructs) in the explica-tion of our cognitive architecture has been for some time a recurring topic in the philosophy of mind. The relevancy of schemas and processes of schematization as organizing principles of language structures has been repeatedly pointed out in linguistic theory, especially within the framework of cognitive linguistics. In this paper we discuss how Kant’s notion of the schematization of the mind, as discussed in his CritiqueofPureReason, i.e. the central no-tion of the schema, provides us with relevant insights into a novel critical approach to sche-matization in linguistics. At the same time, we strive to show that linguistic analyses provide a corroboration and enrichment of Kant’s theoretical philosophy by means of linguistic data, reinforcing Kant’s position with linguistic arguments and thus making him relevant in contemporary linguistic discussions.

Keywordsschema,ImmanuelKant,linguistics,theoreticalphilosophy

1. Introduction

Readersof linguisticpapersmayagree that thenameofImmanuelKant ismorerarelyseeninthemthannamesofotherphilosopherssuchasJohannGottfriedHerder,WilhelmvonHumboldtorLudwigWittgenstein,i.e.philo-sopherswhodealtexplicitlywiththerelationshipoflanguageandthought,languageandcultureandthenatureofmeaninginlanguage.However,con-temporarylinguisticthoughtshapesitsresearchobjectivesaspartofthecog-nitive science enterprise, itself being an interdisciplinary field comprisingvariousscientificdisciplines(linguistics,anthropology,psychology,philoso-phy,neuroscienceandartificialintelligence).Thestudyofthehumanmindandthenatureofknowledgeiscentraltothisbroadfieldofresearch.Inthiscontext,contemporarylinguisticsexploresanddescribesknowledgeoflan-guageinrelationtoothertypesofknowledgeasanintegralpartofthestruc-turesofthehumanmind.Becauseofhiscriticalprojectthatputsthenatureofhumanknowledgeattheforefront,condensedfamouslyinhisthreeCri-tiques,Kantisconsideredanimportanthistoricalsteppingstoneinshapinganddevelopingcontemporarycognitivescience,andsomeauthorslikeBrook(2004:1)callhim“theintellectualgrandfatherofcontemporarycognitivesci-ence”.Withhisinsightsintothe(thencurrent)debatesbetweenrationalismandempiricism,Kantprovidesanewperspectiveontherelationofconcep-tion/cognitiontoperception,a priori knowledgeanda posteriori knowledge

https://doi.org10.21464/sp32204

SYNTHESISPHILOSOPHICA64(2/2017)pp.(311–334)

D. Katunar, I. Eterović, Kant’s Notion ofSchemaandItsBasisinLinguisticAnalysis312

byobservingthemindasanactivefacultywhichshapesandcoordinatessen-sationsandideasandthereforetransformsthemultiplicityofsensedata(“ex-perience”)intoanorderedunityofthought(Gardner1985:57).DespitethegreatterminologicaldifferenceswhichcanbeobservedinKant’scriticalpro-grammeasopposedtocontemporarytextsincognitivescienceandlinguistics,wemustpointoutthatonetermtheybothshare–thenotionoftheschema asarelevantorganizationalprincipleofthestructuresofthemind.Itcanbestatedthenthatthediscussionofschemata1isasrelevanttoKantscholarsasitistocontemporary(cognitive) linguists.Furthermore, thecontributions thatbothsidescanprovideinthismutualdialoguearebestpresentedintheircommoninterestinthenotionoftheschema.WhilethereisgeneralagreementamongKantscholarsthatasmuchaswewouldliketotakeschemata(theschematismofpureunderstanding)forgrantedinKant’scriticalproject,wecannotavoidquestionsandcontroversieswhichaccompanyitsincetheimportantpartsoftheprojectaredependentonthenotionofthe(transcendental)schemaitself.Therefore,themaingoalofthispaperistopresentandquestionthebroadno-tionoftheschemainKant’sphilosophyaswellaslinguistictheory,bearingin mind possible comparisons and mutual contributions that the two fieldshavetoofferoneanother.Firstwewillpresenttheusesofthetermschemaincontemporary linguistics, especiallycognitive linguisticswhichdevelopsandexploitsthenotionoftheschemainmanyways,thusmakingitacentralnotioninlinguistictheoryaswell.Thenwewill juxtaposeKant’snotionoftheschemawhichismostpreciselydescribedintheCritique of Pure Reason andisaprecursortothenotionoftheschemaasdevelopedincognitivesci-enceandlinguistics.2Kantdefinesa(transcendental)schemaasamediatingrepresentationwhichconnectstheconceptualandperceptual–ithastobepureandyetintellectualandsensible(seechapter4).Thismediatingnatureoftheschemaiscertainlyonethatishighlightedincontemporarylinguisticdefini-tionsoftheschemaaswell.Withinthisoverviewofthetwopositionswewillpointoutthedifferencesandsimilaritiesinthedescriptionsoftheschema,aswellastheadvantagesthattheintroductionoftheschemaoffersbothintheinterpretationsofthecategoriesofthemindandthoseoflanguagescategories.Perhapsthemainquestionswefindimportanttoaddressinthispaperarethefollowing:HowcanwereadKantwithinthelinguisticdiscussionona pri-oriandempiricallanguagecategories?Whatistheroleschemataplayinthisprocess?HowcanKant’snotionoftheschemahelpusclarifyandemphasizethemainpropertiesofschemataandschematizationfound incontemporarylinguistictheory?Forthesepurposeswewillpresentanddiscussanumberoflinguisticexamples,aswellassomeexamplesKantoffersinhiswritings.Fi-nally,wewillsummarizeourconclusionsonthemutualreinforcementofbothpositionsonthequestionoftheschema:alinguisticreinforcementofKant’stheoreticalphilosophyandtheactualizationofKant’sthoughtincontemporarylinguisticdiscussions.

2. Kant and linguistics

Itisimportantattheonsetofthischaptertopointoutthatlinguistictheoryisadiverseandrichfieldofstudyinitsownright.ThismeansthattherearemanywaysalinguistcanapproachKant’swritingsandtheirinterpretation,anditisthereforenecessarytolimitoneselftothemainpointspresentedinthispaper.3WhendiscussingKant andhisviewson language it becomes immediatelyclearthatfewremarkscanbefoundinhisCritiques regardingexamplesoflinguisticmeaningandlanguageingeneral.Meaning,however,playsanim-



portantpartinKant’sconceptionofthenotionofschema.Meaninginlinguis-tics,especiallywithinthetheoreticalframeworkofcognitivelinguisticsandsimilarcognitive-functionalapproaches,holdsacentralplaceasthestartingpointinlinguisticanalysis.Thisisnotthecasewithsomelinguistictheories(e.g.generativegrammar),whereotherlinguisticlevelsofanalysis,suchasphonologyorsyntax,obtainprimacyofanalysis.4Therefore,our linguisticdiscussionwillcenteroncognitivelinguisticandsimilarcognitive-functionalapproachesinlinguistictheory,especiallybecausetheroleofschemasintheconstrual of meaning is a common point between Kant and cognitive lin-guisticanalysis.Somemajordifferences,however,revolvearoundthephilo-sophicalbasisofeachapproach,andthesecanbebrieflyoutlinedthroughthefollowingfeaturesofcognitivelinguistics’mainstreamapproach:

i) Theembodiedmindhypothesis,whichnegatesastrictbody-minddi-chotomyand in itsplaceputs thebodilybasisofmeaningand“theexperiential embodied nature of human rationality” (Johnson 1987:100;alsoseeGibbs2005).ThispointisperhapsthemainreasonmanyauthorsviewKantasbeingattheoppositeendofthemind-bodyre-lationshipdiscussionthancognitivelinguists.Here,perhaps,itisrea-sonabletoinvokethegreattimegapbetweenKant’swritingsandtheemergenceofcontemporarycognitivescienceinthe20thcentury,es-peciallydue to the insightsgained fromnewmethodsdeveloped inthatperiod.InretrospectonecansurelystatethatKantdidcontributetobothsidesoftheargument,notjustoneortheother,andthereforestandsasafigurethatfirsttriedtoreconcilesomeaspectsofrational-istandempiricistviews.Also,itisimportanttorealizethatthereisnostrictconsensusamonglinguistsastotheamountofeffectthishypoth-esishasacrossvarioustypesoflanguagestructure,e.g.itismoreread-ilyobservedinsomesemanticdomainsthanothers.Inotherwords,whetherallof language isbased (directly)onembodiment is stilla

1

Deciding between the plural form of sche-mas or schemata was not an easy task be-causebothareusedinextantrelevantworkscitedinthispaper.However,becausetheterm schemas is more commonly used by cogni-tivelinguisticauthorscitedinthispaperthanschemata (andmanyauthorsworkinginotherfieldsofcontemporarycognitivescience)wewilluseschemas whenwearediscussinglin-guisticapproachesandschemata whenwearediscussingKant.

2

Wechosetobeginwithcontemporarylinguis-tictheoriesbecausetheyapplythetermsche-ma toabroadrangeofdataandphenomenaandshowhowthediscussiononthenatureofschemasisstillongoingtoday.

3

Itshouldbealsokeptinmindthatduetotheanalytical reasonsofclarityandgradualnessofthenotionofschemaanalysis,wegivethemost attention toKant’s analysis inhis firstCritique, taking this as the most plausiblefirst stepbecauseKant devotedmuch space

theretotheexplanationofthisnotion.Thus,the reader could get the wrong impressionthat we sometimes speak about schemataas some parts of mind structure instead ofa process/mechanism. On the contrary, weare convinced that proper understanding ofschemataoughttobesituatedinmechanism/processingarticulated terms.Thus, althoughwewillmoreoftenspeakaboutschematismofunderstandingwetakethistobejustanas-pectofschematismofthepowerofjudgment,whichprobablyarticulatesbetterthedynam-icsofschematisation(takenexclusivelyasaprocess),mostlyexplicatedinKant’sCritique of the Power of Judgment, but the detailedelaboration of this interrelatedness exceedsthespacelimitsofthispaper.Forashortsum-maryofschematismofthepowerofjudgmentseeCaygill(2000:360).

4

However, seeWilliams (1993) for an over-viewofatraditionlinkingCartesianlinguis-tics,generativegrammarandsomeoftheas-pectsofKant’scriticalproject.



questionreadyforfurtherinvestigation,andmuchofitisbeinginves-tigatedthankstothelong-termdebatesetbytheearlyscholars.

ii) Perceptionasactiveandnotpassive(asthoughtofbyKant).Thisisapointbroadlyacceptedincognitivescience,andsomeauthorssuchasLenk(2012:71)explicitlystatethatKantwaswronginbeliev-ingthatthematerialfromthesensesisreceivedinitsraw,unproc-essedform(“themanifold”),onlyconsequentlytobeprocessedbyreason.5Onthisviewbothperceptionandcognitionareactiveandflexibleconstruct–creatingmechanismsofthemind.Fromthisitfollowsthatconceptsareintimatelyboundtoandderivefromper-cepts (Evans andGreen2006: 7).Bothpercepts and concepts arethusresultsofintegrationofvarioustypesofperceptualinformation(comingfromourvarioussenses)and/orothertypesofknowledge.

iii) Theexperientialbasisofmeaningandlanguagestructuresasexem-plifiedbye.g.usage-based models of language (seebelow).

iv) Arelativist6anda(moderate)empiricistviewofacquiringknowled-geof language.This latterviewdoesnot,however, treat themindasa tabula rasa,butpoints tothefact that languagevariationisafactthatcannotbeignoredwhendiscussinguniversalpropertiesoflanguageandthought.

v) Aviewofmeaningincontemporary(cognitive)semanticsismorelayeredthanKant’sview,commonlythoughtofasequatingmeaningwithreferenceonly.Reference(orsignificance)issurelyanimpor-tantaspectofmeaninginlanguage,buttherelationshipbetweenthelinguisticsignandthereferentismadecomplexbyotheraspectsofmeaningaswell–mostnotablythecomplexrelationshipbetweena)languageandthought,andb) languageandtheculturallyenrichedcontextinwhichsignsarebeingused.

NotallofthesepointsareindirectcontrastwithKant’sviewofknowledgeandcognition, asKant isoftenperceivedas standing inbetween themainmodernphilosophical viewpoints brought forth by rationalismand empiri-cism.Aswementionedatthebeginningofthischapter,therearemanywaystointerpretKantfromalinguisticviewpoint.7ItishoweverimportanttopointtothisambiguityofKant’swritingsfromvariouslinguisticviewpoints,andespeciallyfromthosethatmay,atfirstsight,differgreatlyfromKant’s–asisthecasewithcognitivelinguistics.Itispreciselybecauseofthisreasonthatwefocusonthenotionofschemainthispaper.Eventheprotagonistsoftheembodiedmindhypothesis,suchasMarkJohnson,pointoutthattheir“useofthetermderivesfromitsoriginaluseasitwasfirstelaboratedbyImmanuelKant”(Johnson1987:19).Thusbeforeweturntolinguisticexamplesoftheuseofthetermschema wewanttopointoutthattheillustrationofourexam-pleshasthegoalofputtingforthfourmainpointswhichrelatetheimportanceofschematism inKant’stheoryaswellaslinguisticanalysis:

a) Schematizationisaubiquitousprocessofthemind(whichoperatesonmanylevelsoflanguagestructure).

b) Vialanguagecategories,schematizationcanbeobservedasacogni-tivemechanismingeneral.

c) Schematahavetobeviewedbothasaprocess anditsresults,andnotasstaticentities,whichinturnpositsthenotionofschemataasallow-ingboththeflexibility of application andstability of a system (suchasthelanguagesystem)simultaneously.



d) AcriticaloverviewofthemethodologicalchallengesthatthenotionoftheschemabringsforthinlinguisticsandKant’scriticalprojectisnecessary.

Therelationshipoftheconceptualandtheperceptual,whatisinnateandwhatislearnedisinthecenterofmanydiscussionsaboutthenatureoflanguageanditscategories.Oneofthemajorcontemporaryapproacheswhichutilizesschemasasacrucialpartofitsmodeloflanguageacquisitionandfunctioningaretheso-calledusage-based models of language,i.e.modelswhichpresumethatthelanguageuseandlanguagesystemareinterconnectedandinseparableaspectsoflinguisticandcommunicationalcompetence(seee.g.BarlowandKemmer2000).Languageuse,inotherwords,isanecessaryempiricalandexperientialprerequisitetothedevelopmentofalanguagesystemandisinconstantdynamicrelationtoit.Suchanapproachaccordingtoitsproponentsisincontrastwiththetraditionalviewofthestructuralistlangue/paroledi-chotomy(Saussure[1916]1995)orthecomplementarygenerativistcompe-tence/performance dichotomy(Chomsky1965,2006).Thecompetence/per-formancedichotomyhasasaconsequence thecomprehensionof languageuse(andlanguageaction)asamoreorlesspassiverealizationofthelanguagesystemwhichistous–thespeakers–giveninadvance–inthecaseofgen-erativegrammarasaninnateuniversalgrammar.8Thistraditionalviewoftherelationship between language system and use is in essence unidirectional

–thesystemprovidestheruleswhicharebeingrealizedinuse.9Therelation-

5

AlthoughthisviewcaneasilybechallengedbydemonstratingthatKanthadamuchricherand more elaborated notion of schemata inmind,itisstilltheprevailingreadingofKantamong philosophers of language and cogni-tivelinguists.

6

Seefootnote8.

7

Seee.g.Williams(1993)foranaccountofthelinkbetweenKantandauniversalistandgen-erativistlanguagetheory.

8

Inlinguisticsthereisofcoursealongtraditionwhich opposes the claims of universal gram-marwiththehypothesisoflinguisticrelativityand its strongervariant– linguisticdetermin-ism – stemming from Herder’s views on therelationshipbetweenlanguageandthought,as

well as the more contemporary Sapir-Whorfhypothesis (see e.g. Gumperz and Levinson1996). According to the linguistic relativityhypothesis, language structures influence andshapethoughtinmanyways,andlanguagecat-egoriesandcategoriesofthemindareintimate-lyboundwithcultureandculturaldifferencesthatspeakersofdifferentlanguagesexperience.Itisimportanttonotethat,becauseofthis,thenotionofschemainlinguisticsisoftentiedtoculturalandculture-specificcommunicationofknowledge, as well as to the differences thatcanbeobservedfromculturetoculture.

9

Thisholdsmorestronglyforgenerativistthanstructuralist approaches, as Saussure clearlystates that the seedofall change in the lan-guage system (langue) stems from an indi-vidual’s speech (parole) and the two are inconstantinteraction.

Figure1.Differencesinthemodelsoflanguagebetweengenerativegrammarandusage-basedgrammars(KemmerandIsrael1994:168).



shipisbidirectionalinusage-basedmodelsoflanguage,andsuchadifferenceiswell-illustratedbyKemmerandIsrael:Figure1. thus illustrates themanner inwhich the long-termdiscussiononthenatureandoriginofthecategoriesofmind(specificallylanguagecatego-ries)isrealizedinlinguistics.Itisimportanttonotethatthedevelopmentoflanguagecategoriesinusage-basedmodelscanbeviewedprimarilyascasesof empirical generalizations, a term established by Kant. Here we believethattheexamplesofparticularcasesofschemas,discussedbelow,canenrichourunderstandingoftheschematizationprocessthatisrelativelybrieflyde-scribedbyKanthimself.

3. Notion of schema in linguistics3.1. Structuralist notions of the schema

Perhapsthefirstnotionoftheschemasimilartothatpresentedincontempo-raryusage-basedmodelsof languageisfoundinstructuralistworksonthenatureoflanguagestructureandtheeffortsdedicatedtoseparatingthenotionof‘languageform’from‘languagesubstance’.Thisdichotomyofform/sub-stanceisfoundinSaussure’sCours de linguistique génerale ([1916]1995)inwhichadefinitionofthelinguisticsignandthenotionoflanguage(langue)asbeingessentially a systemofpure formsarebeingexpounded.Withoutthe formativepowerof language, theauditorypartof the linguisticsign issimplyasequenceofsounds,andtheconceptualpartissimplyanamorphicmassofthought.Thus,thesamesubstancecanbemouldedinvariouswaysdependingonthestructuralprinciplesofvariouslanguages.10Thisformativepoweroflanguageisalsoresponsibleinfindingidentities,orconstantvalues(whichconstitutethelanguagesystem),amongthechainsofinnovativeusageweperceiveasspeech.BuildinguponthisnotionofformversussubstanceisHjelmslev’s(1961)introductionoftheterm‘linguisticschema’asalinguistichierarchywhichisrelatedtoanon-linguistichierarchycalledlinguisticus-age, butonlywhen theusage is ordered to a linguistic schema.Linguisticusage,inthissense,manifestsalinguisticschemabutschemascanbestudiedapartfromlinguisticusageintermsofthearticulationofvariantsoflinguisticschemaswithin theschemasthemselves.ThisdivisionharkensbacktoSaus-sure’sclaimthattheonlyrelevantsubstance(sound,thought)isthatwhichisarticulatedthroughtheformativepoweroflanguage.Furthermore,Hjelmslevputsforthanimportantclaimwhichinitscoredefineswhatisuniversalinlanguages,sayingthat:“Thesimilaritybetweenlanguagesistheirverystructuralprinciple;thedifferencebetweenlan-guagesiscarryingoutthatprinciplein concreto. Boththesimilarityandthedifferencebetweenlanguages lie, then, in languageand in languages themselves, in their internal structure;andnosimilarityordifferencebetweenlanguagesrestsonanyfactoroutsidelanguage.”(1961:76)

Thisstructuralprinciplerestsuponthenotionoftheschema.Thesestructuralistnotionsoftheschemaprovideperhapstheclearestsimilar-itybetweenKant’snotionoftheschemaasthe“crucialthird”elementthatunifiesheterogeneousphenomenaofconceptionandperceptionintoawholeandlinguisticnotionsoftheschema,althoughneitherSaussurenorHjelmslevrefer toKant.AswithKant’snotionof theschema,structuralist“linguisticschemas”areunifyingtheheterogeneousphenomenaofsoundandthoughtthroughtheformativepoweroflanguagestructure.Althoughthisstructureisnottangibleorreadilyobserved,itsstructuringprincipleissomethingavail-abletolinguisticanalysis.



Itshouldbestatedthat,asopposedtomorecontemporarylinguisticapproach-es, instructuralismwefind the importanceofa“top-down”explorationoflinguisticschemas(whenitcomestoseparatingwhatisthelanguagesystemproper),whileinusage-basedmodelswefindtheimportanceofa“bottom-up”inferenceofschemasthroughthenotionsofabstractionandgeneraliza-tionfromlanguageusewhichwewilldiscussinthefollowingsections.

3.2. Linguistics and cognitive science

Thedefinitionofa‘schema’ whichstemsfromthelinkbetweenlinguisticsandothercognitivesciences(primarilypsychology)definestheschemaasamentalmodelbywhichwestructureourexperienceandknowledgeof theworld; therefore, particular schemasguideus inourunderstandingofnewexperiences(GureckisandGoldstone2010).Thebeginningofsuchanun-derstandingofschemasisusuallyattributedtoF.Bartlett(1932).Bartlettwasinvestigating theway inwhichmemoryand interpretationof (folk) storiesvary depending on the cultural background of speakers, and demonstratedhowthenarrativeelementsarechanged,reinterpretedandadaptedindifferentculturalcircles(e.g.NativeAmericanvs.Westernculture).Beginningwithrecognizingtheirroleinourunderstandingandinterpretation,schemascametoberecognizedasoneofthemainorganizingprinciplesofthemind.Thetermschema thuscametobeusedwidelyinpsychology,linguistics,theoriesofartificialintelligenceetc.,anditistightlyboundtothenotionofcategori-zation.Categorizationincognitivelinguisticsrestsontwomainprinciples–theprin-cipleofcategorizationviaprototype andtheprincipleofcategorizationviaschema. Thefirstprinciplestatesthatsomeentityorphenomenoncanbecon-sideredtobemorecentralormoreperipheralfromacategoryprototypeandthatcategorymembershipisnotdiscrete(Raffaelli2009:68).11Forexample,eagle, hawk orrobin arecategorizedasmorecentral,i.e.“better”membersofthecategoryofbirds,whilepenguin orostrich deviatefromtheprototypebasedonsomecharacteristics(e.g.lackofflyingability).However,althoughtherearemoreorlesstypicalmembersofthatcategory,allofthemarestillmembersandinstancesofbirds.Therefore,bird isaschematicconceptsu-perordinatetothesemembers,andeachofthemelaboratesthebird schemabymaking certain features salient. Inotherwords,bird as a superordinateconceptneednotcontainall ofthefeaturespresentinallofthekindsofbirds,butonlyunifiesthosefeatureswhicharerelevantforitsunderstanding(e.g.layingeggs,beak,wings,etc.).Importantly,theseunifyingpropertiesoftheschemahaveasignificantroleinrestrictingtherangeofaparticularcategorybyclearlystatingwhatisnotamember.Therefore,whileprototypesallowa

10

Awell-knownexample is thedifferencebe-tween French mouton and English mutton/sheep. Theselexemeshavedifferentvaluesinthose languagesaccording toSaussuresinceFrenchdoesnotdistinguishbetweenthefleshoftheanimalandthelivinganimalbutinbothcasesusesthesamelexememouton.

11

This principle is related to Wittgenstein’sprincipleoffamily resemblance (1953) whereheusesthemuchquotedexampleofvariousgames(boardgames,cardgames,etc.)which

have nothing in common to all of them yetstill belong to the category of games. Sincethisisatopicexploredinmanycognitivelin-guisticworksweshallnotelaborateitingreatdetailinthispaper,butseee.g.Lakoff(1987),Raffaelli(2009).

12

Thereisanabundanceofliteratureonthesub-ject,seee.g.RoschandMervis1975,Lakoff1987,Taylor2003,Raffaelli2009,etc.



categorytospreadtolesstypicalmembers,schemasforceacategorytostop(thisiswhywedonotconsiderbats orlizards asbirds).12

3.3. The role of schema in linguistic analysis

Accordingtocognitivelinguistics,schema,i.e.theprocessofschematization,isconsideredtobepresentonalllevelsoflanguagestructure–fromphonol-ogy,morphology,syntaxtothelexicon.Schematizationincludesachoiceofcommonfeaturesinherentindifferentexperiencesinordertoreachahigherlevelofabstraction(Langacker2008:17).Suchan“abstraction”whichen-ablesunderstandingandproductionofnewutterancesiscalledaschema.Theprocessofschematizationincognitivelinguisticsisnotconsideredtoapplyonlytolanguagestructures.13

Asinthepreviousexampleof thecategorybird, aschemaenablesaverti-cal i.e. hierarchical structuring of language categories, from more specificinstancestomoregenericones.However,schemasareconsideredtobekeyelements in structuring not only lexical categories (such as bird), but alsogrammaticalones.Inordertoexemplifytheroleofschemasinsuchaway,wewillgiveabriefoverviewoftheuseofschemasinthelinguisticanalysisofa)lexicalstructures,b)grammaticalstructuresandc)imageschemas.

3.3.1. Lexicon

At the levelof the lexicon,oneof thebasicexamplesofschematization isthe abovementionedhierarchical structureof lexicalunits, i.e. taxonomies.Since taxonomies may consist of many levels, relations between schemas andinstances aremultipleandwecantalkof“schematizationchains”,suchas thehierarchyentity → living thing → animal → bird → eagle (…), inwhicheverysuperordinatetermisactuallyaschematothesubordinateones.Anothercommonexampleoftheuseofschemasinlexicalanalysisistheirrole indescribingpolysemous lexemes.For instance, the lexemehead canmeani)partofthebody,e.g.he shook his head, ii)mind,e.g.I wish you’d use your head, iii) theperson inchargeofagrouporanorganization,e.g.the heads of government,iv)toporhighestpartofanobject,e.g.the head of the page, etc.Theconnectionbetweenthedifferentmeaningsofthelexemehead isanalyzedthroughtheexistanceofacommonschemathatunifiesandgeneralizesthemainfeatures(‘toppart’,‘mainfunction’,‘governingpart’,etc.)oftheparticularmeanings.Meaningsthatarederivedfromtheprimarymeaningofhead (bodypart)areunderstoodbyspeakersofEnglishinothercontexts thanks to theexistenceof commonschema.Schema is in this re-spectconsideredtobeakeyelementwhichunifiesthesemanticstructureofapolysemouslexicalunit,and–inturn–apolysemouslexicalunitiseveryunitwhichisunifiedbyacommonschema(Raffaelli2009:71).Inanalysesofpolysemywhichpointouttheroleofschemasitisimportanttonotethattheschemaprovidesstability intheorganizationofpolysemousmeanings.Itisalsoimportanttopointoutthatinexamplesconcerningtaxonomies,sche-maticelementsarealsolexemesintheirownright(e.g.bird asaschemaandalexicalunit),whileincasesofpolysemyschemasareonlyconceptual,notlexicalized(i.e.wehavenosuperordinatewordthatunifiesthevariousmean-ingsofhead).However, inbothcases theschemasare thought tomanifestthemselvesthroughthe“force”theyexertontheorganizationofthelexicon.

3.3.2. Grammatical structures



Fromtheabovementionedexamplesitisclearthatthenotionofschemaisap-pliedwhendiscussinglexico-semanticstructures.Sincecognitivelinguisticsbelieves thatknowledgeof language is inseparable fromknowledgeof theworld, thisalsomeans thatan insight into theworkingsof languagestruc-turesprovidesuswithinsightintotheworkingsofthemind.Furthermore,astronghypothesisofcognitive linguisticsassignsacentral role tomeaningintheanalysisofalllanguagestructures,sothatthenotionofschemaisfur-therexpandedintotheanalysisofphonologicalandgrammaticalstructures.Aschemaisthusdefinedincognitivelinguisticgrammaticaltheories(nota-blyCognitiveGrammarandConstructionGrammar)14asanyproductiveandgeneralized(language)patternemergingfromlanguageuseandusedasthebasis for theproductionofnovelutterances.Theconnectionofexperiencethroughlanguageuseandtheroleofschemasinbuildingthelanguagesystemthusleadstoconceivingschemasasemergent phenomena. Inotherwords,itisbelievedthatschematizationisadynamicprocessthatmediates betweenthelanguagesystemandlanguageuse.Grammaticalconstructionscanthusbe,likelexicalunits,moreorlessschematic.Someexamplesinclude[V Subj Obj – way Obl] e.g.they made their way through the vineyard, the wounded soldiers limped their way across the field (Goldberg 1995), syntactic con-structionssuchas[Subject – Predicate] (Fillmoreetal.2012)ormorphologi-calschemas,e.g.[Nstem/ v [teljsuff/n’ ]] whichallowsforthederivationofnounssuchasčitatelj ‘reader’,spisatelj ‘writer’,učitelj ‘teacher’inCroatian(Raffaelli2013).Whatisimportanttonotefromtheseexamplesisthatsche-mashereactnotonlyonsemanticfeatures,butalsoonlanguageformitself,thusbeingsymbolicstructuresinmuchthesamewaystructuralistsdefinedthenotionof thelinguisticsign(see3.1.).Moreover, thenotionofschemacanbeinthisrespecttightlyrelatedtothetraditionalnotionofgrammatical rule, inthesensethattheschema,forinstance,whichallowsforthecreationoflexemessuchasčitatelj ‘reader’, spisatelj ‘writer’, etc.canbeputintheformofaruleforderivingnounswiththemeaningofagentsviathesuffix-telj(e.g.awriteristheagentwhichperformstheactofwriting).15However,itisinterestingtopointoutthatrulesarenotsynonymouswithschemas.Inshort,rulesareusuallyregardedaspurelyanalyticalformaloperationsoversomeconstituents,whileschemasareregardedasholisticinnature.AsstatedbyGardner (1985:58–59),according toKant’s interpretation, schemasarepartially rule-basedandpartially image-basedand, therefore, theirdescrip-tionisinterestingfromalinguisticperspective.Furthermore,drawingonthestructuralistnotionsoftheschemaasdiscussedin3.1.,wemaynoticethereisaclearformativepoweroflinguisticschemasthatcannotbeobservedwith-outtheirunifyingpropertiesgroundedsimultaneouslyuponthesubstancesofsoundandthought.

3.3.3. Image schemas

Unlikepreviousexamples,image-schemas canbeconsideredasbroaderand“morebasic”formsofschematizationincognitivelinguistics.Theyhavetheirtheoreticalbasisintheembodiedmindhypothesis(seeabove).Afewbasic

13

Taylor (2002:127)givesexamplesof“non-linguistic” schemas, such as a schema of asonnetoraclassicalsymphony,oralgebraicformulaesuchasx2=y forvariousnumericalexpressions,e.g.22=4,32=9,etc.

14

Seee.g.Goldberg(1995),Langacker(2008).

15

InEnglishthesamecouldbesaidforthe-er suffixusedtoformthenounsreader, writer, etc.



characteristicsofimage-schemasfromHampe(2005:1–2)willservetopointoutthespecificitiesofimage-schemas.Theyare:a)directlymeaningful,pre-conceptualstructures,whicharisefrom,oraregroundedin,humanrecurrentbodilymovements throughspace,perceptual interactions,andwaysofma-nipulatingobjects,b)highlyschematicgestaltswhichcapturethestructuralcontoursofsensory-motorexperience,integratinginformationfrommultiplemodalities,c)existascontinuousandanaloguepatternsbeneathconsciousawareness,prior toand independentlyofotherconceptsandd)asgestalts,imageschemasarebothinternallystructured,i.e.madeupofveryfewrelatedparts,andhighlyflexible.There isnocompleteorclosed inventoryof im-age-schemasintheliterature(althoughforthelistofmostcommononesseeHampe2005:3–4),somecommononesbeingCONTAINER,UP–DOWN,SOURCE–PATH–GOAL. In cognitive linguistics image schemas areoftenillustratedthroughtheanalysisofmetaphoricalmeanings,whichpointtotheinfluenceofanimageschemaintheirformation.Forexample,meaningssuchashe came out of a coma, spring is coming, he fell into a state of despair andsoforthareanaylzedasrealizationsoftheSOURCE–PATH–GOALschema,which allow for physical and mental states and temporal units to be con-ceptualizedasspatialentities(withverbsofmotionsuchascome and fall).Johnson(2005)pointsoutthatitisKantwhofirstexplicitlyandextensivelydealtwiththeproblemofconnectingformalstructuresofthemindwithmate-rialformsofexperience.Furthermore,whileaccordingtoJohnson(2005:17)thedichotomiesofformandmatter,mentalandphysicalorpureandempiri-calaretheconsequencesofKant’sefforttokeepthepurelyformalaspectsofthemindandassuchareinoppositiontotheembodiedmindhypothesis,JohnsonemphasizesKant’srecognitionofimaginationasthemainlocus ofthought,judgementandmeaning,whichhasbecomeanimportantpartofthetheoreticalheritageofcognitivelinguistics.Whilealloftheabovementionedexamplesofschemasandtheirtheoreticalandmethodologicalapplicabilityisopentocriticismandfurtherreviewincognitivelinguisticsliterature,withintheboundariesofthispaperwebelieveitisimportanttonotethat,similarlytoKant’scriticalproject,thenotionoftheschemaisusedasthe“mainthirdelement”,whichunifies,producesandsystematizesvariouslinguisticformsandmeanings.

4. The concept of the schema in Kant – schema(tism) in the Critique of Pure Reason

Kant’s criticalproject restson the revolutionary redefiningof theplaceofthe cognising subject in theworld that surroundshim/her. Inhis quest fortranscendentalconditionsofcognition,Kant finds itsbasicand irreducibleconstituentstobeunderstandingandsensibility,mostfamouslyformulatedinthesaying“thoughtswithoutcontentareempty,intuitionswithoutconceptsare blind” (KrVA51/B75, 193–194).16 The cognising faculty of a subjectcomprisesconcepts,ormoreprecisely,thecategoriesofunderstanding,whileintuition17 serves as faculty through which raw data is mediated from theoutsideworld.Thefirstconstituentensuressystematicityandorderandtheconstitutionof“knowledge”and“cognition”itself,whilethesecondofferstherawmaterialforthatsame“knowledge”,i.e.“cognition”.Onlytogether,intheinteractionofanactivesubjectandthesensorydatareceivedfromtheenvironmentdoweobtainthatwhichwecancallcognition.AlmosttheentireprojectoftheCritique of Pure Reason isdedicatedtoprovingtheobjectivityandnecessityoftheconceptsofunderstanding(categories)asconditionsof



cognitionitself(so-calledtranscendentalconditionsofcognition).Adiscus-siononthenumberofcategories,thenatureofperceptionandthefoundationsofthisproject–oftencalledtranscendentalidealism–hasbeenquitedynamicsincethepublicationofKant’sfirstCritique. Oneaspectofthisdiscussionisparticularlyinterestingtous–theonepertainingtothenotionof‘schema’,i.e. Kant’s view of the ‘schematism of the mind’.The interest is twofold.Ontheonehand,itmayseemthatthisnotionistakenforgranted,thereforedeeming a lengthy discussion unnecessary.This would be of interest onlyinthoroughexegesisofthisconceptwithinKant’swork.Ontheotherhand,thisnotioniscrucialinthecriticalprojectbecauseitfunctionsasabasisfortheconnectionholdingbetweena prioriconceptsofthemindandintuitionsofsensibility.Thisinturndrawstheattentionofscholarstotrytoviewthenotionoftheschemafromamorecontemporarypointofview,liketheoneoffered in (cognitive) linguistics.Theanalyticaldivisionof constituentsofcognitionintoconceptsandperceptsputsaseriousprobleminfrontofKant:howthetwo,heterogeneousinitsnature,gotogethertobuildcognition.Inorderforthistobepossible,theyshouldbehomogenous,apointKantmakessalientintheverybeginningofthechapter“Ontheschematismofthepureconceptsoftheunderstanding”:

“Inallsubsumptionsofanobjectunderaconcept therepresentationsof theformermustbehomogeneouswiththelatter,i.e.theconceptmustcontainthatwhichisrepresentedintheob-jectthatistobesubsumedunderit,forthatisjustwhatismeantbytheexpression‘anobjectiscontainedunderaconcept’.Thustheempiricalconceptofaplatehashomogeneitywiththepuregeometricalconceptofacircle,fortheroundnessthatisthoughtintheformercanbeintuitedinthelatter.”(KrVA137/B176,271)

However,itappearsthatwithconcepts(categories)ofunderstandingandem-piricalperceptshomogeneityisnotsatisfied:

“Nowpureconceptsoftheunderstanding,however,incomparisonwithempirical(indeedingeneralsensible)intuitions,areentirelyunhomogeneous,andcanneverbeencounteredinanyintuition.Nowhowisthesubsumptionofthelatterundertheformer,thustheapplicationofthecategory toappearancespossible […]?Thisquestion, sonatural and important, is reallythecausewhichmakesatranscendentaldoctrineofthepowerofjudgmentnecessary,inorder,namely,toshowthepossibilityofapplyingpure concepts of the understandingtoappearancesingeneral.”(KrVA137–138/B176–177,271–272)

Therefore,thecrucialquestionoftheobtainmentoftheentiretranscendentalprojectistoexplaintheapplicationofthecategoriesofunderstandingtothephenomenathatsurroundusandthisheterogeneityistheveryproblemthatthechapteronschematismistryingtoresolve.Thehomogeneityinquestions(whichKantdemands)

16

Kant’s writings are cited in the body of thetext according to volume and page numberin Kants gesammelte Schriften, edited byKöniglichePreußische[nowDeutsche]Aka-demie der Wissenschaften (Berlin, GeorgReimer [now Walter De Gruyter], 1902–).Standardabbreviationsareused(e.g.KrVforCritique of Pure Reason).FortheCritique of Pure Reason,thecurrentpracticeisfollowedbycitingA/Bpagination,referringtothefirsteditionas‘A’andthesecondeditionas‘B’.Alltranslationsaretakenfrom:Guyer,Paul;

Wood,AllenW.(eds.),The Cambridge Edi-tion of the Works of Immanuel Kant, Cam-bridge University Press, Cambridge 1992ff.Forconveniencetheexactpageoftranslationis also added, separated by a comma fromstandardpagination.

17

Itshouldbenotedthat‘intuition’hereistak-enexclusivelyinKant’stechnicalsense,asaformofperceivingingeneral.Itcanbeeitherpure or empirical. The former is connectedwithmathematicalreasoningbyintuitingthe



“…cutsacrossthebarrierbetweenthesensibleandnon-sensible.Inorderforaconcepttogetagriponanobjectgiveninintuition,theremustbesomethingintheconceptwhichiscapableofbeing represented in intuition–conceptsmustbe such that it ispossible for intuitions toconformtothem.”(Gardner1999:108)

By takingphenomena,orempiricalperceptionas self-evident,andcatego-riesofunderstandingassomethingproveninpreviouschaptersthroughtheirmetaphysicalandtranscendentaldeduction,Kantconcludes:

“Nowit isclear that theremustbea third thing,whichmuststand inhomogeneitywith thecategoryontheonehandandtheappearanceontheother,andmakespossibletheapplicationoftheformertothelatter.Thismediatingrepresentationmustbepure(withoutanythingempiri-cal)andyetintellectual ontheonehandandsensibleontheother.Sucharepresentationisthetranscendental schema.”(KrVA138/B177,272)

Therefore,theschemaisthat“crucialthird”whichconnectstheconceptualandtheperceptual.Itisthelinkofspecialpropertiesthatbridgestheafore-mentionedheterogeneitybyallowingcognition ingeneral.As such, it is aconditionofcognitioningeneralandthereforeKantdefinesitastranscenden-tal.Itremainstobeseen,however,whatissospecialaboutschemata.

4.1. The special nature of schemata

Thebasisforaplausiblediscussiononschemata,andthefunctionhegavethem,Kantseesintheuniquenatureofpureintuition–itisatthesametimea priori(therefore“pure”)andapplicabletotheempirical(thereforeintuition).Pureintuitions,thatoftimeinparticular,18possessinthemselvesthekeytounderstandingthefunctioningoftheschematism.InKant’swords:

“…atranscendentaltime-determinationishomogeneouswiththecategory(whichconstitutesitsunity)insofarasitisuniversalandrestsonarulea priori.Butitisontheotherhandhomoge-neouswiththeappearanceinsofarastimeiscontainedineveryempiricalrepresentationofthemanifold.Henceanapplicationofthecategorytoappearancesbecomespossiblebymeansofthetranscendentaltime-determinationwhich,astheschemaoftheconceptoftheunderstanding,mediatesthesubsumptionofthelatterundertheformer.”(KrVA138–139/B177–178,272)

Afewremarksshouldbemadeaboutpureintuiting.Pureintuitions,particu-larlyinthechapteronschematismgainakeyroleinensuringthetransitionfrompureconceptsofunderstandingtotheirapplicationontoempiricalob-jects.ApureintuitionisforKanta“pureformofsensibilityitself”whichwecanreachwhenwe

“…separate fromtherepresentationofabody thatwhich theunderstanding thinksabout it,suchassubstance,force,divisibility,etc.,aswellasthatwhichbelongstosensation,suchasimpenetrability,hardness,color,etc.”(KrVA20–21/B35,156)

Inotherwords,whenallofthehighestconceptualcategoriesinwhichwecanthinkanobjectareleftout,andthenweridtheobjectofallitsempiricalchar-acteristicsandproperties,westillhavetohavetherepresentationofextensionandtemporalsequencetobeabletoimagine19theobject as such.Thatkindofintuitionispure,thatisa priori,becauseitdoesnotpossessanyperceptualcontent,butitisstillanintuitionsinceitpertainstotheformofsensibilityitself.Fornow,itwillsufficetosaythattheobjectofreasoningcannotbeanobjectofourrepresentationifwedonotimagineitasbeingdeterminedinspaceandtime.Thesetimeandspaceaspureintuitionsareonlytheformofsensibilityingeneral,timeasaformoftheinnersenseandspaceastheformoftheoutersense(perception).20



It isschematismthatmakesclearthefactthattime(pureintuitionoftime)is at the forefront, since “[t]emporality is an aspect of the form of all ap-pearances,soifthecategoriesareappliedtoappearancesthroughtimetheywillbeapplicabletoallappearances”(Guyer1987:167).Guyerexcellentlydescribeswhythisisso:

“Theassumptiononwhichthethesisthattheschemataofthecategoriesmustbetranscendentaldeterminationsoftimemostobviouslyturnsisthatsinceallappearancesinoutersensearealsoappearancesininnersense,butnotviceversa,determinationsoftimebut not of spaceareuni-versallyvalidofallappearances.Therefore,theschemataofthecategoriesmustbetemporalbutnotspatialdeterminations.”(Guyer1987:167)21

Basedonwhatwassaid,Kantbuildshisownviewofschemata,anddescribesthemthroughtheirvariouscharacteristics:

1) Schema: a formal and pure condition of the sensibility.Bysummarizingthe foundationsofhiscriticalproject,Kantpointsout that it shouldbeclearthroughthedeductionofcategoriesandthediscussionthusfarintheCritique of Pure Reason thattheconceptsofunderstanding(categories)arerestrictedpurelytophenomena,i.e.“theycannotpertaintothingsinthemselves”(KrVA139/B178,272).However,itisalsoclearthattheonlywaytheseobjects(phenomena)aregiventousisthe“modificationofour

mathematical schemata in pure intuition ofspaceandtime.Thelatter isconnectedwithperceptionofempiricalobjects throughsen-sibility.ItisimportanttokeepinmindKant’sclear distinction between form and contentofcognition,i.e.betweentheconceptualandsensible.Thisisasimplifiedpicture.FormoreaboutKant’s theoryof intuitionseeCaygill:264–266. We will return to the discussionaboutintuitionlaterinthepaper.

18

Besidethepureintuitionoftimeasaformofthe inner sense, Kant distinguishes the pureintuitionofspaceasaformoftheoutersense.The first has the priority in the logical andcognitive sense (and transcendental) since itis the condition of cognition in general. Wewilldiscussthispointinsomedetaillater.Fornow,itisenoughtonotethatthispriorityliesinthefactthat“thecategoriesgainapplicationthrough being equated with, or realised in,thoughtsabouttime,ortimeasthoughtincer-tainways”(Gardner1999:109),asKanttriestodemonstrateinhisdiscussionofschemata.

19

Itwouldbemoreprecisetosay“tointuit”,be-causethiskindofimaginingispureinnaturewithouttheneedofrepresentationintheformofimagesorpictures.Althoughthisisobvi-ousfromourdiscussion,itisworthytostressthispointonceagain.

20

PureintuitionissurelythemostrevolutionaryconceptinKant’stheoryofcognitionandaninnovationintroducedbyKantintheoreticalreasoning.Thisa priorielementisthecondi-tion of thought in general. This insight thatpure intuition ispossibleputsouranthropo-

logical limitations incognitiononto twoba-sicdeterminants: timeandspace.Reasoningitselfasatemporality(ofconsciousness)andreasoningabout (outer)objectsas reasoningabout spatiality itself is the basic charac-teristic of our mind according to Kant. Thewholefirstpartof“TranscendentalDoctrineof Elements” named “The TranscendentalAesthetic”isdedicatedsolelytoinvestigatingtimeandspaceandtheirtranscendentalinter-pretation–wheretheyareaspureintuitionsthebasicconditionsofthought.

21

Wecanaskourselveswhatistheroleofthepureintuitionofspace?AccordingtoGuyer,Kant realizes that we cannot observe timedirectly and that every instantiation of tem-porality reallydependsonaspatial relation:“Thus, though the contents of the transcen-dentalschemataofthecategoriesaresuppliedby theseveral transcendentaldeterminationsoftime,theuseoftheseschemata–andthusthe categories themselves – requires objects in space.Thespatialityofobjectsofappear-ance will be the ultimate condition for theobjectivevalidityofthecategories,evenifitdoes not figure in the actual schematizationofthem”(Guyer1987:168).ThisisthekeytounderstandingKant’sneedforschemataasmediators between concepts and empiricalmaterial. This moment will be more salientinhisnextchapter“Systemofallprinciplesofpureunderstanding”,inwhichKantshowsthewaythatschematismofcategoriesoffersconcreterulestoourpowerofjudgement.Duetothescopeofthispaper,wecanjustmentionthisinordertoindicatetheimportanceoftheroleofschematainthearchitectureofKant’stheoryofcognition.



sensibility” (KrVA139/B178, 272–273).Finally,Kant argues that pureintuitions,besidethefunctionwithinthecategoryofunderstanding,“mustalsocontaina prioriformalconditionsofsensibility(namelyoftheinnersense)thatcontainthegeneralconditionunderwhichalonethecategorycanbeappliedtoanyobject”(KrVA140/B179,273).Thisofcoursere-ferstopureintuitionasthebasictranscendentalconditionofcognitioningeneral.Kantconcludes:

“Wewillcallthisformalandpureconditionofthesensibility,towhichtheuseoftheconceptoftheunderstandingisrestricted,theschemaofthisconceptoftheunderstanding,andwewillcalltheprocedureoftheunderstandingwiththeseschematatheschematismofthepureunderstand-ing.”(KrVA140/B179,273)

WiththisstatementKantoffersthefirstdefinitionofthetermschema.Asche-maissimplyrestrictedthroughthatusebywhichphenomenaassuchcanbestructuredwiththecategoriesofunderstanding,anditisthisstructuringthatrepresentsaprocedure(i.e.aprocess)oftheapplicationwhichwecallsche-matism,i.e.schematization.

2) Schema: a product of imagination, but not an image.Althoughaproductofimagination(Einbildungskraft),aschemaisnotjustausualimage:

“Theschemaisinitselfalwaysonlyaproductoftheimagination;butsincethesynthesisofthelatterhasasitsaimnoindividualintuitionbutratheronlytheunityinthedeterminationofsensibility,theschemaistobedistinguishedfromanimage(…).”(KrVA140/B179,273)

Kantbelievesthattheexampleofmathematicsmakesthisclear:largenum-bers (e.g. 1000) we conceive by representing a specific method by whichmultiplicitycanbethoughtof,andnotassomespecificimagewecaneasilyview(e.g.animageof1000strawslinedupinourimagination).Kantpointsoutthatthisprocedure–i.e.therepresentationofthisprocedure–bywhichwetrytoobtainanimageforaconceptisaschema:“NowthisrepresentationofageneralprocedureoftheimaginationforprovidingaconceptwithitsimageiswhatIcalltheschemaforthisconcept(…).”(KrVA140/B179,273)

Apointofclarificationonthismatterisnecessary.Itseemslogicaltosaythataschemaisaproductofimaginationsinceimaginationistraditionallytakenasamediatingcapacitybetweensensibility(perceiving)andintellect/reason(discursivethinking).Therearetwo,however,kindsofimagination:empiricalorrecollectiveandproductiveorpoetic.Itispreciselytheproductiveimagi-nationthatiscrucialtoKant’sprojectandespeciallythekindthatisnotarbi-trary(whichwouldbeequaltomerephantasy)butgovernedbysomerules.22Thisorderedpowerofproductiveimaginationcomestolightespeciallyinthediscussionofschemata,formerlyintroducedforthepurposeoftranscendentaldeductionofcategories.Itremainstobeseenwhattheproductofsuchim-aginationiswhenitcomestoschemata,ifnotanimage,whichKantanswersimmediatelybyclarifyingtheremainingcharacteristicsofschemata.

3) Schema: a pure synthesis in accord with a rule. Kantexplicitlystatesthatit“…issomethingthatcanneverbebroughttoanimageatall,butisratheronlythepuresynthe-sis,inaccordwitharuleofunityaccordingtoconceptsingeneral,whichthecategoryexpresses,andisatranscendentalproductoftheimagination.”(KrVA142/B181,274)

Thisproductistightlyboundto“…thedeterminationoftheinnersenseingeneral,inaccordancewithconditionsofitsform(time)inregardtoallrepresentations,insofarasthesearetobeconnectedtogetheraprioriinoneconcept(…).”(KrVA142/B181,274)



Therefore,aschemainawayrepresentsastructuring,orevenbetter,thecon-ditionsbywhichanobjectcanbestructuredwithincognition.Itisregular,inthesensethatitdoesnotgooutoftheboundariesimposedbypureintuition,butatthesametimeitopensitselfuptotheempiricaldiversityofphenomenawhichcanbesubsumedunderit.Kantgivestwoexamples:aschemaofthetriangleandtheconceptofadog.Although,atfirst,thesecondexampleseemstobemoreproductiveforcom-parisonsbetweenKant’snotionofschemaandthelinguisticone,itisactuallythe firstonewhichcorrespondssignificantlybetter to the relevant featuresofschemataaccordingtoKant.Namely,intheconstructionofgeneralmath-ematicalconcepts,aschema,oryetbetter,aprocessofschematizationisin-volved,orderedbysomeruleofsynthesisinimagination:

“…theschemaofthetrianglecanneverexistanywhereexceptinthought,andsignifiesaruleofthesynthesisoftheimaginationwithregardtopureshapesinspace(…).”(KrVA141/B180,273)

In other words, mathematical reasoning in the construction of concepts isa paradigm of the schematization process, because for the construction ofa concept, e.g. ‘triangle’, the only thing we need are several rules suffi-cientforsuchconstructioninpureintuitionoftimeandspace–specifically‘three-sidedness’,‘three-angleness’andotherbelongingfeatures(e.g.alwaysanequalsumofinnerangles=180°,etc.).23

Concerningthesecondexample,Kantsays:

“Theconceptofadogsignifiesaruleinaccordancewithwhichmyimaginationcanspecifytheshapeofafour-footedanimalingeneral,withoutbeingrestrictedtoanysingleparticularshape thatexperienceoffersmeoranypossible image that Icanexhibit in concreto.” (KrVA141/B180,273)

With this example Kant emphasizes that all concepts, including empiri-calones, have their schemata,which arenecessary for formation (andun-derstanding)ofthemereconceptassuch.Inotherwords,despitethemuchharder possibility of abstraction when the concept of ‘dog’ is in question,anddespite the seductivecallof recalling imagesof somepreviouslyseendog,Kantinsiststhatitispossible(andactuallythatitispriortoanyfurtherconstructionofaconcept) toconceive‘dog’asaschema inpure intuition.Otherwisewewouldnevergettheconceptofa‘dog’,butjustanimage(s)of

22

FormoreonthemediatingroleandtypesofimaginationseeCaygill(2000:246–249).

23

Foradetailedanalysisonthenatureofmath-ematical construction in Kant’s philosophy,seeShabel(2006).

24

In the light of both examples, several ques-tions remain open: How should cognitivelinguistics and cognitive science assess theKantian transcendental account of the humanmind’sschemata?ItseemsthatforKantsche-mataarenotempiricalgeneralizations(asisthecaseincognitivelinguistics),butpurerepresen-tations. Ifso,are thoseprojectsatallcompat-ibleifnotcompletelyincongruent?Duetothescopeofthispaper,wecanjustnotethatsome

schemataarebestexplainedasempiricalgen-eralizationsandothersastranscendentalformsof pure understanding or power of judgment.Morespecifically,thekeycouldbethenatureofthepowerofjudgment,which(exactlythroughschematism)showsthe“bivalent”natureofex-plainingthereality,dependingfromwhichwaythereasoningiscoming.Someconceptsarebet-terexplainedin“top-down”reasoningfromtheconstructioninpureintuition,butothersareex-clusivelyunderstandable throughthelanguageof a “bottom-up” empirical generalizations.Anyway,theideaisthatschema(andcognitioningeneral) is in transcendentalproject simplyimpossible(oratleastirrelevant)withoutbothnecessary elements of cognition, before dis-cussed.



someparticulardog(s).Forthisadmirable,butpartiallymysteriouspowerofourmindKantsays:

“Thisschematismofourunderstandingwithregardtoappearancesandtheirmereformisahid-denartinthedepthsofthehumansoul,whosetrueoperationswecandivinefromnatureandlayunveiledbeforeoureyesonlywithdifficulty.”(KrVA141/B180–181,273)24

4) Schemata: particular examples of categories of understanding.Kantstatesthateverythingwillbemuchclearerifweturntoexemplifyingschemataandhedoessowiththeexampleofthecategoriesofunderstanding(quan-tity,quality,relationandmodality).Itisinterestingthatinawaythisrela-tiontoschemataoffersKantareinforcementofthedeductionanddivisionofcategories,butthesepointscanbeconsideredseparatelyand,therefore,anexplanationofschematahereonlyfollowsKant’sexamplesnotques-tioningcategoriesassuch.25

Thefirstclassofcategories–quantity–isunifiedbyoneschema:

“Thepureschema of magnitude(quantitatis),however,asaconceptoftheunderstanding,isnumber,whichisarepresentationthatsummarizesthesuccessiveadditionofone(homogene-ous)unittoanother.Thusnumberisnothingotherthantheunityofthesynthesisofthemanifoldofahomogeneousintuitioningeneral(…).”(KrVA142–143/B182,274)

Thesecondclassofcategories–quality–doesnotpossesssuchaspecificdefinitionandremainsinpartobscureandKanttriestoexplainitbycompar-ingittothefirstcategory–schemaofrealityisthusarepresentationof

“…quantityofsomethinginsofarasitfillstime,isjustthiscontinuousand,uniformgenerationofthatquantityintime,asonedescendsintimefromthesensationthathasacertaindegreetoitsdis-appearanceorgraduallyascendsfromnegationtoitsmagnitude(…).”(KrVA143/B183,275)

Wecantrytoexplainthisinthefollowingway:theschemaofqualityisreallyarepresentationofsomequantityexistingintime,andthedegreeofexistence(intensity)canbesomewherebetweenrealityandvariousdegreesoflimita-tiontonegation.Thethirdclassofcategories–relation–isforKantespeciallyimportantinhisentirephilosophicaloeuvre,andespeciallyhereinexplanationofschemata,wherethisclassgetsaspecialplacebyexemplifyingschemataforeachofthecategorieswithinit:

“Theschemaofsubstanceisthepersistenceoftherealintime,i.e.,representationoftherealasasubstratumofempiricaltime-determinationingeneral,whichthereforeendureswhileevery-thingelsechanges.(Timeitselfdoesnotelapse,buttheexistenceofthatwhichischangeableelapsesinit.Totime,therefore,whichisitselfunchangeableandlasting,therecorrespondsinappearancethatwhichisunchangeableinexistence,i.e.,substance,andinitalonecanthesuc-cessionandsimultaneityofappearancesbedeterminedinregardtotime.)Theschemaofthecauseandofthecausalityofathingingeneralistherealuponwhich,when-everitisposited,somethingelsealwaysfollows.Itthereforeconsistsinthesuccessionofthemanifoldinsofarasitissubjecttoarule.Theschemaofcommunity(reciprocity),orofthereciprocalcausalityofsubstanceswithregardtotheiraccidents,isthesimultaneityofthedeterminationsoftheonewiththoseoftheother,inaccordancewithageneralrule.”(KrVA144/B183–184,275)

Kantoffersexamplesforthefourthclassofcategories–modality:

“Theschemaofpossibilityistheagreementofthesynthesisofvariousrepresentationswiththeconditionsoftimeingeneral(…),thusthedeterminationoftherepresentationofathingtosometime.Theschemaofactualityisexistenceatadeterminatetime.Theschemaofnecessityistheexistenceofanobjectatalltimes.”(KrVA144–145/B184,275)



5) Shemata: a priori time-determinations in accordance with rules. Kantpointsoutthat,throughthedescriptionofschemata,itisevidentthatsche-maofeverycategoryrepresentsaparticulartime-determination,stressingespeciallytheaspectofproductivity:

“…inthecaseofmagnitude,thegeneration(synthesis)oftimeitself,inthesuccessiveappre-hensionofanobject;inthecaseoftheschemaofquality,thesynthesisofsensation(perception)with the representationof time,or the fillingof time; in thecaseof the schemaof relation,therelationoftheperceptionsamongthemselvestoalltime(i.e.,inaccordancewitharuleoftime-determination);finally,intheschemaofmodalityanditscategories,timeitself,asthecor-relateofthedeterminationofwhetherandhowanobjectbelongstotime.”(KrVA145/B184,275–276)

Whetherweagreeornotwiththenumberofcategoriesandthesuccessoftheirdescription,itseemsthatthebasisofschematizationis theaforementionedpureintuitionoftime.“Theschemataaretherefore”,accordingtoKant,

“…nothingbuta prioritime-determinationsinaccordancewithrules,andtheseconcern,ac-cordingtotheorderofthecategories,thetime-series,thecontent of time,theorder of time,andfinallythesum total of timeinregardtoallpossibleobjects.”(KrVA145/B184–185,276)

Itisimportanttonotethatitistherelianceonthepureintuitionoftimewhichmakesschemataplausiblebecausethepureintuitionoftimeunifiescatego-riesandsenseimpressions.Itshouldbeclarifiedthattheschemataofcatego-riesofquantityrefertothetemporallineofsuccessivelyaddingtothepureintuitionoftime(arithmetics)andspace(geometry),whichisthebasisoftheentireKant’sphilosophyofmathematics(seeShabel2006).6) Shemata: the real and only conditions of the significance of categories.

Kantfurthermorestatesthattheschematismofunderstandingconsistsof“theunityofallthemanifoldofintuitionininnersense,andthusindirectlytotheunityofapperception,asthefunctionthatcorrespondstoinnersense(toareceptivity)”(KrVA145/B185,276).Kantemphasizesthroughthewhole textof firstCritique theneedfor taking the transcendentalunityofapperceptionastheconditionoftheunityofcognitioningeneral.Butalthoughtherearedisputestotheinterpretationofthisconceptitcanbesaidthattheunityofcognizingsubject’sconsciousnessistheunderlyingconditionofthefunctioningofthecognitiveapparatuswithallofitsbuild-ingblocks(reflexivityofreasonandreceptivity,thelatterbeingthepureformalconditionforempiricalsensibility).Atthispoint,schemataappearas thecrucialmomentwhich leadsus to the thresholdof apperception.ThisisforKantthefinalfrontierofepistemologicalanalysis.26Thus,Kantconcludesthat

“…the schemataof theconceptsofpureunderstandingare the trueandsoleconditions forprovidingthemwitharelationtoobjects,thuswithsignificance,andhencethecategoriesareintheendofnonebutapossibleempiricaluse,sincetheymerelyservetosubjectappearances

25

AsKant’sdeductionofcategories,andespe-ciallytheirnumber,canbethesubjectofcriti-cism (see e.g. Guyer 1992: especially 133–136) we can ask whether this obstructs theplausibilityofschematismassuch.However,it seems that these two thingsareunrelated,becauseschematismismerely“thatthirdele-ment”foranycategoryofreason,independ-entlyofthenumberandtypesofcategories.

26

Theconcept“transcendentalapperception”isforKantassignedfortheunityofconscious-nessas theconditionof thepossibilityforasubject to be aware of different representa-tionsashis/herown,i.e.asasubjectofsuchawareness (cognition) itself. For instructivediscussion on unity of apperception seeAl-lison(1983).



togeneralrulesofsynthesisthroughgroundsofana priorinecessaryunity(onaccountofthenecessaryunificationofall consciousness inanoriginalapperception), and thereby tomakethemfitforathoroughgoingconnectioninoneexperience.”(KrVA146/B185,276)

Schemataare really thedistinctivecarriersof“real”meaning, that is, theybringreal(experiential)referencetocategoriesofunderstanding,sincetheyare mediators toward empirical facts without which the a priori conceptswouldbeemptyincontent,andthuswithout“meaning”(significanceorref-erence)or“meaningless”.27

7) Schema: sensible concept of an object, in agreement with the category. However, not only is there a strong link by which schemata determinecategoriesintheirapplicability,theyalsorestrictthem:

“…theschemataofsensibilityfirstrealizethecategories,yettheylikewisealsorestrictthem,i.e.,limitthemtoconditionsthatlieoutsidetheunderstanding(namely,insensibility).Hencetheschemaisreallyonlythephenomenon,orthesensibleconceptofanobject,inagreementwiththecategory.”(KrVA146/B185–186,276)

WhatKantmeansis thatwithoutschematathecategoriesofunderstandinghavealimitedroleinourcognition.Theyare,withoutschemata,“onlyfunc-tionsoftheunderstandingforconcepts,butdonotrepresentanyobject.Thissignificancecomestothemfromsensibility,whichrealizestheunderstand-ingatthesametimeasitrestrictsit”(KrVA147/B187,277).Inotherwords,schematadetermine theconditionsofapplication(realization)ofpurecon-ceptsofunderstandingtoempiricalcontentthatisbeforeus,andinturnthissensibilityoffers thecategoriesandunderstanding itself their realization intheactofcognition.

5. Common (and distinct) challenges of schemas in Kant’s critical project and linguistic analysis

By examining theuses of the term schema in structuralism, contemporarycognitive linguistic theory and cognitive science in general as well as inKant’sCritique of Pure Reason,itcanbeconcludedthatoureffortstounder-standKant’susageofthetermwerenotinvainandthatthereexistsaclearhistoricalconnectionbetweenKant’stextandcontemporarylinguisticanaly-ses.However,perhapsthisconnectionneedstobereadalongthelinesofbothstructuralistandcognitivelinguisticapproaches.Itmustbebroughttomindthat,althoughcognitivelinguisticsisinmanywaysthecontemporarysucces-sortotheoldertraditionofstructuralism,thereexistsomedifferencesinitsviewoflanguage,asstatedabove.AndalthoughKantisoftenconsideredasthegrandfatherofcognitivescience,itisnotalwaysclearwhatwashisstancewhenitcomestolanguage,especiallybecauseheprincipallydidnotuselan-guagetoexemplifyhisnotionoftheschema(rareexampleistheschemaofa‘dog’).WhatwemeanbytakingintoaccountbothstructuralistandcognitivelinguistictraditionsisthatthesetwolinguistictraditionsofthoughtbringforthdifferentaspectsofKant’snotionoftheschemainview,andthusallowforajointexaminationoftherelationshipbetweenlinguisticanalysisandKant’scriticalprogramme.Theformativeandunifyingpoweroflanguage,embed-dedsodeeply into theverydefinitionof languagestructureand linguisticsinstructuralism,issimilartotheformativeandunifyingpowerofschemataingeneralinKant’scriticalprogramme–thesynthesisinaccordancewitharuleandtheproductofimaginationbutwhichisnotanimageitself.Ontheotherhand,structuralismwasa“pre-cognitive”approachtolanguage,inthe



sensethatitoftentreateditssubject-matterasasysteminandofitself.Whatthismeansisthatlanguagewasnottreatedas“awindowintothestructuresofthemind”inthesamesenseasitistreatedincognitivelinguisticapproaches.Abstractingthelinguisticsystemawayfromusageandothercognitivefacul-tiesmeantthattheformalpropertiesoftheschemawereinsomeways(asisthecasewithHjelmslev)morereadilyobserved,andtheformalnatureoftheschemapresentedinKantismorepresentthereasopposedtothecognitiveperspective.Thecognitiveperspectivebringsforthanotherapproachtosche-mas:ascognitiveprocessesdeeplyrootedincognitionandcategorizationingeneral.ThistiesmorecloselytoKant’sviewofschemaoperatinguponcog-nitioningeneral,languageincluded.Forthisreason,wepresentedanalysesofparticularlinguisticexamplesinordertofamiliarizereaderswiththevarioususesofthetermschemaincontemporarycognitivelinguistictheory.Theshiftoffocusbetweenthetwolinguistictraditions,thatofstructuralismandthatofcognitivelinguistics,especiallywhenviewingexamplesoflinguisticschemasasempiricalgeneralizations,leavesmanymethodologicalquestionsopenforlinguisticanalysis,aswewillshowbelow.IntroducingaKantianperspectiveon this relationshipmay,or at leastwehope so,help to examine the rela-tionshipbetweenthesetwolinguistictraditionsanew,especiallythroughthenotionoftheschema.Thecontemporarylinguisticanalysesarenotwithoutquestionsthemselves,buttheydoshowimportantexampleswhichcanbere-lateddirectlytoKant’sdichotomousreadingsofschemata.This,furthermorecombinedwithexamplesof schemasascasesofempiricalgeneralizations,offersnoveldatasetstobeviewedfromKantianperspectives.Inotherwords,thetwopreviouschaptersonschemasinlinguisticsandKant’scriticalprojectillustratethatwecanarriveatthenotionofschemafromtwooppositedirec-tions.Oneisstartingfromlanguage-specificexamplesofschematizationinordertoachievegeneralconclusionsabouttheprocessofschematizationasauniversalpropertyofthemind,andtheotherisstartingfromageneralviewofcategoriesandtheirspecificapplicationtoempiricalmaterial.Thetwoways,inturn,providetheirownsetofopenquestionsandchallengestothenotionofschemaandschematismofthemind.In previous sections on schemas in contemporary linguistics it is clearlyshownthatthetwomaincharacteristicsofschemasareabstraction andgen-eralization. However,althoughthesetwothingsareconsideredasbasicintheformationofschemas,theyalsoleavemanyquestionsunansweredastotheirapplicationinlinguisticanalysis,mostnotably:a)Whatis theexactnatureof abstractionandgeneralization28 andare there someuniversalpropertiesin their formationof language categories?; b)Are thereuniversal typesofschematizationoflanguagestructureandhowdowe“fine-tune”theiriden-tificationmethodologically?;c)Whatistherelationoflinguisticand“non-linguistic”schemas?;d)Thequestionofovergeneralization(orconstraining

27

Kant reminds readers once againof the im-portanceofa prioriandempirical:“…hencethe categories are in the end of none but apossible empirical use, since they merelyservetosubjectappearancestogeneralrulesof synthesis through grounds of an a priorinecessaryunity(onaccountofthenecessaryunificationofallconsciousnessinanoriginalapperception),and thereby tomake themfitforathoroughgoingconnectioninoneexperi-ence.”(KrVA146/B185,276)Categoriesare

usefulonlyif theycanbeappliedtoexperi-ence,andthisapplicationcomesdirectlyfromschematism.

28

Within linguistics, thisproblem is related totheelusiveproblemofestablishingauniqueoruniformmeaningforsomelinguisticunitswithin a system.Formoreon this the read-er is referred to thediscussion inŽicFuchs(2009).



productivity)oflanguageschemasisalsopresent;e)Furthermore,becauseofthefrequentuseofthetermschemainlinguisticanalysesoverthelastfewdecades,apracticalquestionarises:areschemaslosingtheiranalyticalpoten-tialandaretheybecomingakindofa“placeholder”term,acommonplaceinlinguisticanalysis?NumerousquestionsareopenedfortheinterpretersofKant’stextfromthefirstCritique: a) First and foremost, did Kant simply create two problemsfromonebymultiplyingunnecessarily another theoretical constructwhichresultedintwoheterogeneitiestoexplain:howdoesaschemagowithpercep-tionandhowwithpureconceptsofunderstanding?;b)Hasthenotionoftheschemacontributedtoexplainingthehumancognitiveapparatusoronlymys-tifieditfurther?;c)Finally,isKant’snotionoftheschemahelpfulexclusivelyinarticulatinganddescribingthehighestformofabstractionandgeneraliza-tionandisthusapplicableonlyinthedomainofmathematics?Kant’sexampleofthe“dog”(importantbecauseitisrelatedtolanguageandnotmathematics)showssomeproblematicpointswhenitcomestopureun-derstanding.Perhapsthemainquestionishowcanweevenarticulatethedogschemawithoutsomeempiricalcontent?AccordingtoKant,thisshouldbepossible,butthequestioniswhetherthisarticulationstartswiththeempiricalorwithpureunderstanding.Theexampleofthedogschemaisverysimilartothelinguisticexampleofthebird categoryanditsmembers.Inlinewiththelinguisticanalysisofthatcategory,whichstatesthatthereisanecessarydynamicinterplaybetweenvariousinstancesandtheirfeaturesandthewaythebirdschemaiselaborated,itcouldbestatedthattheschematizedconceptofadogissimilarlyformedbythedynamicinterplayofitsinstances(typesofdogs)andfeatures(fourlegs,barking,fur,etc.).Thenotionofadynamicinterplayisimportantbecausetheinstancesofboththebirdanddogcatego-riesarenotpresentedtousexperientially,coherentlyoratonce,andthisisimportantbecauseitshowshowflexibleandyetstabletheycanbe.Thisisshownfromalinguisticperspectiveinthewayspeakersusethemandadjustthemwhennecessary.Kantdiscussesschemataintwodifferentways,assomecommentatorshavealreadypointedout(seeWalsh1968:77):assomethingwhichcanbereferredto (astatic readingofschemata)andsomething that isaprocess (dynamicreadingofschemata).Whileweareinthedomainofgeneralconcepts,suchasthehighestnodesofalexicalhierarchy,astaticreadingispossible,how-everaswegodowntothespecificinstances(lowernodesinahierarchy),itbecomesclearthatschematahavetobevieweddynamically.Kant’stextaloneindicatesthisasanecessaryshift.Hisinterpretationbytheendofthechap-teronschematismisgettingclosetoapurelydynamicreadingofschemata,whichisunderstandableandclearifwebearinmindthatsubsequentchaptersoftheCritique needtoshowthatitispossibletomakejudgementsthroughtheschematismofpureconceptsofunderstanding,orthroughschematizationbymeansofthepowerofjudgement.WhilesomewillviewthisdichotomyasaproblemforKant’stheoryandanindicatorofinconsistencies,itseemsthattheoppositeistrue:Kantensuresinthiswayanecessarycontinuumofourhighercognitiveabilitieswhichnecessarilyoverlapinacertaindomain,orrelyoneachother.Morepreciselyandinotherwords,whileastaticrea-soncanproducecategories,onlydynamismofthepowerofjudgementcanbringthemtotheirapplicationontoempiricalconcepts.Cognitiveactivityistheonethingthatensuresinteractivitybetweenpureconceptsandempiricalmaterial.Accordingtothisreading,thefirstimportantresultofKant’sanaly-sisispointingtocognitivedynamism,i.e.pointingoutthatwhenwetalkof



schemataweareactuallytalkingaboutaprocess, i.e. therulesofaspecialdimensionofjudgement–schematization.Acceptingschemataintheirdynamicreadingbringsustotheotherimportantconclusion.Schematizationasaprocesspointstoafeedbackbetweencogni-tivepowers (abilities) themselves,but alsobetweencognitive abilities andempiricalmaterial.ThisreinforcesKant’sproject,butalsooffersamoreplau-sibleaccountofunderstandingthenatureofcognitioninwhichpureconceptswithouttheirimplementationaresimplytheoreticalmetaphysicalconstructs,andempiricalmaterialwithoutsystematicityispurelyasumofchaoticsen-sorydata.Schemata, or schematization as an act of judgement is bringingthesetwomomentsinharmonicfunctionalitythatiscalledcognition.InsightsofferedbycontemporarylinguisticsshowthatKantwasrightwhenheconnectedschematanotwithimagesperse,butwiththe“rulesforproduc-ingimages”(Bennett1966:41).Similarly,thediscussionontherelationofrulesandschemata(seeabove)points to theactualityofKant’s thought incontemporarylinguisticdiscussions.

6. Conclusion

ReadingKantthroughtheviewpointofcontemporarylinguisticsoffersanex-pansionofthenotionofschemasandschematismofthemind,deepeningtheinsightsintoacrucialmechanismwhichisthebasisforKant’scriticalproject.WhileKant’sphilosophyofmathematicshasoftenbeenasubjectofdisputeandcritiquesandisatbestperceivedasanarrowareawhereschemascanbeap-plied,modernlinguisticsshowsthattheentireformationoflanguagestructuresassuchrestsonsimilarprinciples.Inotherwords,theformationandapplica-tionofanylanguagestructure,suchasthosepresentinlanguage,isaprocessofschematization.SuchanaccountofschematizationdemonstratesthevalueofKant’stheoreticalinsightsandtheircontinuitywithincontemporaryscience.Furthermore,thetheoreticalprecisionwithwhichKantpresentshisanalyti-calapparatuscallsforanexpansionofthediscussionofschemastoday.ThenotionoftheschemaisnotwithoutitsproblemsincontemporarydiscussionandperhapsitisKanthimself,inhisanalyticalprecision,whocanbeactual-ized toaidus inamoreprecisediscussionofschemasand theiranalyticalapplications.

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Daniela Katunar, Igor Eterović

Kantov pojam sheme i njegovo uporište u lingvističkoj analizi

SažetakUpotreba Kantovih shema kao vrijednih teorijskih elemenata (konstrukata) u objašnjenju našeg kognitivnoga ustroja već je duže vrijeme aktualna tema u filozofiji uma. Relevantnost sheme i shematizacije kao principa organizacije jezičnih struktura u posljednjih je 30-ak godina ista-knuta i u lingvističkoj teoriji, posebice kognitivnoj lingvistici. U ovom se radu nastoji pokazati kako upravo Kantov koncept shematizma uma, izložen u Kriticičistoguma, odnosno središnji pojam sheme, pruža relevantne uvide za mogućnost drugačijega kritičkog sagledavanja sheme u lingvističkoj diskusiji. Istovremeno se pokazuje kako lingvistička diskusija nudi potkrjepu i sadržajno obogaćenje Kantove teorijske filozofije pružajući konkretne primjere jezične artikula-cije onoga što bi sheme trebale biti i kakva je to njihova narav, osnažujući na taj način Kantovu poziciju lingvističkim argumentima i čineći ga aktualnim za suvremenu lingvistiku.

Ključne riječishema,ImmanuelKant,lingvistika,teorijskafilozofija


Kants Begriff des Schemas und dessen Grundlage in der linguistischen Analyse

ZusammenfassungDie Verwendung von Kants Schemata als wertvollen theoretischen Elementen (Konstrukten) bei der Erläuterung unseres kognitiven Aufbaus ist seit längerer Zeit das aktuelle Thema in der Philosophie des Geistes. Die Relevanz des Schemas und der Schematisierung als Prinzip der Organisation von Sprachstrukturen wurde in den letzten 30 Jahren auch in der linguistischen Theorie, insbesondere in der kognitiven Linguistik, hervorgehoben. In dieser Arbeit versucht man zu zeigen, dass eben Kants Konzept des Vernunft-Schematismus, dargelegt in der KritikderreinenVernunft, bzw. der Zentralbegriff des Schemas, relevante Einsichten in die Möglichkeit

https://doi.org/10.1016/0010-0285(75)90024-9

https://doi.org/10.1017/ccol052182303x.004



einer andersartigen kritischen Sichtweise des Schemas innerhalb der linguistischen Diskussion verschafft. Gleichzeitig wird gezeigt, dass die linguistische Diskussion eine Bekräftigung sowie inhaltliche Bereicherung der theoretischen Philosophie Kants bietet, idem sie konkrete Bei-spiele für die sprachliche Artikulation dessen, was Schemata sein sollen und wie deren Natur ist, liefert, und auf diese Art Kants Position durch linguistische Argumente stärkt und ihn für die zeitgenössische Linguistik aktuell macht.

SchlüsselwörterSchema,ImmanuelKant,Linguistik,theoretischePhilosophie


Le concept kantien de schème et son point d’appui dans l’analyse linguistique

RésuméL’utilisation des schèmes kantiens, en tant qu’éléments (constructions) théoriques de grande importance dans l’explication de notre constitution cognitive, est un thème actuel en philoso-phie de l’esprit depuis déjà un certain temps. La pertinence du schème et de la schématisation comme principes d’organisation des structures langagières a également été relevée, durant les trente dernières années, au sein de la théorie linguistique, particulièrement au sein de la lin-guistique cognitive. Ce travail s’applique précisément à montrer comment le concept kantien de schématisme de la raison est exposé dans la Critiquedelaraisonpure, et en particulier, comment le concept central de schème offre des conceptions pertinentes qui nous permettent de porter un regard critique autre sur le schème au sein de la discussion linguistique. En même temps, il est montré comment la discussion linguistique corrobore et enrichit le contenu de la philosophie théorique kantienne en offrant des exemples d’articulations langagières de ce que les schèmes devraient être et de leur nature, renforçant de cette manière la position de Kant à travers des arguments linguistiques, et le rendant ainsi actuel pour la linguistique contemporaine.

Mots-clésschème,EmmanuelKant,linguistique,philosophiethéorique

kant’s notion of schema and its basis in linguistic analysis

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