El contraste entre juicios objetivos y subjetivos puede entenderse de diversas formas. [p. 374]

1er sentido de objetivo de la distinción

Juicios objetivos - - “express how the world actually is”

Juicios subjetivos - - “express how the world appears to be” [they merely express someone’s beliefs]

[…] is merely a distinction between how the world appears to be and how it really is. […] [p. 374]

[Crítica de Wilkerson:

[El punto que Kant quiere expresar como una distinción entre dos tipos de juicios no está muy felizmente expresado, pues los juicios objetivos son juicios, y por ello, expresan las creencias de alguien, expresan: “how the world appears to be”]

[…] Si hemos de tener cualquier creencia en absoluto, debemos usar una distinción entre lo que creemos y lo que es de hecho el caso. […] [p.374]

[Obj. Judgment]

[…] does not merely express a belief; it purports to be true irrespective of what I or anyone else believes. […][ p. 374]

[…] Kant’s claim that we must make objective judgments is to be interpreted as a claim that we must use a distinction between what we believe and what is actually true. […] [p.374]

Ralph Walker,

No es una distinción entre:

1) Sensa data2) External objects

[…] se necesita un argumento para moverse de una afirmación de que debemos usar una noción de verdad objetiva a la afirmación de que debemos usar la noción de un objeto externo. […] [p. 374]

Fenomenalista diría que distingue entre: creencia, verdad, pero no tiene uso para la noción de un objeto externo. [p.374]

2º sentido [y más prominente] sentido de “objetivo”.

[Con la noción de un objeto externo]

[…] in this sense, an objective judgment is a judgment about external objects. […] [p.374]

[…] when Kant argues that we must make objective judgments, he is claiming that we must believe that there are objects external to us and logically independent of us. […] [p. 374]

Específicamente, parece que “we must believe” que:

a) Están en el espacio y el tiempob) Son sustanciasc) Obedecen a leyes causales [and so on]

[…] In this second sense of “objective”, the distinction between subjective and objective judgments is indeed parallel to the distinction between sense data and external objects, for subjective judgments merely record the intentional content of our experience and objective judgments (purport to) record the features of external objects such as tables and chairs. […] [p. 374]

[…] And self-conscious experience would impossible without such objective judgments. […] [p. 374]

Refutación al idealismo: “la conciencia de mi existencia es al mismo tiempo una conciencia inmediata de la existencia de otras cosas fuera de mí”. [p. 374]

[Kant parece utilizar ambas nociones simultáneamente y nublar la distinción completamente al hablar de NECESSARY UNIVERSAL AGREEMENT. [p. 374]

[…] “All our judgments are at first merely judgments of perception; they hold good only for us (that is, for our subject), and we do not till afterward give them a new reference (to an object) and desire that they shall always hold good for us in the same way for everybody else…there would be no reason for the judgments of other men necessarily agreeing with mine if it were not the unity of the object to which they all refer and with which they accord; hence they must all agree with one another” (Ak. 298). […][p. 375]

Argumento:

1. Todas nuestra creencias son inicialmente meras creencias, que pueden no ser compartidas por nadie más.

2. Pero, presumiblemente pretendemos sostener creencias que son verdaderas, creencias que siempre se sostienen para nosotros y de la misma forma para todos los demás.

3. Pero tales acuerdos generales no podrían asegurarse a menos que algunas de esas creencias fueran acerca de objetos externos a nosotros, objetos que tienen propiedades independientes de cualquiera de nuestras creencias sobre ellos.

4. En breve, la noción de creencia requiere la noción de verdad objetiva, verdad objetiva implica NECESSARY UNIVERSAL AGREEMENT, y el NUA sólo puede asegurarse si consideramos nuestras creencias como creencias acerca de un mundo externo.

Wilkerson, preguntas:

1. ¿Qué significa desear que ciertos juicios “will always hold good for us and in the same way for everybody else”?[…] It cannot mean simply that I desire that my beliefs should be true, for that desire could be satisfies without any reference to other people at all. […][p. 375]

Kant parece be claiming que:

1.1 Puedo usar la noción de verdad objetiva sólo si supongo una MEASURE OF UNIVERSAL AGREEMENT, A SET OF SHARED BELIEFS. [p.375] [But this claim seems obviously false]

1.2 Sin mayor argumento, podría parecer que claro que podríamos fallar en alcanzar acuerdo sustantivo en cualquier cosa que sea.

1.3 […] Perhaps the passage only makes sense in conjunction with the general Kantian claim that certain judgments – namely, judgments about the essential Eucledian and Newtonian structure of the world – are judgments that all of us must make if experience is to be possible at all. […] [p. 375] […] They are judgments to which all human beings necessarily subscribe, because they provide the essential framework of human experience. […] there is something in appearances that “holds for sense in all human beings” (A45/B62) […] [p.375]

ARGUMENTO DIFERENTE:

1. If we are to believe anything at all, we must have certain Euclidean and Newtonian beliefs about an external world; so all self-conscious human beings will share certain beliefs.

[Aunque tal argument

[Aunque tal argumento es muy interesante y relacionado con argumentos que discutiré más adelante, no corresponde en nada al pasaje de los Prolegomena]

[…] it is still not clear how we might guarantee that such necessary shared beliefs are objective in the first sense of “objective”. That is, we cannot guarantee that they are true. After all, many modern physicists would claim that the Euclidean and Newtonian beliefs are actually false. Hence, even if we show that there must be certain universal beliefs and even if those beliefs are beliefs about an external world, it would not follow that they are true. […] [p.375]

[Kant’s radical idealism]

Le permitiría moverse de a) necessary agreement a b) verdad.

[Crítica de Wilkerson: […] this is one of many occasions when the tensions between empirical realism and transcendental idealism reach breaking point. […] [p. 375]

[Kant de hecho, ocasionalmente, intent conectar objetividad en el primer sentido y objetividad en el segundo con NECESSARY UNIVERSAL AGREEMENT. [p. 376]

2. LA DEDUCCIÓN TRASCENDENTAL.

[Kant’s central claim: “we must make objective judgments”] Puede ser interpretado de dos maneras distintas:

1) Debemos hacer una distinción entre: “what we believe” y “what is actually the case”

2) La afirmación de que debemos creer que hay objetos externos que son independientes de nuestras percepciones y que tienen ciertas características generales.

Tesis de Wilkerson:

[…] it is far from clear that objectivity in the first sense even implies objectivity in the second. That is, it is far from clear that, in using a distinction between beliefs and objective truth, we car committed to a belief in an external world. […] [p. 376]

Puedes tener la distinción entre “creencia” y “verdad”, sin que eso implique el compromise con la “creencia” en un mundo externo.

[LO QUE SOSTENDRÉ]

[…] such a story, in whatever version, is incoherent, that we must make objective judgments in both sense of objective. […] [p. 376]

MAYOR PESO DEL ENSAYO: “en el segundo sentido de objetividad: […] on the claim that we must believe that there are external objects. […] [p. 376]

ARGUMENTO DE LA DEDUCCIÓN:

1. La experiencia no consiste meramente en una seria de representaciones variadas y discretas [inconexas, separadas]

2. Si una serie de representaciones cuenta como una “single coherent experience”, debe ser unida o combinada como al experiencia de una “single self-conscious person”.

3. Pero no hay características observables de las representaciones mismas suficientes para producir tal “unity of self-consciousness”. [“Consciousness of self according to the determinations of our state in inner perception is merely empirical, and always changing. No fixed and abinding self can present itself in this flux of inner appearances.” (A107)]

4. De hecho, sin tal otro principio de unidad, “I should have as many-coloured and diverse self as I have representations of which I am conscious to myself (B134).

5. La noción de una “fixed and abiding self” solo puede ser asegurada si las representaciones son traídas bajo reglas, sólo si están necesariamente interrelacionadas.

6. Las reglas de tales conexiones necesarias son las categorías, conceptos a priori de objetos.

7. Es al unir las representaciones en el concepto de un objeto que garantizamos la unidad de la autoconciencia: [“ The transcendnetal unity of apperception is that unity through which all the manifold given in an intuition is united in a concepto of the object” (B139)]

[…] In direct opposition to empiricists, Kant insists that experience does not consists in the purely passive reception of information about the world around us but rather consists in an active attempt to bring raw data under intellectual control. […] [p. 377]

[Central Kantian picture = “ a self-conscious person struggling to construct a coherent view of the world”]

Argumento turns to the thought de que:

a) Hay ciertas conexiones necesarias gobernadas por reglas (rule-governed) entre mis experiencias. Conexiones que son “quite” independientes de

cualesquiera conexiones puramente contingentes (e.g. purely personal associations of ideas).

[…] Thus, whatever the incidental contingent features of my experiences may be, I find that I can bring them under certain laws. For example, I can discover instances of causal laws or can connect different perceptions as perceptions of a single persisting object. […] [p. 377]

DIFICULTAD DEL ARGUMENTO QUE ES MÁS IMPORTANTE PARA NUESTRO PROPÓSITO:

[…] the argument fails to explain why the categories are concepts of external objects. Indeed, this is perhaps one of the places in which there is a definite slide from objectivity in the first sense to objectivity in the second. […] [p. 377]

Supongamos, para el propósito del argumento que:

a) That self-consciousness is necessary for experience.b) That our experience must be rule-governed.c) That we must connect and unite our experiences under rules that are

independent of any purely contingent principles of association.

[…] The object is viewed as that which prevents our modes of knowledge from being haphazard or arbitrary, and which determines them a priori in some definite fashion” (A104). […] [p. 377]

Tenemos la distinción entre:

1. The purely contingent and haphazard features of our representations2. [and] Their necessary and rule-governed features, those features that lend

themselves to intellectual control by means of the categories.

Kant quiere insistir que:

1. Las conexiones necesarias en cuestión2. Incorporan el pensamiento de que los objetos de la percepción son

objetos externos.

Wilkerson: “Es extremadamente difícil ver por qué”. [p. 378]

[…] it is extremely difficult to see why the categories, the rules that articulate necessary connections between representations, are concepts of external objects. […] [p. 378]

[El solipsista podría hacer generalizaciones acerca de sus experiencias, podría conectarlas juntas, sin tener en ningún sentido un compromiso con la existencia de objetos externos] [p. 378]

RECONSTRUCCIÓN DEL ARGUMENTO DE KANT PARA ENMENDAR SUS DEFICIENCIAS:

1. La experiencia es necesariamente la experiencia de un “single, persisting, self-conscious subject.

2. But if he is to be aware of himself and his experience, he must distinguish himself from other things. That is, self-awareness and awareness of other things are interdependent.

3. Since the only materials available for making such a distinction must be in the series of his experiences, his conscious mental states, he must regard some of his experiences as perceptions of external things.

4. He must use certain rules – to wit, the categories – rules that connect and unite various experiences.

5. To sustain his awareness of himself, he must, in the Kantian phrase, unite his representations in the concept of an object.

DIFERENCIAS ENTRA LA RECONSTRUCCIÓN Y EL ARGUMENTO DE KANT

[…] Kant certainly argues that self-consciousness and consciousness of external objects are connected, but the reconstructed argument explains this connection. Self-consciousness and consciousness of objects together form a single distinction, and we cannot use one-half of the distinction without using the other. […] [p. 378]

[Strawson and Kant] “ trading on the ambiguity in the expressions “objective”, [pp. 378-9.

ARGUMENTO EXPUESTO A DOS SERIAS OBJECIONES:

A)

Es una cosa insistir en la distinción entre:

1. Experiencing the world as so-and-so2. Its objectively being so-and-so.

Es otra distinta insister que:

1. Hay objetos externos.

B)

[…] Strawson seems to be trading on another ambiguity, namely, an ambiguity in the expressions “having a concept” or “having a thought” or “using a distinction”. There are many ways of using a distinction or having a concept. […][p. 379]

[El concepto de un unicornio] [Se puede usar cuando:

1. I entertain the possibility that unicorns exist.

2. Wonder whether they exist

3. Imagine what it would be like for them to exist.

4. Deny that they exist

5. Assert that they exist.

[…] Yet, in only one case do I use the concept of a unicorn in a way that commits me to their existence. […] [p. 379]

[…] Similarly, a Kantian self-conscious subject may use the distinction between himself and external things. […] [p.379]

Podría preguntarse…

1. Whether external objects exist

2. Imagine what it would be like for them to exist

3. Deny that they exist.

4. Assert that they exist.

[…] But in only one of those cases is he committed to their existence. […] [p. 379]

[Por ello, el argumento reconstruido no destruye del todo nuestra historia del solipsista]

WILKERSON, T.E.:

[…] At the very most, it shows that the solipsist must have the concept of an external world. And that is very far from showing that he must believe that it exists. […] [p. 379]

[Como en nuestra versión de la historia, “he may indeed firmly believed that it does not”]

ARGUMENTO EN LOS CÍRCULOS WITTGENSTANIANOS

[…] To have a concept, it was said, is to have a grasp of certain contrasts, and without the contrasts one would simply lose the concept altogether. Fake coins make sense only against a background of solid currency. […] [p. 379]

[…] hallucination make sense only against a background of veridical perception; there can be false memories only if most of our memories are correct; and so on. […] [p. 379]

SIMILARMENTE…

[…] self-consciousness requires just such a contrast, albeit a contrast of a very high level of generality. I must be able to contrast what is myself with what is not, must be able to tell where I stop and the rest of the world begins. A world that consists entirely of my experiences is incoherent simply because there is no alien background against which I can pick out myself. […] [p. 379]

Hay muchos conceptos que utilizamos sin aparente dificultad y que aún así no descansan en ningún contraste entre casos que caen bajo ese concepto y casos que no. [p. 379]

[Podemos ciertamente usar el concepto de unicornio sin contrastar unicornios con no unicornios]

[…] one might argue that the argument does apply to concepts at a very high level of generality, such as the concept of self or the concept of an external object, but the desperation would be misplaced. […] [p. 379]

Concepto muy general: “that of the universe”.

3. LA REFUTACIÓN AL IDEALISMO.

[…] hay una ambigüedad crucial en la noción kantiana de la objetividad. […] [p. 380]

Cuando afirma que debemos hacer juicios objetivos, algunas veces quiere decir:

1) Que debemos usar una distinción entre: lo que creemos y lo que es de hecho el caso. [what is actually the case].

Y otras veces quiere decir:

2) […] that we must hold certain beliefs about an external world distinct from ourselves and our experiences. […] [p.380]

[…] He does not distinguishes the two claims and appears to slide cheerfully from one to the other. […] [p. 380]

[…] it is far from clear that our using a notion of objective truth commits us to beliefs about external objects. […] [. 380]

[…] Kant focuses on a particular problem, that of measuring time. […] [p. 380]

ARGUMENTO:

1) I am aware of my own existence in time.

2) But we can measure time only in terms of successive changes of a persisting thing, “something permanent”.

3) The permanent cannot be in me, for I have to measure my own existence in time against the permanent.

4) Thus, the permanent, the persisting thing that represents time in general, must exist outside me.

5) In other words, the consciousness of my existence is at the same time an immediate consciousness of the existence of other things outside me. (B276)

EL ARGUMENTO DEPENDE EN LA AFIRMACIÓN…

a) There is something intrinsically absurd about my treating myself and my experience as a clock, for there is something intrinsically absurd about measuring the temporal duration of myself and my experiences against myself and my experiences. [p.380]

Crucial del argumento:

b) “This permanent cannot, however, be something in me, since it is only through this permanent that my existence in time can itself be determined.” [p. 380]

[…] What is precisely wrong with using one’s own representations or experiences as a clock? […] [p. 381]

1) Implica circularidad.

[…] We can presumably only break out of the circle and thereby obtain a proper measurement if we measure experiences against something other than

themselves. In other words, we measure their duration against an external clock. […] [p. 381]

[…] But the crucial point is that we should not be disturbed by such apparent circularity. […] [p.381]

[…] We may use the objects in question as standards of measurement, but it does not follow that expressions referring to what is measured and expressions referring to certain relevant features of the standards have the same meaning. […] [p. 381]

[…] We can stand back from time to time and decide that the standard clock or standard ruler is no longer up to standard. […] [p. 381]

[…] One possibility […] is that measurements yielded by the standard no longer sit comfortably with our scientific theory. […][p. 381]

[…] Another possibility is that we have been using a number of standards of measurement simultaneously and that they are no longer in step […] [p. 381]

[The CLOCK] [in which we are interested]

[…] the clock that consists of a series of representations or experiences. There is no doubt an apparent circularity involved in measuring the duration of my experiences against themselves. […] [p. 381]

[Pero la circularidad sólo será perturbadora para aquellos que insistan que las expresiones tales como “hora”, “minute” y “segundo” tienen el mismo significado como expresiones que se refieren a ciertas características relevantes de las experiencias]

[…] The rest of us will regard the succession of my experiences merely as the standard of measurement. Hence, I can stand back from time to time and ask whether the standard is up to standard. […] [p. 381]

[Conclusión de Wilkerson:

[…] any circularity afflicting internal or private clocks is at least as virtuous as the circularity afflicting external or “objective” clocks. […] [p. 382]

SEGUNDA INTERPRETACIÓN DE LA REFUTACIÓN AL IDEALISMO

[…] that compels us to discuss Wittgenstein’s private-language argument. […] [p. 382]

1. If I am to hold genuine beliefs at all, and particularly beliefs about the temporal features of myself and my experiences, then

2. I must use the notion of objectivity in the first sense of “objective”. That is, I must use a distinction between my beliefs and their truth or falsehood.

3. Thus, I must in principle be able to discover that some of my beliefs are false; for example, that a belief about the duration of an experience is false.

4. But, if the only standards of truth and falsehood are purely private or internal, then I cannot even in principle discover that a belief is false. [p. 382]

5. Such a “discovery” would amount merely to confronting one belief with another, not to falsifying a belief.

6. That is, I would be no nearer giving content to the notion of something’s being the case irrespective of my beliefs about the matter.

[…] “One would like to say: whatever is going to seems right to me is right”. And that only means that here we can’t talk about ‘right’.” […] [p.382]

[Tampoco puedo apelar a la memoria para checar la verdad de mis creencias, pues […] there is similarly no independent check of the correctness of any memory. But by normal contraposition it follows that the “beliefs” are not genuine beliefs at all. […] [p. 382]

[…] If I cannot give content to the notion of a belief’s being true or false, I cannot sustain the notion of a belief. The moral of that is that I must ground my standards of truth and falsehood in something objective in the second sense of “objective”, in certain features of an external world. […] [p. 382]

VENTAJA INCIDENTAL DE ESTA INTERPRETACIÓN DE LA REFUTACIÓN

[…] it protects Kant from the charge of failing to distinguish the two senses of “objective”. […] [p. 382]

ARGUMENTO DE WILKERSON:

[…] If successful, the argument shows that objectivity in the first sense requires objectivity in the second, that we can use a notion of truth and falsehood only if we have certain beliefs about the external world. […] [p. 382]

[Unfortunately, the argument fails] [Su fracas se hace manifiesto una vez que intentamos remediar las supuestas deficiencias de un LENGUAJE PRIVADO]

[…] It might seem that we need merely to introduce external objects. That is, our solitary language user makes “objective” judgments in the second sense, judgments that express or imply beliefs about the existence and nature of objects independent of any perceiver. […] [p. 382]

[…] Similarly, the meaning of words and sentences and the standards of truth and falsehood are grounded in features of such objects rather than in introspectively discernible features of the observer. […][p. 382]

[…] the notion of time is given content in terms of the regular charges of external objects rather than in recurrent features of the observer’s experience. […] [p. 382]

[Main weakness of the private language: […] that it left no room for a mistake. […][p. 383]

[ Standard reply]

[…] is that they public language grounded in features of external objects could be learned by others and that, even though a solitary language user might not in practice have grounds for thinking he had made a mistake, he as grounds in principle, for the objects in which he is interested are in principle accessible to others and others could presumably tell him that he has made a mistake. […] [p. 383]

[Cannot see that help in principle is any help at all]

[ Notion of a mistake ]

[…] By introducing other people we can give some content to the notion of mistake, for other people can disagree with me. I may not be prepared to admit that I am mistaken, but nonetheless I can understand the notion of a mistake because I can appreciate that there two incompatible beliefs, one held by me and one held by someone else. […] [p. 383]

[…] As we have seen, a solitary language user, whether he speaks a private or a public language, cannot sincerely disagree with himself and, therefore, apparently lacks the obvious support for the notion of mistake. […] [p. 383]

[…] In contrast, a language spoken by more than one person allows disagreement and, therefore, mistake. If the crucial weakness of a private language is that it leaves no room for mistake, then Kant’s Refutation of Idealism will force us not merely to believe in external objects but also to believe in external (and articulate) people. […] [p. 383]

WILKERSON, T.E.,

[Este es un paso extravagante, y además, tiene paradójicas consecuencias]

1. Parece implicar que si el resto de la humanidad desapareciera, sería incapaz de sostener cualesquiera creencias coherentes sobre lo que sea. [p. 383]

[Private-language argument]

1. Examinar primero un supuesto importante que es comúnmente aceptado por ambas partes en la disputa:

[…] that we have incorrigible access to our experiences. It seems obvious that there is no distinction between the apparent and the actual features of experience. [….] [p. 383]

[…] If I believe that I am in pain, then I am; if I believe that I have a green afterimage, then I have; if I believe that I am thinking about Kant, then I am; and so on. […] [pp. 383-4]

Con bases históricas nada más, es factible que Kant aceptó la: TESIS DE LA INCORRIGIBILIDAD. [P. 384]

[…] incorrigibility provides security that is entirely empty, for, if there is no distinction between the apparent and the actual features of my experiences, I lose the essential tension between my beliefs and their truth or falsehood. Thus, incorrigibility rules out mistake and thereby rules out a private language. […] [p. 384]

[…] even if we do not press the assumption of incorrigibility, it is very difficult to see how the notion of a mistake might be introduced at all, for the Cartesian private language turns very much on our spotting certain features of our experience and on our associating words with certain such recurrent features. […] [p. 384]

[…] But a mistake is simply not a feature of our experiences. […] [p. 384]

[…] Mistakes are simply not objects of introspective observation. […] [p. 384]

DEFICIENCIAS DEL LENGUAJE PRIVADO.

1) El supuesto de la incorrigibilidad deja fuera los errors, y el Cartesian Framework del lenguaje hace difícil proporcionar […] any alternative notion of a mistake. […] [p. 384]

WILKERSON:

[…] debemos abandonar la incorregibilidad y adoptar una explicación más sofisticada de los errores. […] [p. 384]

1. Discutiré la tesis de la incorrigibilidad [Afirmación de que necesariamente mis creencias sobre mis experiencias son verdaderas]

[…] Many philosophers would concede that we can misidentify certain of our mental states, notably those that do not involve the occurrence of any characteristic experiences. […] [p. 384]

QUIERO SUGERIR QUE:

[…] we can misidentify any mental state, including all those that are or involve characteristics experiences. […] [p. 384]

Por ejemplo, podemos cometer errores incluso sobre nuestros dolores…

[…] there is a considerable looseness of fit between the apparent and the actual features of my mental states, and there is no logical guarantee that my beliefs about them are true. […] [p. 384]

2. ¿Qué está implicado en el cometer errores? ¿in misidentifying experiences?

[…] No doubt it is true that there is no discernible difference between a correctly identified experience and a misidentified experience; a mistake as such is not an object of introspective awareness. […] [p. 385]

MORAL TO BE DRAWN

[…] no that a private language is impossible but rather that we must provide a more sophisticated account of mistakes. […] [p. 385]

En un lenguaje público:

[…] we spot our mistakes in various ways. We might abandon a belief because it is inconsistent with most of our other beliefs or because it is simply an unusual or eccentric belief and so on. Nothing counts as spotting a false belief as such. A belief is taken to be truth or false insofar as it sits comfortably or uncomfortably with other beliefs. […] [p. 385] ´

1. Abandonar la “incorregibilidad”.

2. Aceptar una explicación más sofisticada de los errorers.

[…] there is nothing to prevent our private language user from revising his beliefs in the light of other beliefs, just as public linguistics do. He does not need to stop mistakes as such. […][ p. 385]

[…] As long as he has no Cartesian attachment to incorrigibility, he can appreciate the crucial distinction between his beliefs and their truth and falsehood. […] [p. 385]

So…

[…] the solipsist in our story can make judgments that are objective in the first sense, judgments that reflect a distinction between what is believed and what is actually the case. But he does not make judgments that are objective in the second sense, judgments that are or imply claims about the existence of external things. […] [p. 385]