kaldor 2013 in defence of new wars

8/11/2019 Kaldor 2013 In Defence of New Wars

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Introduction

Global systems of the 20thcentury weredesigned to address inter-state tensionsand civil wars. War between nation-states and civil war have a given logic21stcentury violence does not t the 20thcentury mouldViolence and conicthave not been banishedBut because ofthe success in reducing inter-state war,the remaining forms of violence do not

t neatly either into war or peace, orinto political or criminal violence.(World Bank 2011)

The idea that twenty-first century organisedviolence is different from the wars of thetwentieth century has been widely debatedin both the scholarly and the policy litera-

ture. Various terms have been used to con-ceptualise contemporary conflict warsamong the people, wars of the third kind,hybrid wars, privatized wars, post-modernwars as well as new wars (Duffield 2001;Eppler 2002; Hables Gray 1997; Hoffman2007; Holsti 1996; Kaldor 2012; Munkler2005; Smith 2005; Snow 1996; Van Creveld1991). But it is the term new that seemsto have stuck and become the main butt ofthe critics.

This article1 defends the concept of newwars. Engaging with and countering thevarious criticisms that have been broughtforward against the term new, it makesthe argument that the new in new warshas to be understood as a research strategyand a guide for policy. Because the old isenshrined in the concept of the new theterm enables us to grapple with the overalllogic that is inherent in contemporary vio-

lent conflicts and that makes them differentin kind from old wars. It is a logic that goes

Kaldor, M 2013 In Defence of New Wars. Stability, 2(1): 4, pp. 1-16,DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/sta.at

ARTICLE

In Defence of New Wars

Mary Kaldor*

This article reviews the literature on new wars. It argues that new wars should beunderstood not as an empirical category but rather as a way of elucidating the logicof contemporary war that can oer both a research strategy and a guide to policy.It addresses four components of the debate: whether new wars are new; whether

new wars are war or crime; whether the data supports the claims about new wars;and whether new wars are post-Clausewitzean. It argues that the obsession withthe newness of wars misses the point about the logic of new wars; that there isa blurring of war and crime but it is important to address the political elementsof new wars; that, although the data should be used with caution, it does seem tooer support for some elements of the new war thesis; and that the argument isindeed post-Clausewitzean because new wars are not contests of wills but moresimilar to a mutual enterprise. It concludes that the debate has greatly enrichedthe overall argument.

* London School of Economics and Political

Science, United [email protected]

stability
http://users/szekiuyeung/Library/Caches/Adobe%20InDesign/Version%207.5/en_GB/InDesign%20ClipboardScrap1.pdfmailto:[email protected]:[email protected]://users/szekiuyeung/Library/Caches/Adobe%20InDesign/Version%207.5/en_GB/InDesign%20ClipboardScrap1.pdf


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Kaldor: In Defence of New WarsArt. 4, page 2 of 16

beyond specific components of contempo-rary conflicts identity politics or economicpredation, for example. Rather, it provides anintegrative framework for analysis.

This essay addresses four main thrusts

of criticism: whether new wars are new;whether new wars are war; whether exist-ing data confirms or negates the findingsabout the nature of new wars; and whethernew wars can be described as post-Clause-witzean. Before doing so, it is worth issu-ing a note of caution. One of the problemswith many of the critics is that they lumptogether the different versions of the argu-ment and treat criticism of one particular

aspect contained in one particular versionas a criticism of the whole argument. Suchclaims include the identification of newwars with civil wars, the claim that they areonly fought by non-state actors and onlymotivated by economic gain, or that theyare deadlier than earlier wars (Berdal 2003;de Graaf 2003; Kalyvas 2001; Mellow 2010).In particular, many of the critics employreductionist arguments whereby new wars

are associated with a particular aspect ofcontemporary wars, for example, crime orprivatisation or brutality, and fail to takeinto account the overall conceptual frame-work that relates actors, goals, methods andforms of finance. This essay will try to avoidthis trap and focus on my own version ofNew Wars (Kaldor 1999). Before discussingthe critiques, I will start with a summary ofthis particular new wars argument.

The logic of new warsNew Wars are the wars of the era of globalisa-tion. Typically, they take place in areas whereauthoritarian states have been greatly weak-ened as a consequence of opening up to therest of the world. In such contexts, the dis-tinction between state and non-state, publicand private, external and internal, economicand political, and even war and peace arebreaking down. Moreover the break down of

these binary distinctions is both a cause anda consequence of violence.

New wars have a logic that is differentfrom the logic of what I call old wars theidea of war that predominated in the nine-teenth and twentieth centuries. In the origi-nal version of the argument, I derived this

logic from the differences between old andnew wars in actors, goals, methods and formsof finance. These are:

Actors: Old wars were fought by theregular armed forces of states. New warsare fought by varying combinations ofnetworks of state and non-state actors regular armed forces, private securitycontractors, mercenaries, jihadists, war-

lords, paramilitaries, etc. Goals: Old wars were fought for geo-

political interests or for ideology(democracy or socialism). New wars arefought in the name of identity (ethnic,religious or tribal). Identity politics hasa different logic from geo-politics or ide-ology. The aim is to gain access to thestate for particular groups (that may beboth local and transnational) rather than

to carry out particular policies or pro-grammes in the broader public interest.The rise of identity politics is associatedwith new communications technolo-gies, with migration both from countryto town and across the world, and theerosion of more inclusive (often state-based) political ideologies like socialismor post-colonial nationalism. Perhapsmost importantly, identity politics isconstructed through war. Thus political

mobilisation around identity is the aimof war rather than an instrument of war,as was the case in old wars.

Methods: In old wars, battle was thedecisive encounter. The method of wag-ing war consisted of capturing territorythrough military means. In new wars,battles are rare and territory is capturedthrough political means, through con-trol of the population. A typical tech-

nique is population displacement theforcible removal of those with a different


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Kaldor: In Defence of New Wars Art.4, page 3 of 16

identity or different opinions. Violenceis largely directed against civilians as away of controlling territory rather thanagainst enemy forces.

Forms of Finance: Old wars were largely

financed by states (taxation or by out-side patrons). In weak states, tax revenueis falling and new forms of predatoryprivate finance include loot and pillage,taxation of humanitarian aid, Diasporasupport, kidnapping, or smuggling in oil,diamonds, drugs, people, etc. It is some-times argued that new wars are moti-vated by economic gain, but it is difficultto distinguish between those who use

the cover of political violence for eco-nomic reasons and those who engage inpredatory economic activities to financetheir political cause. Whereas old wareconomies were typically centralising,autarchic and mobilised the population,new wars are part of an open globaliseddecentralised economy in which partici-pation is low and revenue depends oncontinued violence.

The implication of these differences is that,whereas old wars tended to extremes aseach side tried to win, new wars tend tospread and to persist or recur as each sidegains in political or economic ways fromviolence itself rather than winning (seeKeen 2012). Whereas old wars were associ-ated with state building, new wars are theopposite; they tend to contribute to the dis-mantling of the state.

It is this logic of persistence and spreadthat I have come to understand as the keydifference with old wars something Ielaborate in the last section, where I discusswhether new wars are post-Clausewitzean.Clausewitz was par excellence the theoristof old wars for him, war was a contest ofwills. In my version of new wars, war is rathera violent enterprise framed in political terms.It is important to stress that both old and

new wars, in my formulation, are ideal types.They are ideas of war rather than empirical

descriptions of war. The test of how well theyfit empirical reality depends on whether theyprovide a guide to useful policy. As I discussin the following sections, it is this point thatis most often missed by the critics of the new

wars thesis.2

Are new wars New?The most common criticism of the new warsargument is that new wars are not new. It isargued that the Cold War clouded our abilityto analyse small wars or low-intensity wars,that many of the characteristics of new warsassociated with weak states can be found inthe early modern period and that phenom-

ena like banditry, mass rape, forced popula-tion displacement, or atrocities against civil-ians all have a long history.

Of course this is true. Many of the featuresof new wars can be found in earlier wars.Of course the dominance of the East-Westconflict obscured other types of conflict.But there is an important reason, which isneglected by the preoccupation with empiri-cal claims, for insisting on the adjective new.

Critics of the new wars thesis often con-cede that what is useful about the analysisof new wars is the policy implication of theargument. But this is precisely the point. Theterm new is a way to exclude old assump-tions about the nature of war and to providethe basis for a novel research methodology.The aim of describing the conflicts of the1990s as new is to change the way schol-ars investigate these conflicts and thus tochange the way policy-makers and policy-

shapers perceive these conflicts. Dominantunderstandings of these conflicts that under-pin policy are of two kinds. On the one hand,there is a tendency to impose a stereotypedversion of war, drawn from the experienceof the last two centuries in Europe, in whichwar consists of a conflict between two war-ring parties, generally states or proto-stateswith legitimate interests, what I call OldWars. This term refers to a stylised form of

war rather than to all earlier wars. In suchwars, the solution is either negotiation or


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victory by one side and outside interventiontakes the form of either traditional peace-keeping in which the peace-keepers aresupposed to guarantee a negotiated agree-ment and the ruling principles are consent,

neutrality and impartiality or traditionalwar-fighting on one side or the other, as inKorea or the Gulf War. On the other hand,where policy-makers recognise the short-comings of the stereotypical understanding,there is a tendency to treat these wars asanarchy, barbarism, ancient rivalries, wherethe best policy response is containment,i.e. protecting the borders of the West fromthis malady. The use of the term new is a

way of demonstrating that neither of theseapproaches are appropriate, that these arewars with their own logic but a logic that isdifferent from old wars and which thereforedictates a very different research strategy anda different policy response. In other words,the new wars thesis is both about the chang-ing character of organised violence andabout developing a way of understanding,interpreting and explaining the interrelated

characteristics of such violence.As Jacob Mundy (2011) puts it, in one of themore thoughtful contributions to the debate:

Whether we choose to reject, embrace orreformulate concepts such as. new wars,our justifications should not be based onclaims of alleged coherence with particularrepresentations of history. Rather such con-cepts should be judged in terms of their abil-ity to address the very phenomena they seekto ameliorate.

Even so, it can be argued that there aresome genuinely new elements of contem-porary conflicts. Indeed, it would be odd ifthere were not. The main new elements haveto do with globalisation and technology.

First of all, the increase in the destruc-tiveness and accuracy of all forms of mili-tary technology has made symmetrical war war between similarly armed opponents increasingly destructive and therefore

difficult to win. The first Gulf war betweenIraq and Iran was perhaps the most recentexample of symmetrical war a war, much

like the First World War, that lasted for yearsand killed millions of young men, for almostno political result. Hence, tactics in the newwars necessarily have to deal with this reality.

Secondly, new forms of communications

(information technology, television andradio, cheap air travel) have had a range ofimplications. Even though most contempo-rary conflicts are very local, global connec-tions are much more extensive, includingcriminal networks, Diaspora links, as wellas the presence of international agencies,NGOs, and journalists. The ability to mobilisearound both exclusivist causes and humanrights causes has been speeded up by new

communications. Communications are alsoincreasingly a tool of war, making it easier,for example, to spread fear and panic thanin earlier periods hence, spectacular actsof terrorism. This does not mean, as Berdal(2011) suggests, that the argument impliesthat all contemporary wars involve globalconnections or that those connections arenecessarily regressive. Rather, it is an ele-ment in theorising the logic of new wars.

Thirdly, even though it may be the casethat, as globalisation theorists argue, glo-balisation has not led to the demise of thestate but rather its transformation, it isimportant to delineate the different ways inwhich states are changing. Perhaps the mostimportant aspect of state transformation isthe changing role of the state in relation toorganised violence. On the one hand, themonopoly of violence is eroded from above,as some states are increasingly embedded in

a set of international rules and institutions.On the other hand, the monopoly of violenceis eroded from below as other states becomeweaker under the impact of globalisation.There is, it can be argued, a big differencebetween the sort of privatised wars thatcharacterised the pre-modern period andthe new wars which come after the modernperiod and are about disintegration.

These new elements are not the reason for

the adjective new, however, even thoughthey may help to explain the evolution ofnew wars. The point of the adjective new


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does not have to do with any particular fea-ture of contemporary conflicts nor how wellit resembles our assumptions about reality,but rather it has to do with the model of warand how the model I spell out is different

from the prevailing models that underpinboth policy and scholarship. It is a modelthat entails a specific political, economic andmilitary logic.

Many of the critics miss the point about thelogic of new wars. For example, both Berdal(2011) and Malesovic (2010) make the pointthat identity politics are also about ideas the idea of Greater Croatia, for example, saysBerdal. In a trivial sense, that is true just as

ideological conflicts can also be reduced toidentity a communist or a fascist identityas opposed to an ethnic or tribal identity,for example. But the point of making thisdistinction is to illuminate different politi-cal logics, the way in which identity politicsis associated with different practices, differ-ent methods of warfare and different waysof relating to authority. Identity politics isabout the right to power in the name of a

specific group; ideological politics is aboutwinning power in order to carry out a par-ticular ideological programme. Typically, innew war contexts, for example, access to thestate is about access to resources rather thanabout changing state behaviour; in such situ-ations, competition for power tends to bebased on identity rather than on program-matic debate, even if the latter is more of anideal than a reality. This helps to explain mili-tary tactics population displacement as a

method of exerting political control or thepersistence of new wars, as fear is a neces-sary long-term ingredient of identity politics.Berdal and Malesevic seem to be implyingthat the term identity politics suggests thatpolitics is a mask , which is instrumentalisedfor economic reasons; of course new warsare about politics that is why they are wars and of course identity is constructed, butso are all other forms of ideology. The point

is that the distinction that I make betweenidentity politics and ideology (democracy orsocialism) and geo-political interest implies

a different set of political practices and a dif-ferent methodology of war.

Some critics of the new wars argumentsay the term is too fuzzy a hodgepodge,say Henderson and Singer (2002). Indeed,

similar terms like hybrid warfare, multi-variant warfare, or complex warfighting areexplicitly about being a mixture. Thus, forexample, multi-variant warfare refers to aspectrum of conflict marked by unrestrainedMad Max ways in which symmetric andasymmetric wars merge and in which Micro-soft coexists with machetes and stealth tech-nology met by suicide bombers (Evans 2003;Hoffman 2007). The problem with existing

categorisations of conflict, however, is thatthey do not easily fit contemporary reality, apoint that will be elaborated in the data sec-tion, and consequently the policy prescrip-tions that emerge out of them are confusedand distorted. It is to be hoped that the cur-rent debate will further refine the conceptand lead to new categories that may displacethe term new.

A typical example of this type of criticism

is the article by Sven Chojnacki. Chojnacki(2006) argues that the term new wars istoo vague and also methodologically prob-lematic because the criteria for identifyingnew wars are highly arbitrary, difficultto reproduce inter-subjectively, and dif-cult to reconcile with conict theory (italicsadded). Chojnacki then goes on to establishhis own categories based on actors inter-state, extra-state, intra-state, and sub-state which entirely misses the point of new

wars, in which the actors are both state andnon-state, internal and external. It misses thepoint that the term new wars is a critique ofprevailing conflict theory.

Some critics concede that something likenew wars exists. But that does not mean thatold wars have gone away. Particularly afterthe wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, some schol-ars and policy makers warn of assuming thatfuture wars will look like Iraq and Afghani-

stan. It is to be hoped that future wars willnot be like Iraq and Afghanistan becausethese wars have been exacerbated by outside


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military interventions. But nor are futurewars likely to look like the wars of the twen-tieth century. Of course, a return to old warscannot be ruled out. It is possible to imag-ine continued competitive arming by states,

growing interstate tensions, and a tendencyto forget the suffering of previous genera-tions. But failure to deal with the new warsof the present might make that possibilitymore plausible. The reconstruction of mili-tarised states through external wars mightcome to be viewed as a way of re-establishingthe monopoly of violence at national levels.As John Keegan puts it: The great work ofdisarming tribes, sects, warlords and crimi-

nals a principal achievement of monarchsin the 17th century and empires in the 19th threatens to need doing all over again(Quoted in Mueller 2004: 172). In the pre-sent economic crisis, where states are cuttingdefence budgets, there is a tendency to pro-tect what is seen as the core defence task preparation for old war and to squeeze theemerging capacity to contribute to globalpeace enforcement efforts.

Are new wars War?Some writers argue that contemporary vio-lence is mainly privatised and/or criminaland cannot therefore be properly describedas war. A good example of this kind ofthinking is John Muellers interesting bookThe Remnants of War. He claims that war isbecoming obsolescent and what is left arethugs who are the residual combatants(Mueller 2004). In other words, he defines

war as old war. A similar argument is madeby Martin Shaw (2003), who talks aboutdegenerate wars.

According to Mueller (2004: 115), mostof what passes for warfare to-day is cen-trally characterised by the opportunistic andimprovisatory clash of thugs, not by the pro-grammed and/or primordial clash of civilisa-tions although many of the perpetrators docagily apply ethnic, national or ideological

rhetoric to justify their activities because tostress the thrill and profit of predation wouldbe politically incorrect.

There is a lot of sense in this line of argu-ment. New wars can be described as mix-tures of war (organised violence for politicalends), crime (organised violence for privateends) and human rights violations (violence

against civilians). The advantage of not usingthe term war is that all forms of contempo-rary violence can be regarded as wholly ille-gitimate, requiring a policing rather than apolitical/military response. Moreover, muchcontemporary violence like the drugs warsin Mexico or gang warfare in major cities appears to have a similar logic to new wars,but has to be classified as criminal. The samesort of argument has been used in relation

to terrorism. There has been widespreadcriticism of the term war on terror becauseit implies a military response to terrorist vio-lence when policing and intelligence meth-ods, it is argued, would be more effective(Howard 2002).

On the other hand, the political elementdoes have to be taken seriously; it is part ofthe solution. Articulating a cosmopolitanpolitics as an alternative to exclusivist iden-

tity is the only way to establish legitimateinstitutions that can provide the kind ofeffective governance and security that Muel-ler is proposing as a solution. War does implyorganised violence in the service of politicalends. This is the way it legitimises criminalactivity. Suicide bombers in their farewellvideos describe themselves as soldiers not asmurderers. Even if it is the case, and it oftenis, that those who frame the violence in eth-nic, religious or ideological terms are purely

instrumental, these political narratives areinternalised through the process of engag-ing in or suffering from violence. Indeed, thisis the point of the violence; it is only possi-ble to win elections or to mobilise politicalsupport through the politics of fear. This isa point made strongly by Kalyvas in his Logicof Violence in Civil Wars. He quotes Thucy-dides on the violent fanaticism which cameinto play once the struggle had broken out

.society had become divided into two ideo-logically hostile camps, and each side viewedthe other with suspicion (Kalyvas 2006: 78).


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Overcoming fear and hostility does not nec-essarily come about through compromise,even if that is possible, because compromisecan entrench exclusivist positions; rather itrequires a different kind of politics, the con-

struction of a shared discourse that has tounderpin any legal response.

A related terminological issue concernsthe word conflict. There is a legal differencebetween war and armed conflict, whichhas to do with whether or not war has beenformally declared. Most data sets assume athreshold below which violence cannot becounted as war say a thousand battle deathsper year, as in the Correlates of War database

(Correlates of War Project). Without wishingto be overly semantic, the term conflict doesseem to imply a contestation around a legiti-mate grievance that can be resolved either byvictory of one side or through compromise;the term used in the Uppsala University Con-flict Dataset is contested incompatibility(UCDP 1988). Actually, conflict is endemicin all societies and necessary for change andadaptation. Democracy is a peaceful mecha-

nism for managing conflict. Violence, asMichel Wievorka (2009) contends, tends tobe the opposite of conflict; it closes downdebates and encourages ruptures. In newwars the sides need an incompatibility inorder to justify their existence.

The Debate about dataThe new wars argument is largely based onqualitative rather than quantitative data. Itcame out of empirical studies of the wars in

the former Yugoslavia and the South Cauca-sus as well as Sub Saharan Africa (Kaldor andVashee 1997). This knowledge has since beenaugmented by research on Iraq and Afghani-stan, but there were two quantitative claimsthat I used to back up the arguments thatbattles are becoming rare and most violenceis directed against civilians. One concernedthe dramatic increase in the ratio of civil-ian to military casualties and the other con-

cerned the rise in the numbers of displacedpeople per conflict. Other data that could berelevant relate to the recurrence and/or per-

sistence of contemporary conflicts as well asthe tendency to spread.

In fact, the quantitative data, despiteclaims to the contrary, does seem to confirmthe claims about the nature of new wars even

though this data has to be used cautiouslybecause it largely derives from old assump-tions about conflict.The debate about datacovers three broad areas: the numbers andduration of wars; the numbers of casualties;and the levels of forced displacement.

The numbers and duration of wars

There are three main sources for data onnumbers of wars. These are:

- The Uppsala Conflict Data Programme(UCDP), which is used by the Stock-holm International Peace Research Insti-tute (SIPRI) in its annual yearbook, theHuman Security Report project and theWorld Bank (UCDP; SIPRI; Human Secu-rity Report Project);

- The Correlates of War roject at the Uni-versity of Michigan (Correlates of War

project); and- The biennial Peace and Conict Survey

produced by the Center for Develop-ment and Conflict Management at theUniversity of Maryland (Peace and Con-flict Survey).

All three data sets are based on old warassumptions. For violence to be counted asa war, there has to be a state involved at leaston one side and there have to be a certain

number of battle deaths. Moreover, they alldistinguish between intra-state and inter-state war, and some have added sub-state ornon-state categories. Yet central to the newwars argument is the difficulty of distin-guishing between what is state or non-stateand what is external or internal. So, none ofthese numbers are really able to capture thenature of new wars.

In particular, the emphasis on battle deaths

has the counter-intuitive effect of leaving outmajor episodes of violence. As Milton Leiten-berg (2006) puts it: There were few bat-


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tle deaths in Cambodia between 1975 and1978, comparatively few in Somalia in 1990and 1991, or in Rwanda in 1994: but it wouldsimply be bizarre if two million dead in Cam-bodia, 350,000 in Somalia and 8000 or more

in Rwanda were omitted from compilations.Nevertheless, the findings from the three

databases do have some relevance to the newwars thesis. They all tend to concur in the fol-lowing conclusions:

- The virtual disappearance of warsbetween states;

- The decline of all high intensity wars,involving more than a thousand battle

deaths;- The decline in the deadliness of warmeasured in terms of battle deaths;

- The increase in the duration and/orrecurrence of wars; and

- The risk factor of proximity to otherwars.

In other words, there does seem to be adecline in old wars, which is largely what

this data measures. There is also a declinein the numbers killed in battles, which isconsistent with the argument about thedecline of battle. And there does seem to beevidence for the argument that new wars aredifficult to end and they tend to spread if weassume that the data does catch some newwar elements.

The UCDP has made the most effort toadjust to the new realities and has addeddata on episodes of one-sided violence and

on non-state violent conflicts. Both of thesenumbers seem to be increasing and thisagain is consistent with the argument thatnew wars could be treated as cases of mutualone-sided violence and that low-level, lowintensity persistent conflicts may be moretypical nowadays.

Those who have criticised the new warsargument using this sort of data have tendedto set up straw men to attack. Thus it is

argued that new wars are civil wars and thedecline in civil wars suggests that new wars

are not increasing. But new wars are not thesame as civil wars and no one has claimedthat new wars are increasing or decreasing;the argument was always about the changingcharacter of war. Bizarrely, critics have also

suggested that the decline of battle severityis a critique of new wars when on the con-trary it confirms the new wars argument(Melunder, Oberg and Hall 2009)

Casualties

The problem with calculations about theratio of civilian to military casualties is threefold. First, figures on civilian casualties arenotoriously inaccurate. There are a variety of

methods for calculating these numbers: reli-ance on media and other reports of individ-ual deaths, epidemiological surveys, opinionsurveys and, where available, official deathcertificates. The results vary widely. Thus, cas-ualties in the Bosnia war vary from 260,000(the number given by the Bosnian Informa-tion Ministry and widely used by interna-tional agencies at the time), of which 60,000were military, to 40,000 in the World Disas-

ters Report (Roberts 2010). Similarly, civiliancasualties in the Iraq war have been the sub-ject of huge debate; the numbers vary widely,from around 100,000 civilian casualties fromviolence (as of a 2011 estimate by Iraq BodyCount, which relies on media reports andofficial documents) to over a million (basedon an opinion survey in 2007, which askedIraqis in all 18 governorates whether anymember of their family had been killed)(ORB International).

Secondly, it is very difficult to distinguishcombatants from civilians. The only figuresfor which there are accurate statistics aremilitary casualties because these are for-mally recorded by their governments. Hence,we know that, as of September 2012, therewere some 4804 military casualties in Iraq, ofwhich 4486 were American, and some 3202military casualties in Afghanistan, of whichsome 2136 were American (Iraq Coalition

Casualty Count). But, since many combatantsin new wars are police, militia, private con-


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Councils Internal Displacement Monitor-ing Centre, which has only been collectingdata since 1998 (IDMC). Before that date, themain source was UNHCRs estimates of thoseIDPs of concern to UNHCR, a much lowerfigure. Secondly, refugee and IDP data tendsto be cumulative, since many people do not

return to their homes.Nevertheless, recent conflicts especiallyin Iraq, Somalia and Pakistan do seem toconfirm the contention that forcible dis-placement is a central methodology ofnew wars. In Iraq, for example, some 4 mil-lion people were displaced at the height ofthe war in 20062008; roughly half wererefugees and half were internally displaced.Indeed, it can be argued that one reasonfor lower levels of deaths in war is that it is

easier to spread fear and panic using newcommunications, so that more people leavetheir homes than formerly. At the sametime, there does seem to be a trend towardsincreasing displacement per conflict. Usingthe American Refugee Council data, MyronWeiner (1996) calculated that the numberof refugees and internally displaced personsper conflict increased from 327,000 per con-flict in 1969 to 1,316,000 in 1992 (1992 was,

of course, a peak year for conflict). Using theUppsala Conflict Database and figures from

UNHC and the IDMC, an upward trend inrefugees and internally based persons canbe observed per conflict. Figure 1is broader,showing the rise in annual numbers of inter-nally displaced persons in countries experi-encing not only armed conflict, but what theUCDP describe as substate conflict and one-

sided violence.

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One conclusion from this discussion is theneed to refine the displacement data, whichcould well offer a better indicator of humaninsecurity than some of the other numbersthat are used.

The Debate about ClausewitzThe final set of criticisms against the newwars thesis has to do with the claim thatnew wars are post-Clausewitzean (Strachan

and Herberg-Rothe 2007; Schuurman 2010).The reasons that are normally put forwardfor claiming that new wars are post-Clause-witzean have to do with the Trinitarian con-ception of war, the primacy of politics andthe role of reason. Both John Keegan (2004)and Martin Van Creveld (1991) have sug-gested that the Trinitarian concept of war,with its tripartite distinction of the state, thearmy and the people, is no longer relevant.

Other authors suggest that war is no longeran instrument of politics and, indeed, that

Figure 1:Rise in annual numbers of internally displaced persons in countries experiencingarmed conflict, substate conflict, and one-sided violence.

0

100000

200000

300000

400000

500000

600000

700000

800000

900000

1000000

1990 1995 2000 2005 2010

Average # refugeesper countryexperiencingviolence (5)

Average # of IDPsUNHCR per countryexperiencingviolence (6)

Average # of IDPsICDM per countryexperiencingviolence (7)


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the divorce of war from politics is charac-teristic of both pre-Clausewitzean and post-Clausewitzean wars (Snow quoted in Ang-strom 2003: 8). Along with these arguments,critics have also questioned the rationality of

war. Van Creveld, for example, argues that itis preposterousto think that just becausesome people wield power, they act like cal-culating machines that are unswayed by pas-sions. In fact, they are no more rational thanthe rest of us(1991: 10).

These arguments are rather trivial and,depending on how Clausewitz is interpreted,they can all be refuted. Huw Strachan (2007)points out that the trinity refers to tenden-

cies or motivations rather than empirical cat-egories. The point of the concept is to explainhow a complex social organisation, made upof many different individuals with many dif-ferent motivations, can become, in his words,the personalised state a side in or party towar. War says Clausewitz, is, therefore, notonly chameleon-like in character, because itchanges colour in some degree in each par-ticular case, but it is, also, as a whole, in rela-

tion to the predominant tendencies whichare in it, a wonderful trinity, composed ofthe original violence of its elements, hatredand animosity, which may be looked uponas blind instinct; the play of probabilitiesand chance, which make it a free activity ofthe soul; and of the subordinate nature of apolitical instrument, by which it belongs topure reason (1968: 24). These different ten-dencies reason, chance and emotion aremainly associated with the state, the gener-

als and the people, respectively, but the wordmainly or more suggests that they are notexclusively associated with these differentcomponents or levels of warfare.

Clausewitz argues that war is what unitesthe trinity. The trinity was wondrous becauseit made possible the coming together of thepeople and the modern state. Obviously, thedistinction between the state, the military,and the people is blurred in most new wars.

New wars are fought by networks of stateand non-state actors and often it is difficult

to distinguish between combatants and civil-ians. So, if we think of the trinity in terms ofthe institutions of the state, the army and thepeople, then it cannot apply. But if we thinkof the trinity as a concept for explaining how

disparate social and ethical tendencies areunited in war, then it is clearly very relevant.

A second issue is the primacy of politics.Among translators of Clausewitz, there is adebate about whether the German wordpoli-tikshould be translated as policy or politics.It can be argued that it applies to both if weroughly define policy as external, in termsof relations with other states, and politics asthe domestic process of mediating different

interests and views.New Wars are also fought for political

ends and, indeed, war itself can be viewedas a form of politics. The political narrativeof the warring parties is what holds togetherdispersed loose networks of paramilitarygroups, regular forces, criminals, mercenar-ies and fanatics, representing a wide array oftendencies economic and/or criminal self-interest, love of adventure, personal or fam-

ily vendettas, or even just a fascination withviolence. It is what provides a license forthese varying tendencies. Moreover, thesepolitical narratives are often constructedthrough war. Just as Clausewitz describedhow patriotism is kindled through war, sothese identities are forged through fear andhatred, through the polarisation of us andthem. In other words, war itself is a formof political mobilisation, a way of bringingtogether, of fusing the disparate elements

that are organised for war.Understood in this way, war is an instru-

ment of politics rather than policy. It is aboutdomestic politics even if it is a politics thatcrosses borders rather than the external pol-icy of states. If, for Clausewitz, the aim of waris external policy and political mobilisation,this means, in new wars, it is the other wayround. Mobilisation around a political narra-tive is the aim of the war and external policy

or policy vis--vis the proclaimed enemy isthe justification.


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So if new wars are an instrument of poli-tics, what is the role of reason? New warsare rational in the sense of instrumentalrationality. But is rationality the same as rea-son? The enlightenment version of reason

was different from instrumental rationality.As used by Hegel, who was a contemporaryin Berlin of Clausewitz, it had somethingto do with the way the state was identi-fied with universal values, the agency thatwas responsible for the public as opposedto the private interest. The state broughttogether diverse groups and classes for thepurpose of progress democracy and eco-nomic development. Clausewitz puts consid-

erable emphasis on the role of the cabinetin formulating policy and argues that theCommander-in-Chief should be a memberof the cabinet. The cabinet, which in Clause-witzs time was a group of ministers advis-ing the monarch, was thought to play a rolein bringing together different interests andmotivations and providing unifying, publiclyjustifiable arguments for both war and theconduct of war. Of course, members of the

cabinet had their own private motivations,as do generals (glory, enrichment, jealousy,etc), but it is incumbent on them to cometo some agreement, to provide the publicface of the war and to direct the war, andthis has to be based on arguments that areuniversally acceptable (universal, here, refer-ring to those who are citizens of the state).In his description of the evolution of warfareand the state, which echoes Hegels stadialtheory of history, he argues that only in the

modern period can the state be regarded asan intelligent being acting in accordancewith simple logical rules (Clausewitz 1968:342) and that this is associated with the riseof cabinet government where the cabinethad become a complete unity, acting for thestate in all its external relations (Clausewitz1968: 344).

The political narratives of new wars arebased on particularist interests; they are

exclusive rather than universalist. Theydeliberately violate the rules and norms of

war. They are rational in the sense of beinginstrumental. But they are not reasonable.Reason has something to do with universallyaccepted norms that underpin national andinternational law.

However there is another argument aboutwhy new wars are post-Clausewitzean. Thishas to do with the fundamental tenets ofClausewitzean thought his notion of idealwar. This is derived from his definition ofwar. War he says is nothing but a duel onan extended scale. If we would conceive asa unit the countless number of duels whichmake up a war, we shall do so best by sup-posing to ourselves two wrestlers. Each

strives by physical force to compel the otherto submit to his will: each endeavours tothrow his adversary, and thus render himincapable of further resistance.War thereforeis an act of violence intended to compel ouropponent to full our will(Clausewitz 1968:5; italics in the original). Violence, he says, isthe means. The ultimate object is the com-pulsory submission of the enemy to our willand, in order to achieve this, the enemy must

be disarmed.He then goes on to explain why this mustlead to the extreme use of violence. Nowphilanthropists may easily imagine there is askilful method of disarming and overcomingan enemy without causing great bloodshed.However plausible this may appear, still itis an error, which must be extirpated; forin such dangerous things as war, the errorswhich proceed from a spirit of benevolenceare the worst. As the use of physical power

to the utmost extent by no means excludesthe co-operation of intelligence, it followsthat he who uses forces unsparingly, withoutreference to the bloodshed involved, mustobtain a superiority if his adversary uses lessvigour in its application. The former then dic-tates the law to the latter, and both proceedto extremities to which the only limitations arethose imposed by the amount of counteractingforce on each side (Clausewitz 1968: 6; italics

added). In other words, the inner nature ofwar Absolute War follows logically from


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the definition as each side is pushed to makefresh efforts to defeat the other, a proposi-tion that Clausewitz elaborates in Chapter1, through what he calls the three recipro-cal actions according to which violence is

pushed to its utmost bounds (1968: 7). ForClausewitz, combat is the decisive momentof war.

Real war may depart from ideal war for avariety of reasons, but as long as war fits hisdefinition, it contains the logic of extremesand, in Chapter 2 of my book, I describehow that logic applied to Old Wars. Itis this logic of extremes that I believe nolonger applies in new wars. I have therefore

reformulated the definition of war. I havedefined war as an act of violence involvingtwo or more organised groups framed inpolitical terms. According to the logic ofthis definition, war could either be a contestof wills as is implied by Clausewitzs defi-nition or it could be a mutual enterprise.A contest of wills implies that the enemymust be crushed and therefore war tends toextremes. A mutual enterprise implies that

both sides need the other in order to carryon the enterprise of war and therefore wartends to be long and inconclusive.

New wars tend to be mutual enterprisesrather than a contest of wills. The warringparties are interested in the enterprise ofwar rather than winning or losing, for bothpolitical and economic reasons. The innertendency of such wars is not war withoutlimits, but war without end. Wars, definedin this way, create shared self-perpetuating

interest in war to reproduce political identityand to further economic interests.

As in the Clausewitzean schema, realwars are likely to be different from the idealdescription of war. The hostility that is kin-dled by war among the population may pro-voke disorganised violence or there may bereal policy aims that can be achieved. Theremay be outside intervention aimed at sup-pressing the mutual enterprise or the wars

may produce unexpectedly an animosity toviolence among the population, undermin-

ing the premise of political mobilisation onwhich such wars are based.

This redefinition of war constitutes a dif-ferent interpretation of war, a theory of war,whose test is how well it offers a guide to

practice. Since it is an ideal type, examplescan be used to support the theory, but itis, in principle, unprovable. The questionis whether it is useful. Take the exampleof the War on Terror. Antonio Echevarriadefines the War on Terror in classic Clause-witzean terms: Both antagonists seek thepolitical destruction of the other and, atthis point, neither appears open to negoti-ated settlement (2007: 211). Understood in

this way, each act of terrorism calls forth amilitary response, which, in turns, producesa more extreme counterreaction. The prob-lem is that there can be no decisive blow.The terrorists cannot be destroyed by mili-tary means because they cannot be distin-guished from the population. Nor can theterrorists destroy the military forces of theUnited States. But if we understand the Waron Terror as a mutual enterprise what-

ever the individual antagonists believe inwhich the American Administration shoresup its image as the protector of the Ameri-can people and the defender of democracy,those with a vested interest in a high militarybudget are rewarded and extremist Islamistsare able to substantiate the idea of a GlobalJihad and to mobilise young Muslims behindthe cause, then action and counterreactionmerely contribute to long war, which bene-fits both sides. Understood in Clausewitzean

terms, the proposed course of action is totaldefeat of the terrorists by military means.Understood in post-Clausewitzean terms, theproposed course of action is very different; ithas to do with both with the application oflaw and the mobilisation of public opinionnot on one side or the other, but against themutual enterprise.

The contrast between new and old wars,put forward here, is thus a contrast between

ideal types of war rather than a contrastbetween actual historical experiences. Of


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course, the wars of the twentieth century,at least in Europe, were close to the old warideal and the wars of the twenty first centuryare closer to my depiction of new wars. Con-temporary wars may not actually conform

to this description any more than earlierwars conformed to the old war description.Perhaps another way to describe the dif-ference is between realist interpretationsof war as conflicts between groups, usuallystates, that act on behalf of the group as awhole and interpretations of war in whichthe behaviour of political leaders is viewed asthe expression of a complex set of politicaland perhaps bureaucratic struggles pursuing

their particular interest or the interests oftheir faction or factions, rather than those ofthe whole. It can be argued that in the West-phalian era of sovereign nation-states, a real-ist interpretation had more relevance than itdoes today.

This conceptual distinction is not quitethe same as the way I originally describednew wars in terms of the involvement ofnon-state actors, the role of identity poli-

tics, the blurring of the distinction betweenwar (political violence) and crime (violencefor private interests) as well as the fact that,in new wars, battles are rare and violenceis mainly directed against civilians (Kaldor2007). But it is not inconsistent with that ear-lier description; it merely involves a higherlevel of abstraction.

ConclusionThe debate about new wars has helped to

refine and reformulate the argument. Thedebate about Clausewitz has facilitateda more conceptual interpretation of newwars, while the debate about data has ledto the identification of new sources of evi-dence that have helped to substantiate themain proposition.

The one thing the critics tend to agree isthat the new war thesis has been importantin opening up new scholarly analysis and new

policy perspectives, which, as I have stressed,was the point of the argument (Newman2004; Henderson and Singer 2002). The

debate has taken this further. It has con-tributed to the burgeoning field of conflictstudies. And it has had an influence on theintensive policy debates that are taking placeespecially within the military, ministries of

defence and international organisations the debates about counter-insurgency inthe Pentagon, for example, or about humansecurity in the European Union and indeedabout non-traditional approaches to securityin general.

What is still lacking in the debate isthe demand for a cosmopolitan politicalresponse. In the end, policing, the rule of law,justice mechanisms and institution-building

depend on the spread of norms at local,national and global levels. And norms areconstructed both through scholarship andpublic debate. If we are to reconceptualisepolitical violence as new war or crime andthe use of force as cosmopolitan law enforce-ment rather than war-fighting, then we haveto be able to challenge the claims of thosewho conceptualise political violence as oldwar, and this can only be done through criti-

cal publicly-engaged analysis.

Notes 1 I am grateful toDenisa Kostovicova and

Sabine Selchow for comments on an ear-lier draft and to Tom Kirk for help withthe literature search.

2 An exception is Ken Booths (2001)thoughtful essay that accepts the pointabout the logic of new wars, but is criti-cal of what he sees as top-down, overly

militarised policy implications. I have notaddressed this argument in this essay, butit is a concern in much of my work on hu-man security.

3 I am grateful to Anouk Rigterink for as-sistance with these numbers.

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How to cite this article: Kaldor, M 2013 In Defence of New Wars. Stability, 2(1): 4, pp. 1-16,DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/sta.at

Published:7 March 2013

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