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Tuukka KaidesojaMechanisms and Collective Agents

Overcoming the Biases of Microfoundationalism: Social

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Article

Overcoming the Biasesof Microfoundationalism:

Social Mechanisms andCollective Agents

Tuukka Kaidesoja1

Abstract

The article makes four interrelated claims: (1) The mechanism approach tosocial explanation does not presuppose a commitment to the individual-level microfoundationalism. (2) The microfoundationalist requirement thatexplanatory social mechanisms should always consists of interacting individualshas given rise to problematic methodological biases in social research. (3)It is possible to specify a number of plausible candidates for social macro-mechanisms where interacting collective agents (e.g. formal organizations)form the core actors. (4) The distributed cognition perspective combinedwith organization studies could provide us with explanatory understandingof the emergent cognitive capacities of collective agents.

Keywords

microfoundationalism, social mechanism, analytical sociology, collective

agent, distributed cognition

Received 10 April 2013

1University of Helsinki, Helsinki, Finland

Corresponding Author:

Tuukka Kaidesoja, Finnish Centre of Excellence in the Philosophy of the Social Sciences,

Department of Political and Economic Studies, University of Helsinki, PL 24 (Unioninkatu 40),00014, Helsinki, Finland.

Email: [email protected]

POS

433

10.1177/0048393113488872Philosophy of theSocial SciencesXX(X) Kaidesojaresearch-article

2013








302 Philosophy of the Social Sciences 43(3)

The concepts of social mechanism and mechanism-based explanation are

often connected to the idea that mechanism-based explanations of social

macro-phenomena explain by describing the individual-level microfounda-

tions of the social process that brought about the macro-phenomenon under study. This is especially the case in a methodological movement known as

analytical sociology, which has become the leading proponent of the idea of

mechanism-based explanation in the social sciences. In addition to their com-

mon commitment to microfoundationalism, some analytical sociologists

want to give an impression that they are able to provide a comprehensive

methodology for explanatory social research that can be fruitfully applied in

all fields of sociology. For example, Hedström and Bearman (2009, 21) ambi-

tiously write that “it is our hope that the analytical sociology framework willemerge as the central template for a renewed sociology for the twenty-first

century.”

In this article, I argue that analytical sociologists are not able to provide

an explanatory framework for “a renewed sociology for the twenty-first cen-

tury” unless they give up the requirement that mechanism-based explana-

tions of social macro-phenomena should always explicate the explanatory

social mechanisms in terms of interrelated and interacting human individu-

als. I make my case by demonstrating, first, that there is no necessary (or conceptual) connection between (1) the requirement that the individual-

level microfoundations of explanatory social mechanisms should always be

specified and (2) the notions of social mechanism and mechanism-based

explanation. Then, I argue that the commitment to the individual-level

microfoundationalism (in short, IMF) leads to problematic methodological

biases in explanatory social research. After that, I sketch some examples of

macro-level social mechanisms (in short, macro-mechanisms) where inter-

acting collective agents (e.g., states, political parties, trade unions, and busi-

ness corporations) form the core actors. It will also be indicated that

macro-mechanisms of this kind are especially relevant to historical explana-

tions of the large-scale social macro-phenomena. Finally, I suggest how the

perspective of distributed cognition and organization studies could be

employed in the analysis and explanation of the emergent cognitive capaci-

ties of collective agents.

The following discussion on macro-mechanisms and collective agents

presupposes a position of causal realism that is rooted in the ontology of

causal powers (e.g., Bhaskar [1975] 1978; Elder-Vass 2010; Harré andMadden 1975; Kaidesoja 2007, 2013; Wan 2011). In general terms, causal

powers of complex entities include their dispositions, abilities, tendencies,

liabilities, capacities, and capabilities to generate specific type of effects in







Kaidesoja 303

1 Note that the ontological concept of emergent causal power is different from the epis-

temological concept of emergence, which is used to characterize the unpredictable

(and unintended) outcomes of intentional actions and interactions of a large number of

individuals (e.g., Hedström 2005, 74-75). This epistemological concept of emergence

is compatible with the position of IMF, whereas the view that social entities have

ontologically emergent causal powers is not (for useful accounts of different concepts

of emergence, see Theiner and O’Connor 2010; Wan 2011, chap. 4).

suitable conditions. Each particular entity (or powerful particular) possesses

its powers by virtue of its nature, which in turn can typically be explicated in

terms of the intrinsic relational structure of the entity (e.g., Harré and Madden

1975). The ontology of causal powers is both compatible with the mechanismapproach to explanation as well as implicitly assumed by many analytical

sociologists in that they typically advocate the generative account of causa-

tion and hold that individual human beings have ontologically irreducible

causal powers (e.g., Hedström 2005; Hedström and Swedberg 1996; cf.

Hedström and Ylikoski 2010, 53).

Ontology of causal powers, however, comes in different varieties. What

is important for the purposes of this article is that I combine the notion of

causal power to the weak (or rationalist) version of the concept of emergent property. In this view, emergent causal powers are system-level properties

of particular complex entities (or systems) that are not possessed by their

parts (nor the predecessors of these parts) and that are not mere aggregates

(or resultants) of the causal powers of their parts. Nevertheless, unlike in

strong (or irrationalist) varieties of the concept of emergent property, the

ascription of ontologically emergent causal powers to a complex entity

(e.g., an organism, person, or concrete social system) is not assumed to

entail the impossibility of the mechanism-based explanation of these pow-ers in terms of the properties of its components; relations/interactions

between these components; and, at least in some cases, the relations/inter-

actions between the components of the entity and items in its environment

(for details, see Kaidesoja, 2013; cf. Bunge 2003; Elder-Vass 2010; Wan

2011; Wimsatt 2007). In this position, the ontologically emergent causal

powers of a complex entity are thus contrasted with the causal powers that

are mere aggregates (or mereological sums) of the powers of its compo-

nents, due to the fact that the former but not the latter are dependent on the

mode of organization of the components of the entity. A useful specification

of the conditions for aggregativity of a property is provided by Wimsatt

(2007, 280-281).1









1. Mechanism-Based Explanations, Social Mechanisms,

and Microfoundationalism in Analytical Sociology

Although analytical sociology is not a unified doctrinal system, nor is thereany single founding father or mother of this movement, there nevertheless are

certain methodological ideas that unite analytical sociologists. In his account

of the key principles of analytical sociology, Hedström (2005, 1) writes that

analytical sociology “seeks to explain complex social processes by carefully

dissecting them and then bringing into focus their most important constituent

components.” Analytical sociologists thus aim to deliver explanatory under-

standing about social macro-phenomena by developing precise, abstract, and

analytically realist explanatory theories that refer to social mechanisms thatcausally generate these phenomena (Hedström 2005, chap. 1).

Hedström (2005, 2) further specifies the mechanism approach to the

explanation of social phenomena as follows:

The core idea behind the mechanism approach is that we explain a social

phenomenon by referring to a constellation of entities and activities, typically

actors and their actions, that are linked to one another in such a way that they

regularly bring about the type of phenomenon we seek to explain.

Insofar as social mechanisms that bring about social phenomena are

assumed to be “recurrent processes linking specified initial conditions and a

specific outcome” (Mayntz 2004, 241) (rather than abstract theoretical mod-

els or parts of theories), it can be said that mechanism-based explanations

explain by opening up the black boxes that connect the causes to their out-

comes (Elster 1989, 3-10). In other words, “proper explanations should detail

the cogs and wheels of the causal process through which the outcome to be

explained was brought about” (Hedström and Ylikoski 2010, 50).Mechanism-based explanations of this kind are different from covering-

law explanations, since the former do not usually involve any general law

statements nor is the deductive form necessary to mechanism-based expla-

nations (e.g., Hedström 2005, chap. 2; Hedström and Ylikoski 2010, 54-55).

Due to the fact that social mechanisms are typically assumed to consist of

social actors and their activities, mechanism-based explanations are also

regarded as alternatives to functionalist and structuralist explanations that

abstract from concrete social actors and their activities. Moreover, the

above views are meant to differentiate the explanatory methodology of ana-

lytical sociology both from “grand” social theories, which are deemed too

general, abstract, and ambiguous for explanatory purposes, as well as from







Kaidesoja 305

the tradition of correlation-based statistical “causal modeling,” which is

criticized for its eclectic empiricism and tendency to replace real social

actors with statistical variables (e.g., Hedström 2005, chaps. 1 and 5). But

what exactly are these social mechanisms that are said to bring about social phenomena?

A good place to start answering this question is to look at Hedström and

Ylikoski’s (2010, 50) characterization of “the general ideas that are shared by

most accepted definitions [of the concept of mechanism—T. K.]” in the cur-

rent philosophy of science:

1. [A] mechanism is identified by the kind of effect or phenomenon it produces.

A mechanism is always a mechanism for something [. . .].

2. [A] mechanism is an irreducibly causal notion. It refers to the entities of a

causal process that produces the effect of interest. [i.e., mechanism approach to

causal explanation presupposes causal realism—T. K.]

3. [T]he mechanism has a structure. When a mechanism-based explanation

opens the black box, it discloses this structure. It turns the black box into a

transparent box and makes visible how the participating entities and their

properties, activities, and relations produce the effect of interest.

4. [M]echanisms form a hierarchy. While a mechanism at one level presupposes

or takes for granted the existence of certain entities with characteristic properties

and activities, it is expected that there are lower-level mechanisms that explain

them. [. . .] The only requirement [for a mechanism to be explanatory—T. K.] is

that such entities, properties, and activities really exist; their explanation is a

separate question [which means that there is no regress of explanations involved

here—T. K.]. (Hedström and Ylikoski 2010, 50-52)

Now, these assumptions give us some idea what causal mechanisms are

taken to be in analytical sociology since recent accounts of social mecha-

nisms in this movement are influenced by the new mechanistic philosophy of

science.

For example, drawing explicitly on Machamer, Darden, and Craver’s

(2000) influential paper on mechanism-based explanations, Hedström (2005,

25) writes that

mechanisms can be said to consist of entities (with their properties) and the

activities that these entities engage in, either by themselves or in concert with other

entities. These activities bring about change, and the type of change brought about

depends upon the properties of the entities and the way in which they are linked to








one another. A social mechanism, as here defined, describes [is?—T. K.] a

constellation of entities and activities that are organized such that they regularly

bring about a particular type of outcome. We explain an observed phenomenon by

referring to the social mechanism by which such phenomena are regularly broughtabout.

I think that Hedström’s account of mechanisms fits quite nicely to

Mayntz’s (2004, 241; also Hedström and Ylikoski 2010, 50) characterization

according to which “mechanism statements [or models and theories that refer

to mechanisms—T. K.] are causal generalizations about recurrent pro-

cesses.” As was already indicated above, many analytical sociologists assume

a position of causal realism, which includes an assumption that “causal con-

nections between events are real and are conveyed by the powers and proper-

ties of entities” (Little 2011, 273), although analytical sociologists rarely

specify their account of causal realism or their social ontological

assumptions.

What is important to the topic of this article is that Hedström (2005, 28-29)

and many other analytical sociologists (e.g., Demeulenaere 2011; Elster

1989) make a further assumption according to which social mechanisms con-

sist of interrelated human individuals and their activities. Hedström and

Bearman (2009, 4) make this point clearly when they write that mechanismsexplaining social facts “invariably refer to individuals’ actions and the rela-

tions that link actors to one another.” Hedström (2005, 115; also 19, 70-74)

accordingly contends that, when we are modeling social mechanisms that

bring about social macro-phenomena, we must assume that “it is individuals,

not social entities, that are endowed with causal powers.” Individualist social

ontology is presupposed, too, in Hedström and Swedberg’s (1996, 299) bold

statement that “there exist no macro-level mechanisms.” Given his commit-

ment to ontological individualism, it is then no wonder that Hedström (2005,73) ends up contending that “I do not believe that ontological collectivism

[i.e., non-individualist social ontology—T. K.], in whatever form or shape,

has anything to offer sociological theory.”

The above quotations from the programmatic papers by analytical sociol-

ogists clearly indicate that analytical sociology is firmly rooted in the tradi-

tions of methodological individualism and microfoundationalist thinking

(see also Demeulenaere 2011; Little 2012). Some analytical sociologists have

nevertheless rejected the strong (or traditional) version of methodologicalindividualism, and relied instead on a weak version of this doctrine termed as

structural individualism. Hedström and Bearman (2009, 8), for example,

define the latter position as “a methodological doctrine according to which all

social facts, their structure and change, are in principle explicable in terms of








3The underlying problem in Barbera’s (2012) argument is that he assumes that, in the

context of social reality, only intentionally acting human beings can have causal pow-

ers. I find this assumption problematic.

has recently invoked the distinction between causally generative properties

(or causal powers) and causally relevant properties in this context. He argues

that, although macro-level properties are not causal powers of social entities,

they may nevertheless be causally relevant in explanations of macro-leveloutcomes of interactions of many individuals due to the fact that they “influ-

ence, affect, shape, impact, and concern” (Barbera 2012, 3) the actions of

relevant individuals. If this is true, then (in contrast to thesis 4) macro-level

properties would not be causally inert even if they are not emergent causal

powers of social entities.

I nevertheless doubt whether Barbera’s (2012) distinction between caus-

ally generative and causally relevant properties is sound. First of all, it can be

argued that the “causal relevance” of some macro-level properties (e.g., dis-tributions of properties of individuals in a population) can be explicated in

terms of the aggregates of the causal powers of individuals that compose the

population. Insofar as this is the case, the previous distinction is redundant.

Furthermore, it can be argued (in contrast to IMF) that many other macro-

level properties, such as social norms, institutions, and structures of social

networks, actually presuppose the existence of social entities of whose emer-

gent causal powers and properties these norms, institutions, and relational

structures are (see Elder-Vass 2010; Kaidesoja, 2013). In this case, too, thedistinction between causally generative and causally relevant properties of

social entities evaporates, since causal relations that involve social entities

are conveyed by their generative causal powers (as well as causal powers by

other relevant entities).3

What is important to the ensuing arguments is that proponents of IMF

assume by definition that all causal powers ascribed to social groups are

ontologically reducible to the aggregates of causal powers of their individual

members, which implies that social groups cannot be considered as collective

agents. Next, I ask whether the concept of social mechanisms and the model

of mechanism-based explanation really presuppose IMF.

2. Does the Mechanism Approach to Social

Explanation Presuppose IMF?

If we consider the above list of the general ideas associated to causal mecha-

nisms and Hedström’s account of the concept of social mechanism, then we







Kaidesoja 309

can see that all that is required by them is that social macro-phenomena under

explanation are brought about by interacting entities (or actors) of some kind

that exist at the lower level of organization with respect to the macro-phe-

nomenon to be explained. As also several other authors have indicated(Kincaid 1996; Mayntz 2004; Vromen 2010; Wan 2011, 2012; Ylikoski

2012), nothing in the mechanism approach to explanation as such necessi-

tates that causally efficacious entities referred in the mechanism-based expla-

nations of social macro-phenomena should always be individual human

beings. Actually, the idea that mechanisms form a hierarchy (see item 4 in

Hedström and Ylikoski’s 2010 list) can be used to question the very require-

ment according to which explanatory social mechanisms should always con-

sist of interacting individual human beings: If it can be shown that there arerelatively enduring collective agents with characteristic emergent capacities

and activities, then there is no reason why the social entities of this kind could

not form parts of social mechanisms beyond the level of interacting individu-

als. These points then imply that IMF is not necessarily presupposed by the

mechanism approach to social explanation.

It is interesting to note that in the context of biological research, where

mechanism-based explanations are common, mechanism models often incor-

porate references to biological entities with system-level capacities (i.e.,weakly emergent powers) at many different levels of organization. Examples

of such entities include organic molecules, organelles, cells, organs, organ-

isms, and structured groups of organisms (see Machamer, Darden, and Craver

2000; Wimsatt 2007). Hence, it is not required in these explanatory practices

that all mechanism-based explanations should be developed in terms of some

fundamental level of causation, nor is it assumed that there is some funda-

mental level of causally efficacious biological entities. Rather, entities with

capacities to engage in productive activities are assumed to exist at different

levels of organization in biological systems. This is because

Higher-level entities and activities are [. . .] essential to the intelligibility of those

at lower levels, just as much as those at lower levels are essential for understanding

those at higher levels. It is the integration of different levels into productive

relations that renders the phenomena intelligible and thereby explains it.

(Machamer, Darden, and Craver 2000, 23)

Explanations that refer to entities (with capacities) existing at differentlevels of organization nevertheless presuppose that the system-level capaci-

ties (or weakly emergent causal powers) of those entities can be explained in

terms of the properties of their lower-level components, the relations, and

interactions of these components, as well as (at least in some cases) in terms








that describe the entity’s interactions with its environment. Nevertheless,

empirically established inter-level reductive explanations of this kind elimi-

nate neither of these entities nor their causal capacities from the biological

ontology, but rather provide empirically grounded reasons to count themamong the core entities in mechanism-based explanations of higher-level

biological phenomena (Wimsatt 2007, chap. 12).

These views, then, question the link between IMF and mechanism-based

social explanations, since they cast serious doubt on the claim that there has

to be a fundamental level of causally efficacious entities in social reality.

However, to assess the merits of the mechanism approach to social explana-

tion that assumes IMF, we must evaluate its outcomes in the context of

empirical research as well as consider the plausibility of the ontologicalassumptions underlying this position. I turn next to these questions.

3. Biases of IMF in Explanatory Research

In her perceptive analysis of the recent literature on social mechanisms and

mechanism models in the social sciences, Mayntz (2004, 255) contends that

The problem is that our theoretical tool boxes for different types of [social—T. K.]

mechanisms are very unevenly filled. We already have a good-sized, if not very

orderly, tool box of mechanism models for different forms of collective behavior—

collective in the sense that the uncoordinated, but interdependent, actions of many

individuals generate aggregate effects. Examples are models of linear and

nonlinear diffusion, the mechanism underlying spatial segregation in urban

housing, the market mechanism, and the mechanism of mobilization where not

only thresholds but also a “production function” (i.e. how many must participate

to produce the effect) plays a role. [. . .] We have as yet no similarly filled tool box

for mechanisms where specific types of corporate actor constellations and

relational structures play the crucial role. (italics added)

I agree with Mayntz’s observation that most of the theoretical (or formal)

models about social mechanism that have been proposed in sociological lit-

erature aim to explain social macro-phenomena by explicating how “the

uncoordinated, but interdependent, actions of many individuals generate

aggregate effects” (for similar views, see Baldassarri 2009; Little 2012). This

also means that all the examples of mechanism models mentioned by her are

compatible with the doctrine of IMF. In addition to these examples, theoreti-cal models on dissonance-driven desire formation (Festinger), rational imita-

tion (Hedström), and self-fulfilling prophecies (Merton), all of which have

been discussed and formalized in analytical sociology, are compatible with

both Mayntz’s point and the position of IMF.








Kaidesoja 311

Given that analytical sociologists typically combine the mechanism

approach to social explanation with IMF, the absence of theoretical tools for

analyzing macro-mechanisms is not at all surprising. This state of affairs

could be seen rather as an implication of the application of their methodologi-cal prescriptions. In other words, the combination of the mechanism-based

model of explanation and IMF suggests that “there exist no macro-level

mechanisms” (Hedström and Swedberg 1996, 299), and for this reason, “all

social facts, their structure and change, are in principle explicable in terms of

individuals, their properties, actions, and relations to one another” (Hedström

and Bearman 2009, 8). Now, due to the fact that they deny the existence of

macro-mechanisms, the advocates of IMF might reply to Mayntz by claiming

that there are no methodological biases involved here since the content of our theoretical tool-box reflects the true nature of social reality. I will challenge

this latter claim below by arguing, first, that macro-mechanisms are referred

to in some interesting social scientific theories and explanations. Second, I

will try to indicate that, once we take into account some recent approaches in

cognitive science, especially the distributed approach to human cognition,

the notion of collective agent with emergent causal powers is not at all as

problematic as the proponents of IMF tend to assume.

To be fair, there are some analytical sociologists (e.g., Baldassarri 2009;Barbera 2012; Barkey 2009; Demeulenaere 2011; Manzo 2010) as well as

some predecessors of this movement (e.g., Coleman 1990) who have recog-

nized the need for such theoretical models that take explicitly into account

not only the distributions of properties (in populations of individuals) and the

structures of social networks but also social norms, institutions, and rela-

tively enduring organizations. With some exceptions (e.g., Baldassarri 2009),

the concepts of social relation and network structure used by many analytical

sociologists, however, appear to be rather thin in that their theoretical models

tend to downplay the significance of the socially coordinated, organized , and

institutionalized forms of social relations and interactions. Moreover, when

social norms, institutions, and culture are taken into account by analytical

sociologists, there is a tendency to ontologically reduce them to the aggregate

properties of groups of individuals (e.g., shared or typical beliefs and expec-

tations of individuals). For example, Hedström’s (2005, 69) analysis of social

change and interaction explicitly focuses on “the social patterns of desires,

beliefs and actions that are likely to emerge when large number of individu-

als” interact affecting the beliefs and desires of each other. Similar position is presupposed by Elster (2009, 196) when he writes that “[a] social norm is

simply a shared expectation [in a group of individuals—T. K.] that others will

react to a given behavior in a way that is painful to oneself.” Nothing prevents

one claiming that the patterns of shared beliefs and mutual expectations of








the members of a group comprise the culture, norms, and institutions of that

group, but the problem is that this is a very narrow and individualist under-

standing of these properties, which I think can be (and has been) questioned

with good reasons (e.g., DiMaggio 1997; Little 2012; Santoro 2012). So Iwould say that the ideas related to IMF are still very much alive among the

prominent analytical sociologists though I admit that they are not all shared

by all researchers who associate themselves to this methodological move-

ment (see Baldassarri 2009; Barbera 2012; Barkey 2009; Manzo 2010; also

Wan 2012, 1552-53).

It is interesting to note that the methodology based on IMF is clearly

incompatible with many of the methodological ideas and explanations

developed in recent historical and comparative macro-sociology, includingresearch on political processes. This is because socially coordinated and

institutionalized actions of individual actors as well as actions of organized

social groups (e.g. social movements and formal organizations) and larger

social structures are typically among the core explanatory factors in the

explanations of large-scale macro-social changes, such as state formation,

rise of nationalism, democratization, revolutions, wars, globalization, or

emergence of social policies (e.g., see Barkey 2009; Held and McGrew

2007; Little 2012; Mahoney and Rueschmeyer 2003; McAdam, Tarrow, andTilly 2001; Smith 1991; Stinchcombe 1998; Tilly 2001, 2008). A research

program on contentious politics also explicitly recognizes the importance of

social mechanisms beyond the individual-level for explanations of political

processes (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001; also Tilly 2001, 2008).

Moreover, there are some theoretical models about social mechanisms

developed in historical sociology and in organization studies in which (at

least some of) the core actors are formal organizations. Examples include

Stinchcombe’s (1998) model of the monopolist competition between corpo-

rate groups (e.g., business corporations, universities, and nation-states) in

competitive fields (e.g., markets, prestige systems, and the world power sys-

tem) that involve field-specific rankings in terms of profits, prestige, or

power. Hannan and Freeman’s (1989) and their followers’ theoretical mod-

els about various selection mechanisms in organizational populations are

also cases in point.

Now, unless one is able to show that social explanations and mechanism

models that break the assumptions of IMF are always worse in terms of

explanatory power than their alternatives based on IMF, then it should beconcluded that the latter type of methodology is problematically biased.

Next, I will take a closer look at some plausible candidates for the social

macro-mechanisms that have collective agents as their components.








Kaidesoja 313

4. Candidates for Macro-Mechanisms

The research program of contentious politics is a rich source of ideas on

meso- and macro-level social mechanisms (e.g., McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly2001; Tilly 2001, 2008). Some of the following candidates for macro-mech-

anisms, such as coalition formation and competition, are mentioned in the

contributions of the proponents of this research program. I will not, however,

explicitly draw on these contributions. There are two reasons for this: First,

the account of social mechanism in terms of events and the distinction

between mechanisms and processes, presented by McAdam, Tarrow, and

Tilly (2001, 24), are not entirely compatible with the above view on social

mechanisms. Second, many of the ideas on different types of social mecha-

nisms put forward in this program are rather sketchy in that they do not

always specify the nature of entities and activities that are thought to bring

about change in each social mechanism (cf. Little 2011). Therefore, I will

focus here exclusively on the macro-mechanisms that are compatible with

Hedström and Ylikoski’s (2010) account of causal mechanisms.

Here is my list of candidates for social macro-mechanisms that include

collective agents among their core components:

• competition between collective agents (e.g., business firms competingfor market shares in competitive markets, universities competing for

bright and wealthy students in a higher education system, nation-states

competing for political power in an international power system),

• social conflict between collective agents (e.g., conflict between politi-

cal parties in a parliament; conflict between trade unions and employ-

er’s associations in a country, which may alternatively be construed as

an instance of a class struggle at the level of interest organizations,

conflict between states in an international power system),• environmental selection at the level of populations of collective agents

(e.g., the most profitable and competitive business firms are selected

by a market mechanism in a capitalist market economy),

• coalition formation between collective agents (e.g., the governmental

coalition of political parties in a parliamentary democracy, the alli-

ances of states in World Wars I and II),

• compromise between collective agents (e.g., compromise between

political parties with conflicting ideologies in a parliament; compro-mise between states with conflicting interests in an international power

system), and

• legislation (e.g., in a parliamentary democracy, the government and

other responsible state agencies, which may have been influenced by








4I use the term concrete social system in Bunge’s (1998, 2003) sense. An important

feature of this view is that all social systems, such as families, organizations, and

states, can all be analyzed in terms of their components, environments, (relational)

structures, and mechanisms.

various lobbyists and interest organizations, typically prepare a legis-

lative proposal to a parliament that either accepts or rejects the pro-

posal, and if the parliament accepts the proposal, the law is then

enforced by the state agency).

It is important to bear in mind that the items in this list refer to abstract

types of macro-mechanisms (or mechanism schemes), each of which is

thought to bottom out to subspecies consisting of concrete macro-mecha-

nisms. I also believe that this list could be easily extended and that each

subspecies of the list could be further specified, or even modeled theoreti-

cally, by relying on the relevant research literature.

In every concrete macro-mechanism the core actors are collective agents,or both collective agents and human individuals—not just individuals. This is

because it is not possible, or so I will later argue, to ontologically reduce the

cognitive capacities of collective agents involved in these mechanisms to

those of their individual members or the aggregates of the latter. Drawing on

the emergentist systemist ontology of causal powers developed elsewhere

(Kaidesoja, 2013; Wan 2011; cf. Bunge 2003), collective agents, such as for-

mal organizations, can be understood as concrete social systems4 with emer-

gent causal powers, relational structures, and mechanisms underlying their agency. To my mind, this view on social macro-mechanisms is intuitively

plausible, since, for example, competition between business firms in com-

petitive markets does not seem to be ontologically reducible to the interac-

tions between members of different firms for the simple reason that it is

precisely the emergent capacities and competitive activities of the firms in

markets that are essential constituents of this mechanism (cf. Stinchcombe

1998). This is not to deny, however, that competitive actions of each environ-

mentally embedded firm are ontologically dependent on the materially medi-

ated interactions of their personnel in an analogical way as the intentional

actions of human individuals are ontologically dependent on the interactions

of their environmentally embedded brains and bodily organs.

It should be stressed that each of the collective agents in macro-

mechanisms sketched above is embedded in a certain institutional environ-

ment. Indeed, institutional environments play a crucial role in many historical

explanations that refer to macro-mechanisms and social processes that take







Kaidesoja 315

5This is not to deny the existence of semiotic entities, social classes, and class-based

collective agents, such as political parties and trade unions.

long periods of time to unfold, since these environments can have a signifi-

cant effect on how the mechanism or process of interest unfolds in various

contexts (e.g., see Pierson 2003). In my view, institutional environments of

this kind can often be explicated in terms of some larger social system (e.g.,capitalist market economy, nation-state, or international power system) of

which the collective agent forms a part.

It is also worth adding that the ascription of agency to a structured social

group does not amount to a denial that, at least in more or less democratically

organized groups, its individual members still have many degrees of freedom

in their actions both as members of these groups as well as in other spheres of

their lives unrelated to their membership in this particular group. Indeed, as I

will later suggest, collective agency can be usefully considered as a conceptthat allows degrees since some organized social groups (e.g., formal organi-

zations) are clearly more unified, cohesive, and enduring entities than others

(e.g., fleeting interaction groups).

Although macro-mechanisms are occasionally referred to in explanatory

macro-sociology, their significance should not be overrated, since not all

social mechanisms relevant to the explanations of social macro-phenomena

involve interacting collective agents. It thus depends on the explanatory

question and the macro-phenomenon to be explained whether references tomacro-mechanisms are needed. Moreover, postulations of macro-mecha-

nisms in mechanism-based explanations of social phenomena should be done

with care. One reason for this is that sometimes sociologists misattribute

agency to theoretical abstractions, or taxonomic concepts, such as “capital,”

“nationalist ideology,” “bourgeoisie,” “working class,” or “discourse of gov-

ernmentality,” which do not refer to such concrete social systems that may be

said to possess emergent causal powers5 (see Kaidesoja 2007, 2013). Hence,

in explanations of social macro-phenomena, claims about the actions and

interactions of collective agents should always be substantiated by empirical

evidence that shows that such organized social systems that can be plausibly

understood as collective agents (with emergent powers) were present in the

causal process of interest.

It should be emphasized again, however, the requirement that claims about

actions and interactions of collective agents should be backed up with empiri-

cal evidence does not mean that every explanation of large-scale social

macro-phenomena has to explicate the individual-level microfoundations of

these actions and interactions, and/or explain the historical origins of the








collective agents of interest, in terms of interrelated and interacting human

individuals. By contrast, in many explanatory studies on large-scale macro-

phenomena, it is sufficient that we have a general understanding how the

collective agents of this kind function (e.g., how collective-decisions aretypically made in the organizations that are the components of the relevant

macro-mechanism) and empirically grounded reasons to believe that the

macro-phenomenon of interest was causally generated by the interactions of

this kind of collective agents with emergent powers (cf. Little 2012). The

explanation of the emergent powers of the relevant collective agents is sim-

ply a separate explanatory question. Of course, it is always possible to zoom

in to a particular collective agent and study the underlying mechanisms of its

emergent causal powers, but this type of research requires the uses of differ-ent methods and data from the explanatory studies on large-scale macro-

phenomena. Note that the situation is largely analogical with respect to social

mechanisms that consist of interacting individual agents with emergent

causal powers (e.g., capacity to act intentionally and understand intentions of

others), since explanations of social phenomena that refer to mechanisms

of this kind typically take for granted the existence of certain causal powers

of individuals while assuming that these powers can be explained in refer-

ence to their underlying cognitive and neural mechanisms (cf. Hedström andYlikoski 2010). In the next section, I suggest that the distributed cognition

perspective combined with organization studies enables us to get a better

grasp of the underlying mechanisms of the emergent cognitive capacities of

collective agents.

5. Collective Agents as Distributed Cognitive Systems

Let me begin with a brief characterization of the concept of cognition presup-

posed in much recent cognitive science, including the perspective of distrib-uted cognition. Following Theiner and O’Connor (2010), this can be termed

as a big tent approach to cognition. According to this approach, the concept

of cognition is a cluster concept that “subsumes a more or less loosely knit

family of capacities that we can distinguish for taxonomic purposes” (Theiner

and O’Connor 2010, 82). A system is then taken to be cognitive to the extent

that,

1. It can adapt its behavior to changing environments.2. It can process information from its environment.

3. It can selectively and purposefully attend to its environment.

4. It can create internal representations of its environment.








Kaidesoja 317

5. It can modify its environment through the creation of artifacts.

6. It can be aware of itself as a cognitive agent (i.e., it is reflexive).

7. It can have conscious experiences of itself and the world. (Adapted

from Theiner and O’Connor 2010, 82-83)Concrete systems like organisms and integrated social groups may thus

be considered as more or less “mindful” or “intelligent” creatures depending

on how many of these capacities they have (Theiner and O’Connor 2010,

82-83). In a sense, all of the systems that posses one or more of these capaci-

ties may be regarded as cognitive agents although not all of them are pur-

poseful (or intentional) agents. Furthermore, a big tent approach does not

deny that there are other cognitive capacities in addition to those mentioned

in the list.The other perspective I would like to introduce here is the distributed

approach to human cognition. The basic idea of this approach is that many

cognitive processes in our everyday life transcend the boundaries of our

skulls and skins since they are distributed across our environmental struc-

tures, information processing technologies, and the other people with whom

we interact (e.g., Clark 1997; Hutchins 1995). The point is not just that we

use different kinds of artifacts and technologies as aids in our cognitive pro-

cesses as well as rely on the information that we obtain from other people.The distributed approach to human cognition (and the extended mind hypoth-

esis) rather emphasizes that many of the cognitive artifacts, technologies, and

organized groups profoundly alter the cognitive tasks that we face as indi-

viduals as well as transform our cognitive capacities both as technologically

extended systems and as organized groups (Hutchins 1995; also Clark 1997;

Kaidesoja 2012; Theiner and O’Connor 2010). However, this view does not

amount to a denial of the central role of embodied and embedded human

beings in all human cognition.

An important implication of the above perspectives is that they enable

one to ascribe emergent cognitive capacities to social groups and to study

the underlying mechanisms of these capacities empirically (e.g., Hutchins

1995; Theiner and O’Connor 2010). This nevertheless requires that we

reconsider our received concept of cognition that ties all cognitive capacities

to individual organisms (e.g., human beings), since groups obviously lack

system-level consciousness or brains as distinct from those of their individ-

ual members. Proponents of distributed cognition thus hold that a kind of

“big tent” approach to human cognition described above is needed, since itenables us to apply and adapt the methods and concepts of cognitive science

to a broader range of cognitive processes taking place in our everyday life as

well as to build bridges between cognitive and social sciences. So it is

expected that this approach brings explanatory benefits when compared with








the individualist and “brainboud” accounts of human cognition, including

group cognition (e.g., Clark 1997; Hutchins 1995; Theiner and O’Connor

2010).

Now, drawing on organization studies (e.g., Scott and Davis 2003), I sug-gest that formal organizations (in short, organizations) can be understood as

social groups that are designed to accomplish some (more or less clearly

specified) goal or goals, and whose activities are planned, administrated, and

managed by their members (or some subgroup of their members such as man-

agers). Examples of organizations include schools, business firms, universi-

ties, hospitals, political parties, and governments. From the distributed

cognition perspective, relatively enduring organizations can be considered as

distributed cognitive systems that are composed of their individual members(performing more or less strictly defined and complementary roles) as well as

the cognitive artifacts (e.g., strategies, policies, budgets, written rules, mod-

els, and ICT tools) and environmental structures (e.g., the spatial organiza-

tion of offices, legislation that is relevant to the organization) they employ in

materially and socially distributed cognitive processes (Hutchins 1995;

Kaidesoja 2012; Secchi 2011). Drawing on these ideas, I suggest that at least

some organizations (e.g., enduring business firms) are able to

1. adapt to (a certain range of) changes in their environment (e.g., mar-

ket fluctuations),

2. process information from their environment (e.g., market situation,

changing demands of customers),

3. selectively and purposefully attend to those features of their environ-

ments that are relevant to their goals (e.g., pursuit of profits, enlarge-

ment of the market share),

4. create (and store) “internal” representations (i.e., internal to the orga-

nization) of their environments by means of various cognitive arti-

facts (e.g., strategy papers, reports, statistics, databases, archives),

and

5. modify their environments through creation of artifacts (e.g., change the

market situation by inventing, marketing, and selling new products).

Insofar as an organization possesses these five cognitive capacities listed

by Theiner and O’Connor (2010, 82-83), I would say that it can be considered

as a purposeful cognitive agent (with emergent cognitive capacities). It isnevertheless an empirical question whether, or to what extent, an organiza-

tion of interest can be regarded as a cognitive agent.

Although the space limitations do not allow me to argue this point in

detail, I propose that the distributed cognition approach could be useful in







Kaidesoja 319

empirical studies on the emergent cognitive capacities (or capabilities) of

organizations and their underlying mechanisms. This perspective suggests,

for example, that the cognitive division of labor between members of an

organization as well as their uses of cognitive artifacts and technologies inaction coordination are crucially important for the emergent capacities of this

kind. It does not imply, however, that every organization automatically out-

performs individuals in every cognitive task, since it is clear that some cogni-

tive processes (e.g., bandwagon effects) in organizations are counterproductive

with respect to efficient functioning of an organization (e.g., Secchi 2011).

Nevertheless, some of the underlying mechanisms of the emergent capacities

of organizations have already been studied in organization research. Examples

include studies on collective representations, collective decision-making,distributed/transactive memory, organizational learning, and problem solving

in organizations (for an extensive review of organization studies, see Scott

and Davis 2003; for organizational learning and memory, see Argote 2011;

Austin 2003; Hutchins 1995; for decision making in organizations, see Secchi

2011). The perspective of distributed cognition has also been explicitly used

in studies of this kind (e.g., Hutchins 1995; Secchi 2011).

6. Conclusion

The above arguments suggest that, insofar as they take the mechanism

approach to explanation seriously, analytical sociologists have good reasons

to overcome the position of IMF. They can do so by taking meso- and macro-

level social mechanisms into account when studying large-scale social phe-

nomena. I believe that this is required if their hope of providing “the central

template for a renewed sociology for the twenty-first century” is to be real-

ized. It was suggested, too, that historical macro-sociology, organization

studies, and distributed cognition perspective provide fruitful insights that

can be used to broaden the perspective of analytical sociology.

Some readers may still wonder whether the ontological position outlined

above is compatible with the view that that all of the emergent causal powers

of social entities supervene on the properties and relations of individuals (cf.

Hedström 2005, 73-74). Although I have my doubts about the usefulness of

the concept of supervenience in the context of social ontology, I will suggest

here only that, strictly speaking, the supervenience base of the emergent pow-

ers of collective agents does not solely consist of properties of individualsand their relations. This is because in addition to interlinked individuals, also

cognitive artifacts and technologies that are used by them in processing, stor-

ing, and transmitting information are constitutive of some of the emergent

powers of collective agents.









Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research,

authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research,

authorship, and/or publication of this article: The Finnish Centre of Excellence in the

Philosophy of the Social Sciences where the study was conducted is funded by the

Academy of Finland.

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Author Biography

Tuukka Kaidesoja is a postdoctoral researcher at the Finnish Centre of Excellence in

the Philosophy of the Social Sciences located at the University of Helsinki, Finland.

His interests include philosophy and methodology of the social sciences as well as

naturalistic social ontology.

kaidesoja, tuukka - overcoming the biases of microfoundationalism social mechanisms and collective...

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