justice: human and christian virtue

7/30/2019 JUSTICE: HUMAN AND CHRISTIAN VIRTUE

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JUSTICE: HUMAN AND CHRISTIAN VIRTUE

Introduction

If human dignity is the origin and end of social and political morality and human rights arethe expression of that dignity, then justice is the center of this discipline. This is because justice

guarantees and protects the dignity of the person. The task of justice is to regulate the reciprocity

of rights and duties among people. John Paul II teaches that love for others is concretized in thepromotion of justice (C.A., 58).

Justice protects and guarantees fundamental rights and duties. Justice signifies the

conditions which affect the different sectors of society and it assesses them.. It watches thedisparity in economic opportunities and moderates it. Moreover, it orients social circumstances so

to favor peaceful co-existence among people.

In the field of praxis, justice occupies that place which truth represents in the field of

theory. Thus, truth and justice comprise the two most important roles in human existence:

thought and life. According to J. Rawls, justice is the first virtue of social institutions while truthrefers to systems of thought. Any theory no matter how attractive and clear must be rejected or

revised if it is not true. Therefore, one can say that it is not important that laws and institutions be

promulgated and efficient; if they are unjust, they must be reformed or abolished.1 This meansthen that inasmuch as truth is the guarantee of systems of thought, justice belongs to laws, which

regulate the economic and political systems.

If it is not right to maintain human co-existence based on a lie, it is also not possible tobring order in social life through unjust relationships. Because of this, injustice must be

eradicated in social life and it must not be justified by anything. Rawls adds:

Each person possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare of society

as a whole cannot override. For this reason justice denies that the loss of freedom for

some is made right by a greater good shared by others. It does not allow that the

sacrifices imposed on a few are outweighed by the larger sum of advantages enjoyed by

many. Therefore in a just society the liberties of equal citizenship are taken as settledand the rights secured by justice are not subject to political bargaining or to the calculus

of social interests. The only thing that permits us to acquiesce in an erroneous theory isthe lack of a better one; analogously, an injustice is tolerable only when it is necessary to

avoid an even greater injustice. Being first virtues of human activities, truth and justiceare uncompromising.2

Plato related justice to good, and more concretely to physical good or health. For him,injustice is equivalent to an infirmity. In the dialogue in The Republic this question is asked:

How will it be clear that justice or injustice dominates our actions? How is it possible?

It is because good and evil are exactly alike. They belong both to body and soul.3


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For Students Private Use Justice

He explains that since health supposes order in the different parts of the body and infirmity

comes from disorder, in the same manner, it is also true concerning justice and injustice. He

maintains that to secure justice it is necessary to establish a hierarchy among the different parts ofthe soul which subordinates some to others in accord with nature. On the other hand, injustice is

promoted if the different parts of the soul are subordinated in ways contrary to nature.

To sum up, justice is one of the fundamental notions since it is related to truth and good

while injustice connotes lie and infirmity. Therefore, inasmuch as the theoretical order is founded

on truth and that concrete human existence demands health, the equity of social life demands thatit be urgently governed by justice.

If the object of social and political morality is respect for the person living with others,

justice occupies a primary place because its function is to reach an equitable situation in the basicstructures of society. The economic conditions and political institutions indicate this. On the

contrary, from injustice the worst evils arise. The greatest and most repeated form of misery that

human beings suffer is injustice.

I. Justice in the History of Ethical Thought

The concept of justice is one the most basic ideas in human existence. It is a natural and

spontaneous notion which dwells with man or woman in his/her relationship with others. It is

common knowledge that a child when treated unjustly will protest against arbitrary actions whichhe/she thinks are against him/her or do not contribute to his/her well-being.

This idea is logical and original. It accompanies man throughout history acquiringtonalities and contents relative to the rhythm of the time. It is not easy to trace the history of the

concept of justice, not is it easy to write about the feelings evoked by this word in history.

Nonetheless, as a simple testimony, we consider two opposing positions: the initial stage of theWestern thinking and the meaning which justice has in the culture of our time. The gap betweenthese two periods perhaps represents the birth and the culmination of a concept that is so decisive

in the history of humanity.

1. Justice in the Graeco-Roman Culture

In the Western culture the word justice was present in the first reflections of Greekphilosophy. Plato writes in The Republic that justice is a truth transmitted from the past.4 In the

Roman cultural world, St. Augustine affirms that the word justice was coined from time

immemorial.5

InNichomachean Ethics, Aristotle situates the theme of justice in Chapter V to signify that

its study must be the center of ethics. In Chapter I he cites a proverb which affirms that the

concept of justice is received from the past. Consequently, justice is like the womb from wherethe other virtues are born and increase.

Here is a text where Aristotle shows the height reached by the virtue of justice in theGreek ethical reflection:

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Justice understood in this manner is a complete virtue. However, it is not an absolute

and purely individual virtue. It is relative to a third virtue; and usually this is what

makes it the most important among the virtues. The rising and the setting of the sun are

not worthy of admiration. From here comes our proverb: All the virtues are found in

the womb of justice. (Teognis) I add that on an eminent level it is a complete virtue,because it is the application of a complete and accomplished virtue. Whoever possesses

it can apply his virtue in relation to the others and not only to himself. Many can bevirtuous in relation to their very person but they are incapable of virtue with regard to

others. I also find that the saying of Bias is very reasonable. Power, he would say, is

the proof of man. In effect, the judge dressed with power is not somebody in relation to

others since he is already in communion with them. For the same reason, among the

other virtues, justice seems to be the only one which constitutes an external good, a good

for the others, and not for one own self. This is because it is put into practice with regardto others and it does not do more than what is useful for the others who could be either

judges or the entire people. The worst among men is one whose perversity damages his

own self and also his neighbors. However, the most perfect person is not the one who

practices his virtue for himself but rather he practices it for others. This is a thing that is

always very difficult to do. Thus, justice cannot be considered simply as a part of virtue.

It is the entire virtue. Injustice which is its opposite is not a part of vice, it is the whole

vice. Therefore, one sees in the preceding considerations the difference between a virtue

and justice. In its depth, a virtue is the same as justice; however, it is not identical withjustice. Inasmuch as this virtue refers to the other, it is justice and inasmuch as it is a

personal habit, it is indeed truly a virtue.6

As a consequence of the pre-eminence of justice, this doctrine is often repeated among theGreek philosophers: It is a greater evil to commit injustice than to suffer it. 7 Moreover, it is

never licit to commit an injustice since the height of ignominy is being unjust. To commit

injustice against me brings more damage to the one responsible for the act than to my own self.Whoever commits injustice is more to be pitied than he who suffers it.8

The language of the Romans is no less profound in dealing with the virtue and the exercise

of justice. For the Romans, justice is an ethical virtue which affects human behavior. The notionof justice is so connected with the concept of the person that Marcus Aurelius said: To be

without justice is detrimental to human nature. Cicero gives to justice a supreme value among

the virtues: In justice virtue achieves its maximum splendor and for this reason men are calledvirtuous.9

Cicero defines justice as referring to public usage. He affirms that justice gives to eachperson his/her own dignity.10 To this he adds: The foundation of justice is faith, that is, the

firmness and the sincerity in the given word and in the agreements. The consequence of this is

the birth of the Roman Law, that is, the positive justice. The Roman Law served as one of themost important contributions of the Romans to the Western culture.

By way of example, let us take this text from Cicero. It gives us an idea of natural law

which according to the Roman Law establishes the value of any law. It is the basis of justice.

Certainly there exists a true law in accord with nature, known by all, constant and

everlasting....It is not right to add or subtract anything nor to completely eradicate it.

Neither is there need to look for someone to comment or interpret it. There is no one law

in Rome, another in Athens, another in some other place now or in some future age butalways the law remains eternal, immutable binding all humanity. There is only one

common God, teacher and lord of all, author, petitioner and promulgator of this law.

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Whoever does not guard it betrays his own self and reviles human nature and for that

reason he suffers maximum punishments even if he tries to escape from them.11

2. Justice in the Present Culture

Today justice is one of the most invoked words in social and political life. Political and

economic systems, social programs and cultural movements have used justice as the key word intheir declarations in a way that it constitutes one of the most common slogans of our time. As a

result of this the word justice has a great attraction for people.

However, as expected the use of the term repeatedly has stretched its meaning and the

misuse of it has become ideologized. Thus, the different ideologies have made justice what they

express what they wish and so the word justice now has different meanings. It connotes realchanges of content according to the interpretations made by different economic systems and

political programs.

At times, these alienations come from dividing the area of justice and in changing the

accepted meaning of justice according to the changing situations of our times.

The concept of justice understood in the sense of giving to each one his/her due has been

divided, according to the different interpretations of: his/her due, into justice in the

state of possession, justice of output, and social justice. These could at times beunderstood as justice of opportunities or justice of necessities. All these

interpretations can give reasons why they are important. However, each one of thesemay arrive at a different result. Hence, one ought to determine these meanings at the

outset.12

In effect, different definitions are determined by the interpretation of unicuique suum (to

each his own). For example, if one deals with defending what pertains to each one accordingto the state of possession, that person endeavors to look at a juridical state of the property in

order to give some guarantee to such a right. One can also have recourse to this principle in

defense of properties that were unjustly acquired. The acquisition of property must be juridicallylegitimatized; however, it is necessary that the ways of access to property are executed with

justice so that their social function is safeguarded.

II. Biblical Data about the Value and Meaning of Justice

The concept of justice is central in revelation. In this theme are equally introduced

ideologies in such a way that they propose a type of exegesis which we can call temporal andspiritual. The reason is that they interpret the texts with social categories rather than with

religious ones. The latter is a valid hermeneutical criterion.13 Although it is certain that

religiously the bible illumines and judges the real situations of society of the period, error comesin an interpretation that is excessively political.

In the specifically hermeneutical field there are two operations based on philologicalanalysis: (1) those authors who endeavor to always discover the social meaning in the root word

sedekah from which the most important words to designate justice come from; (2) those who

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maintain that the root word sedekah and its derivatives only have an ethical and religious

meaning. Other authors will talk about an evolution in the meaning of the terms relative to justice

in the rhythm of the history of Israel.

Starting from these two extremes and avoiding unnecessary polemics, we intend to

summarize the most evident and less questionable data by following two paths: etymologicalanalysis and a brief exercise of biblical theology.

1. The Terms Just and Justice in the Old Testament

As a whole, the vocabulary around this theme is very abundant: justice, just, to do justice,

the justice of Yahweh and of other people. They are repeated in the Old Testament many times.There are around 800 texts which allude to this matter.

A) Justice

The word justice is found in the Old Testament 213 times and is expressed in two words,

sdeq (saddiq/sedaq) which appears 81 times and dga (rasa) which is mentioned in 132 texts.

Both are frequently repeated in the Wisdom books and they both have a religious sense. Theymean to be just with God inasmuch as the people of God observe his precepts and therefore

they fulfill his will.

In this sense the response of the people to the Ten Commandments and the other precepts

given to Moses is understood: [O]ur justice before the LORD, our God, is to consist in carefully

observing all these commandments he has enjoined on us (Dt 6:25).

The Book of Proverbs pronounces that the wicked cannot practice justice: The violenceof the wicked will sweep them away, because they refuse to do what is just (Prov 21:7).

On the contrary, God cannot but fulfill justice: Does God pervert justice? Or does the

Almighty pervert the right? If your children sinned against him, he delivered them into the power

of their transgression. If you will seek God and make supplication to the Almighty, if you arepure and upright, surely then he will rouse himself for you and restore to you your rightful place

(Job 8:3-6).

The prophet Isaiah laments about the perverted situation in Jerusalem: How has she

turned adulteress, the faithful city, so upright! Justice used to lodge within her, but now,

murderers (Isa 1:21). However, after announcing the punishments on the people of Jerusalem,Isaiah hopes: I will restore your judges as at first, and your counselors as in the beginning. After

that you shall be called city of justice, faithful city (Isa 1:26).

There are many texts that have direct allusions to justice in terms of the equitablerelationships among people. For example, the Book of Leviticus denounces injustice in

judgments, weights and measurements with the words sdeq/sedaq: Do not act dishonestly in

using measures of length or weight or capacity. You shall have a true scale and true weights, an

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honest ephah and an honest hin. I, the LORD, am your God, who brought you out of the land of

Egypt (Lev 19:35-36).

The Book of Proverbs unites the teachings which the Israelites have to learn. Among the

fundamental attitudes found among the Israelites are: righteousness, justice, and equity (Prov

1:3). The ethico-theological meaning of this text is very evident; however, above all, it points outthe importance of justice among people.

It is likewise worth mentioning the different testimonies to which an Israelite has recourseto defend him/herself against his/her adversaries: O God, by your name save me. By your

strength defend my cause and do men justice (Ps 54:3).

Finally, Leviticus warns the person charged to administer justice to act with equity: Youshall not act dishonestly in rendering judgment. Show neither partiality to the weak nor deference

to the mighty, but judge your fellow men justly (Lev 19:15).

B) Just

This noun is referred to 213 times. Of that number 189 times it is used in the OldTestament through the wordsaddq and 24 times in the New Testament using the word sdeq.

The just means the good person without reference to human law but to the divine precept.Thus, the Book of Proverbs puts in opposition the future of the good person and the evil one: The

hope of the just brings them joy, but the expectation of the wicked comes to nought (Prov 10:28).

The Book of Wisdom pronounces that the wicked shall receive a punishment to match

their thoughts, since they neglected justice and forsook the LORD (Wis 3:10).

Already the just is the pious servant, the friend of God. Thus to Noah God said: Go intothe ark, you and all your household, for you alone in this age have I found to be truly just (Gen

7:1). The less just will be likewise saved in Sodom: Then Abraham drew nearer to him and said:

Will you sweep away the innocent with the guilty?I will not destroy it (Genesis 18:23-32).

The Messiah is also called just in the poem of the Servant of Yahweh (Is 53; Wis 2:18).

The people ask Yahweh: Let justice descend, O heavens, like dew from above, like gentle rainlet the skies drop it down (Isa 45:8).

The justpar excellence is Yahweh even to the point that this term may be an attribute or a

name for God (Gen 18:25; Ism5:15-16).

There are also texts which make direct reference to the just by reason of his/her practice of

justice in social co-existence. The Prophet Ezekiel says: If a man is virtuous--if he does what isright and just (Eze 18:5). On the part of Deuteronomy, it recommends the exercise of justice:

I charged your judges at that time, Listen to complaints among your kinsmen, and administer

true justice to both parties even if one of them is an alien (Deut. 1:16). These two texts show

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the relativity of the theory which professes a purely chronological evolution of the concept of

justice in the Old Testament.

However, in the cases referring to justice in life together, practically always, the just is

understood as synonymous with the pious and the good.

As an exception to those who make an exclusive social reading of the Old Testament,

there are others who adhere to those two conclusions:

1) It is not easy to schematize the abundant testimonies which mention the word justice in the

different books of the Old Testament. The difference in context in which they are found is

such that when they are explained from a civil point of view diverse interpretations are

possible especially when they are chosen and are cited by those who favor a special theory.

2) The reading of these biblical testimonies is inseparable from the religious context in which

they were written. Therefore, in all cases they have an ethico-theological dimension. For

this reason, whensdeq is referred to as human justice, it cannot be understood only in the

legal or strictly juridical sense.

2. Vocabulary in the New Testament

Justice and its derivatives are expressed in the New Testament with the word dke,

dakaisne, ddaios, diakaon.

Justice (dke) is found only 3 times with a meaning close to a condemnation or

unchangeable judgment (Acts 28:4; 2Thes 1:9; Jude 1:7). In Acts 25: 15 the word according to

law is used in the sense of a sentence of condemnation referring to Pauls situation in Caesarea.

A) Justice

The noun dakaiosne (justice) is found in the New Testament 91 times with a distinct but

complementary meaning in the different writings in the New Testament.

A common meaning is its equivalent to sanctity. There are so many examples and

occasions that these two words, justice and sanctity, are cited as synonymous (Lk 1:75). In

Matthew there are six texts in which these similarity is obvious: (Mt 3:15;p 5:6; 6:1, 33; 15:20;

21:32). Evil and justice are likewise put opposite each other: "You son of the devil, you enemy ofall that is right, full of every sort of deceit and fraud. Will you not stop twisting the straight paths

of (the) Lord? (Acts 13:10).

There are 63 texts in St. Paul where he deals with the theological concept of justification.

33 of them are from his Letter to the Romans. Paul uses frequently the expression the justice of

God (dikaiosne Zeo) (Rom 5:1-2; 9:30-31; Gal 2:16, 21, etc. According to St. Paul justicecontains faith in Jesus Christ (Rom 3:22); therefore his faith in Christ is reckoned as

righteousness or justice (Rom 4:5).

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It is evident that Pauline justice and social justice hardly have anything in common. This

shows that the word justice in English is a very imperfect synonym for the Greek word (or the use

of Paul in the New Testament) and from its Hebrew and Aramaic basis. This justice does notreally regulate the social conduct of the person but it designates the right and correct relationship

with God.

B) Just (Dkaios)

This word is repeated 79 times and it reaffirms the meaning of the good person.Moreover, justice is understood as fidelity to God. The saints are just; for example Abel (Mt

23:35); Zacharia and Elizabeth (Lk 1:6); Simeon (Lk 2:25); Lot (2Pet 2:8); Cornelius (Acts 10:22)

and St. Joseph (Mt 1:19). Dkaios can be synonymous with gazs. This means that the wordjust is synonymous with the word good.

The just oneper excellence is Jesus Christ. Let us look at some examples:

Have nothing to do with that righteous man (Mt 27:19).

This man is innocent beyond doubt (Lk 23:47).

You denied the Holy and Righteous One and asked that a murderer be released to you (Acts3:14).

It is worth affirming that the word just is a messianic title which is mixed with other

christological titles and which the apostles refer to as the fulfillment in the life of Jesus (Acts

7:52; 22:14).

There are many texts in which the word just modifies actions with evident reference tojustice and equity in human relationships: Masters, treat your slaves justly and fairly, realizingthat you too have a Master in heaven (Col 4:1).

We can formulate some conclusions from the exegetical point of view relative to theconcept of justice in the New Testament:

1) Justice means fidelity to God which is expressed through the fulfillment of his will.

2) The just one is primordially the person who assumes a religious and moral attitude toward

God; it also includes being just towards other men and women.

3) Justice and sin are presented as antithesis: Do not be yoked with those who are different,with unbelievers. For what partnership do righteousness and lawlessness have? Or what

fellowship does light have with darkness? (2 Cor 6:14).4) Justice and justification are closely linked concepts and realities.

As a summary, we can say that from the direct philological analysis we cannot deducespecial consequences which we can today call social justice. Likewise, it is not proper to develop

a theory exclusively based on the exegesis of the word justice. In confusion concerning the sense

of justice, Christians will look for an orientation in the divine revelation in order to listen to Godwho ought to be understood through justice. The word justice is used in a form which at first

glance causes a certain confusion. It is almost synonymous with sanctity, salvation, grace, peace,

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liberation and redemption, that is, it indicates a particular point of view whereby all men and

women hope in God. In an important sense, justice is properly attributed to God, not only as

regards he being a legislator but also as having to direct history with a view to saving his people.Considered from the point of view of the human person, justice in the biblical vocabulary is a

correct attitude toward God and the neighbor which makes possible and preserves communion. It

manifests itself in accepting the law of the covenant and as a response of the believer to the divinerevelation. The word justice acquires with Paul a more profound dimension.

3. Biblical Doctrine on Social Justice

Philology is not everything nor is it perhaps the best method of exegesis. To read the bible

does not mean making a philological analysis but it does mean understanding the whole message:[D]ue attention must be paid both to the customary and characteristic patterns of perception,

speech and narrative which prevailed at the age of the writer...and no less attention must be

devoted to the content and unity of the whole of Scripture, taking into account the Tradition of the

entire Church and the analogy of faith (D.V., 12).

Consequently, the question must be proposed in this manner: Is there something in the

bible besides the teachings on justice, especially in the social field, that expressly refers tounicuique suum,? Can we really talk about a biblical doctrine on the existence of a social life

founded on justice?

The answer to this question is surely yes because besides the justice of God there is a rich

doctrine concerning justice which regulates the relationships of people with one another. It deals

not only with justice before God but also deals with that justice which must govern the world.

In the document, Libertatis Nuntius, issued by the Congregation for the Doctrine of the

Faith there is a good reference to the relationship between biblical justice and social justice:

In the Old Testament, the prophets after Amos keep affirming with particular vigor the

requirements of justice and solidarity and the need to pronounce a very severe judgment

on the rich who oppress the poor. They come to the defense of the widow and the

orphan. They threaten the powerful: the accumulation of evils can only lead to terrible

punishments. Faithfulness to the Covenant cannot be conceived of without the practice

of justice. Justice as regards God and justice as regards mankind are inseparable. God is

the defender and the liberator of the poor. These requirements are found once again inthe New Testament. They are even more radicalized as can be shown in the discourse on

the Beatitudes. Conversion and renewal have to occur in the depths of the heartAt the

same time, the requirements of justice and mercy, already proclaimed in the Old

Testament, are deepened to assume a new significance in the New Testament. Those

who suffer or who are persecuted are identified with Christ.14

4. Justice in Tradition

It is evident that Tradition was extensively preoccupied with different ideas related to

justice in social co-existence. The criticisms of the Church Fathers constitute a true anthology oftexts which condemn wealth unjustly acquired or wealth simply not shared. In the wide literature

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which constitutes the patristic tradition, different ideas appear which cover the virtue of justice:

property and its equitable distribution, abuse of power, obedience to a legitimately constituted

power, condemnation of different crimes committed against social living, the common good, etc.In other words, the Church Fathers made thematic references in their literatures as for example the

just relationship among people themselves, collaboration between authority and the citizens in

terms of the promotion of the common good and the exercise of justice in its three areas:commutative, distributive, and legal.

In their conceptual treatment of social justice, the Fathers in the early tradition alreadytried to apply the doctrine of justice from the Graeco-Roman intellectual context to the Christian

situation. In the civil, juridical and philosophical culture, the notion of justice occupied a

prominent place. The benefits that this civil culture offered to Christian thought were

considerable. Thus the Fathers took from the Greek culture the concept of justice as the virtuewhich dealt with giving to each one his/her due. At the same time, they took from Roman

culture the inherent rights of the citizens which Christians extended to all men and women.

It is clear that the cultural notion of justice will not exactly coincide with the Christianconcept since the latter is dominated by a religious sense. Thus, the attempt of the Fathers to

impregnate the ideal of justice with a new spirit in the Graeco-Roman culture. The Fathers didnot substitute the dominant concept of justice by the bible, but they assumed it and purified it. An

example of this would be the monographs which readily appeared as commentaries to the pagan

writings.

In this light, many would bring up the question of the Hellenization of the concept of

Christian justice. They believe that this caused the loss or, at least, the diminution of the biblical

sense. They will raise this question: is it licit to regret this Hellenization of the concept of justicein Christian ethics and thus lose a chance to return to a strictly biblical teaching?

The concept of justice, elaborated by the Fathers of the Church and the great theologiansthrough a speculative work worthy of praise, establishes a new synthesis of the elements of the

biblical and philosophical tradition and the Graeco-Roman law. A grand picture of a cosmos

based on God wherein all things not only pertaining to the world of nature but also thosecorresponding to society take their proper places. This gave the whole of the existing order a

great stability and a theological legitimization. A Christian ethics of profession would consider

the place and the function of each of those in the society as a mission given by God. From this

would come corresponding rights and duties.

Christianity did what it to inculturate itself in the measure that it evangelized and assumed

those human values that were capable of being enriched by the Gospel. This is what reallyhappened with the consequent enrichment of the Christian concept of justice.

Besides the biblical notion of justice was only valid for a theocratic society like Israel. Itwas not adequate for the pagan world nor for the future of society even when Christianity

extended to Europe and became the official religion of the Roman empire. This was due to the

fact that the church-world distinction constitutes an essential point of the message preached by

Jesus Christ.

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In the 12th century the virtue of justice occupied a big space in the theological treatise on

virtues; and in the 16th century the great treatise,De Justitia et Jure appeared.

Certainly the casuistic moral theology of the 17th century occupied itself by choice with

commutative justice or private justice between individuals causing a great loss of attention

regarding problems related to distributive and legal justice which were common in the newsocieties in the colonies. It is clear that the problems that cropped up then both in the economic

and political world were not properly addressed due to the emphasis given to just relationship

between individuals.

These grave and urgent social problems gave birth to the social teaching of the Church in

the 19th century by which the Church began to make headway in the field of morality.

Without abandoning the demands of commutative justice, theological ethics today

occupies itself with distributive and legal justice so as to establish a just order in the political and

economic life of the people.

The great changes in the social world equally correspond to the political modification and

the interpretation that were made in almost all social institutions. For this reason there is anexperience of deep change in the study of justice. Likewise, the need arises to clarify the

theological concept of justice.

III. The Virtue of Justice: Theological Doctrine

1. The Patristic Tradition

We have already said that Christian writers assumed the Graeco-Roman concept of justice.St. Ambrose stresses the two elements pointed out by Aristotle in the notion of virtue: to give to

each one his/her due and the demand for equality. He added typically Christian elements to

enrich the concept.

In his work, On the Duties of the Minister, St. Ambrose wrote that the pagans established

the concept of justice which gives to each one his/her due, not appropriating from somebody else

and neglecting its own use in order to preserve the common good. He enriches the pagan doctrinewith this Christian consideration:

Respect for justice refers first to God, second to the country, third to the parents and in

the end to all. All of these are according to the teaching of nature with the supposition

that in the early years when man begins to make use of his reason, we love life as a giftof God, country and parents and later we have effect on our neighbors with whom we

must associate. Here is where charity is born which prefers others to oneself and does

not look for the things which pertain to it in which the principle of justice is found.15

Referring to social justice, he writes:

Justice refers to society and to the community of the humankind. The foundation of

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society is twofold: justice and beneficence. These are also called liberality and

benignity. Justice seems more sublime: liberality more amiable. This is because the

former contains judgment while the latter the will.16

Another enrichment of the pagan concept of justice is found in the relationship which St.

Ambrose made between charity and justice:

What the pagan philosophers say to be the first task of justice is not something attractive

to us. They affirm that no one must damage anther even if he provoked. The authority

of the Gospel contradicts this opinion (Lk 22:56).17

Another correction to the Greek concept of justice is the reference to the ownership ofgoods. St. Ambrose affirms in plain language the social demands of property given that by nature

all things are in common:

The pagan philosophers judged that as a form of justice each one may not possess what

is for all, that is, public property is for the public and not for the individual. This

certainly does not conform to nature since God gave things in common to all.18

We can consider St. Ambrose as a model. The Christian authors of the first century

always interpreted the virtue of justice in human co-existence from the perspective of faith. They

had recourse to justice to condemn unjust wealth and to demand an equitable distribution ofwealth so that social life might be governed by equity.

2. Doctrine of St. Thomas

St. Thomas seriously undertook the study of justice as a theological virtue. He structured

his treatise on moral theology based on virtues. This is the scheme that he proposed in his SummaTheologica: Human virtue is a habit which perfects man to do good. Consequently, there are

two types of virtues which he named: intellectual and moral. The moral (cardinal virtues) arefour: prudence, justice, fortitude and temperance (I-II, q. 58, a. 3). As regards justice, he wrote:Justice is the most important for being the most proximate to reason and because it is related to

the others (I-II, q. 66, a. 4).

Besides his extensive commentaries on AristotlesNicomachean Ethics, St. Thomas in hisSumma gave ample space to the study of justice. It is the most extensive treatise of the seven

treatises he devoted to the study of the virtues. Concretely, he gave it 66 quaestiones. Questiones

57-79 have 111 articles referring to the specific matter of justice while in the remaining sectionshe studied the rest of the virtues, constituting them as separate treatises.

He thus defines justice in this way: Justice is a habit whereby a man renders to each hisdue by a constant and perpetual will.19 With little modifications this can be the classic definition

of justice. In this same article, he took two definitions of Aristotle and he concluded the article

with this affirmation: Justice is a habit whereby a man is said to be capable of doing just actions

in accordance with his choice.20

St. Thomas also included the Roman thinking. He appropriated the definition of Ulpian

(+228) which became classic among the Church Fathers: The constant will to give to each one

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his due. The novelty in St. Thomas regarding the doctrine of justice is not so much his definition

but his synthesis and the articulation.

There is no doubt that his principal source was Aristotle. He followed closely the scheme

and the ideas in the first four chapters Book V of the Nicomachean Ethics and expanded the

understanding of justice by adding the Roman definition as well as the other writings of St.Anselm and other texts from the Fathers which were already used by prior scholastics.

Justice for St. Thomas integrates three fundamental elements:

1) The object of justice is right. This means that justice deals with giving and restoring what is due(q. 57, a. 1).

2) Justice refers to another. Alterity is, therefore, a constitutive element of justice: nobody is just

to his/her own self.

3) Justice is founded on equality. It demands equality between the one who receives and the onewho receives.

3. Justice and Right

A new aspect in the Thomistic exposition is the disposition of the quaestiones. In

concrete, St. Thomas first studied the question concerning rights (q. 57) before studying justice (q.

58). This novelty supposes that St. Thomas had a deep intuitionprior to justice there already

exists the right.

He already wrote in Summa Contra Gentiles: If the act of justice is to give to each one his

due it is because the said act supposes another precedent by virtue of which something isconstituted as someones property. This proposition simply shows a fundamental reality: justice

is something that comes second, it presupposes a right. If something is due to a person as his/herown, the same is not due to him/her because of the work of justice. St. Thomas showed this inthis manner: if a person works in the garden what happens is that something pertains to him and

therefore there is something due him/her; the ownership belongs to him who works. That which

is due has to be given to the other. But this giving is an act of justice which is performed on the

supposition that something is due to the person.

As a summary, justice is defined as giving to each one his/her due (unicuique suum) but

we ask: why can someone have something as his/her own? The answer is very clear: becausehe/she has the right to it. Consequently, such right must be respected through justice. The right

precedes justice. The ethical reality comes from the very etymology of justice. It comes from the

wordjus (right). This means it is a derived concept not a primary one.

We can deduce from what we have said so far the following conclusions:

1) Social ethics is more a morality of rights and duties than of justice. In this light, its teaching

will stress more the dignity of the person and his/her rights than the theme of justice. It will

help to clarify the true sense of this virtue often invoked but badly interpreted.

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2) One commits injustice only in the measure that a right is infringed. In this regard, it is not

unjust to deny someone the use of a tractor belonging to a cooperative if he/she is not member

of it. Neither will it be injustice if a lawyer denies defending someone on the basis of materials

which he/she does not have the right to. A doctor does not commit injustice if he/she denies a

sick person who demands from him/her treatment which he/she does not have the right to.

3) Given that to every right there is a corresponding duty, in the pastoral field and in the practice ofconfession the completion of duties and the corresponding demands of ones own rights must

be considered as something urgent. Due to the sensitivity to demand the rights there is more

insistence on the obligation to fulfill the duties the social co-existence demands.

4) Besides the rights-duties which justice calls for, there are cases of moral demands which have to

be attended to not through justice but through charity or through the demands of the common

good. A doctor sins against charity if he/she does not yield to the complaint of a patient.

Consequently, social morality cannot be reduced to the theme of justice alone.

5) Besides rights-duties there are correlative moral values which they represent. They give rise to

different doctrines which material values propose and defend with the exclusion of those which

refer to the human person as a spiritual being. Without failing to pay attention to all the classesof values, it is necessary to understand that material values can be more urgent but that spiritual

are ordinarily more important.

6) Given that the rights-duties arise from the spiritual condition of the human person, it isnecessary to orient the citizen towards the horizon of spiritual life. Justice cannot be lived out

in a community which moves exclusively through the claims of material values or a political

party.

7) Rights and duties must be juridically regulated. Hence comes the importance of a norm or a just

law which must moderate the rights and duties of every person. In this way the trilogy right-

justice-law is united. These three fundamental concepts are correlated and united in the mind

and in the understanding of the jurists and philosophers of all times.

4. Division and Classes of Justice

Justice is a virtue of alterity. It is the ordering of the communitarian life. There are three

fundamental relationships as far as a human person in his/her social existence is concerned;

1) Horizontal. This means relationship of some individuals with others. The justice which

governs these relationships is called commutative justice.

2) Vertical. This means relationships of individuals with the collectivity of the State. The type of

justice under this dispensation is called legal justice. On the other hand, the justice which

governs the relationship of the State with individuals is called distributive justice.

Aristotle proposed this division. This was repeated in tradition, both juridical and

theological, and St. Thomas was in agreement with it.

J. Pieper suggests this diagram which clarifies the classic triple division of justice,

explaining the mutual relationships between them.

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A

A B

The strict notion of justice is given in this three classes of justice. However, each one of

them touches on different aspects which we shall clarify in the succeeding section. Our aim hereis to emphasize their specific content and to call attention to certain risks to which they might be

subjected.

A. Commutative Justice

Commutative justice looks at the good of the individual. It is founded on the singularity ofeach person as carrier of his/her rights and duties; it supposes the radical equality of all men andwomen. The seventh commandment is almost exclusively occupied with commutative justice; it

even constitutes it as a primordial material when the treatise of moral theology is structured on

virtues. Thus the risk of reducing the extensive content of justice to mere just relationshipsamong individuals and thereby neglecting just relationships which must prevail in social life.

This situation would be aggravated in our socialized era by neglecting the common goodor when the importance of society, the regulating function of the State and international

relationships are neglected. These deficiencies become obvious in fiscal deceptions or,

concretely, in the manipulation of prices by one particular group to the detriment of the common

good.

However, in our time there is also the contrary risk: to be too much preoccupied with

distributive and legal justice. This can cause neglect of the demands of commutative justice. Thisrisk is concretized in the case where the individual is sacrificed to the interests of the State or the

collectivity without a social dynamism that arises from interpersonal relationships.

15

Commutative Justice

Individual Individual

Distributive JusticeLegal Justice


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B. Legal Justice

Legal justice looks for the common good. It contemplates on the demands of society. Ittakes on the perspective of the social condition of the human person and it gives emphasis to the

social order through the realization of just laws.

Attention to legal justice demands that the individual overcomes his/her egoism and pays

attention to the juridical ordering of the nation. Frequently, individuals, including Christians, like

to be excused from the fulfillment of civil laws. In this light it becomes necessary to press forobligation of conscience to obey just laws.

However, preferential attention to legal justice has also its own risk: the abundance of lawswhich, instead of favoring social co-existence, put a straitjacket on the activities of particular

groups. There is a classic understanding which affirms that an abundance of laws reveals the

corruption of society.21 Modern states legislate more laws everyday based on the aspects of

natural rights. Often these are against natural law, causing tensions in the personal conscience of

the citizens. What we experience today is a new and specific crisis of governance which does notcome from defect in organization but rather from the excess of it. It is an order that engenders

disorder.

Another risk in legal justice in democratic countries is manifested when laws are legislated

due to political motives and in function of a party in power. In these cases, what takes place is notso much the good of particular groups but the obtaining of more votes that will put them in power.

Justice from the law is considered not because it legitimizes the democratic majority but because

it promotes the common good of the society. We take an example of an immoral law: abortion is

used as part of an electoral platform by some political parties.

C. Distributive Justice

Distributive justice orders the relationships between the State and the individual. The

exercise of this justice is of exceptional interest in order to facilitate justice in society. It must

consider the fundamental equality of all the citizens so as to diminish social inequality.

Distributive justice has to favor the just distribution of economic, political and cultural

goods.

The risk of distributive justiceif it does not take the other classes of justiceis in the

supplanting of the society by the State. The Statification of society is very dangerous in liberalstates because the freedom of the strongest is the one that wins. In totalitarian countries this also

happens with the assumption of power by only one party. In both cases there is the danger that

ideologies or the system will dominate over the demands of justice.

Finally, the danger in the exercise of distributive justice in the hands of the State is in the

non-possibility of having intermediate entities between the individual and the state institutions.

This situation brings loss of the creative capacity of society and it puts to risk the equilibriumbetween the particular initiatives and those exclusively proper to the competence of the State.

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5. Social Justice

Since the 19th century social justice is mentioned as something added to the classical tripledivision of justice. It was the Italian sociologist Luigi Taparelli who introduced this expression

and he was followed by another Italian philosopher, Antonio Rosmini. Both authors would refer

to the urgency to implant justice in the new society of the 19 th century when new and flagrantinequalities would arise in social co-existence. Possibly, the same Italian language favored that

one may talk about social justice and thus, by the imperative of the language, a neologism is

created without having to deal with a new scholarly classification.

This new syllogism was not easily accepted. The fact is that in the clamor of conflicting

ideologies the expression was heavily criticized even by Catholics to the point that is was faultedby the Modernists. The discussions went on and on even though the expression was used by Pius

X. In the encyclical,Iucunda Sane (March 12, 1904), Pius X praised the attitude of Pope Gregory

the Great in the face of the endeavors of the Emperor. Through this act, he earned the title,

Champion of Social Justice.

From that time on, the controversies on the use of the term died down, however,

discussions concerning the exact meaning of social justice began. Pius XI made the first approachto clarify the meaning of social justice in his encyclical, Quadragessimo Anno:

To each, therefore, must be given his own share of goods, and the distribution of created

goods, which, as every discerning person knows, is laboring today under the gravest

evils due to the huge disparity between the few exceedingly rich and the unnumberedpropertyless, must be effectively called back to and brought into conformity with the

norms of the common good, that is, social justice (Q.A., 58).

Pope Pius XI thus reduced social justice to a just distribution of goods.

In the 1930s the expression social justice was thoroughly accepted, creating a decrease in

attention to the classic triple division of justice. Even the encyclicals which deal with this theme

are given the name social encyclicals. Controversies concerning the specific material of this newtype of justice opposed to the classical types arose. The classical division traces its root in

Aristotle, gaining its own epistemological status among Catholic moral authors.

The question posed is this: are we dealing with a new type of justice or is it proper to

reduce social justice to any of the three known divisions? Does social justice gather some of the

demands of the three commonly admitted types of justice? The responses of the different authors

were disparate.

Many authors will equate social justice with legal justice (A. Vermeesch, E. Gnicot, L.

Lanchance, and P. Tischleder). Others limit social justice to the demands of natural right and notlegally codified in the common good (B. Hring and A. F. Utz). Others, in turn, link the concept

of social justice to legal and distributive justice (H. Pesch, O. Schilling, and E. Welty). Some will

interpret social justice as the harmony between legal, distributive and commutative justice rightlyunderstood (B. Mathis and F. Cavallera).

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The solution will never be easy when the discussion is surrounded by the idea of the

classical triple division. In this light, others will decide on admitting that social justice deals with

a new type of justice.22 However, these authors still have not come at a consensus on the questionof the real object of social justice.

In my opinion social justice is an original expression which responds to new socialsituations, both economic and political. In social justice is expressed the need that social

relationships brought about by the new economic order are regulated by justice. For example

since the 19th century, new social institutions which mediate between the individual and the Stategained importance: the economic enterprises, political parties, unions, etc. Neither man/woman

as an individual nor as a member of society has to be directly confronted by the State but by more

immediate institutions which seriously affect his/her life and which are not always regulated in an

equitable manner.

This means that social justice is the justice which governs the institutions born from a new

social and political order. These new institutions are principally economic and political in nature;

however, they touch other fields of human existence. For this reason, the social life which gainedgreater importance in different fields must be ruled by justice. This justice is given the name

social justice because of its immediate influence social life.

Besides, given the dynamism acquired by society, social justice regulates the relationships

among different social groups. For example, the common good does not necessarily coincidewith the good of the State but with the good of the citizens in a concrete situation and the good of

those groups created by it. In the context of social justice, therefore, the principles of subsidiarity

and solidarity have gained importance. Equally, social justice will regulate the creation and the

competence of the intermediate groupings or maybe between the competence of the State andthose which are born as a response to the immediate needs. To these new needs the individuals

intend to give a response in a collective manner.

Uncertainty comes about when one deals with restricting social justice only to the

economic field or to the narrow field of the unjust distribution of wealth. Certainly, this is a very

important assumption of social justice but it is not a unique nor exclusive one. Therefore, whenthe encyclicals appeal to social justice they mention the common good in which the goods of the

family, education, and, in general, the values of the spirit enter. These matters are also regulated

by social justice. Milln-Pulles says:

Social justice goes beyond the limited area of material or economic goods and it extends

to a point where it demands an effective possibility for the participation of the citizens in

the highest goods of lifeThe understanding of social justice in its social plenitude and

according to its highest sense carries with it an organization of co-existence which makespossible the proportionate participation of all the citizens in the highest goods of life.

The common good has a part, or more correctly, a condition of material nature. But its

most important aspect and dimension is that it will constitute the superior values of thespirit. Moreover, to restrict social justice to the realm of the rights of the citizens as

regards material goods would constitute an attack on the dignity of the human person.23

To those who prefer to explain social justice in the light of the classical triple division it

will be easy to arrive at a consensus, if it is admitted ,that it is proper to social justice, at least, tojudge the social aspects of the three classes of justice in relation to material, familial, educational,

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political and religious goods. In other words, social justice is that which regulates the different

social institutions to which the life of the individual in society revolves. This is sufficient with

regard to this quaestio de nomine.

6. Social Order and Juridical Order

We discussed earlier the relationship between justice and right: the right precedes justice.

Therefore, to protect and to defend the right justice is required. This in turn demands the

existence of laws which regulate rights, duties and relationships among the citizens.

This theme refers to the so called state of law in which a just legislation facilitates the

equitable co-existence among citizens. However, as we said earlier, it is important to avoid thesetwo extremes: (1) a city without a law, characterized by lack of norms, which allows the law of

the jungle to reign supreme (2) a society governed by abundant legislation that converts its social

life into a concentration camp. In the first case, adequate legislation makes laws become the pulse

of social life while in the second case excessive legislation stifles all existence in society.

Besides the existence of a good number of laws that facilitate social co-existence it is

likewise required that these laws be just. The ethical ideal exists in social life when it is governedby few but just laws; few but good laws are the juridical ideal of society.

Justice of laws is seen through the following criteria:

1) Laws are considered just when they comply with the conditions which define them. Laws arehonest when they strive for the good of the individual and of society; they are useful if they

facilitate the attainment of the true good. Laws are possible if they can be fulfilled without

grave discomfort and when they come from a legitimately constituted authority.

2) Laws are ethically just when they defend, protect and favor human rights, that is, when they

respect human dignity from whence these fundamental rights come.

3) Laws are morally just when they legislate a social co-existence oriented to the common good.

This theme always poses the problem of conflict: the relationship between morality and

right. It is urgent to give this area separate treatment.

7. Morality and Legality

The importance and meaning of laws in society frequently lead to confusion between twodistinct areas: the moral norm and civil law. This confusion leads to the belief that what the law

demands (legality) is what constitutes the moral good (morality). This approach tends to put

morality and legality on equal footing.

It deals consequently with fixing the relationship between law and morality or between

what is licit in the juridical field and what is just in moral life. Definitely, there exists the need to

distinguish what is permissible in civil law from what is ethically good or bad given that the civillaw does not always coincide with what is judged as moral. This doctrine acquires a special

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weight when civil law legislates against the principles of natural law or ,worse, when it legislates

against the law of God.

The idea of legality as an ethical norm has developed very slowly because of the

secularizing of culture which has been slowly disregarding God. The following is the history of

ethical legalism.

a)Right Naturalism. Grocio proposed a thesis that talks about natural law without considering theexistence of God. He received this inheritance from the old right naturalists. The right

naturalist conception is the first secularization of law and of natural law since it alienated moral

consideration from God. In short, natural law was made independent of God.

b)Juridical positivism. This signified an advancement in the process of secularization. According

to the defenders of this doctrine, there is no natural law. In 1893, Otto von Gierke wrote that

nature was a thing of the past and that what remained of the doctrine was only the pride of the

old power. In our time, Hans Kelsen writes that it does not make any sense to have recourse to

natural law. For this reason he talks about right naturalist ingenuity. It is the State who makes

the laws and determines the norms. Therefore, morality comes from the law. Consequently,morality is correlated to the legality which marks the State.

Juridical positivism reached its highest acceptance among totalitarian nations in the first half of

this century. This phenomenon motivated Pius XII to act urgently. In his discourse to theRota

Romana he criticized juridical positivism as the cause of the loss of the moral sense:

The immediate causes of the crisis (of the Christian moral conscience) have been

found principally in juridical positivism and in the absolutism of the State

Separating the law, its base, constituted by the divine and positive law and therefore

immutable, remains founded only on the law of the State as the supreme normIn

turn the absolute State will necessarily attempt to subject all things under its will

Juridical positivism and absolutism of the State have altered and disfigured the noble

features of justice. It is necessary that the juridical order establishes itself again asclosely linked to the moral order. However, the social order is essentially founded on

God, on his will, his sanctity and his being.24

c)Juridical Sociologism. This doctrine makes morality dependent on the social conditions of the

people. According to Arnold Gehlen, what ordains ethical values is historical sociology. A

law depends on the culture received by the people. The different cultures inherit some moral

values and elevate them to a category of ethical norm of conduct. In juridical sociologism apositive law must respect those inherited norms and they must acquire their moral character.

These three currents lead to an ethical legalism: what is moral is what the law establishes.

This means that morality and legality coincide.

This interpretation suffers many basic errors that must be examined. They are errors of

the metaphysical order and gnoseology with direct impact on the moral order.

The metaphysical error consists in affirming that human nature as such is not possible.

The gnoseological error is rooted in the denial of objective knowledge. The underlying reason for

these two errors is the exaggerated historicism which, in denying a stable human nature, cannot

accept the existence of natural law. The immediate consequence is relativism both distinct and

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diverse. This affects ethics since these doctrines cannot guarantee objective good and evil.

Metaphysical relativism connotes a gnoseological relativism and both lead to an ethical

relativism.

The teachings of the church have been opposed to these doctrines and to their resultant

negative consequences. In so far as these theories are erroneous, Pius XII affirmed Humannature remains substantially the same.25

Vatican II contains similar doctrine. In expounding the sense and task of conscienceGaudium et Spes affirms that in the depths of his conscience man detects a law which he does

not impose upon himself, but which holds him to obedience (no. 16). That law was written by

God in each persons heart. The greatness of the human person consists in being faithful to that

law which conscience applies to different situations in his/her life.

In the face of an understanding of positive law as moral norm, John Paul II affirms the

existence of a moral principle which is rooted to the persons very nature and which cannot be

reduced to positive laws:

Moral law is not only constituted by general orientationsThere are moral norms which

have a precise, immutable and unconditional contentfor example, the norm which

prohibits contraception or that which prohibits the direct taking of the life of an innocentperson. One can deny the existence of moral norms which have such a value if he denies

that there exists the truth of the person, the immutable nature of man, founded in the last

analysis on the creative wisdom which is the measure of all reality.26

In that address, the pope calls historicistic relativism that ethics which relativizes themoral norm. In that relativism are counted those who attach morality to ever-changing civil laws.

Because of these changes positive law will always arrive at legalizing moral values.

Summing up the doctrine regarding the relationship between law and morality, we proposethese principles:

1) For the legal to become moral the law must respect natural law. This law, taken from the

Graeco-Roman thinking and assumed by Catholic moral theology, is the universal and

permanent norm of moral rectitude:

The first postulateis the existence of natural law, common to all people, from

which norms of being, of work and of duty are derivedFor those who will rejectthis truth, relationships among their people will always remain an enigma, both

practical and theoretical. If its rejection is converted into a common doctrine, the

very course of human history will be an eternal wandering in the stormy sea without

any haven. On the contrary, in the light of this principle all can easily discern,perhaps in general lines, the just and the unjust, the law of injury; to indicate the

norms with which to resolve differences; to understand the obligatory character of

international law. In other words, natural law is the common solid base of every

right and duty, the universal language necessary for all understanding. It is thatsupreme tribunal of appeal which humanity has always desired to put an end to

possible conflicts.27

2) Some more important and fundamental positive laws must help facilitate the completion of the

natural law. These must be applications of natural law as for example those approved by the

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Federal Tribunal of Germany. Natural right has the mission of maintaining a hope open to a

just right. When civil laws are separated from natural law moral permissiveness begins. More

seriously the so called civil ethics as opposed to natural morality also begins.

3) Positive laws must fulfill those areas that are not explicitly contained in the natural law. Theymust favor justice and respect of human rights.

Under this criterion are some permissive laws which endeavor to convert into norms some

defects in social life. To elevate into a category of norm that which is lived on the street is a

dangerous path confusing morality with legality. Such legal attitude abandons the sense of the

law as a teacher of the person and seems not to fail to recognize that citizens in general are

inclined to some minimal ethical demands.

This temptation to which many legislators may fall is denounced by the Congregation for the

Doctrine of the Faith:

The role of law is not to record what is done, but to help in promoting improvement.

It is at all times the task of the State to preserve each person's rights and to protect the

weakest. In order to do so the State will have to right many wrongs. The law is notobliged to sanction everything, but it cannot act contrary to a law which is deeper and

more majestic than any human law: the natural law engraved in men's hearts by the

Creator as a norm which reason clarifies and strives to formulate properly, and which

one must always struggle to understand better, but which it is always wrong to

contradict. Human law can abstain from punishment, but it cannot declare to be rightwhat would be opposed to the natural law, for this opposition suffices to give the

assurance that a law is not a law at all.28

4) The field remains open for a social normativity which takes into account the political, social,

cultural, etc. plurality of each country and each period. St. Thomas affirmed that the governing

body does not always have the best legislation:

As stated above (I-II, q. 96, a. 2) human law is given to all people among whomsome are virtuous and others not. Hence human law was unable to forbid all that is

contrary to virtue; and it suffices for it to prohibit what is inimical to society while it

treats other matters as though they were lawful, not by approving but by not

punishing them.29

4) Laws against natural law are unjust and therefore to them can be applied the principle: Lex

unjusta nulla lex. This doctrine is common in Catholic theology and in the Magisterium. We

cite a text fromPacem et Terris to prove this:

Since the right to command is required by the moral order and has its source in God,it follows that, if civil authorities pass laws or command anything opposed to the

moral order and consequently contrary to the will of God, neither the laws made nor

the authorizations granted can be binding on the consciences of the citizens, sinceGod has more right to be obeyed than men. Otherwise, authority breaks down

completely and results in shameful abuse. As St. Thomas Aquinas teaches: Human

law has the true nature of law only in so far as it corresponds to right reason, and in

this respect it is evident that it is derived from the eternal law. In so far as it falls

short of right reason, a law is said to be a wicked law; and so, lacking the true natureof law, it is rather a kind of violence (no. 51).

In some fields of public opinion the conviction that the moral is legal is deeply ingrained.

In this regard we find some slogans commonly derived from this belief:

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1) Legislators cannot impose charges on persons who do not practice certain moral ideals;

2) The legislator must respect the liberty of the subjects;

3) The legislator has to take into account the opinion of the majority;

4) The law must regulate that which is on the street on the level of secrecy.

The confusion between morality and legality notably lessens public morality given thatsociety, not having a leading educator of law, is subjected to some demoralizing pressure when

this attitude does not respond to what is morally correct. This pressure heightens because of thecircumstances and the influence of the latest fashion or craze.

The phenomenon of sociological conformism consists in the influence exercised on the

behavior of a citizen by the accepted models of conduct and approved in the social

milieu in which it exists. It is the result of the pressure of the surroundings on the

conduct of those who do what everybody else does, basing their style of life on themajority behavior which they follow because they accept it blindly or out of fear of

criticism by those who they follow.3031

Obviously, the Christian moral attitude deals with going against the current and withattempt at making Christian moral norms penetrate social life. The mission to teach proper to the

hierarchy has been urged by many church documents. At the same time, the action of Christians

in the world is concretized in the being present in civil society. Vatican II urges this obligation: itis generally the function of the well-formed Christian conscience to see that the divine law is

inscribed in the life of the earthly city (G.S., 43).

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1 J. Rawls,A Theory of Justice (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1971), 3.2 Ibid., 3-3.3The Republic, IV, 18, 444d. The Platonic concept of justice is understood in the social context of his time: the primacy ofsociety over the individual person. In this regard the term unjust does not refer to the person but rather to the maladjustment

which is produced when the good of the society is not followed. Individuals are subordinate to it. Thus, Plato defines

justice as making each one his/her own, that means, that which corresponds to doing. Ibid., I, 6, 331a.4, Ibid., I, 331d-e.5 Non est autem jus, ubi nulla justitia est; procul dubio colligitur, ubi justitia non est, non esse republicam. St. Augustine,

De Civit Dei, XIX, 21, 1, inPatrologia Latina 41, 649.6 Aristotle,Nichomachean Ethics, V, 1,Patrologia Latina, 1129-1130.7 Plato, Giogias, 469c.8 Ibid., 469a-b.9 Cicero, De Officiis, VII, 20.10 Iustitia est habitus animi communi utilitate servata, suam cuique tribuens dignitatem. Cf. Cicero,De Invent Rethor, I,

53.11 Id.,De Republica, III, 22-23.12 W. Kerber, La justicia como orden social justo, in AA. VV.,Fe cristiana y sociedad moderna (Madrid: Ed. SM, 1992),

61.13 The magisterium denounces (cf.Libertatis Nuntius, 5)14 Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith,Libertis Nuntius, 6-10.15 St. Ambrose,De officiis ministrorum, I, XXVIII, 127,Patrologia Latina, 16, 60-61.

16 Ibid, I, XXVIII, 130,Patrologia Latina 16, 61.17 Ibid., I, XXVIII, 131,Patrologia Latina 16, 62.18 Natura enim omnia omnibus in commune profudit. Ibid., I, XXVIII, 132,Patrologia Latina, 16, 62.19Summa Theologica, II-II, q. 58, a.1).20 Ibid.21 Corruptissima re publica, plurimae leges. Tacitus,Anales, 3 ,27.22 Some of them are J. Messner, J. Pieper, A. Retzbach, C. Hentzen, G. Grundlach, O. von Nell-Bruening, B. Molitor, C. van

Gestel, J. L. Gutirrez, J. Marias, etc.23 A. Milln-Puelles,Personal y justicia social(Madrid: Ed. Rialp, 1973), 80-81.24 Pius XII,Right-Conscienc: Discourse to the Rota Romana (November 13, 1949).25Discourse on Natural Law, October 13, 1955.26 John Paul II,Address to the International Congress in Moral Theology (April 10, 1986).27 Pius XII,Maximas conciliadoras (October 13, 1955), 6.28

Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith,Declaration on Procured Abortion (November 18, 1974), no. 21.29Summa Theologica, II-II, q. 77, a. 1 ad 1. Human law cannot prohibit everything that natural law prohibits. Cf. ibid., I-II,

q. 96, a. 3 ad 3.30 A. de Fuenmayor,Legalidad, moralidad y cambio social(Pamplona, Eunsa, 1981), 31.31

justice: human and christian virtue

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