Journal of Applied Philosophy, Vol. 4, No. 2, 1987

DISCUSSION ARTICLE

Just War: theory and application

217

PAUL GILBERT

ABSTRACT How should just war theory be applied to assess a community’s claim to defend itself? The IRA’s claim to be fighting a just war to end British rule in Northern Ireland is upheld against the objection (e.g. by Simpson in this Journal, 1986) that they have a right only to self-defence against indigenous tyranny. Under just war theory no unclarity concerning the alien status of British rule could render the IRA claim unjustifiable: only the well-grounded denial of its alien status might serve (though this is doubtful). But if that denial is argued for by identijjing a separate British community in Ireland then the IRA must be granted a right to repel alien occupation of nationalist areas. However the IRA’s rejection of the ’two communities’ view can be defended; for what constitutes a single community is subject to moral considerations. Accordingly a genuine community’s claim to self-defence is against being wronged, rather than harmed. It is concluded that just war theory cannot be applied without antecedent moral judgements identijjing the community potentially wronged.

The IRA claims the right under the theory of the just war to use such violence as may be required to end British rule in Northern Ireland, thereby making possible the establishment of a united Irish state. Peter Simpson (‘Just war theory and the IRA’, Journal of Applied Philosophy, 3, pp. 73-88) denies this right on the following grounds. “War is only justified as a defence against a real and serious attack on the common good” (p. 76). Such an attack may result either from “occupation and rule by an alien power” or from “a government that is sectarian or tyrannical”. In the former case expulsion of the alien power is justified, in the latter only the restraint of the tyrant. “The presence of the British in Northern Ireland cannot be regarded as a clear case of occupation by a foreign power” (p. 80). However, “the regime in Northern Ireland i s . . . tyrannical”. Hence “violence to expel the British or create a united Ireland is not justifiable” (p. 82), though “self-defence, to resist the tyrannical part” of the community is.

We would be ill advised to take our historical or political analyses from philoso- phers. It is, therefore, somewhat surprising that Simpson conceives it his task to provide not only “a clear grasp of the principles of just war”, but also “of the situation in Northern Ireland to which they are to be applied ” (p. 73). Whoever had that? Fortunately for philosophers, I shall argue, the ethical and empirical questions are not so easy to distinguish. It is through inadequacies in his philosophical analysis of just war theory that Simpson’s application of them to the IRA claim fails to be cogent. But these inadequacies are due, I shall suggest, to the assumption that such a theory can be

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made intelligible, as an instrument of moral appraisal, independently of its application to particular cases.

First let us clear away some difficulties in Simpson’s account that blur the real issue. Simpson appears to think (e.g. pp. 80,85) that because the IRA uses violence with the intention of creating a united Ireland and because this political end does not justify violence its members fail to have the right intention for ius ad bellum. But this would follow only if that was the sole intention from which they acted. Clearly it is not. Their principal intention is the ending of British rule, which is a necessary precondition of Irish unity. There is no reason to assume, as Simpson does, (e.g. p. 82), that the IRA would (like the Unionists) go on to use violence or the threat of violence “to impose a regime on the whole of Ulster” (sic). We are concerned, then, only with whether ending British rule justifies violence [ 11.

This leads to a related point. Simpson argues that, because tyrannical in respect of both the legitimacy and exercise of its rule, the Northern Ireland regime may justly be opposed by violence, but only to the extent required for self-defence, not to that needed for overthrowing it (p. 82). Simpson again seems to think that having the intention to replace the regime counts against the justification of overthrowing it by violence. Believing he has already shown that ending British rule is unjustified on other grounds, he overlooks the possibility that what would justify violent overthrow is that it constitutes the only means to terminate a tyranny. If the use of necessary and reasonable means to terminate a tyranny is justifiable on the theory of the just war then whether the tyranny is alien or indigenous is in this respect irrelevant. The fact, repeatedly noted by Simpson, (e.g. pp. 78, 84) that in the latter case the agents of the regime cannot be expelled does nothing to show it should not be overthrown.

Finally we should deal with Simpson’s curious argument that since the presence of the British is not a clear case of alien occupation “hence. . . violent resistance to them as if they were is not justifiable” (p. 80). All that follows from its not being a clear case is that resistance is not clearly justifiable, certainly not that it is clearly unjustifiable, under the theory of just war. Simpson’s argument is supported by the observation that “the British presence in Ulster is regarded as foreign by one section of the community and not the other” (p. 79). He infers that “since both sections are legitimately part of Ulster.. . both views should be accorded a certain validity”, and hence that neither should “force its opinion on the other”. But if the question of whether there is alien occupation of the six counties is a determinate question of fact then divergence of opinion is no reason for thinking that one side is not right. It is hard to see how to adopt Simpson’s ‘sensible position’ of reaching a compromise on this question, rather than on the quite separate one of what to do in circumstances of disagreement [2]. Simpson’s considered opinion is that British rule is not alien occupation (p. 78). That Unionists “regard British troops and officials.. . as in some sense their own” is thought of as evidence of that. Hence Simpson concludes that the IRA campaign is unjustifiable, not merely unjustified as a result of uncertainty as to the facts.

Let us turn now to the main issue. Let us suppose, with Simpson, that the IRA campaign of violence to end British rule is justifiable under the theory of just war only if that rule is exercised by an alien power. What is the structure of Simpson’s attempted demonstration (p. 79) that it is not?

First, he asks us to envisage a political community (e.g. France) whose common good is violated by a separate community (Germany). We are then asked whether “British troops and government officials” constitute an analogous “alien, occupying

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power”. By implication the community whose common good would be violated if they were an alien power is Northern Ireland. But Simpson gives two reasons why they are not. First the Unionists do not regard them as such, because the Unionists regard themselves as part of the British political community. Secondly the Unionists wish British rule to continue. This second consideration is clearly intended by Simpson to support the first. The Unionists do not regard themselves as British under compulsion, but as willingly so. The first consideration, that the Unionists regard themselves as members of the British community, is then evidence that they are indeed members, because people’s views as to their uncoerced membership of communities are partly determinative of it. If this reconstruction of Simpson’s argument is correct his conclusion, that the British are not an alien power, will depend on the Unionists being right about their communal British identity. Simpson presumably believes this condi- tion to be satisfied.

But what is the consequence of this line of reasoning? Surely it is that there cannot be, as we had originally been led to suppose, a single Northern Ireland community with a common good to be violated. For by the same line of reasoning the nationalists will not be part of the British community. “They may regard the Unionists as really part of Ulster but they do not regard Ulster as really part of the UK . . . and this view of theirs is not mistaken, for at least as far as they are concerned the Union is forced and alien” (p. 79). The important point is that, while regarding themselves as of the same community as the Unionists, nationalists do not regard themselves as British, or at least not willingly so. So, assuming that they are right about their lack of communal British identity, which Simpson concedes, the Nationalists will be of a different community from the Unionists. Simpson does not explicitly draw this conclusion and it is easy to see why not [3]. Once we do, the distinction between opposition to alien and indigenous tyranny which he employs cannot apply. The kind of reason he offers for claiming that the British are not an alien power in the North is destructive of his assumption that the North constitutes a single community and hence undermines his view that the British are an indigenous tyranny. The right of violent opposition by nationalists will be to alien impositions by the British regime, including the right to defend no-go-areas etc. In this light Simpson’s restriction on their justified opposition is easily understood. They cannot overthrow the regime, because it is the legitimate government of the Unionist part of the country [4].

I can see no way of making sense of Simpson’s position which escapes this consequence. Evidently it is a consequence hard to square with Simpson’s preferred solution that the Northern Ireland people should arrive at a compromise by which “the community may be restored to its original form” (p. 78). Here the establishing of “two distinct communities” is thought of as a possible future alternative, not as the formalisation of a present reality. On this, at least, we should surely agree with Simpson.

Simpson has no plausible and coherent account of the “relevant political commu- nity” whose alleged violation by alien British rule is at issue. This is, perhaps, because he nowhere recognises the IRA’S conception of the community it claims to be the victim of British oppression [5 ] . It is not a putative community of the inhabitants of Northern Ireland but of the inhabitants of Ireland as a whole. If there is such a community, evidently no part of the British community, then the IRA description of the British presence in Ireland as alien occupation looks unanswerable. The question Simpson needs to address is whether this conception of the relevant political commu- nity is manifestly mistaken.

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Undeniably there is some evidence against it, namely that Unionists do not believe themselves to be part of a common Irish community. The IRA maintains that their belief is wrong. It is based on the Unionists’ judgement that they lack the appropriate common interests to form part of that community. But the IRA has always claimed that the Unionists’ calculation of their interests is inaccurate [6]. True, if the British regime ended the Unionists would lose their hegemony in the North, but they would, it is claimed, gain association with others who have greater concern for their real interests [7]. Both the Unionists and the British have an interest in the perpetuation of the regime but it appears to be a different interest in each case. The Unionists’ desire to retain their cultural position has little in common with the pursuit of British national interests, with which it can come into conflict [8]. That their interests now coincide is no evidence that the Unionists and the British share the appropriate common interests to constitute a community. The IRA contention is that by contrast the Irish people as a whole have such a common interest. Simpson does nothing to rebut this contention. I conclude that his arguments fail to show that the IRA claim that it is justified in using violence to end alien British rule is illegitimate [9].

How plausible is the IRA position? I want to suggest that it is not a position that a dispassionate survey of the facts can rule out. That is because there is, I think, no non- moral fact of the matter as to what the relevant political community in Ireland is, with respect to the violation of whose good opposing violence might be justifiable. Simp- son’s treatment of the just war theory would lead one to suppose that there are such non-moral facts concerning the identity of the communities involved in the war and the extent of damage to the common good of either party. Having established these facts, the theory provides us with rules for determining what violent acts may be justifiable. However if the cause of dispute between the belligerents itself concerns the identity of the relevant communities and the consequential damage to some putative common goods the just war theory cannot be applied in Simpson’s way to arbitrate on the justification of violence, since it would be quite unpersuasive to claim that the dispute between the belligerents concerns non-moral facts. Claims about who consti- tute common communities are not simply about the shared interests served by their social relationships, but about how worthwhile certain relationships are irrespective of their conducing to further good, (about how worthwhile, for example, the relationships that characterise the Northern Ireland state are). It is characteristically on such questions that disputes as to the justice of wars of partition or national reunification depend [lo]. It is only against a background of acceptance of the desirability of certain social units that just war theory can find an application. In considering standard examples of just wars we tend to forget that we have already made such judgements.

Failure to take note of this is, I believe, what leads to a fundamental inadequacy of Simpson’s paper. Any group banded together for a common purpose can have its interests harmed by the actions of another group. But it is only under certain circumstances that an attack on their common interests entitles the group to take defensive measures. Specifically, only when, as is normally the case, the group is thereby wronged. What is missing in Simpson’s account of the just war is the required distinction between any damage to interests and that which wrongs the group. It may be the case, as Simpson assumes, that Unionist interests would be harmed by a successful IRA campaign to end the British regime in Northern Ireland. It does not follow that the Unionists would be wronged as he implies (p. 82). Only if their common interest is in achieving a just purpose will that be so. Yet if the pursuance of their purposes wrongs the community of Irish people as a whole, of which they are a

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part, this condition will not hold. Here it is important to distinguish wronging the Irish people as a whole from wronging the non-Unionist sections of it. Some players who renege on an undertaking to play in a team, for example, wrong the team as a whole, which cannot now achieve its common objective. The other members may be wronged too, but not with respect to this purpose, and the wrong that they are done as individuals or a residual group is not betrayal, the fundamental wrong. If the Irish people as a whole have been wronged in this way then the IRA need not be restrained by fears that the Unionists constitute a community whose interests have a claim under the theory of the just war. But it is only as protecting their interests that the British regime in the six counties can be justified.

Under just war theory it is wrongs that justify resort to violence. In order to discover the relevant political communities to which the theory applies we need to find out what justly constituted patterns of social relationships have been attacked. History cannot, as Simpson fondly supposes [ 111, be ignored. T o suppose it can is to fall into a consequentialist interpretation of just war that would make coherent and workable identification of the relevant political communities impossible [ 121.

Correspondence: Paul Gilbert, Department of Philosophy, University of Hull, Hull HU6 7RX, United Kingdom.

NOTES

[l J It needs to be stressed, as Simpson does not, that it is British rule, not a local Stormont administration, that is under attack. The latter would constitute a target only in so far as it was an instrument of the former.

[2] While treating the question of what the relevant political communities are as a determinate question of fact (and needing to treat it as such in order to apply just war theory), Simpson seems unaware that an inconsistent triad is generated by allowing both the Unionists to be right about their communal British identity and the Nationalists to be right about their communal identity with Unionists and their lack of communal British identity.

[3] The line of reasoning “would lead naturally to an indefinite disintegration of political societies, since a faction that was in a minority in the whole state would probably be in a majority in some districts and might. . . claim to be governed according to its wishes in these districts”, as Henry Sidgwick long ago noted of any arguments that depended on the “divine right of majorities”. (HENRY SIL-IGWICK (1891) The Elements of Politics, p. 621 (Basingstoke, Macmillan) ).

[4] Surely however they would be justified, pace Simpson, in attacks on the British mainland, in the way any alien occupation may be resisted by striking at its home bases.

[5] Indeed Simpson slips into speaking of the IRA “defending the common good of the nationalist community in Northern Ireland’’ (p. 83).

[6] In particular as overlooking the common interests of the Irish working class (for background see N. MANSERGH (1965) The Irish Question, ch. 3 (London, Allen & Unwin)).

[7] Thus the proclamation of the Provisional Government at Easter 1916 stated: “The Republic guarantees religious and civil liberty, equal rights and equal opportunities to all its citizens. . . oblivious of the differences carefully fostered by an alien government, which have divided a minority from the majority in the past” (F. O’CONNOR (1959) A Book of Ireland, p. 120 (Glasgow, Collins)).

[8] Thus in 1940 the British proposed reunification to end Irish neutrality while Stormont ministers “placed the survival of the six counties as a first priority when Nazi Germany was threatening to destroy Britain, the Crown and all those things to which Northern Ireland was allegedly loyal” (R. FISK (1985) In Time of Wur, p. 209 (London, Paladin)).

[9] It should go without saying that this does not imply that the IRA claim is justified by just war theory. And even if it is justified in accordance with just war theory the acceptability of this theory would need to be shown. This paper has not presented any view on that. Nor has it addressed the justifiability of the methods the IRA employ.

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[lo] De Valera toyed with the notion that Ireland had the same sort of case for annexing nationalist areas as Hitler presented for annexing the Sudetenland, but concluded that Ireland was ‘one country’ (see F. LONGPORD & T. P. O’NEILL (1974) Eamon de Valera, p. 339 (London, Arrow)).

[ l l ] “What it was unjust to do in the past it is not necessarily just to undo in the present” (p. 79). Quite so; but a clear statement of the changes in the situation that remove justification is required. In the absence of such changes the historical justification of the IRA campaign to defend the Irish people remains.

[12] I am grateful to Kathleen Lennon for useful comments on an earlier draft.