G.R. No. 80879 March 21, 1988HONORIO SAAVEDRA, JR., ESTER SAAVEDRA, CESAR SAAVEDRA, & ROEL BEJASA,petitioners,vs.SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, GREGORIO RAMOS, NAPOLEN RAMOS, CELSO TINGCUNGCO, ARMANDO DOMINGO & CAROLINA SEBASTIAN,respondents.R E S O L U T I O NPADILLA,J.:The petitioners seek the reversal and/or setting aside of SEC orders dated 23 November 1987 and 11 December 1987 and other orders issued in Securities and Exchange Commission 'hereinafter, SEC) Case No. 3257 entitled "Gregorio Ramos. et al., vs. Honorio Saavedra, et al." Petitioners likewise seek to prohibit the SEC from proceeding with said case.It appears that, on 20 November 1987, private respondents Id the above-mentioned case with the SEC, alleging in then amended complaint that, on or above 2 July 1981, private respondents sold all their stocks, lights and interests in Philippine Inc. to petitioners for the sum of P12 million payable in installments; that the sale was evidenced by a Memorandum of Agreement and a Deed of Assignment, whereby under the former, the parties agreed that the sale agreement would automatically be rescinded upon failure on the part of petitioners to pay any amount due; that petitioners failed to pay the last sum due on the scheduled date, so that private respondents rescinded the sale under an instrument, Rescission of Memorandum of Agreement. Private respondents prayed, among others, that said instrument of rescission be declared as having been made and executed -in accordance with law and that a Temporary Restraining Order be issued to enjoin petitioners from ... "committing acts of disposal of the Company assets, merchandise stocks, equipment's, machineries and other company paraphernalia."As prayed for, the respondent SEC issued a Temporary Restraining Order on 23 November 1987.On 2 December 1987, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss, alleging lack of jurisdiction over the case on the part of the SEC. Private respondents opposed said Motion to Dismiss.On 11 December 1987, the SEC issued an order denying the Motion to Dismiss.Hence, the present recourse by petitioners to this Court.As aptly held by the SEC, the dispute at bar is an intra-corporate dispute that has arisen between and among the principal stockholders of the corporation due to the refusal of the defendants (now petitioners) to fully comply with what has been covenanted by the parties. Such dispute involves a controversy "between and among stockholders,' specifically as to plaintiffs' right, as stockholders, over unpaid assignment of shares and the validity of defendants' acquisition of the same.1In other words, the present case involves an intra-corporate dispute as to who has the right to remain and act as owners-stockholders of the corporation.Pursuant to PD No. 902-A, as amended, particularly Section 5(b) thereof, the primary and exclusive jurisdiction over the present case properly belongs to the SEC. The pertinent provision reads:SEC. 5. In addition to the regulatory and adjudicative function of the Securities and Exchange Commission over corporations, partnership and other forms of associations registered with it as expressly granted under existing laws and decrees, it shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving:5(b) Controversies arising out of intra-corporate or partnership relations, between and among stockholders, members, or associates; between any and/or all of them and the corporation, partnership or association of which they are stockholders, members or associates, respectively; and between such corporation, partnership or association and the state insofar as it concerns their individual franchise or right to exist as such entity; ...InAbejo vs. de la Cruz,2citingPhilex Mining Corporation vs. Reyes, the Court held that "an intra-corporate controversy is one which arises between stockholder and the corporation. There is no distinction, qualification, nor any exemption whatsoever. The provision is broad and covers all kinds of controversies between stockholders and corporations."In the same case ofAbejo vs. de la Cruz, the Court expounded on the expanded jurisdiction of the SEC in line with the government's policy of encouraging investments, and more active public participation in the affairs of private corporations and enterprises through which desirable activities may be pursued for the promotion of economic development, and to promote a wider and more meaningful equitable distribution of wealth. The expanded jurisdiction of SEC includes absolute jurisdiction, supervision and control over all corporations, partnerships or associations, who are the grantees of primary franchise and/or a license or permit issued by the government to operate in the Philippines (Sec. 3, PD 902-A as amended); ... and, in addition to its regulatory and adjudicative functions over corporations, partnerships and other forms of associations registered with it as expressly granted under laws and decrees, original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving:a) Devices or schemes employed by or any acts, of the board of directors, business associations, its officers or partners, amounting to fraud and misrepresentation which may be detrimental to the interest of the public and/or of the stockholders, partners, members of associations or organizations registered with the Commission.b) Controversies arising out of intra-corporate or partnership relations, between and among stockholders, members, or associates; between any and/or all of them and the corporation, partnership or association of which they are stockholders, members or associates, respectively; and between such corporation, partnership or association and the state insofar as it concerns their individual franchise or right to exist sa such entity;c) Controversies in the election or appointments of directors, trustees, officers or managers of such corporations, partnerships or associations.In cases involving specialized disputes, the trend has been to refer the same to an administrative agency of special competence. As early as 1954, the Court inPambujan Sur United Mine Workers vs. Samar Mining Co. Inc.3held that under the sense-making and expeditious doctrine of primary jurisdiction " ... the courts cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to the decision of that question by the administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience, and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the premises of the regulatory statute administered." Recently, this Court speaking thru Mr. Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee said:In this era of clogged court dockets, the need for specialized administrative boards or commissions with the special knowledge. experience and capability to hear and determine promptly disputes on technical matters or essentially factual matters, subject to judicial review in case of grave abuse of discretion, has become well nigh indispensable.4WHEREFORE. The petition is hereby DISMISSED. Without costs.SO ORDERED.G.R. No. L-47051 July 29, 1988BLUE BAR COCONUT PHILIPPINES; CAGAYAN DE ORO OIL CO; CENTRAL VEGETABLE OIL MANUFACTURING CO.; COCONUT OIL MANUFACTURING (PHIL.) INC., GRANE EXPORT CORPORATION; IMPERIAL VEGETABLE OIL CO., INTERNATIONAL OIL FACTORY; LEGASPI OIL CO., INC.; LIBERTY OIL FACTORY; LUCENA OIL FACTORY, INC., AND 14 OTHER CORPORATIONS,petitioners,vs.THE HONORABLE FRANCISCO S. TANTUICO, JR., Acting Chairman of the Commission on Audit; and DR. GREGORIO YU, Auditor of the Philippine Coconut Authority,respondents.Teodulo R. Dino and Quiason, De Guzman, Makalintal, & Barot for petitioners.GUTIERREZ, JR.,J.:This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary mandatory injunction to annul certain actions of respondents, the then Acting Chairman of the Commission on Audit and the Auditor of the Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA) to prevent them from doing specified acts and to compel them to allow the payment by the PCA of the petitioners' subsidy claims.On June 30, 1973, the then President of the Philippines issued Presidential Decree No. 232 creating a Philippine Coconut Authority, with a governing board of eleven members, which was later reduced to nine by Presidential Decree No. 271 and finally to only seven by Presidential Decree No. 623.On August 20, 1973, the President issued Presidential Decree No. 276 establishing a coconut stabilization fund. Under this decree, the Philippine Coconut Authority, in addition to its powers granted under Presidential Decree No. 232, was authorized to formulate and immediately implement a stabilization scheme for coconut-based consumer goods, along the following general guidelines:a) A levy, initially, of P15.00 per 100 kilograms of copra resecada or its equivalent in other coconut products, shall be imposed on every first sale, in accordance with the mechanics established under R.A. 6260, effective at the start of business hours on August 10, 1973.The proceeds from the levy shall be deposited with the Philippine National Bank or any other to government bank the account of the Coconut Consumers Stabilization Fund, as a separate trust fund which shall not form part of the general fund of the government.b) The Fund shall be utilized to subsidize the sale of coconut based products at prices set by the Price Control Council, under rules and regulations to be promulgated by the Philippine Consumers Stabilization Committee. (Section 1, subparagraphs a and b, P.D. 276).Section I of the Rules and Regulations governing the collection and disposition of the Coconut Consumers Stabilization Fund (CCSF) promulgated by the Coconut Consumer Stabilization Committee provides that the collection of levy in every first sale of copra resecada or its equivalent in terms of whole nuts shall take effect on August 10, 1973. Section 2 of the Rules also states:Start of Collection. Starting Monday, August 20, 1973, all copra exporters, oil millers and desiccators (hereinafter referred to as end-users) shall remit the collection of the levy to the Committee on the basis of their receipt of delivery starting August 10, 1973 up to and including Friday August 17, 1973. Every Monday thereafter, the end-user shall remit to the Committee all collections on their weekly receipt of deliveries from Saturday through Friday. ...Further, that contracts entered into on or before August 9, 1973 shall not be subject to levy;provided, however,that balances undelivered to warehouses by September 10, 1973, and balances undelivered shipside by September 30, 1973 of such contracts shall be subject to the levy (Annex "A" of petition)." (pp. 484-485, Rollo)The petitioners are all end-users and as such, are levy-collectors and remitters.On January 8, 1975, the Governing Board of the PCA issued Resolution No. 01-75 which reduced the rate of levy from P70.00 to P40.00 per 100 kilograms of copra and P110.00 to P70.00 per metric ton of husked nuts. The resolution was effective January 11, 1975.In the meantime, on December 26, 1974, the President issued Presidential Decree No. 623 further amending Presidential Decree No. 232, as amended, by reducing the number and changing the composition of the PCA Governing Board to seven (7) members only.On January 29, 1975, the same Governing Board of the PCA which issued the January 8, 1975 Resolution No. 01-75 issued Resolution No. 018-75 which deferred collection of the CCSF levies from the desiccated coconut industry for a period not exceeding six (6) months.The reduced Governing Board of the PCA, constituted under PD No. 623, qualified only on February 26, 1975.Sometime in 1976, the respondent Acting Chairman of the Commission on Audit initiated a special audit of coconutend-usercompanies, which include herein petitioners, with respect to their Coconut Consumers Stabilization Fund levy collections and the subsidies they had received. As a result of the initial findings of the Performance Audit Office with respect only to the petitioners, respondent Acting COA Chairman directed the Chairman, the Administrator, and the Military Supervisor of PCA and the Manager of the Coconut Consumers Stabilization Fund, in various letters to them (Annexes G-2 H, I, J, L and N of petition) to collect the short levies and overpaid subsidies, and to apply subsidy claims to the settlement of short levies should the petitioners fail to remit the amount due.Reacting to published reports in the issue ofBulletin Todaydated March 5, 1977 regarding the above findings of the respondent COA Chairman, the petitioners, as members of the Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc., and other allied associations, wrote on March 8, 1977 a letter to the said Chairman requesting reconsideration of his action. The petitioners alleged that the supposed overpayments and/or deficiencies in their remittances were due to the Chairman's refusal to recognize the validity of the resolution passed in January 1975 by the then Governing Board of the PCA.A follow-up letter contesting the bases for the COA findings was sent by the petitioners to the respondent COA Chairman on April 14,1977.On March 11, 1977, PCA Administrator Luis R. Baltazar wrote the petitioners' counsel informing him that the management of the PCA was willing to pay the disputed subsidy claims provided they are approved by the representative of the Commission on Audit, herein respondent PCA Auditor.The respondent PCA Auditor, however, refused to act on the matter on the ground that the petitioners' counsel had already written the respondent Acting COA Chairman.On April 4, 1977, the petitioners' counsel wrote respondent COA Chairman a letter stating their arguments regarding the disputed subsidy claims.On May 9, 1977, the petitioners' counsel wrote the respondent COA Chairman requesting early action on their March 8, 1977 letter of reconsideration.On July 15, 1977, the Chairman of the COA Issue Committee composed of the Philippine Coconut Oil Producers Association, inc. (PCOPA) Coconut Oil Refiners Association (CORA), Association of Philippine Coconut Desiccators (APCD), and Soap Detergent Association of the Philippines (SDAP) wrote a letter to PCA Administrator Luis Baltazar requesting him to make representations with the COA to release the disputed subsidy payments "pending resolution of the assessments" and proposing that they be allowed to put up an appropriate bond equivalent to the amounts withheld. Baltazar indorsed the letter to the respondent COA Chairman.On August 24, 1977, the COA Chairman wrote PCA Administrator Baltazar that the COA had no objection to the release of the subsidy payments pending final resolution of the issues involved in the claims provided that the end-users posted a bond equal to the aggregate amount of the disputed claims, issued by a surety company mutually acceptable to the COA and PCA and certified to be in good standing by the Insurance Commission.On September 5, 1977, the COA Chairman again wrote the PCA Administrator. In his letter, the COA Chairman enumerated the following conditions under which the bonds to be posted by the coconut end-users companies would be accepted:a. That what will be covered by the bond shall pertain to the short levy relating to "ultra vires" void ab initio" issued only. Deficiencies based on other reasons shall be settled immediately by direct payment to CCSF or applying what has been withheld, if any.b. That the amount of the bond shall be equivalent to the total short levy (not merely on the amounts withheld).c. That the bond shall be issued by a surety company of good standing duly certified by the Insurance Commissioner and acceptable to both the PCA and the COA.d. That the bond shall have no expiry date but will be contingent upon the final decision of the issue by the President of the Philippines.e. That it shall be a condition in the bond that if the decision of the President is adverse to the coconut end-user companies, they shall unconditionally agree as principals to pay in cash immediately the full amount of short levy.f. That what has already been withheld as of July 13, 1977 and applied to the short levy shall not be refunded the filing and approval of bond notwithstanding. (p. 34, Rollo)A copy of the letter was sent to the United Coconut Association of the Philippines.On September 20, 1977, the petitioners through the Chairman (COA Issue Committee, SDAP/CORA/APCD/PCOPA) wrote the PCA Administrator informing him that in a meeting of all those concerned, "it was the consensus that the terms and conditions set by Acting Chairman Tantuico are unacceptable."On the ground that their letter request for reconsideration dated March 8, 1977 was deemed denied by the September 5, 1977 letter of the COA Chairman to PCA Administrator Baltazar, the petitioners instituted the instant petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction.The petitioners contend that the respondents, COA Acting Chairman Francisco Tantuico, Jr., and PCA Auditor have absolutely no jurisdiction to--1. Assess the CCSF levy against petitioners and to make them personally liable for the payment thereof;2. Cause the witholding of the payments of petitioner's subsidy reimbursement claims;3. Set-off petitioners' subsidy reimbursement payments against alleged CCSF levy remittance shortages;4. Institute a retention scheme of subsidy reimbursement claims which adversely affect even companies not subject to levy;5. Audit private corporations like petitioners;6. Deny to the petitioners, in effect, their constitutional right to appeal to the Supreme Court an adverse decision of the Commission on Audit. (p. 41, Rollo)In a resolution dated August 2, 1978, the case was endorsed to the Courten bancwhich set the case for hearing. However, before the actual hearing could be held, the Solicitor General filed a motion to cancel hearing and suspend proceedings, stating:This case is set for hearing on November 21, 1978 at 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon.The principal issue in this case is whether, or not the two resolutions of the Philippine Coconut Authority (Resolutions Nos. 01-75 and 018-75) issued by its governing board after December 26, 1974 when Presidential Decree No. 623 was promulgated but before February 26, 1975 when the PCA Board was formally reorganized under PD 623, are null and void, which issue is dependent on the intent behind said Decree.The Solicitor General has consulted the President of the Philippines on the intent behind Presidential Decree No. 623, which he has conveyed to the Commission on Audit, on the basis of which the Commission on Audit is now reviewing the matter.The undersigned counsel are therefore constrained to move, as they hereby move, that action on the instant proceedings be suspended or held in abeyance until the COA shall have acted on the matter, which action the undersigned counsel will bring to the Court's attention as soon as received, to aid the Court in the resolution of this case. (pp. 345-346, Rollo).The motion was granted. The petitioners had no objection but manifested that considering the length of time that this case has been pending, the COA should be required to act and finish reviewing the matter within a reasonable period of time.Thereafter, the Solicitor General filed a motion praying that the matter in issue be remanded to the Commission on Audit for appropriate action consistent with the intent behind PD No. 623 based on the following ground:xxx xxx xxxAfter having been apprised by undersigned counsel that it was not the intention of the President of the Philippines by the issuance of said P.D. No. 623 to abolish the Governing Board of the Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA) as originally constituted but merely to reorganize it by including in its composition the required management and financial expertise, and neither was it the intention to paralyze the conduct of PCA's business and operations by rendering it without a Governing Board in the interim period, from the effectivity of said P.D. No. 623 on December 26, 1974, until the formal organization on February 26, 1975 of the Board, as reconstituted under said P.D. No. 623, the respondent Acting Chairman of the Commission on Audit informed undersigned counsel that the Commission was reconsidering its earlier stand on the matter and that it would take appropriate action in the premises consistent with its reconsidered position. (pp. 357-358, Rollo).After considering the aforesaid motion and the petitioners comment that "instead of the case being remanded to the Commission on Audit, the respondents just be given leave to take the "appropriate action," consistent with the Presidential intent in enacting P.D. No. 623, they contemplate to do, and after the appropriate action will have been taken by respondents, the parties shall submit to this Court the appropriate motion and manifestation," as well as the reply of the respondents, we resolved to grant the motion. We directed the Commission on Audit to review the matters raised in this case, to take appropriate action in the premises, and, thereafter, to submit the appropriate action taken to the Court within thirty (30) days from notice of resolution.The Solicitor General then filed a manifestation to the effect that:xxx xxx xxx2. In a Memorandum dated May 7, 1979, respondent Acting-Chairman of the Commission on Audit, thru the Commission's General Counsel, directed the Corporate Auditor of the Philippine Coconut Authority "to release the amount withheld from the subsidy claims of coconut end-user companies for their short levy deficiencies as affected by the two resolutions in question," copy of which memorandum said respondent also furnished the administrator of the Authority under a letter to him dated May 14, 1979.3. The PCA Administrator had already ordered the department concerned to prepare the necessary vouchers. For his part, the Auditor-in-Charge of the PCA informed the undersigned counsel that his office "would process claims for the release of subsidy payments withheld" but that as of yesterday, May 31, 1979 "none has been submitted for audit." He has, moreover, requested the proper officials of the COA Central Office to file specimen signature cards with the PCA depository, United Coconut Planters Bank, since he anticipates that the claims checks would, in some cases be beyond the counter-signing authority of the Resident Auditor." (pp. 374-375, Rollo).xxx xxx xxxThe Solicitor General filed another manifestation that the petitioners have already started refiling their claims and that about 50% of them had been/or are being processed by the Corporate Auditor's Office.Because of the foregoing, the Solicitor General filed a motion to dismiss the petition giving two (2) grounds: (1) the primary issue respecting the validity of the Resolutions Nos. 01-75 and 018-75 issued by the Governing Board of the Philippine Coconut Authority is now moot and academic; and (2) the incidental issues are factual in nature, the resolution of which requires presentation of evidence, and petitioners may file appropriate pleadings with the Commission on Audit where they may adduce evidence relevant to the issues. The Solicitor General manifested that on the basis of present evidence, or lack of it, the respondent COA Chairman is not in a position to change his stand on the incidental issues.It is to be noted that the petitioners opposed the motion to dismiss which was filed on the ground "that there are no factual issues left. The remaining issues all revolve on the questionAfter the Philippine Coconut Authoritythe authority vested by law to implement the stabilization scheme for the coconut industry under P.D. 276, which includes the collection of the levy to support the Stabilization Fundhad acted, can the Commission on Audit say that the rules and decisions of the PCA are erroneous and nullify them, to the prejudice of petitioners who obediently complied with said rules and decisions?"The above issue was raised when the respondent COA Chairman disregarded the two resolutions (Resolution Nos. 01-75 and 018-75) of the PCA Governing Board on the ground that the latter had no more authority to issue such resolutions because of P.D. 623 which reduced the composition of the Governing Board. The respondent COA Chairman contended that the questioned resolutions wereultra vires, hence cannot be enforced. It was actually the refusal of the COA Chairman to recognize the two questioned resolutions which led to the filing of this petition.In short, whether or not the respondent COA Chairman was correct in disregarding the two resolutions of the PCA Governing Board for beingultra viresis the main issue in this petition. This issue became academic when the then President of the Philippines informed the Solicitor General that the Governing Board of the PCA would continue to function until the formal organization of the new Governing Board. Following this ruling, the respondent COA Chairman reconsidered his earlier stand and allowed the petitioners to get their subsidy claims which he had earlier refused. In effect, the respondent COA Chairman eventually acknowledged the validity of the two questioned PCA resolutions.The issue, therefore, on whether or not the respondent COA Chairman may disregard the PCA rules and decisions has become moot.In their Comment to the motion of the Solicitor General praying that the matter in issue be remanded to the Commission on Audit for appropriate action consistent with the aforementioned Presidential intent behind P.D. 623, and in their Memorandum, the petitioners listed the other issues involved in the petition as follows:Whether or not the respondent Acting Chairman and respondent PCA Auditor acted without jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion when they imposed the Coconut Consumers Stabilization Fund (CCFS) levy on oral contracts which the PCA itself, the governemtn agency implementing P.D. 276, considered as exempt because they were perfected prior to the levy;Whether or not the respondents acted without jurisdiction and/or grave abuse of discretion in that they applied and continued to apply the CCFS levy rate prevailing at the time of delivery, and refused to apply the rate prevailing at the time of the perfection of the contract, as decided by PCA;Whether or not the respondents acted without jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion when they imposed the CCFS levy on a delivery under an exempt contract just because such delivery was slightly delayed, whereas the PCA did not impose the levy under the circumstances in view offorce majeuresituation;Whether or not the respondent Acting Chairman acted with lack of jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion in disallowing the moisture content deduction on the ground that the moisture meter used by one of the petitioners was not certified and in thus imposing the CCFS levy on such disallowed deduction, whereas the PCA allowed the moisture content deduction and did not impose the levy on the ground that the transaction was not the one contemplated in R.A. 1365, where a registered moisture meter is to be used;Whether or not the respondent Acting Chairman acted without jurisdiction and/or grave abuse of discretion when he declared that there were subsidy overpayments;a) On deliveries beyond the allocation period, whereas delivery on these sales was authorized by the PCA Military Supervisor, which authorization was approved by the Coconut Consumers Stabilization Committee, such delivery beyond the allocation period being the practice; and because he insists that the settlement price should be based on open market prices in all coconut trading areas, whereas the Price Settlement Committee constituted by PCA, which is charged with the function of determining the settlement price, determines the settlement price by considering the price in Metro Manila only, said practice having been adopted for reasons of convenience and necessity; otherwise the PCA has to check the prices all over the Philippines." (pp. 360-362, Rollo)Undoubtedly, the issues raised involve both actual and legal considerations aside from requiring specialized and technical knowledge.As the Solicitor General observed:Not all the issues raised in the petition are purely legal. Thus, petitioners contend:1. That respondents acted arbitrarily when they withheld 20% of subsidy reimbursement claims of petitioners Liberty Oil Factory and Pacific Oil Products, Inc., since said petitioners were allegedly only refiners, and therefore, not levy-remitters. The matter of whether or not said petitioners were only refiners is a question of fact.2. That respondents acted without jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion when they imposed levy on alleged oral contracts which are exempt because the same were allegedly perfected prior to the imposition of levy (pp. 60-61 of petition). Respondent COA Acting Chairman (thru his Audit Team) did not believe that there were such oral contracts at all on or before August 9, 1973 on the sole basis of a purported certification of the Manager of petitioner Royal Manufacturing Company, Inc., as to the existence of the alleged oral contracts (pp. 6-7 of Annex G-2 of petition). Whether or not such alleged oral contracts really existed is a question of fact that was likewise raised in petitioners' motion for reconsideration which should first be finally resolved by respondents.3. That respondents acted without jurisdiction and/or grave abuse of discretion when they imposed levy on a delivery under an alleged exempt contract, "just because such delivery was slightly delayed" allegedly due to "force majeure"(pp. 68-69 of petition). Whether or not the delay was really caused by "force majeure"presents a factual issue.4. That respondents acted without jurisdiction when they ruled that the settlement price of copra in some provinces or places exceeds the open market price, which situation resulted in the overpayment of subsidy to petitioners (pp. 74-75, Id.) Petitioners further contend that respondent COA Acting Chairman has no authority to substitute his judgment on the settlement price since that is allegedly the sole prerogative of the Price Settlement Committee constituted by PCA (pp. 74-75, Id.) But if this contention of petitioners is not upheld by this Honorable Court, can this Honorable Court completely resolve the matter raised when there is no fact admitted by the petitioners as to whether the settlement price of copra indeed exceeded the open market price of the same and by how much? (pp. 490-491, Rollo)It is readily apparent that we cannot resolve these is ues on the basis of what appears in this petition. There must be substantial evidence on record from where the Court's conclusions may be drawn. As pointed out by the Solicitor General, there are no established facts presented which are intimately related to the legal issues raised by the petitioners. The well-settled principle is that this Court is not a trier of facts. "Its sole role is to apply the law based on the findings of facts brought before it." (Aspacio v. Hon. Amado G. Inciong, et al. G.R. No. L-49893, May 9,1988)The petitioners also question the respondents' authority to audit them. They contend that they are outside the ambit of respondents' "audit" power which is confined to government-owned or controlled corporations. This argument has no merit. Section 2 (1) of Article IX-D of the Constitution provides that "The Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority and duty to examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenues and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by or pertaining to, the Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporation with original charters, and on a post-audit basis. ... (d)such non-governmental entities receiving subsidy or equity directly or indirectly from or through the Government which are required by law or the granting institution to submit to such audit as a condition of subsidy or equity." (Emphasis supplied) The Constitution formally embodies the long established rule that private entities who handle government funds or subsidies in trust may be examined or audited in their handling of said funds by government auditors.In view of the above considerations, we apply the principle of primary jurisdiction:In cases involving specialized disputes, the trend has been to refer the same to an administrative agency of special competence. As early as 1954, the Court in Pambujan Sur United Mine Workers v. Samar Mining Co., Inc. (94 Phil. 932,941), held that under the sense-making and expeditious doctrine of primary jurisdiction ... the courts cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal prior to the decision of that question by the administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience, and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the Purposes of the regulatory statute administered." Recently, this Court specaking thru Mr. Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee said:"In this era of clogged court dockets, the need for specialized administrative boards or commissions with the special knowledge, experience and capability to hear and determine promptly disputes on technical matters or essentially factual matters, subject to judicial review in case of grave abuse of discretion, has become well nigh indispensable." (Abejo v. de la Cruz, 149 SCRA 654, 675). (Saavedra, Jr., et al. v. Securities and Exchange Commission, et al., G.R. No. 80879, March 21, 1988)It has also been the policy of the courts not to ignore or reject as incorrect the acts and determinations of administrative agencies unless there is a clear showing of arbitrary action or palpable and serious error. Thus, we ruled in the recent case ofBeautifont, Inc., et. al. v. Court of Appeals, et al.(G.R. No. 50141, January 29,1988):xxx xxx xxx... The legal presumption is that official duty has been duly performed; (Sec. 5, m, 121 Rules of Court) and it is "particularly strong as regards administrative agencies ...vested with powers said to be quasi-judicial in nature, in connection with the enforcement of laws affecting particular fields of activity, the proper regulation and/or promotion of which requires a technical or special training, aside from a good knowledge and grasp of the overall conditions, relevant to said fields, containing in the nation (Pangasinan Transportation v. Public Utility Commission, 70 Phil. 221). The consequent policy and practice underlying our Administrative Law is that courts of justice should respect the findings of fact of said administrative agencies, unless there is absolutely no evidence in support thereof or such evidence is clearly, manifestly and patently insubstantial (Heacock v. NLU, 95 Phil. 553)." (Ganitano v. Secretary of Agriculture etc., 16 SCRA 543, citing Pajo v. Ago, G.R. No. L-15414, June 30, 1960; see also, Central Bank v. Cloribel, 44 SCRA 307, 317; Macatangay vs. Sec. of Public Works, 17 SCRA 31, citing Lovina v. Moreno, G.R. No. L-17821, Nov. 29,1963; Bachrach Transportation v. Camunayan, 18 SCRA 920 citing cases: Santos v. Sec. of Public Works, 19 SCRA 637; Atlas Development Corp. v. Gozon, 20 SCRA 886; Gravador v. Mamigo, 20 SCRA 742; Rio y Cia v. WCC, 20 SCRA 1196)."In the case at bar, the petitioners have not shown through the laying down of concrete factual foundations that the respondents' questioned acts were done with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. No costs.SO ORDERED.G.R. Nos. 197592 & 20262 November 27, 2013THE PROVINCE OF AKLAN,Petitioner,vs.JODY KING CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORP.,Respondent.D E C I S I O NVILLARAMA, JR.,J.:These consolidated petitions for review on certiorari seek to reverse and set aside the following: (1) Decision1dated October 18, 2010 and Resolution2dated July 5, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 111754; and (2) Decision3dated August 31, 2011 and Resolution4dated June 27, 2012 in CA-G.R. SP No. 114073.The FactsOn January 12, 1998, the Province of Aklan (petitioner) and Jody King Construction and Development Corp. (respondent) entered into a contract for the design and -construction of the Caticlan Jetty Port and Terminal (Phase I) in Malay, Aklan. The total project cost isP38,900,000: P 18,700,000 for the design and construction of passenger terminal, andP20,200,000 for the design and construction of the jetty port facility.5In the course of construction, petitioner issued variation/change orders for additional works. The scope of work under these change orders were agreed upon by petitioner and respondent.6On January 5, 2001, petitioner entered into a negotiated contract with respondent for the construction of Passenger Terminal Building (Phase II) also at Caticlan Jetty Port in Malay, Aklan. The contract price for Phase II isP2,475,345.54.7On October 22, 2001, respondent made a demand for the total amount ofP22,419,112.96 covering the following items which petitioner allegedly failed to settle:1. Unpaid accomplishments on additional worksundertaken - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Php 12,396,143.092. Refund of taxes levied despite it not beingcovered by original contract- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Php 884,098.593. Price escalation (Consistent with Section 7.5,Original Contract- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Php 1,291,714.984. Additional Labor Cost resulting [from]numerous change orders issued sporadically - - - - - - - - Php 3,303,486.605. Additional Overhead Cost resulting [from]numerous Orders issued sporadically - - - - - - - - - - - - - Php 1,101,162.606. Interest resulting [from] payment delaysconsistent with Section 7.3.b of the OriginalContract - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Php 3,442,507.50.8On July 13, 2006, respondent sued petitioner in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Marikina City (Civil Case No. 06-1122-MK) to collect the aforesaid amounts.9On August 17, 2006, the trial court issued a writ of preliminary attachment.10Petitioner denied any unpaid balance and interest due to respondent. It asserted that the sums being claimed by respondent were not indicated in Change Order No. 3 as approved by the Office of Provincial Governor. Also cited was respondents June 10, 2003 letter absolving petitioner from liability for any cost in connection with the Caticlan Passenger Terminal Project.11After trial, the trial court rendered its Decision12on August 14, 2009, the dispositive portion of which reads:WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff Jody King Construction And Development Corporation and against defendant Province of Aklan, as follows:1. ordering the defendant to pay to the plaintiff the amount of Php7,396,143.09 representing the unpaid accomplishment on additional works undertaken by the plaintiff;2. ordering the defendant to refund to the plaintiff the amount of Php884,098.59 representing additional 2% tax levied upon against the plaintiff;3. ordering the defendant to pay to the plaintiff price escalation in the amount of Php1,291,714.98 pursuant to Section 7.5 of the original contract;4. ordering the defendant to pay to the plaintiff the amount of Php3,303,486.60 representing additional labor cost resulting from change orders issued by the defendant;5. ordering the defendant to pay to the plaintiff the sum of Php1,101,162.00 overhead cost resulting from change orders issued by the defendant;6. ordering the defendant to pay the sum of Php3,442,507.50 representing interest resulting from payment delays up to October 15, 2001 pursuant to Section 7.3.b of the original contract;7. ordering the defendant to pay interest of 3% per month from unpaid claims as of October 16, 2001 to date of actual payment pursuant to Section 7.3.b[;]8. ordering the [defendant] to pay to the plaintiff the sum of Php500,000.00 as moral damages;9. ordering the defendant to pay to the plaintiff the sum of Php300,000.00 as exemplary damages;10. ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of Php200,000.00, as and for attorneys fees; and11. ordering the defendant to pay the cost of suit.SO ORDERED.13Petitioner filed its motion for reconsideration14on October 9, 2009 stating that it received a copy of the decision on September 25, 2009. In its Order15dated October 27, 2009, the trial court denied the motion for reconsideration upon verification from the records that as shown by the return card, copy of the decision was actually received by both Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Ronaldo B. Ingente and Atty. Lee T. Manares on September 23, 2009. Since petitioner only had until October 8, 2009 within which to file a motion for reconsideration, its motion filed on October 9, 2009 was filed one day after the finality of the decision. The trial court further noted that there was a deliberate attempt on both Atty. Manares and Prosecutor Ingente to mislead the court and make it appear that their motion for reconsideration was filed on time. Petitioner filed a Manifestation16reiterating the explanation set forth in its Rejoinder to respondents comment/opposition and motion to dismiss that the wrong date of receipt of the decision stated in the motion for reconsideration was due to pure inadvertence attributable to the staff of petitioners counsel. It stressed that there was no intention to mislead the trial court nor cause undue prejudice to the case, as in fact its counsel immediately corrected the error upon discovery by explaining the attendant circumstances in the Rejoinder dated October 29, 2009.On November 24, 2009, the trial court issued a writ of execution ordering Sheriff IV Antonio E. Gamboa, Jr. to demand from petitioner the immediate payment ofP67,027,378.34 and tender the same to the respondent. Consequently, Sheriff Gamboa served notices of garnishment on Land Bank of the Philippines, Philippine National Bank and Development Bank of the Philippines at their branches in Kalibo, Aklan for the satisfaction of the judgment debt from the funds deposited under the account of petitioner. Said banks, however, refused to give due course to the court order, citing the relevant provisions of statutes, circulars and jurisprudence on the determination of government monetary liabilities, their enforcement and satisfaction.17Petitioner filed in the CA a petition for certiorari with application for temporary restraining order (TRO) and preliminary injunction assailing the Writ of Execution dated November 24, 2009, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 111754.On December 7, 2009, the trial court denied petitioners notice of appeal filed on December 1, 2009. Petitioners motion for reconsideration of the December 7, 2009 Order was likewise denied.18On May 20, 2010, petitioner filed another petition for certiorari in the CA questioning the aforesaid orders denying due course to its notice of appeal, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 114073.By Decision dated October 18, 2010, the CAs First Division dismissed the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 111754 as it found no grave abuse of discretion in the lower courts issuance of the writ of execution. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was likewise denied by the CA. The CA stressed that even assuming as true the alleged errors committed by the trial court, these were insufficient for a ruling that grave abuse of discretion had been committed. On the matter of execution of the trial courts decision, the appellate court said that it was rendered moot by respondents filing of a petition before the Commission on Audit (COA).On August 31, 2011, the CAs Sixteenth Division rendered its Decision dismissing the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 114073. The CA said that petitioner failed to provide valid justification for its failure to file a timely motion for reconsideration; counsels explanation that he believed in good faith that the August 14, 2009 Decision of the trial court was received on September 25, 2009 because it was handed to him by his personnel only on that day is not a justifiable excuse that would warrant the relaxation of the rule on reglementary period of appeal. The CA also held that petitioner is estopped from invoking the doctrine of primary jurisdiction as it only raised the issue of COAs primary jurisdiction after its notice of appeal was denied and a writ of execution was issued against it.The CasesIn G.R. No. 197592, petitioner submits the following issues:I.WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION DATED 14 AUGUST 2009 RENDERED BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 273, MARIKINA CITY AND THE WRIT OF EXECUTION DATED 24 NOVEMBER 2009 SHOULD BE RENDERED VOID FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE.II.WHETHER OR NOT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 273, MARIKINA CITY GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN RENDERING THE DECISION DATED 14 AUGUST 2009 AND ISSUING THE WRIT OF EXECUTION DATED 24 NOVEMBER 2009 EVEN IT FAILED TO DISPOSE ALL THE ISSUES OF THE CASE BY NOT RESOLVING PETITIONERS "URGENT MOTION TO DISCHARGE EX-PARTE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT" DATED 31 AUGUST 2006.III.WHETHER OR NOT THE WRIT OF EXECUTION DATED 24 NOVEMBER 2009 WHICH WAS HASTILY ISSUED IN VIOLATION OF SUPREME COURT ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 10-2000 SHOULD BE RENDERED VOID.19The petition in G.R. No. 202623 sets forth the following arguments:Petitioner is not estopped in questioning the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 273, Marikina City over the subject matter of the case.20The petition for certiorari filed before the CA due to the RTCs denial of petitioners Notice of Appeal was in accord with jurisprudence.21The IssuesThe controversy boils down to the following issues: (1) the applicability of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction to this case; and (2) the propriety of the issuance of the writ of execution.Our RulingThe petitions are meritorious.COA has primary jurisdiction over private respondents money claims Petitioner is not estopped from raising the issue of jurisdictionThe doctrine of primary jurisdiction holds that if a case is such that its determination requires the expertise, specialized training and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies, relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before a remedy is supplied by the courts even if the matter may well be within their proper jurisdiction.22It applies where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an administrative agency. In such a case, the court in which the claim is sought to be enforced may suspend the judicial process pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its view or, if the parties would not be unfairly disadvantaged, dismiss the case without prejudice.23The objective of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is to guide the court in determining whether it should refrain from exercising its jurisdiction until after an administrative agency has determined some question or some aspect of some question arising in the proceeding before the court.24As can be gleaned, respondent seeks to enforce a claim for sums of money allegedly owed by petitioner, a local government unit.Under Commonwealth Act No. 327,25as amended by Section 26 of Presidential Decree No. 1445,26it is the COA which has primary jurisdiction over money claims against government agencies and instrumentalities.Section 26. General jurisdiction. The authority and powers of the Commission shall extend to and comprehend all matters relating to auditing procedures, systems and controls, the keeping of the general accounts of the Government, the preservation of vouchers pertaining thereto for a period of ten years, the examination and inspection of the books, records, and papers relating to those accounts; and the audit and settlement of the accounts of all persons respecting funds or property received or held by them in an accountable capacity, as well as the examination, audit, and settlement of all debts and claims of any sort due from or owing to the Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities. The said jurisdiction extends to all government-owned or controlled corporations, including their subsidiaries, and other self-governing boards, commissions, or agencies of the Government, and as herein prescribed, including non-governmental entities subsidized by the government, those funded by donations through the government, those required to pay levies or government share, and those for which the government has put up a counterpart fund or those partly funded by the government. (Emphasis supplied.)Pursuant to its rule-making authority conferred by the 1987 Constitution27and existing laws, the COA promulgated the 2009 Revised Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Audit. Rule II, Section 1 specifically enumerated those matters falling under COAs exclusive jurisdiction, which include "money claims due from or owing to any government agency." Rule VIII, Section 1 further provides:Section 1. Original Jurisdiction - The Commission Proper shall have original jurisdiction over:a) money claim against the Government; b) request for concurrence in the hiring of legal retainers by government agency; c) write off of unliquidated cash advances and dormant accounts receivable in amounts exceeding one million pesos (P1,000,000.00); d) request for relief from accountability for loses due to acts of man, i.e. theft, robbery, arson, etc, in amounts in excess of Five Million pesos (P5,000,000.00).In Euro-Med Laboratories Phil., Inc. v. Province of Batangas,28we ruled that it is the COA and not the RTC which has primary jurisdiction to pass upon petitioners money claim against respondent local government unit. Such jurisdiction may not be waived by the parties failure to argue the issue nor active participation in the proceedings. Thus:This case is one over which the doctrine of primary jurisdiction clearly held sway for although petitioners collection suit forP487,662.80 was within the jurisdiction of the RTC, the circumstances surrounding petitioners claim brought it clearly within the ambit of the COAs jurisdiction.First, petitioner was seeking the enforcement of a claim for a certain amount of money against a local government unit. This brought the case within the COAs domain to pass upon money claims against the government or any subdivision thereof under Section 26 of the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines:The authority and powers of the Commission [on Audit] shall extend to and comprehend all matters relating to x x x the examination, audit, and settlement of all debts and claims of any sort due from or owing to the Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies, and instrumentalities. x x x.The scope of the COAs authority to take cognizance of claims is circumscribed, however, by an unbroken line of cases holding statutes of similar import to mean only liquidated claims, or those determined or readily determinable from vouchers, invoices, and such other papers within reach of accounting officers. Petitioners claim was for a fixed amount and although respondent took issue with the accuracy of petitioners summation of its accountabilities, the amount thereof was readily determinable from the receipts, invoices and other documents. Thus, the claim was well within the COAs jurisdiction under the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines.Second, petitioners money claim was founded on a series of purchases for the medical supplies of respondents public hospitals. Both parties agreed that these transactions were governed by the Local Government Code provisions on supply and property management and their implementing rules and regulations promulgated by the COA pursuant to Section 383 of said Code. Petitioners claim therefore involved compliance with applicable auditing laws and rules on procurement. Such matters are not within the usual area of knowledge, experience and expertise of most judges but within the special competence of COA auditors and accountants. Thus, it was but proper, out of fidelity to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, for the RTC to dismiss petitioners complaint.Petitioner argues, however, that respondent could no longer question the RTCs jurisdiction over the matter after it had filed its answer and participated in the subsequent proceedings. To this, we need only state that the court may raise the issue of primary jurisdiction sua sponte and its invocation cannot be waived by the failure of the parties to argue it as the doctrine exists for the proper distribution of power between judicial and administrative bodies and not for the convenience of the parties.29(Emphasis supplied.)Respondents collection suit being directed against a local government unit, such money claim should have been first brought to the COA.30Hence, the RTC should have suspended the proceedings and refer the filing of the claim before the COA. Moreover, petitioner is not estopped from raising the issue of jurisdiction even after the denial of its notice of appeal and before the CA.There are established exceptions to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, such as: (a) where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine; (b) where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction; (c) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant; (d) where the amount involved is relatively small so as to make the rule impractical and oppressive; (e) where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice; (f) where judicial intervention is urgent; (g) when its application may cause great and irreparable damage; (h) where the controverted acts violate due process; (i) when the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot; (j) when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (k) when strong public interest is involved; and, (l) in quo warranto proceedings.31However, none of the foregoing circumstances is applicable in the present case.The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence.32All the proceedings of the court in violation of the doctrine and all orders and decisions rendered thereby are null and void.33Writ of Execution issued in violation of COAs primary jurisdiction is voidSince a judgment rendered by a body or tribunal that has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case is no judgment at all, it cannot be the source of any right or the creator of any obligation.34All acts pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no legal effect and the void judgment can never be final and any writ of execution based on it is likewise void.35Clearly, the CA erred in ruling that the RTC committed no grave abuse of discretion when it ordered the execution of its judgment against petitioner and garnishment of the latters funds.In its Supplement to the Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner argued that it is the COA and not the RTC which has original jurisdiction over money claim against government agencies and subdivisions.1wphi1The CA, in denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration, simply stated that the issue had become moot by respondent's filing of the proper petition with the COA. However, respondent's belated compliance with the formal requirements of presenting its money claim before the COA did not cure the serious errors committed by the RTC in implementing its void decision. The RTC's orders implementing its judgment rendered without jurisdiction must be set aside because a void judgment can never be validly executed.Finally, the RTC should have exercised utmost caution, prudence and judiciousness in issuing the writ of execution and notices of garnishment against petitioner. The RTC had no authority to direct the immediate withdrawal of any portion of the garnished funds from petitioner's depositary banks.36Such act violated the express directives of this Court under Administrative Circular No. 10-2000,37which was issued "precisely in order to prevent the circumvention of Presidential Decree No. 1445, as well as of the rules and procedures of the COA."38WHEREFORE, both petitions in G.R. Nos. 197592 and 202623 are GRANTED. The Decision dated October 18, 2010 and Resolution dated July 5 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 111754, and Decision dated August 31, 2011 and Resolution dated June 27, 2012 in CA- G.R. SP No. 114073 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated August 14 2009, Writ of Execution and subsequent issuances implementing the said decision of the Regional Trial Court of Marikina City in Civil Case No. 06-1122-MK are all SET ASIDE. No pronouncement as to costs.SO ORDERED.G.R. No. 198554 July 30, 2012MAJOR GENERAL CARLOS F. GARCIA, AFP (RET.),Petitioner,vs.THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, representing the OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT; THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE VOLTAIRE T. GAZMIN; THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, GEN. EDUARDO SL. OBAN, JR., and LT. GEN. GAUDENCIO S. PANGILINAN, AFP (RET.), DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS,Respondents.D E C I S I O NPERALTA,J.:For resolution of this Court is the Petition for Certiorari dated September 29, 2011 under Rule 65, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure which seeks to annul and set aside the Confirmation of Sentence dated September 9, 2011, promulgated by the Office of the President.The facts, as culled from the records, are the following:On October 13, 2004, the Provost Martial General of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), Col. Henry A. Galarpe, by command of Vice-Admiral De Los Reyes, issued a Restriction to Quarters1containing the following:1. Pursuant to Article of War 70 and the directive of the Acting Chief of Staff, AFP to the undersigned dtd 12 October 2004, you are hereby placed under Restriction to Quarters under guard pending investigation of your case.2. You are further advised that you are not allowed to leave your quarters without the expressed permission from the Acting Chief of Staff, AFP.3. In case you need immediate medical attention or required by the circumstance to be confined in a hospital, you shall likewise be under guard.Thereafter, a Charge Sheet dated October 27, 2004 was filed with the Special General Court Martial NR 2 presided by Maj. Gen. Emmanuel R. Teodosio, AFP, (Ret.), enumerating the following violations allegedly committed by petitioner:CHARGE 1: VIOLATION OF THE 96TH ARTICLE OF WAR (CONDUCT UNBECOMING AN OFFICER AND GENTLEMAN).SPECIFICATION 1: In that MAJOR GENERAL CARLOS FLORES GARCIA 0-5820 ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, person subject to military law, did, on or about 16 March 2004, knowingly, wrongfully and unlawfully fail to disclose/declare all his existing assets in his Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities and Net Worth for the year 2003 as required by Republic Act No. 3019, as amended in relation to Republic Act 6713, such as the following: cash holdings with the Armed Forces Police Savings and Loans Association, Inc. (AFPSLAI) in the amount of six million five hundred [thousand] pesos (P6,500,000.00); cash dividend received from AFPSLAI from June 2003 to December 2003 in the amount of one million three hundred sixty-five thousand pesos (P1,365,000.00); dollar peso deposits with Land Bank of the Philippines, Allied Banking Corporation, Banco de Oro Universal Bank, Bank of Philippine Islands, United Coconut Planter's Bank and Planter's Development Bank; motor vehicles registered under his and his wifes names such as 1998 Toyota Hilux Utility Vehicle with Plate Nr. WRY-843, Toyota Car with Plate Nr. PEV-665, Toyota Previa with Plate Nr. UDS-195, 1997 Honda Civic Car with Plate Nr. FEC 134, 1997 Mitsubishi L-300 Van with Plate Nr. FDZ 582 and 2001 Toyota RAV 4 Utility Vehicle with Plate Nr. FEV-498, conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman.SPECIFICATION 2: In that MAJOR GENERAL CARLOS FLORES GARCIA 0-5820 ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, person subject to military law, did, on or about 11 March 2003, knowingly, wrongfully and unlawfully fail to disclose/declare all his existing assets in his Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities and Net worth for the year 2002 as required by Republic Act No. 3019, as amended in relation to Republic Act 6713, such as the following: his cash holdings with the Armed Forces Police Savings and Loans Association, Inc. (AFPSLAI) in the amount of six million five hundred [thousand] pesos (P6,500,000.00); cash dividend received form AFPSLAI in June 2002 and December 2002 in the total amount of one million four hundred thirty-five thousand pesos (1,435,000.00), dollar and peso deposits with Land Bank of the Philippines, Allied Banking Corporation, Banco de Oro Universal Bank, Bank of the Philippine Islands, United Coconut Planter's Bank and Planter's Development Bank; motor vehicles registered under his and his wifes names such as 1998 Toyota Hilux Utility Vehicle with Plate Nr. WRY-843, Toyota Car with Plate Nr. PEV-665, Toyota Previa with Plate Nr. UDS-195, 1997 Honda Civic Car with Plate Nr. FEC-134, 1997 Mitsubishi L-300 Van with Plate Nr. FDZ-582, and 2001 Toyota RAV 4Utility Vehicle with Plate Nr. FEV-498, conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman.SPECIFICATION 3: In that MAJOR GENERAL CARLOS FLORES GARCIA 0-5820 ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, person subject to military law, did, while in the active military service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, knowingly, wrongfully and unlawfully violate his solemn oath as a military officer to uphold the Constitution and serve the people with utmost loyalty by acquiring and holding the status of an immigrant/permanent residence of the UnitedStates of America in violation of the State policy governing public officers, thereby causing dishonor and disrespect to the military professional and seriously compromises his position as an officer and exhibits him as morally unworthy to remain in the honorable profession of arms.CHARGE II: VIOLATION OF THE 97TH ARTICLE OF WAR (CONDUCT PREJUDICIAL TO GOOD ORDER AND MILITARY DISCIPLINE).SPECIFICATION 1: In that MAJOR GENERAL CARLOS FLORES GARCIA 0-5820 ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, person subject to military law, did, on or about 16 March 2004, knowingly, wrongfully and unlawfully make untruthful statements under oath of his true assets in his Statement of Assets and Liabilities and Net worth for the year 2003 as required by Republic Act No. 3019, as amended in relation to Republic Act 6713, conduct prejudicial to good order and military discipline.SPECIFICATION NO. 2: In that MAJOR GENERAL CARLOS FLORES GARCIA 0-5820 ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, person subject to military law, did, on or about 11 March 2003, knowingly, wrongfully and unlawfully make untruthful statements under oath of his true assts in his Statement of Assets and Liabilities and Net worth for the year 2002 as required by Republic Act No. 3019, as amended in relation to Republic Act 6713, conduct prejudicial to good order and military discipline.Petitioner, upon arraignment on November 16, 2004, pleaded not guilty on all the charges.The Office of the Chief of Staff, through a Memorandum2dated November 18, 2004, directed the transfer of confinement of petitioner from his quarters at Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo to the ISAFP Detention Center. On the same day, petitioner, having reached the age of fifty-six (56), compulsorily retired from military service after availing of the provisions of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1650,3amending Sections 3 and 5 of P.D. 1638, which establishes a system of retirement for military personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.Pursuant to a Resolution4dated June 1, 2005 of the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan, petitioner was transferred from the ISAFP Detention Center to the Camp Crame Custodial Detention Center.After trial, at the Special General Court Martial No. 2, on December 2, 2005, the findings or the After-Trial Report5of the same court was read to the petitioner. The report contains the following verdict and sentence:MGEN CARLOS FLORES GARCIA 0-5820 AFP the court in closed session upon secret written ballot 2/3 of all the members present at the time the voting was taken concurring the following findings. Finds you:On Specification 1 of Charge 1 Guilty except the words dollar deposits with Land Bank of the Phils, dollar peso deposits with Allied Bank, Banco de Oro, Universal Bank, Bank of the Philippine Island, United Coconut Planters Bank and Planters Development Bank.On Specification 2 of Charge 1 Guilty except the words dollar deposits with Land Bank of the Phils, dollar peso deposits with Allied Bank, Banco de Oro, Universal Bank, Bank of the Philippine Island, United Coconut Planters Bank and Planters Development Bank.On Specification 3 of Charge 1 GuiltyOn Specification 1 of Charge 2 GuiltyOn Specification 2 of Charge 2 GuiltyAnd again in closed session upon secret written ballot 2/3 all the members are present at the time the votes was taken concurrently sentences you to be dishonorably [discharged] from the service, to forfeit all pay and allowances due and to become due and to be confined at hard labor at such place the reviewing authority may direct for a period of two (2) years. So ordered. (Emphases supplied)Afterwards, in a document6dated March 27, 2006, the Staff Judge Advocate stated the following recommended action:IV. RECOMMENDED ACTION:The court, after evaluating the evidence, found accused: GUILTY on Charge 1, GUILTY on Specification 1 on Charge 1 except the words dollar deposits with Land Bank of the Philippines, dollar and peso deposits with Allied Banking Corporation, Banco de Oro Universal Bank, Bank of the Philippine Islands, United Coconut Planter's Bank and Planter's Development Bank; GUILTY on Charge 1, Specification 2 except the words dollar deposits with Land Bank of the Philippines, dollar and peso deposits with Allied Banking Corporation, Banco de Oro Universal Bank, Bank of the Philippine Islands, United Coconut Planters Bank and Planter's Development Bank; GUILTY on Specification 3 of Charge 1; GUILTY on Charge 2 and all its specifications. The sentence imposed by the Special GCM is to be dishonorably discharged from the service, to forfeit all pay and allowances due and to become due; and to be confined at hard labor at such place the reviewing authority may direct for a period of two (2) years. As it is, the sentence is proper and legal. Recommend that the sentence be approved. The PNP custodial facility in Camp Crame, Quezon City, is the appropriate place of confinement. The period of confinement from 18 October 2004 shall be credited in his favor and deducted from the two (2) years to which the accused was sentenced. Thus, confinement will expire on 18 October 2006. Considering that the period left not served is less than one (1) year, confinement at the National Penitentiary is no longer appropriate.4. To carry this recommendation into effect, a draft "ACTION OF THE REVIEWING AUTHORITY" is hereto attached.In an undated document,7the AFP Board of Military Review recommended the following action:8. RECOMMENDED ACTION:A. Only so much of the sentence as provides for the mandatory penalty of dismissal from the military service and forfeiture of pay and allowances due and to become due for the offenses of violation of AW 96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman) and for violation of AW 97 (Conduct Prejudicial to Good Order and Military Discipline) be imposed upon the Accused.B. The records of the instant case should be forwarded to the President thru the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of National Defense, for final review pursuant to AW 47, the Accused herein being a General Officer whose case needs confirmation by the President.C. To effectuate the foregoing, attached for CSAFP's signature/approval is a proposed 1stIndorsement to the President, thru the Secretary of National Defense, recommending approval of the attached prepared "ACTION OF THE PRESIDENT."After six (6) years and two (2) months of preventive confinement, on December 16, 2010, petitioner was released from the Camp Crame Detention Center.8The Office of the President, or the President as Commander-in-Chief of the AFP and acting as the Confirming Authority under the Articles of War, confirmed the sentence imposed by the Court Martial against petitioner. The Confirmation of Sentence,9reads in part:NOW, THEREFORE, I, BENIGNO S. AQUINO III, the President as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, do hereby confirm the sentence imposed by the Court Martial in the case of People of the Philippines versus Major General Carlos Flores Garcia AFP:a) To be dishonorable discharged from the service;b) To forfeit all pay and allowances due and to become due; andc) To be confined for a period of two (2) years in a penitentiary.FURTHER, pursuant to the 48th and 49th Articles of War, the sentence on Major General Carlos Flores Garcia AFP shall not be remitted/mitigated by any previous confinement. Major General Carlos Flores Garcia AFP shall serve the foregoing sentence effective on this date.DONE, in the City of Manila, this 9th day of September, in the year of our Lord, Two Thousand and Eleven.Consequently, on September 15, 2011, respondent Secretary of National Defense Voltaire T. Gazmin, issued a Memorandum10to the Chief of Staff, AFP for strict implementation, the Confirmation of Sentence in the Court Martial Case of People of the Philippines Versus Major General Carlos Flores Garcia AFP.On September 16, 2011, petitioner was arrested and detained, and continues to be detained at the National Penitentiary, Maximum Security, Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City.11Aggrieved, petitioner filed with this Court the present petition for certiorari and petition for habeas corpus, alternatively. However, this Court, in its Resolution12dated October 10, 2011, denied the petition for habeas corpus. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration13dated November 15, 2011, but was denied14by this Court on December 12, 2011.Petitioner enumerates the following grounds to support his petition:GROUNDSA.THE JURISDICTION OF THE GENERAL COURT MARTIAL CEASED IPSO FACTO UPON THE RETIREMENT OF PETITIONER, FOR WHICH REASON THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE CONFIRMATION OF SENTENCE, AND PETITIONER'S ARREST AND CONFINEMENT PURSUANT THERETO IS ILLEGAL, THUS WARRANTING THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS.B.EVEN ASSUMING FOR THE SAKE OF ARGUMENT THAT PETITIONER REMAINED AMENABLE TO COURT MARTIAL JURISDICTION AFTER HIS RETIREMENT, THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN IMPOSING THE SENTENCE OF TWO (2) YEARS CONFINEMENT WITHOUT ANY LEGAL BASIS, FOR WHICH REASON PETITIONER'S ARREST AND CONFINEMENT IS ILLEGAL, THUS WARRANTING THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS.C.EVEN ASSUMING FOR THE SAKE OF ARGUMENT THAT THE PENALTY OF TWO (2) YEARS CONFINEMENT MAY BE IMPOSED IN ADDITION TO THE PENALTIES OF DISMISSAL AND FORFEITURE, THE SENTENCE HAD BEEN FULLY SERVED IN VIEW OF PETITIONER'S PREVENTIVE CONFINEMENT WHICH EXCEEDED THE 2-YEAR SENTENCE, AND THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT HAS NO AUTHORITY TO REPUDIATE SAID SERVICE OF SENTENCE, FOR WHICH REASON PETITIONER'S ARREST AND CONFINEMENT DESPITE FULL SERVICE OF SENTENCE IS ILLEGAL, THUS WARRANTING THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS.15In view of the earlier resolution of this Court denying petitioner's petition for habeas corpus, the above grounds are rendered moot and academic. Thus, the only issue in this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, which was properly filed with thisCourt, is whether the Office of the President acted with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in issuing the Confirmation of Sentence dated September 9, 2011.In its Comment16dated October 27, 2011, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) lists the following counter-arguments:I.PETITIONER'S DIRECT RECOURSE TO THE HONORABLE COURT VIOLATES THE DOCTRINE OF HIERARCHY OF COURTS; HENCE, THE PETITION SHOULD BE OUTRIGHTLY DISMISSED.II.THE GENERAL COURT MARTIAL RETAINED JURISDICTION OVER PETITIONER DESPITE HIS RETIREMENT DURING THE PENDENCY OF THE PROCEEDINGS AGAINST HIM SINCE THE SAID TRIBUNAL'S JURISDICTION HAD ALREADY FULLY ATTACHED PRIOR TO PETITIONER'S RETIREMENT.III.THE CONFIRMATION ISSUED BY THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT DIRECTING PETITIONER TO BE CONFINED FOR TWO (2) YEARS IN A PENITENTIARY IS SANCTIONED BY C. A. NO. 408 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 178, PURSUANT TO THE PRESIDENT'S CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY AS THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE AFP.IV.PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO A SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF HIS CASE WAS NOT VIOLATED IN THIS CASE.V.THE IMPOSITION OF THE PENALTY OF TWO (2) YEARS CONFINEMENT ON PETITIONER BY THE GCM, AND AS CONFIRMED BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, IS VALID.VI.ACCORDINGLY, PUBLIC RESPONDENTS DID NOT ACT WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ISSUING AND IMPLEMENTING THE CONFIRMATION OF SENTENCE.17Petitioner, in his Reply18dated January 20, 2012, disagreed with the arguments raised by the OSG due to the following:(A)THE CONFIRMATION OF THE COURT MARTIAL SENTENCE IS AN ACT BY THE PRESIDENT, AS THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, AND NOT MERELY AS THE HEAD OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH. THEREFORE, THE HONORABLE COURT IS THE ONLY APPROPRIATE COURT WHERE HIS ACT MAY BE IMPUGNED, AND NOT IN THE LOWER COURTS, I.E., REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ("RTC") OR THE COURT OF APPEALS ("CA"), AS THE OSG ERRONEOUSLY POSTULATES.(B)ALTHOUGH THE GENERAL COURT MARTIAL ("GCM") RETAINED JURISDICTION "OVER THE PERSON" OF PETITIONER EVEN AFTER HE RETIRED FROM THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES ('AFP"), HOWEVER, HIS RETIREMENT, CONTRARY TO THE STAND OF THE OSG, SEVERED HIS "JURAL RELATIONSHIP" WITH THE MILITARY, THEREBY PLACING HIM BEYOND THE SUBSTANTIVE REACH OF THE AFP'S COURT MARTIAL JURISDICTION.(C)UNDER ART. 29, REVISED PENAL CODE ("RPC"), PETITIONER'S COURT MARTIAL SENTENCE OF TWO (2) YEARS IN CARCERATION HAD ALREADY BEEN SERVED IN FULL SINCE HE HAD ALREADY SUFFERED PREVENTIVE IMPRISONMENT OF AT LEAST SIX (6) YEARS BEFORE THE SENTENCE COULD BE CONFIRMED, WHICH MEANS THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD NO MORE JURISDICTION WHEN HE CONFIRMED IT, THEREBY RENDERING THE "CONFIRMATION OF SENTENCE" A PATENT NULLITY, AND, CONSEQUENTLY, INVALIDATING THE OSG'S POSITION THAT THE PRESIDENT STILL HAD JURISDICTION WHEN HE CONFIRMED THE SENTENCE.19Petitioner raises the issue of the jurisdiction of the General Court Martial to try his case. According to him, the said jurisdiction ceased ipso facto upon his compulsory retirement. Thus, he insists that the Office of the President had acted without jurisdiction in issuing the confirmation of his sentence.This Court finds the above argument bereft of merit.Article 2 of the Articles of War20circumscribes the jurisdiction of military law over persons subject thereto, to wit:Art. 2. Persons Subject to Military Law. - The following persons are subject to these articles and shall be understood as included in the term "any person subject to military law" or "persons subject to military law," whenever used in these articles:(a) All officers and soldiers in the active service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or of the Philippine Constabulary; all members of the reserve force, from the dates of their call to active duty and while on such active duty; all trainees undergoing military instructions; and all other persons lawfully called, drafted, or ordered into, or to duty or for training in, the said service, from the dates they are required by the terms of the call, draft, or order to obey the same;(b) Cadets, flying cadets, and probationary second lieutenants;(c) All retainers to the camp and all persons accompanying or serving with the Armed Forces of the Philippines in the field in time of war or when martial law is declared though not otherwise subject to these articles;(d) All persons under sentence adjudged by courts-martial.(As amended by Republic Acts 242 and 516).It is indisputable that petitioner was an officer in the active service of the AFP in March 2003 and 2004, when the alleged violations were committed. The charges were filed on October 27, 2004 and he was arraigned on November 16, 2004. Clearly, from the time the violations were committed until the time petitioner was arraigned, the General Court Martial had jurisdiction over the case. Well-settled is the rule that jurisdiction once acquired is not lost upon the instance of the parties but continues until the case is terminated.21Therefore, petitioner's retirement on November 18, 2004 did not divest the General Court Martial of its jurisdiction. In B/Gen. (Ret.) Francisco V. Gudani, et al. v. Lt./Gen. Generoso Senga, et al.,22this Court ruled that:This point was settled against Gen. Gudani's position in Abadilla v. Ramos, where the Court declared that an officer whose name was dropped from the roll of officers cannot be considered to be outside the jurisdiction of military authorities when military justice proceedings were initiated against him before the termination of his service. Once jurisdiction has been acquired over the officer, it continues until his case is terminated. Thus, the Court held:The military authorities had jurisdiction over the person of Colonel Abadilla at the time of the alleged offenses. This jurisdiction having been vested in the military authorities, it is retained up to the end of the proceedings against Colonel Abadilla. Well-settled is the rule that jurisdiction once acquired is not lost upon the instance of the parties but continues until the case is terminated.Citing Colonel Winthrop's treatise on Military Law, the Court further stated:We have gone through the treatise of Colonel Winthrop and We find the following passage which goes against the contention of the petitioners, viz. 3. Offenders in general Attaching of jurisdiction. It has further been held, and is now settled law, in regard to military offenders in general, that if the military jurisdiction has once duly attached to them previous to the date of the termination of their legal period of service, they may be brought to trial by court-martial after that date, their discharge being meanwhile withheld. This principle has mostly been applied to cases where the offense was committed just prior to the end of the term. In such cases the interests of discipline clearly forbid that the offender should go unpunished. It is held therefore that if before the day on which his service legally terminates and his right to a discharge is complete, proceedings with a view to trial are commenced against him as by arrest or the service of charges, the military jurisdiction will fully attach and once attached may be continued by a trial by court-martial ordered and held after the end of the term of the enlistment of the accused x x xThus, military jurisdiction has fully attached to Gen. Gudani inasmuch as both the acts complained of and the initiation of the proceedings against him occurred before he compulsorily retired on 4 October 2005. We see no reason to unsettle the Abadilla doctrine. The OSG also points out that under Section 28 of Presidential Decree No. 1638, as amended, "an officer or enlisted man carried in the retired list of the Armed Forces of the Philippines shall be subject to the Articles of War x x x" To this citation, petitioners do not offer any response, and in fact have excluded the matter of Gen. Gudani's retirement as an issue in their subsequent memorandum.23It is also apt to mention that under Executive Order No. 178, or the Manual for Courts-Martial, AFP, the jurisdiction of courts-martial over officers, cadets, soldiers, and other military personnel in the event of discharge or other separation from the service, and the exceptions thereto, is defined thus:10. COURT-MARTIAL Jurisdiction in general Termination General Rules The general rule is that court-martial jurisdiction over officers, cadets, soldiers and others in the military service of the Philippines ceases on discharge or other separation from such service, and that jurisdiction as to any offense committed during a period of service thus terminated is not revived by a reentry into the military service.Exceptions To this general rule there are, however, some exceptions, among them the following:x x x xIn certain case, where the person's discharge or other separation does not interrupt his status as a person belonging to the general category of persons subject to military law, court-martial jurisdiction does not terminate. Thus, where an officer holding a reserve commission is discharged from said commission by reason of acceptance of a commission in the Regular Force, there being no interval between services under the respective commissions, there is no terminating of the officer's military status, but merely the accomplishment of a change in his status from that of a reserve to that of a regular officer, and that court-martial jurisdiction to try him for an offense (striking enlisted men for example) committed prior to the discharge is not terminated by the discharge. So also, where a dishonorable discharged general prisoner is tried for an offense committed while a soldier and prior to his dishonorable discharge, such discharge does not terminate his amenability to trial for the offense. (Emphases supplied.)Petitioner also asserts that the General Court Martial's continuing jurisdiction over him despite his retirement holds true only if the charge against him involves fraud, embezzlement or misappropriation of public funds citing this Court's ruling in De la Paz v. Alcaraz,et al.24and Martin v. Ve r.25However, this is not true. The OSG is correct in stating that in De la Paz,26military jurisdiction over the officer who reverted to inactive status was sustained by this Court because the violation involved misappropriation of public funds committed while he was still in the active military service, while in Martin,27military jurisdiction was affirmed because the violation pertained to illegal disposal of military property. Both cited cases centered on the nature of the offenses committed by the military personnel involved, justifying the exercise of jurisdiction by the courts-martial. On the other hand, in the present case, the continuing military jurisdiction is based on prior attachment of jurisdiction on the military court before petitioner's compulsory retirement. This continuing jurisdiction is provided under Section 1 of P.D. 1850,28as amended, thus:Section 1. Court Martial Jurisdiction over Integrated National Police and Members of the Armed Forces. - Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding (a) uniformed members of the Integrated National Police who commit any crime or offense cognizable by the civil courts shall henceforth be exclusively tried by courts-martial pursuant to and in accordance with Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended, otherwise known as the Articles of War; (b) all persons subject to military law under article 2 of the aforecited Articles of War who commit any crime or offense shall be exclusively tried by courts-martial or their case disposed of under the said Articles of War; Provided, that, in either of the aforementioned situations, the case shall be disposed of or tried by the proper civil or judicial authorities when court-martial jurisdiction over the offense has prescribed under Article 38 of Commonwealth Act Numbered 408, as amended, or court-martial jurisdiction over the person of the accused military or Integrated National Police personnel can no longer be exercised by virtue of their separation from the active service without jurisdiction having duly attached beforehand unless otherwise provided by law: Provided further, that the President may, in the interest of justice, order or direct, at any time before arraignment, that a particular case be tried by the appropriate civil court. (Emphasis supplied.)Having established the jurisdiction of the General Court Martial over the case and the person of the petitioner, the President, as Commander-in-Chief, therefore acquired the jurisdiction to confirm petitioner's sentence as mandated under Article 47 of the Articles of War, which states:Article 47. Confirmation When Required. - In addition to the approval required by article forty-five, confirmation by the President is required in the following cases before the sentence of a court-martial is carried into execution, namely:(a) Any sentence respecting a general officer;(b) Any sentence extending to the dismissal of an officer except that in time of war a sentence extending to the dismissal of an officer below the grade of brigadier general may be carried into execution upon confirmation by the commanding general of the Army in the field;(c) Any sentence extending to the suspension or dismissal of a cadet, probationary second lieutenant; and(d) Any sentence of death, except in the case of persons convicted in time of war, of murder, mutiny, desertion, or as spies, and in such excepted cases of sentence of death may be carried into execution, subject to the provisions of Article 50, upon confirmation by the commanding general of the Army in the said field.When the authority competent to confirm the sentence has already acted as the approving authority no additional confirmation by him is necessary. (As amended by Republic Act No. 242). (Emphasis supplied.)In connection therewith, petitioner argues that the confirmation issued by the Office of the President directing him to be confined for two (2) years in the penitentiary had already been fully served in view of his preventive confinement which had exceeded two (2) years. Therefore, according to him, the Office of the President no longer has the authority to order his confinement in a penitentiary. On the other hand, the OSG opines that petitioner cannot legally demand the deduction of his preventive confinement in the service of his imposed two-year confinement in a penitentiary, because unlike our Revised Penal Code29which specifically mandates that the period of preventive imprisonment of the accused shall be deducted from the term of his imprisonment, the Articles of War and/or the Manual for Courts-Martial do not provide for the same deduction in the execution of the sentence imposed by the General Court Martial as confirmed by the President in appropriate cases.On the above matter, this Court finds the argument raised by the OSG unmeritorious and finds logic in the assertion of petitioner that Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code can be made applicable in the present case.The OSG maintains that military commissions or tribunals are not courts within the Philippine judicial system, citing Olaguer, et al. v. Military Commission No. 4,30hence, they are not expected to apply criminal law concepts in their implementation and execution of decisions involving the discipline of military personnel. This is misleading. In Olaguer, the courts referred to were military commissions created under martial law during the term of former President Ferdinand Marcos and was declared unconstitutional by this Court, while in the present case, the General Court Martial which tried it, was created under Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended, and remains a valid entity.In Marcos v. Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines,31this Court ruled that a court-martial case is a criminal case and the General Court Martial is a "court" akin to any other courts. In the same case, this Court clarified as to what constitutes the words "any court" used in Section 1732of the 1935 Constitution prohibiting members of Congress to appear as counsel in any criminal case in which an officer or employee of the Government is accused of an offense committed in relation to his office. This Court held:We are of the opinion and therefore hold that it is applicable, because the words "any court" includes the General Court-Martial, and a court-martial case is a criminal case within the meaning of the above quoted provisions of our Constitution.It is obvious that the words "any court," used in prohibiting members of Congress to appear as counsel "in any criminal case in which an officer or employee of the Government is accused of an offense committed in relation to his office," refers, not only to a civil, but also to a military court or a Court-Martial. Because, in construing a Constitution, "it must be taken as established that where words are used which have both a restricted and a general meaning, the general must prevail over the restricted unless the nature of the subject matter of the context clearly indicates that the limite