june 4-5, 1942. early 1942 events the doolittle raid: when? april 18-19, 1942 where? western...

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THE BATTLE OF MIDWAY JUNE 4-5, 1942

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  • Slide 1
  • JUNE 4-5, 1942
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  • EARLY 1942 EVENTS THE DOOLITTLE RAID: WHEN? APRIL 18-19, 1942 WHERE? WESTERN PACIFIC, JAPAN ISLANDS WHO? U.S. ARMY AIR CORPS / FORCE BOMBERS U.S. NAVY Lt. COL. JAMES DOOLITTLE, U.S.A.A.F. IS C/O 16 B-25 BOMBERS (80 OFFICERS & AIRMEN) WHY? RETALIATION FOR PEARL HARBOR ATTACK TO BOOST U.S. MILITARY & PUBLIC MORALE PROBLEM? HOW TO GET AIR GROUP CLOSE ENOUGH TO JAPAN W/OUT DETECTION HOW TO GET CREWS / PLANES TO SAFETY RESULTS? TOKYO BOMBED W/LITTLE DAMAGE CASUALTIES: U.S. 3 KIA, 8 POW (4 DIE IN CAPTIVITY 3 EXECUTED, 1 OF DISEASE), 15 B-25 BOMBERS JAPAN 50 DEAD, 400 WOUNDED STRATEGIC RESULTS: JAPAN WITHDRAWS CARRIER GROUP FROM INDIAN OCEAN TO DEFEND JAPAN JAPAN DECIDES TO ATTACK MIDWAY ISLAND
  • Slide 3
  • LT. COL. JAMES H. DOOLITTLE, USAAF
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  • THE REAL DOOLITTLE
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  • U.S. ARMY B-25 BOMBER
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  • DOOLITTLES B-25 LAUNCHES FROM U.S.S. HORNET, APRIL 18, 1942
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  • DOOLITTLES B-25s OVER TOKYO HARBOR, APRIL, 1942
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  • DOOLITTLE RAIDER IN JAPANESE CAPTIVITY, APRIL, 1942
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  • THE BATTLE OF THE CORAL SEA WHEN? MAY 4-8, 1942 WHERE? CORAL SEA, S.PACIFIC (near Australia) WHO? IJN COMBINED FLEET (carriers & battleships) USN 2 CARRIER TASK FORCES (define) AUSTRALIA DESTROYER FORCES WHY? JAPAN ATTEMPTING TO STRENGTHEN THEIR POSITION IN S. PACIFIC OCCUPY PORT MORESBY (New Guinea) EXTEND CONTROL IN SOLOMON ISLANDS SO WHAT? DIRECT THREAT TO AUSTRALIA RESULTS? FIRST BATTLE TO EMPLOY LARGE-SCALE CARRIER-BASED ATTACKS HEAVY FIGHTING / LOSSES ON BOTH SIDES CASUALTIES: JAPAN 1 CARRIER SUNK, 1 DAMAGED, 966 KIA U.S. 1 CARRIER SCUTTLED, 1 HEAVILY DAMAGED, 656 KIA STRATEGIC EFFECT? JAPAN CANNOT OCCUPY PORT MORESBY 2 JAPANESE CARRIERS UNABLE TO PARTICIPATE AT MIDWAY U.S. & ALLIES NOW HAVE TIME TO PREPARE NEW GUINEA INVASION
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  • MIDWAY ISLAND, CENTRAL PACIFIC
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  • AERIAL RECONAISSANCE PHOTO, MIDWAY ISLAND, 1942
  • Slide 23
  • FLEET ADMIRAL CHESTER NIMITZ, COMMANDER, U.S. PACIFIC FLEET
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  • REAR ADMIRAL RAYMOND SPRUANCE, COMMANDING OFFICER, TASK FORCE 16, BATTLE OF MIDWAY
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  • VICE ADMIRAL WILLIAM HALSEY, U.S. NAVY, ORIGINAL C/O, TASK FORCE 16
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  • REAR ADMIRAL FRANK JACK FLETCHER, COMMANDING OFFICER, TASK FORCE 17, BATTLE OF MIDWAY
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  • LCDR JOSEPH ROCHEFORT, U.S. NAVY, NAVAL INTELLIGENCE & CRYPTOLOGY DIVISION
  • Slide 29
  • ADMIRAL ISORUKU YAMAMOTO, COMMANDING OFFICER, IMPERIAL JAPANESE NAVY
  • Slide 30
  • ADMIRAL CHUICHI NAGUMO COMMANDING OFFICER, IMPERIAL JAPANESE CARRIER FLEET, BATTLE OF MIDWAY
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  • MIDWAY: PREPARING FOR BATTLE JAPANESE GOALS: ELIMINATE U.S. STRATEGIC POWER IN PACIFIC ALLOW JAPAN TO STRENGTHEN / TAKE ADVANTAGE OF RECENT CONQUESTS WOULD ENSURE NO REPEAT OF DOOLITTLE RAID HOW? / WHAT WAS THE STRATEGY? LURE U.S.NAVY CARRIERS INTO TRAP & ELIMINATE THEM A THREAT TO HAWAII WOULD FORCE U.S. TO RESPOND W/ CARRIER FORCES ATTACK & OCCUPY MIDWAY ISLAND
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  • MIDWAY: ORDER OF BATTLE JAPANESE FORCES*: 4 CARRIERS 2 BATTLESHIPS 15 SUPPORT SHIPS 248 AIRCRAFT U.S. FORCES: 3 CARRIERS 25 SUPPORT SHIPS 233 CARRIER-BASED PLANES 127 LAND-BASED (Midway Island) PLANES *THESE FIGURES ONLY INCLUDE FORCES DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN COMBAT AT MIDWAY
  • Slide 37
  • COMPARING FORCES JAPAN: ADVANTAGES LARGER NAVAL FORCE MOST IMPORTANTLY MORE CARRIERS MORE EXPERIENCED NAVAL CREWS MORE EXPERIENCED PILOTS CONFIDENCE MOMENTUM JAPAN: DISADVANTAGES FEW, IF ANY NAVAL CODEBREAKING / CRYPTOLOGY WAS INFERIOR TO U.S. BATTLE PLAN IS COMPLICATED: JAPANESE FORCES CANNOT SUPPORT EACH OTHER WHY? THEY ARE DISPERSED OVER LARGE AREA OVERCONFIDENCE UNDERESTIMATION OF U.S. CAPABILITIES (at that time)
  • Slide 38
  • COMPARING FORCES(contd.) U.S.: ADVANTAGES CODEBREAKING / CRYPTOLOGY U.S.: DISADVANTAGES LESS EXPERIENCED CREWS FEWER SHIPS, esp. CARRIERS INFERIOR TORPEDO PLANES INFERIOR FIGHTER PLANES U.S. CANNOT AFFORD TO LOSE CARRIERS WHAT ROLE DO U.S. NAVAL INTELLIGENCE CODEBREAKERS PLAY IN THE BATTLE? IJN NAVAL CODE (IJN-25) WAS BROKEN BY THE U.S. CODES PROVED MIDWAY WAS JAPANs PRIMARY TARGET
  • Slide 39
  • U.S. NAVY TASK FORCE 16 CARRIERS, BATTLE OF MIDWAY U.S.S. HORNET (above) U.S.S. ENTERPRISE (right)
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  • U.S.S. YORKTOWN, TASK FORCE 17
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  • U.S. NAVY SBD DAUNTLESS DIVE BOMBER
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  • U.S.NAVY TBD DEVASTATOR TORPEDO PLANE
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  • U.S. NAVY GRUMMAN F-4-F WILDCAT FIGHTER
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  • U.S. NAVY BREWSTER F2A-3 BUFFALO FIGHTER
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  • JAPANESE CARRIER SORYU JAPANESE CARRIER HIRYU
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  • JAPANESE CARRIER KAGA
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  • JAPANESE CARRIER AKAGI
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  • NAKAJIMA BN5 KATE TORPEDO PLANE (ABOVE) ; AICHI D3-A VAL DIVE BOMBER (BELOW)
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  • MITSUBISHI A6M ZERO FIGHTER
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  • COURSE OF BATTLE JUNE 4: 0620 hrs: JAPANESE ATTACK MIDWAY HEAVY AIR LOSSES FOR U.S. MIDWAY DAMAGED, BUT AIRFIELDS REMAIN INTACT SO WHAT? U.S. CAN STILL LAUNCH ATTACKS FROM ISLAND IJN WILL HAVE TO PREP. FOR 2 nd ATTACK ON MIDWAY 0500 hrs.: U.S. ATTACK JAPANESE CARRIERS w/MIDWAY- BASED PLANES 0715 hrs.: NAGUMO ORDERS CARRIER TORPEDO PLANES REARMED W/ CONTACT BOMBS (why?) 0800 hrs.: IJN SCOUT PLANES SIGHT U.S FLEET NAGUMO ORDERS HALT TO ARMING OF PLANES ORDERS BOMBS REMOVED & REPLACED BY TORPEDOS PROBLEM: NAGUMO MUST WAIT FOR MIDWAY STRIKE FORCE PLANES TO LAND THEN HE WILL LAUNCH PLANES AGAINST U.S. CARRIERS SO WHAT? U.S. FLEET HAS ALREADY LAUNCHED THEIR ATTACK PLANES
  • Slide 60
  • COURSE OF BATTLE PROBLEMS? FOR IJN? YES THEY HAVENT LAUNCHED PLANES AGAINST U.S. FLEET FLIGHT DECKS / HANGAR DECKS ARE COVERED w/BOMBS, TORPEDOES, & FUEL LINES FOR U.S.? YES THEIR PLANES WERE LAUNCHED w/OUT COORDINATION PLANES GET SEPARATED ON FLIGHT TO IJN SO TORPEDO PLANES HAVE NO FIGHTER COVER 0920 1000 hrs.: U.S. TORPEDO PLANES ATTACK SEVERE LOSSES (ex. TORPEDO SQUADRON 8) CRITICAL MOMENT: JAPANESE COMBAT FIGHTER PATROL COVERING CARRIERS IS DRAWN DOWN TO SURFACE CHASING TORPEDO PLANES 1020 hrs.: U.S. DIVE BOMBERS ARRIVE OVER IJN CARRIERS IJN FIGHTER PLANES CANNOT STOP THEM (why?) 3 DIVE BOMBER SQUADRONS ATTACK 3 IJN CARRIERS HIT SIMULTANEOUSLY THE FATAL FIVE MINUTES: KAGA, AKAGI, SORYU ALL HIT & SUNK HIRYU LAUNCHES AIRSTRIKE IMMEDIATELY U.S.S. YORKTOWN IS ATTACKED BY IJN DIVE BOMBERS & TORPEDO PLANES HEAVILY DAMAGED; SINKS ON JUNE 7 HIRYU IS SUNK AFTER U.S. ATTACK IN AFTERNOON
  • Slide 61
  • AERIAL RECONAISSANCE PHOTO, MIDWAY ISLAND, 1942
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  • MIDWAY ISLAND AIRFIELD LOCATIONS
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  • LT. COMMANDER (LCDR) JOHN THACH, U.S. NAVY
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  • THE THACH WEAVE
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  • BATTLE OF MIDWAY, BATTLE SEQUENCE, JUNE 4, 1942
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  • LCDR JOHN C. WALDRON, SQUADRON C/O, TORPEDO SQUADRON 8, U.S.S. HORNET
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  • VT-8, TORPEDO SQUADRON 8, U.S.S. HORNET
  • Slide 71
  • JUST A WORD TO LET YOU KNOW THAT I THINK WE ARE READY. WE HAVE HAD A VERY SHORT TIME TO TRAIN AND WE HAVE WORKED UNDER THE MOST SEVERE DIFFICULTIES. BUT WE HAVE TRULY DONE THE BEST HUMANLY POSSIBLE. I ACTUALLY BELIEVE THAT UNDER THESE CONDITIONS WE ARE THE BEST IN THE WORLD. MY GREATEST HOPE IS THAT WE ENCOUNTER A FAVORABLE TACTICAL SITUATION, BUT IF WE DONT, AND THE WORST COMES TO WORST, I WANT EACH OF US TO DO HIS UTMOST TO DESTROY OUR ENEMIES. IF THERE IS ONLY ONE PLANE LEFT TO MAKE A FINAL RUN IN, I WANT THAT MAN TO GO IN AND GET A HIT. MAY GOD BE WITH ALL OF US. GOOD LUCK, HAPPY LANDINGS, AND GIVE EM HELL. LCDR JOHN C. WALDRON, C/O TORPEDO 8, JUNE 4, 1942
  • Slide 72
  • LCDR JOHN C. WALDRON TAKING OFF DECK OF U.S.S. HORNET
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  • U.S.NAVY DAUNTLESS DIVE BOMBERS BEGIN THEIR ATTACK, JUNE 4, 1942
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  • U.S. NAVY DIVE BOMBERS OVER IJN CARRIER IN FLAMES
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  • BASIC U.S.N. DIVE BOMBING TACTICS
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  • RESULTS CASUALTIES: IJN: 4 CARRIERS SUNK 1 CRUISER SUNK 248 AIRCRAFT DESTROYED 2,013 KIA U.S.: 1 CARRIER SUNK (U.S.S. YORKTOWN) 1 DESTROYER SUNK (U.S.S. HAMMAN) 150 AIRCRAFT DESTROYED 307 KIA
  • Slide 84
  • U.S.S. YORKTOWN HIT BY TORPEDO
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  • IJN KATE TORPEDO PLANE AFTER WEAPON RELEASE ON U.S.S. YORKTOWN
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  • U.S.S. YORKTOWN SINKING
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  • U.S.S. YORKTOWN AT 17,000 FEET BELOW PACIFIC OCEAN SURFACE
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  • EFFECTS ALLIES 1 st MAJOR VICTORY AGAINST JAPAN ELIMINATES JAPANs OFFENSIVE CAPABILITY WHY? HIGH CASUALTIES FOR VETERAN PILOTS HIGH CASUALITES FOR CARRIER CREWS EXPERIENCED PEOPLE CANT BE QUICKLY REPLACED LOSS OF 4 CARRIERS CANT BE QUICKLY REPLACED SETS THE STAGE FOR U.S. INVASIONS OF SOLOMON ISLANDS & NEW GUINEA THE TURNING POINT IN THE PACIFIC THEATRE OF WORLD WAR II