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1. MERCEDITA DE JESUS,Complainant,- versus -ATTY. JUVY MELL SANCHEZ MALIT July 8, 2014

Facts: In the Affidavit-Complaint 1 filed by complainant before the Office of the Bar Confidant on 23 June 2004, she alleged that on 1 March 2002, respondent had drafted and notarized a Real Estate Mortgage of a public market stall that falsely named the former as its absolute and registered owner. As a result, the mortgagee sued complainant for perjury and for collection of sum of money.

Issue: W/N respondent is guilty.

Held: Yes. The important role a notary public performs cannot be overemphasized. The Court has repeatedly stressed that notarization is not an empty, meaningless routinary act, but one invested with substantive public interest. Notarization converts a private document into a public document, making it admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. Thus, a notarized document is, by law, entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. It is for this reason that a notary public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of his notarial duties; otherwise, the public's confidence in the integrity of a notarized document would be undermined.2. DANTE LA JIMENEZ & LAURO GVIZCONDE,. - versus -ATTY. FELISBERTO L. VERANO, JR., - July 15, 2014

Facts: It was revealed during one such hearing that respondent had prepared the release order for his three clients using the letterhead of the Department of Justice (DOJ) andthe stationery of then Secretary Raul Gonzales.Issue: W/N respondent tried to influence a government official.

Held: Yes. Rule 1.02 states: "A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed

at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system." Further, according to Rule 15.06, "a lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able to influence any public official, tribunal or legislative body. The succeeding rule, Rule 15.07, mandates a lawyer to impress upon his client compliance with the laws and the principles of fairness.Zeal and persistence in advancing a clients cause must always be within the bounds of the law.23 A self-respecting independence in the exercise of the profession is expected if an attorney is to remain a member of the bar. In the present case, we find that respondent fell short of these exacting standards.

3. RAUL M. FRANCIA,- versus -ATTY. REYNALDO V. ABDON July 23, 2014

Facts: Respondent Reynaldo Abdon admitted that he introduced the complainant to Jaime Vistan a CA employee to facilitate a favorable decision for the case of the complainant electric cooperative.

Issue: W/N respondent is guilty.

Held. He is partially guilty. The respondent, however, is not entirely faultless. He has, nonetheless, engendered the suspicion that he is engaged in an illegal deal

when he introduced the complainant to Vistan, who was the one who allegedly demanded 1,000,000.00 in facilitation fee from the union members. Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that a lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. For, the strength of the legal profession lies in the dignity and integrity of its members.35 It is every lawyers duty to maintain the high regard to the profession by staying true to his oath and keeping his actions beyond reproach. Also, the respondent, as a member of the legal profession, has a further responsibility to safeguard the dignity of the courts which the public perceives as the bastion of justice.

4. EMERITA B. MAHILUM, vs. ATTY. SAMUEL SM. LEZAMA, -July 30, 2014

Facts: This administrative complaint1 filed by Emerita B. Mahilum (complainant) seeks the disbarment of Atty. Samuel SM. Lezama (respondent), a commissioned notary public and practicing lawyer in San Carlos City, Negros Occidental, for notarizing a 'Deed of Donation' in the absence of one of the affiants.

Issue: W/N respondent is guilty.

Held: Yes. Section 1 of Public Act No. 2103, or the Notarial Law mandates that

affiants must personally appear to the notary public, viz: Sec. 1. (a) The acknowledgement shall be before a notary public or an officer duly authorized by law of the country to takeacknowledgements of instruments or documents in the place where the act is done. The notary public or the officer taking the acknowledgement shall certify that the person acknowledging the instrument or document is known to him and that he is the same person who executed it, acknowledged that the same is his free act and deed. The certificate shall be made under the official seal, if he is required by law to keep a seal, and if not, his certificate shall so state.

Corollary, under Section 2(b) of Rule IV of the Rules on Notarial Practice of 2004, a commissioned notary public is enjoined from performing a notarial act unless the affiant is: (1) in his presence at the time of the notarization; and (2) personally known to him or otherwise identified by him through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules.

5. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES,- versus -BENECIO EUSEBIO, JR., - July 2, 2014

Facts: The challenged decision affirmed in toto the June 29, 1999 judgment4

of the Regional Trial Court of Masbate, Masbate, Branch 48, sitting as a

Special Agrarian Court (RTC-SAC) in Special Civil Case No. 4325 for

Determination and Payment of Just Compensation under Republic Act (R.A.)

No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988.

Issue: The core issue for the Courts resolution is whether the RTC-SACs

determination of just compensation for the property at _25,000,000.00, with

10% attorneys fees, is proper.

Held: No. The determination of just compensation is essentially a judicial function that the Courts exercise within the parameters of the law; the RTC-SACs valuation in this case is erroneous for having been rendered outside the contemplation of the law. Jurisprudence settles that the determination of just compensation is fundamentally a function of the courts.31 Section 57 of R.A. No. 6657 explicitly vests in the RTC-SAC the original and exclusive jurisdiction to determine just compensation for lands taken pursuant to the States agrarian reform program. To guide the RTC-SAC in the exercise of its function, Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657 enumerates the factors that the RTC-SAC must take into account in its determination, i.e., cost of acquisition of the land, the current value of like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations and the assessment made by the government assessors, among others.

6. COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, VS. OILINK INTERNATIONALCORPORATION, - July 2, 2014

Facts: This appeal is brought by the Commissioner of Customs to seek the

review and reversal of the decision promulgated on September 29, 2003,1

whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the adverse ruling of the Court

of Tax Appeals (CTA) declaring the assessment for deficiency taxes and

duties against Oilink International Corporation (Oilink) null and void.

Issue: W/N CTA has jurisdiction over the case.

Held: Yes. There is no question that the CTA had the jurisdiction over the case.

Republic Act No. 1125, the law creating the CTA, defined the appellate

jurisdiction of the CTA as follows:

Section 7. Jurisdiction. - The Court of Tax Appeals shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal, as herein provided:

x x x x

2. Decisions of the Commissioner of Customs in cases involving liability for Customs duties, fees or other money charges; seizure, detention or release of property affected; fines, forfeitures or other penalties imposed in relation thereto; or other matters arising under the

Customs Law or other law or part of law administered by the Bureau of Customs;

7. PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE T14ELEPHONE COMPANY,- versus-

MILLARD R. OCAMPO et al July 9, 2014

Facts: In February 1996, petitioner Philippine Long Distance Telephone

Company (PLDT), through its Quality Control Investigation Division (QCID),

conducted an investigation on the alleged illegal International Simple Resale (ISR) activities in Makati City. After confirming that some PLDT subscribers were indeed operating ISR businesses in Makati City, under the business names INFILNET and Emergency Monitoring System9 (EMS), petitioner requested the assistance of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to apprehend the said subscribers.

Issue: W/N the CA erred in giving due course to the Petition for Certiorari, and in subsequently granting the same despite evident procedural lapses.

Held: The CA erred. Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides that a special civil action for certiorari should be instituted within 60 days from notice of the judgment, order, or resolution, or from the notice of the denial of the motion for reconsideration of the judgment, order, or resolution being assailed. The 60-day period, however, is inextendible to avoid any unreasonable delay, which would violate the constitutional rights of parties to a speedy disposition of their cases.55 Thus, strict compliance of this rule is mandatory and imperative. But like all rules, the 60-day limitation may be relaxed for the most persuasive of reasons, which must be sufficiently shown by the party invoking liberality. In the absence of a motion for reconsideration, the Petition for Certiorari should have been dismissed.

8. ALOYSIUS DAIT LUMAUIG, vs. People of the Philippines July 7, 2014

Facts: Sometime in January 1998, Commission on Audit (COA) Auditor Florence L. Paguirigan examined the year-end reports involving the municipal officials of Alfonso Lista, Ifugao. During the course of her examination of the records and related documents of the municipality, she came across a disbursement voucher6 for P101,736.00 prepared for petitioner, a former mayor of the municipality, as cash advance for the payment of freight and other cargo charges for 12 units of motorcycles supposed to be donated to the municipality.

Issue: W/N a prior notice or demand for liquidation of cash advances is a condition

sine qua non before an accountable public officer may be held liable under Article

218 of the Revised Penal Code.

Held: No. Article 218 consists of the following elements:

1. that the offender is a public officer, whether in the service or separated therefrom;

2. that he must be an accountable officer for public funds or property;

3. that he is required by law or regulation to render accounts to the Commission on Audit, or to a provincial auditor; and

4. that he fails to do so for a period of two months after such accounts should be rendered.

Nowhere in the provision does it require that there first be a demand before an accountable officer is held liable for a violation of the crime. The law is very clear. Where none is provided, the court may not introduce exceptions or conditions, neither may it engraft into the law qualifications not contemplated. Where the law is clear and unambiguous, it must be taken to mean exactly what it says and the court has no choice but to see to it that its mandate is obeyed. There is no room for interpretation, but only application.

9. SOLEDAD L. LAVADIA,- versus -HEIRS OF JUAN LUCES LUNA,

represented by GREGORIO Z.LUNA and EUGENIA ZABALLERO-LUNA July 23, 2014

Facts: The petitioner, the second wife of the late Atty. Juan Luces Luna, appeals the adverse decision promulgated on November 11, 2005, 1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed with modification the decision rendered on August 27, 2001 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 138, in Makati City.2 The CA thereby denied her right in the 25/100 pro indiviso share of the husband in a condominium unit, and in the law books of the husband acquired during the second marriage.

Issue: W/N plaintiff should be entitled to the 25/100 pro indiviso share in the condominium unit; and to the law books (i.e., Corpus Juris, Fletcher on Corporation, American Jurisprudence and Federal Supreme Court Reports).

Held: No. Due to the second marriage between Atty. Luna and the petitioner being void ab initio by virtue of its being bigamous, the properties acquired during the bigamous marriage were governed by the rules on co-ownership, conformably with Article 144 of the Civil Code, viz:

Article 144. When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not married, or their marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.(n)

In such a situation, whoever alleges co-ownership carried the burden of proof to confirm such fact. To establish co-ownership, therefore, it became imperative for the petitioner to offer proof of her actual contributions in the acquisition of property. Her mere allegation of co-ownership, without sufficient and competent evidence, would warrant no relief in her favor.

Divorce between Filipinos is void and ineffectual under the nationality rule adopted by Philippine law. Hence, any settlement of property between the parties of the first marriage involving Filipinos submitted as an incident of a divorce obtained in a foreign country lacks competent judicial approval, and cannot be enforceable against the assets of the husband who contracts a subsequent marriage.10. THE HERITAGE HOTEL MANILA, ACTING THROUGH ITS OWNER, GRAND PLAZA HOTEL CORPORATION,- versus - SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT et. Al July 23, 2014

Facts: On October 11, 1995, respondent National Union of Workers in Hotel

Restaurant and Allied Industries-Heritage Hotel Manila Supervisors Chapter

(NUWHRAIN-HHMSC) filed a petition for certification election,3 seeking

to represent all the supervisory employees of Heritage Hotel Manila. The

petitioner filed its opposition, but the opposition was deemed denied on

February 14, 1996 when Med-Arbiter Napoleon V. Fernando issued his

order for the conduct of the certification election.

Issue: W/N the petitioner-employer has the legal standing to petition for the cancellation of union registration based on mixed membership of supervisors and managers in a labor union.

Held: No. Basic in the realm of labor union rights is that the certification

election is the sole concern of the workers, and the employer is deemed an

intruder as far as the certification election is concerned.30 Thus, the petitioner

lacked the legal personality to assail the proceedings for the certification

election, and should stand aside as a mere bystander who could not oppose

the petition, or even appeal the Med-Arbiters orders relative to the conduct

of the certification election. The petitioners meddling in the conduct of the certification election among its employees unduly gave rise to the suspicion that it intended to establish a company union.34 For that reason, the challenges it posed against the certification election proceedings were rightly denied.

11. CATHAY METAL CORPORATION, VS. LAGUNA WEST MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE, INC.

Facts: Respondent Laguna West Multi-Purpose Cooperative is a cooperative recognized under Republic Act No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. It allegedly entered into a joint venture agreement with farmer-beneficiaries through Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) in Silang, Cavite. While respondent was negotiating with the farmer-beneficiaries, petitioner Cathay Metal Corporation entered into Irrevocable Exclusive Right to Buy (IERB) contracts with the same farmer beneficiaries. Under the IERB, the farmer-beneficiaries committed themselves to sell to petitioner their agricultural properties upon conversion to industrial or commercial properties or upon expiration of the period of prohibition from transferring title to the properties.

Issue: W/N respondent was validly served with summon.

Held: No. We rule that respondent was not validly served with summons or notice of the hearing. The Rules of Court governs court procedures, including the rules on service of notices and summons. The Cooperative Code provision on notices cannot replace the rules on summons under the Rules of Court. Rule 14, Section 11 of the Rules of Court provides an- exclusive enumeration of the persons authorized to receive summons for juridical entities. These persons are the juridical entity's president, managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel. However, its annotations of adverse claims should be cancelled for being based on a future claim. A claim based on a future right does not ripen into an adverse claim as defined in Section 70 of Presidential Decree No. 1529. A right still subject to negotiations cannot be enforced against a title holder or against one that has a legitimate title to the property based on possession, ownership, lien, or any valid deed of transfer.

12. JAY CANDELARIA and ERICBASIT,- versus - REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 42, CITY OF SAN FERNANDO; (Pampanga) represented by its Presiding Judge HON. MARIA AMIFAITH S. FIDER-REYES July 14, 2014

Facts: During an alleged buy-bust operation conducted in the evening of June 22,

2001, petitioners were arrested at the corner of Gueco St. and MacArthur Highway, Balibago, Angeles City for delivering, with the intention to sell, five

cases of counterfeit Fundador Brandy. On the strength of the Joint Affidavit6 of

the police operatives, petitioners were formally charged in an Information7 dated

July 6, 2004 with violation of Section 155 in relation to Section 170 of Republic

Act No. 8293, otherwise known as the Intellectual Property Code of the

Philippines.

Issue: W/N THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE

OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN DENYING THE MOTION OF THE PETITIONERS TO SET THE CASE FOR SUPPRESSION HEARING.Held: No grave abuse of discretion. Even assuming that petitioners resort of certiorari is proper, the Petition must still be dismissed for their failure to show that the RTC acted in grave abuse of discretion as to amount to lack of jurisdiction. Grave abuse of discretion is the capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment on the part of the public officer concerned which is equivalent to an excess or lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.In this case, petitioners miserably failed to show how the RTC supposedly abused its discretion. In fact, we note that the main issue raised by petitioners in their Petition is when is the proper time to file a motion to suppress/exclude evidence. They even conceded that this is a pure question of law.

13. CITY OF. DAGUPAN, represented by the CITY MAYOR BENJAMIN

S. LIM, vs. Esther Maramba July 2, 2014

Facts: Respondent Ester F. Maramba was a grantee of a Department of

Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) miscellaneous lease contract3 for a 284-square-meter property in Poblacion, Dagupan City, for a period of 25 years. Sometime in 1974, she caused the construction of a commercial fish center on the property. On December 20, 2003, petitioner city caused the demolition of the commercial fish center, allegedly without giving direct notice to Maramba and with threat of taking over the property.

Issue: W/N the petition of relief for judgment by the petitioner be granted.

Held: Yes. Rule 38 of the Rules of Court allows for the remedy called a petition for relief from judgment. This is an equitable remedy allowed in exceptional cases when there is no other available or adequate remedy that will allow for substantive justice.

Section 1 of Rule 38 provides for the grounds that warrant the filing of a petition under Rule 38:

SECTION 1. Petition for relief from judgment, order, or other proceedings. When a judgment or final order is entered, or any other proceeding is thereafter taken against a party in any court through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, he may file a petition in such court and in the same case praying that the judgment, order or proceeding be set aside. (Emphasissupplied)

Courts may set aside final and executory judgments provided that any of the grounds for their grant are present.

14. CRISANTO F. CASTRO, JR., - versus - ATENEO DE NAGA UNIVERSITY, FR. JOEL TABORA, and MR. EDWIN BERNAL, - July 23, 2014Facts: The petitioner started his employment with respondent Ateneo de Naga University (University) in the first semester of school year 1960-1961. At the time of his dismissal, he was a regular and full-time faculty member of the University's Accountancy Department in the College of Commerce with a monthly salary of P29,846.20.3 Allegedly, he received on February 22, 2000 a letter from respondent Fr. Joel Tabora, SJ., the University President, informing him that his contract (which was set to expire on May 31, 2000) would no longer be renewed.4 After several attempts to discuss the matter with Fr. Tabora in person, and not having been given any teaching load or other assignments effective June 2000, he brought his complaint for illegal

dismissal.

Issue: W/N Claim for accrued benefits should be sustained despite dismissal of the petitioner's complaint.

Held: Yes. The employer is obliged to reinstate and to pay the wages of the dismissed employee during the period of appeal until its reversal by the higher Court; and that because he was not reinstated either actually or by payroll, he should be held entitled to the accrued salaries. Article 279 of the Labor Code, as amended, entitles an illegally

dismissed employee to reinstatement. Article 223 of the Labor Code requires the reinstatement to be immediately executory even pending appeal. With its intent being ostensibly to promote the benefit of the employee, Article 223 cannot be the source of any right of the employer to remove the employee should he fail to immediately comply with the order of reinstatement.31 In Roquero, the Comi ruled that the unjustified refusal of the employer to reinstate the dismissed employee would entitle the latter to the payment of his salaries effective from the time when the employer failed to reinstate

him; thus, it became the ministerial duty of the LA to implement the order of reinstatement.

15. MANOLITO GIL Z. ZAFRA, vs. People of the Philippines July 23, 2014

Facts: This appeal by petition for review on certiorari is taken from the judgment promulgated on August 16, 2006, 1 whereby the Court of Appeals affirmed the consolidated decision rendered on February 17, 2004 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in San Fernando, La Union in Criminal Cases Nos. 4634 to Nos. 4651, inclusive,2 finding Manolito Gil Z. Zafra, a Revenue Collection Agent of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) assigned in Revenue District 3 in San Fernando, La Union guilty of 18 counts of malversation of public funds through falsification of public documents.

Issue: W/N the accused is guilty of .the complex crime of malversation of public fund through falsification of a public document.

Held: Yes. In convicting an accused of the complex crime of malversation of public fund through falsification of a public document, the courts shall impose the penalty for the graver felony in the maximum period pursuant to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, plus fine in the amount of the funds malversed or the total value of the property embezzled. In addition, the courts shall order the accused to return to the Government the funds malversed, or the value of the property embezzled.

16. PRO-GUARD SECURITY SERVICES CORPORATION, vs. TORMIL REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION July 7, 2014

Facts: Contending that it is obliged to pay back rentals only from the time the demand to vacate was served upon it and not from the time it began occupying the

disputed premises, petitioner Pro-Guard Security Services Corporation (ProGuard)

seeks recourse to this Court.

Issue: W/N petitioner bound to pay the rental at the time it occupied the premises or at the time of demand.

Held. Petitioner is bound to pay rental at the time of demand. While indeed Tormil, as the victor in the unlawful detainer suit, is entitled to the fair rental value for the use and occupation of the unit in the building, such compensation should not be reckoned from the time Pro-Guard began to occupy the same, but from the time of the demand to vacate. In unlawful detainer cases, the defendant is necessarily in prior lawful possession of the property but his possession eventually becomes unlawful upon termination or expiration of his right to possess. In other words, the entry is legal but the possession thereafter became illegal. Additionally, the Rules of Court requires the filing of such action within a year after the withholding of possession, meaning that if the dispossession has not lasted for more than one year, [then] an ejectment proceeding (in this case unlawful detainer) is proper.17.