judgment (pdf) - [2017] uksc 2

Hilary Term

[2017] UKSC 2

On appeals from: [2014] EWHC 2714 (QB) and [2015] EWCA Civ 843

JUDGMENT

Abd Ali Hameed Al-Waheed (Appellant) v Ministry

of Defence (Respondent)

Serdar Mohammed (Respondent) v Ministry of

Defence (Appellant)

before

Lord Neuberger, President

Lady Hale, Deputy President

Lord Mance

Lord Kerr

Lord Wilson

Lord Sumption

Lord Reed

Lord Hughes

Lord Toulson (1-4 Feb 2016)

Lord Hodge (26 Oct 2016)

JUDGMENT GIVEN ON

17 January 2017

Heard on 1, 2, 3 and 4 February 2016 and 26 October 2016

Appellant (Al-Waheed) Respondent

Richard Hermer QC James Eadie QC

Andrew Clapham Derek Sweeting QC

Ben Jaffey Karen Steyn QC

Alison Pickup James Purnell

Nikolaus Grubeck

(Instructed by Leigh Day) (Instructed by The

Government Legal

Department)

Respondent (S

Mohammed)

Appellant

Richard Hermer QC James Eadie QC

Andrew Clapham Sam Wordsworth QC

Ben Jaffey Karen Steyn QC

Alison Pickup Julian Blake

Nikolaus Grubeck

Julianne Kerr Morrison

(Instructed by Leigh Day) (Instructed by The

Government Legal

Department)

First Interveners

Shaheed Fatima QC

Paul Luckhurst

(Instructed by Public

Interest Lawyers)

Interveners 2-5 (Written

submissions only)

Jessica Simor QC

(Instructed Hogan Lovells

International LLP)

Interveners:

(1) Mohammed Qasim, Mohammed Nazim, Abdullah

(2) International Commission of Jurists

(3) Human Rights Watch

(4) Amnesty International

(5) The Open Society Justice Initiative

LORD SUMPTION: (with whom Lady Hale agrees)

Introduction

1. The United Kingdom was an occupying power in Iraq from May 2003, and a

mandatory power acting in support of the Iraqi government from June 2004 until her

withdrawal in 2011. She was a mandatory power in Afghanistan between December

2001 and her withdrawal early in 2015. In both countries, the United Kingdom’s

international status depended throughout on successive resolutions of the United

Nations Security Council. Substantial numbers of British troops were engaged in

both theatres as part of separate multi-national forces, primarily in southern Iraq and

in the Afghan province of Helmand. They were required to deal with exceptional

levels of violence by organised armed groups. In the course of their operations,

prisoners were taken and detained in British military facilities for varying periods of

time.

2. These two appeals arise out of actions for damages brought against the United

Kingdom government by detainees, alleging unlawful detention and maltreatment

by British forces. They are two of several hundred actions in which similar claims

are made. In both cases, the claim is based in part on article 5(1) of the European

Convention on Human Rights, which provides that no one shall be deprived of his

liberty except in six specified cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed

by law. They also rely on article 5(4), which requires that the detainee should be

entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention may be tested.

The appeals have been heard together with a view to resolving one of the more

controversial questions raised by such actions, namely the extent to which article 5

applies to military detention in the territory of a non-Convention state in the course

of operations in support of its government pursuant to mandates of the United

Nations Security Council.

3. Abd Ali Hameed Ali Al-Waheed was captured by HM forces at his wife’s

home in Basrah on 11 February 2007 during a search. The Secretary of State

contends that components for improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and explosive

charges and various other weaponry were found on the premises. He was held at a

British army detention centre for six and a half weeks. He was then released after an

internal review had concluded that a successful prosecution was unlikely, as there

was no evidence that he had personally handled the explosives. At a pre-trial review

before Leggatt J, it was common ground that so far as Mr Al-Waheed’s claim was

based on detention in breach of article 5(1) of the Convention, the judge and the

Court of Appeal would be bound to dismiss it by the decision of the House of Lords

in R (Al-Jedda) v Secretary of State for Defence [2008] AC 332. The Appellate

Committee had held in that case that article 5(1) was displaced by the United Nations

Security Council Resolutions authorising military operations in Iraq. The judge was

therefore invited to dismiss the claim under article 5(1) by consent and grant a

certificate for a leap-frog appeal directly to the Supreme Court. A limited number of

facts have been agreed, but there are no findings.

4. Serdar Mohammed, whom I shall refer to as “SM”, was captured by HM

forces in Afghanistan on 7 April 2010. The Secretary of State contends that he was

captured in the course of a planned operation involving a firefight lasting ten hours

in which a number of men were killed or wounded, and that he was seen to flee from

the site, discarding a rocket-propelled grenade launcher and ammunition as he went.

He was brought into Camp Bastion at Lashkar Gah, which was the joint operating

base of the British army in Helmand. Intelligence is said to have identified him

shortly afterwards as a senior Taliban commander who had been involved in the

large-scale production of IEDs and was believed to have commanded a Taliban

training camp in 2009. SM was detained for a period of three and a half months in

British military holding facilities until 25 July 2010, when he was transferred to the

Afghan authorities. He was subsequently convicted by the Afghan courts for

offences relating to the insurgency and sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment. In his

case, the procedural history is more complicated. Leggatt J directed three

preliminary issues to be determined on the assumption that the circumstances of

SM’s capture and detention, as pleaded in the Secretary of State’s defence, were

true. One of the preliminary issues concerned the relationship between article 5 of

the Convention and the international law governing detention in the course of armed

conflict. In the result, the judge held that in Afghanistan HM forces had no power,

either under the relevant Security Council Resolutions or under customary

international law, to detain prisoners for any longer than was required to hand them

over to the Afghan authorities, and then for no more than 96 hours. He also found

that they had no greater power under the domestic law of Afghanistan. On that

footing, he considered that in detaining SM the United Kingdom was in breach of

article 5(1) and (4) of the Convention: see [2014] EWHC 1369 (QB). The Court of

Appeal, although differing from some aspects of the judge’s reasoning, reached the

same conclusion: see [2016] 2 WLR 247. These decisions, and the reasoning behind

them, have significant implications for the Ministry of Defence and for British

troops deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan and indeed other theatres to which they may

be deployed under UN mandates.

5. The Secretary of State formulated eight grounds on which he sought leave to

appeal to the Supreme Court in Serdar Mohammed. He received permission to

appeal, either from the Court of Appeal or from the Supreme Court on six of them,

the question of permission for the other two being deferred until the hearing. As a

result of directions given in the course of the appeals, the sole ground of appeal

before us at the opening of the hearing was the Secretary of State’s ground 4. In the

statement of facts and issues in Serdar Mohammed, the parties agreed that ground 4

raised the following issues:

“(1) Whether HM armed forces had legal power to detain SM

in excess of 96 hours pursuant to:

(a) the relevant resolutions of the United Nations

Security Council; and/or

(b) International Humanitarian Law applicable in a

non-international armed conflict.

(2) If so, whether article 5(1) of the ECHR should be read

so as to accommodate, as permissible grounds, detention

pursuant to such a power to detain under a UN Security Council

Resolution and/or International Humanitarian Law.”

In Al-Waheed, the parties are agreed that the same issues arise, except that the

question is whether HM armed forces had power to detain Mr Al-Waheed at all,

there being no separate issue relating to the first 96 hours.

6. In the course of the hearing the parties were invited to make written

submissions on two further questions arising in SM’s appeal about the scope of

article 5, which had been argued before Leggatt J and the Court of Appeal. This was

because it was considered to be unsatisfactory to examine the Secretary of State’s

ground 4 without regard to them. The additional questions substantially

corresponded to the Secretary of State’s grounds 5 and 6. They were:

“(3) Whether SM’s detention was compatible with article

5(1) on the basis that it fell within paragraph (c) of article 5(1)

of the Human Rights Convention (detention for the purpose of

bringing a suspect before a competent judicial authority) or

article 5(1)(f) (detention pending extradition); and

(4) Whether the circumstances of his detention were

compatible with article 5(4) of the Human Rights Convention

(if necessary, as modified).”

7. These are complex appeals raising distinct issues, which were argued in

stages. They are also related to other appeals arising out of military operations in

Iraq and Afghanistan which were before the court at the same time. For these reasons

the argument has extended over an unusually long period, rather more than a year.

The retirement of Lord Toulson in July 2016 meant that he did not sit on the oral

argument on the procedural requirements of articles 5(1) and 5(4) of the Convention,

and has been concerned only with the other issues. Lord Hodge, who sat for the first

time on these appeals in October 2016 has been concerned only with those

procedural issues.

International and Non-International Armed Conflict

8. International humanitarian law is the modern name for what used to be called

the law of war and is still commonly called the law of armed conflict. It is a body of

international law based on treaty and custom, which seeks to limit for humanitarian

reasons the effects of armed conflict.

9. International humanitarian law distinguishes between international and non-

international armed conflict. An international armed conflict is an armed conflict

between states. A non-international armed conflict is an armed conflict between one

or more states on the one hand and non-state actors on the other. In theory, it is the

difference between an armed conflict of juridical equals and an armed conflict

conducted by a lawfully constituted authority against organised rebels or criminals.

The distinction is an ancient one. It dates back at least as far as Grotius (De Jure

Belli ac Pacis I.4, III.6.27), who limited certain belligerent rights to public wars, on

the ground that the rights of participants in civil wars were governed by municipal

law administered by the municipal judge. But the crude distinction proposed by

Grotius was never an adequate tool for dealing with the complex position of non-

state actors. As Vattel pointed out a century later (Droit des Gens, III.18.293), civil

wars break the bonds of society, leaving the parties without a common judge and in

the same practical position as two nations.

10. Vattel made this point in support of his argument that once a civil war

achieved a level of intensity on a par with an interstate war, the humanitarian

customs of war should be observed by both sides. But ever since his day, there has

been a tension between the desire of states to civilise the conduct of war by

extending humanitarian rules to all armed conflicts, and their desire to treat their

internal enemies as rebels and criminals rather than belligerents. International

humanitarian law treats the parties to international armed conflicts as juridically

equal and their rights and obligations as reciprocal. It proceeds on the basis that in

such a conflict members of the armed forces of a state are reciprocally entitled to

combatant immunity. They commit no offence by merely participating in the armed

conflict, but only by committing war crimes proscribed by international law. Their

detention is authorised on the footing that it is a purely administrative measure with

no penal purpose, and must terminate when the armed conflict ends. However,

notwithstanding the persistent advocacy of the International Committee of the Red

Cross in favour of applying the same rules under both regimes, states have generally

been reluctant to accept that a non-international armed conflict can be reciprocal in

the same way as international armed conflicts. Their concern is that unless a special

regime is devised for such conflicts, the corollary would be a recognition of the

juridical equality of the participants and the immunity of non-state actors.

11. None the less, it is now accepted that the law of armed conflict cannot be

confined to wars waged between states. A non-international armed conflict is an

armed conflict for the purposes of international humanitarian law, albeit that it raises

more difficult problems of definition and classification than an international armed

conflict. The leading modern authorities are the decisions of the International

Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia, whose jurisdiction depends on the existence of

an armed conflict. They identify non-international armed conflicts by reference to

their duration, their intensity and the degree of organisation of the non-state actors

engaged. In its widely cited decision in Prosecutor v Duško Tadić (Jurisdiction of

the Tribunal) ICTY Case No IT-94-1-AR72 (2 October 1995), the Tribunal held

(para 70) that an armed conflict existed “whenever there is a resort to armed force

between states or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and

organised armed groups or between such groups within a state”, provided that it

exceeds the “intensity requirements applicable to both international and internal

armed conflicts”. The intensity requirements were considered in greater detail in

Prosecutor v Ramush Haradinaj ICTY Case No IT-04-84-T (3 April 2008).

Indicative factors included (para 49):

“the number, duration and intensity of individual

confrontations; the type of weapons and other military

equipment used; the number and calibre of munitions fired; the

number of persons and type of forces partaking in the fighting;

the number of casualties; the extent of material destruction; and

the number of civilians fleeing combat zones. The involvement

of the UN Security Council may also be a reflection of the

intensity of a conflict.”

In short, the test is whether the operations conducted by non-state actors are

characteristic of those conducted by the armed forces of the state, as opposed to its

police force. It is common ground that British troops in Afghanistan were engaged

in an armed conflict.

12. The main distinction between international and non-international armed

conflict lies in the more limited provision made for the latter in the main relevant

treaties. Although the earliest Geneva Convention was adopted in 1864, no attempt

was made to provide by treaty for non-international armed conflicts until the Geneva

Conventions of 1949. Article 21 of the Third Geneva Convention of 1949 in terms

confers on states a right to detain prisoners of war which they had long enjoyed as a

matter of customary international law, and comprehensively regulates the conditions

of their detention. Article 78 of the Fourth Geneva Convention confers on an

occupying power a right to detain civilians in cases where this is considered

“necessary for imperative reasons of security.” But these provisions apply only in

international armed conflicts: see common article 2. The International Committee

of the Red Cross had proposed that the Conventions of 1949 should apply in their

entirety in international and non-international armed conflicts alike. But this

proposal was rejected by most states. Instead, it was agreed to confer a more limited

measure of protection by common article 3, which unlike the rest of the Conventions

applied “in the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in

the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties.” Common article 3 does not in

terms confer a right of detention. But it provides for the humane and non-

discriminatory treatment of “persons taking no active part in the hostilities,

including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed

hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention or any other cause”. It specifically

prohibits the practice against such persons of violence, killing, mutilation, cruelty,

torture, hostage-taking and outrages against their personal dignity, as well as the

infliction of penal sentences upon them otherwise than by the judgment of a

“regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are

recognised as indispensable by civilised peoples.” Further provision for the

treatment of prisoners in non-international armed conflicts is made by Protocol II,

adopted in 1977 in cases where dissident armed forces or other armed groups control

part of the territory of a state so as to enable them “to carry out sustained and

concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol”: article 1.

13. In those circumstances, the existence of a legal right in international law to

detain members of opposing armed forces in a non-international armed conflict must

depend on (i) customary international law, and/or (ii) the authority of the Security

Council of United Nations.

14. To establish the existence of a rule of customary law, two things are required.

First, there must be a uniform, or virtually uniform practice of states conforming to

the proposed rule, reflected in their acts and/or their public statements; and,

secondly, the practice must be followed on the footing that it is required as a matter

of law (opinio juris). It follows that although the decisions of domestic courts may

be evidence of state practice or of a developing legal consensus, they cannot

themselves establish or develop a rule of customary international law: see Jones v

Ministry of the Interior of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia [2007] 1 AC 270 at para 63

(Lord Hoffmann). Lord Reed has dealt fully in his judgment with the question

whether the detention of members of the opposing armed forces is sanctioned by

customary international law in a non-international armed conflict. He concludes that

as matters stand it is not, and I am inclined to agree with him about that. But for

reasons which will become clear, I regard it as unnecessary to express a concluded

view on the point. It is, however, right to make certain observations about it which

bear on the construction of the relevant Security Council Resolutions.

15. The first is that, whether or not it represents a legal right, detention is inherent

in virtually all military operations of a sufficient duration and intensity to qualify as

armed conflicts, whether or not they are international. As the International

Committee of the Red Cross has recently observed (Statement, 27 April 2015),

“deprivation of liberty is a reality of war. Whether detention is

carried out by states or by non-state armed groups, whether it

is imposed on military personnel or on civilians, it is certain to

occur in the vast majority of armed conflicts.”

The same view was expressed by the Supreme Court of the United States in holding,

in Hamdi v Rumsfeld 542 US 507 (2004), at p 10, that a power of detention was

implicitly conferred by a statute authorising the use of “all necessary and appropriate

force”:

“Detention of individuals falling into the limited category we

are considering [the Taliban and Al-Qaeda], for the duration of

the particular conflict in which they were captured, is so

fundamental and accepted an incident to war as to be an

exercise of the ‘necessary and appropriate force’ Congress has

authorized the President to use.”

It has been the practice of states to capture and detain members of the opposing

armed forces throughout the recorded history of war. That includes its recent history,

which has for the most part been a history of non-international armed conflicts. The

purpose of any state participating in an armed conflict is to overcome the armed

forces of the other side. At any time when the opposing forces are in the field, this

necessarily involves disabling them from fighting by killing them or putting them

hors de combat. The availability of detention as an option mitigates the lethal

character of armed conflict and is fundamental to any attempt to introduce

humanitarian principles into the conduct of war. In many cases, the detention of an

enemy fighter is a direct alternative to killing him, and may be an obligation, for

example where he surrenders or can be physically overpowered. As the majority of

the US Supreme Court observed in Hamdi, at p 11, citing the earlier decision in In

re Territo 156 F 2d 142, 145, (1946)

“The object of capture is to prevent the captured individual

from serving the enemy. He is disarmed and from then on must

be removed as completely as practicable from the front, treated

humanely, and in time exchanged, repatriated, or otherwise

released.”

16. Second, if there is nevertheless an insufficient consensus among states upon

the legal right of participants in armed conflicts to detain under customary

international law, it is not because of differences about the existence of a right of

detention in principle. At their most recent international conference (Geneva, 8-10

December 2015), the constituent associations of the Red Cross and Red Crescent

approved a resolution by consensus which recited that states had the power to detain

“in all forms of armed conflict” and proposing measures to strengthen the

humanitarian protection available to detainees. The lack of international consensus

really reflects differences among states about the appropriate limits of the right of

detention, the conditions of its exercise and the extent to which special provision

should be made for non-state actors. There is no doubt that practice in international

and non-international armed conflicts is converging, and it is likely that this will

eventually be reflected in opinio juris. It is, however, clear from the materials before

us that a significant number of states participating in non-international armed

conflicts, including the United Kingdom, do not yet regard detention as being

authorised in such conflicts by customary international law.

17. Third, if there were a right of detention on whatever legal basis, there are

various conditions which might be imposed for its exercise. But if the right were to

have any reality, it would at least have to apply in a case where detention was

“necessary for imperative reasons of security”, the test which article 78 of the Fourth

Geneva Convention (1949) applies to the right of an Occupying Power to detain

civilians. This is the narrowest available test, and the one which has been proposed

by the International Committee of the Red Cross. On these appeals, the Secretary of

State does not contend for anything less.

The Security Council Resolutions

18. It is convenient to start with the position in Iraq.

19. At the time of Mr Al-Waheed’s detention, the relevant Security Council

Resolution was 1723 (2006). This extended the authority conferred by Resolution

1546 (2004), which had marked the point at which Britain ceased to be an occupying

power in Iraq and became a mandatory power acting in support of the newly formed

indigenous government of Iraq. Articles 9 and 10 of Resolution 1546 (2004)

reaffirmed the authorisation conferred by earlier resolutions for the multinational

force to operate in Iraq, and conferred on it

“the authority to take all necessary measures to contribute to

the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq in accordance

with the letters annexed to this resolution expressing, inter alia,

the Iraqi request for the continued presence of the multinational

force and setting out its tasks, including by preventing and

deterring terrorism, so that, inter alia, the United Nations can

fulfil its role in assisting the Iraqi people as outlined in para 7

above and the Iraqi people can implement freely and without

intimidation the timetable and programme for the political

process and benefit from reconstruction and rehabilitation

activities.”

The attached letters included a letter of 5 June 2004 from the US Secretary of State,

which expressed the willingness of the United States to deploy forces to maintain

internal security in Iraq. Their activities, he said

“include activities necessary to counter ongoing security

threats posed by forces seeking to influence Iraq’s political

future through violence. This will include combat operations

against members of these groups, internment where this is

necessary for imperative reasons of security …”

20. R (Al-Jedda) v Secretary of State for Defence [2008] AC 332 arose out of the

detention of the applicant by HM forces in Iraq in October 2004. Article 103 of the

UN Charter provides that the obligations of members under the Charter should

prevail over their obligations under any other international agreement. The main

issue on the appeal was whether that meant that the Security Council Resolutions

authorising military operations in Iraq displaced article 5 of the European

Convention on Human Rights. This depended on whether detention in the course of

those operations was an obligation, or merely a power. The House of Lords held that

Resolution 1546 both authorised and required the exercise of a power of detention

where this was “necessary for imperative reasons of security”. Lord Bingham, with

whom the rest of the House agreed, gave three reasons for this. The first was that

British forces occupying Iraq before Resolution 1546 came into effect had been

authorised to intern persons for imperative reasons of security. This was because

detention in those circumstances was authorised by the Hague Regulations (1907),

and

“if the occupying power considers it necessary to detain a

person who is judged to be a serious threat to the safety of the

public or the occupying power there must be an obligation to

detain such person.” (para 32)

Resolution 1546 was intended to continue the pre-existing security regime, not to

change it. Lord Bingham’s second reason was that although the resolution was

couched in permissive terms, this merely reflected the fact that the United Nations

can invite but not require states to contribute forces for purposes such as the security

of Iraq. Applying a purposive approach, and adopting the view of a substantial body

of academic writing, he considered the exercise of that authority to be an obligation

for those who accede to that invitation. The third reason was that those states which

contributed forces became bound by articles 2 and 25 of the UN Charter to carry out

the decisions of the Security Council so as to achieve its objectives. They were

therefore bound to exercise the power of detention where this was necessary for

imperative reasons of security. The decision of the Appellate Committee in Al-Jedda

was rejected by the European Court of Human Rights when the matter came before

them: Al-Jedda v United Kingdom (2011) 53 EHRR 23. I shall return to the

implications of this decision below. But it was rejected only insofar as it treated the

exercise of the power of detention as an obligation. It was not suggested that the

exercise of the power of detention was not even authorised by the Security Council

Resolution.

21. Turning to the position in Afghanistan, Security Council Resolution 1386

(2001) authorised the establishment of “an International Security Assistance Force

to assist the Afghan Interim Authority in the maintenance of security in Kabul and

its surrounding areas so that the Afghan Interim Authority … can operate in a secure

environment.” It called on the International Security Assistance Force (“ISAF”) to

“work in close consultation with the Afghan Interim Authority in the

implementation of the force mandate”, and on member states to contribute personnel

and resources to ISAF. Article 3 “authorised member states participating in the

International Security Assistance Force to take all necessary measures to fulfil its

mandate.” The mandate was subsequently extended by Resolution 1510 (2003) to

the provision of security assistance for reconstruction and humanitarian efforts

throughout Afghanistan.

22. At the time of SM’s detention, the most recent Security Council Resolution

was 1890 (2009), which extended the mandate by twelve months and reaffirmed its

earlier resolutions. Resolution 1890 contained a number of recitals which throw light

on the nature of ISAF’s role as it was then perceived to be and on the dangerous

character of its mission. The recitals recognised that the responsibility for providing

security and law and order resided with the government of Afghanistan, and that the

mandate of ISAF was to “assist the Afghan government to improve the security

situation.” What was meant by the “security situation” appears from a subsequent

recital expressing the Security Council’s strong concern about

“the security situation in Afghanistan, in particular the

increased violent and terrorist activities by the Taliban, Al-

Qaida, illegally armed groups, criminals and those involved in

the narcotics trade, and the increasingly strong links between

terrorism activities and illicit drugs, resulting in threats to the

local population, including children, national security forces

and international military and civilian personnel.”

The recitals go on to express concern about the high level of civilian casualties, and

“the harmful consequences of violent and terrorist activities by

the Taliban, Al-Qaida and other extremist groups on the

capacity of the Afghan Government to guarantee the rule of

law, to provide security and basic services to the Afghan

people, and to ensure the full enjoyment of their human rights

and fundamental freedoms.”

They condemned

“in the strongest terms all attacks, including Improvised

Explosive Device (IED) attacks, suicide attacks and

abductions, targeting civilians and Afghan and international

forces and their deleterious effect on the stabilization,

reconstruction and development efforts in Afghanistan, and

condemning further the use by the Taliban, Al-Qaida and other

extremist groups of civilians as human shields.”

They recorded the Security Council’s support for ISAF’s work in improving the

security situation in Afghanistan in the face of these threats, and welcomed ISAF’s

intention

“to undertake continued enhanced efforts in this regard

including the increased focus on protecting the Afghan

population as a central element of the mission, and noting the

importance of conducting continuous reviews of tactics and

procedures and after-action reviews and investigations in

cooperation with the Afghan Government in cases where

civilian casualties have occurred and when the Afghan

Government finds these joint investigations appropriate.”

23. Under article 24 of the United Nations Charter, the Security Council has

“primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security”, and

under article 25 the member states of the UN have a duty to carry out its decisions

in accordance with the Charter. The basis of the Security Council Resolutions in

Iraq and Afghanistan was Chapter VII (Action with respect to Threats to the Peace,

Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Aggression). This confers extensive powers on

the Security Council to deploy force on its own account or call on its members to do

so, and imposes on members corresponding duties to support these operations.

Measures taken under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter are a cornerstone

of the international legal order. They are taken under a unique scheme of

international law whose binding force is now well established. In Legal

Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia,

Advisory Opinion [1971] ICJ Rep 16, paras 115-116, the International Court of

Justice confirmed that these provisions are binding not only by treaty on members

of the United Nations but as a matter of customary international law on the small

number of states which are not members. In Kuwait Airways Corpn v Iraqi Airways

Co (Nos 4 and 5) [2002] 2 AC 883, at para 115, Lord Steyn described them as

embodying a “principle of international public policy”. At para 114 he summarised

their status in the following terms:

“Not only has the Charter of the United Nations been adhered

to by virtually all states, that is 189 states, but even the few

remaining non-members, have acquiesced in the principles of

the Charter: American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law,

The Foreign Relations of Law of the United States, 3d (1987),

Section 102, comment (h). It is generally accepted that the

principles of the United Nations Charter prohibiting the use of

force have the character of jus cogens, ie is part of peremptory

public international law, permitting no derogation: see

Restatement, p 28, para 102, comment (k). Security Council

Resolutions under Chapter VII of the Charter, and therefore the

resolutions in question here, were binding in law on all

members including the United Kingdom and Iraq … It would

have been contrary to the international obligations of the

United Kingdom were its courts to adopt an approach contrary

to its obligations under the United Nations Charter and under

the relevant Security Council Resolutions.”

24. These considerations are recognised in the jurisprudence of the European

Court of Human Rights in the same way as they are by other international courts and

by the domestic courts of England. In Behrami v France; Saramati v France,

Germany and Norway (2007) 45 EHRR SE10 at paras 148-149, the Strasbourg

Court declined to review the compatibility of the acts of French, German and

Norwegian troops operating under direct United Nations command. In doing so it

drew attention to the significance of the UN’s functions in conducting peacekeeping

operations or authorising member states to conduct such operations, and to the

special legal framework within which these functions were performed.

“148. … the primary objective of the UN is the maintenance

of international peace and security. While it is equally clear that

ensuring respect for human rights represents an important

contribution to achieving international peace (see the Preamble

to the Convention), the fact remains that the UNSC has primary

responsibility, as well as extensive means under Chapter VII,

to fulfil this objective, notably through the use of coercive

measures. The responsibility of the UNSC in this respect is

unique and has evolved as a counterpart to the prohibition, now

customary international law, on the unilateral use of force.

149. … Since operations established by UNSC Resolutions

under Chapter VII of the UN Charter are fundamental to the

mission of the UN to secure international peace and security

and since they rely for their effectiveness on support from

member states, the Convention cannot be interpreted in a

manner which would subject the acts and omissions of

contracting parties which are covered by UNSC Resolutions

and occur prior to or in the course of such missions, to the

scrutiny of the Court. To do so would be to interfere with the

fulfilment of the UN’s key mission in this field including, as

argued by certain parties, with the effective conduct of its

operations. It would also be tantamount to imposing conditions

on the implementation of a UNSC Resolution which were not

provided for in the text of the Resolution itself. This reasoning

equally applies to voluntary acts of the respondent States such

as the vote of a permanent member of the UNSC in favour of

the relevant Chapter VII Resolution and the contribution of

troops to the security mission: such acts may not have

amounted to obligations flowing from membership of the UN

but they remained crucial to the effective fulfilment by the

UNSC of its Chapter VII mandate and, consequently, by the

UN of its imperative peace and security aim.”

25. A Security Council Resolution adopted in the exercise of these

responsibilities is not itself a treaty, nor is it legislation. But it may constitute an

authority binding in international law to do that which would otherwise be illegal in

international law. Sir Michael Wood, a former Principal Legal Adviser to the

Foreign and Commonwealth Office, has made the point that Security Council

Resolutions are not usually drafted by the Secretariat, but within the various national

missions. For this reason they are not always clear or consistent either in themselves

or between one resolution and another: “The Interpretation of Security Council

Resolutions”, Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law [1998] 73. The meaning

of a Security Council Resolution is generally sensitive to the context in which it is

made. In its advisory opinion of June 1971 on the Legal consequences for states of

the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa)

notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) [1971] ICJ Rep 16, 53, para

114, the International Court of Justice observed:

“The language of a resolution of the Security Council should

be carefully analysed before a conclusion can be made as to its

binding effect. In view of the nature of the powers under article

25 [which requires member states to carry out decisions of the

Security Council], the question whether they have been in fact

exercised is to be determined in each case, having regard to the

terms of the resolution to be interpreted, the discussions leading

to it, the Charter provisions invoked and, in general, all

circumstances that might assist in determining the legal

consequences of the resolution of the Security Council.”

26. The expression “all necessary measures”, as used in a Security Council

Resolution has, however, acquired a meaning sanctioned by established practice. It

authorises the use of the full range of measures open to the United Nations itself for

the purpose of maintaining or restoring international peace and security under

Chapter VII of the Charter. This will normally involve the use of force under article

42, but subject to the requirement that the measures should be necessary. What is

necessary depends primarily on the specific mandate, on the general context and on

any conditions or limitations laid down in the resolution.

27. In Gill & Fleck’s valuable Handbook of the International Law of Military

Operations (2010), at para 25.03, the opinion is expressed that although Security

Council Resolutions do not as a rule authorise operational detention in so many

words, “a mandate to use ‘all necessary means’ to achieve the assigned tasks

logically encompasses operational detention as one such means, if indeed

necessary.” A similar approach was adopted by the European Court of Human

Rights in Behrami v France; Saramati v France, Germany and Norway, supra. In

that case, the analysis of the legal responsibility of UN forces proceeded on the basis,

accepted by the Court, that Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999), authorising

military operations in Kosovo, implicitly authorised detention: see paras 124, 127.

There was no express authority to detain. But it was deduced from the authority

conferred on troop-contributing nations by article 7 to take “all necessary means” to

fulfil certain responsibilities specified in article 9, including supporting the work of

the international civil presence. In my opinion, that inference was inevitable, just as

it is in relation to the corresponding operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. This point

is not dependent on the categorisation of the relevant armed conflict as international

or non-international.

28. In my opinion, it is clear that the authorisation given to troop-contributing

states in Afghanistan by Resolution 1386 (2001) to use “all necessary measures”

included the detention of members of the opposing armed forces when this was

required for imperative reasons of security. The nature of the mission, apparent from

the context recited in Resolution 1890 (2009), involved operations of two kinds. The

first entailed operations ancillary to the ordinary law enforcement processes of the

Afghan government, essentially heavy police work. The second entailed armed

combat with the forces of an organised insurrection, with a view to defending ISAF

and its contingent forces, protecting the civilian population against the continual

threat of violence, and creating a secure environment for the reconstruction of the

Afghan state and the country generally. The distinction between these two functions

broadly corresponds to the distinction made by UK military doctrine between (i)

military internment authorised either by the host state’s municipal law or by United

Nations Security Council Resolutions, and (ii) criminal detention in support of the

national police force: see Joint Doctrine Publication 1-10 (Prisoners of War,

Internees, Detainees, April 2006), at para 113. In performing functions in the former

category they must be authorised to employ methods appropriate to military

operations. In short, if detention is “imperative” for reasons of security, it is must be

“necessary” for the performance of the mission.

29. Leggatt J accepted this up to a point, but considered that it could authorise

detention only for a very short period. His reason was that once a prisoner had been

captured and disarmed, he no longer represented an imminent threat to the security

of HM forces or the civilian population. His continued detention thereafter could not

therefore be justified under the Security Council Resolutions. This seems a

surprising conclusion and it was rejected, rightly to my mind, by the Court of

Appeal. If a person is a sufficient threat to HM forces or the civilian population to

warrant his detention in the first place, he is likely to present a sufficient threat to

warrant his continued detention after he has been disarmed. Unless UK forces are in

a position to transfer him for detention to the civil authorities for possible

prosecution, the only alternative is to release him and allow him to present the same

threat to HM forces or the civilian population. This necessarily undermines the

mission which constitutes the whole purpose of the army’s operations.

30. I conclude that in both Iraq and Afghanistan, the relevant Security Council

Resolutions in principle constituted authority in international law for the detention

of members of the opposing armed forces whenever it was required for imperative

reasons of security. It was not limited to detention pending the delivery of the

detainee to the Afghan authorities. I say that this was the position “in principle”,

because that conclusion is subject to (i) in the case of SM the question whether that

authority was limited to 96 hours by virtue of the detention policy of ISAF, and (ii)

in the case of both SM and Mr Al-Waheed, the question whether the authority

conferred by the relevant Security Council Resolutions was limited by article 5 of

the European Convention on Human Rights.

The alleged limitation of detention to 96 hours in Afghanistan

31. This issue arises from differences between the detention policy applied

generally by ISAF and that operated by United Kingdom forces and the forces of

certain other troop-contributing nations in their own areas of operation. Both Leggatt

J and the Court of Appeal concluded that although detention was in principle

authorised by the Security Council Resolutions for imperative reasons of security,

in Afghanistan the duration of that detention was limited to 96 hours by ISAF’s

detention policy. In order to address this question, it is necessary to say something

about the relationship between ISAF and the command structure of British forces in

Afghanistan.

32. Overall command of ISAF was exercised by its commander in Afghanistan

who was himself under the command of NATO at the relevant time. ISAF’s

detention policy was contained in its Standard Operating Procedures for detention

(SOP 362). Paras 4-8 of SOP 362 provided that the only grounds on which a person

might be detained were that detention was necessary for ISAF force protection, self-

defence of ISAF or its personnel or the accomplishment of the ISAF mission.

Detention was limited to 96 hours, after which the person must either be released or

transferred to the Afghan authorities. That period could be extended on the specific

authority of the ISAF commander or his delegate, or in a case where there were

logistical difficulties about effecting his release or transfer within the 96 hour period.

33. Across Afghanistan there was a regional command structure with distinct

task forces. Most British troops, including those who detained SM, were deployed

in Helmand as part of Task Force Helmand. They operated there under their own

national chain of command. British commanders in the field reported up their chain

of command to UK Permanent Joint Headquarters, which in turn reported to the

Ministry of Defence. The judge found that the conduct of operations in Afghanistan,

including detention policy, was regarded as United Kingdom “sovereign business”.

He described the relationship between the UK Detention Authority and the ISAF

chain of command as “one of liaison and coordination only”. The British position,

summarised in a military assessment report of September 2006, was that the United

Kingdom was responsible for complying with its domestic and international legal

obligations and that this required that responsibility for detention should rest with

British officials. The judge found (para 181) that ISAF headquarters tacitly accepted

this, and that thereafter detention decisions continued to be taken by British officials

without involving ISAF. It was essentially for this reason that the judge and the

Court of Appeal found that the United Kingdom and not the United Nations was

responsible for SM’s detention, a conclusion which is no longer challenged.

34. It is clear from the recitals in the successive Resolutions of the Security

Council, culminating in Resolution 1890 (2009), that the level of violence increased

over time and that the threat to the force and the civilian population from suicide

attacks, improvised explosive devices and other extreme methods had become very

serious by 2009. The evidence is that Helmand was one of the most difficult

provinces. In these circumstances, the United Kingdom government became

concerned that the 96 hour limit was unsatisfactory, primarily because in some cases

it did not allow long enough for the prisoner to be interrogated with a view to

acquiring valuable intelligence which was judged essential for mission

accomplishment. This was unsatisfactory to the main detaining nations (identified

as the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada and the Netherlands), but it was

considered that agreement to a change would not be obtained from other detaining

nations or from non-detaining nations. For these reasons, the United Kingdom

decided in November 2009 to adopt its own detention policy. The UK policy was

announced in Parliament on 9 November 2009: see Hansard (HL (Written

Statements)), 9 November 2009, cols WS 31-32). The minister recorded that under

ISAF guidelines, detainees were either transferred to the Afghan authorities within

96 hours for potential prosecution, or released. He said that “in the majority of cases,

UK forces will operate in this manner.” However, “in the light of the evolving threat

to our forces”, they would detain for longer periods those prisoners who

“can yield vital intelligence that would help protect our forces

and the local population - potentially saving lives, particularly

when detainees are suspected of holding information on the

placement of improvised explosive devices.

Given the ongoing threat faced by our forces and the local

Afghan population, this information is critical, and in some

cases 96 hours will not be long enough to gain that information

from the detainees. Indeed, many insurgents are aware of the

96 hours policy and simply say nothing for that entire period.

In these circumstances the Government have concluded that

Ministers should be able to authorise detention beyond 96

hours, in British detention facilities to which the ICRC has

access. Each case will be thoroughly scrutinised against the

relevant legal and policy considerations; we will do this only

where it is legal to do so and when it is necessary to support the

operation and protect our troops.”

The new policy was notified to NATO, which made no objection. The judge found

that it was also accepted by ISAF headquarters.

35. The detention policy applied by HM forces in Afghanistan was contained in

UK Standard Operating Instructions (SOI) J3-9 (Stop, Search and Detention

Operations in the Herrick JOA), issued on the authority of UK Permanent Joint

Headquarters. It was originally issued in 2006. At the time of SM’s capture, the

version in force was Amendment 1, issued on 6 November 2009. This was replaced

on 10 April 2010, three days after SM’s capture, by Amendment 2, which was issued

to forces in the field two days later on 12 April. Since Amendment 2 was in force

for substantially the whole of the period when the judge found SM’s detention to

have been unlawful, I shall refer throughout to this version.

36. SOI J3-9 authorised British troops to “conduct stops, search, detention and

questioning procedures in accordance with [Security Council Resolutions] for

reasons of force protection, mission accomplishment and self-defence.” The

introduction sets out in general terms the principles governing detention policy. It

provided:

“6. Detention Criteria. UK Forces are authorised to

conduct stop, search, detention and question procedures in

accordance with Reference A for reasons of Force Protection,

Mission Accomplishment and Self-Defence. ISAF authorises

detention for up to a maximum of 96 hours following the point

of detention …

7. Post-detention requirements. Within 96 hours

detainees will in most cases be either handed over to the

Afghan Authorities in accordance with [the UK/Afghan

Memorandum of Understanding] or released. Detention and

evidence-gathering processes must be managed as a capability

to ensure that they support the collection of tactical intelligence

and assist the Afghan criminal justice system in achieving

lawful convictions. In almost all cases, ‘Afghan Authorities’ in

this context refers to the National Directorate of Security

(NDS) and it is to the NDS that transfers will normally be made

… Detainees should only ever be detained beyond 96 hours in

exceptional circumstances as follows:

a. On medical or logistic grounds, with HQ ISAF

authorisation (and ministerial authority where

appropriate) …

b. With PJHQ and ministerial authority …”

37. Part I of SOI J3-9 dealt with the initial capture of a detainee. It provided:

“8. As in the case of stop and search, a person must only be

detained if it is deemed necessary to do so. If items found

during the search of the individual or any other factors indicate

that he may be a threat to mission accomplishment, the call-

sign or wider force protection, he should be detained. If items

found relate purely to criminal conduct and do not threaten the

accomplishment of the mission, there are no grounds for UK

FE to detain. In such circumstances the individual should be

released and his details passed to the ANP … Force protection

must always be the primary concern in such situations.

9. Decision to Detain. UK FE can detain persons only if:

a. The person is a threat to force protection; and/or

b. The person is a threat to mission

accomplishment; and/or

c. It is necessary for reasons of self-defence.”

38. The view of the courts below was, in effect, that the United Kingdom had no

power under the Security Council resolutions to adopt its own detention policy so

far as that policy purported to authorise detention for longer than was permitted by

ISAF’s practice, even in the exceptional circumstances envisaged in SOI J3-9. This

was because they considered that the Security Council Resolutions conferred the

authority to take all necessary measures on ISAF and not on troop-contributing

nations. It followed that although British forces had their own chain of command

leading ultimately to ministers in London, compliance with ISAF’s detention policy

was a condition of any authority to detain conferred by the Security Council

Resolutions. In my opinion they were mistaken about this. The Security Council

Resolution has to be interpreted in the light of the realities of forming a multinational

force and deploying it in a situation of armed conflict. ISAF is simply the expression

used in the Resolutions to describe the multinational force and the central

organisation charged with co-ordinating the operations of its national components

(“liaison and co-ordination”, to use the judge’s phrase). Resolution 1386 (2001)

provides for the creation of that force, but article 3 (quoted above) expressly confers

authority to take “all necessary measures” on the member states participating in it.

Both practically and legally, the British government remained responsible for the

safety of its forces in Afghanistan and the proper performance of their functions, as

the United States Supreme Court has recognised in the case of American forces

participating in multinational forces under United Nations auspices: Munaf v Geren

(2008) 533 US 674. ISAF was not authorised, nor did it purport to serve as the

delegate of the Security Council for the purpose of determining what measures

should prove necessary. It follows that the United Kingdom was entitled to adopt its

own detention policy, provided that that policy was consistent with the authority

conferred by the relevant Security Council Resolutions, ie provided that it did not

purport to authorise detention in circumstances where it was not necessary for

imperative reasons of security.

39. For these reasons, I conclude that the authority conferred by the Security

Council Resolutions on Afghanistan to detain for imperative reasons of security,

was not limited to 96 hours. I would have reached the same conclusion even if I had

thought that the power to detain was conferred by the Security Council Resolutions

on ISAF, as opposed to the troop-contributing nations. This is because, in agreement

with Lord Mance and for the same reasons, I consider that the unchallenged

evidence, accepted by the judge, shows that ISAF tacitly accepted the United

Kingdom’s right to adopt its own detention policy within the limits allowed by the

Resolutions.

Impact of the European Convention on Human Rights

40. All international human rights instruments include provisions which

potentially affect the conduct of military operations in an armed conflict. Those

which protect the rights to life and liberty are the most likely to be relevant. In the

European Convention on Human Rights, these rights are protected by articles 2 and

5. Article 5 provides, so far as relevant:

“(1) Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person.

No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following

cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law:

…

(c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected

for the purpose of bringing him before the competent

legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having

committed an offence or when it is reasonably

considered necessary to prevent his committing an

offence or fleeing after having done so.

…

(f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to

prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the

country or of a person against whom action is being

taken with a view to deportation or extradition.

…

(3) Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the

provisions of paragraph 1(c) of this article shall be brought

promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to

exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a

reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be

conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial.

(4) Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or

detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the

lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court

and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful.”

41. The enforcement of human rights has from its inception been a significant

part of the United Nations’ mission under its Charter. It is therefore appropriate to

construe Security Council Resolutions on the footing that those acting under their

authority will respect the human rights of those with whom they deal, so far as that

is consistent with the proper performance of the functions entrusted to them. But

that qualification is important. In the first place, although it is axiomatic that under

a resolution authorising “all necessary measures”, the measures must be necessary,

ie required for imperative reasons of security, military operations will in the nature

of things interfere with rights such as the right to life, liberty and property. Secondly,

most if not all schemes of human rights protection assume a state of peace and basic

standards of public order. This is particularly true of provisions protecting liberty,

which are generally directed to penal and police procedures. They assume not just

minimum levels of public order, but a judiciary with effective criminal jurisdiction

and a hierarchy of state officials with a chain of responsibility. The rights which they

protect cannot be as absolute in a war zone in the midst of a civil war, where none

of these conditions necessarily obtains. Thirdly, Security Council Resolutions such

as those authorising peacekeeping operations in Iraq and Afghanistan are addressed

to every country in the world. They must be taken to mean the same thing

everywhere. This means that they cannot be construed by reference to any particular

national or regional code of human rights protection, such as the European

Convention on Human Rights. The United Kingdom is a member of the Council of

Europe and a party to the European Convention, but about 50 countries participated

in ISAF many of which were not.

42. These considerations are particularly important when it comes to article 5 of

the European Convention, which is unique among international codes of human

rights protection in containing an exhaustive list of six grounds on which the law

may authorise a deprivation of liberty. No other major international human rights

instrument has this feature. In particular it is not a feature of the corresponding

provision, article 9, of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The

Covenant, which is an expansion in treaty form of the Universal Declaration of 1948,

has been ratified by 167 states to date and may be regarded as the paradigm

statement of internationally recognised human rights. Article 9.1 provides:

“Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No

one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one

shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in

accordance with such procedure as are established by law.”

The rest of article 9 is concerned with procedural safeguards. These include

provisions for judicial supervision and a right of resort to a court to challenge the

detention. No attempt is made to prescribe exhaustively the grounds on which the

law may authorise detention, provided that those grounds do not amount to a licence

for arbitrary detention. The attempt by the draftsmen of article 5 of the European

Convention to codify the exceptions more precisely makes it unusually inflexible if

applied according to its literal meaning in a situation of armed conflict. In some

circumstances, some of the six grounds may adventitiously accommodate military

detention. But as the Strasbourg court recognised in Hassan v United Kingdom

(2014) 38 BHRC 358, para 97, they are not designed for such a situation and are not

well adapted to it.

43. When the Security Council calls upon member states of the United Nations

to participate in an armed conflict, the relevant source of human rights protection as

far as the Security Council is concerned is not some particular code of human rights,

let alone a national or regional one. It is the body of principle which applies as a

matter of international law in armed conflicts. The laws of armed conflict are lex

specialis in relation to rules laying down peace-time norms upon the same subjects.

In the case of a non-international armed conflict, this includes Common Article 3 of

the Geneva Conventions and, where it applies, Additional Protocol II. In Legality of

the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion [1996] ICJ Rep 226, the

International Court of Justice considered the interrelation between international

humanitarian law and international human rights law, taking the International

Covenant on Civil and Political Rights as the measure of the latter. Article 6 of the

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides that no one may be

arbitrarily deprived of his life. At para 25 of its advisory opinion, the Court observed

that

“the protection of the International Covenant of Civil and

Political Rights does not cease in times of war, except by

operation of article 4 of the Covenant whereby certain

provisions may be derogated from in a time of national

emergency. Respect for the right to life is not, however, such a

provision. In principle, the right not arbitrarily to be deprived

of one’s life applies also in hostilities. The test of what is an

arbitrary deprivation of life, however, then falls to be

determined by the applicable lex specialis, namely, the law

applicable in armed conflict which is designed to regulate the

conduct of hostilities. Thus whether a particular loss of life,

through the use of a certain weapon in warfare, is to be

considered an arbitrary deprivation of life contrary to article 6

of the Covenant, can only be decided by reference to the law

applicable in armed conflict and not deduced from the terms of

the Covenant itself.”

Referring to these observations in Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall

in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, [2004] ICJ Rep 136, the

International Court of Justice said, at para 106:

“As regards the relationship between international

humanitarian law and human rights law, there are thus three

possible situations: some rights may be exclusively matters of

international humanitarian law; others may be exclusively

matters of human rights law; yet others may be matters of both

these branches of international law. In order to answer the

question put to it, the Court will have to take into consideration

both these branches of international law, namely human rights

law and, as lex specialis, international humanitarian law.”

Cf Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the

Congo v Uganda) Judgment, [2005] ICJ Rep, 168, para 216. As a study group of the

United Nations International Law Commission has observed, “when lex specialis is

being invoked as an exception to the general law, then what is being suggested is

that the special nature of the facts justifies a deviation from what otherwise would

be the ‘normal’ course of action”: Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties

Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law (2006)

A/CN.4/L.682. These observations, which were made in the context of article 6 of

the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, are equally true of the

prohibition in article 9 of the Covenant of arbitrary detention or detention otherwise

than in accordance with law. Article 9, like article 6, applies in hostilities. But the

question what is arbitrary or in accordance with law in an armed conflict cannot be

answered in the same way as it would be in peacetime.

44. International humanitarian law does not specifically authorise detention in a

non-international armed conflict. But, as I have explained, the relevant Security

Council Resolutions did authorise detention, and international humanitarian law

regulates its consequences on the assumption that it is an inevitable feature of state

practice. In that respect, the Resolutions served the same function in a non-

international armed conflict as the authority to detain under article 21 of the Third

Geneva Convention does in an international armed conflict. It conferred an authority

in international law to detain in circumstances where this was necessary for

imperative reasons of security.

45. The next question is how these considerations can live with the European

Convention when troops are contributed to a United Nations multinational force by

a member state of the Council of Europe. The European Convention is not easy to

apply to military operations outside the national territory of a contracting state.

Article 2(2)(c) provides that the right to life is not infringed when it results from

necessary action taken to quell an insurrection, but there is no corresponding

provision for killing in the course of an international armed conflict. Article 5 of the

European Convention, as I have observed, lists the permissible occasions for a

deprivation of liberty in terms which take no account of military detention in the

course of an armed conflict, whether international or non-international. In the case

of an armed conflict on the national territory of the member state concerned, these

problems may be resolved by resort to article 15, which permits derogation from

(among others) article 2 in respect of deaths resulting from lawful acts of war and

from article 5 generally. But derogation under article 15 is permitted only “in time

of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation”. Like Lord

Bingham of Cornhill in R (Al-Jedda) v Secretary of State for Defence [2008] AC

332, para 38, I am inclined to think that “the nation” in article 15 means the nation

seeking to derogate. It cannot, as Leggatt J suggested, mean Iraq or Afghanistan. It

is of course theoretically possible that an armed conflict outside the United Kingdom

might threaten the life of the British nation. The fighting in France in 1939-40 could

no doubt have been so described. But it is difficult to imagine any circumstances in

which this would be true of an armed conflict abroad in which UK armed forces

were engaged as part of a peacekeeping force under the auspices of the United

Nations.

46. In Bankovic v Belgium (2001) 44 EHRR SE5, the European Court of Human

Rights rejected an argument that a Convention state’s obligation under article 1 to

secure to “everyone within their jurisdiction” the rights and freedoms secured by

Section I, could apply to those affected by military operations conducted abroad,

unless they occurred in the territory of another Convention state or in a non-

Convention territory where a Convention state exercised effective governmental

control. Two features of the reasoning are particularly significant for present

purposes. The first was the Court’s view that the rights protected by Section I of the

Convention were a total package. It could not be “divided and tailored in accordance

with the particular circumstances of the extra-territorial act in question” (para 73).

The Convention could not therefore be applied in a non-Convention territory where

the Convention state in question was not in a position to apply it as a whole. The

second significant feature of the reasoning concerned the relationship between the

Convention and international law generally. In Behrami v France; Saramati v

France, Germany and Norway (2007) 45 EHRR SE10 at para 122, the Court cited

the decision in Bankovic in support of the broader proposition that

“the principles underlying the Convention … must … take into

account relevant rules of international law when examining

questions concerning its jurisdiction and, consequently,

determine state responsibility in conformity and harmony with

the governing principles of international law of which it forms

part, although it must remain mindful of the Convention’s

special character as a human rights treaty.”

The principle thus stated corresponds to the ordinary principle on which treaties are

interpreted, taking into account any relevant rules of international law: see Vienna

Convention on the Law of Treaties, article 31(3)(c).

47. In Al-Skeini v United Kingdom (2011) 53 EHRR 18, the Grand Chamber

adopted what was widely regarded as a radically different approach. The Convention

was held to apply, so far as relevant, to extra-territorial military operations in any

case where the agents of a Convention state exercised control and authority over an

individual, even if they did not exercise governmental powers in the place where the

relevant operations occurred. The procedural requirements of article 2 were

accordingly applied to the deaths of Iraqi citizens in the course of firefights with

British troops. The implications of this for the conduct of military operations were

apparent from the Grand Chamber’s judgment in Al-Jedda v United Kingdom (2011)

53 EHRR 23, which was delivered on the same day as Al-Skeini. The Strasbourg

court, rejecting the prior decision of the House of Lords, held that in the absence of

a derogation under article 15 military detention in the course of an armed conflict

outside the national territory of a Convention state contravened article 5, because it

could not be brought within any of the six permitted occasions for detention in article

5(1). It rejected the submission that under article 103 of the UN Charter, UN member

states had an obligation to give effect to resolutions of the Security Council which

prevailed over obligations under the European Convention. This was because the

relevant Security Council Resolution left the choice of methods to the multinational

force in Iraq. In the absence of sufficiently specific language the Security Council’s

authorisation to use “all necessary measures” did not therefore create an obligation

to detain even if it created a power to do so. The Strasbourg court reached a similar

conclusion in two cases arising out of Security Council Resolutions imposing

sanctions on specified individuals: Nada v Switzerland (2012) 56 EHRR 18, and Al-

Dulimi and Montana Management Inc v Switzerland (Application No 5809/08)

(judgment delivered 21 June 2016). In both cases article 103 of the United Nations

Charter was held to be inapplicable because the sanctions resolutions left enough

discretion to member states to fall short of an obligation.

48. In equating the application of physical force with the exercise of jurisdiction,

the decision of the Strasbourg court in Al-Skeini was consistent with the opinion of

the United Nations Human Rights Committee, which has treated extraterritorial

kidnappings as exercises of state jurisdiction: see Lopez Burgos v Uruguay (Case

No C-52/79) (1981) 68 ILR 41 and Lilian Celiberti de Casariego v Uruguay (Case

No C-56/79) (1981) 68 ILR 29. The principle in Al-Skeini was also adopted by this

court in Smith v Ministry of Defence [2014] AC 52, in the admittedly rather different

context of the state’s duties to its own soldiers. But it goes substantially further than

the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice, which has thus far recognised

the extraterritorial application of human rights treaties only in cases where

governmental powers are exercised by a state in the course of a military occupation

of foreign territory: see Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the

Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, [2004] ICJ Rep 136, para 109;

Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo

v Uganda) Judgment, [2005] ICJ Rep 168, para 216. It also gives rise to serious

analytical and practical difficulties, when applied to a state’s treatment of enemy

combatants outside its own territory, because the practical effect is to apply the

Convention to any extra-territorial exercise of force. This is not consistent with the

essentially regional character of the Convention. It goes well beyond the ordinary

concept of extra-territorial jurisdiction in international law, which is generally

confined to territory where the state is the governmental authority or occupying

power and to enclaves of national jurisdiction such as ships, aircraft, military

establishments or diplomatic premises. It thereby requires a Convention state to

apply its terms in places where it has no effective administrative control and no legal

right to effective administrative control. It brings the Convention into potential

conflict with other sources of international law such as the Charter and acts of the

United Nations, as well as with the municipal law of the territory in question. It

requires the application of the Convention to the conduct of military operations for

which it was not designed and is ill-adapted, and in the process cuts across

immunities under national law which may be fundamental to the constitutional

division of powers, as they arguably are in the United Kingdom. The ambit of article

1 of the Convention is a matter of particular sensitivity to any Convention state. At

the level of international law, by defining the extent of the Contracting Parties’

obligation to give effect to its provisions, it identifies the limits of what they have

agreed in an altogether more fundamental sense than the following articles which

set out the rights protected. At the level of municipal law, the authority of the courts

to apply the Convention is a creature of the Human Rights Act 1998. It is ultimately

a matter for the courts of the United Kingdom to decide the territorial ambit of the

obligation of public authorities under section 6 to act compatibly with the

Convention. In doing so it will in accordance with established principle assume that

the legislature intended to act consistently with the United Kingdom’s treaty

obligations. It will not depart from the interpretation of those obligations by the

European Court of Human Rights without very good reason. But it cannot in the last

resort be bound by the view of the Strasbourg court on that question if it is satisfied

that that view goes beyond what Parliament has enacted. As Lord Neuberger and

Lord Mance observed of the European Communities Act 1972 in R

(Buckinghamshire County Council) v Secretary of State for Transport [2014] 1

WLR 324, para 207, there may be fundamental principles, whether contained in

other constitutional instruments or recognised at common law, whose abrogation

Parliament neither contemplated nor authorised.

49. The particular application of the principle in Al-Skeini by the Strasbourg court

in Al-Jedda gives rise to further difficulties of its own. It caused consternation

among those concerned with the enforcement of international humanitarian law,

because it appeared to undermine its role in armed conflicts as well as the efficacy

of international peacekeeping operations. In an influential article in the International

Review of the Red Cross (“The European Court of Human Rights’ Al-Jedda

judgment: the oversight of international humanitarian law”, (2011) 93 IRRC 837),

Jelena Pejic, the Legal Adviser in the Legal Department of the International

Committee of the Red Cross and a distinguished authority in this field, criticised the

decision on the grounds (i) that it required authority to detain in armed conflicts to

be specifically conferred by the language of a Security Council Resolution, when

the relevant lex specialis in international law was the Geneva Conventions; and (ii)

that to make detention an obligation of powers participating in an armed conflict

would restrict their discretion in a way which would be operationally counter-

productive and “hardly a human-rights-friendly outcome” (pp 847-848). “For the

moment”, she concluded (p 851),

“Al-Jedda casts a chilling shadow on the current and future

lawfulness of detention operations carried out by ECHR states

abroad. In addition, their ability to engage with other, non-

ECHR, countries in multinational military forces with a

detention mandate currently remains, at best, uncertain.”

50. It is, however, unnecessary to explore these problems any further in the

present case, because of the relatively narrow basis on which Al-Jedda was argued

and decided and because of the development of the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg

court since it was decided. Al-Jedda was presented as a case of conflicting

obligations. The argument in the Strasbourg court proceeded, as it had done in the

House of Lords, on the footing that there was an irreconcilable conflict between the

Security Council Resolutions and article 5 of the European Convention, one of

which must be displaced by the other: see para 105. By declining to treat military

detention as an obligation, as opposed to a discretionary power, the court was able

to treat article 5 as consistent with the United Kingdom’s obligations under the UN

Charter. But, in the light of later developments, perhaps the most significant feature

of the decision in Al-Jedda was that it marked a clear (though unacknowledged)

departure from the principle stated in Bankovic that the Convention could not be

“divided and tailored” for particular situations and had to be applied on an all or

nothing basis. It thereby opened the possibility of a partial or modified application

of the Convention to the extra-territorial acts of Convention states. In particular,

some adaptation of the Convention might be required by the international law

context in which those acts occurred: see paras 76, 102. This suggests that a more

fruitful approach in Al-Jedda would have been to reconcile the terms of the

Convention with those of the Security Council Resolutions by adapting the former

to the situation created by the latter.

51. This was the step which the Grand Chamber ultimately took in Hassan v

United Kingdom (2014) 38 BHRC 358, a decision which was considered by the

Court of Appeal but unfortunately appeared too late to be taken into account by

Leggatt J. The facts were that the applicant’s brother had been detained by British

forces in Iraq for a period of nine days. When it was ascertained that he was a civilian

who posed no threat to security, he was released. This happened in 2003,

immediately after the invasion of Iraq by coalition forces, at a stage when the armed

conflict was international in character. Hassan’s detention did not fall within any of

the six cases specified in article 5(1) where detention might be permitted, and he had

no effective access to a court for the purposes of article 5(4). The Grand Chamber

none the less held that there was no violation of article 5. It rejected the argument

that article 5 was displaced, as it had in Al-Jedda, but held that it fell to be adapted

to a context in which international humanitarian law provided the relevant

safeguards against abuse. The judgment calls for careful study.

52. The starting point is that on the Court’s analysis no question arose of

conflicting international obligations or of a Security Council Resolution displacing

or overriding article 5 of the European Convention. Cases of conflicting obligations

may have to be resolved by deciding which of them is to override the other. But

where an obligation is inconsistent with a mere power, there is normally no conflict.

The power does not have to be exercised. The United Kingdom relied in Hassan on

article 21 of the Third Geneva Convention and article 78 of the Fourth Geneva

Convention. These provisions did no more than confer a power to detain. No one

suggested that they gave rise to an obligation to detain or that they overrode article

5 of the Convention. The question was a different one, namely what did article 5

mean in the context of an armed conflict. Or, as the Grand Chamber put it (para 99),

whether the Court should “interpret [the obligations of the United Kingdom under

article 5] in the light of powers of detention available to it under international

humanitarian law.” In particular, the question was whether the six cases of

permissible detention listed in article 5(1) were to be interpreted as exhaustive in

that context. This involved interpreting it according to the ordinary principles of

international law, taking account of state practice in its application and of any

relevant rules of international law: see article 31(3)(b) and (c) of the Vienna

Convention. In the result, the Grand Chamber held that article 5(1) fell to be

modified by treating the six cases as non-exhaustive so as to accommodate the

existence of a power of detention in international law. This was a very different issue

from the one which had arisen in Al-Jedda, as the court pointed out at para 99.

53. The court began (para 97) by drawing attention to the incongruity of the six

permitted grounds of detention in article 5(1) of the Convention in a situation of

armed conflict:

“It has long been established that the list of grounds of

permissible detention in article 5(1) does not include

internment or preventive detention where there is no intention

to bring criminal charges within a reasonable time (see Lawless

v Ireland [1961] ECHR 332/57 at paras 13 and 14; Ireland v

UK [1978] ECHR 5310/71 at para 196; Guzzardi v Italy [1980]

ECHR 7367/76 at para 102; Jecius v Lithuania [2000] ECHR

34578/97 at paras 47-52; and Al-Jedda v UK (2011) 30 BHRC

637 at para 100). Moreover, the court considers that there are

important differences of context and purpose between arrests

carried out during peacetime and the arrest of a combatant in

the course of an armed conflict. It does not take the view that

detention under the powers provided for in the Third and

Fourth Geneva Conventions is congruent with any of the

categories set out in sub-paras (a) to (f). Although article

5(1)(c) might at first glance seem the most relevant provision,

there does not need to be any correlation between security

internment and suspicion of having committed an offence or

risk of the commission of a criminal offence. As regards

combatants detained as prisoners of war, since this category of

person enjoys combatant privilege, allowing them to

participate in hostilities without incurring criminal sanctions, it

would not be appropriate for the court to hold that this form of

detention falls within the scope of article 5(1)(c).”

54. The court went on to consider whether these inconsistencies could be

resolved by resort to the right of derogation under article 15. It did not decide

whether derogation was available in respect of armed conflict in Iraq, but concluded

that it was unnecessary to do so, because the consistent practice of states was not to

derogate from article 5 of the European Convention or article 9 of the International

Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in order to detain persons on the basis of the

Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions during international armed conflict:

“However, in respect of the criterion set out in article 31(3)(b)

of the Vienna Convention …, the court has previously stated

that a consistent practice on the part of the high contracting

parties, subsequent to their ratification of the convention, could

be taken as establishing their agreement not only as regards

interpretation but even to modify the text of the convention

(see, mutatis mutandis, Soering v United Kingdom [1989]

ECHR 14038/88 at paras 102-103 and Al-Saadoon v United

Kingdom [2010] ECHR 61498/08 at para 120).” (para 101)

55. In those circumstances, the solution was to adapt the state’s obligations under

the European Convention so as to accommodate the lex specialis applicable to armed

conflict:

“The court has made it clear on many occasions that the

Convention must be interpreted in harmony with other rules of

international law of which it forms part … This applies no less to

international humanitarian law. The four Geneva Conventions of

1949, intended to mitigate the horrors of war, were drafted in

parallel to the European Convention on Human Rights and enjoy

universal ratification. The provisions in the Third and Fourth

Geneva Conventions relating to internment, at issue in the present

application, were designed to protect captured combatants and

civilians who pose a security threat. The court has already held

that article 2 of the Convention should ‘be interpreted in so far as

possible in light of the general principles of international law,

including the rules of international humanitarian law which play

an indispensable and universally-accepted role in mitigating the

savagery and inhumanity of armed conflict’ (see Varnava v

Turkey [GC] … para 185, ECHR 2009), and it considers that these

observations apply equally in relation to article 5. Moreover, the

International Court of Justice has held that the protection offered

by human rights conventions and that offered by international

humanitarian law co-exist in situations of armed conflict … In its

judgment Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo, the

International Court of Justice observed, with reference to its

advisory opinion concerning Legal Consequences of the

Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, that

‘[a]s regards the relationship between international humanitarian

law and human rights law, there are thus three possible situations:

some rights may be exclusively matters of international

humanitarian law; others may be exclusively matters of human

rights law; yet others may be matters of both these branches of

international law’… The court must endeavour to interpret and

apply the Convention in a manner which is consistent with the

framework under international law delineated by the International

Court of Justice.” (para 102)

56. The Court’s conclusion is set out at paras 104-106. Dealing first with the

lawfulness of detention, it observed:

“104. None the less, and consistently with the case law of the

International Court of Justice, the Court considers that, even in

situations of international armed conflict, the safeguards under

the Convention continue to apply, albeit interpreted against the

background of the provisions of international humanitarian

law. By reason of the co-existence of the safeguards provided

by international humanitarian law and by the Convention in

time of armed conflict, the grounds of permitted deprivation of

liberty set out in subparagraphs (a) to (f) of that provision

should be accommodated, as far as possible, with the taking of

prisoners of war and the detention of civilians who pose a risk

to security under the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions.

The court is mindful of the fact that internment in peacetime

does not fall within the scheme of deprivation of liberty

governed by article 5 of the Convention without the exercise of

the power of derogation under article 15 (see para 97 above). It

can only be in cases of international armed conflict, where the

taking of prisoners of war and the detention of civilians who

pose a threat to security are accepted features of international

humanitarian law, that article 5 could be interpreted as

permitting the exercise of such broad powers.

105. As with the grounds of permitted detention already set

out in those subparagraphs, deprivation of liberty pursuant to

powers under international humanitarian law must be ‘lawful’

to preclude a violation of article 5 para 1. This means that the

detention must comply with the rules of international

humanitarian law and, most importantly, that it should be in

keeping with the fundamental purpose of article 5 para 1, which

is to protect the individual from arbitrariness (see, for example,

Kurt v Turkey (1998) 5 BHRC 1, para 122; El-Masri v former

Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (2012) 34 BHRC 313, para

230; see also Saadi v Italy (2008) 24 BHRC 123, paras 67-74,

and the cases cited therein).”

57. In para 104 of the judgment the Grand Chamber referred to the “co-existence

of the safeguards provided by international humanitarian law and by the Convention

in time of armed conflict.” It is clear that the fact that the relevant lex specialis

applicable to armed conflict contained its own safeguards against abuse, albeit less

extensive than those of article 5 of the Convention, was at least part of the reason

why it was legitimate to “accommodate” the six permitted grounds of detention to

cater for detention in the course of armed conflict. The rules of international

humanitarian law which the court had in mind are identified in para 106 of the

judgment:

“106. As regards procedural safeguards, the Court considers

that, in relation to detention taking place during an international

armed conflict, article 5 paras 2 and 4 must also be interpreted

in a manner which takes into account the context and the

applicable rules of international humanitarian law. Articles 43

and 78 of the Fourth Geneva Convention provide that

internment ‘shall be subject to periodical review, if possible

every six months, by a competent body’. Whilst it might not be

practicable in the course of an international armed conflict for

the legality of detention to be determined by an independent

‘court’ in the sense generally required by article 5 para 4 (see,

in the latter context, Reinprecht v Austria, para 31, ECHR 2005

no 67175/01), none the less, if the contracting state is to comply

with its obligations under article 5 para 4 in this context, the

‘competent body’ should provide sufficient guarantees of

impartiality and fair procedure to protect against arbitrariness.

Moreover, the first review should take place shortly after the

person is taken into detention, with subsequent reviews at

frequent intervals, to ensure that any person who does not fall

into one of the categories subject to internment under

international humanitarian law is released without undue

delay.”

58. The reference to articles 43 and 78 of the Fourth Geneva Convention is of

some importance. Leaving aside common article 3, the Fourth Geneva Convention

is concerned with the treatment of “protected persons” (essentially civilian non-

combatants) who in the course of an international armed conflict “find themselves”

in the hands of a belligerent or occupying power of which they are not nationals.

The Convention authorises the internment of aliens found in the territory of a party

to the conflict (article 42) and of protected persons generally in an occupied territory

(article 78). The analogy between those situations and the present one is that

internment is authorised under article 42 “only if the security of the Detaining Power

makes it absolutely necessary” and under article 78 only for “imperative reasons of

security”. The difference of phraseology reflects the fact that internment in an

occupied territory may be necessary for the security of those interned. There is no

substantial difference in the test of necessity as between the two situations. This

contrasts with the position relating to prisoners of war under the Third Geneva

Convention, where it is enough to justify their detention that they belong to a hostile

organised armed force or a civilian service ancillary to such a force. Since the factual

basis of internment is more readily disputable under Fourth Convention, article 43

confers on those interned under article 42 a right to have their internment

“reconsidered as soon as possible by an appropriate court or administrative board

designated by the Detaining Power for that purpose.” If continued detention is

authorised, the court or administrative board must review the case at least twice a

year to determine whether detention is still justified. Article 78 confers similar rights

on persons interned under that article. In either case, article 132 provides that an

internee shall be released “as soon as the reasons which necessitated his internment

no longer exist.” With the possible exception of article 5 of the Third Geneva

Convention (which provides for a “competent tribunal” to determine disputed claims

to prisoner of war status), articles 43 and 78 of the Fourth Geneva Conventions are

the only provisions of the Geneva Conventions which confer rights on detainees that

can in any sense be said to correspond to those conferred by article 5 of the European

Convention on Human Rights.

59. It was argued before us that these observations had no bearing on a non-

international armed conflict such as we are concerned with on these appeals, and no

bearing on detentions under the authority of a Security Council Resolution as

opposed to international humanitarian law. There are occasional passages in the

judgment which can be cited in support of these arguments. But I would not accept

them, for two main reasons.

60. In the first place, the Grand Chamber in Hassan dealt with the point before

them by reference to international armed conflicts because that was the character of

the Iraqi conflict at the time of the events in question. It followed that the relevant

source of the international law power to detain was the Third and Fourth Geneva

Conventions. But the essential question was whether article 5 of the European

Convention on Human Rights should be interpreted so as to accommodate an

international law power of detention which was not among the permissible

occasions for detention listed at article 5(1). The question is the same in the present

cases, although the source of the international law power to detain is a resolution of

the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter instead of the Geneva

Conventions. I have already pointed out that resolutions under Chapter VII are a

cornerstone of the international legal order. Their status as a source of international

law powers of coercion is as significant as the Geneva Conventions, and is just as

relevant where the Convention falls to be interpreted in the light of the rules of

international law.

61. Secondly, I reject the argument that the decision has no application to non-

international armed conflicts because, while there are differences between the two

classes of armed conflict, those differences do not, as it seems to me, affect the

particular features of the reasoning in Hassan which are critical to the resolution of

these appeals. The fundamental question in Hassan was whether the six permitted

grounds listed in article 5(1) of the Convention were to be treated as exhaustive in

the context of armed conflict. The Court decided that they were not. This was

because the exhaustive list of permitted grounds was designed for peacetime and

could not accommodate military detention in the very different circumstances of an

armed conflict: para 97. The Grand Chamber referred at para 102 to the decision of

the International Court of Justice in Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo,

and its advisory opinion concerning The Legal Consequences of the Construction of

a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. At para 104, it drew the same

distinction as the International Court of Justice had made between peacetime norms,

such as the prohibition of internment by international human rights instruments, and

detention in the course of an armed conflict. These points do not depend on the

international character of the armed conflict in question. The taking of prisoners of

war and the detention of civilians posing a threat to security are inherent in

international and non-international armed conflicts alike. The practice of states to

detain is common to both and is universal in both contexts. It is right to add that the

state practice as regards derogations, to which the Grand Chamber attached some

importance, is the same in both international and non-international armed conflicts.

No member of the Council of Europe has ever derogated from the European

Convention with respect to military action of whatever kind taken abroad: see Pejic,

art cit, at p 850.

62. It is fair to point out that some aspects of the functions of the peacekeeping

forces deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan can more readily be accommodated within

the six specified grounds in article 5(1) than the internment of prisoners of war in an

international armed conflict. In particular, where armed forces are operating in

support of the government of the territory, article 5(1)(c) may apply (detention for

the purpose of bringing a person before a competent legal authority on suspicion of

having committed an offence or to prevent him from committing one). But the

enforcement of the criminal law against individual suspects is far from exhausting

the functions of the forces deployed in either theatre. As I have pointed out (paras

21-22, 28 above), their mandate under the relevant Security Council Resolutions

extended well beyond operating as an auxiliary police force. It required them to

engage as combatants in an armed conflict with the forces of a violent, organised

insurrection, with a view to defending itself, protecting the civilian population, and

creating a secure environment for the reconstruction of the country.

63. Once one concludes that the six grounds are not necessarily exhaustive in a

situation of armed conflict, the next question is whether there is some alternative

legal standard to determine what circumstances justify detention and subject to what

procedural safeguards. The court in Hassan answered this question by seeking to

identify the “fundamental purpose” of ECHR article 5(1) and to consider whether

that purpose would be sufficiently served by the rules applicable in armed conflict

even if the case did not come within the six permitted grounds. They considered

that, as with other international human rights instruments, the fundamental purpose

of article 5 was to “protect the individual from arbitrariness” (para 105). The essence

of arbitrariness is discretion uncontrolled by law. There were two essential

conditions for ensuring that detention was not uncontrolled by law. The first was

that there should be a legal basis for it. In other words, there must be a legal power

to detain and it must not be exercisable on discretionary principles so broad, flexible

or obscure as to be beyond legal control. The second was that there must be some

sufficient means available to the detainee to challenge the lawfulness of his

detention. In these respects article 5 of the European Convention, although a great

deal more prescriptive in detail, shares the objective of article 9 of the Universal

Declaration of Human Rights and article 9 of the International Covenant on Civil

and Political Rights.

64. The relevance of the Geneva Conventions in Hassan was that in the context

of an international armed conflict, they provided an appropriate alternative legal

standard to the literal application of article 5. But it does not follow that in a conflict

to which the relevant provisions of the Geneva Conventions do not directly apply,

anyone detained by the peacekeeping forces must necessarily be treated as being

detained arbitrarily. The present question is whether there is an appropriate legal

standard in a non-international armed conflict, notwithstanding that the relevant

provisions of the Geneva Conventions do not directly apply.

65. As far as the right of detention itself is concerned, the answer is reasonably

straightforward. There is, for the reasons which I have explained, a sufficient legal

basis for detention in the Security Council Resolutions. The implicit limitation to

occasions where detention is necessary for imperative reasons of security, provides

a clear legal standard which is no wider than the purpose of the UN mandate

requires. Indeed, it is the same standard as that which applies under articles 42 and

78 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which the Grand Chamber endorsed in the

context of an international armed conflict.

66. The claimants argue that the Grand Chamber could not have envisaged that

its reasoning would be applied to non-international armed conflicts because the

procedural safeguards derived from international humanitarian law, which they

regarded as an acceptable substitute for the protection of article 5, were available

only to those detained in the course of an international armed conflict. I recognise

the force of this argument, but I think that it is mistaken. It is true that with the

exception of common article 3, the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions apply

only in international armed conflicts. The duty of review in articles 43 and 78 of the

Fourth Convention, to which the Grand Chamber attached importance, does not

apply to those detained in the course of a non-international armed conflict. But it

should be noted that it does not apply to most of those detained in an international

armed conflict either. It applies only to those detainees who are “protected persons”

within the meaning of article 4 of the Fourth Convention. They are, as I have

observed, mainly civilian non-combatants. The definition of “protected persons”

expressly excludes those who are protected by the Third Geneva Convention. The

persons thus excluded from the ambit of articles 43 and 78 of the Fourth Convention

include not only the armed forces and civilian ancillary services of a belligerent

state, but also other persons participating in an international armed conflict as

members of organised and identifiable resistance movements or militias, or as

persons who on the approach of the enemy take up arms spontaneously: see article

4 of the Third Geneva Convention. The Third Convention has no equivalent

provision for review of the detention of persons in these categories. It is of course

possible that the Grand Chamber intended to confine the “accommodation” between

international humanitarian law and article 5 of the European Convention on Human

Rights strictly to the limited category of detainees entitled to the benefit of articles

43 and 78 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. This would, however, have been a

rather arbitrary choice. The Grand Chamber was not concerned to define the ambit

of international humanitarian law but to adapt article 5 of the Convention to

conditions of armed conflict for which it was not primarily designed. I think it

unlikely that they intended that article 5 should apply without modification to

prisoners of war taken in an international armed conflict, simply because no review

procedure was available to them under the Geneva Conventions. It is in my opinion

clear that they regarded the duty of review imposed by articles 43 and 78 of the

Fourth Convention as representing a model minimum standard of review required

to prevent the detention from being treated as arbitrary. They were adopting that

standard not just for cases to which those articles directly applied, but generally.

67. Given that the Security Council Resolutions themselves contain no

procedural safeguards, it is incumbent on Convention states, if they are to comply

with article 5, to specify the conditions on which their armed forces may detain

people in the course of an armed conflict and to make adequate means available to

detainees to challenge the lawfulness of their detention under their own law. There

is no reason why a Convention state should not comply with its Convention

obligations by adopting a standard at least equivalent to articles 43 and 78 of the

Fourth Geneva Convention, as those participating in armed conflicts under the

auspices of the United Nations commonly do. Provided that the standard thus

adopted is prescribed by law and not simply a matter of discretion, I cannot think

that it matters to which category the armed conflict in question belongs as a matter

of international humanitarian law. The essential purpose of article 5, as the court

observed at para 105 of Hassan, is to protect the individual from arbitrariness. This

may be achieved even in a state of armed conflict if there are regular reviews

providing “sufficient guarantees of impartiality and fair procedure to protect against

arbitrariness” (para 106).

68. I conclude that Hassan v United Kingdom is authority for three propositions

which are central to the resolution of these appeals:

(1) The Strasbourg court was concerned in Hassan with the interface

between two international legal instruments in the domain of armed conflict

outside the territory of a Convention state. This is pre-eminently a domain

governed by international legal norms. In that context, the Grand Chamber

recognised that international law may provide a sufficient legal basis for

military detention for the purposes of article 5, which requires that any

detention should be lawful. This is consistent with the court’s approach in

Medvedyev v France (2010) 51 EHRR 39, in which the adequacy of the legal

basis for the detention of the applicant on a Cambodian merchant ship on the

high seas by French armed forces was analysed wholly in terms of

international law. The particular source of the international law right to detain

which was relevant in Hassan was international humanitarian law,

specifically the Geneva Conventions. But I see no reason to regard the

position as any different in a case where the source of the international law

right to detain is a resolution of the UN Security Council under powers

conferred by the UN Charter. It does not of course follow from the fact that

international law authorises military detention for the purposes of article 5 of

the Convention, that it also constitutes a defence to a claim in tort. That

depends on other considerations lying wholly in the realm of municipal law,

notably the concept of Crown act of state, which are addressed in the Serdar

Mohammed case in a separate judgment.

(2) Hassan does not add a notional seventh ground of permitted detention

to those listed at (a) to (f) of article 5(1), namely military detention in the

course of armed conflict. Its effect is rather to recognise that sub-paragraphs

(a) to (f) cannot necessarily be regarded as exhaustive when the Convention

is being applied to such a conflict, because their exhaustive character reflects

peacetime conditions. This means that where the armed forces of a

Convention state are acting under a mandate from the Security Council to use

all necessary measures, article 5(1) cannot be taken to prevent them from

detaining persons for imperative reasons of security.

(3) The procedural provisions of article 5, in particular article 5(4), may

fall to be adapted where this is necessary in the special circumstances of

armed conflict, provided that minimum standards of protection exist to ensure

that detention is not imposed arbitrarily. The minimum standard of protection

is a standard equivalent to that imposed by articles 43 and 78 of the Fourth

Geneva Convention. This involves an initial review of the appropriateness of

detention, followed by regular reviews thereafter, by an impartial body in

accordance with a fair procedure. These are the minimum requirements for

protection against arbitrary detention, and nothing in the Grand Chamber’s

decision in Hassan justifies any departure from them. Indeed, it is clear that

in the Court’s view, the continuing existence of these procedural obligations

in large measure justified reading the six permitted occasions for detention

as non-exhaustive in conditions of armed conflict. In the following sections

of this judgment, I shall deal with the safeguards which were available to

those in SM’s position.

The circumstances of SM’s detention after his capture

69. Part II of SOI J3-9 dealt with the processing of detainees through temporary

holding facilities after capture, and their ultimate release or transfer to the Afghan

authorities.

70. The Detention Authority was required to decide within 48 hours whether the

prisoner should be released, further detained or transferred to the Afghan authorities.

The relevant paragraphs of Part II provided:

“19. The Detention Authority must decide whether to

release, transfer or further detain the detainee. This decision

must be made within 48·hours of the time of detention of the

detainee. To authorise continued detention, the Detention

Authority will need to be satisfied, on the balance of

probabilities, that it is necessary for self-defence or that the

detainee has done something that makes him a threat to Force

Protection or Mission-Accomplishment.

…

24. Logistical Extensions. On some occasions, practical,

logistic reasons will entail a requirement to retain a UK

detainee for longer than the 96 hours. Such occasions would

normally involve the short-notice non- availability of pre-

planned transport assets or NDS facilities to·receive transferred

detainees reaching full capacity. These occasions may lead to a

temporary delay until the physical means to transfer or release

correctly can be reinstated. Where this is the case, authority to

extend the detention for logistic reasons is to be sought from

both HQ ISAF and from Ministers in the UK through the

Detention Authority.

25. Initial Detention Review. The Initial Detention Review

must take place within 48 hours of the point of detention …

The Detention Authority does not have the authority to hold a

detainee for longer than 96 hours from the point of detention

(this authority must be sought from Ministers through· the

Detention Review Committee (DRC) - see paras 26-29 below.

Routinely, therefore, within the 96 hour point the detainee must

be either released or transferred to the Afghan authorities.

Detention beyond 96 hours is only permitted in exceptional

circumstances.

26. Detention Review Committee (DRC). The DRC is the

mechanism which supports the Detention Authority in

managing detention cases in the Op HERRICK theatre. The

key role of the DRC is in assessing applications for exceptional

extension to detention before they are submitted through PJHQ

and from there on to the MoD for Ministerial approval as

necessary. The committee should be convened by the Detention

Authority as and when required and may take the form of a

standing committee. The committee’s membership is flexible

(and should be reviewed regularly by the Detention Authority),

but should include the following as a minimum: Detention

Authority (chair), [Chief of Staff Joint Force Support

Afghanistan, Joint Force Support Afghanistan Legal Adviser,

Commanding Officer Intelligence Exploitation Force, Force

Provost Marshall, Staff Officer Grade 2, J3 Branch (current

operations), Joint Force Support Afghanistan Policy Adviser,

Task Force Helmand Liaison Officer Joint Force Support

Afghanistan] … The chair may call on SME advice from Comd

Med, S02 J2X and the [redacted] as necessary, but the core

membership must remain outside the chain of command for

targeting and tactical legal issues, with the aim of being able to

present cases to the Detention Authority ‘cold’. Members do

not hold a vote as such, but attend in order to provide expert

advice to the Detention Authority to assist in his decision

making …”

71. Detention beyond the 96 hour limit applied by ISAF was permitted only in

exceptional circumstances on medical or logistic grounds or with the authority of

both the UK Permanent Joint Headquarters and ministers in London. The criteria

used to assist ministers in deciding whether to approve continued detention were set

out in paragraph 27 of Part II and the procedure was described in para 29. They

provided, so far as relevant, as follows:

“27. Extension of Detention. Where it is believed that there

are exceptional circumstances which justify an extension to the

96 hour limit, the Detention Authority should make an

application for an extension through the DRC to PJHQ, using

the form at Annex G. This application should describe the

background to the application, the operational imperative for

the extension, any anticipated impacts of the decision and any

other pertinent factors to assist in the consideration of the

application. The following criteria are used to assist Ministers

in deciding whether or not to approve applications for

extension of detention:

a. Will the extension of this individual provide

significant new intelligence vital for force protection?

b. Will the extension of this individual provide

significant new information on the nature of the

insurgency?

c. How long a period of extension has been

requested - [redacted]

…

29. Extended Detention Review Process. In exceptional

cases, where extended detention is authorised beyond 96 hours,

the detention is to be the subject of review as follows:

a. Detention Authority. The Detention Authority

is to conduct an internal review of the detention through

the DRC every 72 hours after extended detention starts.

The Detention Authority is similarly to submit a review

to PJHQ at the 14-day period to seek authorisation for

continued extended detention, using Annex H.

b. PJHQ. PJHQ J3 will review all periods of

extended detention every 14 days, informed by a

submission from Theatre …

c. Ministerial Level. The Minister authorising the

extension is to review the decision every 14 days … The

maximum detention permissible (inclusive of the initial

ISAF-permissible 96 hours), as endorsed by UK

Ministers and the Attorney General, is [redacted] …”

72. The judge found that until some point shortly before 12 April 2010 (five days

after SM’s capture) the Detention Authority for British forces in Helmand was the

commander of Task Force Helmand. He delegated his authority to handle routine

authorisations and reviews to the commander of the Camp Bastion Joint Operating

Base. At some point on or shortly before that date the commander of Joint Force

Support (Afghanistan) became the Detention Authority. The evidence about which

officer was the Detention Authority at the time when the first application was made

to extend SM’s detention beyond 96 hours was unclear, but the Secretary of State’s

case proceeded on the basis that it was the later arrangements which applied, and

the judge proceeded on the same basis. As Part II, paragraph 27 records, the

Detention Authority chaired the Detention Review Committee, whose function was

to support him in managing detention cases and to provide him with expert advice.

The Committee had an important role in preparing the reports on which any decision

would be based and in advising the Detention Authority. But the decision rested

with the Detention Authority alone.

73. SM was captured in the early hours of 7 April 2010. Upon his arrival at Camp

Bastion, he was informed that he had been detained because he was considered to

pose a threat to the accomplishment of the ISAF mission, and that he would either

be released or transferred to the Afghan authorities as soon as possible. He was told

that he was entitled to make a statement about his detention if he wished, to which

he replied through the interpreter that he was working in his field when a helicopter

arrived, and so he lay down in the field until he was attacked by a military dog and

then arrested. He was told that he was entitled to contact the International Committee

of the Red Cross, and on being asked whether there was any one whom he wished

to be informed of his capture he gave the name of his father. Thereafter, he was

detained in British military detention facilities, at Camp Bastion and at Kandahar

airport.

74. On 9 April 2010, two days after SM’s capture, a request was made to the

Ministry of Defence in London “to exceptionally extend the 96 hour detention

limitation in order to gain intelligence from [SM]”, on the basis that in-theatre

reviews of the continuing utility of his detention would be conducted every 72 hours.

The official submission to the minister was consistent with the criteria set out in Part

II, paragraph 27 of SOI J3-9. It recommended that SM should be further detained

“to gain valuable intelligence”, and advised that this was “necessary in the particular

case for intelligence exploitation.” It described the circumstances of his capture,

summarised what was known or believed about him, and set out the information

relevant to each of the three criteria listed in paragraph 27. On 12 April, a minister

authorised his continued detention “to gain valuable intelligence”. Writing to the

Foreign Secretary to report his decision, the minister recorded his view that

questioning SM would provide significant intelligence which was vital for force

protection purposes and would provide valuable information about the nature of the

Taliban insurgency. Thereafter, in-theatre reviews were conducted every 72 hours

until 4 May, and after that roughly every 14 days.

75. Responsibility for making decisions about the prosecution of detainees rested

with the Afghan authorities, principally the National Directorate of Security

(“NDS”). The review documentation suggests that after an initial assessment of SM,

the Detention Review Committee took the view that the prospect of a successful

prosecution was weak unless a confession was obtained. This was because the

rocket-propelled grenade launcher had not been recovered and the biometric

evidence linking him with other weaponry was judged to be of poor quality. On 19

April it is recorded that “the NDS will be consulted further”, and on 22nd it is

recommended that he be “held until the [redacted] point and then transferred to the

NDS for investigation by the Afghan authorities”. Although there are references to

discussions on the point with the NDS from 24 April 2010, the Secretary of State’s

pleading and evidence is that the NDS was not asked until 4 May, when the British

authorities had concluded that there was no more intelligence to be obtained from

him. On that date it was decided that SM should remain in UK custody for

interrogation until 6 May. Contact was then made with the NDS to find out whether

they wished to take him into their custody for investigation and possible prosecution.

They replied that they did, but had insufficient capacity to do so at the prison to

which he was to be transferred. At the time, there was a serious capacity problem,

partly because of an increase in the number of detentions following the “surge” of

the previous year; and partly because the British authorities had a policy of refusing

to transfer detainees to a number of NDS prisons at which they had reason to believe

that detainees were liable to be maltreated. The result was that from 6 May 2010 the

British authorities regarded themselves as holding SM on behalf of the Afghan

authorities until capacity became available at an acceptable prison. He was finally

transferred on 25 July.

76. The judge distinguished between three periods of detention. He found that

for the first 96 hours after his capture (the “first period”), SM was detained for the

purpose of bringing him before an Afghan prosecutor or judge in circumstances

where he was believed to be a senior Taliban commander involved in the production

of improvised explosive devices. He found that his detention beyond 96 hours had

been authorised by Ministers for the sole purpose of interrogating him with a view

to obtaining intelligence, and that that remained the sole purpose of his detention for

the next 25 days until 4 May, when the NDS formally expressed their intention of

taking him into their custody as soon as they could (the “second period”). From 4

May to 25 July 2010, (the “third period”), the judge considered that SM was once

again being held for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal

authorities on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence.

Application of ECHR: article 5(1)

77. Of the six permissible grounds of detentions listed in article 5(1), only two

were relied upon by the Secretary of State before us. They were ground (c), which

deals with lawful detention for the purpose of bringing a suspect before a competent

legal authority, and ground (f), which deals with detention pending extradition.

Ground (f): detention pending extradition

78. I can deal shortly with this ground. The judge accepted that the transfer of a

detainee to the Afghan authorities was capable of being an extradition, but held that

it did not apply on the facts. For my part, I would not even accept that it was capable

of being an extradition. The judge’s reasoning on this point was that the Convention

was only engaged because SM was regarded as being within the jurisdiction of the

United Kingdom for the purposes of article 1. It followed that the transfer constituted

a removal of the detainee from the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom to that of

Afghanistan, notwithstanding that it occurred within the national territory of

Afghanistan. In my opinion, this analysis stretches the meaning of sub-paragraph (f)

further than it will go, and is not consistent with what actually happens when a

detainee is transferred from British to Afghan custody. Sub-paragraph (f) is

concerned with movements between the territorial jurisdiction of one state and that

of another. Thus it deals with detention in the course of enforcing immigration

control and with deportation on the same footing as extradition. SM was not within

the territorial jurisdiction of the United Kingdom at any time. He was not even in a

place where the United Kingdom exercised effective governmental control. He was

within its jurisdiction for the purpose of article 1 of the Convention in a different

sense, namely that he was under the physical power and control of the United

Kingdom’s agents: see Al-Skeini v United Kingdom (2011) 53 EHRR 18, para 136.

That physical power and control was exercised, like other functions of HM forces,

in support of the government of Afghanistan. It is not therefore correct to speak of

a transfer from the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom to that of Afghanistan.

Afghanistan always had criminal jurisdiction in Helmand Province and in other

places where British forces operated. In transferring a detainee to the Afghan

criminal justice system British forces were simply enabling the criminal jurisdiction

which Afghanistan already possessed over SM to be more effectually exercised.

Ground (c): detention for the purpose of bringing SM before a competent legal

authority

79. The judge concluded that SM’s detention was justified on ground (c) during

the first 96 hours. He held that ground (c) did not apply during the second period,

because in that period he was being held solely for intelligence exploitation and not

for ultimate transfer to the Afghan authorities.

80. The Strasbourg court has consistently ruled that detention for the sole purpose

of intelligence exploitation is incompatible with article 5(1) of the Convention in a

domestic context, even in the face of a significant terrorist threat: Sakik v Turkey

(1998) 26 EHRR 662, para 44, Őcalan v Turkey (2005) 41 EHRR 45, para 104,

Medvedyev v France (2010) EHRR 39, para 126. The Grand Chamber’s decision in

Hassan does not in my opinion justify a departure from that principle in an armed

conflict. Nor does the Secretary of State suggest otherwise. However valuable the

intelligence is expected to be, its exploitation lacks the immediate connection with

the neutralisation of the threat which justifies detention for imperative reasons of

security. As Justice O’Connor pointed out in the Supreme Court of the United States

in Hamdi v Rumsfeld 542 US 507 (2004), the considerations of military security

which justify the detention of combatants do so only for the purpose of preventing

them from returning to the battlefield. Since imperative reasons of security were the

only ground on which detention was authorised by the relevant Security Council

Resolutions, it follows that the new policy announced to Parliament in November

2009, which permitted extended detention solely for the purpose of intelligence

exploitation, had no basis in international law.

81. In other circumstances, it might have been argued that the intention to transfer

SM to the Afghan authorities persisted during the second period notwithstanding

that advantage was being taken of his detention to question him. But that would not

be consistent with the facts. The evidence shows that after an initial assessment

following his capture, there was thought to be little prospect that the evidence would

support a prosecution. The NDS was not asked at this stage whether they wanted

him for further investigation and possible prosecution. If SM had been detained in

the second period in order to obtain better evidence against him, the case might have

fallen within sub-paragraph (c), even if that evidence was not forthcoming: see

Brogan v United Kingdom (1988) 11 EHRR 117 at para 53. But in fact the

intelligence that the British authorities hoped to obtain by detaining him related not

to his own criminality but to the nature of the Taliban insurgency and the

requirements of force protection generally. It follows that SM’s detention in the

second period cannot be justified by reference to article 5(1)(c).

82. It does not follow from this that SM would or should have been released on

11 April if ministers had not authorised his further detention for intelligence

exploitation. While this must be a matter for trial, it is on the face of it more likely

that if SM had not been detained for intelligence exploitation during the second

period, the British authorities would have asked the NDS earlier whether they

wanted to take custody of him, and would have received the same answer. He would

then have been further detained until he could be transferred to them, although not

necessarily until 25 July. To the extent that his detention was prolonged by the

interlude of intelligence exploitation, and that this was not taken into account in

determining the duration of his imprisonment pursuant to the sentence of the Afghan

court, he may have suffered a recoverable loss.

83. Turning to the third period, the judge held that article 5(1)(c) applied in

principle because from 4 May 2010 SM was once again being detained for the

purpose of being transferred to the Afghan authorities. But he held that his detention

in the third period could not be justified on that ground because he was not brought

promptly or at all before a judicial officer as required in such cases by article 5(3). I

shall return to article 5(3) when I come to deal with the procedural requirements of

article 5.

Detention for imperative reasons of security

84. I have explained earlier in this judgment why, even on the footing that none

of the of the six grounds of detention specified in article 5(1) of the Convention

applies, military detention may be justified. Notwithstanding the ostensibly

exhaustive character of the six grounds, that article cannot be taken to prevent HM

forces from detaining persons in the course of an armed conflict for imperative

reasons of security. The real question in those circumstances is whether this was in

fact why SM was detained in the second and third periods.

85. The judge made findings about the reasons for SM’s detention on which the

claimants naturally rely. But the problem about these findings is that they were made

for the purpose of determining whether SM’s detention was justified on any of the

six grounds specified in article 5(1). It is not easy to redeploy them for the rather

different purpose of determining whether detention was justified by imperative

reasons of security. This is not only because, coming to the matter as he did before

the judgment of the Strasbourg court in Hassan, the judge regarded the six grounds

as exhaustive, and imperative reasons of security as irrelevant. The judge also

believed that there could be no imperative reasons of security for detaining someone

once he had been captured and disarmed. He did not therefore consider the

possibility that imperative reasons of security might have been a concurrent reason

for SM’s detention during the second and third periods. I have already said, in

agreement with the Court of Appeal, that in my opinion he was wrong about this.

For that reason, I do not think it possible to attach any weight to his finding that

interrogation was the sole purpose of SM’s detention in the second period, nor to his

implicit view that detention pending the availability of prison capacity to the NDS

was the sole reason for his detention in the third period. So far as the judge rejected

the possibility that SM was also being detained for imperative reasons of security,

he did so on a false legal premise.

86. There is, as it seems to me, a real issue about whether imperative reasons of

security continued to operate after the first 96 hours concurrently with other factors.

It is clear from SOI J3-9, the relevant part of which I have quoted, that the British

authorities in Afghanistan did not regard themselves as entitled to detain any person

unless his detention was and remained necessary for “self-defence, force protection,

or wider mission accomplishment.” Persons arrested on these grounds might,

consistently with the Security Council Resolutions, have been detained for as long

as they continued to represent a threat. In fact, however, as the minister explained to

Parliament when announcing the new detention policy in November 2009, the policy

was to hold them only pending transfer to the Afghan authorities or (subject to

ministerial authorisation) for intelligence exploitation. In the absence of one or other

of these grounds, the detainee would be released, as SM would have been if the NDS

had shown no interest in him on 4 May 2010. For that reason, the only question with

which a minister was concerned when considering whether to authorise extended

detention for intelligence exploitation was whether it was justified for that purpose.

There is nothing in SOI J3-9 or in the ample documentation concerning SM’s

detention to suggest that the minister was concerned with any other grounds for his

detention.

87. It seems probable that even after ministers had authorised continued

detention for intelligence exploitation purposes, it was a precondition for the actual

exercise of that authority in the field that detention should be assessed as necessary

for imperative reasons of security. The detention documentation relating to SM

appears to suggest that this test was applied at each review after the ministerial

authorisation had been received. On each occasion, the Detention Review

Committee’s assessment for the authorising officers included an account of the

circumstances of his capture, followed by the following statement:

“Legal issues. The test to be applied is whether, on the balance

of probabilities, [SM] has done something which makes him a

threat to self-defence, force protection, or wider mission

accomplishment. Having considered that [SM] was seen

running from a Col known to have links with Obj WHITE, in

an attempt to evade [redacted] after they had been engaged

from nearby compounds, the route along which he was running

was found to contain a hidden RPG launcher and two rounds

and the assessment that he may be Obj WHITE’s deputy, I

advise that the policy test is satisfied.”

The judgment of those involved was presumably that this test was satisfied in SM’s

case. On that basis, there may have been concurrent reasons for holding any

detainee, because imperative reasons of security were a necessary condition for

detention, even if not the only one.

88. Unlike the judge, the Court of Appeal did consider the possibility that

imperative reasons of security constituted a concurrent reason for his detention after

the expiry of the initial period of 96 hours. But they did so only by reference to the

grounds on which further detention was authorised by ministers in London. It is

correct that the sole criterion for ministerial authorisation for continued detention

beyond 96 hours was the value of the intelligence that the detainee might be in a

position to provide. Indeed, that was the reason for the change of policy which led

to the adoption of the procedure for ministerial authorisation. It is also correct that

British troops had no right, either under SOI J3-9 or under the Security Council

Resolutions, to arrest someone solely in order to interrogate them. But it does not

follow that they could not interrogate a detainee who was being held for imperative

reasons of security. Nor does it follow that continued detention after 96 hours for

intelligence exploitation was not also justified by imperative reasons of security.

89. It is not necessary for this court to express a concluded view on these points,

and not appropriate to do so on the inevitably incomplete information before us.

They will be open to the parties at the full trial of the action. At that trial, my

discussion of the facts at paras 86-88 may turn out to be very wide of the mark. For

present purposes, it is enough to say that imperative reasons of security are capable

of justifying SM’s detention in all three periods.

Application of article 5: Procedural safeguards

90. Article 5 imposes procedural requirements on any deprivation of liberty at

four points. Under article 5(1), the detention must be “in accordance with a

procedure prescribed by law.” Under article 5(2), the detainee must be informed

promptly, in a language that he understands, of the reason for his detention. Under

article 5(3), where a person is detained in accordance with article 5(1)(c) (detention

of suspects for the purpose of bringing them before the competent legal authorities),

he must be brought “promptly” before such an authority. And under article 5(4) the

detainee must be entitled to “take proceedings by which his detention shall be

decided speedily by a court, and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful.”

The claimants allege breach of all of these requirements except for the one imposed

under article 5(2).

ECHR article 5(1): “in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law”

91. There is a substantial overlap between the requirement of article 5(1) that any

detention should be “in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law” and the

requirements of the other sub-articles, in particular article 5(4). In substance, the

difference is that this part of article 5(1) requires that the detention should be

authorised by law. Moreover, as explained over the years in the jurisprudence of the

Strasbourg court, it also implicitly defines what kind of rules may properly be

regarded as law for this purpose. By comparison, article 5(4) prescribes the

minimum content of that law in one critical area, namely the availability of an

effective right to challenge the lawfulness of the detention. Both sub-articles are

concerned with the protection of persons against arbitrariness, which the Grand

Chamber in Hassan identified as the core function of article 5. I have dealt with the

Grand Chamber’s analysis of this point at paras 63 and 68(3) above.

92. The requirement that the procedure should be “prescribed by law”, is

intended to satisfy the test of legal certainty which is inherent in any prohibition of

arbitrary detention. “Law” for this purpose has the enlarged meaning which it

normally bears in the Convention. It is not limited to statute, but extends to any body

of rules which is enforceable, sufficiently specific, and operates within a framework

of law, including public law: Nadarajah v Secretary of State for the Home

Department [2004] INLR 139, at para 54; R (Gillan) v Comr of Police of the

Metropolis [2006] 2 AC 307, paras 32-34. In Medvedyev v France, (supra,) another

case of extraterritorial military detention, the Strasbourg court observed at para 80

that it was

“… essential that the conditions for deprivation of liberty under

domestic and/or international law be clearly defined and that

the law itself be foreseeable in its application, so that it meets

the standard of ‘lawfulness’ set by the Convention, a standard

which requires that all law be sufficiently precise to avoid all

risk of arbitrariness and to allow the citizens - if need be, with

appropriate advice - to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in

the circumstances of the case, the consequences which a given

action may entail.”

93. As I have pointed out (para 63), this means in a case like the present one, that

a power of detention must not only be governed by rules but those rules must not be

exercisable on discretionary principles so broad, flexible or obscure as to be beyond

effective legal control. The procedure governing military arrest and detention by

HM forces in Afghanistan was laid down by SOI J3-9. I have summarised this

document above, and quoted the essential parts of it. Its requirements were precise,

comprehensive and mandatory. The principles on which discretionary judgments

were to be made, whether by the Detention Authority in the theatre or by ministers

in London, were exactly specified. The judge considered that it “defined the

conditions for deprivation of liberty with sufficient clarity and precision to meet the

requirement of legal certainty.” The Court of Appeal agreed, and so do I.

ECHR article 5(3): “brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised

by law”

94. Article 5(3) qualifies the ground of detention specified in article 5(1)(c). It

requires that a person suspected of having committed an offence, who is detained

for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority, must be

brought “promptly” before a judge or other officer authorised by law. It is relevant

to this appeal only so far as it is sought to justify his detention under article 5(1)(c)

during the third period.

95. It is plain that SM was not brought before a judge or other officer promptly

or at all in that period. The question is therefore how far the requirements of article

5(3) can properly be adapted to conditions of armed conflict in a non-Convention

state. Without the benefit of the decision in Hassan, the judge understandably did

not appreciate the significance of this question and did not deal with it. The Court

of Appeal recorded the judge’s conclusion, but did not address article 5(1)(c) at all,

presumably because it was irrelevant in the light of their conclusion that any

authority to detain conferred by the Security Council Resolutions was limited to the

96 hours prescribed by the ISAF policy.

96. This is, I think, a more difficult question than the judge appreciated. Articles

5(3) and 5(4) are both directed to the requirement for independent judicial oversight

of any detention. Article 5(3) must be read with article 5(1)(c), to which it is

ancillary. Unlike article 5(4), which applies generally, article 5(3) is concerned only

with prospective criminal proceedings. What is envisaged is that the suspect will be

brought promptly before a judge or other officer with jurisdiction either to try him

summarily or to release him summarily or to make arrangements for his continued

detention or release on bail or otherwise pending a later trial. In the present case,

that posits a judge or other officer with criminal jurisdiction under Afghan law. It is

far from clear what if any procedures of this kind existed in Afghanistan. The judge’s

findings about Afghan criminal procedure do not identify any. The judge adopted

the statement of principle by the Strasbourg court in Demir v Turkey (1998) 33

EHRR 43, para 41, that “where necessary, it is for the authorities to develop forms

of judicial control which are adapted to the circumstances but compatible with the

Convention.” This gives rise to no particular difficulty in a purely domestic case

such as Demir, where the state is responsible both for the arrest and detention of the

suspect and for the process of prosecution and trial. But in citing Demir the judge

appears to have thought that the British government assumed the same responsibility

in Afghanistan. This cannot in my view be correct. The United Kingdom was not a

governmental authority or an occupying power. It was responsible for SM’s arrest

and detention, but it did not have and could not have assumed responsibility for the

organisation or procedures of the system of criminal justice in Afghanistan, which

was a matter for the Afghan state, nor for the conduct of prosecutions, which was a

matter for the NDS. The operations of the British army in Afghanistan did not

displace the role of the NDS, which had jurisdiction throughout the country,

including those areas in which British troops were operating. It was seized of SM’s

case at the latest by 4 May 2010, when the third period began. The British authorities

regarded themselves as holding SM on their behalf. If there was such a procedure as

article 5(3) envisages, it was on the face of it the responsibility of the NDS and not

of the British army to operate it.

97. For the same reason, I do not think that the judge can have been right to say

that, quite apart from any limit on detention arising from ISAF policy, “any period

of detention in excess of four days without bringing the person before a judge is

prima facie too long.” I doubt whether there can be even a prima facie rule about the

appropriate period of detention which applies as a matter of principle in all

circumstances for the purpose of article 5(3) of the Convention, although four days

is probably a reasonable maximum in the great majority of cases. A prima facie limit

of four days takes no account of the truly extraordinary position in which British

troops found themselves in having to contain a violent insurgency while dealing

with the prosecuting authorities of a country whose legal system had recently been

rebuilt and over which they had no control or constitutional responsibility.

98. The judge recorded that the Secretary of State adduced no evidence that it

was impractical to bring SM before an Afghan judicial officer and that accordingly

the Secretary of State had failed to justify the detention under articles 5(1)(c) and

5(3). I confess to finding this an unsatisfactory basis on which to resolve this

question. The judge cannot be criticised for adopting it, because he understandably

assumed in the light of the then state of Strasbourg jurisprudence that article 5 of the

Convention fell to be applied without modification to military detention in

Afghanistan. There are difficulties about determining preliminary issues of law in a

complex case, in conjunction with limited questions of fact, the answers to which

are not only inter-related but dependent on the answers to the issues of law. The

difficulties are increased when the issues of fact fall to be determined partly on

assumptions derived from the pleadings and partly on evidence. They are further

increased when the basis on which article 5 of the Convention falls to be applied is

changed by developments in the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg court after the judge

has given judgment, with the result that findings made in one legal context have to

be applied in another. On any view there will have to be a trial before SM’s claims

can be finally determined. I would therefore decline to determine at this stage

whether the procedure adopted in SM’s case was compatible with article 5(3) of the

Convention, and would leave that question to a trial at which the relevant facts can

be found and assessed in the light of the judgments on this appeal.

ECHR article 5(4): right to take proceedings to decide the lawfulness of the

detention

99. If the essence of arbitrariness is discretion uncontrolled by law, article 5(4),

although procedural in nature, is fundamental to the values protected by article 5.

The gravamen of the procedural objection to SM’s detention was that he had no

practical possibility of testing its lawfulness while he remained in British custody.

There are three avenues by which in theory a detainee might have challenged his

detention. The first was an application to the High Court in England for a writ of

habeas corpus. The second was an internal challenge under the system of review

provided for by SOI J3-9. The third was an application for equivalent relief to the

courts of Afghanistan. No one appears to have suggested that the third possibility

was available even in theory, and we have no information about it. We are therefore

perforce concerned with the first two.

100. The Secretary of State submits that there would be no jurisdiction to grant a

writ of habeas corpus in these cases. This appears always to have been the British

government’s position in relation to military detention in Iraq and Afghanistan.

There is aged but respectable authority that habeas corpus will not be granted to

prisoners of war: see R v Schiever (1759) 2 Keny 473, Furly v Newnham (1780) 2

Dougl 419, The Case of Three Spanish Sailors (1779) 2 W Bl 1324. Nor will it be

granted to those interned as enemy aliens in the United Kingdom in time of war: Ex

p Weber [1916] 1 KB 280; [1916] 1 AC 421, R v Superintendant of Vine Street

Police Station, Ex p Liebmann [1916] 1 KB 268. None of these cases, however,

decided that there is no jurisdiction to grant habeas corpus. They decided only that

it would not be granted on the merits because the detention of prisoners of war and

enemy aliens was a lawful exercise of the prerogative of the Crown. These classes

of persons were regarded as liable to internment merely on account of their status.

Thus in Ex p Weber, and in the later case of R v Home Secretary, Ex p L [1945] KB

7, where there was an issue about whether the applicant was in fact an enemy alien,

the court resolved it. It must have had jurisdiction to do that. The only case in which

the courts have declined to entertain the issue was R v Bottrill, Ex p Kuechenmeister

[1947] KB 1, a questionable decision in a case where the Crown had continued to

detain a civilian internee after the war had ended. The application for habeas corpus

was met with the answer that the courts would not review the Crown’s prerogative

to determine whether or not the United Kingdom was still at war. If this decision

was ever good law, it has certainly not been since the decision of the House of Lords

in Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374

that the exercise of prerogative powers is in principle reviewable.

101. Once that is accepted, the rest is legally straightforward. A writ of habeas

corpus is a personal remedy directed against the person alleged to have possession

or control of the applicant. Jurisdiction to issue it depends on the respondent being

within the jurisdiction of the court, and not on the location of the applicant. There is

no principle to the effect that the writ is not available where the applicant has been

captured in the course of armed conflict, if he disputes the status which is said to

make his detention lawful or otherwise challenges its lawfulness. Thus the US

Supreme Court has recognised that habeas corpus is available to persons captured

in non-international armed conflicts seeking to challenge their designation as enemy

combatants: Hamdi v Rumsfeld 542 US 507 (2004). The same court has held that

habeas corpus may issue to a public official whose agents have effective control

over the applicant’s detention outside the United States: Boumedienne v Bush 553

US 73 (2008). In the United Kingdom, this court has gone further and approved the

issue of the writ in a case where the applicant had been lawfully delivered in Iraq by

British forces to the United States, and the only element of control over his

subsequent detention was an undertaking by the United States to return him on

demand: Rahmatullah v Secretary of State for Defence (JUSTICE intervening)

[2013] 1 AC 614.

102. There was no reason in principle why SM should not have been entitled to

apply for habeas corpus while he was detained by British forces in Afghanistan. I

have concluded that British forces in Afghanistan were entitled to detain him if

detention was and remained necessary for imperative reasons of security. On that

footing, the only issue on the review would have been whether the Detention

Authority had reasonable grounds for concluding that imperative reasons of security

required the detention to continue.

103. The problem about treating the right to apply for habeas corpus as a sufficient

compliance with article 5(4) lies not in any legal difficulty, but in the absence of any

practical possibility of exercising it. SM was an illiterate man with, by his own

account, limited formal education, detained by troops who did not speak his

language and who worked within a system of military law which he had no reason

to understand. In these respects, his position must have been similar to that of many

other detainees. Without sponsors in the United Kingdom, a detainee in Afghanistan

would face formidable practical difficulties in applying for habeas corpus in an

unfamiliar court in a distant foreign country, even if the circumstances of his

detention allowed it. In fact, however, they did not allow it. The British authorities

did not recognise the existence of a right to challenge military detention. Like other

persons detained by British forces under SOI J3-9, SM had no access to legal advice

or assistance and no facilities for communicating with his family or making contact

with the outside world (except with the Red Cross). It follows that although SM was

entitled in point of law to apply for a writ of habeas corpus, the procedures operated

by the British authorities prevented that right from being effective. Wisely, Mr Eadie

QC, who appeared for the Secretary of State, did not press this aspect of his case.

104. This would not necessarily matter if there was a satisfactory alternative. I turn

therefore to the system of internal review, which is the real area of dispute. The

procedure put in place by SOI J3-9 operated wholly internally. In itself this was not

necessarily objectionable. The Grand Chamber in Hassan (para 106) envisaged that

it might not be practical in a war zone to bring the detainee before a court. Articles

43 and 78 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which they regarded as providing an

alternative standard in that event, provide for a review by “an appropriate court or

administrative board designated by the Detaining Power for that purpose” (article

43), or in the case of an occupying power “a competent body set up by the said

Power” (article 78). The essential requirements emphasised by the Grand Chamber

were (i) that the detention should be reviewed shortly after it began and at frequent

intervals thereafter, and (ii) that it should provide “sufficient guarantees of

impartiality and fairness to protect against arbitrariness.” In my opinion, the British

procedures satisfied the first criterion but not the second. Even on the footing that a

review by a court was impractical, the procedure which existed had two critical

failings, both of which were pointed out by the courts below.

105. The first was that it lacked independence. It is true, as counsel for the

Secretary of State pointed out, that in addition to fairness the fundamental

requirement in the eyes of the Grand Chamber was impartiality, and that

independence is not necessarily the same thing. This is, however, an unsatisfactory

distinction in practice. We are concerned with the framework of rules governing

military detention, and not with the circumstances of any individual case. What is

required is not just impartiality in fact, but the appearance of impartiality and the

existence of sufficient institutional guarantees of impartiality. I would accept that it

may be unrealistic to require military detention in a war zone to be reviewed by a

body independent of the army or, more generally, of the executive, especially if

reviews are to be conducted with the promptness and frequency required. But it is

difficult to conceive that there can be sufficient institutional guarantees of

impartiality if the reviewing authority is not independent of those responsible for

authorising the detention under review, as it commonly is in the practice of other

countries including the United States. The Court of Appeal doubted whether the

procedure for review under SOI J3-9 was sufficiently independent but considered

that it was impossible to reach a concluded view on that point without further

information about the procedure and the chain of command. I am bound to say that

I do not see how the process described in SOI J3-9 (Amendment 2) can possibly be

regarded as independent. The UK Detention Authority was responsible both for

authorising detention and then for reviewing his own decision. The role of the

Detention Review Committee was purely advisory and it consisted, with the possible

exception of the Legal Adviser and the Political Adviser (a civilian), of his military

subordinates. There was no procedure for the case to be reviewed at any higher level

than the Detention Authority, except where it was referred to a minister in London

for authority to detain beyond 96 hours. But the written procedures envisaged that

in those cases the minister would focus on the intelligence value of extended

detention, and the documentation in SM’s own case does not suggest that any wider

considerations were before him. I do not doubt that those who operated this system

in the field brought an objective eye to the matter. On the facts to be assumed for

the purpose of this appeal, SM’s detention was certainly not arbitrary. The problem

is that there were no sufficient institutional guarantees that this would necessarily

be so. The assumptions in SM’s case have not been fully tested, as they might have

been under a procedure which was fairer to the detainee.

106. The second failing of the system was that it made no provision for the

participation of the detainee. SM did not in fact participate. Indeed, there is no reason

to believe that he was even aware that the reviews were occurring. The right

conferred on a detainee by article 5(4) of the Convention is “to take proceedings by

which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided.” This is not simply a

requirement that the authorities should review their own act. It is a right of challenge

which must necessarily involve the detainee. Specifically, he must be entitled to

challenge the existence of any imperative reasons of security justifying his

detention, which was the essential condition for it to be lawful. This is, as I have

observed in another context, an inherently disputable question. At each review of

his detention, the Detention Authority had before him a brief written summary of

what SM had said when he was first brought into Camp Bastion and asked whether

he had anything to say about his detention. This recorded that he was “briefly

questioned and denied he was running away or that he had been in command

[redacted] stating he is simply a farmer and had no knowledge of the RPG launcher

or rounds.” Otherwise, the only version of the facts which was before the Detention

Authority was that of the soldiers who captured him. It may well be that SM would

have had little to add. But the vice of the procedure adopted is that we cannot know

that, because he was never given an opportunity to do so.

107. There is no treaty and no consensus specifying what fairness involves as a

matter of international humanitarian law. But some basic principles must be

regarded as essential to any fair process of adjudication. In the present context, the

minimum conditions for fairness were (i) that the internee should be told, so far as

possible without compromising secret material, the gist of the facts which are said

to make his detention necessary for imperative reasons of security; (ii) that the

review procedure should be explained to him; (iii) that he should be allowed

sufficient contact with the outside world to be able to obtain evidence of his own;

and (iv) that he should be entitled to make representations, preferably in person but

if that is impractical then in some other effective manner. It is a more debatable

question whether he should be allowed access to legal advice and assistance. In a

situation of armed conflict this may not always be possible, at any rate within the

required time-scale. But there is no evidence before us to suggest that the restrictions

on access to such assistance imposed by the British authorities in Afghanistan were

necessary. They do not, for example, appear to have been imposed by ISAF, whose

procedures permitted both communication with the outside world and contact with

lawyers: see SOP 362 (Detention Procedure), para 7. In these respects, British

practice also conflicted with the UN Body of Principles for the Protection of All

Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, adopted by the General

Assembly in 1988: see Principles 17-19; and with the position taken by the

International Committee of the Red Cross: see Pejic, “Procedural Principles and

Safeguards for Internment/ Administrative Detention in Armed Conflict and Other

Situations of Violence”, International Review of the Red Cross, 87 (2005), 375 at

388.

108. The absence of minimal procedural safeguards was unwise as well as legally

indefensible, for it rendered the decisions of the Detention Authority more

vulnerable than they need have been. Even without a judicial element, a proper

procedure for the fair and independent review of detention in the theatre may be

faster, more efficient, better informed, and more satisfactory for both detainer and

detainee than a procedure by way of application for habeas corpus or judicial review

in the courts of a country on the other side of the world.

109. I conclude that the United Kingdom was in breach of its obligations under

article 5(4) of the Convention.

110. How far this conclusion will help SM remains to be seen. Article 5(4)

imposes an ancillary duty on the state, breach of which does not necessarily make

the detention unlawful under article 5(1): R (Kaiyam) v Secretary of State for Justice

[2015] AC 1344, para 37. It does not therefore follow from a finding of breach of

article 5(4) that SM ought to have been released any earlier than he in fact was. The

facts which are being assumed for the purpose of the preliminary issues may or may

not be proved at trial. If they are proved, it is difficult to envisage that a fair and

independent review process would have resulted in his release, and an application

for habeas corpus would probably have failed. In those circumstances, it is far from

clear that SM would be able to show that he had suffered any recoverable loss.

Conclusion

111. In the result, in Serdar Mohammed I would set aside paragraph 1(3)(ii) and

paragraph 1(5) of the judge’s order dated 20 May 2014. Subject to the parties’

submissions on the form of order, I would make the following declarations:

(1) For the purposes of article 5(1) of the European Convention on Human

Rights HM armed forces had legal power to detain SM in excess of 96 hours

pursuant to UN Security Council Resolutions 1386 (2001), 1510 (2003) and

1890 (2009) in cases where this was necessary for imperative reasons of

security.

(2) ECHR article 5(1) should be read so as to accommodate, as

permissible grounds, detention pursuant to that power.

(3) SM’s detention in excess of 96 hours was compatible with ECHR

article 5(1) to the extent that he was being detained for imperative reasons of

security.

(4) SM’s detention after 11 April 2010 did not fall within ECHR article

5(1)(f), and his detention between 11 April and 4 May 2010 did not fall within

ECHR article 5(1)(c).

(5) The arrangements for SM’s detention were not compatible with ECHR

article 5(4) in that he did not have any effective means of challenging the

lawfulness of his detention.

(6) Without prejudice to any other grounds on which it may be found that

SM’s detention was unlawful, the defendant is liable under ECHR article 5(5)

and section 8 of the Human Rights Act 1998 to pay compensation to the

claimant so far as the duration of his detention (including any detention

pursuant to his conviction by the court in Afghanistan) was prolonged by his

detention by HM forces between 11 April and 4 May 2010 for intelligence

exploitation purposes.

All other questions raised in Serdar Mohammed by the issues identified in paras 5

and 6 of this judgment, should be open to the parties at any further trial.

112. In Al-Waheed I would make the following declarations:

(1) For the purposes of article 5(1) of the European Convention on Human

Rights HM armed forces had legal power to detain Mr Al-Waheed pursuant

to UN Security Council Resolutions 1546 (2004) in cases where this was

necessary for imperative reasons of security.

(2) ECHR article 5(1) should be read so as to accommodate, as

permissible grounds, detention pursuant to that power.

LORD WILSON:

113. I agree with the judgment of Lord Sumption. In the light, however, of the

disagreement within the court, I propose in my own words to address the main issues

before it.

A: RESOLUTION 1546 (2004) REFERABLE TO IRAQ

114. The authority given by the UN Security Council in Resolution 1546 was to

take “all necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance of security and

stability in Iraq” in accordance with Mr Powell’s letter dated 5 June 2004; and it is

worth noticing that the authority was expressed to be given to “the multinational

force”. Mr Powell’s letter included, as an example of such a measure, “internment

where this is necessary for imperative reasons of security”. In the Al-Jedda case both

in the House of Lords and in the Grand Chamber of the Strasbourg court, Mr Al-

Jedda therefore conceded that the resolution conferred on the UK, as one member

of the multinational force, an authorisation, valid under international law, to detain

Iraqi nationals where necessary for imperative reasons of security. Mr Al-Waheed

makes the same concession.

115. But an issue remains, albeit in the end not at the centre of either of these

appeals, whether in context the authorisation should, as in the Al-Jedda case the

House of Lords accepted but the Grand Chamber rejected, be regarded as an

obligation. In the House Lord Bingham accepted at para 31 that the language of the

resolution was one of authorisation rather than of obligation. He proceeded,

however, with the agreement of the other members of the House (apart from Lady

Hale, who had doubts about it), to identify in paras 32 to 34 three reasons which, so

he considered, justified a conclusion that, for the purposes of article 103 of the UN

Charter, the resolution imposed an obligation to intern in the specified

circumstances. So Lord Bingham concluded in para 39 that the conflict between the

UK’s obligation to detain an Iraqi national under the resolution and its obligation to

uphold his right not to be deprived of his liberty under article 5 of the European

Convention (“the Convention”) should be the subject of what one might now

conveniently describe as an accommodation: namely that the United Kingdom might

detain him if necessary for the imperative reasons “but must ensure that the

detainee’s rights under article 5 are not infringed to any greater extent than is

inherent in such detention”.

116. When the Al-Jedda case reached the Strasbourg court, the Grand Chamber

carefully considered the reasons which Lord Bingham and the other members of the

House had articulated. In para 102 of its judgment, however, it noted that, of the

four declared purposes of the UN, one was to achieve international co-operation in

promoting respect for human rights. In that light it approached the task of

interpreting Resolution 1546 with “a presumption that the Security Council does not

intend to impose any obligation on member states to breach fundamental principles

of human rights”. It followed, so the Grand Chamber considered, that, in the event

of any ambiguity in the terms of a resolution of the Security Council, the

interpretation more in harmony with the requirements of the Convention should be

preferred. In some of its language, for example in para 101 of the judgment, the

court seemed to accept that Resolution 1546 did contain obligations; but the decision

was that, insofar as it did so, the obligations did not extend to internment on the part

of such states as were members of the Council of Europe because article 5(1) cast a

contrary obligation upon them.

117. It was accepted without argument by the Grand Chamber in the Al-Jedda case

that the effect of article 5(1), even when construed in the context of Resolution 1546

and its successors, was such as to impose an obligation on member states not to

effect internment otherwise than with a view to criminal proceedings pursuant to

subpara (c). At the outset of its assessment, namely in paras 99 and 100, the court

emphasised that since, as was accepted, none of the six exceptions prescribed in

article 5(1) applied, the United Kingdom did indeed have an obligation thereunder

not to intern Mr Al-Jedda. So the only question was whether its obligation under

article 5(1) had altogether been displaced by the resolutions in the light of article

103 of the UN Charter. The assumption of the Grand Chamber was therefore that,

subject only to the possibility of its displacement altogether, the extent of the United

Kingdom’s obligation under article 5(1) was immutable even in the context of the

resolutions; and, having made that assumption, the Grand Chamber turned to

construe the resolutions in order to determine the applicability of article 103. In Mr

Al-Waheed’s appeal the central task of this court today is to decide whether,

particularly in the light of the later reasoning of the Grand Chamber in the Hassan

case, it is necessary to regard the extent of the United Kingdom’s obligation to him

under article 5(1) as having been immutable. Unless it was immutable, we have no

need to wrestle with the difference of opinion as to whether Resolution 1546 cast an

obligation to detain where necessary for imperative reasons of security.

B: RESOLUTION 1386 (2001) REFERABLE TO AFGHANISTAN

118. The authority given by the UN Security Council in Resolution 1386 was to

take “all necessary measures” to fulfil the mandate given to ISAF; and its mandate

was, by para 1, “to assist the Afghan Interim Authority in the maintenance of

security in Kabul and its surrounding areas, so that the Afghan Interim Authority as

well as the personnel of the United Nations can operate in a secure environment”.

Later resolutions expanded the geographical reach of the mandate beyond Kabul and

surrounding areas and they progressively extended the period for which the authority

was to remain operative; but the terms of the authority itself remained untouched.

119. There can be no doubt that “all necessary measures” included a power to

intern. “All” measures were included - so long as they were necessary. If, as the

Security Council was later to recognise expressly when passing Resolution 1546 in

relation to Iraq and when annexing Mr Powell’s letter to it, all necessary measures

to contribute to the maintenance of security in Iraq included a power of internment,

how could the Council not have regarded it as likewise included in relation to the

maintenance of security in Afghanistan? An authority to assist in the maintenance

of security which did not include a power to intern would not have been a

worthwhile authority at all.

120. In Mr Mohammed’s case the Court of Appeal agreed that the authority

included a power to intern but held that the authority had been given to ISAF and so

was subject to their policy. There, in my respectful opinion, the Court of Appeal

misread the resolution. The authority to take all necessary measures was given to

“the member states participating in the [ISAF]”. In this regard the later Resolution

1546 referable to Iraq, which, in conferring authority on “the multinational force”,

is accepted to have conferred authority on the United Kingdom, ran closely parallel

to it. ISAF was no more than an umbrella body, which had no independent

personality in law, international or otherwise. Indeed the authority to take all

necessary measures was unqualified: it was not to take all such necessary measures

as ISAF might identify. Were the continued internment of an insurgent after 96

hours to be objectively necessary and yet to conflict with ISAF’s policy, the

authority to intern under the resolution would be unaffected. How could necessity,

of all things, be subordinated to policy?

C: THE AL-SKEINI CASE

121. In a second controversial decision handed down on the same day as its

decision in the Al-Jedda case, namely Al-Skeini v United Kingdom (2011) 53 EHRR

18, the Grand Chamber held that non-detained Iraqi civilians, shot by United

Kingdom forces in the course of military operations during the second of the three

periods in which United Kingdom forces operated in Iraq, namely the period of

“occupation” from 1 May 2003 to 28 June 2004, had also had rights under the

Convention which the United Kingdom had been bound to respect, including a right

under article 2 of the Convention to an investigation into their deaths, and that the

United Kingdom had breached it. The declared basis of this seemingly novel

extension of the Convention was that during this period the United Kingdom had

assumed authority for the maintenance of security in South-East Iraq and had thus

assumed authority over the individual civilians whom they had shot, even if it had

not had effective control over the area in which the shootings had occurred (para

149). The Grand Chamber added, however, that, when jurisdiction under article 1 of

the Convention depended upon authority over an individual, including when a

Convention state took a person into custody abroad, rather than upon effective

control over an area, Convention rights could be “divided and tailored” (paras 136-

137). This was an important recognition that the court’s substantial extra-territorial

enlargement of the concept of jurisdiction under article 1 of the Convention required

re-examination of the breadth of certain of the articles in section 1 of it. It seems

obvious that in particular attention would need to be given to the “tailoring” of

article 5(1) which, on the face of it, permitted no detention in the course of military

operations; and the first step towards doing so was soon taken by the Grand Chamber

in its decision in the Hassan case.

D: THE HASSAN CASE

122. The facts in the Hassan case were that on 23 April 2003 British forces,

searching for the applicant who was a general in the army of the Ba’ath party, raided

his home in Basra and found not him but his brother, T, who might well have been

armed with an AK-47 machine gun. They arrested T either as a suspected combatant

or as a civilian suspected to pose a threat to security. They detained him for eight

days. At about midnight on 1/2 May 2003, having established that he was a civilian

rather than a combatant and that he did not pose a threat to security, they released

him. Following his subsequent death, the applicant brought a claim on T’s behalf in

the High Court against the Secretary of State in which he alleged a breach of T’s

rights under the Convention, including under article 5. The judge dismissed the

claim on the ground that T’s detention, albeit managed by British forces, had been

in a camp officially designated as a US facility and under overall US control, with

the result (so the judge held) that he had not been within the jurisdiction of the United

Kingdom within the meaning of article 1 of the Convention. The applicant then

made an analogous application against the United Kingdom in the Strasbourg court.

Disagreeing with the High Court judge, the Grand Chamber held that, while in

detention, T had been in the physical control of United Kingdom forces and that the

substantive provisions of the Convention were therefore engaged. It therefore

proceeded to consider the nature of its obligations to him, in particular under article

5.

123. At this stage it is important to note the context of T’s detention. It occurred

in the first of the three periods in which United Kingdom forces operated in Iraq,

namely between 20 March 2003 and 1 May 2003, during which there was an

international armed conflict (“an IAC”). Geneva Convention III, relating to the

treatment of prisoners of war, and Geneva Convention IV, relating to the protection

of civilians in time of war, have a common article 2, which provides that they apply

“to all cases of declared war or any other armed conflict which may arise between

two or more of the High Contracting Parties”, in other words that they apply to an

IAC. Article 21 of Convention III provides that the “Detaining Power may subject

prisoners of war to internment”. Article 78 of Convention IV provides that the

Occupying Power may intern protected persons if it “considers it necessary, for

imperative reasons of security”. Insofar as British forces suspected that T was a

combatant, the United Kingdom had power to detain him under article 21 of

Convention III. Insofar, alternatively, as they suspected that he was a civilian who

posed a threat to security, it had power to detain him under article 78 of Convention

IV. The source of the power to detain him was therefore in those two conventions

rather than, for example, in any resolution of the Security Council. Section II of Part

III of Convention III and Section IV of Part III of Convention IV contain elaborate

provisions for the proper treatment of prisoners of war and civilian internees

respectively.

124. By 13 votes to four, the Grand Chamber held that, in detaining T, the United

Kingdom had not violated article 5(1) of the Convention. Its central reasoning was

as follows:

(a) There were “important differences of context and purpose between

arrests carried out during peacetime and the arrest of a combatant in the

course of an armed conflict” (para 97).

(b) None of the six exceptions to the right to liberty, prescribed in article

5(1), applied (para 97).

(c) But in Cyprus v Turkey (1976) 4 EHRR 482 the European

Commission of Human Rights had refused to examine the lawfulness of the

detentions of Greek Cypriot forces by Turkey in the area of Cyprus under

Turkish control because the detentions had been effected under Geneva

Convention III, which accorded to the detainees the status of prisoners of war

thereunder (para 99).

(d) The court should interpret article 5(1) of the Convention in the light

of article 31(3) of the Vienna Convention on the law of treaties 1969 (“the

Vienna Convention”), which required it to take into account, at (b), any

subsequent practice in the application of the (European) Convention which

established the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation and, at

(c), any applicable rules of international law (para 100).

(e) The case of Al-Saadoon v United Kingdom (2010) 51 EHRR 9

demonstrated that, in accordance with article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna

Convention, consistent practice of the parties to the (European) Convention

could even establish an agreement to modify its text (para 101). I interpolate

that the central fact there had been that all but five of the member states had

agreed in a protocol that “the death penalty shall be abolished”. Taking it

together with consistent state practice not to impose the death penalty, the

Strasbourg court in the Al-Saadoon case had held, at para 120, that the

protocol indicated that article 2 of the Convention, which had allowed for the

imposition of the death penalty in specified circumstances, had been

“amended” so as to delete that part of it.

(f) The practice of member states, when engaged extra-territorially in

IACs in which they effected detentions under Geneva Conventions III and

IV, had not been to exercise their power of derogation from article 5 under

article 15 of the Convention (para 101).

(g) In accordance with article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention, the

court should interpret article 5 of the Convention in harmony with

international humanitarian law, in particular Geneva Conventions III and IV,

which had been designed to protect both prisoners of war and captured

civilians who posed a threat to security (para 102).

(h) The United Kingdom (which had argued - see para 90 - that it was

more in the interests of a detainee that the detaining power should not

derogate altogether from article 5 but should instead remain subject to a

suitably accommodated interpretation of it) had been correct in saying that

the lack of derogation did not disable the court from interpreting article 5 in

the light of Geneva Conventions III and IV (para 103).

(i) The safeguards in article 5(2) to (4) of the Convention, albeit also to

be interpreted in the light of Geneva Conventions III and IV, should continue

to apply to detentions during an IAC but, in the light of those safeguards and

of those in the Geneva Conventions themselves, the six exceptions to the right

to liberty prescribed in article 5(1) “should be accommodated, as far as

possible” with the taking of prisoners of war and the detention of civilians

under the Geneva Conventions (para 104).

(j) “The court is mindful of the fact that internment in peacetime does not

fall within the scheme of deprivation of liberty governed by article 5 of the

Convention without the exercise of the power of derogation under article 15

… It can only be in cases of international armed conflict, where the taking of

prisoners of war and the detention of civilians who pose a threat to security

are accepted features of international humanitarian law, that article 5 could

be interpreted as permitting the exercise of such broad powers.” (para 104).

(k) But the requirement in article 5(1) that every deprivation of liberty

should be ‘lawful’ continued to apply to these cases, with the result that

detentions had to comply with the provisions of the two Geneva Conventions

(para 105).

(l) Interpretation in the light of the Geneva Conventions of the safeguard

in article 5(4), when applied to detentions during an IAC, required limited,

but only limited, departure from its usual interpretation (para 106).

125. The central issue in these appeals is whether the reasoning of the Grand

Chamber in the Hassan case should be applied so as to justify a conclusion that,

when detaining the two claimants, the United Kingdom did not violate article 5(1)

any more than when it had detained T.

126. The obvious difference is that the detention of T took place in the course of

an IAC whereas the detention of the claimants took place in the course of a non-

international armed conflict (“a NIAC”).

127. In the Hassan case the Grand Chamber laid great stress on Geneva

Conventions III and IV, which, as I have explained, provided both the source of the

power to detain T and the safeguards which were to surround his detention. But these

two Geneva Conventions scarcely relate to a NIAC. They include just one provision

relating to a NIAC, namely article 3, which is common to both of them and which

requires humane treatment of all those taking no active part in the conflict, whether

by reason of detention or otherwise. Additional Protocol II to the Geneva

Conventions, dated 8 June 1977 and expressed to relate to the protection of victims

of NIACs, “develops and supplements” article 3 (Part I, article 1), in particular by

elaborating upon the requirement that they be treated humanely (Part II). But the

legal regulation exerted by the Geneva Conventions, together with Additional

Protocol II, of states participating in a NIAC is negligible in comparison with their

regulation of states participating in an IAC. This is no accident. In his article entitled

“Is There a Way Out of the Non-International Armed Conflict Detention Dilemma?”,

91 Int’l L Stud 32 (2015), Professor Rona identifies at pp 37-38 three reasons why

states have traditionally had no desire to accept international regulation of the

grounds of their detentions, or of the procedures relating to them, during a NIAC.

They have insisted that:

(a) international regulation would be an intrusion into their sovereign

right to address conflict confined to their own territory;

(b) their domestic law, in particular their criminal law, was the proper, and

an entirely adequate, means of addressing it; and

(c) the prospect that international regulation would afford reciprocity of

rights to the other party to the conflict, ie to the insurgents, was unacceptable.

128. On any view the claimants are entitled to place reliance on the references of

the Grand Chamber in the Hassan case to the application in that case of the two

Geneva Conventions and, of course, on the sentence in para 104 of its judgment,

quoted in para 124(j) above, which begins “[i]t can only be in cases of international

armed conflict …”.

129. But one does not have to delve far below the surface of the Grand Chamber’s

judgment in the Hassan case in order to perceive the problems which confront the

claimants in seeking to distinguish it.

130. It was inevitable that in its judgment the Grand Chamber should speak in

terms of an IAC: for T had been detained in the first period of the conflict in Iraq.

The court had no reason to consider detention in the course of a NIAC. Significantly

the essential distinction which it drew, both in para 97 and in para 104, was between

detention during an IAC, on the one hand, and detention during “peacetime” (as

opposed to during a NIAC), on the other.

131. The Grand Chamber relied heavily on the requirement under article 31(3)(c)

of the Vienna Convention that, in interpreting the (European) Convention, it should

take account of any relevant rules of international law. It had not considered this

important principle in the Al-Jedda case when making the assumption which I have

identified in para 117 above. In the Hassan case the relevant authority under

international law for the purposes of article 31(3)(c) was derived from the two

Geneva Conventions. In the present cases, by contrast, it was derived from the

resolutions of the Security Council.

132. There is no reason to afford any less interpretative significance to the

resolutions of the Security Council than to the Geneva Conventions. On the contrary

the resolutions may be said to have carried greater significance. The purposes of the

United Nations, invested with greater world-wide authority than any other body in

seeking to achieve them, are to “maintain international peace and security, and to

that end … to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of

threats to the peace” and to “achieve international co-operation … in promoting and

encouraging respect for human rights”: paras 1 and 3 of article 1 of the UN Charter.

Primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security is

conferred by the UN on the Security Council which, in discharging it, must act in

accordance with those purposes: article 24. Unlike the generalised authorities to

detain during every IAC which are to be found in the two Geneva Conventions, the

authority to detain in the resolutions was specifically devised by the Security

Council to address what it had concluded to be the threat to international peace and

security which were constituted by the situations in Iraq and Afghanistan. But the

authority conferred by the Security Council was appropriately narrow: internment

would be lawful not because it was expedient nor even because it was reasonably

deemed to be necessary but only when it was - actually - necessary for the

maintenance of security.

133. Since about the end of the Second World War an apparently rigid distinction

has emerged between an IAC and a NIAC. But, particularly where there is foreign

intervention in an armed conflict within a state, the distinction is often difficult to

apply in practice: International Law and the Classification of Conflicts ed

Wilmshurst (2012), Chapter III by Professor Akande, p 56. Before concluding that

article 5(1) of the Convention falls to be accommodated to an IAC but not to a NIAC,

we should ask: why not? There is in principle no lesser need for detention in a NIAC

than in an IAC. I can see no reason why, if an authorisation for detention during a

NIAC is valid under international law in that it emanates from the Security Council,

article 5(1) should hobble the authorisation - so long, of course, that safeguards

against arbitrary or unchallengeable detention remain in place.

134. So I agree with the conclusion of the Court of Appeal in Mr Mohammed’s

case, at para 163, that, in the light of the Hassan case, a resolution of the Security

Council which (contrary to that court’s construction of Resolution 1386) did confer

direct authority on a troop-contributing state to effect a detention during a NIAC

would be compatible with article 5 of the Convention, provided that procedural

safeguards in relation to detention and to its review were also compatible with it.

Interpretation of the procedural safeguards provided in paras (2) to (4) of article 5

may also be sufficiently flexible to take account of the context of the detentions,

namely that they took place in the course of armed conflict and pursuant to the

resolutions (see the Hassan case at para 106). But any dilution of those safeguards

should be to the minimum extent necessary to accommodate the demands of that

context; and (if I may gratefully adopt the reasoning in para 146 of the decision in a

different context of the Grand Chamber in Al-Dulimi v Switzerland, Application No

5809/08, 21 June 2016) these resolutions, which contained no explicit wording to

the contrary, cannot justify any interpretation of the safeguards which undermines

their objective that detentions should not be arbitrary.

E: “IN ACCORDANCE WITH … LAW”

135. But it is insufficient to consider only the safeguards, diluted to the minimum

extent necessary, in paras (2) to (4) of article 5. In the context of detention safeguards

are so important that they are subject to a double lock. The extra lock is provided by

the requirement in para 1 that no one shall be deprived of his liberty save “in

accordance with a procedure prescribed by law”. No one suggests that this particular

phrase requires to be accommodated with the circumstances surrounding the

detentions in Iraq and Afghanistan.

136. An interesting question, left open in the courts below but pressed on this court

by Ms Fatima QC on behalf of the first interveners in the appeal relating to Mr

Mohammed, is whether, even if the detentions were to accord with international law,

the phrase would nevertheless also require their accordance with national law. Even

after having studied paras 79 and 80 of its judgment in the Medvedyev case, cited by

Lord Sumption at para 80 above, I regard the Strasbourg court as not yet having

provided clear authority on this question for us to consider. On any view, however,

there is much to be said in favour of Ms Fatima’s submission that accordance with

national law remains necessary. At the centre of the requirement is the need for the

detaining state to be answerable for the detention; and that need is most obviously

met in the domestic law by which the state is bound. The detention is required to

accord with a “procedure” prescribed by law; within the resolutions which in these

appeals represent the relevant international law there is no prescription of procedure.

In its report to the UN Human Rights Council dated 4 May 2015, the Working Group

on Arbitrary Detention suggested, in Guideline 17 at para 115(ii), that a detention in

the course of a NIAC had to be shown to be “on the basis of grounds and procedures

prescribed by law of the State in which the detention occurs and consistent with

international law”. Although the prescription can no doubt be by any law by which

the detaining State is bound, thus including, if it is operating abroad, its own

domestic law, the guideline in my view helps to identify the source of the law with

which article 5 requires accordance.

137. So the next question is: what does this phrase in the opening words of article

5(1) require of domestic law? The answer is complicated first by the use in the

Convention of the word “lawful” in the description of each of the six exceptions to

the right to liberty in (a) to (f) of para 1; and also by the three specific safeguards,

each clearly procedural, which are importantly provided by paras 2, 3 and 4 of the

article. So there is overlap between the various requirements of the article in this

respect. All of them are generally designed to prevent a detention from being

arbitrary: A v United Kingdom (2009) 49 EHRR 29, para 164. Clearly, however, the

precise territory of the phrase in the opening words of para 1 is procedure. In

Winterwerp v The Netherlands (1979) 2 EHRR 387, the Strasbourg court stated at

para 45:

“The notion underlying the term in question is one of fair and

proper procedure, namely that any measure depriving a person

of his liberty should issue from and be executed by an

appropriate authority and should not be arbitrary.”

This statement has stood the test of time; and in my view the only helpful elaboration

of it has been the suggestion that the phrase relates to the quality of the law rather

than the content of it. As the Grand Chamber observed in Mooren v Germany (2009)

50 EHRR 23, para 76, it requires the relevant domestic law to be compatible with

the rule of law. The court added:

“‘Quality of the law’ in this sense implies that where a national

law authorises deprivation of liberty it must be sufficiently

accessible, precise and foreseeable in its application, in order

to avoid all risk of arbitrariness.”

In para 80 of the Medvedyev case, cited above, these requirements were described

as falling within “the general principle of legal certainty”.

138. In the case of Iraq Mr Powell referred in his letter annexed to Resolution 1546

to the obligations of the multinational force under the Geneva Conventions. Why

did he do so in circumstances in which, apart from those in common article 3, the

obligations would not in terms relate to the NIAC which was shortly to begin? The

answer is to be found in sections 1 and 6 of the revised Memorandum No 3, which

was promulgated - lawfully, so I will assume - on 27 June 2004 by the administrator

of the Coalition Provisional Authority. The memorandum was given continuing

effect under Iraqi law after 28 June 2004, when the conflict became a NIAC, by

article 26(C) of the Transitional Administrative Law which had been promulgated

in March 2004 by the Iraqi Governing Council: see the Al-Saadoon case at para 22,

cited at para 124(e) above. Under those sections the multinational force was to apply

the relevant standards of Geneva Convention IV as a matter of policy during the

forthcoming NIAC and specific provisions were made for regular reviews of

internment. Procedural safeguards under Iraqi law, binding on the United Kingdom

when operating there, were thereby put in place; and in my view it follows that Mr

Al-Waheed’s detention was “in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law”. In

para 38 of its judgment in the Al-Jedda case the Grand Chamber, which had set out

the memorandum in para 36, referred to the Iraqi Constitution adopted in 2006; and

it seemed to suggest that (or at least to question whether) articles 15 and 37 of the

constitution thereafter rendered Mr Al-Jedda’s detention unlawful even under Iraqi

law. Unfortunately, however, the Grand Chamber’s attention was not drawn to

article 46 of the constitution, which allows other Iraqi laws, such as the

memorandum, to limit constitutional rights in certain circumstances. In its

consideration of a second claim made by Mr Al-Jedda, namely Al-Jedda v Secretary

of State for Defence [2010] EWCA Civ 758, [2011] QB 773, the Court of Appeal

concluded that article 46 did indeed limit Mr Al-Jedda’s constitutional rights, with

the result that his detention remained lawful under Iraqi law even after 2006. It

would be extraordinary that, by a side-wind generated by a conventional

constitutional provision intended to protect civilians against arbitrary detention

during peacetime, detentions in Iraq effected by the multinational force during the

final years of the armed conflict suddenly became unlawful under Iraqi law.

139. In the case of Afghanistan, the requisite obligation upon the United Kingdom

under article 5(1) to effect internment there only if in conformity with the rules of

national law as well as to keep within the boundaries of its authorisation under

international law arose even more directly. For the Ministry’s policy in that respect

was set out in instruction SOI J3-9; and United Kingdom law will in principle

require it to have implemented its policy. The conclusion of Leggatt J that the terms

of the instruction satisfied the requirement of legal certainty in the opening words

of article 5(1) does not appear to have been challenged in the Court of Appeal and

is not in issue before this court.

F: CONCLUSION

140. I conclude that the effect of the resolutions of the Security Council was to

modify the United Kingdom’s obligations to the claimants under para 1 of article 5

of the Convention with the result (a) that its detention of Mr Al-Waheed was not in

breach of it and (b) that, to the extent that Mr Mohammed was detained for

imperative reasons of security, its detention of him was not in breach of it.

141. The invitation of the claimants to this court has been that it should depart

from the decision of the House of Lords in the Al-Jedda case pursuant to Practice

Statement (Judicial Precedent) [1966] 1 WLR 1234. Any departure pursuant to the

statement must be from the “previous decision” itself rather than from any of the

reasoning which led to it. Like that of Mr Al-Waheed, the detention of Mr Al-Jedda

by United Kingdom forces took place during the third and final period in which they

operated in Iraq; and Resolution 1546 and its successors applied to it. It can now be

seen that the effect of the resolutions was to modify Mr Al-Jedda’s right under article

5(1) of the Convention, with the result that, by detaining him, the United Kingdom

did not violate it. So, by a jurisprudential route different from that which it took, the

decision of the House to that effect can now be seen to have been correct. Far more

debateable is whether, in light of the points later to be made by the Grand Chamber,

the reasoning of the House was correct.

142. For reasons which one can well understand but which in retrospect have

proved unfortunate, the drafters of the Convention chose to identify six cases as

being the only cases in which it would be lawful for a member state to deprive a

person of liberty. Compare the exhaustive precision of article 5(1) with, for example,

article 9(1) of the UN’s International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966,

which, although otherwise closely modelled on article 5, provides that “[n]o one

shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds … as are established by law”.

There is nothing to indicate that the drafters of the Convention contemplated that its

jurisdiction under article 1 would extend to the operations of member states in the

course of armed conflict beyond their territories. Once, however, the Strasbourg

court had construed the jurisdiction of the Convention as extending that far, it

became essential, as indeed was swiftly recognised in the Al-Skeini case, that

Convention rights should be so divided and tailored as to make the extension

workable. Otherwise member states would be driven, insofar as they were able to

do so, to derogate under article 15 from their obligations under the Convention -

which would leave the human rights of those caught up in the conflict far less

protected. The exercise of tailoring article 5 was duly conducted by the Grand

Chamber in the Hassan case; and today, by a majority, the court takes forward the

exercise which it charted.

143. In my view it is no part of the function of this court to speculate upon the

approach of another court, not even of the Grand Chamber of the Strasbourg court,

to the issue presently raised before it. We cannot foretell the determination in the

Grand Chamber of any claim which might now be brought by the claimants, and by

the hundreds of other claimants in our courts in a position analogous to them, of a

violation by the United Kingdom of article 5(1) of the Convention. No doubt there

would again be dissentient voices, concerned, in a way understandably, about a

perceived dilution of Convention rights. But a vastly more important factor would

be in play. For all of us judges, both in Strasbourg and in the United Kingdom, who

believe - many of us, passionately - in the value of the Convention in having raised

the standards of a state’s treatment of its people across the Council of Europe, its

very credibility is at stake in determination of the present issues. Could it be that, by

reason of article 5(1), such state contributors to the multinational forces in Iraq and

Afghanistan as happened also to be members of the Council of Europe would be

legally disabled from effecting internments in Iraq after 28 June 2004, and from

effecting internments in Afghanistan beyond 96 hours, even where necessary for the

maintenance of security and even pursuant to UN resolutions which, having

surveyed the nature of the conflict there, expressly sanctioned internment in such

circumstances? Could it be that those contributors to the multinational force would

be disabled from acting pursuant to the UN resolutions although fellow-contributors

which happened not to be members of the Council of Europe would not be so

disabled? Such conclusions would bring the Convention into widespread

international disrepute and it is, frankly, a relief for me to have found myself

persuaded that they can properly be avoided.

144. By contrast there was a clear breach of Mr Mohammed’s rights under para 4

of article 5 of the Convention, irrespective of the extent to which the paragraph falls

to be accommodated with the exigencies of an armed conflict; and in that regard the

only remaining question for the trial judge should, in my view, be whether the breach

caused Mr Mohammed to suffer loss. For the reasons given by Lord Sumption at

paras 105 and 106 above, the violation of the paragraph was in each of two respects:

first, the structural system for the reviews of Mr Mohammed’s detention meant that

they were not sufficiently independent of those within the United Kingdom force

who sought its continuation; and second, he was afforded no opportunity to

contribute to them. Lord Mance argues strongly, at para 216 below, that the evidence

so far filed by the Ministry about the structural system for the reviews might, if

supplemented, displace a positive finding against it in the first respect; but in my

view the opportunity already given to the Ministry to file the relevant evidence has

been fair and there is no justification for granting to it any extra indulgence.

LORD MANCE:

Introduction

145. The present appeals concern claims for damages by two individuals in respect

of their allegedly wrongful detention by British forces in respectively Iraq and

Afghanistan. I have had the benefit of reading in draft three of the other judgments

which have been prepared, by respectively Lord Sumption, Lord Wilson and Lord

Reed.

146. A central issue of principle on these appeals is whether the United Kingdom,

in the course of assisting the recognised governments of Iraq and Afghanistan to

combat non-international armed insurgencies, had under international law power to

detain suspected terrorists or insurgents when necessary for imperative reasons of

security, or whether any power to detain must be found within the express terms of

article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The United Kingdom

advances two bases on which it submits that it possessed such power; one is

customary international law applicable to a non-international armed conflict (a

“NIAC”) read with the Geneva Conventions and their additional Protocols; the other

is the relevant Security Council Resolutions (“SCRs”) endorsing the authority of the

United Kingdom to act as part of the multinational force in Iraq and as part, or indeed

leader, of the International Security Assistance Force (“ISAF”), in Afghanistan at

the relevant times.

Customary international law

147. Lord Reed concludes positively that customary international law and the

Geneva Conventions and their Protocols do not confer any such authority to detain

on states (para 263). Lord Sumption is inclined to agree with Lord Reed on this, but

regards it as unnecessary to decide (para 14). His more nuanced thinking is that,

while there is in principle consensus about a right to detain, there is a lack of

consensus about its limits and conditions and the extent to which special provision

should be made for non-state actors, but that practice is converging and it is likely

that this will ultimately be reflected in opinio juris (para 16).

148. My position is closer on this issue to Lord Sumption’s than to Lord Reed’s.

Like Lord Sumption I also regard it as one which is in the event unnecessary to

decide. But I add one observation. The role of domestic courts in developing (or in

Lord Sumption’s case even establishing) a rule of customary international law

should not be undervalued. This subject was not the object of detailed examination

before us, and would merit this in any future case where the point was significant.

But the intermeshing of domestic and international law issues and law has been

increasingly evident in recent years. Just as States answer for domestic courts in

international law, so it is possible to regard at least some domestic court decisions

as elements of the practice of States, or as ways through which States may express

their opinio juris regarding the rules of international law. The underlying thinking is

that domestic courts have a certain competence and role in identifying, developing

and expressing principles of customary international law.

149. The potential relevance of domestic court decisions as a source of

international law was recognised and discussed as long ago as 1929 by H

Lauterpacht, then an assistant lecturer at the London School of Economics, in his

article Decisions of Municipal Courts as a Source of International Law 10 British

Yearbook on International Law (1929) 65-95. This drew on insights derived from

Lauterpacht’s joint editorship with his former LSE doctorate supervisor, the then

Arnold McNair, of the Annual Digest and Reports of Public International Law Cases

(now the International Law Reports) series also launched in 1929: see The Judiciary,

National and International, and the Development of International Law by Sir Robert

Jennings QC in vol 102 of the series (1996). There is a further extensive

bibliography on the subject annexed at pp 18-19 of the Fourth report on

identification of customary international law dated 25 May 2016 submitted by Sir

Michael Wood QC as rapporteur to the International Law Commission (“ILC”).

Most recently, in the chapter The Interfaces between the National and International

Rule of Law: a Framework Paper in The Rule of Law at the National and

International Levels (Hart Publishing, 2016) the “classic answer” given by Machiko

Kanetake (at p 27) is that “under international law, national rule of law practices are,

after all, part of state practices, which contribute to the creation of new customary

international law”, that they “may also form part of the general principles of

international law”, and “may also qualify as opinio juris”.

150. Sir Michael Wood, as rapporteur to the ILC, recognised in his Second Report

dated 22 May 2014 para 58 the potential significance in international law of

domestic jurisprudence not only as state practice, but also, with caution, as a means

for the determination of rules of customary international law: see also his Third

Report dated 27 March 2015 paras 41(e) and 76(b).

151. Yet more significantly, the current draft Annual Report of the International

Law Commission to the UN General Assembly for 2015, following upon Sir

Michael Wood’s Reports, contains the following draft Conclusion 13 (subject to

finalisation in 2018):

“Decisions of courts and tribunals

1. Decisions of international courts and tribunals, in

particular of the International Court of Justice, concerning the

existence and content of rules of customary international law

are a subsidiary means for the determination of such rules.

2. Regard may be had, as appropriate, to decisions of

national courts concerning the existence and content of rules of

customary international law, as a subsidiary means for the

determination of such rules.”

Security Council Resolutions (“SCRs”)

(a) Iraq

152. The relevant SCR for Iraq was 1723 (2006), whereby the Security Council,

“recognizing the tasks and arrangements set out in letters annexed to resolution 1546

(2004) and the cooperative implementation by the Government of Iraq and the

multinational force of those arrangements”, reaffirmed “the authorisation for the

multinational force as set forth in resolution 1546 (2004)” and decided “to extend

the mandate of the multinational force as set forth in that resolution until 31

December 2007”, taking into consideration the Iraqi Prime Minister’s letter dated

11 November 2006, which had in turn requested such extension “in accordance with

the Security Council Resolutions 1546 (2004) and 1637 (2005) and the letters

attached thereto” until 31 December 2007. SCR 1546 (2004) itself reaffirming the

authorisation conferred by earlier resolutions, conferred

“the authority to take all necessary measures to contribute to

the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq in accordance

with the letters annexed to this resolution ...”

The resolution went on to state that the letters set out the tasks of the multinational

force, including “preventing and deterring terrorism”. The letters included a letter

of 5 June 2004 from the US Secretary of State, expressing the United States’

willingness to deploy forces to maintain internal security in Iraq and to undertake

activities which would, the letter said:

“include activities necessary to counter ongoing security

threats posed by forces seeking to influence Iraq’s political

future through violence. This will include combat operations

against members of these groups, internment where this is

necessary for imperative reasons of security …”

153. SCR 1546 (2004) is thus on its face clear. It gave authority to take all

necessary measures, which, it was expressly stated, would include “internment

where this is necessary for imperative reasons of security”. In Al-Jedda v United

Kingdom (2011) 53 EHRR 23, the European Court of Human Rights addressed the

relevant letter (which it had earlier summarised in para 34), by concluding that it did

not impose an obligation or requirement to detain (para 108). On that basis, it further

concluded that the letter could not override the United Kingdom’s duties under

article 5 of the Convention. But it did not suggest that the SCR, read with the letter,

did not contain power to detain.

154. The European Court of Human Rights in Al-Jedda was only concerned with

arguments based under article 103 on competing obligations: see paras 101-110.

Once it had concluded that there were no competing obligations, that was the end of

those arguments. The relationship between a power to detain conferred by

international law in circumstances of armed conflict and article 5 of the European

Convention on Human Rights was not squarely addressed until Hassan v United

Kingdom (2014) 38 BHRC 358. There it was addressed in the context of an

international armed conflict (“IAC”). The Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions

expressly recognise certain powers (though not obligations) to detain prisoners of

war and civilians who pose a risk to security. The European Court of Human Rights

held that the scheme provided by article 5 had to be read in the light of, and modified

to reflect, the power to detain on security grounds, subject to the condition that such

detention was not arbitrary, but was accompanied by a review process which was

independent, even if it was not by a court.

155. The European Court of Human Rights acknowledged at the outset that the

arguments raised in Hassan were novel. As it said (para 99):

“99. This is the first case in which a respondent state has

requested the court to disapply its obligations under article 5 or

in some other way to interpret them in the light of powers of

detention available to it under international humanitarian law.

In particular, in Al-Jedda v United Kingdom (2011) 30 BHRC

637, the United Kingdom government did not contend that

article 5 was modified or displaced by the powers of detention

provided for by the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions.

Instead they argued that the United Kingdom was under an

obligation to the United Nations Security Council to place the

applicant in internment and that, because of article 103 of the

United Nations Charter, this obligation had to take primacy

over the United Kingdom’s obligations under the convention.

It was the government’s case that an obligation to intern the

applicant arose from the text of United Nations Security

Council Resolution 1546 and annexed letters and also because

the resolution had the effect of maintaining the obligations

placed on occupying powers under international humanitarian

law, in particular article 43 of the Hague Regulations (see Al-

Jedda v United Kingdom (2011) 30 BHRC 637 at para 107).

The court found that no such obligation arose.”

156. In this passage, the European Court of Human Rights was recognising,

realistically, that it had before it arguments that had not been, though they might

have been, raised for its consideration in Al-Jedda. (This is so, even though its

reference to “powers of detention provided for by the Third and Fourth Geneva

Conventions” may quite possibly be open to question, in the light of paras 115-116

of this judgment.) To treat the fact that the United Kingdom did not in Al-Jedda

present any argument about the relationship between a power to detain conferred by

international law and the provisions of article 5 of the Convention as fatal to any

such argument now appears to me unreal. The United Kingdom has now changed

its stance, and the previous stance of one individual state cannot in context anyway

be significant. As to the European Court of Human Rights, in a case law system, like

that which the European Court of Human Rights operates under the Convention,

courts proceed from case to case, sometimes having to reconsider or modify past

jurisprudence (moreover, in Strasbourg without applying any strict doctrine of

precedent). Above all, it is necessary to bear in mind the very considerable difficulty

of the issues which arise, since the European Court of Human Rights’ judgment in

Al-Skeini v United Kingdom (2011) 53 EHRR 18, in applying the Convention to

circumstances and territories outside any which are likely to have been in

Contracting States’ mind when they agreed to secure the Convention rights and

freedoms to “everyone within their jurisdiction” (Convention, article 1). Finally, if

Hassan had been decided before Al-Jedda, it is quite obvious that the submissions

and the reasoning in the judgment in Al-Jedda would have been very different.

157. Hassan itself concerned a situation of IAC, where the Geneva Conventions

confer express powers to detain. This was, not surprisingly, underlined by the

European Court of Human Rights as a reason for concluding that the terms of article

5 could not be applied, and that they should be modified so as to recognise a further

and different power to detain, based on the Conventions concurrently. Thus, the

court said in para 104:

“104. None the less, and consistently with the case law of the

International Court of Justice, the Court considers that, even in

situations of international armed conflict, the safeguards under

the Convention continue to apply, albeit interpreted against the

background of the provisions of international humanitarian

law. By reason of the co-existence of the safeguards provided

by international humanitarian law and by the Convention in

time of armed conflict, the grounds of permitted deprivation of

liberty set out in subparagraphs (a) to (f) of that provision

should be accommodated, as far as possible, with the taking of

prisoners of war and the detention of civilians who pose a risk

to security under the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions.

The court is mindful of the fact that internment in peacetime

does not fall within the scheme of deprivation of liberty

governed by article 5 of the Convention without the exercise of

the power of derogation under article 15 (see para 97 above). It

can only be in cases of international armed conflict, where the

taking of prisoners of war and the detention of civilians who

pose a threat to security are accepted features of international

humanitarian law, that article 5 could be interpreted as

permitting the exercise of such broad powers.”

158. Again, it would be unrealistic to treat this (and in particular the word “only”

in the last sentence) as either addressing or as decisive of the issue now before the

courts, where there is on the face of SCR 1546 an unqualified power to detain where

necessary for imperative reasons of security. There is no logical and substantial

reason why article 5 should not adapt to a power to detain contained in a SCR

directed to a NIAC, just as it does to a power to detain conferred by customary

international law and/or the Geneva Conventions in the context of an IAC. The

reasons why there may as yet be no recognised customary international law power

to detain in a NIAC are closely associated with member states’ wish to avoid

recognising or giving reciprocal rights to insurgent groups. These are precisely the

reasons why a host state may request, and the Security Council may under Chapter

VII of the UN Charter confer, a unilateral power to detain to a friendly third state

helping the host state to resist the insurgency.

159. The principal basis on which Lord Reed would refuse to recognise the

existence of any such power consists in the reasoning in Al-Jedda, as followed in

Nada v Switzerland (2012) 56 EHRR 18 and Al-Dulimi and Montana Management

Inc v Switzerland (Application No 5809/08) (unreported) (judgment given 21 June

2016). In the latter two cases, the European Court of Human Rights identified the

need for “clear and specific language” if SCRs were to be read as intending states to

take measures that would conflict with their obligations under international human

rights law: see in particular Al-Dulimi, para 140. That was said in the context of the

fundamental right of a person made the subject of a sanctions order to know and

have the right to address the case against him or her.

160. In the present case, not only is SCR 1546 clear on its face in authorising

detention, but there is nothing in general international human rights law precluding

such a measure. Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights is alone in

seeking to define and limit grounds of permissible detention. International human

rights law generally is reflected by the International Covenant on Civil and Political

Rights (“ICCPR”). Article 9 of the ICCPR provides a general limitation, by

reference to a test of arbitrariness, no more. It reads, so far as relevant:

“1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person.

No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No

one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and

in accordance with such procedure as are established by law.

2. Anyone who is arrested shall be informed, at the time of

arrest, of the reasons for his arrest and shall be promptly

informed of any charges against him.”

161. The argument that one must start with the express terms of article 5 of the

Convention, and read SCR 1546 consistently therewith is not in my opinion

sustainable. SCR 1546 was not directed to states party to the Convention, but to all

member states of the United Nations and to the multinational force established to

operate in Iraq. It is perfectly tenable to treat a SCR as intended impliedly (in the

absence of clear and specific language to the contrary) to comply with general

principles of international law, as the European Court of Human Rights indicated in

Nada and Al-Dulimi. But article 5 of the European Convention does not reflect

general international law, and it is circular to construe SCR 1546 in the light of an

assumption that it cannot have been intended to detract or differ from article 5. The

starting point is not what article 5 says. The starting point is to identify what SCR

1546 says about the power to detain in a NIAC, just as the starting point in Hassan

was to see what customary international law and the Geneva Conventions say about

the power to detain in an IAC.

162. As the European Court of Human Rights said in Hassan (paras 77 and 102)

that it had observed on many occasions, the Convention cannot be interpreted in a

vacuum and should so far as possible be interpreted in harmony with other rules of

international law of which it forms part. The fundamental significance in

international law of SCRs under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter needs

little underlining. It has been recorded by Lord Sumption in his judgment (para 23),

and was clearly expressed by the European Court of Human Rights in Behrami v

France; Saramati v France, Germany and Norway [2007] 45 EHRR SE10, para 149,

when the Court said that the contribution by NATO states of troops to the KFOR

security mission in Kosovo “may not have amounted to obligations flowing from

membership of the UN but they remained crucial to the effective fulfilment by the

UNSC of its Chapter VII mandate and, consequently, by the UN of its imperative

peace and security aim”.

163. To treat SCR 1546 as contemplating that member states, participating in the

peace-keeping operations in Iraq and exercising the power to detain afforded by its

terms, would satisfy their European Convention obligations by derogating from the

Convention appears to me unreal. Putting the same point the other way round, I see

no basis for treating member states party to the Convention when exercising such

power to detain as being in breach of article 5 unless they derogated from the

Convention. First, it seems clear that article 15 of the Convention, which authorises

derogation “in time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the

nation” was itself not conceived with this this type of situation expressly in mind.

Second, if it be said that the expanded concept of “jurisdiction” now recognised in

European Court of Human Rights jurisprudence under article 1 should lead to some

implied modified understanding of the scope of potential derogation under article

15, that is both highly speculative, and a possibility which any contracting state can

well be forgiven for missing. Third, not surprisingly, there is just as little indication

that any state has ever purported to derogate under article 15 in respect of

involvement in a NIAC as there is in respect of involvement in an IAC (see Hassan).

Fourth, it would be splitting hairs to treat the reasoning and decision in Hassan as

turning essentially on state practice not to derogate under article 15 in the course of

an IAC.

164. In the light of the above, I conclude that SCR 1546, properly construed in the

light of its terms and the circumstances to which it was directed, provided for a

power to detain in a NIAC for imperative reasons of security. On the assumption

(which the government does not now challenge on this appeal) that the matters in

question fell within the United Kingdom’s jurisdiction under article 1 of the

Convention, and provided that sufficient procedural safeguards exist (see the next

two paragraphs), I also conclude that article 5 of the Convention should be

interpreted in a way which gives effect to and enables the exercise of this power.

This can be done, as it was in Hassan, by recognising that the fundamental purpose

of article 5(1) is to protect the individual from arbitrariness in accordance with the

basic international law principle stated in ICCPR, article 9 (para 160 above). On that

basis, the more detailed express terms of article 5(1) may be seen as illustrations of,

rather than limitations on, the exercise of the power to detain. This in turn allows

scope for or accommodates the operation of wider powers to detain in situations of

armed conflict, where provided by general international law or by a specific SCR

under Chapter VII. It follows that I concur in principle with all that is said by Lord

Sumption in para 18 to 30 and 40 to 68 and by Lord Wilson in paras 114 to 117 and

121 to 134 of their respective judgments.

165. On that basis, the only point requiring further attention is whether a power to

detain “where this is necessary for imperative reasons of security”, as provided in

Iraq by SCR 1546, is too unspecific, or too lacking in procedural safeguards, to be

recognised either generally or in conjunction with and in addition to the express

terms of article 5. As already stated (para 160), the general principle of international

law is that “No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention”. The relevant

ICCPR article 9(1) goes on to provide that: “No one shall be deprived of his liberty

except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure as are established by

law”. The requirement for grounds to be established is met by a power to detain

where necessary for imperative reasons of security.

166. The requirement for a procedure established by law was met in Hassan by

the terms of the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions. The Third Convention

provides for the internment of prisoners of war (articles 4(A) and 21), for any doubt

about their status to be determined by a competent tribunal (article 5) and for their

release and repatriation without delay after the cessation of active hostilities (article

118). The Fourth Convention provides for the detention of individuals “definitely

suspected of or engaged in activities hostile to the security of the state” (Fourth

Convention, article 5), for any such action to be reconsidered as soon as possible by

an appropriate court or administrative board, and, if maintained, to be reviewed

periodically and at least twice yearly (article 43). The United Kingdom had reason

to believe that Mr Hassan fell within these categories, and released him as soon as

screening showed that he was a civilian who did not pose a threat to security:

Hassan, para 109.

167. In agreement with Lord Sumption (paras 67-68), I would not read Hassan as

requiring the procedure needed to avoid arbitrariness to be specified in the

convention or other treaty or the relevant SCR authorising detention. The procedure

falls to be established by or on behalf of the detaining state, and it must at least

comply in a NIAC both with the minimum standard of review required in an IAC

under article 43 of the Fourth Geneva Convention and accepted as appropriate in

that context in Hassan and, subject to such alterations as are necessary to meet the

exigencies of armed conflict, with the procedural requirements of article 5: see per

Lord Sumption, paras 91 et seq.

(b) Afghanistan

168. The relevant SCR in respect of Afghanistan at the time of the detention of Mr

Serdar Mohammed (“SM”) was 1386 (2001), the operation of which was

subsequently extended, lastly by SCR 1890 (2009). Lord Sumption has stated the

terms of these SCRs in his paras 21-22. SCR 1386 authorised the establishment of

“an International Security Assistance Force” (“ISAF”) to assist in the maintenance

of security in Kabul and surrounding areas, working in close cooperation with the

Afghan Interim Authority, and it “authorised member states participating in [ISAF]

to take all necessary measures to fulfil its mandate”. This last critical phrase of

article 3 of SCR 1386 falls to be read in the context of the extreme circumstances of

violence (including improvised explosive device, IED, and suicide attacks targeting

civilians as well as Afghan and international forces and use of civilians as human

shields), terrorism, illegally armed groups, increasingly strong links between

terrorism activities and illegal drugs, recounted in recitals to resolution 1890. For

the reasons coinciding with those given by Lord Sumption in paras 28 and 30 and

by Lord Wilson in paras 118 and 119, I consider that the critical phrase in article 3

of SCR 1386 in principle contemplated and authorised detention where necessary to

fulfil the mandate, in short detention for imperative reasons of security. Again,

appropriate procedural safeguards must be established, meeting the standards

identified in para 160 and 165 to 167 above.

Afghanistan - do the SCRs give powers to ISAF alone or to both ISAF and its

member states?

169. This further question arises because of SM’s case that any permissible

detention was governed by the detention policy guidelines adopted by ISAF, which

basically restricted detention (before transfer to the custody of Afghan authorities)

to 96 hours with only limited exceptions. I understand Lord Reed to conclude that it

was, for reasons set out in his paras 322-334 and 343-346. The context in which this

question arises can be summarised as follows. Leggatt J considered that the position

of ISAF in Afghanistan broadly mirrored that of KFOR in Kosovo, as examined by

the European Court of Human Rights in Behrami. But he went on to reject the United

Kingdom’s submission that the detention of SM was in reality undertaken by or on

behalf of ISAF and so the United Nations, to which SM must in consequence address

any claim. He rejected it, because the United Kingdom had at least in November

2009, pursuant to responsibilities which it saw as resting on itself under national and

international law, established its own extended detention policy, claiming to enable

it to detain for periods longer than 96 hours. It had not, in this respect, acted on

behalf of or under any authority conferred, at least originally, on ISAF. ISAF

originally complained about this, but Leggatt J inferred that “ISAF headquarters did

subsequently accept the UK position as detention decisions continued to be taken by

United Kingdom officials without involving ISAF and there is no evidence of any

further complaints”. But that did not mean that the United Kingdom was acting as

part of or on behalf of ISAF. See generally per Leggatt J, paras 180-184, and see

further paras 181-190 below. On that basis Leggatt J held the United Kingdom

responsible for the detention of SM. The United Kingdom thus failed below on the

basis that the relevant SCRs gave power only to ISAF to detain, and not to individual

member states participating in security operations in Afghanistan: see the Court of

Appeal’s judgment, paras 155-156.

170. Lord Sumption (para 38) and Lord Wilson (para 120) consider that the correct

analysis is that the relevant SCRs conferred power to act on the individual

participating member states, and that there is no basis for limiting this power (as

between the United Kingdom and SM) by reference either to ISAF’s detention

policy or to any agreement between the United Kingdom and the Afghan authorities,

such as that dated 23 April 2006, by clause 3.1 whereof it was agreed that the “The

United Kingdom AF will only arrest and detain personnel where permitted under

ISAF Rules of Engagement”. In these circumstances, Lord Sumption concludes that

the United Kingdom was entitled to operate its own detention policy vis-à-vis SM,

provided of course that this complied as a minimum with the procedural standards

required under international law to avoid arbitrariness.

171. The difference on this point between Lord Reed on the one hand and Lord

Sumption and Lord Wilson on the other turns on the construction of the relevant

SCRs. It is correct that article 3 of SCR 1386 authorised “the member states

participating in the International Security Assistance Force to take all necessary

measures to fulfil its mandate”. This followed recitals which inter alia recorded a

request in the Bonn Agreement to the Security Council to consider authorising “the

early deployment to Afghanistan of an international security force” and welcomed

a letter from the United Kingdom government and took note of the United

Kingdom’s offer contained therein “to take the lead in organising and commanding

an International Security Assistance Force”.

172. In the light of these recitals, articles 1 and 2 of SCR 1386 went on to authorise

“as envisaged in Annex 1 to the Bonn Agreement, the establishment for six months

of an International Security Assistance Force to assist the Afghan Interim Authority

in the maintenance of security in Kabul and its surrounding areas, so that the Afghan

Interim Authority as well as the personnel of the United Nations can operate in a

secure environment” and, second, to call “upon member states to contribute

personnel, equipment and other resources to the International Security Assistance

Force”. Article 3 was, further, followed by articles 4 and 5, respectively calling

“upon the International Security Assistance Force to work in close consultation with

the Afghan Interim Authority in the implementation of the force mandate, as well

as with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General” and calling “upon all

Afghans to cooperate with the International Security Assistance Force and relevant

international governmental and non-governmental organizations, and welcom[ing]

the commitment of the parties to the Bonn Agreement to do all within their means

and influence to ensure security …”.

173. The Bonn Agreement itself contained recitals “reaffirming the independence,

national sovereignty and territorial integrity of Afghanistan”, “recognizing that

some time may be required for a new Afghan security force to be fully constituted

and functional and that therefore other security provisions detailed in Annex I to this

agreement must meanwhile be put in place” and “considering that the United

Nations, as the internationally recognized impartial institution, has a particularly

important role to play, detailed in Annex II to this agreement, in the period prior to

the establishment of permanent institutions in Afghanistan”.

174. Consistently with the references contained in SCR 1386, Annex I to the Bonn

Agreement provided:

“3. Conscious that some time may be required for the new

Afghan security and armed forces to be fully constituted and

functioning, the participants in the UN Talks on Afghanistan

request the United Nations Security Council to consider

authorizing the early deployment to Afghanistan of a United

Nations mandated force. This force will assist in the

maintenance of security for Kabul and its surrounding areas.

Such a force could, as appropriate, be progressively expanded

to other urban centres and other areas.

4. The participants in the UN Talks on Afghanistan pledge

to withdraw all military units from Kabul and other urban

centres or other areas in which the UN mandated force is

deployed. It would also be desirable if such a force were to

assist in the rehabilitation of Afghanistan’s infrastructure.”

Annex II to the Bonn Agreement included the provision that:

“1. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General

will be responsible for all aspects of the United Nations’ work

in Afghanistan.”

The Bonn Agreement therefore envisaged a UN mandated force (ISAF) under UN

control to assist the Afghan Interim Authority. It does not support the idea of

individual contributing nations operating on their own authority or terms to support

the UN’s role or give effect to its aims.

175. SCR 1510 (2003) authorised “expansion of the mandate of [ISAF] to allow

it, as resources permit, to support the Afghan Transitional Authority and its

successors in the maintenance of security in areas of Afghanistan outside of Kabul

and its environs” (article 1). It called upon ISAF to continue to work in close

consultation with the Afghan Transitional Authority and its successors and the

Special Representative of the Secretary-General as well as with the Operation

Enduring Freedom Coalition in the implementation of the force mandate, and to

report to the Security Council on the implementation of the measures set out in

article 1 (article 2). It decided also “to extend the authorization of ISAF, as defined

in resolution 1386 (2001) and this resolution, for a period of 12 months (article 3),

and it authorised “the member states participating in [ISAF] to take all necessary

measures to fulfil its mandate (article 4) and requested “the leadership of [ISAF] to

provide quarterly reports on the implementation of its mandate to the Security

Council through the Secretary-General”.

176. SCR 1890 (2009) decided “to extend the authorization of [ISAF], as defined

in resolution 1386 (2001) and 1510 (2003), for a period of 12 months beyond 13

October 2009 (article 1). It authorised “the member states participating in ISAF to

take all necessary measures to fulfil its mandate” (article 2). It recognised “the need

to further strengthen ISAF to meet all its operational requirements, and in this regard

calls upon member states to contribute personnel, equipment and other resources to

ISAF” (article 3), and stressed “the importance of increasing, in a comprehensive

framework, the functionality, professionalism and accountability of the Afghan

security sector, encourage[ing] ISAF and other partners to sustain their efforts, as

resources permit, to train, mentor and empower the Afghan national security forces

…” (article 4). It further called “upon ISAF to continue to work in close consultation

with the Afghan Government and the Special Representative of the Secretary-

General as well as with the OEF coalition in the implementation of the force

mandate (article 5), and requested “the leadership of ISAF to keep the Security

Council regularly informed, through the Secretary-General, on the implementation

of its mandate, including through the provision of quarterly reports” (article 6).

177. Under these SCRs, member states were, necessarily, to provide the personnel

and resources which ISAF needed, and were thus authorised to participate in ISAF

and take all necessary measures to fulfil its mandate. But the SCRs are replete with

references to ISAF acting and being authorised to act, to ISAF having or being given

resources and to ISAF reporting to the Secretary General.

178. SCRs also need to be read in light of the principle of proportionality: see

Simma et al, The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary (2012), who

continue:

“This will typically lead to a restrictive reading: resolutions

should be understood to embody less restrictive measures -

generally favoured on proportionality grounds - unless the SC

has clearly used its discretion to decide otherwise. Thus, in

cases of deliberate ambiguity, especially as regards delegations

of powers and authorizations to use force, a narrow

interpretation is appropriate.”

179. Against a narrow view, Lord Sumption notes the exceptional and escalating

levels and threats of violence faced by UK forces. That these were particularly

serious in Helmand Province where UK troops were located is a fact. On the other

hand, the wording of the mandate conferred by the SCRs goes back to the outset of

UN involvement, when these levels and threats were not necessarily apparent.

180. Viewing the SCRs overall, I am unable to read them as authorising member

states to act otherwise than as participants in or in collaboration with ISAF. The

alternative construction, which Lord Sumption and Lord Wilson adopt, amounts to

saying that member states received their own authorisation entitling them each to

act quite independently of ISAF and each other. This appears to me ultimately a

recipe for confusion and unlikely to have been intended by the Security Council.

That is not however the end of the matter as regards the United Kingdom’s authority

to operate its own detention policy.

ISAF’s and the United Kingdom’s policies regarding detention

181. The position is summarised in Lord Sumption’s judgment in paras 31 to 37.

ISAF policy under its Standard Operating Procedures SOP 362 allowed up to 96

hours for release or handing over into the custody of Afghan authorities, subject in

para 8 to authority, vested in the ISAF commander in the following terms:

“The authority to continue to detain an individual beyond the

96-hour point is vested in COMISAF (or his delegated

subordinate). A detainee may be held for more than 96 hours

where it is deemed necessary in order to effect his release or

transfer in safe circumstances. This exception is not authority

for longer-term detentions but is intended to meet

exigencies·such as that caused by local logistical conditions eg

difficulties involving poor communications, transport or

weather conditions or where the detainee is held in ISAF

medical facilities and it would be medically imprudent to move

him. Where this exigency applies, COMISAF must be notified.

Where, in the opinion of COMISAF (or his delegated

subordinate), continuation of detention is warranted,

COMISAF (or his delegated subordinate) may authorize

continued detention.”

182. Although no change was made in ISAF’s guidelines, the United Kingdom

did over the years develop and operate its own policy relating to detention. In the

years prior to November 2009, this involved decisions regarding detention being

taken by United Kingdom officials, rather than ISAF. On the evidence of Mr Devine,

called by the Ministry and unchallenged on this point, ISAF was kept informed both

of the United Kingdom’s policy in this respect and of individual detentions made

under it. Leggatt J made significant findings in this connection. In para 181, he

referred to a United Kingdom report of an initial objection by the Chief of Staff of

ISAF in this connection in 2006, to the effect that ISAF, rather than United Kingdom

officials should be taking detention decisions. The United Kingdom rejected this

objection, explaining that it considered that the United Kingdom had to take such

decisions in order to ensure that its legal obligations were properly discharged. The

report concluded by saying that, now United Kingdom officials had made this point

to NATO HQ, “it is hoped that HQ ISAF will soon be directed to accept the UK

position”. Importantly, Leggatt J went on to say, in the passage already quoted in

para 25 above:

“I infer that ISAF headquarters did subsequently accept the UK

position as detention decisions continued to be taken by UK

officials without involving ISAF and there is no evidence of

any further complaints.”

183. Until November 2009, United Kingdom policy matched ISAF policy with

regard to the length of detention. But, with effect from November 2009, the United

Kingdom’s detention policy changed to allow detention beyond 96 hours not only

in accordance with ISAF policy, on the grounds set out in para 8 of SOP 362 and

with ISAF HQ authorisation, but also in “exceptional circumstances” with the

authority of United Kingdom HQ and United Kingdom ministerial authorisation.

The revised policy was set out in BRITFOR Standard Operating Instruction J3-9

dated 6 November 2009. Annex G required detailed justification to be submitted

with any application for extension of detention beyond 96 hours. The notes to assist

its compilation identified as relevant factors the intelligence gained to date and likely

to be obtained by further detention and its relevance for any prosecution, together

with (and emphasised) the likely impact of detention for United Kingdom/Coalition

forces, and in particular whether detention would save life and limb and what the

detained was likely to do if released, as well as any legal issues relevant to continued

detention.

184. Mr Devine also gave evidence that ISAF was made aware at the highest level

of the change introduced in November 2009 and of its application thereafter in

individual cases and never objected. He said in one passage:

“No, my point under this policy is when we introduced the

policy in November 2009 we informed ISAF both through its

senior body, the North Atlantic Council, and I assume, I don’t

recall, ISAF through its chain of command. The chain of

command, and indeed the NATO political authority, the North

Atlantic Council, were fully aware of the policy we were

undertaking. I think we can take that - understanding how

NATO works, I think we can take that consent as NATO

authority for our actions.”

Mr Devine’s evidence on this point was again not challenged by cross-examination.

185. In this connection, Leggatt J said this in para 184:

“The MOD has argued that the UK did not operate a detention

policy which was separate from ISAF policy because ISAF

policy envisaged and accommodated some variations in

national practice and, in particular, ISAF accepted the need for

the UK to depart from the ISAF 96-hour detention limit in

exceptional circumstances in light of the fact that UK armed

forces were operating in an area of Afghanistan where there is

a particularly high level of insurgent activity. I have accepted

the evidence of Mr Devine that NATO was informed of the

UK’s decision to apply a ‘national policy caveat’ to the ISAF

96-hour limit and did not object to this. But that is a very long

way from showing that either UK detention operations

generally or individual detentions by UK armed forces were

under the command and control of ISAF. It is clear that they

were not.”

The documentation shows that NATO was indeed informed in the most formal way

and at the highest level, by letter dated 5 November 2009 to its Secretary-General,

Mr Anders Rasmussen, giving full details and the explanation for the change in

policy. The terms would clearly have been expected to elicit an objection, if

objection there had been. In fact there was none.

186. In the light of Mr Devine’s evidence, I read Leggatt J’s findings in paras 181

and 184 as accepting as an inference that ISAF acquiesced in the UK position that

it was open to the UK to take its own detention decisions within the 96 hour period,

and, in and after November 2009, to apply its own policy regarding detention in

excess of 96 hours in “exceptional circumstances”.

187. In international law terms, the position is in my opinion covered by the

judgment in Case Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v Thailand)

Merits, [1962] ICJ Rep (judgment of 15 June 1962), where the ICJ said this at p 23:

“It has been contended on behalf of Thailand that this

communication of the maps by the French authorities was, so

to speak ex parte, and that no formal acknowledgment of it was

either requested of, or given by, Thailand. In fact, as will be

seen presently, an acknowledgment by their conduct was

undoubtedly made in a very definite way; but even if it were

otherwise it is clear that the circumstances were such as called

for some reaction, within a reasonable period, on the part of the

Siamese authorities, if they wished to disagree with the map or

had any serious question to raise in regard to it. They did not

do so, either then or for many years, and thereby must be held

to have acquiesced. Qui tacet consentire videtur si loqui

debuisset ac potuisset.”

188. The Court of Appeal did not consider that ISAF’s failure to protest in these

circumstances could be considered to amount to tacit consent (para 71). I do not

agree with the Court of Appeal’s analysis. The Court of Appeal did not refer to

Leggatt J’s clear conclusion in para 181 that ISAF did subsequently accept the UK’s

position regarding detention, and para 184, which the Court of Appeal did cite, is

directed not to the contrary, but to the question of command and control. Leggatt J

expressly accepted the evidence of Mr Devine, which also establishes that ISAF was

kept fully and regularly informed of the UK detention policy and its application to

particular detainees. The natural inference from this and from the absence of any

further complaints by ISAF at any time is, in my opinion, that ISAF did accept the

UK’s right to apply its policies and procedures both before and after November

2009, even though they differed from ISAF’s.

189. I add that it seems that two other members of ISAF also adopted different

policies regarding the 96-hour limit, the USA by enacting domestic legislation and

Canada by reaching specific agreement with the Afghan authorities to treat detainees

as prisoners of war. Domestic legislation would protect US forces in at any rate the

United States. It may be that an agreement with the Afghan authorities could be

presented as an independent source of authority to detain under local law. The UK

did not pursue either of these protective routes. But in no case is there an indication

that ISAF raised any objection to this conduct by members of ISAF.

190. I add that, had I not concluded that ISAF tacitly accepted (and indeed that the

judge’s findings amount to acceptance that ISAF tacitly accepted) the UK’s position

regarding its policies both before and after November 2009, I would not have

determined this largely factual point against the Ministry of Defence. I would have

remitted it to the judge for further examination, on the basis that Mr Devine’s

evidence on the point was effectively unchallenged, such potential significance as

the point may have does not appear to have emerged very clearly at the hearing

before him, and the point should now be clearly addressed and determined.

The consequences of the above analysis

191. The above analysis means that the UK was, when implementing its detention

policies before and after November 2009, acting in a way which was accepted as

permissible by ISAF. ISAF could not however authorise any detention policy by a

state whose forces were participating in ISAF outside the scope of the authority

which ISAF had under the relevant SCRs. The SCRs did not authorise detention

save where necessary for imperative reasons of security. Any policy involving

detention purely for intelligence-gathering reasons, without the co-existence of

some other ground such as danger to UK forces or the ISAF mission generally, could

not properly have been authorised by ISAF, or applied by the UK. But, subject to

that caveat, I see no reason why ISAF should not accept the operation by a particular

state participating in ISAF of its own detention policy, separate from ISAF’s own

guidelines.

192. A number of possibilities arise from these conclusions. One is that, as a result

of ISAF’s tacit assent to the United Kingdom’s operation of its own policies,

responsibility for any detention by United Kingdom forces should be borne by ISAF,

not the United Kingdom. The Ministry of Defence argued as much before the courts

below, relying on the decision of the Grand Chamber of the European Court in

Behrami v France, Saramati v France, Germany and Norway (2007) 45 EHRR

SE10. Leggatt J rejected the argument for the reasons given in his para 184 (quoted

in para 185 above). The essential reason was that the UK forces were not in this

respect under the command and control of ISAF. The Ministry of Defence originally

sought permission to appeal against this conclusion (by a proposed Ground 3 in its

notice of appeal to this court). The Ministry has not however pursued that

application, so that Leggatt J’s conclusion in para 184 stands.

193. That is again not the end of the matter. The issue to which Leggatt J was

referring in his para 184 - whether UK armed forces were under the command and

control of ISAF in relation to detention - is one thing. Whether the UK was

authorised by ISAF to pursue its own detention policy in the context of its activities

as a participating member of ISAF is another. Accordingly, subject to the caveat that

detention purely for intelligence gathering reasons could not be justified, the primary

question in relation to each period of detention in respect of which SM complains is

whether there was a good reason for his detention for imperative reasons of security,

and if so whether “exceptional circumstances” existed justifying United Kingdom

forces in continuing to act as the detaining authority, rather than handing SM over

to the Afghan authorities, after the first 96 hours. If such circumstances operated as

a concurrent reason for continued detention, they could justify the detention, even if

another illegitimate reason, such as a desire to interrogate, was also in operation.

Even if the only motive for continued detention present in the United Kingdom

authorities’ mind was to continue interrogation, that does not exclude the possibility

that another basis in fact existed, which would have justified and led to continued

detention, had the United Kingdom authorities directed themselves correctly. SM is

claiming damages for wrongful detention. It is highly material to consider whether,

but for any failures which he may establish in United Kingdom authorities’

reasoning or procedures, he would have been any better off - in other words,

anywhere other than in custody. Further, if the answer is that he would not have been

in the custody of United Kingdom forces, but would have been in the custody of

Afghan forces, it would be material to consider whether this would have involved

him in any form of detriment, justifying an award to damages.

194. Exceptional circumstances could well exist if extended detention was or

would have been necessary because SM represented a real danger to United

Kingdom forces or ISAF’s mission generally, but could not in the meanwhile be

transferred to Afghan custody because the Afghan facilities were for the time being

either unsatisfactory or full. As to this, para 44 of the Ministry’s amended defence,

which is for the purposes of the issues now before the Court to be taken as correct,

indicates that overcrowding and lack of capacity in Afghan facilities was a reason

for non-transfer during the third period from 6 May to 25 July 2010 in respect of

which SM complains. It seems unlikely that this situation did not also exist during

the second period starting on 10 April 2010. Another factor of potential relevance is

that throughout that period a legal challenge was on foot as to the appropriateness

of any transfers of detainees to any of the three detention facilities operated by the

National Directorate of Security (“NDS”) of Afghanistan in Kabul, Kandahar and

Lashkar Gah. The relevant proceedings were heard in the Divisional Court on 19 to

23 and 26 to 29 April 2010. They led to a judgment given 25 June 2010, which

concluded that it would be unlawful for United Kingdom transfers to be made to

NDS’s Kabul facility. It could hardly lie in the mouths of the present respondents to

assert that they could have been transferred to a facility to which it would have been

unlawful for such a transfer to be made.

195. As to the danger or risks for United Kingdom forces or the ISAF mission, the

assumed facts set out in paras 26 to 65 of the amended defence speak for themselves.

I set out the most material:

“26. … The claimant was detained at around 3.20 am

(Afghan time) on 7 April 2010 as part of a planned ISAF

operation. The team which undertook this operation included

UK military personnel, members of the Afghan Partnering Unit

and ISAF military working dogs. The operation targeted a

senior Taliban commander and the vehicle in which it was

believed he was travelling. When the operation was launched,

approximately four people were seen leaving the vehicle and

entering two compounds.

27. From the outset of the operation, as their helicopter

touched down near the two compounds, the capturing team

came under heavy fire.

28. The claimant ran from one of the two compounds, along

with another insurgent. The other insurgent fired upon UK

military personnel and was killed. The claimant fled from the

compound into a field about 450 metres from the compound.

He was asked a number of times via an interpreter to identify

his location and to come out with his hands up. He did not do

so. He was considered to present a significant and imminent

threat. Accordingly, a military working dog was released into

the field by its handler and the dog apprehended the claimant,

in the process causing him to suffer a bite to his right arm.

29. Halfway along the route along which the claimant was

observed to have fled, between the compound and the place of

his arrest, UK Armed Forces found a rocket propelled grenade

(‘RPG’) launcher and two RPG rounds.

30. During the course of the operation, another two

insurgents were found in one of the two compounds. One of

them engaged UK armed forces and was killed. The other

insurgent was captured.

31. UK Armed Forces safely extracted the claimant and the

other captured insurgent. They did so whilst under heavy and

sustained small arms and RPG fire. The extraction took about

ten hours. Three members of UK Armed Forces were wounded

in action.

32. The claimant was lawfully captured and detained in

accordance with ISAF’s standard operating procedures,

pursuant to authorisation contained in UN Security Council

Resolution 1890 (2009) and in compliance with IHL.

33. … the claimant’s asserted ignorance of the RPGs and

launcher is denied. The Detainee Transfer Paperwork records

that explosive traces were found on the claimant’s clothes.

…

36. … In response to questioning the claimant stated he was

a farmer. The defendant subsequently received information that

the claimant was a senior Taliban commander, also known as

Mullah Gulmad. Mullah Gulmad was, and is, believed to have

been involved with the large-scale production of IEDs and to

have commanded a local Taliban training camp in mid 2009.

…

38. … On 7 April 2010, at Camp Bastion, the claimant was

informed, with the aid of an interpreter, that he had been

detained because he was considered to pose a threat to the

accomplishment of the ISAF mission and that he would either

be released by ISAF or transferred to the Afghan authorities as

soon as possible. He was informed that he had the right to

contact the International Committee of the Red Cross (‘ICRC’)

at any time and when asked if he wished to have someone

informed of his detention, gave the name of his father.”

196. Taking this account as correct, as we are required for present purposes to do,

it is unsurprising that, in an initial application by BRITFOR for continued detention

dated 8 April 2010 the Detention Authority said this in respect of SM in the section

of the relevant form (Annex G) headed “Legal Issues”:

“The test to be applied is whether, on the balance of

probabilities, Detainee 995 has done something that makes him

a threat to force protection, self-defence or wider mission

accomplishment. Having considered all the evidence and

intelligence relating to this operation, in particular Detainee

995’s actions immediately prior to capture and the assessment

that he attempted to hide two RPGs, I advise that the policy test

is satisfied.”

The “Legal Issues” sections in the eight subsequent Annex G applications which

were completed to obtain a series of 72 hour extensions of detention included similar

information, but were from time to time also expanded and updated. Thus on 13

April 2010 specific mention was added of the fact that the compound from which

SM had fled had been known to have links with “Obj White” (code for the local

Taliban commander) and the assessment was added that SM “may be” that

commander’s deputy. By 16 April 2010, the assessment was expanded to say that

SM “is” the commander’s deputy. On 25 April 2010, there was reference to “the

positive identification that he is … a TB Comd and Obj WHITE’s deputy”. On 28

April 2010, the addition was made that “the recent CHEMEX results have revealed

a high confidence return for RDX, PETN and TNT. It is also assessed that he may

be … Obj WHITE’S deputy”. On 1 May 2010, the further addition appeared that he

“has been positively identified by HUMINT as call sign …”. (The dots represent

redactions in the versions before the Supreme Court.)

197. The picture which on its face emerges is that the completion of the Annex G

applications was not a mere formality or box-ticking exercise. Rather, it appears as

a conscientious exercise on each occasion in reconsidering and restating the facts

and in re-applying the test whether SM had done something “which makes him a

threat to self-defence, force protection or wider mission accomplishment”. The

initial application was also completed with “No” to “Release” and “Yes” to

“Transfer”, “Extension to 96 hours” and “Extension beyond 96 hours”. The eight

subsequent applications were all completed with “No” to “Release” and “Yes” to

“Transfer” and to “Extension beyond 96 hours”. In these circumstances, despite the

further entries to the effect that the evidence to hand made this a “weak case to hand

to the NDS”, the natural (and unsurprising) inference is that SM was seen throughout

not only as a threat to self-defence, force protection and/or wider mission

accomplishment, but also as a suspect who, once United Kingdom forces ceased to

hold him and a suitable NDS facility was available, was to be handed over to the

NDS rather than released.

198. Whether exceptional circumstances for extended detention in this or any

other sense existed which justified or could have justified detention by United

Kingdom forces for longer than 96 hours is therefore an issue which should, in my

view, be left open for further consideration at trial. The judge’s findings in relation

to the second and third periods of SM’s detention were made on the false premises

that, firstly, once someone has been captured and disarmed, there can be no

imperative reasons of security for detaining him further, and, secondly, that article

5 of the ECHR applied without qualification or addition. The judge also appears to

have thought that a short-term absence of capacity in the NDS Lashkar Gar detention

facility would preclude a conclusion that SM was being held with a view to transfer

there (see eg his para 348). That was wrong in my view, if there was a fair prospect

of transfer there within a not unreasonable longer-term period. I add that the Court

of Appeal was incorrect, in para 250 of its judgment, to say that Mr Devine had

stated about SM “that his continued detention was not assessed to be necessary ‘for

force protection purposes’”.

199. Likewise, if, contrary to my above conclusions, ISAF cannot be treated as

having tacitly accepted the UK’s changed policy in and after November 2009, it

should still remain open to the UK to submit that SM’s detention beyond 96 hours

could and would have been authorised under ISAF’s guidelines, had they been

applied. That too will require factual inquiry and findings about the reasons for

which SM was in fact held, as well as potentially about any other basis or bases on

which he could and would have been held in any event, and in each case whether

they would have constituted grounds for extended detention within the terms of the

ISAF guidelines. Para 8 of the ISAF guidelines gives some limited, but not

exclusive, examples of the “exigencies” which may justify extended detention. It

also contemplates extended detention “where it is deemed necessary in order to

effect his release or transfer in safe circumstances”. Whether the situation falls

within these words or not, there must be a strong argument that the relevant

“exigencies” could include, for example, extended detention when necessary

because the person in question represented a real danger to UK forces or ISAF’s

mission generally, but could not for the meanwhile be transferred to Afghan custody

because the Afghan facilities were for the time being either unsatisfactory or full.

200. In these circumstances, and in common with Lord Sumption, (paras 86 and

87), I am not satisfied that Leggatt J’s findings can be transposed to the present

context, when the issue is now whether there were exceptional reasons which under

UK policy, or alternatively, exigencies which under ISAF rules, justified SM’s

continuing detention during either or both of those periods. I would remit that issue

for determination at the trial accordingly.

Application of ECHR

201. This brings me to consider whether and how far detention for exceptional

reasons under UK policy or by reasons of exigencies under ISAF rules can be

regarded as consistent or can be accommodated with article 5 of the ECHR. The

Ministry of Defence relies upon article 5(1)(c) and (f) as heads expressly covering

the present circumstances, alternatively upon the accommodation between the

power to detain conferred by SCR 1546 and article 5 which I have already concluded

(para 164 above) should be made in the context of non-international armed conflicts

such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan in which United Kingdom forces were

engaged at the times relevant to these appeals.

202. To the extent that SM was held with a view to handing him over to the NDS

on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or offences, article 5(1)(c)

would constitute a basis for his detention. It would, however, be necessary to go on

to consider whether the United Kingdom had complied with article 5(3). Article 5(3)

is (as Lord Sumption also notes in his para 96) not easy to fit into a context where

the United Kingdom was not in a position to exercise judicial authority or power, or

ever going to put SM on trial itself. Applying an approach similar to that taken in

Hassan, it may be that it can be modified in the present context to accommodate

administrative procedures undertaken by United Kingdom authorities.

Alternatively, if articles 5(1)(c) and 5(3) do not, even with modification, fit the

present circumstances, then, to the extent that SM was held with a view to his

handing over to the NDS, there is to my mind attraction in Leggatt J’s view that

article 5(1)(f) can be regarded as applicable to a de facto transfer of jurisdiction

between armed forces of different States in Afghanistan. It would then be necessary

to consider whether the United Kingdom complied with article 5(4). However, even

if neither article 5(1)(c) nor article 5(1)(f) directly applies, each offers an analogy

which points towards and assists in identifying a more general accommodation

between the international law power to detain and article 5.

203. Under both article 5(1)(c) and (f), the Ministry of Defence faces a difficulty

if its only actual motivation in continuing to detain during the second period was to

interrogate. That, as I have stated, was not a legitimate basis under the SCR, any

more than it is under the European Convention on Human Rights (see authorities

cited by Lord Sumption in para 80). If there was in fact some other legitimate basis

on which SM could and would still have been detained, then the question would

arise whether, on showing this, the Ministry of Defence could bring itself directly

within article 5(1)(c) or (f), or whether its relevance would simply be to the question

whether SM should receive any (or what) damages. This would then merit further

argument in due course before the judge.

204. If neither article 5(1)(c) nor article 5(1)(f) applies directly, the question arises

whether and how far the power conferred by SCR 1546 to detain for imperative

reasons of security can and should be accommodated with article 5. For reasons

indicated in paras 152 to 168 above, I consider that the two can and should be read

together. But this is subject always to compliance with core procedural requirements

modelled on the provisions of article 5(1), (3) and (4). With regard to article 5(1)

(“in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law”), I am content to adopt what

Lord Sumption says in his paras 91 to 93. With regard to article 5(3), which will

arise for consideration if the circumstances prove on further consideration to make

article 5(1)(c) relevant, I agree with Lord Sumption that the critical question is how

far the requirements of article 5(3) can properly be adapted to the conditions of

armed conflict in Afghanistan, and that this question should be left to be determined

at the trial (see his paras 95 and 98 in particular). For completeness, I must address

the argument raised by the First Interveners and considered by Lord Wilson in paras

136-140 that, whatever the international or Convention law position, compliance

with domestic law (whether English law or the law of the place of detention or one

or other is not entirely clear) is also required for any detention to be in accordance

with law. This argument cannot, in my view, arise in Al-Waheed in the light of the

limited leap-frog issue before the Supreme Court. In SM the argument was suggested

below by Ms Fatima QC for the Interveners, but neither court found it necessary to

deal with. However, the Ministry of Defence argued unsuccessfully for a reverse

position, namely that it was authorised to detain SM by Afghan law, and this alone

sufficed to justify SM’s detention under article 5, whatever the international legal

position. The Supreme Court has now decided to defer decision whether to grant

permission to appeal on this issue. My own view is that Ms Fatima’s argument fails

for the reasons given by Lord Reed in his paras 343-345, which I understand to fit

with those given by Lord Wilson in his para 139. But, if the view were to be taken

that the argument does not fail for these reasons, this adds potentially to the

significance of the issue on which the Court has now deferred any decision whether

to grant permission to appeal (viz, whether Afghan law authorised detention in

accordance with international law, and in particular in accordance with any Security

Council Resolution authorising such detention).

ECHR article 5(4): right to review of the lawfulness of detention

205. Article 5(4) provides in terms that:

“Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention

shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of

his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his

release ordered if the detention is not lawful.”

In Hassan, para 106, the European Court of Human Rights explained how this might

be understood and adapted to cater for the exigencies of an international armed

conflict:

“106. As regards procedural safeguards, the Court considers

that, in relation to detention taking place during an international

armed conflict, article 5 paras 2 and 4 must also be interpreted

in a manner which takes into account the context and the

applicable rules of international humanitarian law. Articles 43

and 78 of the Fourth Geneva Convention provide that

internment ‘shall be subject to periodical review, if possible

every six months, by a competent body’. Whilst it might not be

practicable, in the course of an international armed conflict, for

the legality of detention to be determined by an independent

‘court’ in the sense generally required by article 5 para 4 (see,

in the latter context, Reinprecht v Austria, (2005) no 67175/01,

para 31, ECHR 2005‑XII), none the less, if the Contracting

State is to comply with its obligations under article 5 para 4 in

this context, the ‘competent body’ should provide sufficient

guarantees of impartiality and fair procedure to protect against

arbitrariness. Moreover, the first review should take place

shortly after the person is taken into detention, with subsequent

reviews at frequent intervals, to ensure that any person who

does not fall into one of the categories subject to internment

under international humanitarian law is released without undue

delay. …”

206. For reasons already given, I consider that this guidance is equally relevant in

relation to the NIAC in which United Kingdom forces were engaged and in the

context of which SM was captured and detained. In October 2012, a wide range of

24 states together with international organisations including the UN, NATO, the

African Union, the European Union and the ICRC agreed on The Copenhagen

Process: Principles and Guidelines. These were specifically intended to reflect

“generally accepted standards” (Commentary, para 16.2) applicable “to

international military operations in the context of non-international armed conflicts

and peace operations” (Introductory para IX). Principle and Guideline 12 reads:

“A detainee whose liberty has been deprived for security

reasons is to, in addition to a prompt initial review, have the

decision to detain reconsidered periodically by an impartial and

objective authority that is authorised to determine the

lawfulness and appropriateness of continued detention.”

This is both consistent with and supports the application to detention in the course

of a NIAC of principles similar to those recognised in Hassan as appropriate in

relation to an IAC.

207. The possibility that SM could have sought habeas corpus while in United

Kingdom forces’ custody was not pressed by Mr Eadie QC. Even assuming that a

writ of habeas corpus could (contrary to the Ministry of Defence’s primary case)

have lain, Mr Eadie was, as I understood him, prepared to accept that the possibility

of seeking and obtaining such a writ would not, at least in the Afghan context, satisfy

the modified requirements of article 5(4). On the other hand, it is not, I understand,

suggested, and in any event could not, I think, realistically be suggested, that SM

should have been afforded access to any local court prior to being handed over to an

NDS detention facility. The question is therefore whether the legality of SM’s

detention was subject to periodic review by a competent body in the sense of a body

providing “sufficient guarantees of impartiality and fair procedure to protect against

arbitrariness”, the first such review taking place shortly after he was taken into

detention, with subsequent reviews at frequent intervals thereafter. What is

“frequent” must depend on the context in and basis on which a detainee is being

held. But the European Court of Human Rights was, on the face of it, envisaging

periodic reviews of greater regularity than “if possible every six months”, the phrase

it quoted earlier in para 106 from the Fourth Geneva Convention.

208. The scheme established by SOI J3-9 is detailed and clear. The reviews

undertaken under it in respect of SM were very frequent, and the documentation

relating to them can be seen (despite redactions for security reasons) to be

impressive in its thoroughness. Criticisms are however directed in two main areas:

(a) sufficiency of the guarantees of impartiality and (b) fairness of the procedure so

far as concerns SM’s involvement.

209. Before considering these criticisms, it is appropriate to consider the purpose,

in the context of the present case, of reviews such as those contemplated by Hassan,

para 106, and by Copenhagen principle 12. The purpose is to ensure that detention

only occurs and continues when there is good cause for it. For that reason, the

detainee should be told why he is being detained, and given the opportunity to give

his account of events as well as to pass information to the outside world which will

reach his family. But, if this has occurred and a detainee is held as an active member

of the Taliban and a continuing threat, with a view to his eventual transfer to NDS

custody, the frequency of review which is required may well diminish. In the present

case, the actual frequency of reviews was closely linked with the process of

obtaining authorisation for further interrogation, but interrogation was not itself a

basis for detention. What was a potential basis for detention was the risk that SM

posed to United Kingdom forces and the ISAF mission and the intention to transfer

him into NDS custody with a view to further investigation and/or criminal

prosecution.

210. In the present case, SM was arrested during armed operations and extracted

under heavy and sustained small arms and RPG fire in a process which took ten

hours. He must have known that he was being arrested as an insurgent, and he

responded to questioning by saying that he was a farmer: see para 195 above. He

was then taken to Camp Bastion where he was interviewed through an interpreter,

told that he had been detained as a threat to the ISAF mission and further told that

he would be either released or transferred to the Afghan authorities as soon as

possible. He was then given the opportunity of making a statement about his

detention. Form Annex A “Rights of a detainee”, which was (on the currently

assumed facts) accurately translated to him and signed by SM by thumbprint,

records SM’s response and information which he was given, in the following terms:

“I was working in the field 9-12. Helicopter came so I layed

down in my Field, they let the dog attack me and then arrested

me”. Likewise, he was informed of his right to contact the

ICRC by letter ‘at any time during your detention here’.”

211. No subsequent information came to light to change the United Kingdom

forces’ assessment of SM’s role and involvement with the Taliban in any way which

could have militated in favour of his release, rather than his detention and transfer

in due course into NDS hands. On the contrary, such further information as came to

light merely strengthened the grounds for considering that he was an insurgent: see

para 196 above. In fact, SM was also interrogated over a period during which he

“maintained an obstructive approach to questioning and persisted in his denial of

involvement in the insurgency and specifically Obj WHITE”, as recorded in Annex

G relating to the eighth successive 72 hour review. So it is clear that he did have

further opportunities to give his account and to provide any information which might

put a different complexion on his involvement.

212. Against this background, I turn more specifically to the two areas of criticism.

As to (a), sufficiency of the guarantees of impartiality, the Court of Appeal dealt

with this at some length, on the assumption that (although it took place on 9-10 April

2010) the initial review as well as all the subsequent reviews were all conducted in

accordance with the revised Detention Authority regime set out in Amendment 2 of

SOI J3-9 dated 12 April 2010. The Court of Appeal noted that under Amendment 2

the Detention Authority was the Commander of Joint Force Support (Afghanistan),

and went on (para 288):

“Amendment 2, para 12 states that his continuing duty as the

Detention Authority to ensure that each detention is justified

provided an independent level of review for all detention

operations, and that the Legal Advisor is a member of the

Detention Review Committee. We note that it is also stated that

the core members of the Detention Review Committee ‘must

remain outside the chain of command for targeting and tactical

legal issues’, although they are not wholly outside the chain of

command in the Theatre.”

213. The Court of Appeal went on to point out (para 289) that the judge had made

“no detailed findings about the nature of this relationship” (because he did not need

to in the light of his view that strict compliance with article 5 was necessary and

because he was only dealing with preliminary issues), and continued:

“This, together with the fact that this issue was only explored

in the Secretary of State’s post-hearing note on outstanding

issues, means that we have limited information as to the precise

relationship of the chain of command which has the

Commander of Joint Force Support (Afghanistan) at its

pinnacle and those responsible for detaining a person. The

court lacks the factual context required to reach a decision

about the independence of the reviewing body. That would

include details of the precise chain of command in Afghanistan,

and the meaning of the statement … that the core membership

must remain outside the chain of command for targeting and

tactical reasons.”

214. However, the Court of Appeal went on to give some guidance, stating:

“291. … We doubt whether a Detention Authority squarely

within the chain of command in the relevant theatre, advised by

a committee consisting of members who are either the

subordinates of the Detention Authority or otherwise within the

chain of command under him meets the requirement of

independence and impartiality.”

and

“292. … As to whether that regime satisfied the requirements

of independence and impartiality, we know that the core

membership included the Commanding Officer of the

Intelligence Exploitation Force and the Force Provost Marshal.

The relationship of the legal adviser who was also a core

member of the Detention Review Committee and those

responsible for ‘tactical legal issues’, who it was stated should

not be core members, was not explained. We, however, note

that the legal and political Advisers and the Force Provost

Marshal provided advice to the Detention Authority as to

whether to release, transfer or detain in the first 48 hours. The

Force Provost Marshal was stated to be the subject-matter

specialist for detention issues. This does not sit easily with, and

might even be thought to be contrary to the requirement that all

members of the Committee should be able to present cases

‘cold’ to the Detention Authority. Moreover, the Detention

Authority reported to military superiors, and MoD civil

servants advised a government minister who made the decision

about whether to authorise further detention. For these reasons,

we also doubt that the new regime was sufficiently

independent, although our doubts are of a lesser order than

those concerning the former Detention Authority regime.”

215. During the hearing before the Supreme Court, Mr Eadie produced a list

giving the full composition of the Detention Review Committee as well as

explaining some of the acronyms used in Amendment 2. But for my part I do not

think that the picture is materially clearer than it was before the Court of Appeal.

Both the Court of Appeal and Lord Sumption in para 105 of his judgment also adopt

the concept of “independence” as an element of the appropriate test. To my mind,

that risks introducing too formal an aspect into an essentially military review. It is

notable that the European Court of Human Rights in Hassan, para 106, used only

the word “impartial”, while Copenhagen principle 12 spoke only of review by an

“impartial and objective authority”. I am not confident that the Supreme Court

knows enough about the relationships between the various ranks and posts identified

in the list that the Court has been given or the way in which the military operates to

be able to condemn the review system introduced by Amendment 2 as inadequate.

Appellate judges with no military experience sitting thousands of miles from the

theatre of armed conflict should, I think, be very cautious to assess the impartiality

of a group of officers from or about whom, or of a process about which, they have

heard no oral evidence. This should be left to the judge who will at trial have had

the opportunity of hearing evidence and making findings about these matters. On

this, I see no reason for us, sitting in the Supreme Court, to disagree with the Court

of Appeal.

216. Up to this point, I have focused on the process before the Detention Authority

and Detention Review Committee. I have done so, because the material available

suggests to me that it was only at this level that the existence and level of any threat

presented by SM were assessed. So far as appears, and subject to anything that may

emerge at trial, it appears that the matter only went to a higher level (that is to

Permanent Joint Headquarters (“PJHQ”) and ultimately to ministerial level) in the

context of the 14 day reviews which were undertaken under Amendment 2 Part II

paragraph 29 using Annex H, to gain permission for further detention for further

interrogation. Annex H does not appear to have included information directed at

enabling either PJHQ or ministers themselves to form any view on whether SM

presented a threat which itself justified further detention pending transfer into NDS

hands. Both paragraph 27 of Part II of Amendment 2 to SOI J3-9 and the way in

which Annex H was itself completed focus on the value of the intelligence which

any extension of detention might provide for force protection and/or (more

generally) for a better understanding of the nature of the insurgency.

217. I would add that in the light of what I have said in paras 209-211 above, I

find it difficult to see that the circumstances of SM’s detention called for reviews

every 72 hours or even every 14 days directed to the question whether he was a

threat to United Kingdom forces or the ISAF mission. If he was a threat on capture,

as he clearly was on the assumed facts, there was nothing to make that threat go

away. Rather, as I have said, the only information becoming available simply

strengthened the case for regarding him as a threat. There was no change in the

general situation in Afghanistan to affect this. The reason for the regular reviews

which actually occurred was the repeated need to authorise further interrogation. But

that was not by itself a justified reason for detention (and one might add that, if it

had been, it could hardly be expected that SM would be offered the opportunity to

make observations on the course of interrogation so far or the merits or otherwise of

further interrogation).

218. I turn to (b), the fairness of the procedure as regards SM. For the reasons I

have already given, he was in my view given and in possession of sufficient

information about the case against him at the outset, and had an appropriate

opportunity of responding to it. He must have known that this was part of a process

of considering the appropriateness of his continuing detention. Likewise, to the

extent that he was held thereafter because he would if released have been a threat

and was being held pending transfer to the NDS, I cannot see what any further

opportunity or opportunities to comment could have offered him in practical terms.

219. However, I accept that - in order to avoid leaving a suspect in SM’s position

in silent limbo, and in some contexts perhaps also to minimise the risks of ill-

treatment - there is an intrinsic value in having a suspect’s case reviewed at regular

intervals and informing him of the opportunity to make representations. This is so,

even if such reviews appear unlikely to lead to any change in his treatment or

detention. Here, SM was not, so far as appears, informed about any review process

or offered any opportunity of making representations in that connection (although

he was offered the opportunity at any time of contacting the ICRC). On the face of

it, the United Kingdom fell short in this respect of providing him with the

appropriate procedural guarantees. However, the claimant is seeking damages,

expressly including just satisfaction. In this context, it seems highly unlikely -

indeed contrary to all the evidence presently available - to suggest that there would

have been any prospect that informing SM about any review process, or offering

him any opportunity of making representations in respect of it, would have made

any difference to actual events.

220. There is of course a question whether SM’s handing over to the NDS was

delayed, or (putting the point the other way around) whether his detention in United

Kingdom hands was extended, by the fact that the United Kingdom regarded him as

a potential source of information material to the success of the ISAF mission, and

repeated extensions of his detention were sought and obtained on that ground. He

was not notified of the reviews which led to such extensions. Had he been notified,

he might, at least in theory, have objected to any extensions with that purpose in

mind. Had that objection (however implausible it may seem) been given weight, the

question would at once have arisen whether there was any other basis for United

Kingdom forces continuing to detain him. The United Kingdom authorities would

then have had to consider, earlier than it appears they did, the question whether there

was any NDS detention facility with spare capacity to which they could properly

transfer SM. Again, however, so far as one can presently see, such a process may

well have led to no more than SM remaining in United Kingdom custody pending

transfer to NDS or his slightly earlier transfer from United Kingdom to NDS

custody. Either way, a claim for substantial damages might be optimistic.

221. In the light of the above, I, for my part, would limit myself to the views

expressed, and remit the whole case to the judge for trial on that basis.

Conclusions

222. The appeal in Al-Waheed is not concerned with the question whether

minimum procedural standards were established and applied in relation to the

relevant detention. I agree with its disposition as Lord Sumption proposes.

223. As to SM, whether the United Kingdom was or would have been entitled to

detain him after the expiry of a 96-hour period, that is after 11 April 2010, depends

upon whether it can show, firstly, that detention was required for imperative reasons

of security, and, secondly, that exceptional circumstances under the UK policy (or

alternatively exigencies under ISAF guidelines) existed justifying United Kingdom

forces in continuing to act as the detaining authority, rather than handing the

detainee over to Afghan authorities. This and the further issue whether failure to

provide SM with an appropriate review process in any respect led to any extended

detention or other loss should be remitted for determination at the trial.

LORD HUGHES: (with whom Lord Neuberger agrees)

224. The ground in this case has been comprehensively covered by the judgments

above. It would not help to repeat the valuable analysis offered. Subject to what

follows, I agree with the judgments of Lord Mance, Lord Wilson and Lord

Sumption.

225. It is necessary to address three points on which these judgments do not agree,

and one further point which is considered by Lord Wilson at paras 136-140.

226. The first difference is whether the UN Security Council resolutions

concerning Afghanistan conferred authority to detain (and to lay down rules about

detention) upon ISAF as an entity (as Lord Mance says) or upon the troop-

contributing member nations through the medium of ISAF (as Lord Sumption and

Lord Wilson say). This difference has no impact on the outcome of the appeal in the

case of Serdar Mohammed because, as Lord Mance concludes, ISAF in any event

endorsed the decision of the United Kingdom to adopt its own detention policy, as

was also the position in relation to the USA and Canada. I therefore doubt if it is

necessary to express a concluded view on this topic, but, subject only to observing

that the authority to troop-contributing member nations is clearly premised on

mutual co-operation although not on precise identity of polices, I presently prefer

the analysis of Lords Sumption and Wilson.

227. The second difference relates to whether there has been established an

infringement of article 5(4) ECHR on the grounds that the United Kingdom system

of internal review in Afghanistan failed to achieve sufficient impartiality. On this

topic I agree with Lord Mance, for the reasons he gives, that that suggested

shortcoming has not been established, and accordingly do not agree with the

contrary conclusion of Lords Sumption and Wilson. I particularly support Lord

Mance’s observations in the last four sentences of para 215. I also agree with both

Lord Mance and Lord Sumption that it is very questionable that any further

opportunity to state his case could have made any difference to Serdar Mohammed.

228. The third difference concerns the possible application of article 5(1)(f). On

this topic I agree with Lord Mance at paras 202-203. My primary conclusion is, like

Lords Mance, Sumption and Wilson, that the very terms of article 5(1)(f), as well as

those of other subparagraphs, demonstrate that in the context of armed conflict the

article must be interpreted on the principle explained in Hassan. If, however, that

were to be wrong, then it seems to me that subparagraph (f) is capable of including

situations in armed conflict when one State detains for the purpose of handing over

the detainee to another.

229. I should add that I doubt if there is a difference between Lord Mance and

Lord Sumption as to the possible application of article 5(1)(c). On the findings of

fact made by the judge at para 333 it cannot apply to the second period of Serdar

Mohammed’s detention but if he could have been detained in that period for the

purpose of producing him to the Afghan authorities, this goes to the question

whether he is entitled to any, or if so what, award of damages.

230. The additional point considered by Lord Wilson at paras 136-140 concerns

the relevance of the domestic law of the country concerned. As to that, I agree with

the conclusions of Lord Mance at para 204, for the reasons which he gives and in

the light of the observations of the ECtHR in Őcalan v Turkey (2005) 41 EHRR 45,

cited by Lord Reed at para 345.

LORD TOULSON:

231. My involvement in this appeal has been in relation to all issues except the

procedural requirements of articles 5(1), 5(3) and 5(4) of the Convention in relation

to the detention of Serdar Mohammed. On all those issues I agree, subject to one

point, with the judgments of Lord Mance, Lord Wilson and Lord Sumption. The one

point is that discussed in para 226 of Lord Hughes’ judgment with which I agree.

LORD HODGE:

232. My only involvement in this appeal has been the hearing on 26 October 2016,

following the retirement of Lord Toulson, at which the court considered the

procedural requirements of articles 5(1), 5(3) and 5(4) of the Convention in relation

to the detention of Serdar Mohammed. On those matters I agree with the judgment

of Lord Sumption at paras 68 and 90-110 and with the declarations which he

proposes at para 111(4), (5) and (6).

LORD REED: (dissenting) (with whom Lord Kerr agrees)

233. I agree in part with the conclusions reached by Lord Sumption, in which the

majority of the court concur. In particular, I agree that Mr Mohammed’s detention

by HM Forces after 11 April 2010 did not fall within article 5(1)(f) of the European

Convention on Human Rights, and that his detention between 11 April and 4 May

2010 did not fall within article 5(1)(c). I also agree that the arrangements for his

detention did not fall within article 5(4), and that the question whether they complied

with article 5(3) should be considered after trial. I also agree that the Ministry of

Defence is in principle liable to pay compensation to Mr Mohammed if and in so far

as his detention was prolonged by his detention by HM Forces between 11 April and

4 May 2010 for intelligence exploitation purposes.

234. There are also some matters on which I have reached a different conclusion,

in agreement with the courts below: in particular, whether UN Security Council

Resolutions (“SCRs”) 1546 (2004) and 1890 (2009) should be interpreted as

authorising detention in circumstances other than those specified in article 5(1)(a)

to (f) of the Convention, and in consequence whether HM Forces were entitled to

detain Mr Al-Waheed and Mr Mohammed in such circumstances, pursuant to those

SCRs. Having reached that conclusion, I also require to consider whether a right to

detain was conferred by international humanitarian law, an issue on which Lord

Sumption does not (and does not require to) reach a concluded view. In relation to

that issue, I conclude that no right of detention arose under international

humanitarian law. I therefore reach the conclusion that Mr Mohammed’s detention

between 11 April and 4 May 2010, being authorised neither by an SCR nor by

international humanitarian law, was in violation of article 5(1).

235. Given the importance of the issues, and the potential influence of this court’s

decision, I have thought it right to prepare a reasoned judgment. As it is a long

judgment which discusses many issues and arguments, I shall summarise my main

conclusions at the outset, with references to the sections of the judgment containing

the relevant discussion:

(i) Conventional (ie treaty-based) international humanitarian law

provides no authority for detention in a non-international armed conflict

(paras 243-270 and 274).

(ii) Customary international humanitarian law, in its present state of

development, provides no authority for detention in a non-international

armed conflict (paras 256-257, 271-273 and 275-276).

(iii) For the purpose of applying the European Convention on Human

Rights, UN Security Council Resolutions should be interpreted on the basis

that there is a presumption that the Security Council does not intend to impose

any obligation on member states to breach fundamental principles of human

rights; that, in the event of ambiguity, the court must choose the interpretation

which is most in harmony with the requirements of the Convention; and that

it is to be expected that clear and explicit language will be used if the Security

Council intends states to take measures which would conflict with their

obligations under international human rights law (paras 277-289).

(iv) The judgment of the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human

Rights in the case of Hassan v United Kingdom [2014] BHRC 358 should not

be interpreted as entailing a departure from that approach (paras 290-300).

(v) The court should depart from the decision of the House of Lords in Al-

Jedda v Secretary of State for Defence (JUSTICE intervening) [2007] UKHL

58; [2008] 1 AC 332, that SCR 1546 imposed an obligation to detain in

circumstances other than those listed in sub-paras (a) to (f) of article 5(1) of

the Convention, which prevailed over the obligation to comply with the

Convention by virtue of article 103 of the Charter of the United Nations

(paras 304-305).

(vi) Hassan should not be interpreted as warranting the modification of

article 5(1) so as to permit detention in circumstances not falling within sub-

paras (a) to (f), in relation to the detention authorised in Iraq by SCR 1546

(2004), as extended by SCRs 1637 (2005) and 1723 (2006) (paras 292-297

and 307-315).

(vii) Interpreting SCR 1546 consistently with the Convention, Mr Al-

Waheed’s detention by HM Forces was compatible with article 5(1) of the

Convention only if he was detained in circumstances falling within sub-paras

(a) to (f) (para 316).

(viii) Hassan should not be interpreted as warranting the modification of

article 5(1) so as to permit detention in circumstances not falling within sub-

paras (a) to (f), in relation to the detention authorised in Afghanistan by SCR

1386 (2001), as extended by SCR 1890 (2009) (para 324).

(ix) Interpreting SCRs 1386 and 1890 consistently with article 5(1), HM

Forces had authority to detain Mr Mohammed under the SCRs for more than

96 hours only in circumstances falling within sub-paras (a) to (f) of article

5(1) (paras 322-334).

(x) Mr Mohammed’s detention by HM Forces between 11 April 2010 (ie

the end of the initial period of 96 hours) and 4 May 2010 was for the purpose

of obtaining intelligence. It did not fall within sub-paras (a) to (f) of article

5(1) (paras 335-346 and 351).

(xi) Mr Mohammed’s detention during that period was in any event for a

purpose falling outside the scope of the authority granted by SCR 1890, and

was therefore for that reason also incompatible with article 5(1) (paras 343

and 352-353).

(xii) Mr Mohammed’s detention by HM Forces after 4 May 2010 fell

within the scope of article 5(1)(c) of the Convention, and was not

incompatible with article 5(1) (paras 347-350 and 354-357).

(xiii) The arrangements for Mr Mohammed’s detention were not compatible

with article 5(4), since he did not have any effective means of challenging

the lawfulness of his detention (para 359).

(xiv) Whether there was a violation of article 5(3) of the Convention should

be considered after trial (para 359).

Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights

236. Article 5(1) of the Convention defines the circumstances in which persons

may be detained. It begins:

“Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No

one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases

and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law.”

In relation to the question whether a procedure “prescribed by law” has been

followed, “the Convention refers essentially to national law but also, where

appropriate, to other applicable legal standards, including those which have their

source in international law”: Medvedyev v France (2010) 51 EHRR 39, para 79.

Medvedyev itself provides an example of a situation where the legal basis of

detention was assessed by reference to international law, since the detention took

place on the high seas.

237. There follows in sub-paragraphs (a) to (f) a list of circumstances in which

detention is permissible. They do not include detention for reasons of security, or

for the gathering of intelligence. The only ones which are relevant to these appeals

are those set out in sub-paragraphs (c) and (f):

“(c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the

purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority

on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or

when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his

committing an offence or fleeing after having done so;

..

(f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his

effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person

against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation

or extradition.”

238. The remaining paragraphs of article 5 are concerned with procedural

protections against arbitrary detention:

“2. Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in

a language which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest

and of any charge against him.

3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the

provisions of paragraph 1(c) of this article shall be brought

promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to

exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a

reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be

conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial.

4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or

detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the

lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court

and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful.

5. Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention

in contravention of the provisions of this article shall have an

enforceable right to compensation.”

239. Although the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan with which these appeals are

concerned took place outside Europe, the European Court of Human Rights has held

that a contracting state which detains persons in a situation of armed conflict, outside

its own territory, has those persons within its jurisdiction for the purposes of article

1 of the Convention, so that the Convention is applicable. That approach has been

applied in particular to the detention of persons by HM Forces operating in Iraq

during both the international and the non-international phases of the armed conflict

there (the distinction between the international and non-international phases will be

explained shortly): see Al-Skeini v United Kingdom (2011) 53 EHRR 18, Al-Jedda

v United Kingdom (2011) 53 EHRR 23 and Hassan v United Kingdom (2014) 38

BHRC 358.

240. The substantive guarantees set out in the Convention have been given effect

in the domestic law of the United Kingdom by the Human Rights Act 1998. In so

far as HM Forces operating in conflicts overseas may have been acting in

circumstances which engaged the United Kingdom’s responsibilities under the

Convention, and in so far as the Human Rights Act is applicable to those overseas

operations, any breach of the Convention rights by those forces falls within the

jurisdiction of British courts.

241. The central question which has to be determined at this stage of these appeals

is how article 5 applied in the context of the phases of the armed conflicts in Iraq

and Afghanistan during which Mr Al-Waheed and Mr Mohammed were

respectively interned by HM Forces. It is contended on behalf of the Secretary of

State that detention in these non-international armed conflicts was authorised under

international law by one or more of (1) treaty-based international humanitarian law,

(2) customary non-international law, or (3) the relevant SCRs. It is further contended

that article 5(1) is modified in its application to these conflicts so as to accommodate

the authorisation of detention under international humanitarian law or the relevant

SCRs, with the consequence that the list of permissible grounds of detention set out

in sub-paras (a) to (f) is not to be regarded as exhaustive. It is also contended that

detention in these conflicts satisfied the requirement in article 5(1) that any

deprivation of liberty must be “in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law”.

242. In considering these contentions, it is necessary to consider the relationship

between the Convention, international humanitarian law, and SCRs. It is also

necessary to consider the extent to which the application of international

humanitarian law and international human rights law depends on the nature of the

armed conflict in question: whether, in particular, it is classified under international

humanitarian law as an international or a non-international armed conflict. It may

be helpful at the outset to consider the meaning of these terms.

International and non-international armed conflict

243. “Non-international armed conflict” is an expression which has no universally

agreed definition, but can be understood for present purposes as referring, in the

language of article 3 of all four of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (“common

article 3”), to “armed conflict not of an international character”, as opposed to

international armed conflict, which can be understood as referring, in the language

of common article 2, to “cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which

may arise between two or more of the high contracting parties”. So understood, non-

international armed conflict includes conflict in which organised armed groups

engage in hostilities against a state. Such conflict may be purely internal to the state

concerned, or it may not. It may include situations where a foreign state intervenes

in an internal armed conflict in support of the government of the state concerned, at

its invitation or with its consent. Such conflict is to be distinguished from conflict in

which one state engages in hostilities against another, which falls into the category

of international armed conflict.

244. Examples of non-international armed conflict involving the intervention of

foreign armed forces include certain phases of the recent conflicts in Iraq and

Afghanistan. Although the conflict in Iraq began as an international armed conflict

conducted by coalition forces against the Iraqi armed forces, a multi-national force,

to which about 40 states contributed, remained there after that war had concluded

and a new Iraqi Government had been established, so as to assist the Iraqi

Government in combating insurgents. That phase of the conflict was a non-

international armed conflict. Similarly, when an international security assistance

force, to which about 50 states contributed, assisted the Government of Afghanistan

in its struggle against the Taliban, that also was a non-international armed conflict.

Detention and the Geneva Conventions

245. It is necessary next to consider the significance of the distinction between

international and non-international armed conflicts in relation to the authorisation of

detention under international humanitarian law. In that regard, it is helpful to begin

by considering the relevant provisions of the Geneva Conventions.

246. Traditionally, international humanitarian law, like other international law,

was concerned almost entirely with the reciprocal relationships between states, and

therefore with conflicts between states rather than internal conflicts between a state

and its subjects (subject to exceptions under customary law where internal conflicts

affected relationships with other states). It was therefore concerned only with

international armed conflict (subject, as I have explained, to limited exceptions).

247. Atrocities committed in civil wars led however to the adoption, as part of the

Geneva Conventions, of a limited measure of treaty-based regulation of non-

international armed conflict under common article 3. That article provides for the

humane treatment of those who may have been involved in “armed conflict not of

an international character occurring in the territory of one of the high contracting

parties”. It states in para 1:

“Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including

members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and

those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or

any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely

...”

It goes on to prohibit specific acts, such as torture and rape.

248. Common article 3 was later supplemented by Additional Protocol II to the

Geneva Conventions (1977). This is narrower in scope than common article 3 in two

important respects. First, it is only applicable in armed conflicts taking place on the

territory of a state that has ratified it. Those states do not include several states in

which non-international armed conflicts have recently taken place, including Iraq

and, until November 2009, Afghanistan. It also applies to a more limited category

of armed conflicts than common article 3: namely, those that “take place in the

territory of a contracting party between its armed forces and dissident armed forces

which, under responsible command, exercise such control over a part of its territory

as to be enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to

implement [the obligations imposed by the Protocol]”. Certain categories of armed

conflict are excluded: first, “armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting against

colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise

of their right of self-determination”, and secondly “situations of internal

disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and

other acts of a similar nature”. The Protocol spells out rules of humane treatment in

greater detail than common article 3, and lays down minimum standards in relation

to the prosecution and punishment, under domestic law, of criminal offences related

to the armed conflict.

249. By comparison, the Geneva Conventions deal much more fully with the

treatment of those involved in international armed conflict. In relation to the present

appeals, it is relevant to note in particular the provisions concerned with the

detention of prisoners of war and civilians. In relation to the first of these categories,

article 21 of the Third Geneva Convention authorises the detention of prisoners of

war:

“The Detaining Power may subject prisoners of war to

internment.”

The persons who may be detained under this power are defined in detail by article

4(A). They include members of armed forces of a party to the international armed

conflict (article 4(A)(1)), members of other armed forces who profess allegiance to

a party to the conflict (article 4(A)(3)), members of militias fulfilling certain

conditions (article 4(A)(2)), and persons who accompany the armed forces, such as

civilian contractors and war correspondents (article 4(A)(4)). The treatment of

prisoners of war during their internment is also the subject of detailed regulation.

Under article 118 of the Third Geneva Convention, they must be released and

repatriated without delay after the cessation of active hostilities in the international

armed conflict.

250. So far as civilians are concerned, the Fourth Geneva Convention is concerned

with “protected persons”, defined by article 4 as “those who at a given moment and

in any manner whatsoever, find themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation, in

the hands of a Party to the conflict or Occupying Power of which they are not

nationals”. That general definition is then subject to a number of exclusions, such as

“nationals of a neutral state who find themselves in the territory of a belligerent State

... while the State of which they are nationals has normal diplomatic representation

in the State in whose hands they are”. In the section of the Convention dealing with

aliens in the territory of a party to the conflict, article 41 prohibits measures of

control of protected persons more severe than assigned residence or internment.

Article 42 sets out the permitted grounds of internment, and provides that “the

internment ... of protected persons may be ordered only if the security of the

detaining power makes it absolutely necessary”. The International Criminal

Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia has interpreted article 42 as permitting

internment only if there are “serious and legitimate reasons” to think that the

interned persons may seriously prejudice the security of the detaining power by

means such as sabotage or espionage: Prosecutor v Zejnil Delalić, Case No: IT-96-

21-T, Trial Chamber, 16 November 1998, para 1132. Article 43 lays down

procedures governing internment:

“Any protected person who has been interned ... shall be

entitled to have such action reconsidered as soon as possible by

an appropriate court or administrative board designated by the

detaining power for that purpose. If the internment ... is

maintained, the court or administrative board shall

periodically, and at least twice yearly, give consideration to his

or her case, with a view to the favourable amendment of the

initial decision, if circumstances permit.”

Article 46 requires that restrictive measures taken regarding protected persons, in so

far as they have not previously been withdrawn, must be cancelled as soon as

possible after the close of hostilities in the international armed conflict.

251. Further provision for the detention of civilians is made in the section of the

Fourth Geneva Convention dealing with occupied territories. Article 68 is concerned

with protected persons who commit an offence which is solely intended to harm the

occupying power. In the case of certain specified types of offence, such persons are

liable to internment, provided its duration is proportionate to the offence committed.

A further power of internment is provided by article 78:

“If the occupying power considers it necessary, for imperative

reasons of security, to take safety measures concerning

protected persons, it may, at the most, subject them to assigned

residence or to internment. Decisions regarding such assigned

residence or internment shall be made according to a regular

procedure to be prescribed by the occupying power in

accordance with the provisions of the present Convention. This

procedure shall include the right of appeal for the parties

concerned. Appeals shall be decided with the least possible

delay. In the event of the decision being upheld, it shall be

subject to periodical review, if possible every six months, by a

competent body set up by the said power.”

252. Article 79 of the Fourth Geneva Convention prohibits the internment of

protected persons other than in accordance with articles 41, 42, 43, 68 and 78.

Detailed provision is made elsewhere in the Fourth Geneva Convention in relation

to the treatment of internees. Article 132 requires that each interned person shall be

released as soon as the reasons which necessitated his internment no longer exist,

and article 133 provides that internment shall cease as soon as possible after the

close of hostilities, subject to specified exceptions.

253. Whereas articles 4 and 21 of the Third Geneva Convention, and articles 4,

42, 43, 68 and 78 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, confer explicit authority to

detain in an international armed conflict, and contain detailed provisions concerning

the grounds and procedures governing detention in those circumstances, no

comparable treaty provisions of international humanitarian law apply in relation to

non-international armed conflicts. Instead, legal authority for the detention of

participants in a civil conflict, and the grounds and procedures governing detention

in those circumstances, are normally regulated by the domestic law of the state

where the conflict occurs. They may also be regulated for some purposes by the

domestic law of the detaining state, if different from the state where the conflict

occurs; or by SCRs. It will be necessary to return to the latter possibility.

254. This distinction reflects the fact that prisoners of war have committed no

offence by their participation in an international armed conflict. They are detained

purely as an administrative measure, for the duration of the hostilities. Non-state

actors who participate in a non-international armed conflict, on the other hand,

commit offences against the law of the country in question when fighting to

overthrow its government (as in most, but not all, non-international armed conflicts),

and killing or injuring individuals in the course of doing so. They are therefore

subject to penal proceedings, including detention pending trial or following

conviction.

255. The distinction has long been understood and accepted by the British

Government. For example, during the “Troubles” in Northern Ireland, participants

in the violence, other than the forces of the Crown, were treated as criminals under

domestic law rather than as prisoners of war. When the Government wished to

impose administrative internment on suspected members of the IRA, instead of

dealing with them through the criminal justice system, Parliament enacted

legislation in order to enable it to do so. The Ministry of Defence summarised the

general position in The Joint Service Manual of Armed Conflict (2004 ed), paras

15.6.2-15.6.3:

“Unlike combatants in an international armed conflict,

members of dissident armed forces remain liable to prosecution

for offences under domestic law. These can include normal acts

of combat - for example, a dissident combatant who kills or

injures a member of the government forces may be prosecuted

for murder or other offences against the person - and even

membership of the dissident group. A member of the security

forces who kills a dissident or a civilian will also have to justify

his actions under domestic law and may be tried before the

courts for any offence he may have committed.

A captured member of dissident fighting forces is not legally

entitled to prisoner of war status. He may be dealt with

according to the law of the state for any offences he may have

committed. A member of the security forces who is captured

by the dissidents is not entitled to prisoner of war status but any

mistreatment of him is likely to amount to an offence against

the law of the state.”

It added at para 15.30.3:

“Prisoner of war status does not arise in internal armed

conflicts unless the parties to the conflict agree, or decide

unilaterally, as a matter of policy, to accord this status to

detainees. Otherwise, the treatment of detainees is governed by

the domestic law of the country concerned, and human rights

treaties binding on that state in time of armed conflict and the

basic humanitarian principles mentioned in [common article 3

and Additional Protocol II].”

Arguments in favour of the view that detention in non-international conflicts is

authorised by international humanitarian law

256. Some commentators have argued that international humanitarian law

impliedly authorises the detention of persons in a non-international armed conflict:

see, for example, Gill and Fleck, The Handbook of the International Law of Military

Operations (2010), p 471, and Pejic, “Procedural principles and safeguards for

internment/administrative detention in armed conflict and other situations of

violence” (2005) 87 International Review of the Red Cross 375, 377. In summary,

such arguments place reliance on the reference to detention in common article 3,

and the reference to persons “interned or detained” in Additional Protocol II. They

argue that common article 3 and Additional Protocol II, in requiring detention in

non-international armed conflicts to comply with certain humanitarian standards,

impliedly recognise that detention is authorised by international humanitarian law

in such circumstances. They also argue that, since states are undeniably entitled to

use lethal force in combating insurgents in non-international armed conflicts, they

must also be authorised to use the lesser alternative of detention. It is inherent in the

nature of any armed conflict that parties to such a conflict may capture persons who,

if at liberty, would pose a threat to their security. There must, it is contended, be an

implied authority under international humanitarian law to intern such persons, since

otherwise the alternatives would be either to release them or to kill them.

257. A related approach has been adopted by the International Committee of the

Red Cross (“ICRC”) in its Opinion Paper, “Internment in Armed Conflict: Basic

Rules and Challenges” (2014), where it distinguishes between “traditional” non-

international armed conflict, occurring between government armed forces and non-

state armed groups, and non-international armed conflict “with an extraterritorial

element”, in which “the armed forces of one or more state, or of an international or

regional organisation, fight alongside the armed forces of a host state, in its territory,

against one or more organised non-state armed groups” (p 7). In a situation of

“traditional” non-international armed conflict, the ICRC Opinion Paper

acknowledges that domestic law constitutes the legal framework for possible

internment whereas, in a situation of non-international armed conflict with an

extraterritorial element, the Opinion Paper contends that common article 3 and

Additional Protocol II, and also customary international humanitarian law, reflected

in those instruments, contain an inherent legal basis to intern (pp 7-8).

Arguments against that view

258. As a matter of policy, there is much to be said for the view that international

humanitarian law should recognise a right to intern in non-international armed

conflicts with an extra-territorial element. As statements of the current state of the

law, however, these contentions are controversial. Many scholars take a different

view: to give only a few recent examples, see Conte, “The legality of detention in

armed conflict”, in The War Report 2014 (2015), ed Casey-Maslen; Dinstein, Non-

International Armed Conflicts in International Law (2014), para 274; Debuf,

Captured in War: Lawful Internment in Armed Conflict (2013), p 465; Goldman,

“Extraterritorial Application of the Human Rights to Life and Personal Liberty,

Including Habeas Corpus, During Situations of Armed Conflict”, in Research

Handbook on Human Rights and Humanitarian Law (2013), eds Kolb and Gaggioli,

p 121; Hill-Cawthorne, Detention in Non-International Armed Conflict (2016),

Chapter 3; Milanovic, “The Applicability of the Conventions to ‘Transnational’ and

‘Mixed’ Conflicts”, in The 1949 Geneva Conventions: A Commentary (2015),

Clapham, Gaeta and Sassòli (eds), pp 46-47; Rona, “Is there a Way Out of the Non-

International Armed Conflict Dilemma?” (2015) 91 International Law Studies 32;

Rowe, “Is there a right to detain civilians by foreign armed forces during a non-

international armed conflict?” (2012) 61 ICLQ 697, 702; and Sivakumaran, The Law

of International Armed Conflict (2012), p 71. The contentions set out in paras 256

and 257 above have also been rejected by the International Commission of Jurists in

its Legal Commentary on the Right to Challenge the Lawfulness of Detention in

Armed Conflict (2015), pp 16-23.

259. Considering first the contention that the Geneva Conventions and their

Protocols impliedly authorise detention in non-international armed conflicts, the

arguments against that view can be summarised as follows.

Textual arguments

260. First, whereas articles 4 and 21 of the Third Geneva Convention (concerning

prisoners of war), and articles 4, 42, 68 and 78 of the Fourth Geneva Convention

(concerning civilians) confer express authority to detain specified categories of

person on specified grounds in situations of international armed conflict, the

Conventions and their Additional Protocols contain no provisions expressly

conferring such authority in situations of non-international armed conflict. Applying

ordinary principles of interpretation (expressio unius, exclusio alterius), it is

unlikely in those circumstances that the contracting parties intended to confer such

authority by implication.

261. Secondly, the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol II are silent as to

the grounds of detention and the applicable procedural safeguards in a non-

international armed conflict, in contrast to the detailed provision made for

international armed conflict. It is argued that it is difficult to suppose that these

instruments were intended to confer an authority to detain, or to interpret them as

doing so, when they contain no indication of the scope of the power supposedly

conferred. The ICRC Opinion Paper suggests that these matters can be addressed,

in the context of an “extraterritorial” non-international armed conflict, by an ad hoc

international agreement between the international forces and the host state, or by the

domestic law of the host state (p 8). In that event, however, the legal basis for

detention would be the international agreement or domestic law.

Contextual arguments

262. It is also argued that there are cogent reasons why the states negotiating the

Conventions and their Additional Protocols are unlikely to have intended to confer

any such authorisation. It is apparent from the travaux préparatoires that states

regarded it as important to maintain their sovereignty over internal matters.

Common article 3 was a controversial measure, the British delegate, for example,

objecting that it would “strike at the root of national sovereignty” (Final Record of

the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva of 1949: Vol II, Section B (1963), p 10). It

has to be remembered that it was only in the aftermath of the Second World War

that the scope of international law was widely extended to matters internal to

sovereign states. In that regard, common article 3 was connected to other

developments, including the emergence of international human rights law, with the

Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) and the International Covenant on

Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) (1966), together with regional instruments

such as the European Convention on Human Rights (1950). Similar concerns about

sovereignty were also expressed by numerous states during the diplomatic

conference which led to Additional Protocol II (see Hill-Cawthorne, op cit, pp 23-

24).

263. A further concern was to avoid giving the appearance of a legitimate status

to those who rebel against their government (ibid, pp 25-26). The British delegate

in 1949 commented, for example, that “the application of the Conventions [to

internal conflicts] would appear to give the status of belligerents to insurgents,

whose right to wage war could not be recognised” (Final Record, Vol II, Section B,

p 10). In so far as common article 3 raised that concern, it was addressed by common

article 3(4), which makes clear that the legal status of the parties to the conflict is

not altered. It is argued that it is unlikely, given those concerns, that the parties

intended to depart from the position that the detention of captured insurgents was

governed by domestic law, subject to guarantees of humane treatment. Furthermore,

since international humanitarian law is generally understood as being reciprocal in

its operation (unlike international human rights law, which is directly binding only

on states), the authorisation of detention in non-international armed conflicts would

have entailed that states recognised the legitimacy of detention by dissident armed

groups (for example, the legitimacy of the detention of British and American troops

in Afghanistan by the Taliban): something which would be anathema to most states.

Arguments against inferential reasoning

264. Fourthly, in so far as the contentions are based on an inference, from the fact

that common article 3 and Additional Protocol II require a minimum level of

humanitarian treatment for people who are detained during non-international armed

conflict, that detention is therefore authorised by those instruments, it is argued that

the reasoning rests on a non sequitur: that the regulation of conduct by international

humanitarian law entails that the conduct in question is authorised by international

humanitarian law. Provisions requiring that persons interned in a non-international

armed conflict should be treated humanely implicitly recognise that detention occurs

in fact, but, it is argued, do not imply that it is authorised by law, let alone that it is

authorised by international law rather than by the domestic law of the place where

the conflict takes place or some other applicable law, still less that it is authorised

by those very provisions. Common article 3 and Additional Protocol II, it is argued,

are not concerned with the grant of powers to detain: they are simply intended to

ensure the humane treatment of all persons who are detained, including those

detained by non-state groups, and apply whether their detention is legally justified

or not. As the International Committee of the Red Cross Commentary on the Geneva

Conventions (1952), ed Pictet, states in relation to common article 3, “it merely

ensures respect for the few essential rules of humanity which all civilised nations

consider as valid everywhere and in all circumstances” (p 60).

265. Fifthly, it is argued that a similar fallacy - that the absence of a prohibition is

equivalent to the presence of an authorisation - vitiates the contention that, since

international humanitarian law does not prohibit the use of lethal force in non-

international armed conflict, therefore it must impliedly provide lawful authority for

the use of the lesser alternative of detention. In the first place, it is argued, the

contention is based on a false dichotomy: that either international humanitarian law

confers lawful authority for the detention of prisoners, or they must be killed or

released. As explained above, however, lawful authority for detention (and, indeed,

for killing) in a non-international armed conflict is normally conferred not by

international humanitarian law but by the domestic law of the state in which the

conflict occurs. It may also be conferred by other sources of law, such as the

domestic law of the detaining state, or SCRs. Detention may be authorised by any

of these sources of law only for defined purposes, such as criminal investigation and

prosecution, and it may be rendered subject to judicial control (just as domestic or

international law may authorise killing only in specified circumstances, and render

soldiers who kill in other circumstances liable to prosecution and punishment). The

idea that, in the absence of authority under international humanitarian law, soldiers

have no lawful option in a non-international armed conflict but to release captured

prisoners is therefore mistaken.

266. Furthermore, it is argued, the contention that authority to kill impliedly

carries with it authority to detain, even if well-founded, would only result in

authority to detain those who might otherwise be lawfully killed: a limited category

of persons which would not, for example, include Mr Al-Waheed, who on the

assumed facts was an unarmed man who offered no violence towards the members

of HM Forces who detained him. The argument would not, therefore, support the

existence of a power of detention of the width for which the Secretary of State argues

in the present proceedings.

267. In short, it is argued that it is not germane to the question here in issue to

demonstrate that the killing of insurgents in non-international armed conflict is not

prohibited by international humanitarian law. It does not follow from the absence of

such a prohibition that international humanitarian law therefore confers lawful

authority for detention. In international armed conflict, such authority can be found

in article 21 of the Third Geneva Convention and articles 42, 68 and 78 of the Fourth

Geneva Convention, but those provisions do not apply to non-international armed

conflict. In a situation of the latter kind, lawful authority must be sought elsewhere.

Normally, it will arise under domestic law, but it may also arise out of other branches

of international law, as for example where it is conferred by an SCR.

Arguments based on the absence of protection against arbitrary detention

268. Sixthly, it is argued that the contention that common article 3 and Additional

Protocol II authorise detention in non-international armed conflict is difficult to

reconcile with the requirement under international law that the deprivation of liberty

must be non-arbitrary. That is a requirement which the ICRC maintains is implicit

in the obligation, imposed by common article 3 and Additional Protocol II, that

detainees should be treated “humanely”, and it is in any event imposed by article

9(1) of the ICCPR, which provides that “no one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest

or detention” and that “no one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds

and in accordance with such procedure as are established by law”. Similar provisions

exist in the regional human rights treaties: article 6 of the African Charter on Human

and Peoples’ Rights, article 7 of the American Convention on Human Rights, article

14 of the Arab Charter on Human Rights, and article 5 of the European Convention

on Human Rights.

269. Any law authorising detention must therefore define the circumstances in

which it applies “with sufficient precision to avoid overly broad or arbitrary

interpretation or application” (see the Human Rights Committee’s General

Comment No 35, “Article 9 (Liberty and security of the person)”, UN Doc

CCPR/C/GC/35 (2014), para 22: the Human Rights Committee is the UN body

established to monitor the implementation of the ICCPR, and has included among

its members present and former judges of the European Court of Human Rights).

This requirement is illustrated by several reports in which the Human Rights

Committee has considered grounds for detention to be insufficiently precise (eg

Concluding Observations: Initial Report of Honduras, UN Doc

CCPR/C/HND/CO/1 (2006), para 13). The concept of arbitrariness is, however, of

broader scope: it “is not to be equated with ‘against the law’ but must be interpreted

more broadly to include elements of inappropriateness, injustice, lack of

predictability and due process of law”: Mukong v Cameroon, UN Doc

CCPR/C/51/D/458/1991 (1994). International humanitarian law, however, contains

no definition of the permitted grounds of detention in non-international armed

conflict, nor any mention of procedural protections.

270. Specifically in relation to security detention in situations of armed conflict,

the Human Rights Committee has stated that “security detention authorised and

regulated by and complying with international humanitarian law in principle is not

arbitrary” (General Comment No 35, para 64; emphasis added). In other words, in

order for detention for reasons of security not to be arbitrary, on the hypothesis that

it is (1) authorised by international humanitarian law, it must also be (2) regulated

by international humanitarian law, so that (3) it is possible to determine whether the

detention is in compliance with international humanitarian law. These requirements

are satisfied in situations of international armed conflict by the provisions of the

Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions which were discussed earlier. In non-

international armed conflict, on the other hand, it is argued that neither common

article 3 nor Additional Protocol II defines who may be detained, on what grounds,

in accordance with what procedures, or for how long. In consequence, it is argued,

there is no possibility of determining whether detention in non-international armed

conflict complies with any such requirements.

Arguments relating to customary international humanitarian law

271. Considering next the contention that detention in a non-international armed

conflict is authorised by customary international humanitarian law, the arguments

against that view can be summarised as follows. It is argued that the contention lacks

sufficient support in either opinio juris or state practice. So far as the former is

concerned, the contention is disputed by many experts in this area of the law, as

explained in para 258 above. It is argued that it is also unsupported by the ICRC’s

major international study into state practice, Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck,

Customary International Humanitarian Law (2005). That study concludes that the

arbitrary deprivation of liberty is prohibited (pp 347-349), but not that there are

grounds on which the deprivation of liberty is authorised under customary

international humanitarian law. The ICRC’s catalogue of the rules of customary

international humanitarian law is also said to give no support to the idea that they

include an authority to detain: ICRC, Customary IHL, www.icrc.org/customary-

ihl/eng/docs/v1.

http://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1

http://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1

272. So far as state practice is concerned, it is of course true that states involved

in non-international armed conflicts have detained persons, but, it is argued, it does

not follow that they have done so in reliance on a right to do so under international

humanitarian law (rather than the absence of a prohibition of such detention under

international humanitarian law, and a right under domestic law, or under an SCR).

Reference was made by counsel for the Secretary of State to a recital forming part

of the preamble to Resolution 1 of the 32nd International Conference of the ICRC

and Red Crescent in December 2015, which refers to states having “in all forms of

armed conflict, the power to detain”, but commentators have argued that those words

are not conclusive evidence of state practice, and that the resolution was not in any

event concerned with the authorisation of detention. Reference was also made to

The Copenhagen Process: Principles and Guidelines, but commentators have

pointed out that the official commentary to principle 16 states that “the mere

inclusion of a practice in The Copenhagen Process Principles and Guidelines should

not be taken as evidence that states regard the practice as required out of a sense of

legal obligation”. As the Court of Appeal noted at para 231 of its judgment in the

case of Mr Mohammed, the only example of a state which has placed reliance on

international humanitarian law as a basis for detention in a non-international armed

conflict, other than the Ministry of Defence in the present proceedings, appears to

be the Netherlands, in a letter dated 21 July 2006, headed “Combating international

terrorism”, sent by the Foreign Minister, the Minister of Defence and the Minister

for Development Cooperation to the President of the House of Representatives (KST

99753, 27 225 Nr 221). That approach can be contrasted with the practice of the UK

and other states in Iraq and Afghanistan (see paras 311-312, 336-337 and 341

below).

273. In addition, it has been pointed out that the ICRC itself accepts that customary

international humanitarian law prohibits the arbitrary deprivation of liberty: see

ICRC, Customary IHL, rules 87 and 99. That prohibition is said to be a rule

applicable in both international and non-international armed conflict, established by

state practice in the form of military manuals, national legislation and official

statements, and also international human rights law. The arguments discussed in

paras 268-270 above are therefore also relevant in this context.

Conclusions

274. As the foregoing discussion makes clear, there are substantial arguments both

for and against the contention that the Geneva Conventions or their Protocols

implicitly confer authority under international law for detention in non-international

armed conflicts. My current view, based on the submissions in the present case, is

that the arguments against that contention - the textual arguments discussed in paras

260-261 above, the contextual arguments discussed in paras 262-263, the arguments

against inferential reasoning discussed in paras 264-267, and the arguments based

on the absence of adequate protection against arbitrary detention discussed in paras

268-270 - are cumulatively the more persuasive.

275. Customary international humanitarian law is a developing body of law, and

it may reach the stage where it confers a right to detain in a non-international armed

conflict. The submissions made on behalf of the Ministry of Defence have not,

however, persuaded me that it has yet reached that stage. The contention that

authority for detention in non-international armed conflicts is conferred by

customary international humanitarian law is controversial as a matter of expert

opinion. There appears to be a paucity of state practice which is supportive of the

contention, as explained at para 272. In those circumstances, I have not been

persuaded that there exists at present either sufficient opinio juris or a sufficiently

extensive and uniform practice to establish the suggested rule of customary

international law.

276. In short, it appears to me that international humanitarian law sets out a

detailed regime for detention in international armed conflict, conferring authority

for such detention, specifying the grounds on which detention is authorised, laying

down the procedures by which it is regulated, and limiting its duration, in accordance

with the requirements of article 9 of the ICCPR and analogous regional provisions.

In contrast, subject to compliance with minimum standards of humane treatment,

international humanitarian law leaves it to states to determine, usually under

domestic law, in what circumstances, and subject to what procedural requirements,

persons may be detained in situations of non-international armed conflict. It follows

that the Ministry of Defence’s argument in the present case that the detention of Mr

Al-Waheed and Mr Mohammed was authorised by conventional or customary

international humanitarian law should be rejected.

Detention in the non-international conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan under the

SCRs

277. It is necessary next to consider the Ministry of Defence’s contention that

authority for detention, in circumstances falling outside article 5(1)(a) to (f) of the

Convention, was conferred on HM Forces, in the non-international conflicts in Iraq

and Afghanistan, by the relevant SCRs. For the purpose of considering that

contention, the SCRs have to be interpreted in accordance with principles laid down

by the European Court of Human Rights in a number of its judgments. It is therefore

necessary to begin by considering the most significant of these judgments.

(1) Al-Jedda v United Kingdom

278. In the case of Al-Jedda v United Kingdom the Grand Chamber concluded that

there had been a violation of article 5(1) in respect of the detention by HM Forces

of a suspected insurgent during the non-international armed conflict in Iraq. Mr Al-

Jedda’s detention occurred between October 2004 and December 2007, after an Iraqi

Government had been established with sovereign authority. It overlapped with that

of Mr Al-Waheed, which occurred during February and March 2007. The Multi-

National Force was at that time fighting against insurgents with the consent of the

Iraqi Government, under a mandate established by SCR 1546 (2004), as extended

by SCRs 1637 (2005) and 1723 (2006).

279. SCR 1546 had been preceded by letters to the President of the Security

Council from the Prime Minister of Iraq and the US Secretary of State. In his letter,

the Prime Minister requested the Security Council to make a new resolution

authorising the Multi-National Force, which had previously been in occupation of

Iraq following the defeat of Iraqi forces, to remain on Iraqi territory and to contribute

to maintaining security there, “including through the tasks and arrangements” set

out in the accompanying letter from the US Secretary of State. In his letter, the

Secretary of State confirmed that the Multi-National Force was prepared to continue

to contribute to the maintenance of security in Iraq, including by preventing and

deterring terrorism. He added that, under the agreed arrangement, the Multi-

National Force stood

“ready to continue to undertake a broad range of tasks to

contribute to the maintenance of security and to ensure force

protection. These include activities necessary to counter

ongoing security threats posed by forces seeking to influence

Iraq’s political future through violence. This will include

combat operations against members of these groups,

internment where this is necessary for imperative reasons of

security, and the continued search for and securing of weapons

that threaten Iraq’s security.”

The words “internment when this is necessary for imperative reasons of security”

reflected the terms of article 78 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which had applied

prior to the establishment of the Iraqi Government, when Iraq had been an occupied

territory.

280. These letters were annexed to SCR 1546. The preamble to the resolution

recognised the request of the Iraqi Prime Minister in the annexed letter to retain the

presence of the Multi-National Force, welcomed the willingness of the Multi-

National Force to continue efforts to contribute to the maintenance of security and

stability in Iraq, and noted “the commitment of all forces ... to act in accordance with

international law”. In para 9 of the resolution the Security Council noted that the

Multi-National Force remained in Iraq at the request of the incoming government,

and reaffirmed the authorisation for the Multi-National Force first established under

SCR 1511, “having regard to letters annexed to this resolution”. In para 10 it stated

that the Multi-National Force:

“shall have the authority to take all necessary measures to

contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq

in accordance with the letters annexed to this resolution

expressing, inter alia, the Iraqi request for the continued

presence of the Multi-National Force and setting out its tasks,

including by preventing and deterring terrorism.”

281. Procedures were laid down for the review of detention, under the domestic

law of Iraq, by Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) Memorandum No 3

(Revised), which provided:

“(1) Any person ·who is detained by a national contingent of

the MNF [Multi-National Force] for imperative reasons of

security in accordance with the mandate set out in UNSCR

1546 (hereinafter ‘security internee’) shall, if he is held for a

period longer than 72 hours, be entitled to have a review of the

decision to intern him.

(2) The review must take place with the least possible delay

and in any case must be held no later than seven days after the

date of induction into an internment facility.

(3) Further reviews of the continued detention of any

security internee shall be conducted on a regular basis but in

any case no/later than six months from the date of induction

into an internment facility.

(4) The operation, condition and standards of any

internment facility established by the MNF shall be in

accordance with Section IV of the Fourth Geneva Convention

...”

It has been held by a majority of the Court of Appeal that detention in accordance

with these procedures was lawful under the law of Iraq: Al-Jedda v Secretary of

State for Defence [2010] EWCA Civ 758; [2011] QB 773.

282. Mr Al-Jedda was detained in a British military facility for over three years.

His continuing internment was authorised and reviewed in accordance with the CPA

Memorandum, initially by British military personnel and subsequently also by

representatives of the Iraqi and British Governments and by non-British military

personnel, on the basis of intelligence material which was never disclosed to him.

He was able to make written submissions to the reviewing authorities but there was

no provision for an oral hearing. His internment was authorised “for imperative

reasons of security”. There was no intention at any point to bring criminal charges

against him. In these circumstances, his detention did not fall within any of sub-

paragraphs (a) to (f) of article 5(1) of the Convention.

283. In domestic proceedings, the majority of the House of Lords considered that

it could be inferred from the text of SCR 1546, and from the context in which it was

adopted, that states contributing to the Multi-National Force were authorised to

intern individuals where necessary for imperative reasons of security; that the

authorisation should be regarded as an obligation for the purposes of article 103 of

the UN Charter (“In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the members

of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other

international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail”);

and that, to the extent that such internment was unavoidably incompatible with

article 5(1) of the European Convention, the UK’s obligations under article 5(1)

were therefore qualified: R (Al-Jedda) v Secretary of State for Defence (JUSTICE

intervening) [2007] UKHL 58; [2008] 1 AC 332. In a speech which anticipated some

of the points later to be made by the European court, Baroness Hale of Richmond

agreed only to the extent that competing commitments under the UN Charter and

the Convention could be reconciled by adopting a qualification of the Convention

rights.

284. The European court rejected the idea that the SCR should be interpreted as

impliedly imposing an obligation which would contravene obligations under

international human rights law:

“[T]he court must have regard to the purposes for which the

United Nations was created. As well as the purpose of

maintaining international peace and security, set out in the first

sub-paragraph of article 1 of the UN Charter, the third sub-

paragraph provides that the United Nations was established to

‘achieve international cooperation in ... promoting and

encouraging respect for human rights and fundamental

freedoms’. Article 24(2) of the Charter requires the Security

Council, in discharging its duties with respect to its primary

responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and

security, to ‘act in accordance with the Purposes and Principles

of the United Nations’. Against this background, the court

considers that, in interpreting its resolutions, there must be a

presumption that the Security Council does not intend to

impose any obligation on member states to breach fundamental

principles of human rights. In the event of any ambiguity in the

terms of a Security Council resolution, the court must therefore

choose the interpretation which is most in harmony with the

requirements of the Convention and which avoids any conflict

of obligations ... [I]t is to be expected that clear and explicit

language would be used were the Security Council to intend

states to take particular measures which would conflict with

their obligations under international human rights law.” (para

102)

285. The principles of interpretation of SCRs which can be taken from that

passage are the following: (1) there is a presumption that the Security Council does

not intend to impose any obligation on member states to breach fundamental

principles of human rights; (2) in the event of ambiguity, the court must choose the

interpretation which is most in harmony with the requirements of the European

Convention; and (3) it is to be expected that clear and explicit language will be used

if the Security Council intends states to take measures which would conflict with

their obligations under international human rights law.

286. On that basis, the European court interpreted SCR 1546 as leaving unaffected

the obligation of the member states within the Multi-National Force to comply with

their obligations under international human rights law:

“Internment is not explicitly referred to in the resolution. In

para 10 the Security Council decides that the Multi-National

Force shall have authority ‘to take all necessary measures to

contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq

in accordance with the letters annexed’, which inter alia set out

the Multi-National Force’s tasks. Internment is listed in

Secretary of State Powell’s letter, as an example of the ‘broad

range of tasks’ which the Multi-National Force stood ready to

undertake. In the court's view, the terminology of the resolution

appears to leave the choice of the means to achieve this end to

the member states within the Multi-National Force. Moreover,

in the preamble, the commitment of all forces to act in

accordance with international law is noted. It is clear that the

Convention forms part of international law ... In the absence of

clear provision to the contrary, the presumption must be that

the Security Council intended states within the Multi-National

Force to contribute towards the maintenance of security in Iraq

while complying with their obligations under international

human rights law.” (para 105)

287. The court rejected the Government’s alternative contention that a legal basis

for the applicant’s detention could be found in international humanitarian law. The

argument was that SCR 1546 had maintained in place the position under

international humanitarian law which had existed during the occupation of Iraq,

when the Fourth Geneva Convention applied. The court noted that para 2 of SCR

1546 recorded the end of the occupation, and that the Fourth Geneva Convention

did not in any event authorise indefinite internment (para 107). The court also

considered whether a basis for detention which could operate to disapply the

requirements of article 5(1) was provided by the agreement between the Iraqi

Government and the US Government, set out in the letters annexed to SCR 1546,

but concluded that such an agreement could not override the obligations under the

Convention (para 108). The court therefore concluded that there was no conflict

between the United Kingdom’s obligations under the UN Charter and its obligations

under article 5(1) of the Convention (para 109). It followed that the applicant’s

detention constituted a violation of article 5(1) (para 110).

(2) Nada v Switzerland

288. Shortly after Al-Jedda, the Grand Chamber decided the case of Nada v

Switzerland (2012) 56 EHRR 18, which concerned a Swiss law implementing an

SCR requiring sanctions to be imposed on individuals listed as being associated with

Al-Qaeda. The sanctions imposed were incompatible with the applicant’s rights

under article 8 of the Convention. The court confirmed the principles laid down in

para 102 of Al-Jedda, set out in para 284 above, but distinguished that case on the

basis that the SCR in issue in Nada clearly and explicitly imposed an obligation to

take measures capable of breaching human rights, whereas in Al-Jedda “the wording

of the resolution at issue did not specifically mention internment without trial” (para

172). However, the court also found that Switzerland “enjoyed some latitude, which

was admittedly limited but nevertheless real”, in implementing the SCR (para 180).

On the basis of that finding, it took the view that Switzerland could not confine itself

to relying on the binding nature of SCRs, but should have persuaded the court that

it had taken - or at least had attempted to take - all possible measures to safeguard

the applicant’s rights under the Convention within the constraints set by the SCR.

On that basis, the court found it unnecessary to determine the relative priority of the

two instruments (paras 196-197).

(3) Al-Dulimi v Switzerland

289. The case of Al-Dulimi and Montana Management Inc v Switzerland

(Application No 5809/08) (unreported) given 21 June 2016 also concerned the

implementation of sanctions required by an SCR. The Grand Chamber repeated

what it had said in para 102 of Al-Jedda (para 140). It gave effect to that approach

by holding that, since the SCR in question did not contain any clear or explicit

wording excluding the possibility of judicial supervision of the listing of persons on

whom sanctions were to be imposed, it must be understood as authorising national

courts to exercise sufficient scrutiny so that any arbitrariness could be avoided (para

146).

(4) Hassan v United Kingdom

290. Between Nada and Al-Dulimi, the Grand Chamber decided the case of

Hassan v United Kingdom, which concerned an earlier phase of the Iraq conflict

than Al-Jedda or the present appeal of Mr Al-Waheed. Mr Hassan was captured by

HM Forces in Iraq during 2003, at a time when the situation there constituted either

international armed conflict or occupation, and the Third and Fourth Geneva

Conventions applied. He was detained for about nine days. He complained of a

violation of his rights under article 5 of the Convention. In response, the British

Government submitted that his detention had been authorised under article 21 of the

Third Geneva Convention, as a prisoner of war, or by articles 42 and 78 of the Fourth

Geneva Convention, as a civilian whose internment was necessary for imperative

reasons of security. In those circumstances, it argued, article 5 of the Convention

was displaced, or had to be modified so as to be compatible with the applicable lex

specialis, namely international humanitarian law.

291. In deciding how article 5 was to be interpreted in the light of the provisions

of the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions, the court applied article 31 of the

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (para 100). Under article 31(3)(b),

account was to be taken of any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty

in question which established the agreement of the parties regarding its

interpretation. The practice of the contracting parties to the European Convention

was not to derogate from their obligations under article 5 in order to detain persons

on the basis of the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions during international armed

conflict. That practice was contrasted with the practice of the contracting states in

relation to non-international armed conflict, such as the “Troubles” in Northern

Ireland and the Kurdish conflict in Turkey, and their practice in relation to terrorist

threats (para 101).

292. Under article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention, account was to be taken of

any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties.

The provisions in the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions relating to internment

were designed to protect captured combatants and civilians who posed a security

threat. The International Court of Justice had held that the protection offered by

human rights conventions and that offered by international humanitarian law co-

existed in situations of armed conflict. The court must therefore endeavour to

interpret and apply the European Convention in a manner which was consistent with

the framework under international law delineated by the International Court of

Justice (para 102). Accordingly:

“By reason of the co-existence of the safeguards provided by

international humanitarian law and by the Convention in time

of armed conflict, the grounds of permitted deprivation of

liberty set out in sub-paras (a) to (f) of [article 5(1)] should be

accommodated as far as possible, with the taking of prisoners

of war and the detention of civilians who pose a risk to security

under the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions. The court is

mindful of the fact that internment in peacetime does not fall

within the scheme of deprivation of liberty governed by article

5 of the Convention without the exercise of the power of

derogation under article 15. It can only be in cases of

international armed conflict, where the taking of prisoners of

war and the detention of civilians who pose a threat to security

are accepted features of international humanitarian law, that

article 5 could be interpreted as permitting the exercise of such

broad powers.” (para 104)

293. The court added that deprivation of liberty pursuant to powers under

international humanitarian law must be “lawful” to preclude a violation of article

5(1). This meant that the detention must comply with the rules of international

humanitarian law and, most importantly, that it should be in keeping with the

fundamental purpose of article 5(1), which was to protect the individual from

arbitrariness (para 105). In that regard, the court cited its case law concerning the

necessary safeguards against arbitrary detention.

294. Applying this approach to the facts, the court found that the applicant was

captured in circumstances giving reason to believe that he might be either a person

who could be detained as a prisoner of war or someone whose internment was

necessary for imperative reasons of security, both of which provided a legitimate

basis for detention under international humanitarian law (under article 21 of the

Third Geneva Convention and articles 42 and 78 of the Fourth Geneva Convention).

He was subject almost immediately to a screening process which led to his being

cleared for release. He was released shortly afterwards (para 109). In these

circumstances, his detention was consistent with the powers available to the UK

under the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions, and was not arbitrary. In these

circumstances, the court held that there had been no breach of article 5(1) of the

European Convention.

The relevance of Hassan to the present appeals

295. In the present appeals, the majority of the court accept the Ministry of

Defence’s argument that the reasoning in Hassan leads to the conclusion that, where

an SCR authorises detention in a non-international armed conflict in circumstances

other than those contemplated by sub-paragraphs (a) to (f) of article 5(1), the latter

provision must be modified so as to be consistent with the SCR. On that basis, the

majority accept that article 5(1) is modified so as to permit the detention which is

said to have been authorised by the SCRs in question in these appeals.

296. The argument takes as its starting point an interpretation of the SCRs as

authorising detention in circumstances falling outside the terms of article 5(1)(a) to

(f). It is because of that interpretation that it can be argued that article 5(1) then

requires to be modified so as to accommodate the detention authorised by the SCRs.

The terms of SCR 1546, which applied in the case of Mr Al-Waheed, have already

been considered. They did not clearly or explicitly authorise detention in

circumstances falling outside article 5(1)(a) to (f), as the court held in Al-Jedda. Nor

did SCR 1890, which applied in the case of Mr Mohammed, and will be considered

later. Applying the approach to the interpretation of SCRs established by the court

in its case law both prior and subsequent to Hassan, and summarised in para 285

above, it follows that the SCRs cannot be interpreted as authorising detention falling

outside article 5(1)(a) to (f). The premise on which the Ministry of Defence’s

argument is based is therefore inconsistent with the clear and constant jurisprudence

of the Grand Chamber concerning the interpretation of SCRs.

297. The answer put forward by the majority of the court is that, following Hassan,

article 5(1) must be interpreted as permitting detention during armed conflicts which

falls outside the categories listed in sub-paragraphs (a) to (f) but is authorised by an

SCR. On that basis, the interpretation of the SCRs as authorising detention which

falls outside article 5(1)(a) to (f) is not incompatible with the Convention. There are

a number of reasons why the judgment in Hassan does not appear to me to be

applicable to detention in the non-international conflicts with which these appeals

are concerned, which are explained below at paras 307-315 and 324. But a point

which should be made at the outset is that the reasoning of the majority appears to

me to be circular. The proposition which the majority seek to establish - that article

5(1) is modified so as to permit detention falling outside sub-paragraphs (a) to (f),

where such detention is authorised by an SCR - is actually assumed for the purposes

of its premise, that the SCRs should be interpreted as authorising such detention.

298. The case of Hassan was not concerned with the interpretation of an SCR. The

court did not, therefore, cite or consider, let alone depart from, the approach to the

interpretation of SCRs which it had set out in Al-Jedda and repeated in later cases.

On the contrary, at para 99 it pointed out that its judgment in Al-Jedda had concerned

the SCR there in question, and that no issue had been raised in relation to the powers

of detention provided for in the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions. The only

issue in the case of Hassan was the interpretation of article 5 of the Convention in a

context where detention was authorised by international humanitarian law - in

particular, by the provisions of the Geneva Conventions authorising the detention of

prisoners of war and civilians during international armed conflicts. Those provisions

did not apply in the situations with which the present appeals are concerned. Nor

was the detention of Mr Al-Waheed or Mr Mohammed authorised by any other rules

of international humanitarian law, for the reasons summarised in paras 274-276

above. The case of Hassan does not therefore appear to me to be in point when

deciding whether the detention of Mr Al-Waheed or Mr Mohammed was authorised

by the relevant SCRs. The answer to that question depends on the interpretation of

the SCRs; and the principles governing their interpretation, for the purpose of

establishing whether there has been a breach of the Convention, are those laid down

in Al-Jedda, Nada and Al-Dulimi, and summarised in para 285 above.

299. Put shortly, in Al-Jedda the court required greater precision of international

law, when it comes to authorising military detention in situations of armed conflict,

than was afforded by SCR 1546. Nothing in Hassan appears to me to cast any doubt

on that decision. Hassan was concerned with powers of detention under the Geneva

Conventions which are explicit and detailed, as explained at paras 249-252 above.

300. A different argument is put forward by Lord Mance at para 163: that to start

from the premise that SCR 1546 should be interpreted consistently with article 5(1)

is unsustainable, since article 5(1) does not reflect general international law, but is

unique in stating an ostensibly exhaustive list of circumstances in which detention

is permissible (unlike article 9 of the ICCPR), whereas SCR 1546 was not directed

only to states party to the Convention but to all member states of the United Nations.

I recognise the force of that argument, but it appears to me to be inconsistent with

the approach to the interpretation of SCRs which the European court has adopted in

a “clear and constant” line of decisions at Grand Chamber level.

301. Having considered the Strasbourg authorities, I can next consider the appeals.

The case of Mr Al-Waheed

302. Mr Al-Waheed is an Iraqi citizen. He was detained by HM Forces in Iraq for

about six weeks during February and March 2007, when the relevant legal regime

was identical to that considered in Al-Jedda and explained at paras 278-281 above.

The relevant facts in relation to his detention have not yet been established, but it is

assumed for the purposes of this appeal that he was detained on 11 February 2007

at a house where arms, ammunition, components for improvised explosive devices

(“IEDs”), and explosive charges, were found. Two days later an ad hoc British

Divisional Internment Review Committee decided that he should be interned for

imperative reasons of security. On 22 February the committee decided that, if it were

confirmed that he could not be proved to have handled any of the recovered material,

it was unlikely that he could be successfully prosecuted, and he should be released.

His case was reviewed again on 12 or 13 March, and again on 21 March, when a

decision on his release was deferred while forensic evidence was obtained. On 28

March he was released.

303. Mr Al-Waheed accepts that SCR 1546, as extended by SCR 1723, authorised

detention. He complains, however, that his detention violated article 5(1) of the

Convention. It is conceded on behalf of the Secretary of State that his detention was

attributable to the UK, and that he fell within the jurisdiction of the UK during his

internment for the purposes of article 1 of the Convention (which governs its

applicability). It is maintained on behalf of the Secretary of State that his detention

was justified under article 5(1)(c), but that issue is not before the court in this appeal.

The only issue raised in the appeal, as a preliminary point, is whether it was legally

necessary for his detention to fall within any of sub-paragraphs (a) to (f) of article

5(1). In relation to that issue, the judge, Leggatt J, was bound by the decision of the

House of Lords in Al-Jedda that article 5(1) did not apply to detention under SCR

1546 for imperative reasons of security, since SCR 1546 should be construed as

imposing an obligation to detain, and such an obligation prevailed over the

inconsistent obligation imposed by article 5(1) of the Convention, by reason of

article 103 of the UN Charter. Since the Court of Appeal would have been equally

bound by that decision, the appeal has come directly to this court.

Discussion

304. In my opinion this court should depart from the reasoning of the House of

Lords in relation to this point, summarised in para 283 above. It did not approach

the interpretation of SCR 1546 on the basis subsequently laid down by the Grand

Chamber and summarised in para 285 above. That approach, subsequently applied

in relation to other SCRs in the cases of Nada and Al-Dulimi, represented a

development in the court’s case law, based on a fuller consideration of international

law than appears in the speeches in the House of Lords. Its interpretation of SCR

1546 was also based on a fuller consideration of the scope of the authority conferred

than appears to have been canvassed in argument before the House of Lords.

305. Although it is of course open to this court to adopt a different approach to the

relationship between the Convention and other international instruments from that

adopted by the Grand Chamber, such a course would run contrary to the general

intention that the Human Rights Act 1998 should “bring rights home”, and would

require some compelling justification. It does not seem to me that such a justification

has been made out. In particular, the Ministry of Defence’s argument that the issue

is a question of interpretation of the UN Charter and the SCR, on which the

European court has no particular authority, seems to me to be an over-simplification.

The interpretation and application of the Convention depend on its interaction with

other international instruments, and a uniform approach to these issues is desirable

if the Convention system of guaranteeing a minimum level of human rights

protection by all the contracting parties is to be preserved. In my view, this court

should therefore proceed on the basis that article 103 of the UN Charter is not

applicable.

306. Consistently with that conclusion, the Grand Chamber held in Al-Jedda that

there was a presumption that the Security Council intended states within the Multi-

National Force to contribute towards the maintenance of security in Iraq while

complying with their obligations under international human rights law. In its view,

nothing in SCR 1546 displaced that presumption. Article 5(1) of the Convention

therefore continued to apply. Since Mr Al-Jedda’s detention did not fall within any

of sub-paragraphs (a) to (f), it followed that there was a violation of article 5(1).

307. As I have explained, it is now argued that the reasoning in Hassan supersedes

that in Al-Jedda. I reject that argument, firstly for the reasons explained in paras

295-300 above, and also for the following additional reasons.

308. In addressing the problem which arose in Hassan, the court’s starting point

was article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention, and the need to take account of

subsequent practice in the application of the treaty in question. In that regard, the

court noted the absence of any practice of derogating from article 5 of the

Convention in relation to detention during international armed conflicts,

notwithstanding the practice of exercising powers of detention under the Third and

Fourth Geneva Conventions in circumstances not falling within any of sub-

paragraphs (a) to (f) of article 5(1). The court expressly contrasted that position with

the practice of derogating from article 5 in relation to non-international armed

conflicts, citing cases concerned with internal conflicts in Northern Ireland and

Turkey as examples.

309. In order to answer that point, counsel for the Secretary of State argue that a

distinction should be drawn between purely internal conflicts, and those which are

“extraterritorial”, in the sense that they involve armed forces from outside the host

state. They point out that, although there have been a number of military missions

involving contracting states participating in non-international armed conflicts

outside their own territory since their ratification of the Convention, no state has

ever made a derogation in respect of these.

310. But that is not in itself enough to meet the requirements of article 31(3)(b) of

the Vienna Convention (assuming, for the sake of the argument, the validity of the

distinction drawn between extraterritorial and other non-international armed

conflicts: a distinction which is controversial and has not as yet been drawn by the

European court in its case law). In the first place, it has to be borne in mind that until

the case of Al-Skeini it might not have occurred to contracting states participating in

military operations overseas that they remained bound by their obligations under the

Convention. More importantly, however, a practice of non-derogation is significant

only if (1) it has been the practice of contracting states to detain persons during non-

international armed conflicts in circumstances not falling within sub-paragraphs (a)

to (f) of article 5(1) of the Convention, and (2) if so, that practice has been

sufficiently accepted by other contracting states to justify imputing to all of them an

intention to modify the obligations undertaken under article 5.

311. It appears to me that neither of these conditions is met. The practice of other

contracting states in relation to non-international armed conflicts does not establish

a common intention to modify the obligations arising under article 5 in the context

of extraterritorial non-international armed conflicts. On the contrary, statements by

a number of contracting states confirm, without qualification, the continuing

relevance of international human rights law and, in particular, of the Convention.

The German government, for example, made explicit in 2007, in a statement to the

Bundestag, its view that its obligations under the Convention continued to apply in

relation to persons detained by its forces operating in Afghanistan as part of the

International Security Assistance Force (“ISAF”) (ICRC, Customary IHL Database:

Practice Relating to Rule 99 - Deprivation of Liberty (www.icrc.org/customary-

ihl/eng/docs/v2_rul_rule99)). Switzerland has questioned the United Kingdom’s

claim that the provisions of the Convention need to be qualified, in the context of

military operations overseas, in order to take SCRs into account, and recommended

that the United Kingdom should consider that any person detained by armed forces

is under the jurisdiction of that state, which should respect its obligations concerning

the human rights of such individuals (UN Human Rights Council, Report of the

Working Group on UPR: United Kingdom, UN Doc A/HRC/8/25 (2008), para 33).

The Netherlands has expressed the view that international human rights law, in the

absence of derogation, continues to apply without restriction during armed conflicts,

and that detainees therefore cannot be held indefinitely or without due process (Hill-

Cawthorne, op cit, p 178).

312. The argument now put forward by the Ministry of Defence is also a recent

departure from the previous practice of the United Kingdom. In Al-Jedda, for

example, the government did not suggest that the nature of the situation in Iraq at

the material time, as an “extraterritorial” non-international armed conflict, affected

the application of article 5. Its view of the law at the time of its operations during

the non-international armed conflict in Afghanistan is discussed below (see paras

336-337).

313. In addressing the problem which arose in Hassan, the court also based its

reasoning on the requirement under article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention to

take account of other relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations

between the parties when interpreting the European Convention. The relevant rules

in Hassan were the provisions in the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions

conferring powers of internment on specified grounds during an international armed

conflict, subject to specified procedural safeguards. In Mr Al-Waheed’s case the

Secretary of State argues, by analogy, that the European Convention must also be

interpreted compatibly with the exercise of the powers of internment conferred by

SCR 1546.

314. As explained in para 285 above, the European court construed SCR 1546 in

Al-Jedda on the basis that there is a presumption that the Security Council does not

intend to impose any obligation on member states to breach fundamental principles

of human rights; that, in the event of ambiguity, the court must choose the

interpretation which is most in harmony with the requirements of the European

Convention; and that it is to be expected that clear and explicit language will be used

if the Security Council intends states to take measures which would conflict with

their obligations under international human rights law. On that basis, the court

interpreted the SCR as meaning that the Security Council intended states within the

Multi-National Force to contribute towards the maintenance of security in Iraq while

complying fully with their obligations under the Convention. Article 5(1)(a) to (f)

therefore applied, so as to limit the circumstances in which SCR 1546 was to be

understood as authorising detention. As explained in paras 288-289 above, the court

has followed the same approach to the interpretation of SCRs in more recent cases.

On that basis, there is no need to modify article 5 in order for it to be interpreted

harmoniously with SCR 1546.

315. Accordingly, whereas in Hassan the court identified an inconsistency

between the terms of article 5 of the Convention and the provisions of international

humanitarian law regulating detention in an international armed conflict, and

resolved that inconsistency by concluding that a substantial body of state practice,

together with the need to reconcile the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions with

the European Convention, justified reading article 5 so as to accommodate the

relevant provisions of those Conventions, there is no such inconsistency between

article 5 and SCR 1546; and there exists, in any event, no comparable body of state

practice.

316. It follows that it was necessary for Mr Al-Waheed’s detention to fall within

one or more of the categories listed in sub-paragraphs (a) to (f) of article 5(1), in

order for it to be compatible with article 5 of the Convention.

The case of Mr Mohammed

317. Mr Mohammed is an Afghan national who was detained by HM Forces in

Afghanistan for about 15 weeks during 2010. It is assumed, for the purposes of this

appeal, that he was captured by HM Forces on 7 April 2010 during a military

operation which targeted a senior Taliban commander and the vehicle in which he

was travelling. After an exchange of fire, during which two insurgents were killed,

Mr Mohammed and another insurgent were captured. They were extracted after an

operation lasting ten hours, during which British troops were under heavy and

sustained fire. Three British soldiers were wounded.

318. Following his capture, Mr Mohammed was taken to Camp Bastion in

Helmand Province. HM Forces received information that he was a senior Taliban

commander involved in the large-scale production of IEDs. He was said to have

commanded a Taliban training camp. On 8 April, an application for the extension of

his detention beyond 96 hours for intelligence purposes was submitted to UK

Permanent Joint Headquarters (“PJHQ”), in accordance with BRITFOR Standard

Operating Instructions J3-9 (“J3-9”), discussed at paras 339-340 below. It stated that

there was no information to confirm Mr Mohammed’s identity, and that information

suggested that he might be a senior Taliban commander with an extensive

knowledge of the structure of the Taliban and of IED networks. On 9 April, an

application was submitted to the Ministry of Defence to extend the 96 hour limit in

order to gain intelligence from Mr Mohammed. On 12 April, a minister authorised

Mr Mohammed’s continued detention “to gain further valuable intelligence”. The

Afghan authorities were not asked whether they wanted Mr Mohammed transferred

to them for investigation and possible prosecution. The view had been formed by

this time that it would be a weak case to pass to the Afghan authorities for

prosecution, given the available evidence.

319. On 4 May it was decided that there was no more intelligence to be obtained

from Mr Mohammed. The Afghan authorities were then asked whether they wished

to have Mr Mohammed transferred into their custody for criminal investigation and

possible prosecution. They responded that they did, as soon as space became

available. As they had insufficient capacity at the Lashkar Gah detention facility to

which he was to be transferred, he continued to be held by UK armed forces until

capacity became available. He was transferred to the Afghan authorities on 25 July

2010. He was subsequently prosecuted and convicted by the Afghan courts of

offences relating to the insurgency. He was sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment.

320. Mr Mohammed complains that his detention, beyond the initial period of 96

hours, violated his rights under articles 3, 5, 6 and 8 of the Convention, as given

effect by the Human Rights Act 1998. A number of preliminary issues were

identified and decided by Leggatt J. In particular, he found that for the first 96 hours

after his capture, Mr Mohammed was detained for the purpose of bringing him

before the competent legal authorities on reasonable suspicion of having committed

an offence. His detention during that period was authorised, in the judge’s view, by

SCR 1890 and the Memorandum of Understanding concluded between the British

and Afghan Governments, as explained at paras 322-326 and 329-334 below.

During the period of 24 days between 11 April and 4 May 2010, on the other hand,

Mr Mohammed was detained by HM Forces for the sole purpose of obtaining

intelligence. During the 82 days between 5 May and 25 July 2010, he was detained

for “logistical” reasons, as they were described, because of the shortage of space in

Afghan detention facilities. The judge concluded that Mr Mohammed’s detention

after the initial period of 96 hours was contrary to article 5 of the Convention, the

effect of which was not, in his view, displaced or qualified by SCRs or international

humanitarian law. He also held that Mr Mohammed’s detention after an initial

period of a few days (as explained at para 329 below) was unlawful under Afghan

law. On appeal, those conclusions were upheld by the Court of Appeal.

321. The Secretary of State has appealed to this court on a number of grounds.

Those which are being considered at this stage of the proceedings are:

(1) whether HM armed forces had the legal power to detain Mr

Mohammed in excess of 96 hours pursuant to the relevant SCRs or

international humanitarian law;

(2) if so, whether article 5(1) of the Convention should be read so as to

accommodate detention pursuant to such a power;

(3) whether Mr Mohammed’s detention was in any event compatible with

article 5(1) on the basis that it fell within para (c) (detention for the purpose

of bringing a suspect before a competent judicial authority) or (f) (detention

pending extradition); and

(4) whether the circumstances of his detention were compatible with

article 5(4) (if necessary, as modified).

So far as (1) is concerned, the contention based on international humanitarian law

has already been rejected at paras 274-277 above. It is also unnecessary to consider

ground (4), as to which I agree with Lord Sumption. That leaves the contention

under ground (1) based on the SCRs, any issue then arising under ground (2), and

the issues arising under ground (3).

The interpretation of SCR 1890

322. It is common ground that, at the time when Mr Mohammed was detained,

HM Forces were engaged in a non-international armed conflict. They were operating

as part of ISAF, whose establishment had initially been authorised by SCR 1386

(2001), following the establishment of the Afghan Interim Authority by the Bonn

Agreement of 5 December 2001 and its agreement to the deployment of such a force.

SCR 1386 authorised the establishment of ISAF “to assist the Afghan Interim

Authority in the maintenance of security in Kabul and its surrounding areas”, and

authorised the member states participating in ISAF “to take all necessary measures

to fulfil its mandate”. The mandate was subsequently extended to the whole of

Afghanistan. At the time of Mr Mohammed’s capture, the SCR in force was SCR

1890 (2009). In its preamble, it reaffirmed the Security Council’s “strong

commitment to the sovereignty ... of Afghanistan”, recognised that “the

responsibility for providing security and law and order throughout the country

resides with the Afghan authorities”, and stressed “the role of [ISAF] in assisting

the Afghan Government to improve the security situation”. It also called for

“compliance with international humanitarian and human rights law”. It again

authorised “the member states participating in ISAF to take all necessary measures

to fulfil its mandate”.

323. Whereas the letters annexed to SCR 1546 referred explicitly to internment

for imperative reasons of security, SCR 1890 said nothing about internment or

detention. It was, however, apparent at the time when SCR 1890 was adopted that

the accomplishment of ISAF’s mission would involve engaging in combat

operations against armed and organised insurgents, in the course of which it was

inevitable that insurgents and suspected insurgents would be taken prisoner. In that

context, construing the SCR in accordance with the principle of interpretation in

good faith, ut res magis valeat quam pereat, the words “all necessary measures”

should be understood as encompassing the detention of insurgents. At the same time,

since SCR 1890 said nothing about the procedures to be followed, but conferred a

mandate on a basis which recognised the sovereignty of Afghanistan and envisaged

ISAF’s role as being to assist the Afghan authorities in the maintenance of security,

it must have been intended that detention would be in accordance with procedures

agreed with the Afghan Government. As explained at paras 329-334 below, a

Memorandum of Understanding covering these matters was indeed agreed with the

Afghan Government.

324. It is argued on behalf of the Ministry of Defence, as in the case of Mr Al-

Waheed, that in the light of the Hassan judgment, article 5(1) of the Convention is

modified by SCR 1890, or in any event by customary international humanitarian

law, so as to permit detention falling outside the scope of sub-paras (a) to (f). I reject

that argument, in agreement with the judge and the Court of Appeal, for the reasons

explained at paras 276-277 above in relation to customary international law, and at

paras 296-300 and 307-315 in relation to Hassan.

325. Construed on that basis, SCR 1890 can be understood as having conferred on

the states participating in ISAF authority under international law to take prisoner

persons who posed an imminent threat to ISAF forces or the civilian population, and

to detain them for the purpose of transferring them to the Afghan authorities, so that

those authorities could then undertake criminal investigations and proceedings. It is

accepted, for reasons explained below at para 331, that a period of 96 hours could

reasonably be required for that purpose, and it is apparent that there could be

circumstances where a longer period was necessary (eg where a detainee was

medically unfit to be transferred, or where the Afghan authorities did not have

accommodation immediately available).

326. So construed, SCR 1890 is consistent with the principles established by the

case law of the European court and summarised in para 285 above. As explained

there, the European court considers there to be a presumption that, unless it uses

clear and unambiguous language to the contrary, the Security Council does not

intend states to take measures which would conflict with their obligations under

international human rights law. Interpreting SCR 1890 on that basis, there is nothing

which demonstrates, in clear and unambiguous terms, an intention to require or

authorise detention contrary to international human rights law. That construction of

SCR 1890 is also consistent with the traditional approach to non-international armed

conflicts, including the approach of the Ministry of Defence, under which the

treatment of insurgents is regulated primarily by the law, including the criminal law,

of the state where the conflict occurs: see paras 253-255 above.

Behrami v France; Saramati v France, Germany and Norway

327. I am not persuaded that the admissibility decision in Behrami v France;

Saramati v France, Germany and Norway (2007) 45 EHRR SE10 supports a

different conclusion. The relevant part of that decision concerned the criminal

justice system operating in Kosovo at the time when the territory was governed by

the United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK), established by

SCR 1244. UNMIK was assisted by the UN security presence in Kosovo, Kosovo

Force (KFOR), also established by SCR 1244. Para 7 of the SCR authorised member

states to establish KFOR “with all necessary means to fulfil its responsibilities under

para 9”. Its responsibilities under para 9 included “supporting, as appropriate ... the

work of [UNMIK]”. UNMIK’s responsibilities, as set out in para 11, included

“maintaining civil law and order, including ... through the deployment of

international police personnel”. The UNMIK police force was commanded by the

commander of KFOR (COMKFOR). Mr Saramati was arrested by UNMIK police

officers on suspicion of attempted murder, by order of COMKFOR, and detained on

the orders of COMKFOR until his trial. The admissibility decision concerned the

question whether Mr Saramati’s detention was the responsibility of the contracting

states which had contributed the individuals holding the position of COMKFOR

during the relevant period, or was attributable to the UN.

328. In the course of considering that question, the European court stated that

KFOR’s security mandate included issuing detention orders. It stated (para 124) that

it based that finding on two considerations. The first was the terms of the agreement

under which the government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) withdrew

its own forces from Kosovo in favour of UNMIK and KFOR, which provided that

KFOR would operate with the authority to take all necessary action to establish and

maintain a secure environment for all citizens of Kosovo. As the court stated,

UNMIK and KFOR “exercised the public powers normally exercised by the

government of the FRY” (para 70). The second consideration was para 9 of SCR

1244, as well as para 4 of Annex 2, which repeated the relevant wording of the

agreement with FRY, as confirmed by later documents describing the procedures

governing detention authorised by COMKFOR. This was a very different context

from that of SCR 1890: as has been explained, that SCR was premised on a

recognition of the sovereignty of Afghanistan, and of the Afghan authorities’

responsibility for security.

The Memorandum of Understanding

329. SCR 1890 did not itself specify the procedures required to comply with the

requirement in article 5(1) of the Convention that detention should be “in accordance

with a procedure prescribed by law”. It was however supplemented by agreements

between the Afghan Government and the states participating in ISAF.

330. The relevant agreement between the UK and Afghanistan at the time of Mr

Mohammed’s detention was a Memorandum of Understanding dated 23 April 2006.

Para 3 provided:

“3.1 The UK AF will only arrest and detain personnel where

permitted under ISAF Rules of Engagement. All detainees will

be treated by UK AF in accordance with applicable provisions

of international human rights law. Detainees will be transferred

to the authorities of Afghanistan at the earliest opportunity

where suitable facilities exist. Where such facilities are not in

existence, the detainee will either be released or transferred to

an ISAF approved holding facility.

3.2 The Afghan authorities will accept the transfer of

persons arrested and detained by the UK AF for investigation

and possible criminal proceedings ...”

In relation to para 3.1, “applicable provisions of international human rights law”

were recognised at the time to include the European Convention on Human Rights:

see para 332 below. The Memorandum of Understanding made no provision for HM

Forces to detain persons for intelligence purposes rather than transferring them to

Afghan custody, but it provided for British personnel to have full access to question

persons who had been transferred to Afghan custody.

331. In relation to para 3.1 of the Memorandum of Understanding, detention was

permitted under ISAF rules of engagement, at the relevant time, in the circumstances

set out in ISAF’s Standard Operating Procedures 362 (“the SOP”). Para 1 of that

document stated that “commanders at all levels are to ensure that detention

operations are conducted in accordance with applicable international law and human

rights standards”. Para 4 stated that the only grounds upon which a person could be

detained under current ISAF Rules of Engagement were if the detention was

necessary for ISAF force protection, for the self-defence of ISAF or its personnel,

or for accomplishment of the ISAF mission. Para 5 stated that the current policy for

ISAF was that detention was permitted for a maximum of 96 hours, after which time

an individual was either to be released or handed into the custody of the Afghan

National Security Forces or the Government of Afghanistan. According to internal

United Kingdom correspondence, 96 hours reflected the time it might take to

transport someone from a battlefield to an Afghan detention facility.

332. Para 6 of the SOP stated that, as soon as practicable after a detention had

taken place, the decision to continue to detain must be considered by an appropriate

authority. Certain senior ranks were specified as being permitted to act as an ISAF

Detention Authority. That authority must be able to support the grounds of detention

by a reasonable belief in facts. Para 7 permitted a Detention Authority to authorise

detention for up to 96 hours. Authority for detention beyond that period could only

be granted by the commanding officer of ISAF (“COMISAF”) or his delegated

subordinate. In that regard, para 8 stated:

“A detainee may be held for more than 96 hours where it is

deemed necessary in order to effect his release or transfer in

safe circumstances. This exception is not authority for longer-

term detentions but is intended to meet exigencies such as that

caused by local logistical conditions eg difficulties involving

poor communications, transport or weather conditions or where

the detainee is held in ISAF medical facilities and it would be

medically imprudent to move him. Where this exigency

applies, COMISAF must be notified. Where, in the opinion of

COMISAF (or his delegated subordinate), continuation of

detention is warranted, COMISAF (or his delegated

subordinate) may authorize continued detention.” (Emphasis

supplied)

A footnote stated that “the standards outlined within this SOP are to be considered

the minimum necessary to meet international norms and are to be applied.” In

relation to international norms, the document identified two sources of international

human rights law: the ICCPR and the European Convention on Human Rights.

333. It was therefore envisaged under the Memorandum of Understanding, read

with the SOP, that persons would only be detained by HM Forces on specified

grounds, would be screened as soon as practicable, and would be transferred to the

Afghan authorities at the earliest opportunity, for investigation and possible criminal

proceedings. Detention by HM Forces would normally be for a maximum of 96

hours, although that period could be extended by a decision taken at a senior level

where necessary in order to effect the detainee’s release or transfer in safety.

334. The detention which this agreement permitted fell within the authorisation

conferred by SCR 1890. It reflected the traditional treatment of insurgents in a non-

international armed conflict as having committed offences under domestic criminal

law, and ISAF’s mandate to assist the sovereign Afghan authorities. It was

compatible with article 5(1)(c) of the Convention: that is to say, “the lawful arrest

or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the

competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence

or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence

or fleeing after having done so”. A procedure was prescribed which protected

detainees against arbitrary detention.

The new United Kingdom policy: detention beyond 96 hours in order to obtain

intelligence

335. In the event, powers of detention which were limited to holding persons for

up to 96 hours, before transferring them to the Afghan criminal system if they might

have committed a criminal act, were found by the states principally involved in

detaining insurgents, including the United Kingdom, to be unsatisfactory from a

military perspective. Particularly after they undertook operations in Helmand

Province, HM Forces wished to be able to hold detainees for longer periods for the

purpose of questioning them in order to obtain intelligence, for example about the

whereabouts of IEDs.

336. Ministers were advised that “legal advice has confirmed that there is currently

no basis upon which we can legitimately intern such individuals” (briefing paper for

the Armed Forces Minister on Detention Policy in Afghanistan, dated 1 March

2006). They were told that the considered advice was that the European Convention

would apply unless those detained were immediately handed over to the Afghan

authorities, and that “the possibility of amending the 96-hour policy to permit longer

periods of detention ... would not be lawful because the UNSCR does not authorise

extended detention” (ibid). The advice concluded that

“The reality of the legal basis for our presence in Afghanistan

is such that available powers may fall short of that which

military commanders on the ground might wish” (ibid).

It was felt that the UK was unlikely to succeed in having the SCR revised to provide

“some kind of specific authorisation to detain”, and that, so far as ISAF was

concerned, “even with the added authority of a UNSCR, the reservations of some of

our allies in becoming involved or associated with detention or internment are likely

to remain” (internal correspondence concerning UNSCR renewal in Afghanistan,

dated 25 June 2007). A further memorandum stated:

“There is no power for any ISAF forces to intern individuals in

Afghanistan. This would require an express UNSCR

authorisation and preferably a power in Afghan law as well,

neither of which currently exist. Therefore, if UK forces were

to intern people, we would probably be acting unlawfully.”

(Ministry of Defence briefing note, ‘Detention by UK Forces

on Overseas Operations - Iraq and Afghanistan’, sent on 12

September 2007)

337. A later briefing for the Secretary of State explained that, although in Iraq a

significant proportion of operations had been triggered by intelligence from

detainees:

“In Afghanistan, however, we cannot replicate Iraq arrangements

because UK forces have no power to intern under the extant

UNSCR (only a power to temporarily detain is inferred).”

(Ministerial Brief on Afghanistan: Intelligence Exploitation

Capability, dated June 2008: NATO was in effective command of

ISAF)

Later correspondence dated 10, 21 and 24 August 2010 considered the possibility

that the ISAF rules of detention might be altered, but concluded that any approach

to NATO would be unsuccessful, and that the United Kingdom would have to adopt

its own policy if it wished to detain individuals for more than 96 hours.

338. The policy then adopted, as announced to Parliament on 9 November 2009,

was that while HM Forces would adhere to NATO guidelines (ie, the SOP) in the

majority of cases, Ministers in the United Kingdom would in some cases authorise

detention for more than 96 hours in order to obtain intelligence:

“[I]n exceptional circumstances, detaining individuals beyond

96 hours can yield vital intelligence that would help protect our

forces and the local population - potentially saving lives,

particularly when detainees are suspected of holding

information on the placement of improvised explosive devices.

Given the ongoing threat faced by our forces and the local

Afghan population, this information is critical, and in some

cases 96 hours will not be long enough to gain that information

from the detainee. Indeed, many insurgents are aware of the 96

hours policy and simply say nothing for that entire period. In

these circumstances, the Government have concluded that

Ministers should be able to authorise detention beyond 96

hours, in British detention facilities to which the ICRC has

access. Each case will be thoroughly scrutinised against the

relevant legal and policy considerations; we will do this only

where it is legal to do so and when it is necessary to support the

operation and protect our troops.

Following a Ministerial decision to authorise extended

detention, each case will be thoroughly and regularly

monitored by in-theatre military commanders and civilian

advisers. Individuals will not remain in UK detention if there

is no further intelligence to be gained. We will then either

release the detainee or transfer the detainee to the Afghan

authorities.” (Hansard (HL (Written Statements), 9 November

2009, cols WS 31-32)

339. The policy announced to Parliament was reflected in J3-9. The version of J3-

9 which was in force during most of Mr Mohammed’s detention was Amendment

2. Part 1 dealt with the initial stages of detention. It stated in para 9 that a person

could be detained by British forces only if he was a threat to force protection or

mission accomplishment, or if it was necessary for reasons of self-defence.

340. Part II dealt with the processing of detainees, and required the detaining

authority to decide within 48 hours whether to release, transfer or further detain the

detainee. To authorise continued detention, the Detention Authority had to be

satisfied that it was necessary for self-defence or that the detainee had done

something that made him a threat to force protection or mission accomplishment

(para 19). Para 25 stated that the Detention Authority did not have the authority to

hold a detainee for longer than 96 hours from the point of detention, and that

authority for any further detention must be sought from Ministers through the

Detention Review Committee (“DRC”). Para 27 stated that the criteria used to assist

Ministers in deciding whether or not to approve applications for extension of

detention were

“a. Will the extension of this individual provide significant

new intelligence vital for force protection?

b. Will the extension of this individual provide significant

new information on the nature of the insurgency?

c. How long a period of extension has been requested -

[redacted]”

Para 29 set out the procedure to be followed following an extension. This involved

fortnightly reviews, internally and at Ministerial level.

341. The only other nations whose forces were detaining significant numbers of

insurgents by that stage of ISAF operations were the USA and Canada (the

Netherlands having been the fourth nation in that category at an earlier stage). They

also departed from the ISAF policy limiting detention to a maximum of 96 hours,

but on a different basis from the United Kingdom. The USA authorised its conduct

by domestic legislation. Canada entered into an agreement with the Afghan

Government providing for it to treat detainees as if they were prisoners of war, and

thus to apply the Third Geneva Convention.

342. An internal assessment dated 18 September 2011 described the United

Kingdom’s current detention regime in Afghanistan as being “based upon United

Kingdom national sovereignty”. Afghanistan was however a sovereign state at the

relevant time; and it was inconsistent with Afghan sovereignty for the United

Kingdom to carry out detention in Afghanistan without the permission of the

government of that country. The judge found that the United Kingdom policy was

not agreed with the Afghan Government, and that there was no evidence that any

attempt was made to amend the Memorandum of Understanding between the British

and Afghan Governments to reflect the new policy.

The legal basis of detention for intelligence purposes

343. The judge concluded that the United Kingdom policy announced in

November 2009 had no legal basis under Afghan, international or English law. In

relation to Afghan law, he considered that, since the United Kingdom Government

was operating on the territory of an independent sovereign state at the invitation of,

or at least with the consent of, that state, it was arguable that it was necessary under

article 5(1) for the detention to comply with the law of that state. On the basis that

there had been no argument on the point, however, he proceeded on the assumption

that it was sufficient that there was a basis for the detention under the SCR (para

301). The Court of Appeal considered it unnecessary to decide the point (para 126).

The point has however been pursued before this court on behalf of the first

interveners, who had also raised it in their skeleton argument before the judge.

344. As they point out, the European court has said many times that, where the

lawfulness of detention is in issue, including the question whether a procedure

“prescribed by law” has been followed, the Convention refers essentially to national

law and lays down an obligation to conform to the substantive and procedural rules

of national law. The same approach has been followed by the UN Human Rights

Committee in relation to article 9 of the ICCPR. They also point out that that

approach has been adopted, specifically in relation to detention in a non-

international armed conflict, in the Report of the UN Working Group on Arbitrary

Detention, “Basic Principles and Guidelines on remedies and procedures on the right

of anyone deprived of their liberty to bring proceedings before a court”, UN Doc

WGAD/CRP.1/2015 (2015), Guideline 17, para 115(a)(ii) (“With regard to

detention in relation to a non-international armed conflict: (a) ... the detaining State

must show that: ... (ii) administrative detention is on the basis of grounds and

procedures prescribed by law of the State in which the detention occurs and

consistent with international law”).

345. I am not persuaded that that is the correct approach to adopt to the application

of the Convention in the present context. Guidance is provided by the judgment in

Ocalan v Turkey (2005) 41 EHRR 45, which concerned the arrest of a Turkish

citizen in Kenya by Turkish officials who then transferred him to Turkey. The court

considered it irrelevant to examine whether the conduct of the officials had been

unlawful under Kenyan law: what mattered was whether their conduct had been

authorised by the Kenyan Government, so as to provide a basis in international law

for an extra-territorial arrest, and had a legal basis under Turkish law. The court

stated:

“Irrespective of whether the arrest amounts to a violation of the

law of the state in which the fugitive has taken refuge - a

question which only falls to be examined by the court if the host

state is a party to the Convention - the court requires proof in

the form of concordant inferences that the authorities of the

state to which the applicant has been transferred have acted

extra-territorially in a manner that is inconsistent with the

sovereignty of the host state and therefore contrary to

international law. Only then will the burden of proving that the

sovereignty of the host state and international law have been

complied with shift to the respondent Government.” (para 60;

emphasis supplied)

346. So far as international law and English law are concerned, I agree with the

judge’s conclusion, which is consistent with the legal advice given to the British

Government at the time. The practice of detaining persons for more than 96 hours

for intelligence purposes, rather than transferring them to the Afghan authorities for

the purpose of criminal investigations and proceedings, was not authorised by SCR

1890, interpreted as explained in para 325 above. The grounds for the person’s being

detained by HM Forces, rather than being transferred to the Afghan authorities for

criminal investigation and prosecution, did not fall within any of those listed in sub-

paras (a) to (f) of article 5(1) of the Convention. Indeed, even leaving article 5(1)

out of account, the phrase “necessary for imperative reasons of security” in the SCR

did not authorise detention for the purpose of obtaining intelligence from the

detainee. In addition, the policy did not respect Afghan sovereignty, having been

introduced without the agreement of the Afghan Government, and without any

amendment of the Memorandum of Understanding. Since the detention during that

period was not authorised by SCR 1890, it was, on that basis also, not lawful for the

purposes of article 5(1).

Detention pending the availability of space in Afghan facilities

347. As explained at para 332 above, the Memorandum of Understanding, read

with the SOP, permitted detention to be extended beyond 96 hours where necessary

to enable the detainee to be transferred in safe circumstances. Provision for

“logistical extensions” was also made by para 24 of J3-9:

“On some occasions, practical, logistic reasons will entail a

requirement to retain a UK detainee for longer than the 96

hours. Such occasions would normally involve the short-notice

non-availability of pre-planned transport assets or NDS

[Afghan National Security Directorate] facilities to receive

transferred detainees reaching full capacity. These occasions

may lead to a temporary delay until the physical means to

transfer or release correctly can be reinstated. Where this is the

case, authority to extend the detention for logistic reasons is to

be sought from both HQ ISAF and from Ministers in the UK

through the Detention Authority.”

348. In the event, HM Forces held people for substantial periods when the Afghan

authorities wished to accept their transfer but the detention facilities were full, or

when the only accommodation available was in facilities which were considered

unsuitable. This situation arose as a result of three factors. One was the fact that

Afghanistan remained a state under reconstruction, with limited detention facilities.

The second was the large number of insurgents captured by HM Forces, particularly

during operations in Helmand. The third was the fact that the treatment of detainees

in some Afghan detention facilities did not meet Convention standards. It was indeed

held by the Divisional Court, during the period when Mr Mohammed was detained

pending the availability of space in the Afghan detention facility at Lashkar Gah,

that it would be unlawful for HM Forces to transfer detainees to the Afghan

detention facility in Kabul: R (Evans) v Secretary of State for Defence [2010] EWHC

1445 (Admin).

349. The judge accepted, in relation to Mr Mohammed, that his detention in these

circumstances was for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal

authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence. The implication

is that such detention fell in principle within the scope of article 5(1)(c) of the

Convention. That conclusion has not been challenged: as the Court of Appeal noted,

the question has not been explored at any stage of the proceedings. I am inclined to

agree with the judge, and to regard such detention as in principle authorised by SCR

1890, but in the absence of any argument on the point it would be inappropriate to

consider the issue in detail.

350. There are, however, other aspects of article 5 which are also relevant to

detention in these circumstances: notably, the requirement in article 5(1) that

detention be “in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law”, and the procedural

requirements of article 5(3) and (4). It will be necessary to return to these.

Application to the facts of Mr Mohammed’s case

351. On the facts of the case, Mr Mohammed’s detention by HM Forces between

11 April 2010 (ie after 96 hours) and 4 May 2010 (when he ceased to be held for

intelligence purposes) was not in my view compatible with article 5(1), since it was

not for any of the purposes listed in sub-paras (a) to (f). In particular, the reason for

his detention at that time was not to bring him as a suspect before a competent

judicial authority, within the meaning of article 5(1)(c). Nor was he, either then or

later, detained pending extradition within the meaning of article 5(1)(f), for the

reasons explained by Lord Sumption at para 79.

352. Even if SCR 1890 were to be construed as going beyond article 5(1)(a) to (f),

and as authorising detention when necessary for imperative reasons of security, I

would not regard it as authorising Mr Mohammed’s detention during this period.

Although I accept that detention for imperative reasons for security would not

become unauthorised by reason of a concurrent purpose of obtaining intelligence, it

appears to me to be clear from the facts found by the judge that the obtaining of

intelligence was the only reason why HM Forces detained Mr Mohammed during

the period in question, rather than enquiring of the Afghan authorities whether they

wished to have him transferred to their custody. That was not a reason for detention

falling within SCR 1890. Nor was Mr Mohammed’s detention during this period in

accordance with the commitment in SCR 1890 to respect Afghan sovereignty, since

it was based on a policy to which the Afghan Government had not agreed.

353. I respectfully disagree with Lord Sumption’s conclusion that there remains a

question whether Mr Mohammed’s detention between 11 April and 4 May 2010 was

for imperative reasons of security, which should be determined after trial. The

grounds for his initial detention clearly fell within the scope of that phrase, but it

seems to me to be clear that this was not the reason why he continued to be detained

by HM Forces after 11 April. As the judge observed at para 333 of his judgment,

not only was the obtaining of intelligence the sole purpose alleged in the Secretary

of State’s defence, but there was no other criterion set out in the UK policy which

could have been used to approve an extension of Mr Mohammed’s detention at that

time (the availability of space in Afghan detention facilities not having been

investigated). Furthermore, as the Court of Appeal noted at para 250 of its judgment,

according to the evidence given on behalf of the Ministry of Defence, Mr

Mohammed’s continued detention beyond 96 hours was “for the purposes of

intelligence exploitation” and “was not assessed to be necessary for force protection

purposes”.

354. In relation to the period of detention between 5 May and 25 July 2010, the

judge found that, although the circumstances of the detention fell within the scope

of article 5(1)(c) of the Convention, there was a violation of the requirement in

article 5(1) that the detention should be in accordance with a procedure prescribed

by law. In that regard, he held (para 309) that detention for lengthy periods (82 days

in the case of Mr Mohammed, and between 231 and 290 days in the cases of the

interveners) was not authorised by para 24 of J3-9. Alternatively, he held that if that

para 24 did authorise detention for such protracted periods, then it failed to meet the

test of legal certainty implicit in the requirement that detention be in accordance

with a procedure prescribed by law, since it failed to provide standards which were

clearly defined and whose application was reasonably foreseeable.

355. I recognise the force of that reasoning. I also recognise the importance of

legal certainty, especially in this context. The European court referred in Hassan to

“the fundamental purpose of article 5(1), which is to protect the individual from

arbitrariness” (para 105). In Medvedyev v France, the court stated:

“... where deprivation of liberty is concerned, it is particularly

important that the general principle of legal certainty be

satisfied. It is therefore essential that the conditions for

deprivation of liberty under domestic and/or international law

be clearly defined and that the law itself be foreseeable in its

application, so that it meets the standard of ‘lawfulness’ set by

the Convention, a standard which requires that all law be

sufficiently precise to avoid all risk of arbitrariness ...” (para

80)

356. Nevertheless, it is also necessary to recognise the practical exigencies of the

situation which confronted HM Forces at the time, and to endeavour to apply the

Convention in a manner which is feasible in the real world. The terms of para 24 of

J3-9 suggest that it was originally envisaged as a basis for accommodating

occasional logistical problems, normally arising at short notice and leading to a

temporary delay. It did however provide a procedure for extending detention which

could be used when more serious and long-term problems emerged in relation to the

capacity of the Afghan authorities to deal satisfactorily with large numbers of

insurgents and suspected insurgents, in the context of a state undergoing

reconstruction. In principle, the provision by a member of ISAF of detention

facilities on behalf of the Afghan authorities, when they were unable to cope, was

within its mandate under SCR 1890. In the nature of things, the duration of such

detention in individual cases could not be predicted, particularly when it depended

on contingencies, such as the willingness of the Afghan authorities to treat detainees

humanely, and the outcome of legal proceedings in the English courts, which lay

wholly outside the control of HM Forces and the Ministry of Defence. It is also

relevant to note that para 24 of J3-9 required the detention to be authorised by HQ

ISAF as well as by UK Ministers. It was therefore consistent with para 8 of the SOP,

and hence with the Memorandum of Understanding.

357. In these circumstances, it appears to me that the basic requirement that there

should be a procedure prescribed by law was satisfied by J3-9.

358. I agree with Lord Mance that, in considering Mr Mohammed’s claim for

damages for wrongful detention, it is highly material to consider whether, but for

any failures on the part of the United Kingdom authorities, he would have been any

better off - in other words, would have spent less time in custody. That is an

important question both in relation to the period during which Mr Mohammed was

held by HM Forces for the purpose of obtaining intelligence, and in relation to the

period during which he was held because of the unavailability of suitable

accommodation in an Afghan detention facility. Further, as Lord Mance observes,

if the answer is that he would have been in the custody of the Afghan authorities, it

will be material to consider whether this would have involved him in any form of

detriment.

359. Finally, in relation to article 5(3) and (4) of the Convention, I agree with Lord

Sumption’s conclusions, and with the core of his reasoning at paras 94-109. Whether

there was a breach of article 5(3) should be considered after trial. It is however

apparent from the material already before the court that the arrangements for Mr

Mohammed’s detention were not compatible with article 5(4), since he did not have

any effective means of challenging the lawfulness of his detention.

Conclusions

360. For these reasons, I would have allowed Mr Al-Waheed’s appeal and

declared that it was legally necessary for his detention to fall within one or more of

sub-paragraphs (a) to (f) of article 5(1). In agreement with the judge and the Court

of Appeal, I would have dismissed the Secretary of State’s appeal in the case of Mr

Mohammed, so far as based on the grounds considered at this stage.

judgment (pdf) - [2017] uksc 2

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