jtcdm working paper 3

Cover Page :A sketch of The TISS building at the Malati and Jal A.D. Naoroji (New) Campus, which houses the Jamsetji Tata Centre forDisaster Management by Udeet J Methala, a student of Kamla Raheja Vidyanidhi Institute of Architecture, Mumbai.

JTCDM Working Paper Series

Number 3, November, 2007

POST-DISASTER RECONSTRUCTION

AND THE WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY :

A Review of Select Concepts, Models

and Research Studies

V. Thiruppugazh

JAMSETJI TATA CENTRE

FOR DISASTER MANAGEMENT

Tata Institute of Social SciencesA Deemed University

The logo for the Jamsetji Tata Center for Disaster Management symbolises knowledge and learning giving rise to newtomorrows. The Centre’s work is geared towards human security, vulnerability reduction, strengthening disaster responseand preparedness through knowledge resources.

Published in 2007 by

Jamsetji Tata Centre for Disaster ManagementTata Institute of Social SciencesMalati and Jal A.D. Naoroji (New) CampusSion-Trombay Road, P.O. Box 8318Deonar, Mumbai-400 088, India.Tel: +91-22-2556 3290-96 Ext: 5883Fax: +91-22-2548 2048Email: [email protected]

Series Editor: Janki Andharia

Author: V. Thiruppugazh

Any part of this publication may be reproduced with full acknowledgements andmay be utilized after informing the Jamsetji Tata Centre for Disaster Management.

© JTCDM 2007

ISSN: 0974-3669

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Printed by:Specific Assignments India Pvt LtdEmail: [email protected]

JTCDM Working Paper

CONTENTS

Page No.

From the Editor’s Desk ................................................................................................. v

Executive Summary .................................................................................................... vii

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Disasters and Reconstruction .................................................................... 1

1.2 Disaster Management Framework in India ............................................. 2

1.3 Gujarat Earthquake 2001: A Backdrop ..................................................... 5

2. REVIEWING CONCEPTS

2.1 Disasters ...................................................................................................... 10

2.2 Risk ......................................................................................................... 11

2.3 Vulnerability ............................................................................................... 12

3. REVIEWING MODELS AND RESEARCH STUDIES:RECONSTRUCTION, DEVELOPMENT ANDWINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY

3.1 Disaster Reconstruction and Recovery: Models, Research Studies .... 14

3.2 Reconstruction: Issues and Parameters of Success ............................... 21

3.3 The Window of Opportunity and its Dimensions ................................ 22

3.4 The Window of Opportunity and Reconstruction AfterGujarat Quake ............................................................................................ 26

4. REFERENCES ...................................................................................................... 31

APPENDICES

I. History of Disasters in Gujarat and Financial Implications. ............... 37

II. Select Definitions of Vulnerability. .......................................................... 40

III. Models of Vulnerability ............................................................................ 42

No. 3, November 2007 iii

iv JTCDM Working Paper

List of Figures and Tables

Page No.

Figures

Figure 1 : Trends in Number of Reported Events .............................................................. 10Figure 2 : Sequence of Vulnerability .................................................................................... 12Figure 3 : Phases of Disaster Recovery ................................................................................ 15Figure 4 : Map of Gujarat, showing epicenter of 2001 earthquake. ................................. 37Figure 5 : PAR Model ............................................................................................................. 42Figure 6 : Outline of Access Model ...................................................................................... 43Figure 7 : Cycle of Disaster .................................................................................................... 44Figure 8 : Bicycle Model of Development ........................................................................... 45Figure 9 : Development and Disasters ................................................................................. 45Figure 10 : Model of Capacities and Liabilities .................................................................... 46

Tables

Table 1 : Human Responses to Major Earthquakes ......................................................... 23Table 2 : Tasks Accomplished in terms of construction, livelihoods and social

rehabilitation after Gujarat earthquake ............................................................. 27Table 3 : Occurrences of Natural Hazards in Gujarat since 1819 ................................... 37Table 4 : Amount spent on Calamity relief and rehabilitation by State Government

of Gujarat ................................................................................................................ 38Table 5 : Estimated (100 years) Annualized GSDP .......................................................... 39

No. 3, November 2007 v

From the Editor’s Desk:

In the first year of introducing the Working Paper Series, the Jamsetji Tata Centre for DisasterManagement (JTCDM), has identified specific themes and areas and invited scholars andpractitioners to contribute either their work as studies in progress or their experiences in thefield of disaster management. We hope that the Working Paper Series will contribute to criticalinquiry and expand the knowledge and experience base of understanding the notion ofdisasters. The papers also serve as a forum to discuss new ideas and concepts in disastermanagement research. Many of these papers will enhance the information and knowledgelevels of lay public and also guide governmental agencies and functionaries in policyformulation by providing a broader social, environmental or ideological perspective notnormally available to them.

The focus in the first year, where we hope to bring out at least one paper every threemonths, will be the theoretical review of concepts and research studies, budget analysis,policy review, intervention or practice- based work and curriculum building in highereducation in disaster management.

I am pleased to present the third paper in the Series by Mr. V. Thiruppugazh which reviewsselect concepts, models and research studies in disaster management literature. This is part ofhis doctoral work focusing on the reconstruction and rehabilitation efforts in Gujarat after the2001 earthquake in the state. Young researchers and scholars in the field, especially those whoare new to theoretical work in disaster management and wish to familiarize themselves withthe wide range of models and studies will find this paper very useful.

Disaster management as a discipline is still in its infancy and we welcome, policy makers,practitioners, researchers and students to contribute their reflective work for considerationas working papers for wider dissemination. Each of the papers is peer reviewed and theCentre would be pleased to receive suggestions, comments and feedback.

Janki AndhariaNovember 2007.

vi JTCDM Working Paper

About the Author

Mr. V. Thiruppugazh has 23 years of experience in the development sector, with specialinterest in disaster management, reconstruction and rehabilitation. He has presented severalpapers in this area, both at the national and international levels. As a serving officer withinthe Indian Administrative Services (IAS), Mr. Thiruppugazh has served in senior positionssuch as Secretary to Chief Minister and Joint Chief Executive Officer, Gujarat State DisasterManagement Authority (GSDMA). During his tenure and under his leadership, the GSDMAreceived the Green Award from the World Bank for the Gujarat Earthquake EmergencyReconstruction Program (GEERP), the Commonwealth Association for Public Administrationand Management Gold Award in September 2004 as well as the Sasakawa Award by theUnited Nations for the year 2003.

He speaks several Indian languages fluently, and has varied interests across a range of subjectssuch as psychology, philosophy, mysticism, science, religion and literature. Currently workingon his Ph.D. at the Australian National University, Canberra this paper is based on his reviewand reflection on disaster related concepts and existing studies.

No. 3, November 2007 vii

Executive Summary

The number of reported natural disasters and their human and economic impact is increasingnot only due to advances in information technology and improved reporting but also as aresult of increasing vulnerability created by a concentration of people and assets, poverty,inequity, unplanned growth and socio-economic conditions. In the aftermath of massivedisasters the state undertakes post-disaster activities in the form of relief and reconstructionaimed at the long-term recovery of the affected areas. Recovery includes the interventionundertaken to ensure short-term restoration of assets and services and the reconstruction ofdamaged assets.

One of the basic issues faced by governments, planners and stakeholders is the choicebetween restoration to the status quo or enhancing development. While affected communitiestypically feel the urgency of returning to normalcy, planners and experts often perceive thedisaster to have thrown open an opportunity to “build back better”. The assumption thatdisasters open a window of opportunity to move towards a planned future motivatesstakeholders to address larger developmental issues, risk reduction, equity, and the safetyof the built environment, social and economic changes and the betterment of communities.This is largely a normative discourse. This paper examines the existence of such a window,the parameters to which it is sensitive (i.e. the type of hazard, its magnitude, the loss of life,the scope of physical destruction and economic loss, etc.) and the determinants which shapeor limit opportunity (social, economic, political, cultural etc.) through empirical studies.The author argues that it is equally important to understand the scope and characteristics ofthe activities that can be undertaken to enable full use of the opportunity. For example inorder to effectively use the “window”, it is essential to grasp interrelatedness and theopportunities for developing mutually reinforcing preventive and mitigation measures thathelp sustain a positive impact. Such an analysis has enormous implications for devising acatalogue of public policy-related measures aimed at not only strengthening mitigation andadaptation, but also forming larger developmental programs. Most studies can be broadlyclassified in one or more of the following categories:

1. Management approach: based on how the reconstruction program was managed;

2. Process approach: studies that focus on the reconstruction processes, depending on social,economic, cultural and political factors; and,

3. Outcome approach: those studies attempting to evaluate the program.

The paper points out that most studies tend to focus more on recovery aspects than theactual reconstruction or the extent to which the window of opportunity is used in practice.

This paper contributes to the disaster literature by addressing some of the current theoreticalgaps, and also providing insights for policymakers, planners, administrators and otherstakeholders in making use of the window of opportunity afforded in the aftermath of adisaster. The author discusses select research studies, models and concepts and also reviewsfield literature dealing with post-disaster reconstruction and recovery.

This paper is divided into 3 sections. The introduction establishes the context of the discoursearound using the “window of opportunity” to address issues ranging from safereconstruction to positively impacting social and economic inequalities in the affectedcommunity. Systematic research in this area is limited, and the paper argues that more needsto be done to gain beneficial insights into this notion towards an integrated approach for

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more holistic recovery. The section further delves into the historical background of disastermanagement in India focusing on an overview of legislation, funding mechanisms and thehierarchy of political duties and responsibilities. The backdrop of the 2001 Gujarat earthquakeis also used to discuss the impact, financial losses and the extent of vulnerabilities faced.The role of the Government of Gujarat in reconstruction is emphasized, especially in thesetting up of the Gujarat State Disaster Management Authority, the progressive policies andtheir implementation.

The second section reviews concepts of disasters, risk and vulnerability. Each of these aredefined and discussed, emphasizing the relationship between the concentration of peopleand assets, unplanned development and/or underdevelopment, preparedness (or the lackthereof), and the broadening of vulnerabilities with respect to social, economical, culturaland political aspects.

The third section examines the idea of “window of opportunity” offered by disasters. Itexamines models and research on recovery and also assesses the role of governmentalorganizations and intergovernmental processes in community-level revival, especially withleadership issues and availability of resources. While most studies featuring Indian incidentshave been technical in nature, some have focused on the success of reconstruction programsin relation to the role of governments and NGOs. The paper points to the fact that there is adearth of empirical studies on whether development (“building back better”) has been madepossible in the reconstruction and recovery period.

This section also deals with a host of issues in reconstruction, the parameters of success, andthe benefits of using “the window period” versus the financial implications of delayingpermanent reconstruction. Such analysis and research would also enable a “menu” of publicpolicy options and measures to strengthen mitigation, preparedness and adaptation indisaster management processes. The experience of Gujarat Reconstruction is used extensivelyto discuss post earthquake issues and the role of civil society, social network and capital,and political leadership in lessening the negative impact of a disaster in its aftermath. Thethree Appendices are substantive and informative as they cover history of disasters in Gujaratand the financial losses, definitions of vulnerability and the popular models in understandingdisasters and various concepts and their relationships.

No. 3, November, 2007 1

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Disasters and Reconstruction

My interest in disaster research stems from the personal experience of responding to disasterssuch as droughts, cyclones, floods, earthquakes and industrial disasters which has spannednearly two decades. My particular interest in post-disaster reconstruction arose during myinvolvement in the massive reconstruction and rehabilitation program undertakenfollowing the Gujarat earthquake in 2001. My role in the reconstruction program andinteraction with many stakeholders, including policy-makers, affected people,implementing agencies, Non-Governmental Organizations, civil society, donors,international funding organizations, elected representatives, local self governments, expertsand many others, provided a unique opportunity to view post-disaster reconstructionfrom different perspectives and appreciate the variety of interests involved. Interactionwith researchers and the wider academic sphere also drew my attention to the gap betweenacademic research and actual practice on the ground.

One of the unique features of human civilization has been the ability to overcome challengesposed by the vagaries of nature. It can be argued that this ability to overcome is dependenton a comprehensive understanding of the tools and techniques required to mitigate impactsand in several cases also a capacity to adapt to the changed circumstances. Resilience andpreparedness to adopt preventive measures also appear to contribute significantly to thisdynamic phenomenon. The instance of communities tackling the externalities generatedby natural disasters is a case in point. While disasters are becoming increasinglyconspicuous due to rapid and timely communication across the globe, the dynamics ofthe response to the calamities appear to be determined by the developmental imperativesof the affected location. The extent of damage is also determined by the degree ofvulnerability of the community.

It is being increasingly recognized that resilience is not restricted to the built environmentalone but also includes aspects of livelihood and sustainable development. This paradigmgains enormous significance when the diversity of disasters is taken into account with respectto the socio-economic profiles of those affected. These profiles in turn can determine theexisting levels of preparedness to tackle the impact of the disaster and more importantly thepreparedness to learn and integrate preventive and mitigation measures aimed at counteringfuture disasters.

While catastrophic disasters result in a large number of human deaths and a huge lossof property and infrastructure, they may also open up a window of opportunity foraddressing a range of issues from a safely constructed environment to social andeconomic equality. The potential opportunity which exists at the moment of destructionand crisis is not always translated into actuality. The reconstruction of Lisbon after theearthquake, fire and tsunami in 1755 by Marquis do Pombal (Alexander 2004) can citedas an example of realization of some of the post-disaster opportunities. The reconstructionof Tokyo after the Great Kanto earthquake in 1923 is an example of an opportunity lost(Schencking 2006). Some of the communities act decisively to reduce future losses, theothers just return to status quo (National Research Council 2006). In many cases theaffected areas fail to recover even to the pre-impact level. Some of the importantstakeholders in this context are the government, policy makers, implementing agencies,and affected communities, international financial institutions, civil society, experts, Non-

2 JTCDM Working Paper

Government Organizations, construction industry, professionals like engineers andarchitects and donors.

While there is a general agreement and assumption among various scholars and practitionersregarding the opportunities that open up after disasters to address issues beyond replacementreconstruction (Wisner, Blaikie et al. 2004; Berke and Campanella 2006; Davidson, Johnsonet al. 2006; Siembieda, Baird et al. 2004; Bolin 1985; Christoplos, Mitchell et al. 2001; Bates1982; Badri, Asgary et al. 2006) very little research on this subject can be found in the disasterliterature. Many authors have articulated the window of opportunity as a normativediscourse, rather than an empirical fact. Post-disaster opportunities have not been studiedand validated, particularly in the Indian context. As Comerio (1998) has commented, the“recovery phase is the least understood component of aid.”

In addition to the range of opportunities provided by the window, it is also necessary tostudy the parameters to which it is sensitive (the type of hazard, its magnitude, the loss oflife, the scope of physical destruction and economic loss, etc) and the determinants thatshape or limit opportunity (social, economic, political, cultural, etc) through an empiricalstudy. In order to address both development issues beyond mere replacement reconstructionand the issue of sustainable disaster mitigation, one should examine the opportunityprovided by the disaster and also understand the limitations which force policy makersand planners to strike a compromise.

The analysis of post-disaster opportunity has enormous implications for devising a catalogueof public policy related measures aimed at strengthening mitigation and adaptation. Indeveloping countries, post-disaster reconstruction involving billions of dollars is undertakenby mobilizing funds through international loans, aid and the re-appropriation ofdevelopment budgets. Hence it is necessary to ensure that reconstruction does not reinforcepre-disaster vulnerabilities and risks. As the National Research Council (2006:147) rightlypoints out, “Although disaster impacts can be positive or negative, research generally tendsto focus on various negative impacts occurring at different levels of analysis.” It is necessarynot only to study what went wrong but it is also necessary to study what went right to learnfrom successful interventions.

The frequency and intensity with which natural disasters have wreaked havoc in the Indiansub-continent has led to post-disaster reconstruction programs in the states of Maharashtra,Orissa, Gujarat, Tamilnadu, Kerala, and Jammu & Kashmir in the recent past. Though thegovernment of the respective states has been responding to the calamities, it is important toask whether proactive measures have been undertaken based on a comprehensiveunderstanding of systemic barriers and predictive analysis which take advantage of theopportunities that open up after disasters.

1.2 Disaster Management Framework in India

Historical Background

Government intervention in disaster management began in the late 19th century in the formof famine relief after severe famines in many parts of the country. The famine code formulatedby the British provided the broad framework for individual Indian states to prepare theirstate specific manuals. Drought or famine relief was mainly provided in the form of wageemployment in the affected areas (Singh and Ballabh 2004). Today’s relief manuals basicallydeal with recurrent disasters such as drought, floods and cyclones. For example, the relief


manual of Gujarat does not deal with disasters such as earthquakes, chemical and industrialdisasters and tsunamis. Relief in the case of infrequent disasters is provided for from time totime by issuance of government resolutions (GRs) after the occurrence of such disasters.

The subject of disaster management does not figure in any of the three lists mentionedin the seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India. It is not included in the Union list(the domain of the national government) or in the shared domain of the Concurrentlist and is also not mentioned in the State list which would make it entirely a statesubject. In practice, states are to handle disasters though an attempt is now being madeto include the subject of disaster management in the Concurrent list as per therecommendations of the constitutional review committee (NIDM 2007). This ambiguityhas been tilting the responsibility of post-disaster relief and reconstruction towardsstate governments rather than the Centre. The political implications of handling reliefand reconstruction after massive disasters therefore are also borne directly by the stategovernments. It is not uncommon for the incumbent party to lose an election in theaftermath of massive disasters, or for the chief minister or ministers responsible forhandling relief and reconstruction to be replaced. Apart from such political challenges,disasters also affect state bureaucracy. Transfers, suspensions and disciplinaryproceedings due to the perceived or actual failure of bureaucracy are also quite commonin the aftermath of disasters. Interestingly the victims have always been bureaucratsin the affected states, not those in the central government.

The portfolio of disaster management was traditionally in the hands of the Ministry ofAgriculture since historically famine relief was considered the most important disastermanagement activity. In the absence of any specific legislation at the national or state level,disaster management was carried out largely through plans, procedures and protocols.

The Current Scenario

After the 2001 Gujarat earthquake, the portfolio of disaster management was bifurcatedand the Ministry of Home Affairs was made the nodal Ministry to handle all disasters exceptdroughts. The responsibility of drought management remained with the Ministry ofAgriculture. In addition to the Union Cabinet, headed by the Prime Minister, for effectivedisaster response the following bodies were created1. National Crisis Management Committee, headed by the Cabinet Secretary2. Crisis Management Group, headed by the Central Relief Commissioner3. National Disaster Management Authority, headed by the Prime Minister.

In 2005 the National Disaster Management Act was passed to provide a legal framework fordisaster management in the country. In the absence of any provision in the Act to declare anevent as a national disaster, the intervention of the central government after disasters ismainly based on the magnitude of the disaster and the response capacity of the stategovernment. However, a proactive shift has been brought about in the center from post-disaster need-based intervention to pre-disaster mitigation and planning through theNational Disaster Management Authority. The Act envisages an important role for the centralgovernment in disaster prevention and mitigation in the future.

The road ahead for disaster management depends on the inclusion of disaster managementin the Concurrent list. The National Disaster Management Act, passed in 2005, is yet tocome into effect. The legal status of the Disaster Management Acts passed by various state


governments vis-à-vis the National Act, and the overlapping roles of the multiple authoritiesin the central government, may create operational difficulties.

Funding Mechanisms

Unlike in the United States, where the President is empowered to declare an event as adisaster and allot special funds (Platt 1999), the Indian President or Prime Minister cannotdeclare an event as a national disaster. As mentioned earlier, the implications of the successfulhandling of disasters or otherwise lie with the state governments. In contrast to the US,where presidential declarations are issued even in the case of minor disasters affecting smalltowns and counties for political mileage, in India the central government has no mileage togain by announcing national disasters. In the vast electorate comprising 602 districts whichvote in Parliamentary elections in India, disasters which affect a few districts or towns donot make a big political impact.

The absence of any provision in the national act for declaring national disasters and the lackof a constitutional mandate to fund disaster relief and reconstruction vest the mainresponsibility for mobilizing funds for relief and reconstruction in the state governments.However, the national government also provides funds for disaster relief through two fundsspecially set up for the purpose, namely the Calamity Relief Fund (CRF) and NationalCalamity and Contingency Fund (NCCF).

The CRF, mainly provided for immediate relief, consists of 75% contribution by the centralgovernment and 25 % by the state government concerned. The CRF provides norms ofassistance and of the nature of activities which can be undertaken using the fund. The stategovernment is not restricted by the norms of CRF for relief, but any assistance or reliefprovided in excess of the norms specified by CRF has to be borne by the state government.In the event that CRF assistance is not sufficient, funds will be provided from the NCCF,created through contribution from the central government and augmented by a surchargeon central taxes based on need. Requests from state governments for grants from theNCCF is assessed by a team of experts nominated by the central government and issanctioned by a high powered committee headed by the Home Minister. Both CRF andNCCF funds are meant for immediate relief and rehabilitation only. The long-termreconstruction costs cannot be met from these funds. Financial support for long-termreconstruction can be provided through a reallocation of plan funds, which has to go througha set of procedures and protocols.

The central government assists the state in reconstruction by borrowing money frominternational financial Institutions such as the World Bank and the Asian DevelopmentBank. External borrowings, which were formerly delivered as 70% loan and 30% grant, arenow allotted back to back (as 100% loan), thus increasing the financial burden of stategovernments. The borrowings increase the debt burden of the states in the immediate present,and, in the long term, the diversion of funds for loan and interest repayment reduce thefunds available for the development budget. The state governments, while formulating thepolicy and assistance for reconstruction, are constrained by the short and long-termimplications of such borrowings.

Though clearly laid down policy and procedures for funding post-disaster relief andreconstruction do not provide much scope for political maneuvering, in extreme cases PrimeMinisters have declared assistance from the Prime Minister’s Relief Fund, which is theprerogative of the Prime Minister. Apart from providing financial assistance from the


designated funds, the central government does not interfere in the relief and reconstructionpolicy of the state governments, as the state governments are ultimately responsible fordisaster management.

As a result, the politics of disasters at the central government level is restricted to providingsome extra funds beyond the norms. Even in the case of the deployment of armed forces inrescue and relief activities, payments to the armed forces are made by the respective stategovernments. The real politics of disasters thus happens at the level of the state governments,which frame the policy for relief and reconstruction, decide the assistance schemes and themethod of implementation. As the political impact of disasters bears directly upon the stategovernments, they are also subject to pressures and demands from various electedrepresentatives, opposition parties, local self governments, affected communities, and civilsociety groups. The way in which the various stakeholders engage with one another largelydetermines the outcome of the reconstruction program.

The local self governments in districts, towns and villages which are responsible for reliefand reconstruction are economically weak organizations. They act as implementing agenciesof state government rather than with autonomy of self governance. Except large MunicipalCorporations, other local self governments depend heavily on government grants even forproviding basic services to people within their command area. While disaster impact ismagnified by a lack of planning and a failure to enforce regulations by local self governments,these self governments articulate their demands through formal and informal channels inattempt to gain larger slices of the pie in post-disaster relief and reconstruction. Co-ordinationbetween the local self government and state government also depends on the party in powerin the state government and the party in power in the local self government.

Given that state governments are totally responsible for post-disaster response andreconstruction, making use of the post-disaster window of opportunity to “build back better”and address issues beyond the restoration of the status quo depend squarely on the stategovernment. The financial and administrative capabilities and the vision of the stategovernment play a major role in post-disaster reconstruction.

Gujarat is vulnerable to all-major natural hazards such as drought, floods, cyclones,earthquakes, tsunamis etc. In addition, due to its high level of industrial development it isalso exposed to multiple man-made hazards such as industrial and chemical disasterstransportation accidents, terrorism, radiological accidents, etc (Appendix I).

1.3 Gujarat Earthquake 2001: A Backdrop

On 26th January 2001, one of the most destructive earthquakes ever to strike India occurredin the Kutch district of Gujarat at 8:46 am. The damage spread to an area 400 km from theepicenter. The official magnitude of the earthquake was 7.7 on the moment (Mw) scale. Theepicenter was located near the village of Chaubari, about 20 km to the north of the town ofBhachau in the Kutch district. Over 7,600 villages, 14 towns and the city of Ahmedabadwere affected in the earthquake (GSDMA 2001a). The earthquake left 13,805 people deadand 167,000 injured. The population affected was 28 million. About 222,000 houses collapsedfully and 917,000 houses were damaged partially (GSDMA 2007a).

Social and public infrastructure and industries sustained severe damage. Over 50,000 schoolrooms and 1500 health clinics and hospitals were damaged. The damage to publicinfrastructure included damage to roads, bridges, public buildings, water supply systems,


electrical installations and power supply systems, and irrigation structures. The earthquakealso had a very severe impact on livelihoods. More than 10,000 small and medium industrialunits stopped production and the livelihood of more than 50,000 artisans was affected dueto the loss of workshops, tools and the destruction of salt pans. The estimated direct losseswere Rs. 99,000 millions, indirect losses amounted to about Rs. 30,000 millions, and tertiarylosses reached Rs. 101,000 Millions (The World Bank and The Asian Development Bank2001). The worst affected was the district of Kutch where 12,221 people died, more than124,000 houses fully collapsed and more than 210,000 houses were partially damaged(GSDMA 2007b).

The fact that the mega city of Ahmedabad, situated at a distance of 250 km from the epicenter,was severely affected highlighted several issues related to urban development, the lack ofintegration of development planning with disaster risk reduction, the lack of regulationsand the enforcement of building codes, and poor quality construction and materials (EERI2002). The rural impact was mainly due to a lack of awareness of seismic risk, non complianceto building codes and the poor quality of stone masonry construction. It is argued that inGujarat a seismic hazard was turned into a disaster by political and bureaucratic failures(Wisner, Blaikie et al. 2004). It is difficult to pinpoint who is responsible for the lack ofregulation and enforcement. This problem is not unique to Gujarat or India. As Godschalket al. (1999) point out, hazard mitigation happens in a morally diffused environment, inwhich either everyone is responsible or no one is. The system of self-regulation, a lack ofprofessional ethics on the part of engineers, a lack of awareness among the public, themultiplicity of regulations, a lack of the consideration of market forces on the part ofregulating agencies, and profiteering by developers are some of the factors that contributedto urban vulnerability in Gujarat.

It is pertinent to note that in Gujarat the enforcement of building codes and the granting ofbuilding permissions lies with local self governments, while the responsibility for post-disaster relief and reconstruction is mainly the responsibility of the state government. Theempowerment of local self governments through the 73rd and 74th ConstitutionalAmendment Acts made local self governments the key players in regulation anddevelopment. The 12th Schedule of the 74th Constitutional amendment entrusted urbanlocal bodies with eighteen new tasks which included urban planning, regulation of landuse and the construction of buildings, planning for social and economic development, fireservices, slum improvement and the upgrading of infrastructure, etc. The state governmentspromulgated their own acts or amended the old ones as per the Constitutional amendments,transferring the bulk of the responsibility regarding land use planning and the builtenvironment to local self governments.

The Gujarat earthquake not only highlighted the dichotomy between empowerment andresponsibility, but also exposed the sheer lack of capacity of the Municipalities and Villagelocal self governments, mainly in terms of technical expertise and human resources, toaddress the issues related to disaster mitigation. For example, the power to grant buildingpermission in the rural areas is vested in the village local self governments which do notpossess any technical staff. The Municipalities usually have one or two junior or assistantengineers to look after the public works, water supply, town planning, and construction. Inthe municipal areas building permission is granted by a town planning committee whichcomprises of elected representatives. In Municipal Corporations, the Town DevelopmentDepartment grants building permission. Even though Municipal Corporations have more


technical manpower, the system of self-regulation is implemented partly due toregulatory overload and partly due to a lack of technical capacity. The attempts toempower local self governments without adequately building their capacity are placinga strain on state governments in the form of post-disaster relief and reconstruction. TheHyogo framework of action 2005-2015 rightly emphasizes the need to build localcapacities to reduce risk, which includes not only the capacity building of thecommunities but also of the local self governments.

Earthquakes in India before the Gujarat earthquake affected rural areas. In the Gujaratearthquake urban areas were among those worst affected, particularly in the district ofKutch. The Gujarat earthquake occurred when the state was facing its second consecutiveyear of drought. Drought relief activities were in full swing with more than 3.5 millionpeople employed in relief works. Expenditure of around Rs. 9,000 million had alreadybeen poured into drought relief by that time. The state government was thus confrontedwith the enormous challenge of mobilizing human and financial resources to tackle amassive drought and a catastrophic earthquake simultaneously. This convergence ofdisasters resulted in a huge loss of assets and productivity, and a shortage of technicaland administrative manpower in Government for disaster relief and response. This contextand background should be kept in mind when analyzing the process of policy formulationin the area of earthquake reconstruction.

On the political front the ruling party had only one and a half years before it was due toface election. The Kutch district, which was the worst affected in the earthquake, has beendemanding the status of an independent state for many decades. Though the movementfor independent Kutch has grown weaker over time, a feeling of neglect and exclusionfrom the mainstream development process would appear to persist among many in Kutch.The Kutch district also borders Pakistan and is therefore a sensitive district from the pointof view of national security. Thus reconstruction intervention and the policy decisionspertaining to reconstruction and program implementation became important issues froma political perspective. From the point of view of public policy, the challenge ofreconstruction posed significant demands from the political and bureaucratic wings ofgovernment and the systems of governance to reduce the time-scales of decision-making.The fact that disaster management is the responsibility of the state government providedthe government of Gujarat with an opportunity to formulate a reconstruction andrehabilitation policy to respond to the challenges. Some of the issues which dominatedthe decision-making interface were:

1. A restoration of the status quo versus the “build back better” option of creating andupgrading infrastructure

2. The mobilization of financial resources

3. The adoption of owner-driven housing reconstruction vis-à-vis contractor drivenreconstruction

4. The integration of long term mitigation and capacity building for risk reduction

5. The reconstruction of the four worst affected towns in the Kutch district to pre-impactlevel versus complete redevelopment of the towns with revised town anddevelopment planning

The Government of Gujarat launched a comprehensive reconstruction program, with loans


from the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank and assistance from the Governmentof India, with the objective of promoting sustainable recovery in the earthquake-affectedareas and to lay the foundation of sustainable disaster management capacity building inGujarat (GSDMA 2004:2). The government took a conscious decision to “build back better”,making use of the window of opportunity. It was also decided to rebuild the four worst-affected towns of Kutch as model towns with revised town and development planning.Several factors, such as approaching elections, the availability of funds, consultation withexperts, media pressure, difficulties experienced in search and rescue (heavy rescue vehicleslike bulldozers could not enter many narrow roads) and the genuine desire and politicalwill of the state government, contributed to the decision to “build back better”. It is generallyassumed by a vast majority of people and disaster researchers that decisions by politicalmasters are always short-sighted and based on self-interest (Drury and Olson 1998), butthis may not always be the case.

The Government of Gujarat’s reconstruction program consists of the short-term objective ofrestoration of partially damaged assets and livelihood rehabilitation, the medium-termobjective of the reconstruction of completely destroyed assets, and the long-term objectiveof creating new infrastructure and long-term disaster management capacity building. TheGujarat earthquake rehabilitation and reconstruction program comprises a number ofcomponents based on the assessment of recovery needs which included the reconstructionand repair of damaged houses, livelihood support programs, the reconstruction ofinfrastructure, both social and public, social rehabilitation, community participation supportand long-term disaster management capacity building.

In terms of the number of houses damaged, and the area affected, the Gujarat earthquakeconstituted an extremely severe and widespread disaster (Barenstein 2006). The housingreconstruction program undertaken in Gujarat, one of the largest reconstruction programsever undertaken in India, formed the major component of the earthquake reconstructionprogram. The geographical spread of the area1, the number of houses affected and thebackwardness of the worst affected districts posed an enormous challenge for reconstruction.

The Gujarat government adopted owner driven reconstruction supported by financial,technical and material assistance from the government, as the preferred model of housingrecovery. However, due to the interest shown by a large number of NGOs and externalagencies in housing reconstruction, it also adopted a policy of private-public partnership inaddition to the owner-driven model. Nonetheless the choice of owner driven or NGO drivenreconstruction was left to the beneficiaries and village community. The choice of relocationor building in-situ was also left to the village communities. Thus the decision to empowervillage communities to make their own decisions about relocation resulted in minimalrelocation and thus facilitated a speedy recovery.

Seventy-four NGOs participated in the reconstruction program, either in partnership withgovernment or independently, to reconstruct private houses, schools and hospitals. The listof NGOs included corporate houses, international NGOs, local NGOs, national NGOs andreligious organizations. Five other states also participated in the reconstruction of damagedvillages. Apart from the diverse NGOs which participated in the reconstruction, the largeNon Resident Gujaratis also actively participated in the reconstruction program. Many NGOs

1 The earthquake affected 21 of the 25 districts in the state of which 5 districts were worst affected. The total areaaffected is nearly 100,000 sq.kms


were also involved in advocacy, information dissemination and the mobilization of pubicopinion. According to Barenstein (2005), the significant variation in the approaches of theseagencies made Gujarat a laboratory for post-disaster reconstruction to experiment withvarious approaches. The politics of financial aid, discourses relating to the mobilization offunds, technical expertise, financial capacity, and competition for visibility dictated thevarious approaches of the external agencies which participated in reconstruction.

The Gujarat State Disaster Management Authority (GSDMA) was setup to coordinate andimplement reconstruction activity. This newly formed authority was registered as a societyunder the Societies Registration Act to enable it to have its own Memorandum ofUnderstanding, governing body and Rules of Business, different from the procedures ofgovernment. GSDMA was created to work as a single window to deal with reconstructionactivity with rules of business different from government to facilitate quick decision-makingand faster implementation of the reconstruction program. The funds received from the WorldBank and the Asian Development Bank were placed with the GSDMA, so that the fundscould be used only for reconstruction and not diverted to meet the routine expenditure ofthe state government.

In order to bridge the gap between the norms that emerge after catastrophic disasters andbureaucratic norms, GSDMA was provided with the powers of the cabinet, and the decisionsof GSDMA were treated at par with cabinet decisions. Creation of extraordinary mechanismsfor reconstruction is not easy. For example, the attempt of Goto Shinpei, the Home Ministerof Japan to create an extraordinary mechanism in the form of the Reconstruction Ministryafter the Canto earthquake in 1923 failed due to the resistance from other Ministries(Schencking 2006). One of the reasons why it succeeded in Gujarat was that the Chief Ministerhimself was the chairman of GSDMA. It became difficult for departments to challenge thedecisions taken by GSDMA as the Chief Minister was at the head of the GSDMA. The otherreason was the support accorded by the international funding agencies who found it easierto deal with a single agency than to deal with twenty-five different departments. There wasless political interference from various ministers and party cadres in the award of contractsfor civil work and the procurement of services and goods. This unprecedented extraordinarydecision-making mechanism and simplified operational procedure, evolved for theprocurement of goods, works and services, played a major role not only in speeding up theimplementation but also in making decisions bypassing the departments and political wingof the government. In order to develop the four worst affected towns of Kutch, AreaDevelopment Authorities were newly created and vested with the powers of town anddevelopment planning and the granting of building permission, taking into considerationthe lack of capacity of the Municipal bodies of these towns to address these issues.

Gujarat earthquake reconstruction is nearing completion. Nearly 200,000 houses have beenreconstructed and more than 900,000 houses repaired. Nearly 55,000 school rooms, morethan 10,000 public buildings, thousands of kilometers of; roads, drinking water supplypipelines and power supply lines, have been either restored or reconstructed. Reconstructionof the four totally devastated towns in the district of Kutch has also been completed. Inother words, the replacement reconstruction phase is over, and the developmentalreconstruction phase is in its final stage of completion. A review of how the different actorsperformed and to what extent the disaster became an opportunity to address issues beyondthe mere restoration of damaged assets.


2. REVIEWING CONCEPTS: DISASTER, RISK AND VULNERABILITY

2.1 Disaster

The number of reported natural disasters and their human and economic impact has beenincreasing since 1900. The increasing trend over the last century has been well-establishedon the basis of reliable data (UNDP 2004:11). It has been suggested that “more than 255million people were affected by natural disasters each year, on average between 1994 and2003” and “during the same period those disasters claimed an average of 58,000 thousandlives annually” (Guha-Sapir, D. Hargitt et al. 2004).

According to the estimate of Emergency Events Data Base (EM-DAT), 934,619 people werekilled by natural disasters from 1996 to 2005. In the year 2006, even though there were nohigh impact disasters, 23,047 people were killed and 143 million were affected and the totaleconomic damages were to the tune of $36.4 billion (CERD 2007).

The increase in the number of disasters such as earthquakes, which has not been accompaniedby a corresponding increase in geo-physical events, is partly due to an increase in thereporting of disasters, facilitated by advancements in information and communicationtechnology (Guha-Sapir, D.Hargitt et al. 2004). The conversion of natural hazards into high-impact disasters is also a result of the concentration of assets and people (Quarantelli2003:212), urbanization (Pelling 2003:21), unplanned development, the lack of enforcementof building codes (Lewis and Mioch 2005), and socio-economic, political, cultural and otherconditions, all of which heighten vulnerability (Oliver-Smith 1996; Hewitt 1997; Mileti 2000;Munasinghe and Clarke 1994; UNDP 2004).

Source: (GRID-Arendal 2005)

Figure 1: Trends in Number of Reported Events


While developed countries frequently suffer major economic loss as a result ofearthquakes, developing countries suffer a major loss of lives. The extent of economicloss suffered by developing countries, though comparatively low in comparison withthat suffered by developed countries, adversely impacts future development (Guha-Sapir, D.Hargitt et al. 2004). A calculation of loss in terms of the GDP of a nation as ameasure of disaster impact is under debate, but the fact remains that disasters damagesocial, public and economic infrastructure and result in massive post-disasterreconstruction programs affecting the development priorities of the countries impacted.

One of the most important questions facing scholars today is the issue of how a disaster canbe defined (McEntire 2001). International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR) definesdisaster as “A serious disruption of the functioning of a community or a society, causingwidespread human, material economic or environmental losses which exceed the ability ofthe affected community or society to cope using its own resources”. According to ISDR,disaster is a function of the risk process, which results from the combination of hazards,conditions of vulnerability and an insufficient capacity to reduce the potential negativeconsequences of risk (UNISDR).

The concept of disaster has undergone change over the course of the past half century.Natural disasters, once considered “acts of god”, represent events which affect geographicallocations and cause a state of departure of a society from normal life. These geo-physical,hydro-meteorological, or biological hazards, which were considered largely outside humancontrol, led to a reactive post-disaster relief approach. Too much focus on hazards resultedin a failure to consider many social, political, economic, cultural and other factors whichcould cause a disaster (Neal 1997). The shift in focus from the societal responses to disasters,to the processes that produce disasters, assisted in identifying the root causes and socialaspects of disasters rather than their immediate triggering agent. Thus risk becomes afunction of not only hazard but also vulnerability.

2.2 Risk

ISDR defines risk as the probability of harmful consequences, or expected losses (deaths,injuries, loss of property and livelihoods, disrupted economic activity or environmentaldamage) resulting from interactions between natural or human induced hazards andvulnerable conditions. Risk is expressed as a function of hazard and vulnerability(UNISDR 2007; Wisner, Blaikie et al. 2004):

Risk = Hazard × Vulnerability.

In other words, “the negative impact of a disaster will depend on the characteristics,probability and intensity of the hazard, as well as the susceptibility of the exposed elementsbased physical, social, economic and environmental conditions” (UNISDR 2002).

Risk is studied in two different contexts, one which arises due to over-consumption andaffluence, and the other, which is due to poverty and underdevelopment. “The concept of arisk society”, created due to an accumulation of wealth and ‘hazards and insecurities inducedand introduced by modernization itself’ (Beck 1992:21 as quoted in Wisner, Blaikie et al.2004) is different from the risk faced by developing countries, as a result of underdevelopmentand a lack of resources. The risk arising from underdevelopment and a lack of resources ismore relevant to this study. It is more appropriate to consider the objective and perceivedconcepts or risk. Objective risk is risk which experts are aware of, while perceived risk is the


view of the layman. Despite the recent arguments against the false distinction betweenobjective and perceived risk, the perception of risk is closely related to risk reduction measuresundertaken by individuals and communities. For example, low frequency disasters such asearthquakes are not perceived as risks by communities and thus they do not want to investin retrofitting measures or earthquake resistant construction. The perception of risk dependson cultural norms and values (Oliver-Smith 1996). This is of special relevance to developingcountries where the preparedness of communities is of paramount importance. It is thereforeessential to relate preparedness and a diversity of arguments on a location-specific manner.

2.3 Vulnerability

The concept of vulnerability in the disaster literature initially referred to the vulnerability ofthe built environment, which included buildings, critical infrastructure and lifelines, andemphasized response and mitigation measures through the application of science andtechnology and engineering solutions. Moving away from the concept of the vulnerabilityof physical infrastructure and built environment, recent approaches focus on social,economic, cultural, and political aspects of vulnerability (Oliver-Smith 1996; Lewis 1999;Quarantelli 1998)

Though poverty contributes a great deal to make individuals and households vulnerable,poverty cannot be equated with vulnerability (Anderson 1994:46). For example, in the caseof the Gujarat earthquake, asset ownership and vulnerability did not show a perfectcorrelation. Moreover, disasters change the economic conditions of affected parties if theproperties and productive assets owned are destroyed and many families may also be pushedbelow the poverty line as depicted by the figure below:

Increasing pressures ofpopulation, economic processes,marginalization, and underdevelopment have led to abroader definition ofvulnerability to include apolitical economy approach todisasters. “The most vulnerableare those with fewest choices:those whose lives areconstrained, for example, bypoverty, gender oppression,ethnic discrimination, politicalpowerlessness, physicaldisabilities, limited employmentopportunities, absence of legalrights and other forms ofdomination” (Cannon 1994 asquoted in Bolin and Stanford 1998:23).

Establishing the inter-linkage between risk and vulnerability, ISDR defines vulnerabilityas “the conditions determined by physical, social, and environmental factors or processes,which increase the susceptibility of a community to the impact of hazards”. Westgateand O’Keefe (1976) define vulnerability as “the degree to which a community is at risk

Figure 2: Sequence of Vulnerability

Source: Glewwe and hall 1998 as adapted by Vatsa (2005:79)


from the occurrence of extreme physical or natural phenomenon, where risk refers tothe probability of occurrence and the degree to which socio-economic and socio-politicalfactors affect the community’s capacity to absorb and recover from extreme phenomena.”According to perspectives in anthropological research, “disaster is a process or an eventinvolving a combination of a potentially destructive agent(s) from the natural and/ortechnological environment and a population in a socially and technically producedcondition of environmental vulnerability” (Oliver-Smith 1996:315).

Bankoff’s argument (2001:19) that “tropicality, development and vulnerability from part ofone and the same essentialising and generalizing cultural discourse that denigrates largeregions of world as disease ridden, poverty-stricken and disaster-prone,” makes vulnerabilityessentially a “western discourse”. However this does not explain why the majority of deathsand losses beyond the coping capacity of the nations occur in the so called disaster-proneparts of the world, rendered unsafe by “western discourse.” Population increase,urbanization, unplanned growth, the lack of regulation and enforcement of building codes,poverty and a lack of awareness are some of the factors that render the developing countriesdisaster-prone.

The definition of vulnerability has been undergoing continuous change, depending uponthe understanding of the various contributing factors. Some select definitions of vulnerabilityare presented in Appendix II.

The concept of resilience, which is an integral part of vulnerability, leads to the definition ofvulnerability as “The characteristics of a person or group and their situation that influencetheir capacity to anticipate, cope with, resist and recover from the impact of a hazard” (Wisner,Blaikie et al. 2004: 11). This concept of the ability to recover from the impact of the hazardbecomes important from the view of disaster reconstruction and recovery. A number ofstructural factors, such as social class, gender, race, caste, ethnicity, age, etc also contributeto vulnerability.

The cause of vulnerability has not remained local. Globalization and liberalization haveplayed a role in creating non-local vulnerabilities. Structural adjustments, economicinvestments, and developmental processes also increase vulnerability, as stated by Valdes:

Disasters are the outcome of a complex mix of actions linked to economic, social, cultural,environmental and political-administrative factors that are determined by inadequatedevelopment processes, structural adjustment programs and economic investmentprojects which do not consider the social or environmental cost of their actions. Thesituation is worsened by the unfair distribution of wealth and opportunities, deficientsettlement patterns in high- risk areas, unbridled urban growth with no proper planning,continuous environmental degradation, poor ability to manage and reduce the risk ofdisasters by authorities and communities, lack of human, technical and material andmaterial resources in affected societies (Valdes 2006:3).

Some of the important vulnerability models are attached in Appendix III.


3. REVIEWING MODELS AND RESEARCH STUDIES:RECONSTRUCTION, DEVELOPMENT ANDTHE WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY

3.1 Disaster Reconstruction and Recovery: Models, Research Studies

In the aftermath of massive disasters, regional and national governments undertakereconstruction following the relief phase. Reconstruction, a highly visible activity, is also ahighly debated activity. Reconstruction, basically seen as a process of reestablishing thepre-impact normalcy of life, is also seen as an opportunity for vulnerability reduction andmitigation. The goals, objectives, and processes of reconstruction depend on a wide rangeof factors, ranging from the availability of resources to the political system prevalent in theaffected country.

Post-disaster reconstruction and recovery research is a relatively recent phenomenon.A comparative study of four earthquake reconstruction programs conducted by Hass, Kateset al. (1977) is the first noteworthy contribution. This study compared four urbanreconstruction programs undertaken after the San Francisco earthquake (1906), theAnchorage earthquake (1964), the Rapid City Flood (1972) and the Managua earthquake(1972). The major findings of the study can be elucidated as follows:

1. Disaster recovery is ordered, knowable and predictable.

2. The central issues and decisions are value choices that give varying emphasis to theearly return to normalcy, the reduction of future vulnerability or to opportunities forimproved efficiency, equity and amenity.

3. Overambitious plans to accomplish these goals tend to be counterproductive.

4. Major opportunities to improve the reconstruction lie in early recognition of certainoverlooked problems, people, functions and areas; the reduction of uncertainty aboutthe future for those who live and work in the city; and the preparation for reconstructionbefore the disaster comes. (Hass, Kates et al. 1977: XXVI )

On the basis of the study Hass, Kates, and Bowden arrived at a sequential model for disasterrecovery activity. The model consists of four overlapping phases of recovery:

I. The emergency period consists of search and rescue, mass feeding, housing, the clearanceof debris and emergency medical response (2 weeks)

II. The restoration period is characterized by the patching up of the utility, housing, therelatively normal functioning of social and economic activities (1 to 20 weeks)

III. The replacement reconstruction period is aimed at rebuilding the capital stock, and thereturn of social and economic activities to pre-disaster levels. Indicators are thereplacement of the population and the functioning of their needs in homes, jobs andcapital stock and urban activities.(10 to 250 weeks)

IV. The commemorative, betterment and development reconstruction period is for projectsthat serve to memorialize or commemorate the disaster, to mark the city’s post-disaster betterment or improvement, or to serve future growth or development.(100 to 400 weeks).


Figure 3: Phases of Disaster Recovery

PERIODS : Emergency Restoration Reconstruction I Reconstruction II

Capital Damaged of Patched Rebuilt Major ConstructionStock : Destroyed (Replacement) (Commemoration

Betterment,Development)

Normal Ceased or Return and Return at Pre Improved andActivities : Changed Function disaster Levels or Developed

Greater

Sample Completion of Restoration of Attain Pre Completion ofIndicators : Search and Major Urban disaster Level of Major

Rescue Services Capital Stock Constructionand Activities Projects

End of Emergency Return ofShelter or Feeding RefugeesClearing Rubble Rubblefrom Main Arteries Cleared

Source: Hass, Kates et al. 1977

According to the study, though each period is longer than the previous one, the exact durationdepends on policy decisions regarding the speed of recovery. Further recovery is also “relatedto the extent of damage, the availability of resources, prevailing pre disaster trends, andqualities of leadership, planning and organization for reconstruction” (Hass, Kates et al.1977: XXVII). The model advocated, known as the classical model, attempted to provide aframework for reconstruction with specific recommendations for policymakers. A numberof criticisms have been made on the linear model proposed by Hass, Kates et al.

Critics argue that the sequence of the recovery process is uneven and that phases overlapmore than is suggested in the model. It is also argued that different groups in the samecommunity will be at different levels of recovery, based on their capacities andvulnerabilities, and thus they experience the sequence differently. The model is alsocriticized as a value-added approach, “which views community as going through seriesof fixed stages, each stage a necessary development adding value to the final product(Wisner, Blaikie et al. 2004:357).


While the model by Hass and his colleagues included a separate phase for ‘bettermentreconstruction’, they have not dealt with its various determinants in detail. According tothe study, while an early return to normalcy is desired by the affected communities andbusiness establishments, planners and experts see an opportunity for improved efficiency.Although the study by Hass and his colleagues is one of the earliest studies to incorporatepost-disaster opportunity, in so far as it identifies the existence of the potential to go beyondreplacement reconstruction in the aftermath of disasters, it does not dwell in depth on thefactors that define the scope, the limitations and how potential opportunity can be madeoperational. The tensions created by these two mutually conflicting perceptions and theirimpact on political, social and economic systems are also not addressed. The study also failsto deal with the way in which policy decisions were made and the role of stakeholders inthe reconstruction process. As pointed out by Quarantelli (1989), however, the Hass modeldoes deal with the conflicting nature of reconstruction process.

Rubin, Saperstein et al (1985), in their comparative study of the post-disaster recovery ofcommunities, examined the role of governmental organizations and intergovernmentalprocesses in community level recovery on the basis of 14 disaster case studies in the U.S.but none of them were considered ‘catastrophic’ disasters. In contrast to Hass, Kates etal.’s findings that reconstruction is ordered, knowable and predictable, Rubin, Sapersteinet al. observed that in the process of reconstruction, issues crop up simultaneously or inillogical sequences. They argued that through leadership, the ability to act and knowledgeof available resources, local officials affect the recovery process. According to Petterson(1999: 2), Rubin’s model comprises three forms of recovery consisting of minimalist/restoration; foresight/mitigation, and visionary/community betterment. Quarantelli(1999:2) observes that the model of Rubin, Saperstein et al. has three peaks: physicalrecovery, societal impacts and focuses on community betterment. This is again a valueadded model, as each stage requires more resources, effort and work for “bettermentbuilding” than the previous stage. Though Rubin and his colleagues, on the basis of theirstudy of 14 county level disasters, discuss visionary reconstruction or communitybetterment reconstruction, they do not dwell in depth on the various exogenous andendogenous factors which contribute to or limit such betterment.

Another sequential model of recovery proposed by UNDP and UNDRO consists of a threephased recovery consisting of relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction:

Relief Phase: The relief phase is the time period following the occurrence of the disasterwhen exceptional measures have to be taken to search and find the survivors as well asmeet their basic needs for shelter, water, food and medical care.

Rehabilitation: Rehabilitation comprises the operations and decisions taken after a disasterwith a view to restoring a stricken community to its former living conditions, whileencouraging and facilitating the necessary adjustments to the changes caused by the disaster.

Reconstruction: Reconstruction is the action taken to reestablish a community after a periodof rehabilitation subsequent to a disaster. Actions include the construction of permanenthousing, a full restoration of all services, and the complete resumption of pre-disaster state.(UNDP and UNDRO 1992)

Improvements aimed at hazard mitigation and vulnerability reduction are not included as apart of recovery in this model. Instead, mitigation activities are viewed as belonging to thepre-disaster period. As such, the model basically aims at restoration to the status quo and


hence does not discuss the way in which post-disaster reconstruction can be used as anopportunity to address issues beyond pre-impact restoration.

According to Siembieda, Baird et al. (2004), the classical model can be improved by adding toit “activities like risk assessment, mitigation measures, identification of special done groupand emphasizing post disaster planning.” The concept of recovery as a continuing opportunityseeking process (Mileti 1999) and the concept of “holistic recovery”, based on participation,sustainability and a holistic approach (Natural Hazards Center 2005), also attempt to improvethe classical model. Mitchell (2004) advocates a model of functional recovery in which materialand economic functions, metabolic functions which include natural and human-modified lifesupport systems, learning functions, performance functions, creative functions, and theregulatory functions of communities, are restored. The suggestions of Siembieda, Mileti andMitchell are normative and not based on any actual study of post-disaster reconstruction.

A longitudinal study of the 1976 Guatemalan Earthquake by Bates (1982), analyzed thesocial change fostered by the earthquake and evaluated the effects of the reconstructionprogram on households, communities and the development process. Bates views recoveryas a process of the interaction of political, economic and social forces, and thus provides auseful model with which to understand the complex forces that inhibit successfulreconstruction. Though Friesema, Caposarso et al. (1979) studied recovery in four disasterswith a view to examining the long-term economic effects of disasters on communities, “muchof their book ended up being a discussion on how to develop better methodologies for [thestudy of] future disasters” (Olshansky 2005:11).

Bolin conducted many studies on family and community recovery after disasters (Bolin1982; Bolin 1994; Bolin and Bolton 1986). These focused mainly on housing recovery and theimpact of race, ethnicity, and religion on differential housing recovery. Bolin’s studies donot deal with the reconstruction of public infrastructure and complex issues of bettermentreconstruction, etc. The study of Peacock, Gills et al. (1997) on the differential impact ofHurricane Andrew on race and ethnicity does not deal with the issues of post-disasteropportunities and issues related to replacement reconstruction.

Yaoxian’s (2002) article on Tangshan reconstruction describes the Chinese model ofreconstruction, which closely follows the model proposed by Hass, Kates et al. (1977) and isa four phased recovery model consisting of emergency, recovery (restoration and operation),reconstruction I (returning to the same level as that prior to impact), and reconstruction II(improvement and development). The Chinese approach is one which employs a systemdynamics method and incorporates the four important issues of population recovery andgrowth, infrastructure systems reconstruction, housing and other building reconstruction,and priority of the rehabilitation and development of industrial sectors through computersimulation. The “three cuts” process, adopted to identify the buildings and structures whichrequire strengthening, first identifies critical cities, then critical institutions, and, thirdly,critical buildings and structures.

The Chinese model was built on the basis of “one principle, three policies”. The one principlewas the principle of self-reliance through productive development and hard work, and thethree policies may be summarized as:i) Giving prominence to projects closely related to mass life,ii) The assignment of a head of a prefecture to direct reconstruction in an area, andiii) The carrying out of reconstruction in stages (Cheng and Wang 1996).


There exists no in- depth study to date on the Tangshan reconstruction, particularly on theaspects of policy formulation, and their contributing factors and limitations. As the entirereconstruction was a top down process, the role of different stakeholders is not discussed indetail in any study. In short, post-disaster reconstruction in China is a country-specific modeland may not be particularly applicable to other countries.

The study of the Great Hanshin Earthquake by Yoshimitsu, Eiichi et al. (2005) basicallyfocuses on the lessons learnt in the recovery process, the consequences of the government’sdecision not to fund the reconstruction of private houses, and the major issues which remainunsolved a decade after the occurrence of the earthquake. Borland (2006) has argued thatthe earthquake was used by conservative government officials as a pretext for politicalmanipulation and the fostering of loyalty among the people, and thus approached individualson an ideological level. The market-driven model of Japan, in which the poor and elderlypersons were worst affected, is not relevant to many developing countries. The adoption ofa complete market-driven model would amount to political Hara-Kiri in India.

In his evaluative study of the Gediz earthquake in Turkey in 1970, Mitchell, (1976) concludesthat reconstruction is mainly influenced by the availability of resources and time. Geipel(1982), in his study of disaster reconstruction after the Friuli earthquake 1976 in Italy,examined the social, economic and political circumstances that affected areas prior to andafter the devastating earthquakes. Many of the generalizations made by Geipel are applicableto other disaster situations (Mitchell 1983). However both the Gediz and Friuli earthquakeswere not catastrophic in nature. The remarkable concern shown by the communities inFriuli in maintaining the architectural integrity of style in the rebuilding of the city sloweddown reconstruction. The communities were relatively unconcerned about the speed ofreconstruction and were willing to stay in temporary prefabricated homes for many years(Hogg 1980), which is contrary to the normal tendency of people to wish to return to normallife quickly. The lesson learned from Friuli earthquake reconstruction is the need forcommunity cooperation and patience in successful reconstruction. The Friuli model howevercannot be applied to catastrophic disasters that impact upon very large areas.

Comerio (1998), based on her study of six reconstruction programs, classifies the recoveryprocess into four models as below:

1. The Redevelopment Model: Complete redevelopment of a devastated area by a nationalgovernment used in Tangshan in China in 1976, and Spitak and Leninakan in SovietArmenia in 1988.

2. Capital Infusion Model: Infusion of outside capital model was used in Skopje 1963,Managua 1972, Guatemala City 1976 and San Salvador 1986 earthquakereconstructions. In the above cases, outside capital, in the form of international aid,combined with outside expertise was used for rebuilding housing for low incomepopulations. In each of these cases as well as in numerous rural disasters, socialscientists and housing advocates criticized the misfit between institutionally plannedand built post disaster housing and local needs.

3. The Limited intervention model: Government takes the responsibility of repairingand reconstructing the pubic infrastructure. The limited-intervention approach assumesthat private insurance will cover some losses, property prices will adjust to the newcircumstances, and government will provide supplementary assistance to the poor. Thismodel was used in the reconstruction after Alaska earthquake 1964 and HurricaneCamille 1969.


4. The Market Model: The market model relies on market forces to adjust and adapt aftera disaster. The market model assumes that the real estate market will sort out the winnersand losers in the aftermath of a calamity. Reconstruction of private assets is entirely theresponsibility of the owners. Kobe earthquake recovery is an example of this model.

Comerio’s study does not dwell in depth on the socio-economic, political and other reasonsfor the choice of a particular model by a country. The Chinese model of completeredevelopment, built on the basis of self reliance without accepting international aid, maynot be possible in the context of democratic and non-authoritarian regimes. It is also notpossible for poor nations to refuse international aid. Complete reliance on market forces,as in the Japanese case, is also not a viable option for many developing countries. TheJapanese model has been heavily criticized and it is argued that it has led to social andeconomic inequalities.

In the infusion-of-outside-aid model, there is a misfit between institutionally planned andbuilt post-disaster housing and local needs, and this model may not also be fully applicablein all countries. Limited intervention to supplement insurance claims does not apply todeveloping countries like India, where insurance penetration in the housing sector is lessthan one percent. In the absence of insurance cover, the intervention of the government inhousing reconstruction by providing financial and technical assistance not only helps theaffected but also provides an opportunity for risk reduction by improving the technicalstandard of the reconstructed houses.

In the context of South Asia, and particularly India which is highly vulnerable to naturaldisasters, no in-depth study has been undertaken on the reconstruction process. Most of thestudies conducted after the Marathwada earthquake in 1993, the Orissa cyclone in 1999,and the Gujarat earthquake in 2001 are purely technical studies which focus on the builtenvironment from an engineering point of view. The other studies conducted basically focuson the success of the reconstruction program, beneficiary satisfaction and the role of thegovernment and NGOs particularly in housing reconstruction.

The objective of the Samal, Meher et al. study (2005) on the Orissa cyclone was to assess theimpact of the cyclone on livelihood, to analyze how stake holders responded to the crisis,and to identify the coping strategies of the weaker sections. The main focus of this studywas post-disaster relief and the problems associated with relief. The issues of post-disasterreconstruction were also addressed in the study. The reasons for successful reconstructionor otherwise, the role of stakeholders, the process of policy formulation, etc, were not dealtwith. Interestingly there exists no major study on post-disaster reconstruction in Orissadespite the fact that it was one of the worst disasters of a large country like India.

Barenstein and Pittet’s study (2007) on post-tsunami reconstruction in Tamilnadu in SouthIndia focuses on housing recovery and locally relevant building practices, the quality ofconstruction and the cost-benefit of different building technologies. A mid-term socio-technical assessment of post-tsunami construction in Tamilnadu by UNDP and NGOCoordination Resource Center (UNDP and NCRC 2006) relates to the extent of disastersafety incorporated in the reconstruction work in Tamilnadu, both in the construction ofprivate houses and public buildings. Reconstruction in Tamilnadu has just begun. It is tooearly to assess whether post-disaster opportunity has been employed successfully or missed.The two studies mentioned above center on the physical reconstruction of buildings. Theyprovide little information on the process of reconstruction.


In the context of Gujarat, a satisfaction study conducted in 2003 by Abhiyan, UNDP and theGujarat State Disaster Management Authority (GSDMA) attempted to measure thesatisfaction of beneficiaries in the housing reconstruction program (Abhiyan, GSDMA et al.2003). Barenstein’s study (2006) of six different approaches to the reconstruction of housesin Gujarat is an attempt to analyze the housing reconstruction program based on beneficiaries’perspectives with regard to house location, size, the quality of materials, and the quality ofconstruction. Samaddar and Okoda (2006), in their study on a participatory approach forpost-disaster reconstruction in Gujarat which is based on a ‘Vitae system’ that aims to integratesurvival, communication and vitality, focus on the satisfaction level of beneficiaries and theoccupation of houses. All of the studies referred to above focus on housing reconstructiononly. The evaluation study of Abhiyan was undertaken in the initial phase of thereconstruction program and hence does not give a clear picture of the entire program. Thestudies of Barenstein and Samaddar and Okoda, carried out in 2004-2005, are evaluativestudies in the housing sector from the point of view of the beneficiaries. They do not dealwith policy issues and the reconstruction process, or the social, political and economic factorsthat shape post-disaster opportunity.

The Earthquake Engineering Research Institute’s (EERI) Recovery Reconnaissance Reporton earthquake rebuilding in Gujarat (Murty, Greene et al. 2005) presents observations froma five day field visit investigation undertaken by a team of structural engineers, an urbanplanner and a sociologist in September 2003 and contains broad observations regarding thereconstruction. It is intended to serve as a springboard for further research rather than adocument of conclusive findings. Though the EERI study covers all sectors, including thereconstruction of social and public infrastructure, most of the study is from a technical pointof view. The study is more concerned with the implementation of the policies and, basedprimarily on field observations, does not explore whether the opportunity has been used toaddress issues beyond pre-impact restoration and physical reconstruction.

Jigyasu’s article (2001b), written in the early stages of reconstruction in Gujarat, voicesconcerns about cultural compatibility and sustainability and is full of sweepinggeneralizations, based on text book prescriptions without considering actual problems,processes and dynamics of large scale reconstruction and rehabilitation (Vatsa 2002).

The Social Impact Assessment (SIA) undertaken by GSDMA (Gujarat Institute ofDevelopment Research 2004:M.S.University 2004) focuses on the social impact of thereconstruction program and the attitude and awareness of beneficiaries. Their indicatorconsist of policy, stake holder participation and consultation, the decision-makingprocess, implementation procedures, community participation and grievance redressmechanisms. The SIA, conducted as per the requirement of international fundingagencies, was more concerned about the adverse social impact of the program such assecondary displacement, involuntary resettlement, land acquisition, and the needs ofsocially vulnerable groups, etc. The terms of reference of the study do not include policyformulation, stake holder conflicts, or the influence of social, cultural and economicfactors on reconstruction.

A benefit monitoring study undertaken by the GSDMA to measure the benefits of thereconstruction program (KPMG 2003; KPMG 2005) measures the benefits accrued acrossthe entire reconstruction program. The benefit monitoring study evaluates the programoutcome, based on certain parameters. The study is not a research study on the reconstructionprocess, hence does not talk about the aspects of policy formulation or implementation.


Olshansky (2005), in his review of the studies carried out on post-disaster recovery, classifiesthe studies on the basis of the extent of their approach and the themes they deal with.According to him, studies have been undertaken which view reconstruction as: a predictableprocess, a management problem, citizen’s participation, a process of physical change, aconcern and lesson for planners, issues of housing, finance and economics, the recovery ofindividuals and households, and small business recovery. Interestingly, there is no mentionof any study conducted in the context of Asia, which has been the most highly impacted bynatural disasters (CERD 2007).Most studies can be broadly classified in one or more of the following categories:1. Management approach: based on how the reconstruction program was managed;2. Process approach: studies that focus on the reconstruction processes, depending on social,

economic, cultural and political factors; and,3. Outcome approach: those studies attempting to evaluate the program.

Most of the studies focus on small disasters rather than large scale catastrophic disasters,and on post-disaster reconstruction in developed countries particularly in the U.S. Themajority of them place an emphasis on family and community recovery and areconcerned with the sociology this phenomenon. Furthermore, the studies are mostlyconcerned with the recovery aspect of post-disaster intervention rather than thereconstruction phase. The intervention models of Japan, the US and other developedcountries are not readily applicable in the context of developing countries. The fewstudies undertaken in the context of developing countries have been by researchersfrom the developed world with the obvious limitations of a lack of knowledge aboutthe language, culture, and socio-economic conditions. It is pertinent to note that nosignificant study has been undertaken to examine whether post-disaster reconstructioncan be used as an opportunity to address larger issues of development beyond pre-impact restoration. Especially in the context of South Asian countries, including in thecontext of post-disaster reconstruction in India.

3.2 Reconstruction: Issues and Parameters of Success

The reconstruction process and the parameters for measuring the success of thereconstruction program is a complex issue. There is no consensus among experts, plannersand governments regarding the parameters which make reconstruction and rehabilitationeffective and efficient. The restoration of the pre-impact population (Hass, Kates et al.1977), speed and quality (Rubin, Saperstein et al. 1985), disaster risk reduction (Comerio1998), ensuring equity, access to resources, and reducing community vulnerability(Alexander 2004), and supporting the long-term development of the community in question(Sarkar 2006) are some of the parameters. Quarantelli (1999) suggests the goals of recovery,the level of recovery, the size of the recovering unit, the perspective on recovery, therecovery from the secondary or ripple effects of the disaster, and the difference in recoveryfrom catastrophes and disasters as the six parameters which might constitute the successor failure of recovery.

One of the basic dilemmas of policymakers in any reconstruction is whether to aim at thereplacement of damaged or destroyed assets, to orient the reconstruction efforts towardsthe future, or to strike a balance between replacement-reconstruction and developmentreconstruction (Alexander 2004; Mitchell 2004). The conflict between speed versus safety,the betterment of some segments versus equity, the trend of post-disaster recovery


following and sometimes even accelerating the pre-disaster trends (Kates, Colten et al.2006), the differential ability of people to recover, the social and cultural changes due tothe recovery process (Oliver-Smith 1996), and the factors of time and resources limitingreconstruction (Hass, Kates et al 1977; Mitchell 1976) are some of the issues of post-disasterrecovery and reconstruction.

3.3 The Window of Opportunity and its Dimensions

Going beyond replacement reconstruction in order to address developmental issues ofsustainable disaster mitigation, one should examine the opportunity provided by thedisaster and also understand the limitations which force policymakers and planners tostrike a compromise.

For example, the post-disaster reconstruction after Hurricane Mitch in 1998, led to the coiningof the slogan “Reconstruction with transformation” by the governments and the donors.Numerous books and articles written on post- disaster recovery, draw attention to the windowof opportunity which opens up after disasters.

Disasters provide an opportunity for risk reduction and mitigation (Wisner, Blaikie et al.2004; Berke and Campanella 2006; Davidson, Johnson et al. 2006; Siembieda, Baird et al.2004; Bolin 1985; Christoplos, Mitchell et al. 2001; Alexander 2006). Catastrophic naturaldisasters create the conditions for political change at the local and national level (Pellingand Dill 2006), offer a vision for the future and promote socially just redevelopment (Berkeand Campanella 2006), increase the level of development (Davidson, Johnson et al. 2006),and create opportunities for rebuilding with revised designs (Comfort, Wisner et al. 1999).Reconstruction, if planned well and implemented properly, can also improve the long-termstability of communities (Badri, Asgary et al. 2006; Bates 1982).

During disaster recovery the flow of funds through loans, aid, and foreign remittancesprovide an opportunity to recast development priorities to reduce vulnerability (UNDP2004). Disasters can also be important factors in social and economic change (Oliver-Smith1996; Asgary, Badri et al. 2004). Disasters provide a window of opportunity for advocacy(Rocha and Christopher, 2001) and responsible behavior (Parker 2000), educating thepolitical and bureaucratic wings of government (Wisner, Blaikie et al. 2004), and improvinglivelihood conditions (Nakagawa et al, 2004). Major disasters stimulate legal andorganizational changes (Gawin 1930; Alexander 2006)

It appears that there is an agreement among many scholars about the opening of a window ofopportunity after disasters to bring about a plethora of changes for the betterment of thecommunities and to orient development towards future needs. The range of issues whichcould be addressed appears to cover social, cultural, political and economic life of the affectedpeople. However, the discussions regarding post-disaster opportunity are normative discoursesnot verified through any actual study. According to Christoplos (2006), the assumptionregarding the window of opportunity is based on a new awareness among stake holders, theavailability of money, the exposure of weaknesses in policy and institutions, the destruction ofbad infrastructure, and enhanced political will, but the notion of a window of opportunitybeing opened has not yet been elaborated conceptually and studied empirically.

It is necessary to examine whether disasters really can be used as an opportunity to addressissues beyond pre-impact restoration. It is equally important to understand the characteristicsof the scope of activities which could be undertaken to make use of the opportunity. In orderto effectively use the window based on the understanding of the scope it is essential to


construct the characteristics, occurrence, and interrelatedness of, and the opportunities for,developing mutually reinforcing preventive and mitigation measures which actually helpto sustain positive impacts. This analysis has enormous implications for devising a menu ofpublic policy related measures to strengthen mitigation and adaptation.

The opportunity for planned development, risk reduction and community betterment doesnot seem to arise after every disaster. In my view, disasters in themselves do not open awindow of opportunity. The magnitude of the disaster and the scale of destruction and lossdetermine the opening of the window to some extent. The use of the opportunity dependson various factors such as the length of time taken for a return to normalcy, the size andduration of the reconstruction program, the political and bureaucratic leadership, thedemography of the population affected in terms of their political voice, the administrativeculture, the availability of resources, and more importantly the awareness and demandingcapacity of the people. The creation of institutional mechanisms is also necessary to carryout the development and mitigation measure beyond the reconstruction period.

The time period of the “open” window is not fixed, but it is situation specific, depending onmany factors such as political will, popular awareness, media pressure, the availability offunds and the setting up of institutional mechanisms to effect long term changes. Accordingto Key (1990), the window period is the first one year after the disasters and the post-disasterinterventions for risk reduction are not sustainable. The interests for higher standardsdiminish over a period of time, perpetuating the disaster cycle as depicted in table 4.

Policy making aimed at risk reduction and mitigation may also be due to the cumulativeimpact of repeated disasters, rather than a single major event. Repeated disasters and lossmay play a major role in creating an enabling atmosphere in which policy changes areaccepted among stakeholders. Sometimes a lost opportunity is not really lost, for the lessonslearnt may lead to an opening of the window of opportunity after the next disaster. Henceit is also important to examine the cumulative effect of the experience and the lessons leantfrom previous disasters which identify and shape policy decisions.

Table 1: Human Responses to Major Earthquakes

Stage Time Event ReactionPositive Negative

1 0-1 Min Major earthquake Panic2 1 min- I week After shocks Rescue and Fear

survival3 1 week- 1 month Diminishing Short term Allocation of blame

repairs to builders, designers,officials etc

4 1 month- 1 year long term repairsAction for higherstandards

5 1 year – 10 years Diminishing interests6 10 years – Reluctance to meet

next earthquake seismic provisionsnon-compliance withregulation

7 Next earthquake Repeat stages 1-7

Source: (Key 1990)


The pre-disaster scenario also tends to shape or limit opportunity. Social, economic, politicaland cultural factors play an important role in defining the scope of the window. Theoutcome of the reconstruction program also depends on existing social dynamics, politicaland power equations, intergovernmental relationships, and access to resources andinformation. The reconstruction process depends on the availability of funds in the formof loans, grants or aid, but the flow of aid and loans also may depend on the pre-impacteconomic condition, and/or the bargaining capacity of the relevant state government withthe funding organizations.

The responsibility for hazard mitigation and vulnerability reduction is usually vested inlocal governments, while the funds for post-disaster reconstruction come either from thestate or national government. Sometimes, disasters which are created due to the failure ofthe local government to enforce regulations for risk reduction are funded by the state andregional governments, creating a moral hazard and irresponsible behavior on the part ofthe local self-governments and affected communities (Platt 1999). Thus the reconstructionprocess may encourage rebuilding in vulnerable places rather than taking sustainablemitigation measures.

The needs of the already marginalized and weaker sections, vulnerable groups and womentend to be neglected in the reconstruction process unless special attention is paid to involvethem in the process. Reconstruction can sometimes perpetuate existing inequalities or evenlead to new ones. The issues of equity, gender empowerment, safety of the built environment,futuristic planning, poverty alleviation, and integration or risk reduction with developmentplanning are difficult issues to address even during normal development processes. It isnecessary to examine whether all these issues can be addressed in the aftermath of disasterswhen speed of recovery becomes the single most important factor for the affectedcommunities. A realistic understanding of the limits to mainstreaming may be useful toprioritize intervention. It is a subject of debate whether equity in reconstruction is uniformassistance without considering different requirements or whether the principle of equityshould aim at providing according to need.

While the shock of the disaster silences some of the voices of vested interests, it can alsocreate new vested interests in the form of international pressure, hidden agendas of thedonors, opportunistic property scavenging, or renewal of past communal and caste feudsetc., as a means of taking advantage of the opportunity. For example builders and real estatedevelopers may see an opportunity in the aftermath of disasters to build condominiumsand multi-storey buildings in the place of single owner houses. They may also try to influencethe land zoning process in order to convert residential zones into commercial zones. Theyalso try to influence the town planning process, road alignments, and infrastructure locationand add value to their existing properties.

Amongst other donors often also consist of various religious, caste and community groups.While the religious groups may use the opportunity of reconstruction to propagate theirreligious faith, the caste and community groups focus on the reconstruction of particularcaste or community groups. Differential aid for reconstruction in the same village or townacross different sections of the population may renew past communal and caste feuds.Many countries provide aid with the condition that the goods and consultancy servicesshould be procured from the donor country only and thus aid given is ploughed back intothe donor country. The relationship between the local, state and national government,emerging political opportunities for a change of leadership, elections in the near future


and the political mileage that can be obtained by doling out benefits also influence thepolices, speed and outcome of reconstruction.

Due to the urgency of the communities to go back to pre-impact life, due to media pressure,and also due to the criticism of the opposition regarding the slow pace of reconstruction,reconstruction is driven by, as Comerio (1998) puts it, “Camcorder Policies” to address theimmediate requirement of rebuilding rather than using the opportunity for long termdevelopment. In order to take positive advantage of the opportunity, there is a need for bothpolitical and bureaucratic leadership, for both vision and long term commitment. Theintroducing of regulation, the enactment of bills and the establishment of a techno-legal regimecannot happen in the immediate aftermath of disasters. Sustained political will is necessary tocarry out systemic corrections and to create institutions beyond window dressing.

The effective use of the post-disaster reconstruction opportunity should also address theissue of the sustainability of the initiatives undertaken during the reconstruction process.One time intervention to “build back better” will not be sustainable if knowledge andtechnology transfer does not take place. Different approaches of the government, externalagencies and NGOs have different implications on sustainability.

The perceived failure or success of reconstruction also sometimes brings about political changesand has an impact on the outcome of elections. The perceptions of people regardingreconstruction may also undergo a change over a period of time. Affected communities in thebeginning are more concerned with rebuilding their private assets and do not appreciate theefforts of the government for redevelopment, infrastructure creation and upgrading. However,once redevelopment plans unfold on the ground as reality, their perceptions may change.

Further, a delay in permanent reconstruction to build a planned city will also have financialimplications. Adequate intermediary shelter arrangements with necessary infrastructurelike power, water and roads etc should be provided so that people are able to stay for extendedperiods in intermediary shelters until the redevelopment planning is completed. However,the creation of such intermediary shelter sites with facilities may result in the continuedexistence of these shelter sites even after the reconstruction of permanent shelters, and theymay turn into slums.

Civil society organizations, social networks and social capital also play an important role inthe process of reconstruction. Civil society organizations sometimes directly participate in thereconstruction process or organize themselves and voice the concern of their members to thegovernment and policy-making organizations. They also mediate between donors and NGOsin order to negotiate more funds, better houses or infrastructure to the members and thecommunity. Social networks and social capital bring people together and enable them toarticulate their demands in various ways. Strong societies have access to political andbureaucratic leadership and thus influence policy decisions. In India, caste based organizationsattempt to mobilize the support of the elected representatives and political leaders belongingto their caste. Scheduled castes and scheduled tribes, apart from employing the abovementionedmethods of mobilization, also directly appeal to the National Commission for Scheduled Castesand Scheduled Tribes. Minority communities also adopt the same strategy of appealing to theNational Commission for Minorities in order to redress their grievances.

The political leadership may see an opportunity to create goodwill using tax payers’ moneyto “build back better”. An increased flow of money and a huge reconstruction programcould become a boon to the construction industry. Due to the flow of aid money and


competition among NGOs to adopt villages, the affected communities also get increasedbargaining power. The communities demand bigger houses, more facilities and betterinfrastructure from the NGOs. The NGOs, which are winding up due to lack of resources, inturn gain access to foreign funds and donor support to revive themselves. Thus the windowmay open differently for different stake-holders.

The complex process of reconstruction is aptly described by Schencking (2006) :

A reconstruction process is a series of interrelated, interconnected processes that not onlyreveal, uncover, and disclose the undercurrents in the society, but also exacerbate manyof the pre-existing underlying tensions, fissures, or fault lines that exist in the politicalarena. I would argue that the post-disaster reconstruction process springs from the nexuswhere politics, economy, society and technology come together- the place where politicians,bureaucrats, financial experts, urban planners, academics, and to a lesser extent citizens,meet to plan, shape and construct what they think will be their individual, collective andperhaps national future. Not surprisingly, post-disaster reconstruction is an arena fraughtwith political, ideological and economic divisiveness and contestation.

Schencking, however, has not included the role of external agencies and NGOs inreconstruction. The success and sustainability of reconstruction mainly depends on the effortsto involve citizens in planning and reconstruction.

3.4 The Window of Opportunity and Reconstruction After Gujarat Quake

In Gujarat, replacement reconstruction is now over and developmental reconstruction is inthe last stages of completion. The task, accomplished in terms of physical reconstructionand livelihood rehabilitation, is outlined in Table 5.

The figures are not only impressive but also indicate the huge task accomplished by Gujaratin a span of just six years. In order to take advantage of the window of opportunity inorder to build back better, nearly half of the reconstruction cost was directed towards thecreation and upgrading of infrastructure and long-term disaster management capacitybuilding. The four worst affected towns of Kutch have been built from scratch with reviseddevelopment planning, keeping in mind the infrastructural and life line requirements ofthe projected population of the year 2030. The program also aimed at gender equity byregistering the houses in the joint names of husband and wife and by launching a speciallivelihood program for women-headed households and affected women (GSDMA 2005a).

In addition the government also aimed at a transformation of the industrially backwarddistrict of Kutch by providing tax concessions for those industries set up in Kutch withinfive years of the occurrence of the disaster. Kutch attracted huge investments and is nowquickly developing into one of the industrial investment destinations of Gujarat. It wouldbe useful to examine the role played by various stakeholders with regard to policyformulation and implementation.

The Gujarat earthquake also resulted in a paradigm shift in the policy of the governmentfrom relief and humanitarian assistance oriented post-disaster intervention to proactiveprevention, mitigation and pre-disaster preparedness. The Comprehensive Gujarat StateDisaster Management Policy was declared in the year 2002, followed by the enactment ofthe Gujarat State Disaster Management Act in 2003. Gujarat became the first state in thecountry to provide a legal and regulatory framework for disaster management by enactinga bill. Competency based certification of masons and the passing of the Gujarat Professional


Engineers Bill and the Emergency Response Medical Bill are some of the initiativesundertaken to enable the better management of disasters in the state.

Table 2: Tasks accomplished in terms of construction, livelihoods and social rehabilitationafter Gujarat earthquake

Sr. No. Sector Repair/ Reconstruction

1. Housing 1,110,001

2. School Rooms 54,150

3. Roads (Km) 4,279

4. Bridges 179

5. Power (Transmission & distribution lines in Kms.) 8,903

6. Water supply pipeline (Kms.) 2,615

7. Public Buildings 11,757

8. Dams 191

9. Health Buildings 1,107

10. Urban Roads (Kms.) 349

11. Urban Pipe Lines (Kms.) 700

12. Urban Sewerage Lines (Kms.) 333

13. Urban Public infrastructure 171

14. Livelihood No. of Beneficiaries

Agriculture 1,83,794

Industries 80,000

15. Social Rehabilitation

Provided with artificial limbs 236

Provided with wheelchair and supportive devices 3,017

Setting up of 157 day care centers and3 orphanages 241

Paraplegics provided pension 105

Old age pension 657

Widows provided pension 999

16. Women covered through livelihood program 14,147

Source: GSDMA (2007a)

The Government undertook large scale training programs to train 26,000 masons and6,000 engineers. The syllabus of engineering colleges was revised to include earthquakeengineering as part of the civil engineering curriculum. The syllabus of the school


curriculum was also revised to include the basics of disaster management in schoolsto create a culture of disaster preparedness. In order to continue the training andresearch activity in disaster management, a Gujarat Institute of Disaster Managementhas been set up as the research and training wing of GSDMA. In order to study theseismic risk in Gujarat and India, an Institute of Seismic Research is being set up as anational research institute.

Some of the measures undertaken as part of preparedness include the preparation of acomposite hazard risk vulnerability atlas, the preparation of state, district and village leveldisaster management plans, large scale training programs for search and rescue, and theprocurement of emergency response equipments. In order to train communities as firstrespondents to a disaster, a community-based disaster risk management program has beenundertaken in 4,000 hazard prone villages.

The above list of activities is only illustrative not exhaustive. In recognition of the riskreduction activities undertaken, the GSDMA was awarded the UN Sasakawa CertificateMerit award in 2003. For the innovations undertaken in earthquake reconstruction, theGSDMA was also awarded the Commonwealth Association for Public Administration andManagement (CAPAM) Gold award in 2004. According to a benefit-monitoring studyconducted by KPMG (2005) in 60 villages in the earthquake affected area, using variousindicators to compare the pre-earthquake and post-earthquake life, the quality of life indexafter reconstruction has gone up by nearly 15 percent.

The post-disaster opportunity not only resulted in change of focus from relief to mitigationand the establishment of institutional mechanisms in Gujarat, but also brought about amajor change at the national level. The initiatives, discussed earlier in the disastermanagement framework at the national level, were mainly based on the initiatives of Gujarat.In addition, the national government, which urged other Indian states to follow the Gujaratmodel and set up state a disaster management authority, has now made this move mandatorythrough the National Disaster Management Act 2005.

From the Gujarat experience, it appears that a window of opportunity does open afterdisasters. The question remains, why did such a window of opportunity not open in thecase of earlier disasters which occurred in Gujarat? This question is valid in the nationalcontext as well.

Some of the important factors with reference to the policy decision of the Gujarat government are

1. The choice of owner-driven reconstruction: In all reconstruction programs prior toGujarat reconstruction, the governments preferred contractor-driven reconstruction orNGO-driven reconstruction. Contractor-driven reconstruction is easy and fast. Owner-driven reconstruction is slow. There is also the risk of beneficiaries spending theassistance money for purposes other than housing reconstruction. The lack of trainedmasons and engineers and the lack of awareness of the affected people can make owner-driven reconstruction a difficult process. Despite the above problems government optedfor owner-driven reconstruction.

2. The complete redevelopment of the towns of Kutch: The complete redevelopment ofthe towns through town planning was undertaken in the worst affected towns of Kutchfor the first time in India following a disaster. The Government’s decision to completelyredevelop and impose a moratorium on any type of construction in these towns untilthe completion of planning clearly indicated that no reconstruction could take place


in these towns until two years had lapsed, in other words, until the assemblyelections. In addition to the time delay, the problems associated with providingintermediate shelters, large scale demolitions due to town planning, the wideningof roads, and revised zoning regulations are also measures that do not help politicallyin the short term.

3. The creation of extra-ordinary mechanisms for decision-making andimplementation: The decision of government to create extraordinary decision-makingand implementation mechanisms to bypass routine procedures and grass rootorganizations such as local self-governments could adversely affect the electoralprospects of the party in power.

4. The policy of minimum relocation: Immediately after the disaster, the Chief Ministermade a public announcement stating that all of the severely affected villages wouldbe relocated and reconstructed. However, when the final reconstruction policy wasannounced, the government adopted a policy of minimum relocation and preferredin-situ reconstruction.

The policy choices made in Gujarat to experiment with owner-driven reconstruction and“building back better”, despite the delay in reconstruction due to the legal lead timerequired for redevelopment and town planning and expenditure on infrastructure ratherthan on individual benefits, had implications on the speed and quality of reconstruction.More importantly, the policy choices also had far-reaching political implications. Whilethe huge sum of money spent in the affected areas to “build back better” could havebenefited the ruling party, the perceived and actual delay in reconstruction could haveadversely affected it. Policy choices made by the government, though apparently riskyand likely to jeopardize the political interests of the ruling party when elections areapproaching, are to a significant extent also a product of the role played by differentstakeholders such as experts, funding institutions, etc. The Assembly elections in Gujaratin 2002, the Parliament election in 2004 and the Assembly elections due in December 2007make Gujarat an ideal case study with which to gain a greater understanding of the politicalimplications of policy decisions on reconstruction.

In the earthquake 19 districts were affected. Five districts – namely Kutch, Jamnagar, Rajkot,Surendranagar and Patan, were declared the worst affected. The Government also named42 talukas as severely affected. It is also pertinent to study whether opportunity followingthe disaster opened for all of these the worst affected districts and talukas and, if this is notthe case, what factors led to the differential treatment and development.

The attempt to integrate mitigation and reconstruction was undertaken in Gujaratearthquake reconstruction for the first time in India. It is possible that sometimesgovernments take initiatives in the aftermath of disasters to avoid media and publicpressure. The sustainability of the initiatives depends on continuing those initiatives andsetting up institutional mechanisms without which the window of opportunity would bemerely a window dressing exercise.

Social and community networks played a major role in reconstruction. These caste andcommunity groups brought social capital but at the same time might have played a role inperpetuating and strengthening the existing stratifications and inequalities. While thefreedom given to NGOs for adoption and reconstruction could have resulted in betterconstruction, there was also a possibility of the creation of islands of excellence leading to


competition and resentment among the affected villages. It is also important to understandthe role of the rich Gujarati diaspora in the reconstruction process.

The national government played a significant role in helping the government of Gujarat tomobilize funds and the financial assistance offered through a reallocation of budget planfunds and other policy decisions. This was also an important factor that contributed toenhancing or limiting the opportunity in Gujarat.

ConclusionThe number of reported natural disasters and their human and economic impact is increasingnot only due to advances in information technology and improved reporting but also as aresult of increasing vulnerability created by a concentration of people and assets, poverty,inequity, unplanned growth and socio-economic conditions. In the aftermath of massivedisasters the state undertakes post-disaster activities in the form of relief and reconstructionaimed at the long-term recovery of the affected areas. Several authors have defined theoccurrence and existence of a window of opportunity after disasters to address a range ofissues, from “building back better” to planned development as a normative discourse.

The paper reviewed some of the key concepts and models in disaster studies. Examiningdisasters through the lens of vulnerability has significant value for policy makers.Vulnerability is also the key to understanding of risk from disasters. The models and researchstudies on understanding the relationship between these concepts and processes of post-disaster recovery and reconstruction and multi disciplinary requires further conceptual work.

This review attempted to examine and interrogate the notion of “the window of opportunity”which disaster response work is said to open. The paper contributes to the disaster literaturein two central ways: firstly by addressing some of the current theoretical gaps, and secondlyby bringing insights from my practical experience in handling disasters into further studiesto provide a more holistic perspective.


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APPENDIX I : HISTORY OF DISASTERS IN GUJARAT ANDFINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS

The state of Gujarat lies on the west coast of India. In addition to its coastline on the ArabianSea, it has common borders with Pakistan, and the states of Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, andMaharashtra. The state consists of 25 districts and has a total population of more than50 million. It covers a total area of 19.6 million hectares, accounting for approximately sixpercent of the totalgeographic area ofIndia. According to thefinal results of thecensus 2001, theliteracy rate in the stateis 69.14 percent. Thepopulation density is258 persons per sq. km.,with 37.36 percent ofthe population residingin urban areas.

Gujarat ranks thirdamong the major statesin India in per capitaincome and hasachieved an impressiveannual average growth rate of 10.6% for the last four years. The total population of Gujarat isless than 5% of the population of the country, but it contributes nearly 15% of the nationalindustrial output (Government of Gujarat 2007). The state is a major producer of chemical andpharmaceutical products, cement, steel, lignite, diamond jewelry, salt, soda ash, and handicrafts.With nearly 41 large and small ports, the state handles over 20% of the country’s shipping trade.

With rapid industrialization and urbanization taking place in the state and with its geo-climatic,geological and physical features, Gujarat is vulnerable to all-major natural hazards such asdrought, floods, cyclones, earthquakes, tsunamis etc. In addition, due to its high level ofindustrial development it is also exposed to multiple man-made hazards such as industrialand chemical disasters transportation accidents, terrorism, radiological accidents, etc.

Table 3: Occurrences of Natural Hazards in Gujarat since 1819

Hazard Years

Cyclones 1850, 1881, 1893, 1896, 1897, 1903, 1917, 1920, 1933, 1947, 1948,1961, 1964, 1975, 1976, 1978, 1981, 1982, 1983, 1990, 1993, 1996,1998, 1999

Drought/ Heat Waves 1985, 1986, 1987, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002

Floods 1980, 1989, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1996, 1997, 1998, 2003, 2004, 2005,2006

Earthquake 1819, 1845, 1847, 1848, 1864, 1903, 1938, 1956, 2001

Source: Revenue Department, Government of Gujarat, 2007

Figure 4: Map of Gujarat showing epicenter of 2001 earthquake.

Source: GSDMA


Note: Drought is a recurring phenomenon in Gujarat. Every third or second year there hasbeen a drought year before 2001. This table gives details of drought since 1985.

In Gujarat, over the last decade the number of disaster-related deaths has increased due toa large number of high impact disasters. Gujarat also suffered enormous loss of property,infrastructure and livelihoods. In 1998, the “Kandla cyclone” killed over 3,000 people and350,000 livestock and left over half a million dwellings partially or fully collapsed. Thecyclone also damaged port facilities, the power infrastructure and ships. In the recent past,apart from the loss of nearly Rs 300,000 million in the Kutch earthquake of 2001, the floodsin 2004, 2005, and 2006 have resulted in the loss of more than Rs 380,000 million. The impactof natural calamities such as drought, cyclones, floods and earthquakes over the last fewyears has severely affected the economy of the state. The direct financial implications ofthese natural calamities for the state of Gujarat after 1998-1999 can be seen in terms of theamount spent on relief and rehabilitation as the table below indicates:

Table 4: Amount spent on Calamity relief and rehabilitation by the State Government ofGujarat (current prices) (Rs. in million) **

Year Drought Cyclone/Flood Earthquake Total

1998-1999 10.80 1137.20 — 1148.001999-2000 2657.70 345.20 — 3002.902000-2001 8862.80 170.20 560.47 14637.702001-2002 10420.90 471.30 22973.40 33865.602002-2003 1958.60 83.50 12391.40 14433.502003-2004 2581.20 410.70 6965.10 9957.002004-2005 407.00 1336.50 — 1743.502005-2006 18.60 3829.60 6568.10 10416.302006-2007 8856.20 2745.90 11602.10Total 26,917.60 16,640.40 52,204.37 95,762.37**

Source: Revenue department, Government of Gujarat, 2007.**This does not include the amount spent by departments from their regular budget and contributions byNGOs and other organizations.

Between 1998 and 2007, the state has incurred a total expenditure of Rs. 95,762 million onnatural calamities. Against Rs. 77010 million spent on relief and reconstruction since 1997-98 to 2003-04 only Rs. 24830 million was made available to the state from CRF and NCCF. Alarge part of the same had to be financed by the state government by borrowings from theWorld Bank and the Asian Development Bank and by diverting money for relief from theregular budget. These borrowings have increased the debt of the state government andconsequent repayment liabilities. The financial implications of frequent natural calamitiesare not limited to immediate relief and long-term rehabilitation expenses. They also have along-term adverse impact on the revenue stream of the state government.

The state’s own tax revenues had virtually stagnated during the period 1998-2003. In fact,during the post earthquake period, sales tax revenues of the state declined sharply. Hugerelief and rehabilitation expenses, financed mainly through borrowings and the stagnationof the state’s own tax revenues has compelled the state government to pursue increasedborrowing in order to carry out its normal developmental work. The debt of the state


government and consequent interest payment liabilities has been increasing sharply duringthe post 1998 period.

A study conducted by the Gujarat State Disaster Management Authority (GSDMA), basedon certain assessed sectors (agriculture, animal husbandry, fishery, manufacturing, tradeand hotels) reveals that the annualized losses on account of disasters is to the tune ofRs 9,860 million which constitutes 1.8% of the state’s GDP and the annualized loss to capitalstock is to the tune of Rs 1,260 million. Of this, drought is the highest with an effectiveannualized risk of Rs 9,561 million.

Table 5: Estimated (100 year) Annualized GSDP and Capital Stock loss due to NaturalHazards (drought, flood, earthquake and cyclone)

Rank order HazardAmount

Percentage to Total(Rs Millions at current prices)

A. GSDP Losses

1 Drought 9561 1.76%

2 Flood 136 0.02%

3 Earthquake 120 0.02%

4 Cyclone 50 0.01%

All Event-GSDP Loss 9866 1.81%

B. Capital Stock Losses

1 Earthquake 634 0.04%

2 Drought 441 0.03%

3 Flood 331 0.02%

4 Cyclone 215 0.01%

All Events Capital Stock Loss 1620 0.11%

Source: GSDMA(2005b)

The above analysis emphasizes the need for the government to shift its focus from postdisaster relief and reconstruction efforts to pre-disaster prevention and mitigation in orderto minimize the periodic shocks to development efforts in the state. The analysis undertakenby GSDMA with a view to preparing a hazard, risk and vulnerability atlas for long termmitigation also indicates the need to learn lessons and integrate post-disaster reconstructionand disaster mitigation using the window of opportunity. The mere restoration of pre-impactvillages and towns will only lead to the repetition of disasters in the future. While the factsand figures build a strong case for a shift in policy from post-disaster relief to pro-activepre-disaster risk reduction, the question must also be raised of whether the policy of post-disaster relief and recovery assistance might play a role in creating a moral hazard, therebyincreasing vulnerability to future disasters.


APPENDIX II : SELECT DEFINITIONS OF VULNERABILITY

Source Definition

Gabor and Griffith (1980) Vulnerability is in reference to the threats (to hazardousmaterials) to which people are exposed (includingchemical agents and the ecological situation of thecommunities and their level of emergency preparedness).Vulnerability is the risk context.

Timmerman (1981) Vulnerability is the degree to which a system acts adverselyto the occurrence of a hazardous event. The degree andquality of the adverse reaction are conditioned by asystem’s resilience (a measure of the system’s capacity toabsorb and recover from the event).

UNDRO (1982) Vulnerability is the degree of loss to a given element orset of elements at risk resulting from the occurrence of anatural phenomenon of a given magnitude.

Susman et al (1984) Vulnerability is the degree to which different classes ofsociety are differentially at risk.

Kates (1985) Vulnerability is the ‘capacity to suffer harm and reactadversely’

Pijawka & Radwan (1985) Vulnerability is the threat or interaction between risk andpreparedness. It is the degree to which hazardous materialsthreaten a particular population (risk) and the capacity ofthe community to reduce the risk or adverse consequenceof hazardous materials releases.

Bogard (1989) Vulnerability is operationally defined as the inability totake effective measures to insure against losses. Whenapplied to individuals, vulnerability is a consequence ofthe impossibility or improbability of effective mitigationand is a function of our ability to detect the hazards.

Mitchell (1989) Vulnerability is the potential for loss.

Liverman (1990a) Distinguishes between vulnerability as a biophysicalcondition and vulnerability as defined by political, socialand economic conditions of society. She argues forvulnerability in geographic space (where vulnerablepeople and places are located) and vulnerability in socialspace (who in that place is vulnerable).

Downing (1991b) Vulnerability has three connotations: it refers to aconsequence (e.g. famine) rather than a cause (e.g.drought); it implies an adverse consequence (e.g. maizeyields are sensitive to drought; households are vulnerableto hunger); and it is a relative term that differentiates


among socio-economic groups or regions, rather than anabsolute measure of deprivation.

Dow (1992) Vulnerability is the differential capacity of groups andindividuals to deal with hazards, based on their positionswithin physical and social worlds.

Smith (1992) Risk from a specific hazard varies through time andaccording to changes in either (or both) physical exposureor human vulnerability(the breadth of social and economictolerance available at the same site)

Alexander (1993) Human vulnerability is a function of the costs and benefitsof inhabiting areas at risk from natural disaster.

Cutter (1993) Vulnerability is the likelihood that an individual or groupwill be exposed to and adversely affected by a hazard.It isthe interaction of the hazards of place (risk and mitigation)with the social profile of communities.

Watts & Bohle (1993) Vulnerability is defined in terms of exposure, capacity andpotentiality. Accordingly, the prescriptive and normativeresponse to vulnerability is to reduce exposure, enhancecoping capacity, strengthen recovery potential and bolsterdamage control (i.e. minimize destructive consequences)via private and public means

Blaikie et al (1994) By vulnerability we mean the characteristics of a personor group in terms of their capacity to anticipate, cope with,resist and recover from the impact of a natural hazard. Itinvolves a combination of factors that determine the degreeto which someone’s life and livelihood are put at risk by adiscrete and identifiable event in nature or in society.

Bohele et al (1994) Vulnerability is best defined as an aggregate measure ofhuman welfare that integrates environmental, social,economic and political exposure to a range of potentialharmful perturbations. Vulnerability is a multilayered andmultidimensional social space defined by the determinate,political, economic, and institutional capabilities of peoplein specific places at specific times.

Dow & Downing (1995) Vulnerability is the differential susceptibility ofcircumstances contributing to vulnerability. Biophysical,demographic, economic, social and technological factorssuch as population ages, economic dependency, racismand age of infrastructure are some factors which have beenexamined in association with natural hazards.

Source: Cutter (2006: 72-73)

Source Definition


Source: Wisner, Blaikie et al. (2004:51)

APPENDIX III : MODELS OF VULNERABILITY

PAR ModelThe Pressure and Release (PAR) and the Access model were proposed by Wisner, Blaikieet al. (2004) in order to conceptualize risk in terms of vulnerability analysis in specifichazard situations.

PAR Model: In the PAR model, disaster is located at the intersection of hazards on one sideand vulnerabilities on the other.. In this model, the root causes interact with dynamicpressures to create unsafe conditions. Vulnerabilities are expressed in specific forms of unsafeconditions that interact with the hazard to produce loss. In order to release the pressure thatcauses disasters it is not sufficient to address the unsafe conditions and vulnerabilities butroot causes should also be addressed.

Access Model

The PAR model does not explain the differential vulnerabilities. The issue of what happensat the point of interaction between unsafe conditions and the natural event is addressed inthe access model. In this model, people’s vulnerability depends on the access, capacities,assets and livelihood opportunities. Access model depicts how people earn their livelihoodswithin the limitations of social relations and structural domination. The trigger event burstingthrough the social protection impacts differently upon different households, leading todifferent responses and also altering the conditions of vulnerability, social protection, andfuture actions for disaster mitigation and prevention. Access to resources is always basedon social and economic relations, including the social relations of production, gender,ethnicity, status and age, meaning that rights and obligations are undistributed equallyamong all people (Wisner, Blaikie et al. 2004:90). The Access model provides an opportunityto mitigate disasters by broadening the access to resources after disasters by taking advantageof the window of opportunity which is expected to open after disasters.

Figure 5: PAR Model


Figure 6: An outline of Access Model

Source: Wisner, Blaikie et al. (2004:89)

Capacities and Vulnerabilities Analysis (CVA)

This model of Anderson and Woodrow (1989) is used as a framework for designing andevaluating projects as a practical tool. Though meant to help relief interventions, it is largelyused in disaster mitigation activities. The following matrix is used to analyze thevulnerabilities and capacities of people.


CVA Matrix

Vulnerabilities Capacities

Physical and Material

What productive resources, skills and hazards exist?

Social/organizational

What are the relations and organizations among people?

Motivational/attitudinal

How does the community view its ability tocreate change?

The matrix identifies vulnerability in terms of the capacity to recover, or the lack of it. Thecapacity to cope and recover depends on the available resources, skills, social ororganizational networks and the attitude of the community. The lack of the above makescommunities vulnerable. This model is broad-based, and is a useful tool for examiningexternal intervention.

Other Models

The conventional representation of disasters as a cycle of events consisting of disaster, relief,rehabilitation, reconstruction and preparedness and disaster does not include other sourcesof activities taking place outside the cycle.

Figure 7: The Cycle of Disaster

Source: Lewis (1999:129)


Lewis (1999) in order to include development in the disaster cycle, proposed a model of abicycle. In the bicycle model the disaster cycle forms one wheel of the cycle and thedevelopment cycle forms the other wheel. However Lewis also notes that the disaster cycleand development cycle are not driven by the same authorities.

Figure 8: The bicycle model of development

The growing body of knowledge on relationship between disasters and developmentindicates four basic themes as indicated below:

Figure 9: Development and Disasters

Source: UNDP (1994: 10)

Source: Lewis (1999:130)


McEntire, Fuller et al. (2002:272) suggest a model that is able to “design and implementdecisions and activities that reduce risk and susceptibility and raise resistance and resilienceto disaster”.

Figure 10: Model of capacities and liabilities

According to McEntire the benefits of viewing vulnerability as a product of these fourcomponents are that, it includes both the positive and negative aspects of the physical andsocial arenas. In other words, the model recognizes that vulnerabilities are most likely to bepresent when there is a combination of high liabilities and low capabilities from diverse butoverlapping environments. This perspective also acknowledges that location andconstruction are important determinants of vulnerability, but can never be isolated fromsocial, cultural, economic and political realms that influence decisions regarding settlementpatterns and methods of building.... the model shows the relevance of vulnerability to naturaland physical scientists in addition to engineers, sociologists, political scientists, economists,anthropologists, epidemiologists, psychologists, students of emergency management, etc.(McEntire 2001:191)

The various models put forward, such as disaster resistant communities (Geis 2000) todisaster resilient communities (Buckle, Mars et al. 2000: Godschalk, Beatley et al. 1999),sustainable hazard mitigation (Mileti 2000) and invulnerable development (McEntire etal. 2002) are based on a movement away from the technocratic and technical approachof risk reduction and instead address the role of socio-economic, political and contextualissues in vulnerability reduction.

The models however have not been able to explain how to make them operational. Theexisting gap between theoretical models and actual implementation needs to be bridged inorder to achieve vulnerability reduction. The growing list of disasters which are not due tonatural hazards such as “plane crashes, sunken vessels, oil spills, train derailments, nuclearplant accidents, chemical explosions, computer malfunctions, and bio-chemical releases”

Source: Mc Entire (2001)


(McEntire 2001:190) cannot be fully explained on the basis of social construction. The abovemodels also don’t help us to quantify, prioritize and allot weightage to the various factorswhich contribute to vulnerability.

Vulnerability, according to Anderson is complex, dynamic, compounding and cumulative,sometimes irreversible, has no borders and is sometimes difficult to contain. The complexityof measuring and indexing vulnerability has been aptly described by her as:

Though essential, assessment of vulnerability has proven to be a complex undertaking. Aswe have gained more and more experience responding to disasters, we have improved ourunderstanding of vulnerability. But have also been forced to recognize its complexity and toacknowledge that numerous interconnected, mutually reinforcing, and dynamic factors areinvolved. In addition, disagreement about which factors are more important has emerged.Different disciplines have developed indexes of vulnerability that incorporate the factors ofprimary concern within their own fields but overlook or omit factors that other disciplinesconsider essential for full understanding.” (Anderson 1994:42)


JTCDM Working Papers (WP) Series 2007-08:

WP 1, May 2007 : The Nicobar Islands: A Long Way to Go, Prof. Janki Andharia,Ms. Bidisha Fouzdar and Mr. Mohan Rao.

WP 2, August 2007 : Curriculum Building in Disaster Management – A ProcessDocument of Master’s Programme at TISS, Prof. Janki Andhariaand Dr. Sunil D.S.

WP 3, November 2007 : Post-Disaster Reconstruction and the Window of Opportunity –A Review of Select concepts, Models and Research Studies,Mr. V. Thiruppugazh

WP 4, February 2007 : Public Policy and Provisioning towards Natural Disasters in India:Some Issues and Concerns with Specific Focus on the CalamityRelief Fund, Centre for Budget and Governance Accountability(CBGA), Delhi

WP 5, May 2008 : Disaster Studies and Development: A Critical Review of India’sDisaster Management Framework, Mr. Pravin Kushwaha

Contact us :

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New Delhi, the 29th April, 1964

N O T I F I C A T I O N

In exercise of the powers conferred by Section 3 of the UniversityGrants Commission Act, 1956 (3 of 1956), the Central Government, onthe advice of the Commission, hereby declares that the Tata Institute ofSocial Sciences, Bombay, which is an institution for higher education,shall be deemed to be a University for the purpose of the said Act.

Sd/-(PREM KIRPAL)

Secretary

Tata Institute of Social Sciences

jtcdm working paper 3

Education

disaster management

jamsetji tata center

byjamsetji tata centre

research studiesv

vulnerability reduction

history of disasters

definitions of vulnerability

knowledge resources