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ADVOCACY IS OUR BUSINESS
Jensen Shawa Solomon Duguid Hawkes LLP
JSS BA RRI STERS RULES J U L Y 2 0 1 6
Volume 2 Issue 2
Jensen Shawa Solomon Duguid Hawkes LLP is pleased to provide summaries of recent Court Decisions which consider the Alberta Rules of Court. Our website, www.jssbarristers.ca, also features a Cumulative Summary of Court Decisions which consider the Alberta Rules of Court. The Cumulative Summary is organized by the Rule considered.
Below is a list of the Rules (and corresponding decisions which apply or interpret those Rules) that are addressed in the case summaries that follow.
1.2 • AMIKOILFIELDEQUIPMENT&RENTALSINCVWHITECAPRESOURCESINC,2016ABQB192
• DECOREVDECORE,2016ABQB246
• STACKARDVHARRINGTON,2016ABQB357
• URSAVENTURESVEDMONTON(CITY),2016ABCA135
• XSTECHNOLOGIESINCVVERITASDGCLANDLTD,2016ABCA165
• DEMBVVALHALLAGROUPLTD,2016ABCA172
• NEPCANADAULCVMECOPLLC,2016ABCA201
1.3 • DECOREVDECORE,2016ABQB246
• BARDVCANADIANNATURALRESOURCES,2016ABQB267
1.4 • DORNAN(RE),2016ABQB259
3.2 • MDOFOPPORTUNITYNO17VGUN-SHYINVESTMENTSINC,2016ABQB244
• CONDOMINIUMCORPORATIONNO.0729313(TRAILSOFMILLCREEK)VSCHULTZ,2016ABQB338
3.42 • GAUTHIERVSTARR,2016ABQB213
3.56 • DECOREVDECORE,2016ABQB246
3.62 • GAUTHIERVSTARR,2016ABQB213
• HERCHAKVENBRIDGEPIPELINESINC,2016ABQB217
• BARDVCANADIANNATURALRESOURCES,2016ABQB267
• MANJIVPRASAD,2016ABQB273
• MCMORRANVHOCKETT,2016ABQB279
• EASYLOANCORPORATIONVBASEMANAGEMENT&INVESTMENTSLTD,2016ABCA163
3.65 • HERCHAKVENBRIDGEPIPELINESINC,2016ABQB217
• BORDENLADNERGERVAISLLPVCBIINVESTMENTSLTD,2016ABQB220
• WOODBUFFALOHOUSING&DEVELOPMENTCORPORATIONVALVESCONSTRUCTIONLTD,
2016ABQB249
• BARDVCANADIANNATURALRESOURCES,2016ABQB267
• MANJIVPRASAD,2016ABQB273
• EASYLOANCORPORATIONVBASEMANAGEMENT&INVESTMENTSLTD,2016ABCA163
3.66 • HERCHAKVENBRIDGEPIPELINESINC,2016ABQB217
• MANJIVPRASAD,2016ABQB273
3.68 • WAQUANVCANADA(ATTORNEYGENERAL),2016ABQB191
• STONEYNAKODANATIONSVCANADA,2016ABQB193
• GAUTHIERVSTARR,2016ABQB213
• HERCHAKVENBRIDGEPIPELINESINC,2016ABQB217
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3.68 • ELLMARDEVELOPMENTSLTDVBEARSPAWDEVELOPMENTINC,2016ABQB221
• GRENONVCANADAREVENUEAGENCY,2016ABQB260
• MCMORRANVHOCKETT,2016ABQB279
• CONDOMINIUMCORPORATIONNO0729313(TRAILSOFMILLCREEK)VSCHULTZ,2016ABQB338
3.74 • HERCHAKVENBRIDGEPIPELINESINC,2016ABQB217
• BORDENLADNERGERVAISLLPVCBIINVESTMENTSLTD,2016ABQB220
• HARTWELLVTAYLOR,2016ABQB289
4.1 • URSAVENTURESVEDMONTON(CITY),2016ABCA135
4.3 • URSAVENTURESVEDMONTON(CITY),2016ABCA135
4.4 • URSAVENTURESVEDMONTON(CITY),2016ABCA135
4.5 • URSAVENTURESVEDMONTON(CITY),2016ABCA135
4.6 • URSAVENTURESVEDMONTON(CITY),2016ABCA135
4.8 • URSAVENTURESVEDMONTON(CITY),2016ABCA135
4.10 • IMPERIALOILVFLATIRONCONSTRUCTORS,2016ABQB310
4.22 • MCMORRANVHOCKETT,2016ABQB279
• MILAVSKYVMILAVSKYESTATE,2016ABQB333
4.24 • STEWARTESTATEVTAQANORTHLTD,2016ABCA144
4.29 • KITCHINGVDEVLIN,2016ABQB212
• MIKKELESENVTRUMANDEVELOPMENTCORPORATION,2016ABQB255
• PARKAVENUEFLOORINGINCVELLISDONCONSTRUCTIONSERVICESINC,2016ABQB332
4.31 • STACKARDVHARRINGTON,2016ABQB357
• RO-DARCONTRACTINGLTDVVERBEEKSAND&GRAVELINC,2016ABCA123
• URSAVENTURESVEDMONTON(CITY),2016ABCA135
• XSTECHNOLOGIESINCVVERITASDGCLANDLTD,2016ABCA165
4.33 • STACKARDVHARRINGTON,2016ABQB357
• RO-DARCONTRACTINGLTDVVERBEEKSAND&GRAVELINC,2016ABCA123
• URSAVENTURESVEDMONTON(CITY),2016ABCA135
• WEAVERVCHERNIAWSKY,2016ABCA152
• XSTECHNOLOGIESINCVVERITASDGCLANDLTD,2016ABCA165
4.34 • STACKARDVHARRINGTON,2016ABQB357
5.2 • BARDVCANADIANNATURALRESOURCES,2016ABQB267
• DEMBVVALHALLAGROUPLTD,2016ABCA172
5.3 • DORNAN(RE),2016ABQB259
• BARDVCANADIANNATURALRESOURCES,2016ABQB267
5.5 • BARDVCANADIANNATURALRESOURCES,2016ABQB267
5.6 • BARDVCANADIANNATURALRESOURCES,2016ABQB267
• KOHANVKOHAN,2016ABCA125
• URSAVENTURESVEDMONTON(CITY),2016ABCA135
• DEMBVVALHALLAGROUPLTD,2016ABCA172
5.10 • PARKAVENUEFLOORINGINCVELLISDONCONSTRUCTIONSERVICESINC,2016ABQB332
• RO-DARCONTRACTINGLTDVVERBEEKSAND&GRAVELINC,2016ABCA123
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5.12 • DORNAN(RE),2016ABQB259
• PARKAVENUEFLOORINGINCVELLISDONCONSTRUCTIONSERVICESINC,2016ABQB332
5.15 • URSAVENTURESVEDMONTON(CITY),2016ABCA135
5.22 • XSTECHNOLOGIESINCVVERITASDGCLANDLTD,2016ABCA165
5.28 • XSTECHNOLOGIESINCVVERITASDGCLANDLTD,2016ABCA165
5.29 • XSTECHNOLOGIESINCVVERITASDGCLANDLTD,2016ABCA165
5.31 • WEATHERFORDCANADAPARTNERSHIPVADDIE,2016ABQB188
• KITCHINGVDEVLIN,2016ABQB212
5.32 • HERCHAKVENBRIDGEPIPELINESINC,2016ABQB217
5.33 • HERCHAKVENBRIDGEPIPELINESINC,2016ABQB217
5.36 • KITCHINGVDEVLIN,2016ABQB212
• GEOPHYSICALSERVICEINCORPORATEDVENCANACORPORATION,2016ABQB230
6.3 • AMIKOILFIELDEQUIPMENT&RENTALSINCVWHITECAPRESOURCESINC,2016ABQB192
• IMPERIALOILVFLATIRONCONSTRUCTORS,2016ABQB310
6.6 • WEATHERFORDCANADAPARTNERSHIPVADDIE,2016ABQB188
6.7 • WEATHERFORDCANADAPARTNERSHIPVADDIE,2016ABQB188
6.14 • FELDMANVBENDLEGLASSCO(1975)LTD,2016ABQB219
• BUSINESSBLOSSOMSINCVBLOSSOMSFRESHFRUITARRANGEMENTSLTD,2016ABQB275
• LINDECANADALIMITEDVLUFFINDUSTRIESLTD,2016ABQB298
• FELDMANVBENDLEGLASSCO(1975)LTD,2016ABQB321
6.37 • ELKOWVSANA,2016ABQB235
7.1 • MDOFOPPORTUNITYNO17VGUN-SHYINVESTMENTSINC,2016ABQB244
• NEPCANADAULCVMECOPLLC,2016ABCA201
7.3 • WEATHERFORDCANADAPARTNERSHIPVADDIE,2016ABQB188
• 336239ALBERTALTD(DAVE’SDIESELREPAIR)VMELLA,2016ABQB190
• AMIKOILFIELDEQUIPMENT&RENTALSINCVWHITECAPRESOURCESINC,2016ABQB192
• STONEYNAKODANATIONSVCANADA,2016ABQB193
• FELDMANVBENDLEGLASSCO(1975)LTD,2016ABQB219
• ELLMARDEVELOPMENTSLTDVBEARSPAWDEVELOPMENTINC,2016ABQB221
• 1059028ALBERTALTDVCAPIOOILFIELDSERVICESLTD,2016ABQB234
• ELKOWVSANA,2016ABQB235
• MDOFOPPORTUNITYNO17VGUN-SHYINVESTMENTSINC,2016ABQB244
• DECOREVDECORE,2016ABQB246
• WOODBUFFALOHOUSING&DEVELOPMENTCORPORATIONVALVESCONSTRUCTIONLTD,
2016ABQB249
• BUSINESSBLOSSOMSINCVBLOSSOMSFRESHFRUITARRANGEMENTSLTD,2016ABQB275
• ALBERTAVGRETER,2016ABQB293
• LINDECANADALIMITEDVLUFFINDUSTRIESLTD,2016ABQB298
• CONDOMINIUMCORPORATIONNO0729313(TRAILSOFMILLCREEK)VSCHULTZ,2016ABQB338
• CLEARHILLSDEVELOPMENTCORPORATIONVHORSEMAN,2016ABQB341
7.5 • IMPERIALOILVFLATIRONCONSTRUCTORS,2016ABQB310
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7.8 • IMPERIALOILVFLATIRONCONSTRUCTORS,2016ABQB310
9.13 • WAQUANVCANADA(ATTORNEYGENERAL),2016ABQB280
9.15 • POLOMAINVESTMENTSLTDVYUEN,2016ABCA93
9.24 • 336239ALBERTALTD(DAVE’SDIESELREPAIR)VMELLA,2016ABQB190
10.29 • GAUTHIERVSTARR,2016ABQB213
• GEOPHYSICALSERVICEINCORPORATEDVENCANACORPORATION,2016ABQB229
• MIKKELESENVTRUMANDEVELOPMENTCORPORATION,2016ABQB255
• ETVROCKYMOUNTAINPLAYTHERAPYINSTITUTEINC,2016ABQB299
• VOISEYVCANADA(ATTORNEYGENERAL),2016ABQB316
• PARKAVENUEFLOORINGINCVELLISDONCONSTRUCTIONSERVICESINC,2016ABQB332
• MILAVSKYVMILAVSKYESTATE,2016ABQB347
• TURNERVBELLMOBILITYINC,2016ABCA188
10.31 • GEOPHYSICALSERVICEINCORPORATEDVENCANACORPORATION,2016ABQB229
• MIKKELESENVTRUMANDEVELOPMENTCORPORATION,2016ABQB255
• ETVROCKYMOUNTAINPLAYTHERAPYINSTITUTEINC,2016ABQB299
• FELDMANVBENDLEGLASSCO(1975)LTD,2016ABQB321
• PARKAVENUEFLOORINGINCVELLISDONCONSTRUCTIONSERVICESINC,2016ABQB332
• WAYMARKERMANAGEMENT(SILVERCREEK)INCVTIBU,2016ABCA118
• MAVCOYNE,2016ABCA119
• STEWARTESTATEVTAQANORTHLTD,2016ABCA144
10.32 • TURNERVBELLMOBILITYINC,2016ABCA188
10.33 • GEOPHYSICALSERVICEINCORPORATEDVENCANACORPORATION,2016ABQB229
• MIKKELESENVTRUMANDEVELOPMENTCORPORATION,2016ABQB255
• ETVROCKYMOUNTAINPLAYTHERAPYINSTITUTEINC,2016ABQB299
• FELDMANVBENDLEGLASSCO(1975)LTD,2016ABQB321
• PARKAVENUEFLOORINGINCVELLISDONCONSTRUCTIONSERVICESINC,2016ABQB332
• STEWARTESTATEVTAQANORTHLTD,2016ABCA144
• TURNERVBELLMOBILITYINC,2016ABCA188
10.41 • PARKAVENUEFLOORINGINCVELLISDONCONSTRUCTIONSERVICESINC,2016ABQB332
• MAVCOYNE,2016ABCA119
10.48 • MCMORRANVHOCKETT,2016ABQB279
10.52 • ROVDF,2016ABCA170
• DEMBVVALHALLAGROUPLTD,2016ABCA172
12.36 • MILAVSKYVMILAVSKYESTATE,2016ABQB333
13.4 • IBUVLAH,2016ABCA108
13.5 • DORNAN(RE),2016ABQB259
13.6 • WEATHERFORDCANADAPARTNERSHIPVADDIE,2016ABQB188
• GAUTHIERVSTARR,2016ABQB213
• HERCHAKVENBRIDGEPIPELINESINC,2016ABQB217
• DECOREVDECORE,2016ABQB246
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13.6 • BARDVCANADIANNATURALRESOURCES,2016ABQB267
• MANJIVPRASAD,2016ABQB273
• MCMORRANVHOCKETT,2016ABQB279
13.7 • BARDVCANADIANNATURALRESOURCES,2016ABQB267
• MCMORRANVHOCKETT,2016ABQB279
13.18 • 1059028ALBERTALTDVCAPIOOILFIELDSERVICESLTD,2016ABQB234
• CONDOMINIUMCORPORATIONNO.0729313(TRAILSOFMILLCREEK)VSCHULTZ,2016ABQB338
• CLEARHILLSDEVELOPMENTCORPORATIONVHORSEMAN,2016ABQB341
14.2 • EASYLOANCORPORATIONVBASEMANAGEMENT&INVESTMENTSLTD,2016ABCA163
14.4 • IBUVLAH,2016ABCA108
14.5 • KEVCSM,2016ABQB342
• SETTLEMENTLENDERSINCVBLICHARZ,2016ABCA109
• CONDOMINIUMCORPORATIONNO0311443VGOERTZ,2016ABCA167
14.8 • IBUVLAH,2016ABCA108
14.12 • EASYLOANCORPORATIONVBASEMANAGEMENT&INVESTMENTSLTD,2016ABCA163
14.14 • IBUVLAH,2016ABCA108
14.15 • BARRYVINSTITUTEOFCHARTEREDACCOUNTANTSOFALBERTA(COMPLAINTSINQUIRY
COMMITTEE),2016ABCA89
14.16 • BARRYVINSTITUTEOFCHARTEREDACCOUNTANTSOFALBERTA(COMPLAINTSINQUIRY
COMMITTEE),2016ABCA89
• IBUVLAH,2016ABCA108
14.17 • IBUVLAH,2016ABCA108
14.20 • BARRYVINSTITUTEOFCHARTEREDACCOUNTANTSOFALBERTA(COMPLAINTSINQUIRY
COMMITTEE),2016ABCA89
14.24 • IBUVLAH,2016ABCA108
14.25 • EASYLOANCORPORATIONVBASEMANAGEMENT&INVESTMENTSLTD,2016ABCA163
14.27 • IBUVLAH,2016ABCA108
14.37 • EASYLOANCORPORATIONVBASEMANAGEMENT&INVESTMENTSLTD,2016ABCA163
14.38 • CONDOMINIUMCORPORATIONNO0311443VGOERTZ,2016ABCA167
14.45 • PINTEAVJOHNS,2016ABCA99
• ROVDF,2016ABCA170
14.47 • BARRYVINSTITUTEOFCHARTEREDACCOUNTANTSOFALBERTA(COMPLAINTSINQUIRY
COMMITTEE),2016ABCA89
• SETTLEMENTLENDERSINCVBLICHARZ,2016ABCA109
14.64 • BARRYVINSTITUTEOFCHARTEREDACCOUNTANTSOFALBERTA(COMPLAINTSINQUIRY
COMMITTEE),2016ABCA89
14.65 • BARRYVINSTITUTEOFCHARTEREDACCOUNTANTSOFALBERTA(COMPLAINTSINQUIRY
COMMITTEE),2016ABCA89
• SETTLEMENTLENDERSINCVBLICHARZ,2016ABCA109
14.88 • MAVCOYNE,2016ABCA119
• TURNERVBELLMOBILITYINC,2016ABCA188
15.3 • WEAVERVCHERNIAWSKY,2016ABCA152
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15.4 • XSTECHNOLOGIESINCVVERITASDGCLANDLTD,2016ABCA165
15.15 • XSTECHNOLOGIESINCVVERITASDGCLANDLTD,2016ABCA165
SCHEDULE C • MIKKELESENVTRUMANDEVELOPMENTCORPORATION,2016ABQB255
• MCMORRANVHOCKETT,2016ABQB279
• ETVROCKYMOUNTAINPLAYTHERAPYINSTITUTEINC,2016ABQB299
• VOISEYVCANADA(ATTORNEYGENERAL),2016ABQB316
• MILAVSKYVMILAVSKYESTATE,2016ABQB347
• STEWARTESTATEVTAQANORTHLTD,2016ABCA144
• TURNERVBELLMOBILITYINC,2016ABCA188
AMIK OILFIELD EQUIPMENT & RENTALS INC V WHITECAP RESOURCES INC, 2016 ABQB 192 (MASTER MASON)Rules 1.2 (Purpose and Intention of these Rules), 6.3 (Applications Generally) and 7.3 (Summary Judgment)
ThePlaintiffsoldandservicedoilfieldequipment.The
PlaintiffcommencedanActionagainsttheDefendant
afteritallegedlyrefusedtotakedeliveryof,andpayfor,
custombuiltequipmentwhichtheyorderedfromthe
Plaintiff.ThePlaintiffappliedforSummaryJudgment
forthepurchasepriceoftheequipment,plusinterest
andCosts.TheDefendantarguedthatanamendment
ApplicationshouldhavebeenbroughtpriortotheSummary
JudgmentApplicationinordertoincludeadditionalclaims
withrespecttoacontractbetweenthepartiesmadein
December2014.
MasterMasonstatedthatthisapproachisinconsistent
withRule1.2(3)(a)whichrequiresthepartiestoidentify
therealissuesindisputeandtofacilitatethequickest
meansofresolvingtheclaimattheleastexpense.Master
MasonobservedthattheDefendantsunderstoodtheclaims
broughtbythePlaintiff,andtheSummaryJudgment
ApplicationcompliedwithRule6.3(2).
MasterMasonnotedthatSummaryJudgmentisgoverned
byRule7.3,andthatAlbertahasalonghistoryoftaking
arobustapproachtoSummaryJudgment.TheCourtnoted
thatSummaryJudgmentisnolongerdeniedsolelyon
thebasisthattheevidencedisclosesatriableissue.The
Courtnowaskswhetherthereisanyissueofmeritthat
genuinelyrequiresaTrialor,conversely,whethertheclaim
ordefenceissocompellingthatthelikelihoodthatitwill
succeedisveryhighsuchthatitshouldbedetermined
summarily.TheCourtalsoshouldconsiderwhetheran
examinationoftheexistingrecordcanleadtoafairand
justdisposition.Thestandardforfairnessisnotwhether
theprocessisasexhaustiveasaTrial,butwhetheritgives
theJudgeconfidencethatthenecessaryfactscanbefound
andtherelevantlegalprinciplescanbeapplied.TheCourt
istopresumethebestevidencefrombothsidesisbefore
it,andthepartyfacedwithanApplicationforSummary
Judgmentmustputitsbestfootforward.Thekeyiswhether
thecircumstancesrequirevivavoceevidenceinorderto
properlyresolvethecase.
Followinganexaminationoftheevidenceontherecord,
MasterMasongrantedSummaryJudgmentinfavourofthe
Plaintiff.
DECORE V DECORE, 2016 ABQB 246 (MICHALYSHYN J)Rules 1.2 (Purpose and Intention of These Rules), 1.3 (General Authority of the Court to Provide Remedies), 3.56 (Right to Counterclaim), 7.3 (Summary Judgment) and 13.6 (Pleadings: General Requirements)
Thepartieswereinvolvedinacomplexdisputeovertheir
latemother’swillandestate.Followinglengthysurrogate
proceedings,thePlaintiffscommencedanActionagainst
theDefendants,andtheDefendantscounterclaimed.
ThepartiesthenfiledcompetingSummaryJudgment
Applicationsagainsteachother.
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MichalyshynJ.consideredtheSummaryJudgment
ApplicationsandobservedthatthelegaltestforSummary
Judgmentisnowsettled,andfollowedtheprinciplesset
outinHryniak v Mauldin,2014SCC7.JusticeMichalyshyn
referredtorecentauthorities,andheldthatthequestionis
whetherthereisanyissueofmeritthat“genuinelyrequires
atrial”or“whethertheclaimordefenceissocompelling
thatthelikelihooditwillsucceedisveryhigh”.Thetest
forSummaryJudgmentrequirestheCourttoexaminethe
availablefactsanddetermineifafairandjustdisposition
canbemadeontheexistingrecord.JusticeMichalyshyn
reviewedtheavailableevidenceandstatedthatitwasnot
sufficienttoallowtheCourttomakethenecessaryfindings
offacttosupportthePlaintiffs’case.ThePlaintiffs’
SummaryJudgmentApplicationwasdismissed.
BeforeexaminingtheDefendant’sCounterclaimand
SummaryJudgmentApplicationonthemerits,Michalyshyn
J.consideredtwothresholdissuesraisedbythePlaintiffs.
OneoftheCounter-Claimantswasnotnamedasa
DefendantintheStatementofClaim.ThePlaintiffsargued
that,basedonRule3.56(1),onlyanamedDefendantcan
advanceaCounterclaim.TheCourtagreedthatwhilethere
wasastrongappealtotheconceptofaddinganewPlaintiff
byCounterclaimtoensurethatallnecessarypartiesare
beforetheCourt,toallowaCounterclaimmadebyanon-
partywouldineffect“re-write”Rule3.56(1).
InordertoresolvewhetherthenewCounter-Claimant
couldbeadded,JusticeMichalyshynconsidereds.8of
theJudicature Act,RSA2000,cJ-2,andnotedthatthe
CourtshavebeenmindfulofthepurposeoftheRulesasset
outinRule1.2,whichistofacilitatethe“quickestmeans
ofresolvingaclaimattheleastexpense”,toprovide“an
effective,efficient,andcrediblesystemofremediesand
sanctions”and,mostimportantly,assetoutinRule1.2(1),
to“provideameansbywhichclaimscanbefairlyand
justlyresolved”.TheJudicature Act,ats.8,grantstheCourt
thepowertodeterminemattersindisputeandtoavoida
multiplicityofproceedings.Further,Rule1.3(1)allowsthe
CourttogiveanyreliefdescribedintheJudicature Actor
theRules.Rule1.3(2)specificallystatesthattheCourt
maygrantaremedywhetherornotitissoughtinanAction.
JusticeMichalyshynultimatelyagreedwiththePlaintiffs
thatthereachofs.8oftheJudicature Act“stopsshort
ofaffectinglegislatedrules”andthereforeRule3.56(1)
effectivelydisallowedaJudicature Actremedyinthiscase.
HisLordshipheldthatthepartieswereessentiallyengaged
inestatelitigation.Asaresult,theSurrogate RulesAlta
Reg130/1995alsoapplied.TheSurrogate Rules,at
s.2,preservestheCourt’sdiscretiontovaryanyRule
whereappropriate,andwhereitwouldservetheendsof
justice.HisLordshipheldthattheSummaryJudgment
Applicationsinthiscaseshouldhavebeenbroughtunder
theSurrogate Rules,andobservedthatRule3.56(1)
appliesspecificallytoCourtActions,Actionscommenced
bywayofaStatementofClaim,andCounterclaims.Asa
resultofthebroadapplicabilityoftheSurrogate Rules,it
wasunnecessarytoapplyaspecificprovisionoftheRules
ofCourt,suchasRule3.56(1).Therefore,thenewparty
couldbeaddedasaCounter-Claimant.
ThePlaintiffsarguedfurtherthattheCounterclaims
werebarredbytheLimitation Act,RSA200cL-11.The
Plaintiffsdidnotraisethisargumentuntiltheirwritten
submissionsbeforetheCourtandtheDefendantsargued
thatthePlaintiffsviolatedRule13.6(3)(q).Michalyshyn
J.statedthatthattheCounterclaimswerenecessaryand
desirableinthiscase,andallowedtheCounterclaimsto
stand.
Finally,JusticeMichalyshynconsideredthemeritsofthe
Defendants’SummaryJudgmentApplicationandheldthat
therewasinsufficientevidencebeforetheCourttofind
fortheDefendants.TheDefendants’SummaryJudgment
Applicationwasaccordinglydismissed.
STACKARD V HARRINGTON, 2016 ABQB 357 (BAST J)Rules 1.2 (Purpose and Intention of These Rules), 4.31 (Application to Deal with Delay), 4.33 (Dismissal for Long Delay) and 4.34 (Stay of Proceedings on Transfer or Transmission of Interest)
ThePlaintiffsappealedfromaMaster’sdecisiondismissing
theirApplicationunderRule4.33.Themainissuebefore
theMasterandonappealwaswhethertheActionwas
significantlyadvancedsincetheDefendants’filingofits
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StatementofDefenceonNovember29,2011.Oneof
thePlaintiffs,Stackard,hadpassedawayonDecember
31,2011;assuch,theActionwasautomaticallystayed
underRule4.34.Ms.Dorathwasappointedpersonal
representativeofthePlaintiff’sestate,andsheobtainedan
ex parteOrderendingtheStayandpermittingtheAction
tocontinueunderRule4.34(2).However,theOrderwas
onlyservedonpreviouscounselforthePlaintiffs.Justice
BastnotedthatRule4.34(3)requiressuchanOrdertobe
servedonallpartiesassoonasitisreceived.
TheDefendantsbroughtanApplicationunderRule4.33
onJuly15,2015,overthreeyearsandsevenmonthssince
thefilingoftheStatementofDefence.TheDefendants
wereservedwiththeex parteOrderendingtheStaya
monthafterfilingtheirRule4.33Application.TheMaster
dismissedtheRule4.33Applicationonthegroundsthat:
(1)Ms.DorathhadintendedtoservetheOrderuponall
parties;and(2)obtainingtheOrderwasa“requiredstep”
undertheRules,whichsignificantlyadvancedtheAction.
BastJ.,referringtopriorauthority,notedthataStay
pursuanttoRule4.34doesnotexpresslystoptherunning
oftheclockunderRule4.33.Further,thereferencetoRule
4.31pointstothefactthat,ifaStayremainsinplacewith
noOrdertocontinuetheAction,aDefendantmayapply
forreliefunderRule4.31notwithstandingtheStay.Bast
J.observedthatthelawwithrespecttoRule4.33had
changedrecently.PriorleadingCourtofAppealauthority
heldthatRule4.33requiresafunctionalapproachrather
thananoveremphasisonformalisticsteps,andthat
anything“requiredbytheRules”doesnotnecessarily
significantlyadvancetheAction.Further,thefunctional
approachisconsistentwithFoundationalRule1.2.
Consequently,BastJ.heldthatrelianceontheOrderas
beinga“mandatory”stepwhichthereforeadvancedthe
actionwasinerror.LiftingtheStaywasonlyrequiredifthe
PlaintiffEstatewishedtocontinuewiththelitigation;itwas
notamandatorystep.HerLadyshipalsonotedthatthestep
hadnotevenbeenproperlycompleted.TheAppealwas
grantedandthePlaintiff’sActionwasdismissed.
URSA VENTURES V EDMONTON (CITY), 2016 ABCA 135 (MARTIN, ROWBOTHAM AND WAKELING JJA)Rules 1.2 (Purpose and Intention of These Rules), 4.1 (Responsibilities of Parties to Manage Litigation), 4.3 (Categories of Court Action), 4.4 (Standard Case Obligations), 4.5 (Complex Case Obligations), 4.6 (Settling Disputes About Complex Case Litigation Plans), 4.8 (Court May Categorize Actions), 4.31 (Application to Deal with Delay), 4.33 (Dismissal for Long Delay), 5.6 (Form and Contents of Affidavit of Records) and 5.15 (Admissions of Authenticity of Records)
TheApplicantappealedaDecisionwhichheldthatthe
Respondent’sAffidavitofRecordssignificantlyadvanced
theActionforthepurposesofRule4.33.RowbothamJ.A.,
forthemajority,discussedthepurposesofRule4.33and
observedthatapurposiveapproachshouldbetakenwhen
determiningapplicationsunderRule4.33,inkeepingwith
thefoundationalprinciplesunderlyingtheRulesofCourt,
particularlyinRule1.2.RowbothamJ.A.statedthatCourts
mustlookatwhetherornotthesubstanceofthesteptaken
advancestheAction,andthatthissameanalysisshouldbe
madewhetherornotthestepismandatedbytheRulesof
Court.JusticeRowbothamreviewedthedistinctionbetween
Rule4.31andRule4.33,statingthatRule4.31canbe
triggeredbyprejudicewhereasRule4.33actsasasortof
limitationsperiodandistheretoterminateActionsthat
have“trulydied”.TheCourtcautionedthatasteptaken
undertheRules,suchasservinganAffidavitofRecords,
willnotautomaticallysignificantlyadvanceactionsforthe
purposeofRule4.33.
RowbothamJ.A.heldthat,althoughmanyofthedocuments
producedintheAffidavitofRecordswererecordsthatthe
Applicantalreadyhadinitspossession,oneelementof
Rule5.6(2)(e)isthatapartymustcertifythatithasno
otherdocuments,whichconfirmsthattheopposingpartyis
awareoftheextentoftheparty’sproduction,andensures
thatthereareno“surprise”documentsthatariselaterin
thelitigation.Further,Rule5.5requiresthattheparties
makeadmissionsaboutthevalidityandauthenticityof
thedocumentsinanAffidavitofRecords.Whenaparty
includestheopposingparty’sdocumentsintheirAffidavit
ofRecords,itisadmittingtotheirauthenticity.
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TheAppealwasdismissedandtheCourtorderedthatthe
RespondentfileafurtherandbetterAffidavitofRecords,
andthattheyservetheApplicantwithaLitigationPlanin
accordancewithRule4.4(2).
Indissent,WakelingJ.A.notedthatthereisalinedividing
acceptableandunacceptabledelaybyaparty,andthat
theRespondent’sdelayinservingitsAffidavitofRecords
wasunacceptable.WakelingJ.A.statedthattheCourt
shouldnothavetoleranceforplaintiffswhodonotadvance
theiractionsinatimelyandconsistentmanner,andthat
Courtsshouldbecomeinvolvedwiththeseactionsby
wayofLitigationPlansinordertomoveactionsalong.
Toemphasizethis,WakelingJ.A.citedRule4.1,which
providesthatthepartiesareresponsibleformanaging
theirdisputeandplanningitsresolutioninatimelyand
cost-effectiveway;Rule4.3,whichcategorizestypesof
CourtActions;Rules4.4and4.5,whichdelineatebetween
standardcaseobligationsandcomplexcaseobligations;
Rule4.8,whichprovidesthataCourtmaydirecthowa
caseistobecategorized;andRule4.6,whichprovides
thataprudentPlaintiffmayasktheCourttograntanOrder
settlingdisputesaboutcomplexLitigationPlans.Wakeling
J.A.didnotfindtheRespondenttobeareasonablydiligent
PlaintiffandwouldhaveallowedtheAppeal.
XS TECHNOLOGIES INC V VERITAS DGC LAND LTD, 2016 ABCA 165 (PAPERNY, ROWBOTHAM AND MCDONALD JJA)Rules 1.2 (Purpose and Intention of These Rules), 4.31 (Application to Deal with Delay), 4.33 (Dismissal for Long Delay), 5.22 (Questioning Options), 5.28 (Written Questions), 5.29 (Acknowledgment of Corporate Witness’s Evidence), 15.4 (Dismissal for Long Delay: Bridging Provisions) and 15.15 (Coming into Force)
TheActionwascommencedin2002.InMay2009,
theDefendantprovidedAnswerstoUndertakingsgiven
atQuestioning.InAugust2013,thePlaintiffsentthe
DefendantaNoticeofWrittenQuestioningandcopiesof
documentslistedintheAppellant’sAffidavitofRecords
inelectronicformat.OnAugust30,2013,thePlaintiff
servedaSupplementalAffidavitofRecords.OnNovember
4,2013,theDefendantfiledanApplicationtoDismissfor
LongDelay.TheChambersJudgefoundthatthelaststep
whichsignificantlyadvancedtheActionwastheResponse
toUndertakingsinMay2009.Accordingly,theActionwas
dismissedunderRule4.33.TheChambersJudgealsoheld
thatthedelayintheActionwasinordinateandinexcusable
suchthatsignificantprejudicecouldbepresumed,
warrantingdismissingtheActionunderRule4.31.The
Plaintiffappealed.
ThePlaintiffarguedthattheChambersJudgeerredin
applyingRule4.33ratherthanTransitionalRule15.4.
TheCourtofAppealheldthatbecauseRule4.33came
intoforcebeforetheDefendantbroughtitsApplication
toDismissforLongDelaythatRule4.33applied.The
CourtofAppealconsideredthePlaintiff’sargument
thattheChambersJudgemisappliedthetestforlong
delay,andheldthataChambersJudge’sconclusionwith
respecttowhetherastephassignificantlyadvancedan
Actionisentitledtodeference.TheCourtnotedthatthe
considerationofwhetherastepadvancesanActioninvolves
afunctionalanalysisastothenature,quality,genuineness,
timing,andoutcomeofthesteptaken.ThePlaintiffalso
assertedthattheDefendanthadfailedtoadvanceits
Counterclaim,andthisinactionnegatedthePlaintiff’s
failuretotakeanystepsinitsownAction.TheCourtof
Appealheldthat,notwithstandingRule1.2,aPlaintiff
bearstheultimateresponsibilityforprosecutingitsClaim.
TheDefendant’sfailuretomovethelitigationforwarddid
notexcusethePlaintiff’sinaction.
ThePlaintiffhadQuestionedanemployeeofthe
Respondentin2008.InAugust2013,thePlaintiff
servedaNoticeofWrittenQuestioningpursuantto
Rules5.22and5.29,appending258questionsand
theemployee’sanswers.TheNoticerequestedthatthe
Defendantacknowledgethattheevidenceoftheemployee
tothosequestionsformedsomeoftheinformationofthe
Respondent.TheChambersJudgeconcludedthatthe
NoticewassimilartoaNoticetoAdmitFacts,andwithout
anacknowledgement,itdidnotsignificantlyadvancethe
Action.Rule5.29statesthatevidencegivenbyacorporate
witnessmaynotbereadinasevidenceatTrialunlessa
corporaterepresentativeunderoathacknowledgesthat
theevidenceformstheinformationofthecorporation.A
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corporationmayrefusetoacknowledgesomeorallofthe
evidencegivenbyawitnesspursuanttoRule5.29(2).Rule
5.29doesnotimposeatimelimitforacknowledgementor
theconsequencesforthefailuretoacknowledge.
Asaresult,theCourtofAppealheldthattheChambers
JudgedidnoterrinlikeningtheNoticeofWritten
Questioningandrequestforacknowledgementtoa
NoticetoAdmitFacts.ItisnottheNoticetoAdmitthat
significantlyadvancestheAction,itistheadmission,or
unreasonablerefusaltoadmit,oralapseoftimewithno
replywhichconstitutestheadvancementoftheAction.In
theresult,theAppealwasdismissed.
DEMB V VALHALLA GROUP LTD, 2016 ABCA 172 (ROWBOTHAM, MCDONALD AND SCHUTZ JJA)Rules 1.2 (Purpose and Intention of These Rules), 5.2 (When Something is Relevant and Material), 5.6 (Form and Contents of Affidavit of Records) and 10.52 (Declaration of Civil Contempt)
ThePlaintiffsobtainedanOrderwhichexplicitlyset
outthattheRespondentswereeachrequiredtoprepare
andswearafurtherandbetterAffidavitofRecords.
TheDefendantsproducedheavilyredacteddocuments,
andproducedaharddrivewithoutproperlylistingthe
documentsinthescheduletotheAffidavitofRecords.The
PlaintiffsappliedunsuccessfullybeforeaCaseManagement
JudgetoholdtheDefendantsinContempt,pursuantto
Rule10.52.TheCaseManagementJudgedismissedthe
ContemptApplicationonthebasisthatitwaspremature
andtheOrderdidnotgivetheDefendantsanultimatum
whichwouldreasonablyleadthemtobelievethatfailingto
complywouldresultinJudgmentagainstthem.Subsequent
totheseevents,oneoftheDefendantssworeanAffidavitin
supportofaSummaryDismissalApplicationwhichattached
asexhibitsanumberofinvoicesandothersupporting
documentationwhichhadnotbeenpreviouslyproduced.
ThePlaintiffsappliedasecondtimeforContempt,butthis
wasalsodismissedbytheCaseManagementJudge.The
PlaintiffsappealedthesecondOrder.
TheCourtofAppealheldthattheCaseManagementJudge
haderredindismissingtheApplicationforContemptand
grantedtheAppeal.ThesecondOrderwasgrantedinthe
contextofthepriorOrderwhichexplicitlysetoutthatthe
Respondents“shalleachprepareandswearafurtherand
betterAffidavitofRecords”.OnlyoneoftheDefendants
sworeanAffidavitofRecordsonbehalfofallthem.Further,
theDefendants’failuretopreviouslyproducerelevant
documents,asdeterminedbyRule5.2,thattheyrelied
onfortheirownSummaryDismissalApplication,wasin
clearbreachoftheOrderandtheirobligationstocomply
withRule5.6.TheRespondentswerethereforefoundin
contempt.TheCourtofAppealreferredtoFoundational
Rule1.2andstatedthattheRulesmustbeinterpretedand
appliedinamannerthatpromotesaccesstojusticeand
encouragesearlydisclosure.Thematterwasreturnedtothe
CaseManagementJudgetoimposetheappropriatepenalty
forthecontempt.
NEP CANADA ULC V MEC OP LLC, 2016 ABCA 201 (SLATTER, BIELBY AND O’FERRALL JJA)Rules 1.2 (Purpose and Intention of These Rules) and 7.1 (Application to Resolve Particular Questions or Issues)
ThepartieswereinvolvedintworelatedActions.Inone
oftheActions(the“MeritAction”)theCaseManagement
Judgeorderedthatasinglediscreteissuebetried
separatelyandinadvanceofthebalanceoftheTrialwith
thesecondAction(the“CarrAction”).TheDefendantsin
theMeritActionappealedtheOrderwhichseveredthe
issues(whichresultedintwoTrials)onthebasisthatthe
evidencedidnotmeettherequirementsunderRule7.1in
ordertopermittheTrialofadirectedissue.Theyargued
thatitwouldnotresultinthedispositionofallorpart
oftheclaim,wouldnotsubstantiallyshortenthelength
ofTrialfortheremainingissues,andwouldnotdefray
expense.
TheCourtofAppealnotedthattoordertheTrialofan
issue,aJudgemustbeconvincedthattheseveranceof
theissueislikelytoorhasagoodprobabilityofsatisfying
oneormoreoftherequirementsinRule7.1.TheCourtof
AppealreviewedwhethertheOrderunderAppealwould
resolveallorpartoftheClaim,shortentheTrialorsave
expense,andconsideredwhethertherewasanyprejudiceto
afairhearing.TheCourtagreedwiththeCaseManagement
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JudgethatRule7.1mustbeviewedthroughthelensof
FoundationalRule1.2,andthattheRulesareintendedto
beusedtofacilitatethequickestmeansofresolvingaclaim
attheleastexpense.
TheCourtofAppealconcludedthat,whileinsome
situationsafullTrialonallissuesisrequiredandis
proportionatetothereliefsought,theCaseManagement
Judgewasnotunreasonableinconcludingthatthiswas
notoneofthosecases.TheCourtofAppealstatedthat
“considerationofthequickestmeanstoresolveadispute
isentirelyconsistentwiththewordingofRule7.1”.The
Appealwasdismissed.
BARD V CANADIAN NATURAL RESOURCES, 2016 ABQB 267 (NIXON J)Rules 1.3 (General Authority of the Court to Provide Remedies), 3.62 (Amending Pleadings), 3.65 (Permission of Court to Amendment Before or After Close of Pleadings), 5.2 (When Something is Relevant and Material), 5.3 (Modification or Waiver of this Part), 5.5 (When Affidavit of Records Must be Served), 5.6 (Form and Contents of Affidavit of Records), 13.6 (Pleadings: General Requirements) and 13.7 (Pleadings: Other Requirements)
Inadisputerelatedtoanoilsandsproject,thePlaintiffs,
(“Devon”)appliedforpermissiontoamendtheirStatement
ofClaimandtocompeltheDefendants,(“CNRL”)to
producecertainrecords.
CNRLconsentedtosomeoftheamendmentssoughtby
DevonwhichwereallowedpursuanttoRule3.62.Nixon
J.consideredwhethertheremainderoftheamendments
couldbegrantedpursuanttoRule3.65,andnotedthat
thegeneralruleisthatanypleadingmaybeamended,no
matterhowcarelessorlate,subjecttofourexceptions:
(1)theamendmentwouldcauseseriousprejudicenot
compensableincosts;(2)theamendmentishopelessand
wouldhavebeenstruck;(3)theamendmentseekstoadd
apartyorcauseofactionoutsidealimitationperiod;and
(4)thereisanelementofbadfaithinthefailuretoplead
theamendmentinthefirstplace.NixonJ.notedthatthe
evidentiaryburdeninseekingtoamendislow,butthe
amendmentsmusthavesomefoundationinfact.Justice
Nixonconsideredeachamendment,andheldthatmost
couldbeallowedwiththeexceptionofseveralparagraphs
whichwerehopelessastheyallegedthatCNRL’sconduct
inthelitigationamountedtobadfaith.NixonJ.statedthat
thereisnofiduciarydutyowedbetweenpartiestolitigation,
noracontractualdutytoactingoodfaith.Misconduct
duringthelitigationgivesrisetoaremedyofCostsonly,not
punitivedamages.
Someoftheamendmentsallegedbadfaithinrespectof
CNRL’spre-litigationconduct.ThepartiesandtheCourt
agreedthatamendmentsallegingfraudorbadfaithwere
subjecttoahigherthresholdofproof.However,wherethe
amendmentsparticularizeanexistingcauseofaction,this
requirementisrelaxed.NixonJ.notedthatthisexception
wasconsistentwiththetechnicalrequirementsfor
PleadingsinRules13.6and13.7:partiesmustpleadthose
causesofactionwhichmaytaketheotherpartybysurprise.
Theamendmentsrelatedtobadfaithwereallowed.CNRL
objectedtootherproposedamendmentsonthegrounds
thattheyaddedremedieswhichwerenotinitiallypleaded.
NixonJ.allowedtheamendmentsonthebasisthatRule
1.3givestheCourtdiscretiontograntremedieswhether
pleadedornot,andthisdiscretionextendedtoallowing
amendmentstopleadnewremedies.JusticeNixonheld
thattheremainderoftheamendmentsdidnotcause
seriousprejudicewhichcouldnotbecompensatedwith
costs,werenotbarredbytheLimitations Act,RSA2000,
cL-12,andwerenothopelessorproposedinbadfaith.
TheseamendmentswereallowedpursuanttoRule3.65.
Devonalsosoughtproductionofanumberofelectronic
recordsrelatedtotheoilsandsproject.CNRLresisted
productiononthegroundsthat:(1)therecordswerenot
relevantandmaterial,(2)thattherecordshadalready
beenproducedinadifferentformat,(3)thattherecords
werenotreadilyavailableandarequesttoproduce
3,516nativespreadsheetswouldcauseanundueburden
disproportionatetotheprobativevalueoftherecords,and
(4)thatDevonhadenoughrecordstoaccomplishtheir
objectiveofreconstructingthejointaccountwithoutfurther
production.ThepartiesagreedthatRule5.2governed
relevanceandmateriality.NixonJ.notedthatthestarting
pointforassessmentsofrelevanceandmaterialitywas
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aStatementofDefencewascommonlyextendedasa
courtesybetweencounsel.UnderRule5.12,thepenalty
forlateproductionofanAffidavitofRecordswasusually
amonetarysanction,butthissanctionwasnotabsolute
andcouldbeavoidedwith“sufficientcause”.TheCourt
notedseveralcaseswhereanextensionoftimewasgranted
forfilinganAffidavitofRecordsandconcludedthatthe
efficienciesoftimeandexpensesupportedgrantingaStay
inthisinstance.
MD OF OPPORTUNITY NO 17 V GUN-SHY INVESTMENTS INC, 2016 ABQB 244 (MASTER SCHLOSSER)Rules 3.2 (How to Start an Action), 7.1 (Application to Resolve Particular Questions or Issues) and 7.3 (Summary Judgment)
TheApplicant,MunicipalDistrictofOpportunityNo.17,
broughtanOriginatingApplicationseekingthereturnof
landswhichhadbeenconveyedtotheRespondent,Gun-
ShyInvestmentsInc.,fordevelopmentinaccordancewith
adetailedcontractbetweentheparties(the“Agreement”).
TheAgreementcontainedanoptiontorepurchaseinthe
eventthattheRespondentdidnotmeetthecontractual
deadlinesorconditions.Bythefirstanniversaryofthe
Agreement,theRespondenthadnotcompletedanyofthe
stepsrequiredundertheAgreement,andtheApplicant
electedtorescindtheAgreementandtoexerciseitsoption
torepurchase.
TheRespondentbroughtaCross-ApplicationunderRule
3.2(6)seekingaconversionoftheOriginatingApplication
toanActionbroughtbyStatementofClaim,arguingthat
therewerefactsindisputewhichnecessitatedaTrial.
MasterSchlossernotedthatCourtsarewellabletodeal
withfactualissuesarisingonanOriginatingApplication.
MasterSchlossercommentedthattheOriginating
ApplicationprocedureissimilartoaSummaryJudgment
Application,exceptthatthestandardofproofishigheron
anApplicationforSummaryJudgment.MasterSchlosser
observedthatsomeCourtshaveputthestandardfor
SummaryJudgmentApplicationsat80%,whereasthe
thresholdonanOriginatingApplicationis51%.Assuch,an
OriginatingApplicationisanalogoustoanApplicationunder
Rule7.1.
theamendedPleadings.HerLadyshipnotedthatDevon’s
expertwitnesshadswornthattherequesteddocuments
werenecessaryforhisanalysis,andnoindependentwitness
hadsuggestedotherwise.Assuch,thetestunderRule5.2
wasmet,andtherecordswereproducible.
JusticeNixonalsofoundthatforverylargespreadsheets,
theTIFFformatwaseffectivelyunusable.Productionof
electronicrecordsinanunusableformatundermined
proceduralfairnessandfailedtomeetCNRL’sdisclosure
obligations.NixonJ.declinedtoexercisediscretion
underRule5.3torelievehardshiponCNRLinproducing
theserecords,andheldthat,whileproportionalityisa
considerationinproduction,thiscaseinvolveddamagesin
thehundredsofmillionsofdollarsandproportionalitydid
not“figureprominently”.NixonJ.orderedtheproductionof
allrequestedrecords.
DORNAN (RE), 2016 ABQB 259 (MASTER SCHLOSSER)Rules 1.4 (Procedural Orders), 5.3 (Modification or Waiver of this Part), 5.12 (Penalty for not Serving Affidavit of Records) and 13.5 (Variation of Time Periods)
ThepurposeofthisActionwastosetasideatransferof
assetsbyMr.Dornan,whohadaDivision1Bankruptcy
Proposalpending,ortoobtainJudgmentagainstMr.
Dornanforthedifferencebetweenthetransfervalueand
thefairmarketvalueofthetransferredassets.AnAppealof
theOrdergrantingpermissionfortheActionwasscheduled
tobeheardMay27,2016,butpriortothehearing,Mr.
Dornan’screditorsservedaStatementofClaimonMr.
Dornan.ThedeadlineforfilingtheStatementofDefence
wasApril21,2016andthecreditorsrefusedtograntan
extensionofthatdeadline.Mr.DornanappliedforaStayof
theproceduralstepsintheActionpendingtheAppealof
theRegistrar’sOrder.
MasterSchlosser,actingastheRegistrarinBankruptcy,
consideredthetestforgrantingaStayunderthe
Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act,RSC1985,cB-3,and
notedthattheApplicantwasseekingaStayofupto
twoproceduralstepsintheAction.BothRules1.4and
13.5permittedtheCourttoextendproceduraldeadlines
andMasterSchlossernotedthatthetimeforserving
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OnthefactsbeforetheCourt,MasterSchlosserdetermined
thattheAgreementhadbeenbreachedandorderedthatthe
Applicantwasentitledtoexerciseitsrepurchaseoption.
CONDOMINIUM CORPORATION NO 072 9313 (TRAILS OF MILL CREEK) V SCHULTZ, 2016 ABQB 338 (MASTER SCHLOSSER)Rules 3.2 (How to Start an Action), 3.68 (Court Options to Deal with Significant Deficiencies), 7.3 (Summary Judgment) and 13.18 (Types of Affidavit)
ThePlaintiffcommencedanActionbywayofOriginating
ApplicationinordertoevicttheRespondent’sson,a
minor,fromacondominiumunit.Thecondominiumunitin
questionwassoldbeforetheCourtrendereditsDecisionso
theevictionissuebecamemoot.
OneoftheremainingissuesbeforetheCourtwasin
relationtothenatureandsufficiencyoftheevidencegiven
intheOriginatingApplication.MasterSchlossernoted
thatpursuanttoRule3.2(2),theOriginatingApplication
procedureismeantforsituationsinwhichthereareno
factsindispute,orwhenadecisionisthesubjectof
JudicialReview.AnOriginatingApplicationisdecided
onabalanceofprobabilities,unlikeSummaryJudgment
ApplicationsunderRules7.3and3.68.Furthermore,
pursuanttoRule13.18(3),theevidencerequiredinthese
circumstancesmustbefirst-hand,direct,andpersonaland
cannotbehearsayastheApplicationmayfinallydisposeof
someoralloftheissues.MasterSchlosserconsideredthe
AffidavitevidencegivenbytheApplicantcondominium’s
propertymanager,andheldthatthekeyevidencegivenwas
second-hand,andthattheAffidavitwassilentaboutcertain
factsinquestion.
Thenatureandsufficiencyoftheevidencegiven,in
combinationwithotherremainingissuesbeforethe
Court,suggestedthatmorewasexpectedofthePlaintiff
condominium’sboard.MasterSchlosserheldthatthe
Plaintiff’sOriginatingApplicationforfinesandrecovery
ofCostswasdismissed,andtheRespondent’sCross-
Applicationwasallowed.Finally,thefinesissuedtothe
DefendantbythePlaintiffcondominiumcorporationwere
setaside.
GAUTHIER V STARR, 2016 ABQB 213 (ROOKE ACJ)Rules 3.42 (Limitation on When Judgment or Noting in Default May Occur), 3.62 (Amending Pleading), 3.68 (Court Options to Deal with Significant Deficiencies), 10.29 (General Rule For Payment of Litigation Costs) and 13.6 (Pleadings: General Requirements)
ThePlaintiffsuedthreeindividualsfortrespass,but
theStatementofClaimwasextremelybriefanddid
notparticularizeanyclaimsagainsttwoofthethree
Defendants.AllthreeDefendantsappliedtohavetheAction
struckunderRule3.68.AssociateChiefJusticeRooke
notedthataStatementofClaimmustprovideaminimum
thresholdofinformationsotheDefendantscanprovide
ameaningfulresponse.Baldallegationsareinsufficient,
andaclaimintrespassrequiresmaterialfactssufficientto
demonstrateanintentionaltort.
AnAmendedStatementofClaimwasacceptedforfiling
justpriortothechambersApplication,pursuanttoRule
3.62,asthePleadingshadnotclosed.TheAmended
StatementofClaimwassimilartotheoriginalbutprovided
additionaldetailsaboutthedatesoftheallegedtrespasses
byeachDefendant.ThePlaintiffalsosoughttohavethe
Defendantsnotedindefault,butthisstepwasunavailable,
pursuanttoRule3.42(b),astheDefendantshadappliedto
striketheClaimunderRule3.68.TheDefendantsargued
thattheStatementofClaimfailedtoprovideanything
morethanbaldallegationsoftrespassanddidnotmeet
thecriteriaforpleadingsinRule13.6.RookeA.C.J.agreed
thattheStatementofClaimfailedtoprovidethenecessary
materialfactsfortheDefendantstomakeameaningful
response,andthereforestrucktheAction.
ThePlaintiffhadbeenwarnedinanotherActionthat
hemaybedeclaredavexatiouslitigantifhecontinued
tolitigateonthebasisofastrategywhichRookeA.C.J.
groupedasOrganizedPseudolegalCommercialArguments
(“OPCA”).ItwasapparentthattheOPCAtacticsexhibited
similaritiesinthePlaintiff’scurrentlitigation,andHis
LordshipheldthattheActionwasinfactOPCAlitigation.
RookeA.C.J.furtherheldthatthePlaintiffwasavexatious
litigant.
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BecausetheDefendantsweresuccessfulintheir
Application,theywereeachawarded$500inlitigation
costs,pursuanttoRule10.29(1)foracontested
Applicationwithoutwrittenbriefs.RookeA.C.J.also
orderedthatthePlaintiffwasprohibitedfromanyfurther
CourtfilingsinrespectofthethreeDefendants.
HERCHAK V ENBRIDGE PIPELINES INC, 2016 ABQB 217 (TILLEMAN J)Rules 3.62 (Amending Pleading), 3.65 (Permission of Court to Amendment Before or After Close of Pleadings), 3.66 (Costs), 3.68 (Court Options to Deal with Significant Deficiencies), 3.74 (Adding, Removing or Substituting Parties After Close of Pleadings), 5.32 (When Information May be Used), 5.33 (Confidentiality and Use of Information) and 13.6 (Pleadings: General Requirements)
ThePlaintiffwasaformeremployeeoftheDefendant,
Enbridge,andduringhisemploymentthePlaintiffhada
relationshipwiththeindividualDefendant,Scratch.When
therelationshipwasbroughttoEnbridge’sattention,the
Plaintiffwasdismissedforcause.ThePlaintiffcommenced
separateActionsagainstEnbridgeandScratchwhichwere
consolidatedbyconsent.ThePlaintiffappliedtofilean
AmendedStatementofClaimseeking,amongotherthings,
toaddScratch’spartnerHoldenasaDefendantonthe
basisthattheindividualDefendantsconspiredtohavehim
fired.HealsosoughtanOrderwaivingRules5.2and5.33.
ScratchandHoldenarguedthattheAmendedStatementof
ClaimcontainedimpermissibleevidenceinbreachofRule
5.33(impliedundertakings).Further,Scratcharguedthat,
iftheCourtallowedtheamendmentstotheStatementof
Claim,shewasentitledtoCostspursuanttoRule3.66.
Holdenarguedthattherewereinsufficientfactstoadd
himasaDefendantforconspiracy.Healsoarguedthat
theamendmentApplicationwasbroughtinbadfaithand
thatthecontentswerefrivolous,irrelevantanddesignedto
embarrass,contrarytoRule3.68(2).
JusticeTillemanreviewedtherelevantRulesandheldthat
theRuleagainstimpliedundertakingsinRule5.33isonly
infringedifinformationfrompre-Trialdiscoveryisused
beyondthescopeofthelitigationinwhichithasbeen
obtained.TheproductionrelieduponbythePlaintiffto
seektheadditionofHoldenasaDefendantwasnotbeyond
thescopeofthelitigationinwhichitwasdiscovered,and
wasthereforenotinviolationofRule5.33.TillemanJ.
alsoheldthattherewerecommunicationsthatmetthe
thresholdtoaddconspiracyasacauseofactionagainst
bothScratchandHolden,andthereforegrantedpermission
toaddHoldenasaDefendantunderRule3.74(2)(b).
JusticeTillemanobservedthattheAmendedStatement
ofClaimcontainedasignificantamountofcontentthat
wassuperfluous,salacious,orinbreachofRule13.6(2)
(a),whichprovidesthataPleadingmuststatethefacts
onwhichapartyreliesbutnottheevidencebywhichthe
factsaretobeproved.HisLordshiporderedtheremoval
ofirrelevant,salaciousandredundantinformationinthe
AmendedStatementofClaim.
MANJI V PRASAD, 2016 ABQB 273 (PENTELECHUK J)Rules 3.62 (Amending Pleading), 3.65 (Permission of Court to Amendment Before or After Close of Pleadings), 3.66 (Costs) and 13.6 (Pleadings: General Requirements)
Thepartieswereinvolvedinalong-standingdisputeover
thepurchaseofcertainrealestate.Shortlybeforethe
Trialwassettobeheard,theCourtwasinformedthatthe
Defendant,Prasad,intendedtomakeadditionalarguments
relatingtoaresultingtrustor,alternatively,thatthe
Applicantwasentitledtorelieffromforfeiture.Theparties
soughtdirectionsfromtheCourtastowhetherPrasad
wasrequiredtoamendhisDefencetopleadthesenew
argumentsand,ifso,whetherleavetoamendshouldbe
granted.
JusticePentelechukconsideredRule13.6andstatedthat
onlythefactualsituationthatdisclosesacauseofaction
needstobepleaded,notthecauseofactionitself.Inthis
case,noneoftheunderlyingfactshadchanged.Moreover,
relieffromforfeitureandresultingtrustwerenotcausesof
action,butratherdefencesorformsofrelief.Onaplain
readingofRule13.6(2),bothdefencesweremattersthat
coulddefeatorraiseadefencetothePlaintiff’sclaims,and
shouldbepleaded.Further,PentelechukJ.notedthatRule
13.6(3)statesthataPleadingmustinclude“anymatteron
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necessarytoallowsomeonetodefendtheirwords.Master
RobertsonheldthatthePlaintiffs’Pleadingslackedproper
clarityandhadconflictingparticulars.Intheresult,the
claimsrelatingtodefamationwerestruck.
MasterRobertsonalsoconsideredtheSecurityforCosts
Application.MasterRobertsonnotedthatthecorporate
PlaintiffdidnotcarryonbusinessinAlbertanordidthe
individualPlaintiffhaveanyexigibleassetsinAlberta.
Furthermore,bothofthePlaintiffsweresignificantly
indebtedtothecorporateDefendant.TheCanadaRevenue
Agencyalsohadawritofenforcementagainstthe
Plaintiff.MasterRobertsonheldthattheevidenceclearly
demonstratedthatthePlaintiffwouldverylikelynotbeable
topayanawardofCosts.Asaresult,MasterRobertson
orderedSecurityforCostsagainstthePlaintiffinthe
amountofdoubleColumn5ofScheduleC.
EASY LOAN CORPORATION V BASE MANAGEMENT & INVESTMENTS LTD, 2016 ABCA 163 (WAKELING JA)Rules 3.62 (Amending Pleading), 3.65 (Permission of Court to Amendment Before or After Close of Pleadings), 14.2 (Application of General Rules), 14.12 (Contents and Format of Notices of Appeal and Cross Appeal), 14.25 (Contents of Factums) and 14.37 (Single Appeal Judges)
TheAppellantsappliedtoamendtheirNoticeofAppealin
ordertoaddreliefthatwasnotpartoftheearlierNotice
ofAppeal,andtoappealonlypartoftheTrialDecision.
WakelingJ.A.consideredRules14.2(1),14.12(1)(2),
14.25(1)and14.37(1),andstatedthatRule14.12(2)
setsoutthepurposesofaNoticeofAppealandmandatory
elements.Rules14.25(1)(c)and(e)establishthatthe
argumentsinsupportoftheAppealareappropriately
placedintheAppellant’sfactumandoralargument,not
theNoticeofAppeal.WakelingJ.A.notedthatRule14.37
grantsasingleAppealJudgethejurisdictiontoamenda
NoticeofAppeal.Alternatively,thisjurisdictionisgranted
byRule14.2(1),whichmakestheotherRulesapplicable
wheretheAppealRulesdonotdealwithmattersdirectly.
Therefore,Rule14.2allowsapartytoamendtheNoticeof
AppealpursuanttotheRulesgoverningtheamendmentof
pleadings,namelyRules3.62and3.65.
whichapartyintendstorelythatmaytakeanotherpartyby
surprise”includingmatterslistedundertheRule.Although
neitherrelieffromforfeitureorresultingtrustarelisted,
JusticePentelechukstatedthatthelistisnotexhaustive,
andtheparamountfactoriswhetherthemattermaytake
anotherpartybysurprise.ThepurposeofRule13.6(3)is
consistentwiththeCourts’positionthatTrialbyambush
isnottolerated,andthatpartiesareentitledtoknowthe
casetheymustmeet.PentelechukJ.concludedthatthe
Respondentinthiscasecouldbecaughtbysurprise,
becausebothnewargumentswerenotsoroutinethat
theywouldbeanticipatedinanycontractualdispute.Her
Ladyshipconcludedthattheproposedamendmentsshould
beallowed.
JusticePentelechuknotedthat,pursuanttoRule3.66(2),
theCostsofacontestedApplicationtoamendapleading
areinthediscretionoftheCourt.Becausetherewasmixed
successontheApplication,eachpartywasorderedtobear
itsownCosts.
MCMORRAN V HOCKETT, 2016 ABQB 279 (MASTER ROBERTSON)Rules 3.62 (Amending Pleadings), 3.68 (Court Options to Deal with Significant Deficiencies), 4.22 (Considerations for Security for Costs Order), 10.48 (Recovery of Goods and Services Tax), 13.6 (Pleadings: General Requirements) and 13.7 (Pleadings: Other Requirements) and Schedule C
ThePlaintiffssuedtheDefendantsfor,amongotherthings,
defamation.TheDefendantsappliedtostrikethePlaintiffs’
ClaimunderRule3.68.Inthealternative,theDefendants
alsoappliedforSecurityforCostsagainstthePlaintiffs.
MasterRobertsonconsideredRules13.6and13.7inorder
toassessifthePleadingsdisclosedacauseofaction.
MasterRobertsonconsideredthelawassetoutinAbrams
v Johnson,2009ABQB575regardingadefamation
Pleading,andnotedthataclaiminDefamationrequiresa
numberofparticulars.APleadingmustdiscloseaconcise
statementofthematerialfacts,thewordspublishedbythe
Defendant,referencestothePlaintiff,thetimeandplaceof
thepublication,themannerofpublicationandtowhomthe
publicationwasmade.Therequirementsarestrict,butare
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JusticeWakelingheldthattheproposedamendmentsto
theNoticeofAppealdidnotpurporttoenlargethescope
oftheAppeal.TheamendmentsclarifiedtheAppellants’
intentionthattheynolongerwantedtoAppealagainstthe
wholedecision,onlyportionsofit.Assuch,theApplication
wasgranted.
BORDEN LADNER GERVAIS LLP V CBI INVESTMENTS LTD, 2016 ABQB 220 (MAHONEY J)Rules 3.65 (Permission of Court to Amendment Before or After Close of Pleadings) and 3.74 (Adding, Removing or Substituting Parties After Close of Pleadings)
ThePlaintifflawfirm(“BLG”)appealedaMaster’sDecision
whichdeniedBLG’srequesttoamenditsAmended
AmendedAppointmentforReviewofBLG’schargesand
retaineragreement,andtoaddindividualdirectorsand
shareholdersoftheDefendantcompany(“CBI”)asnamed
Respondentsintheirpersonalcapacities.
JusticeMahoneystatedthatRule3.65doesnotapplyto
anamendmenttoadd,remove,substituteorcorrectthe
nameofapartytowhichRule3.74applies.HisLordship
consideredRule3.74,whichprovidesfortheaddition,
removalorsubstitutionofpartiesafterthecloseof
Pleadings.MahoneyJ.heldthattheapplicablethresholdto
allowsuchanamendmentislow.Accordingtothe“classic
rule”assetoutinBalmv3512061CanadaLtd.,2003
ABCA98,“anypleadingcanbeamendednomatterhow
carelessorlateisthepartywhoisseekingtoamend”.The
“classicrule”issubjecttofourexceptions:
a) thattheamendmentwouldcauseseriousprejudice
totheopposingparty,notcompensableincosts;
b) theamendmentrequestedis“hopeless”;
c) unlesspermittedbystatute,theamendmentseeks
toaddanewpartyoranewcauseofactionafter
theexpiryofalimitationperiod;and,
d) thereisanelementofbadfaith.
TheMasterhadpreviouslyheldthatgrantingthe
amendmentwouldhaveresultedinprejudiceandharmto
theopposingparty,andthattheproposedamendmentwas
both“hopeless”andoutoftime.JusticeMahoneyagreed
withthisanalysis,anddeniedtheAppeal.
WOOD BUFFALO HOUSING & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION V ALVES CONSTRUCTION LTD, 2016 ABQB 249 (MASTER WACOWICH)Rules 3.65 (Amendments to Pleadings) and 7.3 (Summary Judgment)
TheDefendants,DavidHamiltonArchitectLtd.and
DavidHamilton(the“Hamiltons”),appliedforSummary
JudgmenttodismissthePlaintiff’sclaim.ThePlaintiff
cross-appliedtoamendtheStatementofClaimtoinclude
particularsoftheallegationsagainsttheHamiltons.The
Actioninvolvedabuildingdeficiencyclaimrelatingtothe
restorationofacondominiumcomplexdamagedbyfire.
MasterWacowichnotedthatamendmentsaftertheclose
ofpleadingsaregovernedbyRule3.65,whichprovides
theCourtbroaddiscretiontoamend.Theclassicruleis
thatanamendmentshouldbeallowednomatterhow
carelessorlate,unlessthereisprejudicewhichcannotbe
compensatedbycosts.Thediscretiontoallowamendments
shouldbeexercisedgenerously,allowingamendmentsthat
raiseevendoubtfulpleas,solongasitisarguable.The
Courtshouldconsiderwhetheranamendmentisdisallowed
becauseitishopeless.MasterWacowichobservedthat,in
thiscase,theamendmentssoughtwouldbehopelessifthe
SummaryJudgmentApplicationwasgranted.
MasterWacowichstatedthatthekeypointstobe
consideredonanApplicationforSummaryJudgmentwere
setoutbytheCourtofAppealin776826 Alberta Ltd v
Ostrowercha,2015ABCA49.Procedurally,Summary
Judgmentshouldonlybegivenifadispositionthatisfair
andjusttobothpartiescanbemadeontheexistingrecord.
Substantively,SummaryJudgmentcanbegrantedwhere
thereisnomerittotheClaim.Nomeritmeansthat,even
assumingtheaccuracyofthepositionofthenon-moving
party,thenon-movingparty’spositionhasnomeritinlaw
orfact.Inorderforthenon-movingparty’scasetohave
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alsoheldthattheindividualPlaintiffshadnoauthorityto
bringaderivativeActiononbehalfofMCFN.Asaresult,
WittmannC.J.strucktheclaiminitsentiretyforfailingto
discloseacauseofaction.
STONEY NAKODA NATIONS V CANADA, 2016 ABQB 193 (JEFFREY J)Rules 3.68 (Court Options to Deal with Significant Deficiencies) and 7.3 (Summary Judgment)
ThePlaintiff,StoneyNakodaNations(“SNN”),commenced
anActionfortrespassandconversionofpetroleum,natural
gas,andrelatedhydrocarbons(“PNG”)whichtheyclaimed
wereproperlytheirs.SNNarguedthatvarioustransfers
ofPNGtoCanadianPacificRailway(“CPR”)andCPR’s
whollyownedsubsidiary,whichisnowEncana,wereeither
invalidorforinadequateconsideration.TheDefendants,
EncanaandCPR,broughtanApplicationforSummary
Dismissal.Encanaarguedthattheclaimswerebrought
outoftime,thatitcannotbeatrespasseronitsown
property,andthatSNN’sclaimsfailbecauseofEncana’s
indefeasibilityoftitle.CPR’sApplicationforSummary
Dismissalwasonthesamegrounds,andanyinterestit
hadinthelandswaswhollytransferredtoEncana,and
thereforeCPRhadnointerestinanyofthePNGatissue
intheAction.Further,anyclaimfordamagesagainstCPR
wasoutoftimeandthusstatute-barred.SNNarguedthat
whatwasbeingsoughtbyCPRandEncanawas,ineffect,
anextinguishmentofAboriginalTreatyRights.Therefore
theApplicantsboretheonusofprovingthattherewasa
clearandplainintentbytheCrowntoextinguishSNN’s
AboriginalTreatyRightsinthePNG.
JeffreyJ.,inconsideringRule7.3,notedthatSummary
Judgmentcanbegrantedifthereisnomerittotheclaim.
“Nomerit”meansthat,evenassumingtheaccuracyof
thepositionofthenon-movingpartyastoanymaterial
orpotentiallydecisivematters,thenon-movingparty’s
positionhasnomeritinlaworinfact.JusticeJeffreynoted
thatanotherwaytoexplaintheconceptofmeritisthat,in
orderforthenon-movingparty’scasetohavemerit,there
mustbeagenuineissueorapotentiallydecisivematerial
factinthecasewhichcannotbesummarilyfoundagainst
theRespondentsontherecord.Themereassertionofa
merit,theremustbeagenuineissueofpotentiallydecisive
materialfactwhichcannotbesummarilyfoundagainstthe
non-movingpartyontheexistingrecord.Theassertionbya
non-movingpartythatsomethingwillturnupatTrialdoes
notsuffice.Thekeyiswhetherthecircumstancesrequire
viva voceevidenceinordertoproperlyresolvethecase.
OnthepresentApplication,MasterWacowichstatedthat
theonlydisputedissuesweremattersofbasiccontractlaw
concerningthelegalsignificanceofundisputedfacts.The
disputedissuescouldbedeterminedontheexistingrecord.
MasterWacowichheldthattherewereseveralelementsof
abindinglegalcontractmissing,andthereforenocontract.
Assuch,thePlaintiff’sclaimswerewithoutmeritand
weresummarilydismissed.Withtheclaimssummarily
dismissed,theproposedamendmentswereheldtobe
hopeless,andtheApplicationtoamendtheStatementof
Claimwasdismissed.
WAQUAN V CANADA (ATTORNEY GENERAL), 2016 ABQB 191 (WITTMANN CJ)Rule 3.68 (Court Options to Deal with Significant Deficiencies)
ThePlaintiffs,membersoftheMikisewCreeFirstNation
(“MCFN”),broughtanActiontosetasidecertaintermsof
atreatysettlementagreementfromapriorActionbetween
MCFNandCanada.TheDefendant,theAttorneyGeneral,
appliedtostrikethePlaintiffs’Pleadingsforfailingto
discloseacauseofaction.WittmannC.J.notedthatRule
3.68governsthestrikingofclaims,andstatedthat:
Aclaimwillonlybestruckifitisplainandobvious,
assumingthefactspleadedtobetrue,thatthe
pleadingdisclosesnoreasonablecauseofaction...
Anotherwayofputtingthetestisthattheclaimhasno
reasonableprospectofsuccess.Whereareasonable
prospectofsuccessexists,themattershouldbe
allowedtoproceedtotrial.
ChiefJusticeWittmannheldthattheindividualPlaintiffs
hadnostandingtobringtheActiononbehalfoftheMCFN,
astherightssettledunderthetreatywerecollectiverights
belongingtoallmembersoftheMCFN.HisLordship
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positionbytheRespondentinaPleadingorotherwise,or
themerehopeofthenon-movingpartythatsomethingwill
turnupatTrial,willnotsufficeforapositiontohavemerit.
ThisisdistinguishedfromthetestunderRule3.68,which
involvesdeciding“whetherthereisanyreasonableprospect
thattheclaimwillsucceed,erringonthesideofgenerosity
inpermittingnovelclaimstoproceed”.
BasedontherecordbeforetheCourt,JeffreyJ.dismissed
theclaimasagainstCPR.JeffreyJ.alsofoundthatSNN
hadactualknowledgethatcertainpartieshadclaimed
ownershipofthePNGinissueby1982atthelatest.As
such,theActionagainstCPRwassummarilydismissedas
itwasstatutebarredandwithoutmerit.
RegardingSNN’sclaimasagainstEncanafortherecovery
ofin situPNG,JeffreyJ.heldthatEncanahadnotmetits
burdentoshowthattheCrownhadintendedthealienation
ofthePNGatissuetoCPRsuchthatSNN’sAboriginal
Rightswereextinguished.Consequently,theissuecouldnot
bedecidedonasummarybasis,andEncana’sApplication
wasdenied.JeffreyJ.alsofoundthatSNNhadraised
sufficientdoubtastowhetherthetransferfromCPRto
Encana’spredecessorwasforsufficientconsiderationsuch
thatitwasnotbeyonddoubtthatthedefencehadmerit.
JeffreyJ.notedthatthedeterminationofindefeasibilityof
Encana’stitlecalledforacomplexdeterminationoflegal
issues,intertwinedwithvariousdegreesofsocial,historical,
legislativeandcorporatefacts.JusticeJeffreyconcluded
that,insuchcases,afullTrialisrequired.
ELLMAR DEVELOPMENTS LTD V BEARSPAW DEVELOPMENT INC, 2016 ABQB 221 (MASTER HANEBURY)Rules 3.68 (Court Options to Deal with Significant Deficiencies) and 7.3 (Summary Judgment)
ThePlaintiffappliedforSummaryJudgmentagainstthe
Defendants,andtheDefendantscross-appliedforthe
claimsagainstthemtobestruckor,inthealternative,
SummaryDismissal.MasterHaneburyconsideredwhether
SummaryJudgmentcouldbegrantedwhentherewas
conflictingevidencebetweentheparties.MasterHanebury
notedthatSummaryJudgmentcouldnotbedeniedsolely
onthebasisthattheevidencedisclosedatriableissue,
butratherwhentherewasanissueofmeritthatgenuinely
requiredaTrial.Additionally,issuesofcredibilitycould
generallynotbedeterminedsummarily.MasterHanebury
concludedthat:
…conflictingevidenceonamaterialmatterusually
resultsinatrialunlessoneside’sevidenceis
completelynon-credible,i.e.itisdestroyedeither
byotherevidenceoroncross-examination,orisfound
tobebald,self-servingandunsupported.
Inthiscase,MasterHaneburyheldthatneitherparty’s
evidencewassufficientlybolsteredordestroyedtothe
degreenecessarytograntSummaryJudgment;therefore,a
Trialwasrequired.
RegardingtheDefendants’Applicationtostriketheclaims
againstthem,MasterHaneburynotedthatanApplication
underRule3.68(2)(b)tostrikeaclaimonthebasisthat
itdisclosednoreasonablecauseofactionmustbemade
withoutevidence.TheCourtassumedthattheallegations
offactfoundintheClaimweretrue.MasterHaneburyheld
thattheclaimdisclosedacauseofactionagainstboth
Defendants;therefore,theDefendants’Applicationsto
Strikeweredismissed.Additionally,asneitherDefendant
filedevidenceinsupportoftheirCross-Applicationsfor
SummaryDismissal,theCourtdismissedbothApplications
statingthat,iftheyweretosucceed,itwouldsetan
“unacceptableprecedent”.
GRENON V CANADA REVENUE AGENCY, 2016 ABQB 260 (DARIO J)Rule 3.68 (Court Options to Deal with Significant Deficiencies)
TheDefendants,theCanadaRevenueAgencyandanumber
ofitsOfficers,appliedtostriketheStatementofClaimof
thePlaintiff,Grenon.TheActionhadarisenoutofatax
auditandreassessmentagainstGrenonandanumberof
corporationswhollyownedbyhim.Grenonprotestedthe
Defendants’conduct,includingnegligence,misfeasancein
publicoffice,interferencewithcontractualrelations,and
breachoffiduciaryduty.JusticeDarioconsideredwhether
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thefactsallegedinGrenon’sStatementofClaimwere
sufficienttosupportthecausesofaction.
DarioJ.reviewedpriorleadingauthorityonApplicationsto
strike,andsummarizedtheprinciplesas:
1.TheCourtmustassumethefactsallegedinthe
Pleadingaretrue,butthisassumptiondoes
notextendtobaldallegations,tolegalconclusions
ortospeculations,absurdities,highlyimplausible
statementsorstatementsincapableofproof.
2.Makingconclusorystatementswithoutevidenceis
anabuseofprocessandsuchstatementsshouldbe
struck.
3.Improperreferencetotermssuchas“maliciously”
and“recklessly”alsoconstitutesanabuseof
processandsuchtermsshouldbestruckunless
theyarerelevanttothecauseofaction
alleged.
4.Whereaplaintiff’sstatementofclaimincludes
contradictoryfactsthatcannotbothbetrue,such
contradictoryallegationsneednotbeacceptedby
theCourt.
5.TheCourtisnotobligatedtoassumethatan
allegedfactistruewherethatallegationiscontrary
toastatutorydirective.
DarioJ.notedthattheseprincipleswerenon-exhaustive
andaCourtmayconsiderotherbasesinrejectinga
Plaintiff’sallegations;further,whileaCourtshouldnot
bequicktodismissnovelclaims,theentirecontentsand
contextofaPleadingmustbeconsidered,andaline-by-
lineanalysismaynotbeappropriate.
DarioJ.notedthatthetestunderRule3.68forfailingto
discloseareasonablecauseofactioniswhethertheClaim
hasareasonableprospectofsuccess.Severalparagraphsin
Grenon’sStatementofClaimwerestruckbecausetheywere
foundtobeacollateralattackontheexclusivejurisdictions
oftheTaxCourtofCanadaandFederalCourtofCanada,
orbecausetheyfailedtodiscloseareasonablecauseof
action.Anumberoftermswerestruck,andsomewere
replaced.
HARTWELL V TAYLOR, 2016 ABQB 289 (WILSON J)Rule 3.74 (Adding, Removing or Substituting Parties After Close of Pleadings)
Followingafailedrealestatetransaction,thePlaintiff
commencedaClaimagainsttheDefendant,andthe
Defendantcounterclaimedtorecoverhisdeposit.During
QuestioningoftheDefendant,thePlaintiffbecameaware
ofinformationthatsuggestedthatnewpartiesmaybe
liable,andappliedtoamendtheStatementofClaim.The
DefendantopposedtheApplicationand,basedonthe
existenceofaparallelActioninvolvingthesameparties,
alsoappliedtohavethisActiondeclaredanabuseof
process.
ThePlaintiffsubmittedthatthematerialintheparties’
Affidavitsprovidedsufficientevidencetoconnectthenew
partiestotheissuesraisedintheAction.JusticeWilson
notedthat,pursuanttoRule3.74,threerequirementsmust
bemettoamendtheClaim:theApplicationtoAmend
mustbebroughtbyapartytotheAction;theCourthadto
besatisfiedthatanOrdershouldbemade;andtheremust
benoprejudiceifthePleadingwasamended.WilsonJ.
consideredwhethertheadditionofnewpartieswasmore
likelytoexpandthescopeandexpenseoftheAction.
JusticeWilsonnotedthat,generally,anypleadingcould
beamendednomatterhowcarelessorlatethepartywas
whenseekingtomaketheamendment,subjecttofour
exceptions.
WilsonJ.notedthattheDefendant’sobjectiontothe
amendmentswasbasedonthePlaintiff’slackofevidence.
JusticeWilsonreviewedwhatqualityandquantityof
evidencewasrequiredforanamendmentApplication.
HisLordshipnotedthatamodestdegreeofevidence
wasrequired,butinthiscasesuchevidenceincluded
hearsayevidence,evidenceofanuncertainconclusion,
andevidenceinAffidavitsbypartiesotherthantheparty
seekingtheamendment.Further,WilsonJ.observedthat
thelackofafactualbasiswasordinarilynotagroundfor
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denyinganamendment,solongasitallegedfactswhich,
iftrue,gaverisetoacauseofAction.HisLordshipheld
thattherewasnothingbeforetheCourttosuggestthat
theexceptionstothegeneralruleapplied,andthere
wassufficientallowableevidenceuponwhichtobase
theamendments.Intheresult,WilsonJ.heldthatthe
Pleadingscouldbeamended.
IMPERIAL OIL V FLATIRON CONSTRUCTORS, 2016 ABQB 310 (GRAESSER J)Rules 4.10 (Assistance by the Court), 6.3 (Applications Generally), 7.5 (Application for Judgment by Way of Summary Trial) and 7.8 (Objection to Application for Judgment by Way of Summary Trial)
Altalink,theThirdPartyDefendant,appliedtohavethe
ThirdPartyClaimagainstthemdeterminedbywayof
SummaryTrialpursuanttoRule7.5.AlthoughthePlaintiffs
wouldnotbeinvolvedintheSummaryTrial,thePlaintiffs
objectedtoitsarguingthattheissuesweretoocomplex
andthusnotappropriatetoproceedbywayofSummary
Trial,andthattheywouldsufferprejudiceiftheThirdParty
ClaimwasdeterminedbywayofSummaryTrial.
TheDefendant,Flatiron,questionedwhetherthePlaintiffs
hadstandingtobringtheirApplication.JusticeGraesser
notedthatRule6.3requiresnoticesofApplicationstobe
servedon“allparties”.Suchisthecaseevenwherethe
Applicationhasnopotentialtoaffectaparty.TheCourt
statedthattheSummaryTrialwouldrequirenoticetothe
Plaintiffs,andthatitwaspreferableforthePlaintiffsto
bringthisApplication,insteadofwaitinguntilthedateof
theSummaryTrialtoobject.HisLordshipheldthatthe
PlaintiffshadstandingtobringtheApplication.
JusticeGraesserconsideredtheappropriatenessofsetting
thematterdownforSummaryTrial.Afterreviewingthe
amountsinvolved;thecomplexityofthematter;the
urgencyofthematter;anyprejudicelikelytoariseby
reasonofdelay;thecostoftakingtheissuesforwardtoa
conventionalTrialinrelationtotheamountinvolved;the
courseofproceedings;andissuesrelatingtowitnesses,
GraesserJ.heldthatSummaryTrialwasappropriate.The
Plaintiffs’Applicationwasdismissedaccordingly.
MILAVSKY V MILAVSKY ESTATE, 2016 ABQB 333 (TILLEMAN J)Rules 4.22 (Considerations for Security for Costs Order) and 12.36 (Advance Payment of Costs)
ThePlaintiff,Ms.Milavsky,commencedanActionfor
DivorceandDivisionofMatrimonialPropertyinJuneof
2009,whichwasexpandedinMay2010toincludea
ClaimofUnjustEnrichmentagainstthreetrustssettled
bytheDefendant,thelateMr.Milavsky.Thelitigationhad
anextensivehistory,andwasscheduledforan8week
Trial.Ms.MilavskyappliedfortheDefendantEstatetopay
$1,000,000inadvanceCostsinordertofundthecomplex
EstateandTrustlitigation.
Ms.MilavskycharacterizedtheActionasamatrimonial
propertyclaim,andarguedthattheActionagainstthe
trustswasancillaryand,therefore,thatRule12.36should
apply.TheEstatearguedthatRule12.36didnotapply.
TheRespondentTrustscharacterizedtheClaimagainstthem
assolelyacivilonetowhichthetestunderRule4.22applies.
JusticeTillmanheldthattheClaimagainsttheEstate
wasprimarilyamatrimonialpropertyActiontowhich
Rule12.36applied.UnderRule12.36,theCourthas
widediscretiontoorderadvanceCosts,andtheprimary
considerationiswhethertheApplicanthassufficient
resourcestopayfortheirpartofthelitigation.Thepurpose
ofadvanceCostsawardsunderRule12.36isto“levelthe
playingfield”,andnoconsiderationisgiventothemerits
oftheClaim.JusticeTillmannotedthatMs.Milavskywas
68yearsold,earnednoemploymentincome,andhadan
incomethatwasinsufficienttokeepupwiththeescalating
legalfeesrequiredtoadvanceherClaim.Thisevidencewas
sufficienttomeetthetestforadvanceCosts.
TillemanJ.observedthat,underRule4.22,anApplicant
mustmeetthethreecriteriasetoutbytheSupremeCourt
ofCanadainBritish Columbia (Minister of Forests) v
Okanagan Indian Band2003SCC71,whichare:
(i) Theapplicantisimpecunioustotheextentthat
theywouldbedeprivedoftheopportunityto
proceedwiththecasewithouttheorder,
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(ii) Theapplicanthasaprimafaciecaseofsufficient
merit,
(iii) Theremustbespecialcircumstancessufficient
tosatisfytheCourtthatthecaseiswithinthe
narrowclassofcaseswheretheextraordinary
exerciseofitspowersisappropriate.
JusticeTillmanheldthatMs.Milavskydidnotmeetthetest
assetoutinOkanagan Indian Band.Intheresult,advance
CostswerepayablebytheEstate,butnotbytheTrusts.
STEWART ESTATE V TAQA NORTH LTD, 2016 ABCA 144 (ROWBOTHAM, MCDONALD AND O’FERRALL JJA)Rules 4.24 (Formal Offers to Settle), 10.31 (Court-Ordered Costs Award) and 10.33 (Court Considerations in Making Costs Award) and Schedule C
TheAppellants,agroupofPlaintiffs,weresuccessfulin
theirAppealandinhavingtheRespondents’Cross-Appeal
dismissed.Thepartiessoughtadeterminationwithrespect
toCostsforTrialandfortheAppeal.
TheCourtofAppealheldthatawardingCoststothe
Appellantswasappropriateastheyweresuccessful,and
thefactorswhichwouldmilitateagainstCostsdidnot
ariseatTrialoronAppeal.Thekeyissuewaswhether
theCourtshouldawardenhancedCostsabovethetariffs
prescribedbyColumn5inScheduleC.TheCourtof
AppealreferredtoRules10.31and10.33,notingthe
Court’sdiscretioninawardingCostsandthefactorsthe
Courtmayconsiderwhendoingso.TheCourtofAppeal
observedthatamultipliermaybeappliedwhentheTrialis
longandcomplexandthequantumofdamagesclaimedis
significantlygreaterthan$1.5million.Generally,theCourts
recognizethat,wheretheamountindisputegreatlyexceeds
Column5,ScheduleCisdeficientandamultipliermaybe
applied.However,thecourtsmustbecarefulnottoavoid
over-indemnifyingthesuccessfulparty.GiventheAction’s
complexity,amultiplieroftwotimestheColumn5tariff
wasgranted.Further,theAppellantsbestedaFormalOffer
madebeforeTrialand,assuch,wereawardeddoubleCosts
fortheTrialfromthetimeoftheFormalOffer.
Inaddition,theAppellantsbestedtwoinformalOffers
beforetheAppeal.TheRespondentsarguedthatdouble
costsdidnotapply,relyingonRule4.24whichrequires
FormalOfferstouseForm22andbeunconditional.
TheRespondentscontendedthattheinformalOffers
wereconditionalonapprovalandweremerelyinvitations
totreat.TheCourtofAppealacknowledgedthatthese
informalOfferswereconditional,buttherewereindications
thatacceptancewouldhaveledtoapprovalbyallofthe
Appellants.TheseOfferswereasincereattempttosettle
thedisputeand,assuch,theAppellantswereawarded
doubleCostsfortheAppealforthestepstakenafterthe
informalOffers.
KITCHING V DEVLIN, 2016 ABQB 212 (JEFFREY J)Rules 4.29 (Costs Consequences of Formal Offer to Settle), 5.31 (Use of Transcript & Answers to Written Questions) and 5.36 (Objection to Expert’s Report)
ThePlaintiffwasinvolvedinapersonalinjuryClaimand
heretainedtheDefendantlawyer,Mr.Devlin,torepresent
him.Themattersettledfor$350,000.Subsequently,the
PlaintiffsuedMr.DevlinfornegligentlyhandlingtheClaim,
claimingthatthesettlementwasimprovident.
Bothpartiescalledexpertstoprovideevidencewithrespect
tothestandardofcareofapersonalinjurylawyer,and
whetherthatthresholdwasmetbyMr.Devlin.AtTrial,
thePlaintiffobjectedtotheDefendant’sexpertreport.
Sincetheobjectionwasnotmadeinaccordancewith
Rule5.36,thePlaintiffproposedthattheCourthearthe
Defendant’sexpert’sevidencesubjecttoalaterRuling
ontheobjection,towhichtheCourtagreed.Oneofthe
issuesindeterminingtheadmissibilityoftheDefendant’s
expertwastheuseofDiscoverytranscriptspursuanttoRule
5.31.TheDefendant’sexpert,Mr.Rodin,basedanumber
ofhisconclusionsonanswersgivenbytheDefendantat
Questioning.ThePlaintiffdidnotgiveMr.Rodinpermission
tousethetranscriptforthatpurposeandarguedthatthe
transcriptwasevidencebelongingtohimalone,andit
wasimproperfortheDefendant’sexperttointroducethat
evidenceatTrialthroughhisreport.
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JusticeJeffreystatedthat,whileitwaslessthanidealthat
Mr.RodinreliedontheQuestioningtranscriptofMr.Devlin,
thisdidnotrenderthereportinadmissible.TheCourtfound
thatwherereferencestothetranscriptwerecorroborated
byotheradmissibleTrialevidence,theopinionsassociated
withthatevidencewouldbeadmissible.Conversely,if
transcriptreferenceswerenotcorroboratedbyadmissible
evidence,thentheassociatedopinionswouldnotbeused
bytheCourt.Indeterminingwhetherthesettlement,and
theadviceprovidedtothePlaintiffbyMr.Devlinwere
reasonable,theCourtlookedatthestatementsmadeby
Mr.DevlintothePlaintiff.Mr.DevlinadvisedthePlaintiff
thathewouldfacesignificantriskiftheywenttoTrial
becausehemayhavetopaydoubleCoststotheopposing
party.JeffreyJ.notedthat,underRule4.29,ifaDefendant
makesaFormalOffertoSettlethatisnotaccepted,and
thePlaintiff’sTrialJudgmentexceedsthatOffer,then
thePlaintiffmustpaydoubletheDefendant’slegalCosts
incurredaftertheOfferwasmade.SincetheDefendanthad
statedthataFormalOfferintheamount$350,000would
bemadeifthesettlementofferwasnotaccepted,Justice
JeffreyheldthatitwasreasonableforMr.Devlintoadvise
thePlaintiffhemightfaceseriousCostconsequencesifhe
pursuedthemattertoTrial.Intheresult,JusticeJeffrey
dismissedtheActionagainstMr.Devlin.
MIKKELESEN V TRUMAN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, 2016 ABQB 255 (ERB J)Rules 4.29 (Costs Consequences of Formal Offer to Settle), 10.29 (General Rule for Payment of Litigation Costs), 10.31 (Court-Ordered Costs Award) and 10.33 (Court Considerations in Making Costs Award) and Schedule C
Thepartieswereinvolvedinadisputeovertheproposed
developmentofthePlaintiffs’farmland.TheTrialDecision
concludedthattherewasnobindingagreementbetweenthe
parties.Basedonthisconclusion,theCourtgrantedmuch
ofthereliefsoughtbythePlaintiffsbuttheresultswere
mixed.SomeoftheDefendant’sclaimsinitsCounterclaim
weregranted.ThePlaintiffssoughtfullindemnityCosts
or,alternatively,alumpsumawardof$300,000,which
representedapproximately60%oftheactualamountthey
paidaslegalfeesanddisbursements.TheDefendantargued
thatthepartiesshouldbeartheirownCosts.
ThePlaintiffsarguedthattheywerethesuccessfulparty,
andthattheCourt’sJudgmentatTrialwasequaltothe
FormalOffermadebythePlaintiffspriortoTrial.The
PlaintiffsfurtherarguedthattheDefendantengaged
inmisconduct,includingimproperlydenyingDiscovery
records,changingevidencegivenunderoathafterhearing
thePlaintiffs’caseatTrial,forcingthePlaintiffstoprove
factsthatshouldhavebeenadmitted,andforcingthe
Plaintiffstoexhaustlegalproceedingstoobtainthat
whichwasobviouslytheirs.TheDefendantarguedthatthe
PlaintiffsdidnotmeetorexceedtheFormalOffer,andthey
werenotwhollysuccessfulatTrial.TheDefendantindicated
thatthePlaintiffswereorderedtomakepartialpayments
totheDefendantforpre-developmentCostspursuanttothe
Counterclaim.
JusticeErbheldthat,pursuanttoRule10.29andcaselaw
arisingoutofthatRule,Costsgenerallyfollowtheultimate
result,butarenotusuallyapportionedonanissue-by-issue
orclaim-by-claimbasis,asitisrareforasuccessfulparty
tosucceedoneachitemclaimed.Overall,thePlaintiffs
succeededonthemostimportantissuebetweenthe
parties;theDefendant’ssuccesswas“minimal”forthe
purposeofdeterminingCosts.
JusticeErbconsideredRule10.31(6),notingthatCostsare
discretionary,andsubjecttospecificrequirementsinthe
Rules.Specifically,pursuanttoRule10.31(6)(b),theCourt
hastheabilitytoawardCostsonanindemnityoralump
sumbasis.PursuanttoRule10.33(1)(a),(b),and(g),the
Courtmaytakeintoaccountfactorsincludingtheresultof
theActionandeachparty’sdegreeofsuccess,theamount
claimedandtheamountrecovered,andanyothermatter
theCourtconsidersappropriate.Further,pursuanttoRule
10.33(2)(a),(b),(f)and(g),theCourtmayalsoconsider
theconductofapartythatunnecessarilylengthenedor
delayedtheAction,aparty’sdenialoforrefusaltoadmit
factsthatshouldhavebeenadmitted,acontraventionofor
non-compliancewiththeRulesoranOrder,andaparty’s
engagementinmisconduct.ErbJ.,referringtopriorleading
authority,heldthattheCourthasjurisdictiontoaward
CostsonahigherscalethanprovidedforinScheduleC,
butthatsolicitorandclientCostsareonlyawardedin“rare
andexceptional”circumstances.Withrespecttosolicitor
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clientCosts,ErbJ.notedthatenhancedCostsmayalsobe
appropriateforthepurposeofsatisfyingtheobjectivesof
deterrenceandpunishment.JusticeErbconsideredthat
theDefendant’switness’stestimonywasnotcredibleand
containedmanyinconsistencies,theunnecessaryexpenses
incurredbythePlaintiffs,andthesettlementoffer.
JusticeErbconcludedthatthecircumstancesofthiscase
supportedaCostsawardbeyondtheusualpartyandparty
amount.
WithrespecttotheFormalOffer,ErbJ.statedthat,under
Rule4.29(1),aPlaintiffisnormallyentitledtodouble
CostsifthePlaintiffmakesaFormalOfferthatwasnot
acceptedandsubsequentlyobtainsaJudgmentorOrder
thatisequaltoormorefavourablethantheOffer.However,
inaccordancewithRule4.29(4)(a),thisgeneralprinciple
doesnotapplyifCostswereawardedonanindemnity
orlumpsumbasisunderRule10.31(1)(b).JusticeErb
heldthattheOfferinthiscasewasasfavourableasthe
JudgmentinthemainAction,butdidnotaddressthe
Defendant’sCounterclaim.Asaresult,Rule4.29(1)was
nottriggeredinthiscase;however,itwasopentotheCourt
toconsider,asafactorindeterminingCosts,aFormalOffer
thatfell“marginallyshort”oftheJudgment,aslongasit
wasalegitimateattempttosettletheissuesindispute.
ErbJ.observedthat,whiletheScheduleCamountswere
inadequate,thiswasnotacasethatrequiredfullindemnity
forthePlaintiffs’Costs.HerLadyshipstatedthatthereare
numerousoptionsavailable,includingadjustingSchedule
Camountsinvariousways,aslongasthefinaltotalis
reasonable.Ultimately,JusticeErbhelditwasreasonable
toawardalumpsumCostsawardpursuanttoRule
10.31(1)(b)(ii).ThePlaintiffswereawarded$300,000,
whichwasdiscountedby$100,000becausethePlaintiffs
allegedbutfailedtoprovefraudagainsttheDefendant.
PARK AVENUE FLOORING INC V ELLISDON CONSTRUCTION SERVICES INC, 2016 ABQB 332 (MCCARTHY J) Rules 4.29 (Cost Consequences of Formal Offer to Settle), 5.10 (Subsequent Disclosure of Records), 5.12 (Penalty for Not Serving Affidavit of Records), 10.29 (General Rule for Payment of Litigation Costs), 10.31 (Court Ordered Costs Award), 10.33 (Court Considerations in Making Costs Award) and 10.41 (Assessment Officer’s Decision)
FollowingaTrialinacontractualdispute,theparties
returnedtoargueCosts.ThePlaintiffhadbeenrepresented
bycounselforonlypartofthelitigation.TheDefendant
arguedthatthePlaintiffwasonlyentitledtoCostsfor
thetimethatitwasrepresentedbycounsel,andwas
notentitledtoCostsforanyofthetimethatitwasself-
represented.McCarthyJ.notedthatRule10.29provides
thatasuccessfulpartytoanApplicationisentitledto
CostsandthatRule10.31(5)providesthat,inappropriate
circumstances,theCourtmayawardCoststoaself-
representedlitigantforanamountpartoforequaltothe
feesspecifiedinScheduleC.McCarthyJ.reviewedRule
10.33,whichlistsconsiderationsthataCourtmaytake
intoaccountwhenmakingaCostsaward.JusticeMcCarthy
concludedthat,giventhecircumstances,particularlythe
lengthoftheTrial,thecomplicatedfacts,andthedegree
ofconflictbetweentheparties,thePlaintiffwasentitledto
Costsduringthetimeitwasself-representedinaccordance
withRule10.31(5).
McCarthyJ.heldthat,despitetheFormalOffersbetween
theparties,anawardofdoubleCostspursuanttoRule
4.29wasnotappropriate.ThePlaintiffalsoarguedthat
theDefendantshouldbepenalizedfordelaypursuant
toRule5.12;specifically,foritsfailuretocomplywith
Rule5.10,whichprovidesthatapartymustsubsequently
discloserecordsthatitdiscoversinitspossessionthatare
relevantandmaterialifithasnotalreadydisclosedthem.
McCarthyJ.rejectedthisargumentanddidnotfindthat
theDefendant’sactionscausedsignificantdelay.Justice
McCarthyalsorejectedthePlaintiff’sargumentthatthey
shouldbeawardedinflationunderRule10.41(3)(d)asthis
RuledealswithhowanAssessmentOfficermaysetCosts.
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RO-DAR CONTRACTING LTD V VERBEEK SAND & GRAVEL INC, 2016 ABCA 123 (SLATTER, MCDONALD AND BIELBY JJA)Rules 4.31 (Application to Deal with Delay), 4.33 (Dismissal for Long Delay) and 5.10 (Subsequent Disclosure of Records)
ThePlaintiffappealedanOrderdismissingtheirActionfor
longdelayunderRule4.33.TheChambersJudgewhohad
grantedthedismissaloftheActionprovidedasummaryof
thelitigationhistory,whichincluded,amongstotherthings:
(i)theDefendantscomplyingwithanOrdercompelling
answerstoquestionsfromExaminationforDiscoveryon
October4,2010;(ii)settlementdiscussionsbetween
October2012andFebruary2013;(iii)theDefendants
disclosingadditionaldetailedinvoicesonOctober22,2012
aspartofthesettlementdiscussions;and(iv)thePlaintiff
servingaSupplementalAffidavitofRecordsonOctober
30,2013withamissingSchedule1.Priortotheinitial
Applicationfordismissalforlongdelay,thePlaintiffserved
theirmissingSchedule1withaSupplementalAffidavitof
Records.
TheMasterdismissedtheApplicationandaJustice
overturnedthepriorOrderandgrantedadismissalofthe
ActiononAppeal.
ThepartiesagreedthattheDefendants’compliancewith
theOrderonOctober4,2010,wasasignificantadvance
intheAction.ThenewRulescameintoforceonNovember
1,2010,effectivelystartingathreeyeardropdeadperiod.
Therefore,therelevantperiodofconsiderationwasbetween
November1,2010,andthedatetheApplicationtodismiss
wasfiledonFebruary24,2014.TheCourtofAppealnoted
thattheChambersJudgehadappliedafunctionalapproach
andstatedthatsettlementinitiativescouldsignificantly
advanceanAction,butthediscussionsinthisAction
accomplishedlittle.TheChambersJudgealsoheldthatthe
failuretoincludeSchedule1intheSupplementalAffidavit
ofRecordswasinadvertent,butthatthisstepdidnot
advancetheAction.
TheCourtofAppealreferredtoRules4.31and4.33as
thetwoRulesthatdealwithdelay,andnotedthatthe
functionalapproachwasadoptedbythe2013amendments
totheRules.Itwasheldthatthephrase“materially
advances”inthepriorRulehadthesamemeaningasa
“significantadvance”innewRule4.33.
TheCourtobservedthatproductionofnewinformationor
documentscansignificantlyadvanceanAction,butthe
natureofthosedocumentsandtheirimportancetothe
litigationmustbeexamined.TheCourtconsideredthe
disclosureofdetailedinvoicesonOctober22,2012.One
oftheissuesintheActionwashowmuchthePlaintiffwas
entitledtobepaid.Assuch,theinvoiceswererelevant
andmaterial,andtheDefendantswererequiredtoproduce
themunderRule5.10.Theyshouldhavedonesoina
SupplementalAffidavitofRecords,asopposedtoattaching
themtoasettlementletterona“withoutprejudice”basis.
Thesedocumentswereimportanttobothpartiesandtheir
productionconstitutedasignificantadvanceintheAction.
Therefore,theAppealwasgrantedandtheActionwas
restored.
WEAVER V CHERNIAWSKY, 2016 ABCA 152 (BERGER, MARTIN AND ROWBOTHAM JJA)Rules 4.33 (Dismissal for Long Delay) and 15.3 (Dispute Resolution Requirements)
ThePlaintiffappealedaDecisionwhichstruckherAction
forlongdelay.ThePlaintiff’sActionwascommenced
in2004,andQuestioningtookplaceinMay2009.In
October2011,thePlaintiff’scounselproducedacopyof
awrittennotewhichhadnotbeenproducedearlierdue
toinadvertence.InNovember2011,Plaintiff’scounsel
confirmedwiththeCourtthatthepartieshadagreedto
attendJudicialDisputeResolution(“JDR”);however,
noneoftheparties’agreeddateswereavailablefromthe
Court,andnofurtherattemptwasmadetoschedulea
JDR.InJune2014,theDefendantsappliedtodismiss
thePlaintiff’sClaimunderRule4.33.AMasterheldthat
disclosureofthewrittennotedidnotsignificantlyadvance
theAction,buttheagreementtoparticipateintheJDR
did.TheDefendantsappealed.TheJusticeheldthatthe
lastsignificantadvanceintheActionwasQuestioning
whichoccurredmorethan3yearsbeforetheApplicationto
dismissforlongdelay.ThePlaintiffthenappealed.
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TheCourtofAppealconfirmedthatthedelayRulesapplya
functionalapproach,whichrequiredeterminingwhethera
particularstepsignificantlyadvancedtheActionbymoving
theActionforwardina“meaningfulwayconsideringits
nature,value,importanceandquality”.ACourtisalsoto
lookatthegenuinenessandtimingofthestepatissue.The
emphasisisonsubstance,notform.TheCourtofAppeal
heldthattheagreementtohaveaJDR,andsubsequent
correspondencewiththebookingCoordinator,constituted
nothingmorethanafailedattemptatschedulingtheJDR
whichdidnotmateriallyadvancetheAction.TheCourt
rejectedthePlaintiff’sassertionthatagreeingtoparticipate
inanalternativedisputeresolution(“ADR”)process
significantlyadvancedtheActionbecauseitisamandatory
steprequiredbytheRules.BecausetheCourt’sanalysisis
oneofsubstance,notform,eventakingmandatorysteps
imposedbytheRulesdoesnotnecessarilysignificantly
advancetheActionforthepurposesofRule4.33.
Secondly,becauseQuestioningtookplacebeforeNovember
2010,Rule15.3operatedtomakeRules4.16and8.4
(whichrequiresomeformofADRbeforeaTrialdatecould
berequested)inapplicable.
Withrespecttotheproductionofthewrittennote,theCourt
heldthatitscontentshadalreadybeenextensivelycovered
inQuestioning.Itthereforecouldnotbesaidtohave
narrowedtheissuesindisputeormovedthemattercloser
toresolution.Accordingly,itdidnotsignificantlyadvance
theAction.TheAppealwasdismissed.
KOHAN V KOHAN, 2016 ABCA 125 (MARTIN, SLATTER AND VELDHUIS JJA)Rule 5.6 (Form and Content of Affidavit of Records)
TheDefendantappealedaJudgmentgrantingchildsupport
andspousalsupport.OneoftheissuesintheAppealwas
whetheradequateevidencewasadducedthattheparties’
daughteroughttobeconsideredadependantforthe
purposesofchildsupport.TheTrialJudgehadawarded
childsupportforaperiodinwhichthechildwasover
theageofmajority.TheCourtofAppealfoundtherewas
insufficientevidenceregardingthechild’spresentand
intendededucationalplantosupportthisfinding,andthat
thePlaintiff(Respondent)hadfailedtomeettheburden
ofproofforchildsupport.TheRespondentarguedthatthe
burdenofproofatTrialhadbeenmetbynotingthatshe
hadanswered99Undertakingsandprovided45Releases
withrespecttodocumentsintheAffidavitofRecords.The
CourtofAppealnotedthatRule5.6requireseachparty
toproduce“relevantandmaterial”documentsundertheir
control,andthatprovidingaReleasetoallowtheother
partytoobtainarecorddoesnotsatisfythisobligation.The
Courtheldthatthepartythatcontrolsthedocumentmust
obtainandproduceit.
TheCourtalsonotedthat,evenwhereapartytakesa
Release,anddoesnothingwithit,thatdoesnotaffect
theburdenofproofatTrial.Apartywhofailstoproduce
relevantandmaterialrecordscannottakethepositionat
Trialthatmissingevidenceistheresponsibilityoftheother
partybecausethatpartyhadobtainedaRelease.
WEATHERFORD CANADA PARTNERSHIP V ADDIE, 2016 ABQB 188 (VEIT J)Rules 5.31 (Use of Transcript and Answers to Written Questions), 6.6 (Response and Reply to Application), 6.7 (Questioning on Affidavit in Support, Response and Reply to Application), 7.3 (Summary Judgment) and 13.6 (Pleadings: General Requirements)
TwooftheDefendantsappliedforleavetoAmendtheir
StatementsofDefencetopleadtheLimitations Act,RSA
2000,cL-12,and,iftheamendmentApplicationwas
granted,forSummaryDismissalofthePlaintiff’sClaim.
Thepartiesagreedthattheamendmentsneedonlycrossa
lowbar,butthattheyshouldnotbeallowediftheycause
thepartyoppositeprejudicewhichcannotbecompensated
byCosts,oriftheproposedamendmentsarehopeless.The
partiesalsoagreed,withrespecttoSummaryJudgment,
thattherehasbeenashiftinthelegalculturewhichnow
supportsthegrantingofSummaryJudgmentinsituations
whereuncontrovertedevidenceestablishesthatthereisno
genuineissueforTrial.
TheDefendantsobjectedtothefilingofanAffidavit
byWeatherfordbecauseitwasfiledaftertheparties’
writtenbriefshadbeenfiled.JusticeVeitallowedthe
Affidavitinquestionstatingthattherewereprocedural
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uncertaintiesincludingwhethertheDefendantswere
applyingonlytoamendtheirStatementsofDefence,or
whethertheApplicationforSummaryJudgmentwouldbe
includedintheApplicationaswell.TheDefendantsalso
objected,pursuanttoRule5.31(2),toWeatherford’suse
ofportionsofthetranscriptofQuestioningofoneofits
ownwitnesses.VeitJ.notedthatWeatherfordcouldnot
useitsownwitness’sQuestioningevidenceinaself-serving
way.However,inthiscase,itwasentitledtoensurethat
anyexcerptfromitswitness’evidenceconstitutedafair
representationofthatwitness’evidence.TheDefendants
alsoobjected,pursuanttoRule6.7,toWeatherford’suse
ofexcerptsfromthetranscriptsofcross-examinationon
AffidavitbyWeatherford’saffiant.JusticeVeitheldthat
theuseofthisevidencewasusedtoensurethatafair
representationofthatwitness’evidencewasbeforetheCourt.
Thepartiesalsodisagreedonwhetherlachesand
acquiescencecouldberaisedwithouthavingbeenpleaded.
JusticeVeitnotedthattherequirementofPleadingsis
tostatethefacts,nottostatethelaw.HerLadyshipalso
notedthatRule13.6(3)listsanumberofargumentsthat
mustbepleadedifapartywishestorelyonthematTrial.
Thelistdoesnotincludelachesandacquiescence.
WithrespecttoSummaryJudgment,VeitJ.commented
thatthepartiesarerequiredtoputtheirbestfootforward,
andtheCourtisentitledto,andshould,grantthe
Applicationifitcanfairlydosoonthebasisofthematerial
putforward,withoutrequiringaTrial.
VeitJ.allowedtheamendmenttotheStatementof
Defence,andconcludedthattherewasnogenuineissuefor
Trial,giventhatthelimitationsissuecouldbefairlydecided
onthebasisoftheevidencebeforetheCourt.HerLadyship
grantedtheDefendants’SummaryJudgmentApplication
accordingly.
GEOPHYSICAL SERVICE INCORPORATED V ENCANA CORPORATION, 2016 ABQB 230 (EIDSVIK J) Rule 5.36 (Objection to Expert’s Report)
ThePlaintiffsuedanumberofDefendantsinseparate
Actionsforbreachofcopyrightandbreachofcontract.The
CaseManagementJudgeorderedthetrialoftwocommon
issuesregardingthebreachofcopyrightclaiminan
attempttohelpstreamlinetheActionsandcleartheCourt’s
docket.
IntheTrialinrespectofthetwocommonissues,Eidsvik
J.consideredwhattheeffectoftheRegulatoryRegime
wasonthePlaintiff’sclaims,andwhetherornotcopyright
couldsubsistinseismicmaterialsofthekindthatwerethe
subjectmatterofthePlaintiff’sclaims.Theevidenceduring
theTrialofthetwocommonissueswasconsiderable,and
includedtheevidenceoffiveexperts.DuringtheTrial,the
Plaintiffobjectedtotheevidenceofoneoftheexperts,
arguingthathewasbiasedbecausehehadpreviously
beenemployedbyoneoftheDefendants.EidsvikJ.
determinedthattheexpert’sformeremploymentwith
oneoftheDefendantsdidnotnecessarilymeanthathis
evidencewasbiasedfortheTrialofthecommonissues.
JusticeEidsvikacceptedtheexpert’sevidence,notingthat
apartyobjectingtotheopinionofanexpertmustraise
theobjectioninadvanceofTrial,andmustnotifytheparty
servingthereport.HerLadyshipnotedthat,althoughRule
5.36doesnotspecificallyrefertoanexpert’squalifications
beingobjectedtoinadvance,asopposedtotheiropinion,
itisstillgoodpracticetomakeanobjectiontoanexpert’s
qualificationsinadvanceofTrial,pursuanttoRule5.36.
EidsvikJ.determinedthatcopyrightcouldanddidexistin
theseismicmaterialsthatwereatissue;however,under
theexistingRegulatoryRegime,theDefendantswere
permittedtodisclosethesematerialsafteracertainamount
oftime,andthereforetheyhadnotbreachedthePlaintiff’s
copyright.
FELDMAN V BENDLE GLASS CO (1975) LTD, 2016 ABQB 219 (LEE J)Rules 6.14 (Appeal from Master’s Judgment or Order) and 7.3 (Summary Judgment)
ThePlaintiffsappealedfromaMaster’sDecisionwhich
grantedtheDefendants’SummaryDismissalApplication.
TheMasterdeterminedthatthePlaintiffshadextensive
knowledgeoftherequisitefactsmorethantwoyearsprior
tocommencingtheirAction,andthatapurportedstandstill
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agreementcouldnotpreservethePlaintiffs’claimssince
itwasenteredintoaftertheexpiryofthelimitationperiod.
JusticeLeereviewedRules6.14and7.3andobserved
that,giventhatthehearingwasde novo,nostandardof
reviewwasapplicable.
ThePlaintiffsfiledtranscriptsoftheproceedingsbeforethe
Masterandtheirnewevidencelate.ThePlaintiffsapplied
toextendtimelines,andJusticeLeeheldthat,although
thePlaintiffs’counselwasnotverydiligentaboutthe
deadlines,nothingprejudicialresultedfromthedelay.
JusticeLeestatedthatRule7.3establishesa“merit
based”testforSummaryJudgmentinAlberta:theCourt
willgrantSummaryJudgmentwherethereisnoissue
ofgenuinemeritrequiringTrial.JusticeLeeconsidered
evidencecontainedinanAffidavitfiledsubsequentto
theMaster’sDecision,filedpursuanttoRule6.14(3),
whichsetoutprima facieevidencethattherewasa
standstillagreementinplace.HisLordshipheldthatthe
issueregardingtheexistenceandscopeofthestandstill
agreementwasanissueoffactwhichshouldbedetermined
atTrial.
JusticeLeenotedthattheApplicationforSummary
JudgmentwasbroughtmanyyearsaftertheStatement
ofClaimwasfiled,andobservedthatatimelyandjust
adjudicationoftheissuesnecessitatedthattheparties
proceedexpeditiouslytoTrial.TheAppealwasallowedand
theSummaryDismissalsetaside.
BUSINESS BLOSSOMS INC V BLOSSOMS FRESH FRUIT ARRANGEMENTS LTD, 2016 ABQB 275 (YAMAUCHI J)Rules 6.14 (Appeal from Master’s Judgment or Order) and 7.3 (Summary Judgment)
BusinessBlossomsInc.(“Business”)appealedthe
dismissalofitsSummaryJudgmentApplication.Business
wasseekingSummaryJudgmentagainstBlossomsFresh
FruitArrangementsLtd.(“FreshFruit”)inrelationtothe
natureoftherelationshipbetweenthepartiesanditsnet
lossesforfailedretailoperations.YamauchiJ.notedthat,
pursuanttoRule6.14,anAppealfromaMaster’sdecision
wasahearingde novoandthestandardofreviewwas
correctness.Further,whenapplyingRule7.3,Summary
Judgmentcouldonlybegrantedtoamovingpartyifthe
non-movingparty’spositionwaswithoutmerit.Inthiscase,
BusinesswasrequiredtoshowthatFreshFruit’sposition
waswithoutmerit,suchthatthefactsandlawmade
Business’sposition“unassailable”and“socompellingthat
thelikelihoodofsuccessisveryhigh”.Whenbalanced
againstSection19oftheFranchise Act,RSA2000cF-23,
theCourtstatedthatFreshFruitfirstboretheonusof
provingonabalanceofprobabilitiesthatthearrangement
betweenitandBusinesswasnota“franchise”.Ifit
succeededinthis,Businesswouldnothavemetitsonus
andtheCourtcouldgrantSummaryJudgmentinitsfavour.
Ifitdidnotsucceedinthis,theCourtwasrequiredtomove
onandconsiderwhetherBusinesscouldmeetthetestfor
SummaryJudgment.Themovingpartywasrequiredto
present“uncontrovertedfactsandlawwhichentitleitto
judgmentagainstthenonmovingparty”.
YamauchiJ.wasunabletodeterminewhetherthe
relationshipbetweenBlossomsandFreshFruitwasa
franchisebasedontheevidencebeforetheCourt.Inthis
case,thereweredisputedfactsandlawthatrequireda
fullTrialoftheissues.TherecordbeforetheCourtdidnot
showthatBusiness’spositionwas“unassailable”andHis
LordshipdismissedtheAppealoftheMaster’sOrder.
LINDE CANADA LIMITED V LUFF INDUSTRIES LTD, 2016 ABQB 298 (WILSON J)Rules 6.14 (Appeal from a Master’s Judgment or Order) and 7.3 (Summary Judgment)
ThePlaintiffappealedfromaMaster’sDecisionwhich
dismisseditsApplicationforSummaryJudgmentas
againsttheDefendant,andrefusedSummaryDismissalof
theDefendant’sCounterclaim.WilsonJ.referredtoRule
6.14whichgovernsappealsofMaster’sdecisions.Justice
Wilsonreviewedtherecordandobservedthatnofurtheror
additionalevidencewasofferedbyeitherparty.
WithrespecttotheSummaryJudgmentApplication,
WilsonJ.notedthat,essentially,thisActionarosefroma
contractualdispute.WilsonJ.foundthattheunderlying
contractwasunclear,andtheMasterwascorrectin
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determiningthatoneoftherealissuesinthecasewas
theexpectationsoftheparties.WilsonJ.agreedthatthere
wasagenuineissueforTrialandsoupheldtheMaster’s
DecisiontorefuseSummaryJudgmentasagainstthe
Defendant.
JusticeWilsonthenconsideredtheappealoftheDecision
whichdeniedSummaryDismissaloftheDefendant’s
Counterclaim.HisLordshipnotedthattheCounterclaim
wasoveramatterofanexclusionaryclauseinthecontract
betweentheparties.Afterreviewingpriorleadingauthority
withrespecttoexclusionaryclauses,WilsonJ.found
thattherewasnoevidencetosupporttheclaimthatthe
exclusionclauseshouldnotbeapplied.WilsonJ.therefore
allowedthePlaintiff’sAppealandgrantedSummary
DismissaloftheCounterclaim.
FELDMAN V BENDLE GLASS CO (1975) LTD, 2016 ABQB 321 (LEE J)Rules 6.14 (Appeal From Master’s Judgment or Order), 10.31 (Court-Ordered Costs Award) and 10.33 (Court Considerations in Making Costs Award)
ThePlaintiffssuccessfullyappealedaSummaryDismissal
decision,soughtCostsfortheAppealandsoughtthe
returnoftheCostsawardedbytheMaster.TheDefendant
condominiumcorporation(therespondentontheAppeal)
arguedthattheCourtshouldnotgrantCostsfortheAppeal
or,alternatively,thatCostsshouldbeinthecause.The
DefendantsubmittedthatareturnoftheCostsawarded
bytheMasterwasnotwarrantedbecauseofthePlaintiffs’
improperAffidavit,admissionsduringQuestioningon
Affidavit,andtheirattempttorelyonevidencenotproperly
beforetheCourt.TheDefendantarguedfurtherthat
thePlaintiffsalsofailedtocomplywiththeprocedural
requirementsofRule6.14attheAppeal.
JusticeLeereferredtoRules10.31and10.33,andthe
Court’sgeneraldiscretiontograntCosts.HisLordship
heldthattheproceduralandevidentiaryirregularitieswere
duetotheconductofthePlaintiffs’formercounseland,
assuch,thePlaintiffsshouldnotbedeniedareturnof
theirCosts.AttheAppeal,theDefendantwaivedallof
theproceduralirregularitieswhenthematterwasheard;
and,theDefendantdidnotsufferanyprejudicefromthe
deficiencies.Therefore,theirregularitieshadminimal
bearingwithrespecttoCosts.ThePlaintiffswereawarded
theirCostsontheAppealandareturnofthethrownaway
CostspreviouslypaidpursuanttotheMaster’sOrder.
ELKOW V SANA, 2016 ABQB 235 (GRAESSER J)Rules 6.37 (Notice to Admit) and 7.3 (Summary Judgment)
OneoftheDefendantsinadefamationAction,Ms.Sana,
appliedtosettlethetermsofaJudgmentfollowinga
SummaryJudgmentApplication.GraesserJ.hadgranted
SummaryJudgmentofsomeofthePlaintiff’sclaims,
andhadissuedasupplementalDecisionwithrespectto
damages.Ms.SanaobjectedtothesupplementalDecision,
arguingthatanassessmentofdamagesshouldnothave
beenremoved.Ms.Sanaalsoarguedthattheformal
JudgmentshouldclarifythattheclaimsforwhichSummary
Judgmentwerenotgrantedshouldbeexpresslydismissed.
GraesserJ.statedthat,generallyspeaking,aPlaintiffwho
appliesforSummaryJudgmentandfailsisnotatriskof
theirActionbeingdismissed.Similarly,aDefendantwho
bringsaSummaryDismissalApplicationandfailswillnot,
asaresult,haveJudgmententeredagainstthem.Graesser
J.thereforedeclinedtoexpresslydismissthoseclaims
whichremainedextantafterSummaryJudgment.
ThePlaintiffhadarguedthattherewasadeemedadmission
ofliabilitybyMs.SanabecauseaReplytoNoticetoAdmit
Factscontainedonlyabaredenialofthefactswhichthe
PlaintiffarguedwasnotmadeinaccordancewithRule
6.37(3)(a).ThePlaintiffarguedthattheRulerequiresthat
adenialtoaNoticetoAdmitFacts“setoutindetailthe
reasonswhythefactcannotbeadmitted”.JusticeGraesser
consideredthisatechnicalbutfairargument.However,
HisLordshipheldthatitwasinappropriatetodetermine
issuesofdefamationandmaliceonthebasisofadeemed
admissionwhichresultedfrom“imperfectcompliance”
withtheRulesrelatingtoNoticestoAdmit.
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336239 ALBERTA LTD (DAVE’S DIESEL REPAIR) V MELLA, 2016 ABQB 190 (SHELLEY J)Rules 7.3 (Summary Judgment) and 9.24 (Fraudulent Preferences and Fraudulent Conveyances)
ThePlaintiffobtainedaConsentJudgmentasagainst
theDefendantsandsubsequentlylearnedthatoneofthe
Defendantshadbeenusinghiswife’sbankaccountto
divertfundsthatwouldotherwisebesubjecttoenforcement
proceedings.ThePlaintiffsoughtJudgmentagainstthe
Defendant’swife,whowasnotapartytotheAction.The
PlaintiffarguedthattheFraudulent Preferences Act,RSA
2000,cF-24,ortheStatute of Elizabeth,13ElizI,C-5
(UK)allowedforaJudgmentagainstanon-partyrecipient
ofassetswhonolongerhadpossessionoftheassetsand
receivedlittleornobenefitfromthem.
ShelleyJ.notedthatRule9.24onlypermittedtheCourt
toorderanon-partytoanActionwhoreceivedwrongfully
conveyedpropertytosellthatpropertytopaythedebt
owedpursuanttotheAction.TheStatute of Elizabethdid
notgivethePlaintifftherighttodamagesorcompensation
asthatstatuteonlyallowedtheCourttosetasidea
conveyance.Further,asthePlaintiffdidnotbringan
ApplicationforSummaryJudgmentunderRule7.3,the
CourtwasnotpermittedtograntJudgmentagainstthe
Defendant’swifeasanon-party.
Afterexaminingtheimpugnedtransactions,theCourt
concludedthattherewasafraudulentconveyancebythe
Defendanttohiswife;therefore,thePlaintiffwasrequired
tocommenceanActionagainsttheDefendant’swife,since
Rule9.24andtheStatute of Elizabethonlyprovidedfor
seizingandsellingthetransferredasset.
1059028 ALBERTA LTD V CAPIO OILFIELD SERVICES LTD, 2016 ABQB 234 (MASTER SCHULZ)Rules 7.3 (Summary Judgment) and 13.18 (Types of Affidavit)
TheDefendantsappliedforSummaryDismissalon
thebasisthatthePlaintiffs’claimswerebasedonan
unenforceableRestrictiveCovenantinanagreement
betweentheparties.ThePlaintiffscross-appliedseeking
adeclarationthattheRestrictiveCovenantwasvalidand
enforceable.
ThePlaintiffsarguedthattheApplicationforSummary
JudgmentshouldbedismissedbecausetheDefendants’
Affidavitdidnotcontainastatementswearingpositively
thattherewasnomerittotheClaim.MasterSchulznoted
that,becauseaSummaryJudgmentApplicationmay
disposeofallorpartofaClaim,Rule13.18(3)applies.It
requiresthattheAffiantsweartheAffidavitbasedonhis
orherpersonalknowledge.MasterSchulzstatedthat“the
magicwordsarenotnecessary,butevidenceonpersonal
knowledgeisnecessary”.TheAffiant’sroleistoprovide
theCourtwiththeevidencerequiredtoformanopinion
ontheissuesinquestion.Thepresenceorabsenceofa
declarationthataclaimordefencehasnomeritwillnot
haveanybearingonanApplicationforSummaryJudgment.
MasterSchulzheldthattheRestrictiveCovenantwasvalid
andenforceableanddismissedtheDefendants’Application
forSummaryJudgment.
ALBERTA V GRETER, 2016 ABQB 293 (MASTER SCHULZ)Rule 7.3 (Summary Judgment)
AfterreceivingherPhD,theDefendantfailedtorepay
herstudentloansfromtheGovernmentofAlbertainthe
amountofoversixtythousanddollars.ThePlaintiffargued
thattheDefendanthadbreachedtheloancontract,and
theyappliedforSummaryJudgmentpursuanttoRule7.3
onthebasisthattheDefendanthadnorealdefencetothe
claim.MasterSchulzobservedthattheDefendanthadused
some“freemanontheland”tactics,andhadalsoinformed
thePlaintiffthatshewouldnotbeattendingtheSummary
JudgmentApplication.TheDefendanthadalsomade
argumentswhichtheCourtshavereferredtoas“Organized
PseudolegalCommercialArguments”(“OPCA”).
TheDefendanthaddelivereddocumentstothePlaintiff
whichunilaterallyimposedseveraltermsandobligationson
thePlaintiff.MasterSchulzdeterminedthattheDefendant
hadnobasisinlawtomakeanyofthedemandsorto
imposeanyobligationsontheDefendant.Further,Master
SchulzheldthattheDefendant’spositionwascontractually
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WAQUAN V CANADA (ATTORNEY GENERAL), 2016 ABQB 280 (WITTMANN CJ)Rule 9.13 (Re-Opening Case)
WittmannC.J.reservedJudgmentinWaquan v Canada
(Attorney General),2016ABQB191,and,priortowritten
reasonsbeingissued,theFederalCourtissuedaDecision
inasimilarcase.CounselforseveralofthePlaintiffsasked
WittmannC.J.toreconsidertheearlierJudgmentinlightof
theFederalCourtDecision.HisLordshipnotedthatwhile
Rule9.13representsanexpansionofjudicialdiscretion
ascomparedwithitspredecessor,Rule339whichmerely
providedforcorrectionofclericalmistakesorerrorsarising
fromaccidents,slips,oromissions,discretionunderRule
9.13isnotboundless.TakingRule1.2intoaccountand
theprinciplesoffairness,justice,andefficiencywhichare
setoutinthatFoundationalRule,Rule9.13allowsthe
Courttocorrectaplainandmanifesterror,butdoesnot
permitparties“anotherkickatthecan”.
WittmannC.J.deniedtherequestforareconsiderationof
theJudgment,notingthattheFederalCourtDecisionwas
notbindingauthority.Theexistenceofacontrary,non-
bindingDecisionisaninsufficientgroundtoshowaplain
andmanifesterror.Further,theFederalCourtDecision
offerednonewanalysisforthecircumstancesintheinstant
caseanddidnot,contrarytotheargumentofPlaintiff’s
counsel,“cometotheexactoppositeconclusion”.
POLOMA INVESTMENTS LTD V YUEN, 2016 ABCA 93 (SLATTER, MCDONALD AND BIELBY JJA)Rule 9.15 (Setting Aside, Varying and Discharging Judgments and Orders)
ThePlaintiffsappealedaDecisionwhichsetasidea
DefaultJudgmentagainsttheDefendant,Yuen.TheCourt
notedthataDefaultJudgmentmaybesetasideincertain
circumstances,includingwherenonoticeoftheClaim
wasreceivedbytheDefendantpursuanttoRules9.15(1)
(b)and(3)(c)oftheRules.ThePlaintiffsarguedthat
thereisarequirementthattheApplicantseekingtoset
asideaDefaultJudgmentmustshow,notonlythatthe
documentwasnotservedonthem,butthattheydidnot
knowofthedocumentandthatthedocument’scontents
andlegallywrong,andthatshehadnodefencetothe
government’sactiontoenforcetheoutstandingstudent
loandebts.MasterSchultzawardedSummaryJudgmentin
favourofthePlaintiff.
CLEAR HILLS DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION V HORSEMAN, 2016 ABQB 341 (ROSS J)Rules 7.3 (Summary Judgment) and 13.18 (Types of Affidavit) and Schedule C
TheDefendantsappliedforSummaryDismissalof
theclaimagainstthembythePlaintiff,ClearHills
DevelopmentCorporation.TheDefendantshadbroughta
priorApplicationin2014tosummarilydismisstheclaim.
RossJ.dismissedtheearlierApplication,asitdidnot
meetthetestforSummaryDismissal,andsuggestedthat
theSummaryTrialRulemighteventuallybeemployedto
disposeofsomeoftheissues.TheDefendantsarguedthat
thesubsequentApplicationwasappropriatebecausethe
lawhaddevelopedsincethe2014SummaryDismissal
Application.
TheCourtagreedthatthelawpertainingtoSummary
Dismissalhaddevelopedsincethe2014Application;
specifically,RossJ.notedthe6stepprocessforSummary
JudgmentApplicationsformulatedbyMasterSchlosserin
1214777 Alberta Ltd v 480955 Alberta Ltd,2014ABQB
301.JusticeRossexaminedtheparties’evidenceusing
the6stepanalysis,andbasedonthelackofevidence
frombothparties,amongotherdeficiencies,dismissedthe
SummaryJudgmentApplication.
ThePlaintiffsoughtsolicitorandclientCostsorenhanced
CostsonthegroundsthattheApplicationwasessentiallya
repeatofthe2014Applicationandthatitwasres judicata.
RossJ.heldthattheApplicationwasnotres judicata,
asthe2014ApplicationdidnotresultinafinalOrder.
Additionally,theCourtwasnotpreparedtocharacterizethe
Applicationasanabuseofprocess.TheCourtawardedthe
PlaintiffCostsbasedonColumn4ofScheduleC,payable
forthwith.
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didnototherwisecometotheirattention.TheCourtnoted
thattheestablishedcommonlawtestforsettingasidea
DefaultJudgmentunderpriorRule158,nowRule9.15(3),
directedthataCourtmaysetasideorvaryanyJudgment
enteredondefaultortocommitaDefencetobefiledbya
partywhohasbeennotedindefault.
TheCourtconcludedthattherewasevidencebeforethe
ChambersJudgewhichallowedaninferencetobedrawn
thattheRespondenthadnoknowledgeoftheClaimmade
againsthim.Further,hepromptlylaunchedtheApplication
toSetAsideoncehewasservedwiththeresultingDefault
JudgmentandidentifiedanarguabledefencetotheAction.
NoevidenceofprejudicewasadvancedbytheAppellants.
Intheresult,theAppealwasdismissed.
GEOPHYSICAL SERVICE INCORPORATED V ENCANA CORPORATION, 2016 ABQB 229 (STREKAF J)Rules 10.29 (General Rule for Payment of Litigation Costs), 10.31 (Court-Ordered Costs Award) and 10.33 (Court Considerations in Making Costs Award)
AMastergrantedtwenty-sixOrdersforSecurityforCosts
asagainstthePlaintiff,andthePlaintiffappealed.The
combinedamountofSecurityorderedtobepostedbythe
Masterwasreducedby$431,655.75,butthesuccesson
theAppealwasmixed.ThepartiesappearedbeforeJustice
StrekaftoobtainadirectionwithrespecttoCosts.
JusticeStrekafreferredtoRules10.29and10.31,stating
thattheCourthasdiscretioninorderingCosts,andthat
Rule10.33providesthefactorstheCourtshouldconsider.
Here,therelevantconsiderationsincludedthat:(i)thecase
involvedmultiplepartiesparticipatingontheAppealin
numerousActions;(ii)theamountinissueontheAppeal
was$1.9million;(iii)successwasmixed;(iv)theissue
wasamatterofconsiderableimportancetoallparties;(v)
theAppealraisedsomenovelarguments;(vi)therewas
cooperationamongcounselwhichallowedtheAppealto
proceedefficiently;and(vii)therewasnomisconduct
whichwouldjustifyaCostspenalty.StrekafJ.heldthat
theparties’proposalsastoCostswereunreasonable,and
assuch,HerLadyshipapportionedlessthanwhatwas
requested.
ET V ROCKY MOUNTAIN PLAY THERAPY INSTITUTE INC, 2016 ABQB 299 (STREKAF J)Rules 10.29 (General Rule for Payment of Litigation Costs), 10.31 (Court-Ordered Costs Award) and 10.33 (Court Considerations in Making Costs Award) and Schedule C
FollowingtheAppealofaMaster’sDecisioninwhichthe
Defendantwassuccessful,StrekafJ.heardtheparties’
submissionswithrespecttoCosts.TheDefendant,Mr.
Kwan,requestedsolicitorandclientCostsinanunspecified
amountor,inthealternative,fivetimesColumnCinthe
amountof$30,000.JusticeStrekafnotedthatRules
10.29and10.31providethatCostsareintheCourt’s
discretion,havingregardtotheconsiderationsoutlinedin
Rule10.33.
Despitetheallegationsbytheself-representedPlaintiffE.T.
being“highlyinflammatory”andnotrelevanttotheissues
beforetheMasterorintheAppeal,StrekafJ.declinedto
awardsolicitorandclientCosts.HerLadyshipnotedthat
suchCostsarereservedforexceptionalcircumstancesof
reprehensible,scandalous,oroutrageousconduct;were
inappropriatetoawardatthisstage;andoughttobeleftto
thediscretionoftheTrialJudge.However,StrekafJ.held
thatenhancedCostsshouldbeawardedgiventhatserious
allegationsofimproprietywereunsuccessfullyadvancedby
thePlaintiff.HerLadyshipawardedthreetimesthetaxable
ColumnCcosts,being$18,000.
VOISEY V CANADA (ATTORNEY GENERAL), 2016 ABQB 316 (CRIGHTON J)Rule 10.29 (General Rule for Payment of Litigation Costs) and Schedule C
TheApplicant,aprisonerattheBowdenInstitution,applied
unsuccessfullyforhabeas corpusfollowinganinvoluntary
transferfromtheminimumsecurityGriersonInstitution
toBowdenInstitution,amediumsecurityfacility.The
AttorneyGeneralsoughtCostsoftheApplicationbased
onthepresumptionunderRule10.29thatthesuccessful
partyinacivilproceedingisentitledtotheirCosts.The
ApplicantarguedthatheshouldnotbeforcedtopayCosts
forenforcinghisrights,andthathewasimpecunious.
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awardedthePlaintiffCostscalculatedusingthedraftBill
ofCostspreparedbyPlaintiff’scounsel,exceptforthefee
amountunderColumn5whichwasdoubled.
TURNER V BELL MOBILITY INC, 2016 ABCA 188 (BERGER, WATSON AND ROWBOTHAM JJA)Rules 10.29 (General Rule for Payment of Litigation Costs), 10.32 (Costs in Class Proceeding), 10.33 (Court Considerations in Making Costs Award) and 14.88 (Cost Awards) and Schedule C
FollowingasuccessfulAppealinaClassAction,the
Defendantcommunicationcompaniesarguedthatthey
wereentitledtoCostsoftheAppealandCostsfromthe
proceedingsintheCourtbelow.
TheCourtreiteratedthatithadjurisdictiontovary
TrialCostsasaresultofasuccessfulAppealinclass
proceedingspursuanttos.37oftheClass Proceedings
Act,RSA2000cC-16.5andRule10.32.TheCourt
notedthatRule10.32allowstheCourttoconsideraccess
tojusticeissuesinawardingCostsinclassproceedings.
TheCourtconsideredthefactorsoutlinedinRule10.33,
andawardedamultiplierof1.5timesScheduleCforthe
AppealandTrialleveltotheDefendants.Accesstojustice
considerationspersuadedtheCourttorejectlevyinga
“sanction”ofgreatlyenhancedCosts,despitenotingthat
ScheduleCCostshadnotbeenupdatedinsome20years
andthelawsuitwaspotentiallyworthbillionsofdollars.
WAYMARKER MANAGEMENT (SILVER CREEK) INC V TIBU, 2016 ABCA 118 (BERGER, WATSON AND O’FERRALL JJA)Rule 10.31 (Court-Ordered Costs Award)
TheAppellantandtheRespondentswereinvolvedina
disputewhichresultedinaRestrainingOrderagainst
theAppellant.TheTrialJudgeawardedCoststothe
Respondents,despitethefactthattheRespondents’
counselatTrialwasalsotheRespondentCompany’ssole
directorandmajorityshareholder.OnAppeal,theAppellant
arguedthatCostsshouldnothavebeenawardedin
counsel’sowncause.However,theCourtofAppealrejected
CrightonJ.notedthatthedefaultpositionforthequantum
ofcostsforanapplicationwithnomonetaryvalueis
basedonColumn1ofScheduleC,butthatsection8
oftheSchedulecontemplatesanenhancedcostsaward
wherethesubjectmatteriscomplex.TheApplicant
wasentirelyunsuccessful,andhadfiledvoluminous
applicationmaterialswhichwere“notparticularlywell
focused”.Further,JusticeCrightonfoundtheApplication
tohavebeenmeritless,whichraisedtheconcernthat
the“unrestricteduseofhabeas corpusbyincarcerated
individualsrisksunwarrantedandexpensivelitigationpaid
outofthetaxpayers’purse”.TheAttorneyGeneralwas
awardedcostsof$1,000.
MILAVSKY V MILAVSKY ESTATE, 2016 ABQB 347 (MAHONEY J)Rule 10.29 (General Rule for Payment of Litigation Costs) and Schedule C
TheDefendantsunsuccessfullyappliedforSummary
DismissalofthePlaintiff’sAction.ThePlaintiffapplied
foranOrderforpaymentof60%oftheCoststhatshe
incurred.ThePlaintiffsubmittedthatanawardofCosts
pursuanttoScheduleCwouldbeinadequatebecause
Column5onlyentitledhertolessthan5%oftheactual
feesincurred.TheDefendantsarguedthatCostsshouldbe
determinedbytheTrialJudgefollowingTrial.
TheCourtfirstnotedthatitwaswellestablishedthat
Costswereawardedontheassumptionthatawinning
partydeservedcompensationforlegalcosts,butthat
fullindemnityoflegalfeescouldsignificantlyhampera
party’saccesstojustice.WhileCostsconsequenceswere
aneffectivemechanismforcontrollinglitigation,notall
unsuccessfulcaseswerewithoutmerit;therefore,aparty
shouldnotbeundulypunishedforbringingalosingAction.
MahoneyJ.heldthatCostsonindemnitybasiswerenot
justifiedbasedontheApplicationbeingcomplexornovel.
Nonetheless,theApplicationrequiredextensiveresearch
andpreparation.HisLordshipheldthat,whiletheSummary
JudgmentApplicationwasnotanabuseofprocess,the
Plaintiffwassuccessfulindefendingagainstacomplexand
voluminousApplication.Onthisbasis,JusticeMahoney
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RO V DF, 2016 ABCA 170 (COSTIGAN, PAPERNY AND ROWBOTHAM JJA)Rules 10.52 (Declaration of Civil Contempt) and 14.45 (Application to Admit New Evidence)
TheAppellant,R.O.,appealedtwoOrdersofaCase
ManagementJudgewhichdeclaredtheAppellanta
vexatiouslitigantandheldherincontemptofCourtfor
failingtocomplywithtworestrictedCourtAccessOrders.
TheAppellantalsobroughtthreeApplicationstoadmitnew
evidence.
TheCourtofAppealnotedthat,underRule10.52(3),a
findingofcontemptrequiredthatthepersonknowthat
theyhadbreachedaCourtOrderwiththeburdenofproof
forsuchafindingbeingbeyondareasonabledoubt.The
CaseManagementJudgeheldthattherewasnoevidence
whichraisedareasonabledoubtthattheAppellantwas
responsibleforbreachingtheRestrictedAccessOrders.In
responsetothisfinding,theAppellantsoughttoadduce
newevidenceonappeal.Inthisinstance,thebulkofthe
newevidenceconsistedofanExpert’sReportandthe
supportingAffidavitsforthatReport.TheCourtconcluded
thattheExpert’sReportcouldnotbeadmittedbecauseit
didnotmeetthecriteriasetoutinR v Palmer[1980]1
SCR759,andnoinjusticewouldarisefromadecisionnot
toadmitit.WhiletheAppellantsubmittedthattimeand
expensepreventedherfromobtainingtheReportearlier,
theCourtnotedthatshedidnotrequestanadjournmentof
theApplicationand,further,theReportcontainednonew
evidence.ThepurposeoftheReportwastocorroborate
orbolsterevidencethatwasbeforetheCaseManagement
Judge.TheCourtnotedthattheappellateprocesscouldnot
be“routinelyusedtoaugmentthetrialrecord”;therefore,
theApplicationstoadmitnewevidenceweredismissed.
Further,theCourtnotedthatthepenaltyimposedbythe
JudgeinstrikingtheStatementofClaimwasareasonable
exerciseoftheCourt’sdiscretion.
WithrespecttotheVexatiousLitigantOrder,theCourtof
AppealnotedthatthereasonsforgrantingtheOrderwere
focusedonthisActionagainsttheRespondent.TheCourt
ofAppealheldthattheOrderwastoobroadinthatthere
wasinsufficientevidencetosupportafindingthatthe
thisargument,holdingthattheTrialJudgehadbroad
discretiontoawardCostspursuanttoRule10.31(5).The
AppealagainsttheCostsawardwasdismissedaccordingly.
MA V COYNE, 2016 ABCA 119 (MARTIN, ROWBOTHAM AND O’FERRALL JJA)Rules 10.31 (Court Ordered Costs Award), 10.41 (Assessment Officer’s Decision) and 14.88 (Costs Awards)
TheDefendantsappealedfromaChambersJudge’s
DecisionallowinganOrderwhichawardedinterpreters’
feesincurredbeforeaStatementofClaimwasfiled.An
AssessmentOfficerhadallowedthefees.TheAssessment
wasappealedtotheCourtofQueen’sBench,anda
ChambersJudgedismissedtheAppeal.TheDefendants
appealedtotheCourtofAppeal.
TheCourtofAppealnotedthatmostcasesdecided
underpriorRule600concludedthatpre-commencement
disbursementswerenotrecoverable.However,thewording
ofthenewRulesisverydifferent.Rule10.31permitsa
CourtofQueen’sBenchJudgetoawardreasonableand
properCoststhatapartyincurredtofileanApplicationor
commenceproceedings.Foraddedclarity,Rule10.31(2)(a)
statesthatthisincludes“reasonableandpropercoststhat
apartyincurredtobringanaction”.TheCourtfurthernoted
thatRule10.41grantsanAssessmentOfficerjurisdiction
to“determinewhetherthecoststhatapartyincurredto
fileanapplicationortakeproceedingsarereasonableand
propercosts”.Rule10.41(2)(a)furtherclarifiesthat“costs
ofapartyundersubrule(1)includethereasonableand
propercoststhatapartyincurredtobringanaction”.
TheCourtheldthatthepre-commencementinterpreters’
feeswerereasonableandproperCostsascontemplatedby
Rules10.31and10.41.TheAppealwasdismissedandthe
CourtawardedtheRespondentstheirCostsinaccordance
withRule14.88.
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KE V CSM, 2016 ABQB 342 (BROWNE J)Rule 14.5 (Appeals Only With Permission)
Inafamilylawdispute,KEappealedanOrderfromthe
ProvincialCourtwhichdeniedheraccesstochildrenborn
fromvariousrelationships.KEwasthesubjectofanOrder
fromtheProvincialCourtrestrictingheraccesstoProvincial
Courtprocesses.
JusticeBrownenotedthatRule14.5(1)(j)requiresaperson
whoissubjecttoavexatiouslitigantOrdertoobtainleave
toappeal,andthatdenialofleaveisfinal.Accordingto
priorleadingauthorities,thisleaverequirementapplies
toanyvexatiouslitigantdeclarationmadeunderthe
Judicature Act,RSA2000,cJ-2,theFamily Law Act,
SA2003,cF-4.5,orunderasuperiorCourt’sinherent
jurisdiction.Inthiscase,KEwasonlyrestrictedfrom
activitiesintheProvincialCourtofAlberta,andtherefore
herApplicationtoappealtheProvincialCourt’sOrder
wasnotsubjecttoavexatiouslitigantOrder.BrowneJ.
consideredthesubstanceofKE’sAppealoftheProvincial
CourtDecision,andreturnedthemattertotheProvincial
Courtforconsiderationofmaterialswhichwouldberelevant
toanApplicationforleavetoappeal.
SETTLEMENT LENDERS INC V BLICHARZ, 2016 ABCA 109 (ROWBOTHAM JA)Rules 14.5 (Appeals Only With Permission), 14.47 (Application to Restore an Appeal) and 14.65 (Restoring Appeals)
TheApplicant,Blicharz,soughtleavetoAppealaprior
DecisionwhichdeniedherApplicationtosetasidea
DefaultJudgment.TheApplicant’sfilingofaNoticeof
Appealwasoutoftimebyfourmonths,andherAppealwas
eventuallystruckforfailuretofiletheAppealRecordina
timelyfashion.ShethenbroughtanApplicationtorestore
theAppealorextendthedeadlinetofiletheAppealRecord.
ThatApplicationwasdismissedduetosignificantdelayand
alackofarguablemeritoftheAppeal.
JusticeRowbothamstatedthatanAppealofthedismissal
requiredleavepursuanttoRule14.5.HerLadyshipnoted
thatthetestforleavetoAppealisthatpermissioncan
Appellanthadahistoryof“’persistently’engaginginany
oftheprohibitedactions”againstanyoneotherthanthe
Respondent.Basedonthisfinding,theCourtofAppeal
variedtheOrdertospecificallyrequirethattheAppellant
seekleavetotheCourtbeforecommencingortaking
anystepsinlitigationagainsttheRespondentandthose
associatedwithhim.
IBU V LAH, 2016 ABCA 108 (SLATTER JA)Rules 13.4 (Counting Months and Years), 14.4 (Right to Appeal), 14.8 (Filing a Notice of Appeal), 14.14 (Fast Track Appeals), 14.16 (Filing the Appeal Record – Standard Appeals), 14.17 (Filing the Appeal Record - Fast Track Appeals), 14.24 (Filing factums – Fast Track Appeals) and 14.27 (Filing Extracts of Key Evidence)
TheAppellant(“IBU”)appliedtopermitthelatefiling
ofhisAppeal.TheDecisionbeingappealedfromwas
pronouncedonFebruary9,2016,whichprovidedfora
filingdeadlineofMarch9,2016inaccordancewithRule
13.4(1).IBUattemptedtofiletheAppealonthatdate,
butwasunabletodosobecauseofsomeuncertaintyasto
whetherhewasentitledtohavethefilingfeewaived.On
March10,2016,hereturnedwithdocumentationclarifying
hisentitlementtowaiverofthefilingfee.Rule14.8(2)(a)
(iii)requirestheAppealtobefiledwithin“onemonth”,so
thefilingwasonedaylate.
JusticeSlatternotedthattheAppealwasbroughtpursuant
tosection21oftheDivorceAct,RSC1985,c3(2nd
Supp),whichrequiresfilingwithin“30days”.Rule14.8(2)
(a)(i)recognizesthetimelinessetoutinanotherenactment
forfilinganAppeal.BecausetheDecisionwasrenderedin
February,whichhasonly29days,technicallytheAppellant
wasnotlateinfilingtheAppealandnoextensionoftime
wasrequired.JusticeSlattersetoutnewdeadlines,as
theAppealwasaFastTrackAppealunderRule14.14(2)
(b),andstatedthattheRespondent’smaterialswere
requiredtobefiledinaccordancewithRules14.24(1)(b)
and14.27(3).HisLordshipdirectedthat,ifthedeadlines
werenotmet,thentheAppealwouldbestruckunderRule
14.16(3).
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Themainissuebeforethepanelwaswhetherthe
Respondentrequiredpermissiontoappealpursuantto
Rule14.5(1)(g),whichstatesthatmatterswherethe
controversyintheappealcanbeestimatedinmoneyand
doesnotexceedthesumof$25,000exclusiveofcosts
cannotbeappealedunlesspermissiontoappealhasbeen
obtainedfromtheCourt.Inthiscase,thedollaramountof
thedamageswaswellwithinthe$25,000limit.However,
thepanelheldthatthe“matterincontroversy”inthiscase
wasaboutmorethanmoney.Itwasappropriatetoconsider
theextentthattheJudgmentunderappealaffectedthe
interestofthepartyprejudicedbyit.Here,theRespondent
contendedthattheChambersJudgeerredonwhetherthere
wasadebtatall–anditisthefactofadebt,regardless
ofthedollaramount,thatwouldgiverisetotherightto
fileaCaveatandtocommenceforeclosureproceedings.
TheApplicationtodismisstheAppealwasaccordingly
dismissed.
BARRY V INSTITUTE OF CHARTERED ACCOUNTANTS OF ALBERTA (COMPLAINTS INQUIRY COMMITTEE), 2016 ABCA 89 (WAKELING JA)Rules 14.15 (Ordering the Appeal Record), 14.16 (Filing the Appeal Record – Standard Appeals), 14.20 (Contents of Appeal Record – Appeals from Tribunals), 14.47 (Application to Restore an Appeal), 14.64 (Failure to Meet Deadlines) and 14.65 (Restoring Appeals)
ThePlaintiff’sAppealwasstruckpursuanttoRules
14.16(3)and14.64(a)forfailingtofiletheAppealRecord
intime.CounselforthePlaintiffsubsequentlypresented
aproposedcopyoftheAppealRecordtotheClerk,which
confirmedthattherecordswereinproperform.The
PlaintiffApplicantthensoughttorestorehisAppeal,
pursuanttoRule14.47,andfiledanAffidavitwhichset
outthereasonswhyhefailedtofileontime.WakelingJ.A.
referredtoRules14.15(1),14.16(3),14.20(1),14.47(a),
14.64(a)and14.65(3)statingthatanAppealmaybe
restoredwhenitisintheinterestsofjusticetodoso.The
CourtwillconsidersuchthingsaswhethertheApplicant
intendedtoprosecutetheAppeal;providedanexplanation
forthedeficiency;movedwithsufficientexpediencytocure
thedefect;hasarguablegroundsinsupportofanAppeal;
andhascausedanyprejudicetotheRespondent.
begrantediftheApplicantestablishesthatthereis:a
questionofgeneralimportance;apossibleerroroflaw;an
unreasonableexerciseofdiscretion;oramisapprehension
ofimportantfacts.
RowbothamJ.A.foundthattherewasnoquestionof
generalimportance,noerroroflaw,andnounreasonable
exerciseofdiscretion,emphasizingtheApplicant’s
delinquencyinfollowingproceduralRules.TheApplicant
contendedthatshedidnotreceivelegaladviceatthe
timesheenteredintotheagreementswhichwerethe
subjectoftheoriginallitigation,andthefailuretoconsider
thisconstitutedamisapprehensionofimportantfacts.
RowbothamJ.A.heldthattheApplicanthadhadlegal
advicebothduringthepresentAppealandintheCourt
below.RowbothamJ.A.alsoreiteratedthatthetestfor
restorationunderRule14.47andthetestforextension
oftimetofileanAppealbothrequireconsiderationofthe
factorsofdelayandarguablemeritoftheAppeal.The
Applicationforleavewasaccordinglydenied.
CONDOMINIUM CORPORATION NO 0311443 V GOERTZ, 2016 ABCA 167 (PAPERNY, ROWBOTHAM AND VELDHUIS JJA)Rules 14.5 (Appeals Only With Permission) and 14.38 (Court of Appeal Panels)
TheApplicants,acondominiumcorporationand
condominiummanagementcompany,filedcaveatsagainst,
andsoughtCourtOrderstoforecloseonpropertiesfor
whichcondominiumfeeswerenotpaid.Theindividual
RespondentarguedthathedidnotowetheApplicants
anything,andthereforetheCaveatsandproposed
foreclosureOrderswerebaseless.TheRespondentalso
counterclaimedfor$200,000forgeneralandpunitive
damages,aswellasout-of-pocketexpenses.TheChambers
JudgesummarilydismissedtheCounterclaim,andordered
theRespondenttopaydamagesof$1,562.62plusCosts.
TheRespondentappealed,andtheApplicantsappliedto
striketheAppeal.TheApplicationwasinitiallybrought
beforeasingleJusticeoftheCourtofAppeal,whodirected
theApplicationtobeheardbyapanel,asonlyapanel
may“allowordismissanappealonthemerits”underRule
14.38(1)(a).
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evidencecouldhavebeenadducedatTrialiftheparties
exercisedduediligence.Second,theevidencemustbe
relevanttoadecisiveissueintheTrial.Third,theevidence
mustbecredibleandfourth,theevidencecouldreasonably
beexpectedtohaveaffectedtheresult.TheCourtadded
that,inapplyingthePalmertest,theymustconsider
whetherthe“proposedevidenceisorwouldbeadmissible
underanyrulesoflawapplicabletoitsnature,itssource,
itscontinuity”,and“itsbalanceofprobativeforceagainst
prejudicialeffect”.
TheMajoritynotedthattheAppellanthadnotcomplied
withRule14.45inthathedidnotfileaNoticeof
ApplicationbeforetheCourttointroducethefresh
evidence,nordidheprovideanAffidavitattestingto
compliancewiththePalmerfactors.Giventhesefailings,
theCourtheldthattheApplicant’sfreshevidencefailed
thethresholdrequirementsetoutinPalmer.TheCourt
thenconsideredtheRespondents’Applicationtoadduce
freshevidenceoftheApplicant’s“mischief”inpresenting
documentssuggestinghehadfiledachangeofaddress
withtheCourt.TheMajorityheldthatthisevidencemet
thePalmerrequirementsandclearlyestablishedthatthe
Appellant’sevidencewaseithernotprovidedatallprior
toAppeal,orwasalteredtomakeitappearasthough
theAppellantprovidedhisnewaddresstotheCourt.The
Majorityaddedthatbeingaself-representedlitigantdidnot
excusetheAppellant’sfailuretocomplywiththeRulesand
theAppealwasdismissed.
Indissent,MartinJ.A.focusedontheAppellantbeing
aself-representedlitigantwhocouldreasonablyhave
expectedtoreceiveasignificantawardofdamages.
MartinJ.A.opinedthatdismissingtheAppellant’sclaim
insuchcircumstanceswasasignificantlydisproportionate
consequenceforfailingtofileachangeofaddresswiththe
Court.MartinJ.A.wouldhaveallowedtheAppealonthe
basisthatdismissaloftheActionwasexcessivelypunitive.
JusticeWakelingheldthattheAppealshouldbe
restored:thePlaintiffhaddemonstratedaclearintent
toprosecutetheAppeal;theerrorwasduetocounsel’s
misunderstandingthattheAppealtribunalwould
commencepreparationoftherecordofproceedings;the
Plaintiffappliedpromptlytorestore;theAppealwasnot
frivolous;andtherewasnoprejudicetotheRespondent.
PINTEA V JOHNS, 2016 ABCA 99 (MARTIN, MCDONALD AND VELDHUIS JJA)Rule 14.45 (Application to Admit New Evidence)
TheAppellantwasaPlaintiffinanActionarisingfroman
automobileaccident.TheActionwasunderthedirectionof
CaseManagementandinMay2014,theCaseManagement
JudgedirectedthePlaintifftoproducehiswitnesslist
andcomplywithproceduralrequirementsforTrial.InJuly
2014,thePlaintiffmoved,butfailedtofileachangeof
addresswiththeCourtandsubsequentlyfailedtoattend
furtherApplicationsandCaseManagementmeetings.
WhenthePlaintifffailedtoappearataCaseManagement
meetinginJanuary2015,theCourtheldhimincontempt
andtheStatementofClaimwasstruck.ThisfinalOrder
wasalsoservedonthePlaintiff’sformeraddress,but
thePlaintiffbecameawareoftheOrderwhenitwasalso
emailedtohim.
ThePlaintiffappealedtheOrderandbothpartiessought
toadducefreshevidence.ThemajorityoftheCourtnoted
thatthePlaintiff’sFactumdidnotclearlystatehisgrounds
ofappeal,butnotedthatheappearedtoarguethatthe
ApplicationdocumentsfortheCaseManagementhearing
wereservedonhimimproperlyathisformeraddress.The
RespondentssubmittedthattheAppellantonlyraised
thenewaddressonAppeal.TheMajorityappliedthe
fourparttestfromR v Palmer,[1980]1SCR759,when
determiningwhetherornottoadmitfreshevidence.Under
thePalmertest,theCourtmustconsiderfirst,whetherthe
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