jp 3_13_1 joint doctrine command and control warfare (c2w)

Joint Doctrine forCommand and Control

Warfare (C2W)

Joint Pub 3-13.1

7 February 1996

PREFACE

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1. Scope

a. This publication concentrates oncommand and control warfare (C2W) and isnot intended to present comprehensivedoctrine for the broader concept ofinformation warfare (IW). It introduces anddefines IW in general terms with the objectiveof clarifying its overarching relationship toC2W. The scope of C2W is defined in theChairman of the Joint Chiefs of StaffMemorandum of Policy 30, but the fulldimensions of IW policy and itsimplementation are still emerging.

b. This publication provides guidelines forintegrating C2W into joint military operationsand exercises by addressing the followingdoctrinal areas:

• C2W, a warfighting application of IW.

• Joint C2W organization.

• The elements of C2W.

• Intelligence support to C2W.

• C2W planning.

• C2W training and exercises.

• C2W in multinational operations.

c. While C2W has applications at thestrategic and tactical levels of combat, thispublication focuses on C2W as a part ofmilitary strategy for planning or conductingcombat at the operational level. Theoperational level is the level at whichcampaigns and major operations are planned,conducted, and sustained to accomplishstrategic objectives within specific theaters orareas of operations.

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared underthe direction of the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff. It sets forth doctrine to governthe joint activities and performance of theArmed Forces of the United States in jointoperations and provides the doctrinal basis forUS military involvement in multinational andinteragency operations. It provides militaryguidance for the exercise of authority bycombatant commanders and other joint forcecommanders and prescribes doctrine for jointoperations and training. It provides militaryguidance for use by the Armed Forces inpreparing their appropriate plans. It is not theintent of this publication to restrict theauthority of the joint force commander (JFC)from organizing the force and executing themission in a manner the JFC deems mostappropriate to ensure unity of effort in theaccomplishment of the overall mission.

3. Application

a. Doctrine and guidance established in thispublication apply to the commanders ofcombatant commands, subunified commands,joint task forces, and subordinate componentsof these commands. These principles andguidance also may apply when significantforces of one Service are attached to forces ofanother Service or when significant forces ofone Service support forces of another Service.

b. The guidance in this publication isauthoritative; as such, this doctrine will befollowed except when, in the judgment of thecommander, exceptional circumstancesdictate otherwise. If conflicts arise betweenthe contents of this publication and thecontents of Service publications, thispublication will take precedence for theactivities of joint forces unless the Chairman

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Joint Pub 3-13.1

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally incoordination with the other members of theJoint Chiefs of Staff, has provided morecurrent and specific guidance. Commandersof forces operating as part of a multinational(alliance or coalition) military command

should follow multinational doctrine andprocedures ratified by the United States. Fordoctrine and procedures not ratified by theUnited States, commanders should evaluateand follow the multinational command’sdoctrine and procedures, where applicable.

WALTER KROSSLieutenant General, USAFDirector, Joint Staff

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

TABLE OF CONTENTS

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PAGE

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................. v

CHAPTER IINTRODUCTION

• Policy........................................................................................................................ I-1• Terminology.............................................................................................................. I-1• Fundamentals of IW.................................................................................................. I-3• Fundamentals of C2W............................................................................................... I-4

CHAPTER IITHE ELEMENTS OF C2W

• General.................................................................................................................... II-1• OPSEC .................................................................................................................... II-1• PSYOP in Support of C2W...................................................................................... II-2• Military Deception................................................................................................... II-4• Electronic Warfare................................................................................................... II-5• Physical Destruction in Support of C2W.................................................................. II-7

CHAPTER IIIINTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO C2W

• General.................................................................................................................. III-1• Intelligence Support............................................................................................... III-1• Sources of Intelligence Support.............................................................................. III-2• Intelligence Support to the Elements of C2W......................................................... III-3• Intelligence Role in C2-Protect.............................................................................. III-6

CHAPTER IVJOINT C2W ORGANIZATION

• General.................................................................................................................. IV-1• Joint Force C2W Organization............................................................................... IV-2• Relationship Between Joint C2W and Supporting Organizations............................ IV-7

CHAPTER VC2W PLANNING

• General................................................................................................................... V-1• C2W Planning as a Part of JOPES........................................................................... V-1• Differences in C2W Planning for War and MOOTW............................................... V-6• Coordination of C2W.............................................................................................. V-7

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• C4 Systems Support to C2W.................................................................................. V-11• C2W Reports and Request Procedures................................................................... V-12

CHAPTER VIC2W TRAINING AND EXERCISES

• General.................................................................................................................. VI-1• Training ................................................................................................................. VI-1• C2W in Joint/Multinational Exercises.................................................................... VI-2

CHAPTER VIIC2W IN MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

• General................................................................................................................. VII-1• The Multinational C2W Cell................................................................................. VII-1• Multinational C2W Planning................................................................................. VII-1• Multinational Information Security....................................................................... VII-2

APPENDIX

A The Decision Cycle........................................................................................... A-1B Supporting Agencies Responsibilities in C2W.................................................... B-1

Annex A—Joint Command and Control Warfare Center Support to C2W...... B-A-1Annex B—Joint COMSEC Monitoring Activity Support to C2W.................. B-B-1Annex C— DOD Joint Spectrum Center Support to C2W.............................. B-C-1

C References.......................................................................................................... C-1D Administrative Instructions................................................................................ D-1

GLOSSARY

Part I Abbreviations and Acronyms................................................................... GL-1Part II Terms and Definitions.............................................................................. GL-4

FIGURE

I-1 Command and Control Warfare Applicability to the Range of Military Operations.................................................................................... I-5

I-2 Potential Actions of Command and Control (C2)-Attack and C2-Protect Operations................................................................................ I-7

II-1 Elements of Command and Control Warfare.................................................. II-1III-1 PSYOP Essential Elements of Information.................................................. III-4IV-1 Nominal C2W Cell...................................................................................... IV-3IV-2 Command and Control Warfare (C2W) Officer Functions........................... IV-5V-1 C2W Planning Related to Deliberate Planning............................................. V-2V-2 C2W Planning Related to Crisis Action Planning......................................... V-5VI-1 Fundamental Exercise Planning Considerations........................................... VI-2A-1 The Decision Cycle...................................................................................... A-2

EXECUTIVE SUMMARYCOMMANDER’S OVERVIEW

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Provides an Introduction to the Fundamentals of InformationWarfare

Explains the Elements of Command and Control Warfare

Discusses Intelligence Support to Command and ControlWarfare

Covers Joint Command and Control Warfare Organization

Covers Command and Control Planning

Describes Command and Control Warfare Training andExercises

Explains Command and Control Warfare in MultinationalOperations

Information warfare (IW) capitalizes on the growingsophistication, connectivity, and reliance on informationtechnology. The ultimate target of IW is the informationdependent process, whether human or automated. Intelligenceand communications support are critical to conductingoffensive and defensive IW. IW supports the national militarystrategy but requires support, coordination, and participationby other United States Government departments and agenciesas well as commercial industry. Command and controlwarfare (C2W) is an application of IW in militaryoperations and employs various techniques and technologiesto attack or protect a specific target set — command and control(C2). C2W is the integrated use of psychological operations(PSYOP), military deception, operations security(OPSEC), electronic warfare (EW), and physicaldestruction, mutually supported by intelligence, to denyinformation to, influence, degrade, or destroy adversaryC2 capabilities while protecting friendly C2 capabilitiesagainst such actions. C2W is applicable throughout the rangeof military operations. Effective C2W provides the joint forcecommander (JFC) an ability to shape the adversarycommander’s estimate of the situation in the theater of

Introduction

Technologicaldevelopments inelectronics,communications, electro-optics, and computersystems offer improvedcapabilities to accomplishthe combatantcommander’s missions.

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operations and allows the JFC to process information throughthe C2 decision cycle faster than an adversary commander,which is crucial to gaining and maintaining the initiative inmilitary operations. Applicability to combatant commander’sstaffs or subordinate joint forces may vary due to staff resourcesand responsibilities. Most staffs already have C2W planningand coordinating cells. Integration of C2W resources into thelarger IW cell can facilitate deconfliction of compartmentedand noncompartmented IW activities and provide plannersmore resources to support operational planning.

The elements of C2W are as follows: OPSEC denies criticalinformation necessary for the adversary commander to estimatethe military situation accurately; psychological operationsare vital to the broad range of US political, military, economic,and informational activities, including support of C2 duringC2-attack and C2-protect operations; military deceptionfocuses on causing the adversary commander to estimateincorrectly the situation in the operational area with respectto friendly force dispositions, capabilities, vulnerabilities, andintentions; electronic warfare includes electronic warfaresupport, electronic attack, and electronic protection; andphysical destruction in support of C2W refers to the use of“hard kill” weapons or other means such as sabotage or covertactions against designated targets as an element of an integratedC2W effort.

Intelligence products support C2W operations pre-planning,provide analysis of adversary C2 systems, and determineadversary C2W capabilities. These are accomplished to assistthe C2W cell in developing plans for both C2-attack and C2-protect operations. Intelligence support to C2W activitiesis the result of collection, evaluation, analysis, andinterpretation of all available information that concernsone or more aspects of foreign nations or areas and dependson how well those providing intelligence understand thecommander’s mission and how quickly the intelligencesupport can be adapted to changing situations. Through thejoint staff intelligence officer, C2W planners and supportingjoint organizations have access to support from both thenational and combatant command-level intelligence producersand collectors. The joint intelligence community supportseach of the organizations that plan and direct use of theelements of C2W. The unique requirements are intelligence

Each of the elements ofcommand and controlwarfare (C2W) play a rolein the overall C2W effort.

Intelligence support iscritical to the planning,executing, and assessing ofany military operation.

The Elements of C2W

Intelligence Support To C2W

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support for OPSEC planning, PSYOP, military deception, EW,and physical destruction. Traditional military defensive meansshould defend against adversary efforts to employ physicaldestruction and EW against friendly C2 systems.

To be successful, C2W should be an integral part of alljoint military operations. This requires extensive planningand coordination to ensure that C2W operations are fullyintegrated with other portions of operation and campaign plans.The principal types of joint staffs that may be involved in C2Wplanning are the combatant command staffs, subordinateunified command staff, and the joint task force staffs. TheJFC should provide guidance for planning and conduct ofC2W operations and be assigned responsibility for theemployment of C2W resources in joint operations within scopeof his authority. The joint staff operations officer, C2W officer,joint staff intelligence officer, joint plans officer, jointcommander’s staff command, control, communications, andcomputer systems officer, special technical operations cell,public affairs office, other joint staff personnel in C2W, andthe functional and Service component representatives in C2Whelp organize, plan and execute C2W operations and objectives.

Detailed C2W planning and integration is accomplished byorganizations and personnel charged with planning the fiveelements of C2W, using the Joint Operation Planning andExecution System planning process and other key staff andsupport personnel. C2W planning should occur simultaneouslywith the phases of deliberate planning. Phase I of C2W is theinitiation of planning requirements. Phase II is conceptdevelopment, which includes mission analysis, planningguidance, staff estimates, Commander’s estimate, Commanderin Chief’s concept, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs ofStaff concept review. Phase III, plan development, focuseson the development of the complete C2W plan to support theapproved overall operational concept and requiredmethodology, the C2W appendix, C2W in other aspects of theoperation plan, and expert support in order to accurately planfor C2W. Phase IV is a plan review which requires a reviewof all changes, suggestions and concerns expressed in thereview process and allows for refinements in the C2W planand element level plans. Phase V produces supporting plansthat ensure that all C2W personnel/materiel supportrequirements are included in time-phased force and deployment

The organizationalstructure to plan andcoordinate C2W should besufficiently flexible toaccommodate a variety ofplanning and operationalcircumstances.

The key to building asuccessful C2W plan is theintegration of the elementsof C2W (both offense anddefense).

Joint C2W Organization

C2W Planning

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data and promulgated in the time-phased force and deploymentlist. All planning actions accomplished during the deliberateplanning process must be accomplished in the crisis actionplanning process in a compressed time period. The six phasesof crisis action planning include: situation development, crisisassessment, course of action development, course of actionselection, execution planning, and execution.

The JFC should provide guidance and establish procedureswithin the joint force for planning, coordinating, andexecuting C2W. Coordination of joint C2W support betweenthe Army, Marine, Navy, and Air Force Service componentsand functional components should be accomplished to themaximum extent possible at the lowest possible level.Communication and computer support can also assist C2Wplanners in planning and monitoring C2W operations.

The basic training task is to train those personnelresponsible for planning the individual elements of C2Win the concepts and doctrine found in this publication. Eachcombatant commander should ensure that key personnelresponsible for planning and implementing OPSEC, PSYOP,military deception, EW, and physical destruction receivetraining in C2W. Training includes classroom training, jointexercise training, and joint/multinational exercises.

The development of capabilities, plans, programs, tactics,employment concepts, intelligence, and communicationssupport applicable to C2W as a part of military strategyrequires coordination with responsible Department of Defensecomponents and allied/coalition nations. The Joint Staffwill coordinate US positions on all C2W matters discussedbilaterally or in multinational organizations in order toencourage interoperability and compatibility in fulfillingcommon requirements. Multinational C2W cell planningand information security are required to resolve complexsecurity issues, differences in the level of training of involvedforces, interoperability of equipment, and language barriers.

Information warfare capitalizes on the growing sophistication,connectivity, and reliance on information technology andsupports the national military strategy during both offensive

Effective employment ofC2W in joint operationsdepends on the ability totrain the way the UnitedStates intends to employ ajoint force.

Coordination with allieswill normally be effectedwithin existing defensearrangements.

C2W Training and Exercises

C2W in Multinational Operations

CONCLUSION

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Executive Summary

and defensive situations. Command and control warfare is awarfighting application of IW in military operations andemploys various techniques and technologies to attack orprotect command and control. C2W is the integrated use ofpsychological operations, military deception, operationssecurity, electronic warfare, and physical destruction, mutuallysupported by intelligence. C2W should be an integral part ofall joint military operations and requires extensive planningand coordination to ensure that C2W operations are fullyintegrated with other portions of operation and plans. Detailedplanning, training and exercises, and understanding ofmultinational operations allow for successful applications ofC2W.

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CHAPTER IINTRODUCTION

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1. Policy

Department of Defense (DOD) DirectiveS-3600.1, “Information Warfare,” establishesDOD policy and responsibilities forinformation warfare (IW) in DOD. TheChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS)Memorandum of Policy (MOP) 30,“Command and Control Warfare (C2W),”provides joint policy guidance for C2W.

2. Terminology

a. The terms and abbreviations used arelisted in the glossary. The basic definitionsand concepts in this chapter are critical tounderstanding the rest of this publication.

b. An “information system” is definedas the organized collection, processing,transmission, and dissemination ofinformation , in accordance with definedprocedures, whether automated or manual. InIW, this includes the entire infrastructure,organization, and components that collect,process, store, transmit, display, anddisseminate information. It includeseverything and everyone that performsthese functions — from a lap-top computerto local and wide-area voice and datanetworks, broadcast facilities, buried cableand, most importantly, the people involved intransmitting, receiving, processing, and usingthe information. People, decisionmakers atall levels, are the most important part of

“Our present theory is to destroy personnel, our new theory should be todestroy command. Not after the enemy’s personnel has been disorganized,but before it has been attacked, so that it may be found in a state ofdisorganization when attacked.”

J.F.C. FullerMemorandum, Strategic Paralysis as the

Object of the Decisive Attack, 1918

While hardware and software are integral to an informationsystem, people are the most important component.

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the information system. How peopleactually capitalize on the proliferation ofinformation technology constitutes the coreof the information revolution.

c. Today, information systems are partof larger information infrastructures.These infrastructures link individualinformation systems in a myriad of direct andindirect paths. A growing informationinfrastructure transcends industry, media, andthe military and includes both government andnongovernment entities. It is characterizedby a merging of civilian and militaryinformation networks and technologies.The collection, processing, and disseminationof information by individuals andorganizations comprise an important humandynamic, which is an integral part of theinformation infrastructure. A news broadcaston CNN, a diplomatic communiqué, and amilitary message ordering the execution ofan operation all depend on the globalinformation infrastructure. The informationinfrastructure has been assigned threecategories — global information infrastructure(GII), national information infrastructure(NII), and defense information infrastructure(DII).

• The GII is the worldwide interconnectionof communications networks, computers,data bases, and consumer electronics thatmake vast amounts of informationavailable to users. It encompasses awide range of equipment, includingcameras, scanners, keyboards, faxmachines, computers, switches, compactdisks, video and audio tape, cable, wire,satellites, fiber-optic transmission lines,microwave, nets, switches, televisions,monitors, printers and much more. TheGII, however, includes more than just thephysical facilities used to store, process,and display voice data. The personnelwho operate and consume the transmitteddata constitute a critical component ofthe GII .

• The DII is the shared or interconnectedsystem of computers, communications,data applications, security, people,training, and other support structuresserving DOD’s local, national andworldwide information needs. The DIIconnects DOD mission support,command and control (C2), andintelligence computers through voice,telecommunications, imagery, video and

THE BATTLE OF ARNHEM: A COMMUNICATIONS SNAFU

In 1944, at the Battle of Arnhem, the British First Airborne Division landed withthe wrong radio crystals. They couldn’t communicate with the outside, noteven to their relief column at Nijmegen, a few miles away. They were isolated,under attack by superior numbers, and surprised at being dropped where theyweren’t supposed to be. During the entire multi-day battle, members of theDutch resistance in Arnhem were routinely talking to the counterparts inNijmegen by telephone, because the national telephone system had not beentaken down. It never occurred to a single paratrooper to knock on the door ofa house and call Nijmegen, because the battlefield had been defined outsidethe civilian infrastructure. The Dutch underground assumed the paratrooperswere talking by radio, and the paratroopers had never thought about using thecivilian infrastructure.

SOURCE: Congressman Newt GingrichSpeech at National Defense University, 3 May 1995

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multimedia services. It providesinformation processing and services tosubscribers over the Defense InformationSystems Network. It includes C2,tactical, intelligence and commercialcommunications systems used to transmitDOD data.

d. In actuality the GII, NII and DII labelsare misleading as there are few distinctboundaries in the information environment.The DII, NII, and GII are inextricablyintertwined , a trend that will only intensifywith the continuous application of rapidlyadvancing technology.

e. In the post-Cold War era, US militaryforces are tasked with a wide variety ofmissions, from disaster relief to peacekeepingto fighting a major regional conflict.Historically, the US military has relied ontechnology as a force multiplier toaccomplish assigned missions as efficientlyas possible while preserving human life andlimiting the destruction of property. The use

of sophisticated information technologies asa force multiplier is the latest example of thistrend.

3. Fundamentals of IW

“Information is the currency of victoryon the battlefield.”

Gen Gordon Sullivan

a. IW is defined as actions taken toachieve information superiority by affectingadversary information, information-basedprocesses, information systems, andcomputer-based networks while defendingone’s own information, information-basedprocesses, information systems, andcomputer-based networks. The use of theword “warfare” in the term IW should not beconstrued as limiting IW to a military conflict,declared or otherwise.

b. The growing worldwide dependence onsophisticated and interconnected informationsystems affords significant opportunities andvulnerabilities. Technological developmentsin electronics, communications, electro-optics, and computer systems, together withthe synergistic application of establisheddisciplines like psychological operations(PSYOP) and military deception, offerimproved capabilities to accomplishcombatant commander’s missions.Although these technologies and techniquesoffer a significant increase in the efficientapplication of military power, they alsoincrease the risk to military forces or evenentire societies if information infrastructuresare not protected.

c. IW capitalizes on the growingsophistication, connectivity, and reliance oninformation technology. IW targetsinformation or information systems in orderto affect the information dependent process,whether human or automated. Suchinformation dependent processes range fromNational Command Authorities-level

The Defense Information Infrastructure linksmission support and intelligence infrastructuresand puts vital information at DOD user's workstations.

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decisionmaking to the automated control oftransportation systems.

d. Many different systems, disciplines,and techniques must be integrated toachieve a coherent IW strategy. Intelligenceand communications support are critical toconducting offensive and defensive IW. Thethoughtful design and correct operation ofinformation infrastructures are fundamentalin underpinning the successful conduct ofoffensive and defensive IW.

e. IW supports the national militarystrategy but requires support, coordination,and participation by other United StatesGovernment (USG) departments and agenciesas well as commercial industry. AlthoughDOD information flows depend on civilinformation infrastructures, the protection ofthese infrastructures falls outside the authorityand responsibility of the DOD. A USGinteragency effort is necessary tocoordinate the protection of civilinformation infrastructures critical toDOD interests. Offensive IW actions alsorequire interagency deconfliction andcooperation.

4. Fundamentals of C2W

“Wisdom is better than weapons ofwar.”

Ecclesiastes 9:18

a. C2W is the integrated use of PSYOP,military deception, operations security(OPSEC), Electronic Warfare (EW), andphysical destruction, mutually supported byintelligence, to deny information to, influence,degrade, or destroy adversary C2 capabilitieswhile protecting friendly C2 capabilitiesagainst such actions. C2W is an applicationof IW in military operations and is a subsetof IW. C2W applies across the range ofmilitary operations and at all levels of conflict.C2W is both offensive and defensive.

• C2-attack. Prevent effective C2 ofadversary forces by denying informationto, influencing, degrading or destroyingthe adversary C2 system.

• C2-protect. Maintain effective C2 ofown forces by turning to friendlyadvantage or negating adversary effortsto deny information to, influence,degrade, or destroy the friendly C2system.

b. C2W employs various techniques andtechnologies to attack or protect a specifictarget set — C2. C2W is applicablethroughout the range of military operations.C2W is planned and executed by combatantcommanders, subunified commanders, andjoint task force commanders. C2W effortsare focused within a commander of acombatant command’s (CINC’s) area ofresponsibility or a commander, joint task

C2W offers military commanders lethal andnon-lethal means to achieve the assignedmission.

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force’s (CJTF’s) joint operations area and theirarea of interest (AOI). C2W is an essentialpart of any joint military operationopposed or threatened by an organizedmilitary or paramilitary force. It is anintegral part of an overall campaign plan.Figure I-1 illustrates the types of joint militaryoperations where C2W is appropriate. C2Wapplies to all phases of an operation, includingthose before, during, and after actualhostilities.

c. The elements of C2W (PSYOP,military deception, OPSEC, EW, physicaldestruction) can support land, sea, air, andspace operations. Although C2W as definedis composed of these five elements, in practiceother warfighting capabilities may beemployed as part of C2W to attack or protecta C2 “target set.” The level of applicability

of the various C2W elements is dependent onthe assigned mission and the circumstances,targets, and resources available. C2Wprovides a framework that promotes synergybetween the joint force elements to produce asignificant warfighting advantage. Even inmilitary operations other than war(MOOTW), C2W offers the militarycommander lethal and non-lethal meansto achieve the assigned mission whiledeterring war and/or promoting peace.

d. Effective C2W provides the joint forcecommander (JFC) the ability to shape theadversary commander’s estimate of thesituation in the theater of operations. It mayeven be possible to convince an adversary thatthe US has “won” prior to engaging in battle,resulting in deterrence and preemptinghostilities.

Figure I-1. Command and Control Warfare Applicabilityto the Range of Military Operations

OPERATIONSOTHERTHAN WAR

WAR

MILITARYOPERATIONS

COMMAND AND CONTROL WARFARE APPLICABILITYTO THE RANGE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS

FIGHT & WIN

DETER WAR &RESOLVECONFLICT

PROMOTEPEACE

LARGE-SCALE COMBATOPERATIONS:

Peace Enforcement / NEOStrikes / Raids / Show of Force

Counterterrorism / PeacekeepingCounterinsurgency

GENERAL USGOAL

EXAMPLES

AttackDefend

Blockades

COMBAT N

ONCOMBAT

Antiterrorism Disaster ReliefPeacebuilding NEO

Nation AssistanceCivil Support Counterdrug

C2W APPLICABILITY POSSIBLE C2W APPLICABILITY

C2W Command & Control WarfareNEO Noncombatant Evacuation Operation

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e. A successful C2W effort will contributeto the security of friendly forces, bring theadversary to battle (if appropriate) at adisadvantage, help seize and maintain theinitiative, enhance freedom of maneuver,contribute to surprise, isolate adversary forcesfrom their leadership, and create opportunitiesfor a systematic exploitation of adversaryvulnerabilities.

f. Effective C2W operations influence,disrupt or delay the adversary’s decisioncycle. This decision cycle is supported by aC2 system which does not merely consist ofa commander and the infrastructure tocommunicate orders. It encompasses all thecapabilities, thought processes, and actionsthat allow a commander to correctly observethe AOI; assess what those observations implyabout the operation; use assessments to maketimely, effective decisions; and communicatethose decisions as orders to subordinatecommanders in order to control the course of

an operation. The execution of orders on bothsides of an operation alters the situation inthe operational area. These changes, in turn,must be observed, assessed, and acted uponin a continuous process. This process can bethought of as a “decision cycle.” (Foradditional discussion of the decision cycle seeAppendix A, “The Decision Cycle.”)

g. Synchronized C2W operations shouldenable a JFC to operate “inside” anadversary’s decision cycle by allowing theJFC to process information through the C2decision cycle faster than an adversarycommander. Initiative is fundamental tosuccess in military operations. As shown inFigure I-2, in C2W, both C2-attack and C2-protect operations contribute to gainingand maintaining military initiative. (Theterms C2-attack and C2-protect replace theCJCS MOP 30 terms counter-C2 and C2-protection. MOP 30 will reflect this changein the next revision.)

THE INFORMATION AGE: HIS TORY IN THE MAKING

The history of the “information age” is being made now. 1988 saw the firstwell publicized case of a computer virus. This insidious, self-replicating virusknown as the “Internet Worm” penetrated the computer system at the Universityof California at Berkeley corrupting thousands of computers on the Internet.A Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) was created at Carnegie MellonUniversity. In 1993 they had their first large event as they put out a warning tonetwork administrators that a band of intruders had stolen tens of thousandsof Internet passwords. When CERT began in the late 1980s they processedless than 50 events per year, now they are in the thousands per year. Themilitary is a target of this attack. Recent stories have told of a 16 year-old whocompromised the security of more than 30 military systems, and more than100 other systems before he was caught after a 26 day international electronicmanhunt. This experience hints at the impact a professional, well financedeffort could have against computer nets. The lesson this evolving history isshowing us vividly today, is that the information highway is creating a greatvulnerability to US forces. We are all familiar with the security of transmittinginformation over a radio or telephone. But there is an even greater weak spotnow in computers, data bases, software (like decisionmaking aids and tools),servers, routers, and switches. This vulnerability exists today, and is growingin geometric proportions.

SOURCE: FM 100-6, Information Operations

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Figure I-2. Potential Actions of Command and Control (C2)- Attack andC2-Protect Operations

POTENTIAL ACTIONS OF COMMAND AND CONTROL(C2)-ATTACK AND C2-PROTECT OPERATIONS

Through C2-attack operations the friendly force can:

Through C2-protect operations friendly forces can:

Slow the adversary's operational tempo. Causing hesitation,confusion, and misdirection among adversary commanderscontributes to slowing adversary's operational tempo

Disrupt adversary's plans. The adversary may putconsiderable effort into positioning forces and logistics tosupport a particular plan. If the adversary is forced tobecome reactive, the adversary's battlefield effectivenesswill be degraded

Disrupt the adversary commander's ability to focus combatpower. Reactive C2 forced upon the adversary by effectiveC2-attack may cause enemy force misdirection or at leastdelays

Influence the adversary commander's estimate of thesituation. By creating confusion and inaccuracy in theassumptions an adversary makes regarding the situation,the direction and outcome of military operations can beinfluenced

Minimize friendly C2 system vulnerabilities to adversary C2-attack through the employment of adequate physical,electronic, information, and operations security measures.Since information infrastructures are difficult to define withingeographic boundaries and may be simultaneously used forinformation functions other than military C2, C2-protectefforts should encompass all aspects of C2 relatedinformation infrastructures that a specific adversary may becapable of attacking

Minimize friendly mutual interference during the operationalemployment of the different elements of command andcontrol warfare and minimize the impact of command andcontrol warfare actions on friendly C2 and unintended thirdparties

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1. General

a. Each of the elements of C2W —OPSEC, PSYOP, military deception, EW,and physical destruction (shown in FigureII-1), plays a role in the overall C2W effort.The purpose of using two or more of theseelements in a coordinated C2W effort is toachieve a synergistic effect that would notnormally be achieved from the single oruncoordinated application of these elementsin a military operation. Synergism requiresclose cooperation and coordination betweenthe personnel supporting the five elements ofC2W and other key members of thecommander’s staff.

b. This chapter focuses on eachelement’s potential contribution to C2W.Joint doctrine for OPSEC, military deception,PSYOP, and EW is promulgated in other jointpublications. The fundamentals of physicaldestruction’s role in C2W are covered atgreater length in this chapter.

2. OPSEC

“The general is skillful in attack whoseopponent does not know what todefend; and he is skillful in defensewhose opponent does not know whatto attack.”

Sun Tzu

a. OPSEC is concerned with denyingcritical information about friendly forcesto the adversary. In C2W, the threat toOPSEC is ultimately the adversarycommander. Denial of critical informationabout friendly capabilities and limitations mayresult in flawed command decisions that prove

CHAPTER IITHE ELEMENTS OF C2W

II-1

“The instruments of battle are valuable only if one knows how to use them.”

Ardant du Picq

Figure II-1. Elements of Commandand Control Warfare

PHYSICALDESTRUCTION

ELECTRONICWARFARE

MILITARYDECEPTION

PSYCHOLOGICALOPERATIONS

OPERATIONSSECURITY

ELEMENTS OFCOMMAND AND

CONTROL WARFARE

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ELEMENTS OFCOMMAND AND

CONTROL WARFARE

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c. Denial of critical information to theadversary commander contributes touncertainty and slows the adversary’s decisioncycle. Critical information can be hiddenby such traditional OPSEC measures asaction control, countermeasures, andcounteranalysis. Counterintelligencesupport is an integral part of successfulOPSEC. PSYOP and military deceptionpersonnel also work closely with OPSECplanners to mutually support their respectiveefforts.

d. Critical information denied to anadversary can be replaced or refocused tosupport the commander’s goals throughmilitary deception and/or PSYOP, if use ofthose elements has been approved at theappropriate level. In C2W, operationalplanners concerned with OPSEC shouldalso coordinate with C2 planners, EWplanners, and target planners to denycritical information to the adversarycommander. The OPSEC process may alsoidentify for attack particular adversarycollection, processing, analysis, anddistribution systems to deny the adversarycommander critical information byforestalling that commander’s ability tocollect it.

3. PSYOP in Support of C2W

“Loss of hope, rather than loss of life,is the factor that really decides wars,battles, and even the smallest combats.The all-time experience of warfareshows that when men reach the pointwhere they see, or feel, that furthereffort and sacrifice can do no more thandelay the end they commonly lose thewill to spin it out, and bow to theinevitable.”

B. H. Liddell Hart

a. Introduction. PSYOP are a vital partof the broad range of US diplomatic, military,economic, and informational activities. Theemployment of any element of national power

devastating to the adversary force. Theemphasis of OPSEC as a part of an overallC2W effort should be to deny criticalinformation necessary for the adversarycommander to accurately estimate the militarysituation. The intent of OPSEC in C2Wshould be to force the adversarycommander to make faulty decisions basedupon insufficient information and/or to delaythe decisionmaking process due to a lack ofinformation. Joint OPSEC doctrine iscontained in Joint Pub 3-54, “Joint Doctrinefor Operations Security.”

b. The inevitable presence of the newsmedia during military operationscomplicates OPSEC. As part of the GII, thenews media portrays and offers commentaryon military activities on the battlefield — bothpreparatory to and during battle. News mediaportrayal of military activities prior tohostilities can help to deter actual hostilitiesand/or build public support for inevitablehostilities. By portraying the presence of US/multinational military forces in or en route tothe operational area, news media stories candemonstrate the readiness, commitment, andresolve of the US and its multinationalpartners to commit military forces to battle ifnecessary to protect US/multinationalinterests, lives, or property. However, thepresence of the news media in theoperational area, with the capability totransmit information on a real time basis to aworldwide audience, has the potential to bea lucrative source of information toadversaries. OPSEC planners must keepthese considerations in mind whendetermining which aspects of a militaryoperation are “critical information” that mustbe denied to the adversary. OPSEC plannersmust work closely with military publicaffairs (PA) personnel to develop guidelinesthat can be used by both military and newsmedia personnel to avoid inadvertentdisclosure of critical information that could,ultimately, increase the risk to the lives of US/multinational military personnel.

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projection, particularly the military element,has always had a psychological dimension.Joint PSYOP doctrine is contained in JointPub 3-53, “Doctrine for Joint PsychologicalOperations.”

• PSYOP are employed at the strategiclevel in support of international andtheater information activities conductedby USG agencies to influence foreignattitudes, perceptions, and behavior infavor of US goals and objectives.PSYOP are employed at theoperational and tactical levels ofmilitary operations to support thearticulation of the JFC’s message todiscerning target audiences withdedicated persuasive communicationsassets.

• PSYOP’s mission in developing theoverarching PSYOP supporting plan forthe JFC should be outlined in Appendix4 to the Operations Annex of the subjectoperation plan (OPLAN). Appendix 4,for example, should address tacticalPSYOP support to Army and Marinemaneuver units on the ground. FocusedPSYOP support to C2W will beaddressed in the Operations Annex C of

the subject OPLAN. PSYOP support toC2W should conform to the JFC’s overallPSYOP support plan; however, the focuswill be tailored to high-value C2-orientedtarget audiences.

• Psychological Impact. All militaryoperations have a psychologicalimpact. Moving an aircraft carrier battlegroup off of an adversary’s shores,conducting amphibious landing trainingor a surgical air strike, or executing aclandestine special operation into anadversary’s heartland all influenceattitudes, emotions, motives, objectivereasoning, and ultimately, the behaviorof foreign governments, their leaders,groups, and individuals. In C2W, thePSYOP component’s objective is tointegrate, coordinate, and deconflictPSYOP with the full range of militaryactivities. This should enable the JFC toharness, focus, and synchronize theaggregate psychological impact foroptimal effect in influencing anadversary’s C2 system to ultimatelyachieve US goals and objectives.

b. PSYOP in Support of C2-attack.PSYOP should be employed to enhance the

PSYOP are a vital part of the broad range of US political, military, economicand informational activities.

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and neutralize their efforts and that theirwhole military force and its infrastructurewill suffer if they persist in antagonizingfriendly forces.

• When called upon, PSYOP operationscan target individual intelligence and C2nodes to assist in C2-protect operations.

4. Military Deception

“All warfare is based on deception.Hence, when able to attack, we mustseem unable; when using force, wemust seem inactive; when we are near,we must make the adversary believewe are far away; when far away, wemust make him believe we are near.Hold our baits to entice the adversary,feign disorder, and crush him.”

Sun Tzu

Military deception as an element of C2Wshould focus on causing the adversarycommander to estimate incorrectly thesituation in the operational area with respectto friendly force dispositions, capabilities,vulnerabilities and intentions. It may only benecessary to cause the adversary commanderto hesitate in making decisions during a criticaltime in the operations in order for a deceptionto “succeed.” Joint military deceptiondoctrine is contained in Joint Pub 3-58, “JointDoctrine for Military Deception.”

a. Military Deception in C2-attack. Theadversary commander is the target for militarydeception in support of C2-attack. Some ofthe military deception goals of C2-attackshould be to:

• Cause the adversary commander toemploy forces (including intelligence) inways which are advantageous to the jointforce.

• Cause the adversary to reveal strengths,dispositions, and future intentions.

actual and perceived C2W effort againstadversary decisionmakers. PSYOP canarticulate to appropriate foreign audiencesthe mission, intent, and combat power ofthe joint force, as well as curb unreasonableexpectations about the USG’s role and actionsduring operations. PSYOP can multiply andmagnify the effects of military deceptionplans, reinforce apparent perceptions of theadversary, plant the seeds of doubt about theleadership of adversary forces, proliferatediscrete messages to adversary command,control, communications, and intelligencecollectors, enhance and combine live-firecapability demonstrations with PSYOP“surrender appeals” to encourage an adversaryto give up, and magnify the image of USsuperiority.

c. PSYOP in Support of C2-protect.PSYOP’s main objective in C2-protect isto counter the adversary’s hostilepropaganda against the joint force.Discrediting the source of mass media attacksagainst the operations of the US/multinationalforces is critical to maintaining a favorableworld opinion of the operations. Counteringadversary propaganda is a coordinated effortrequiring centralized planning andsynchronized execution at all levels. Thecorollary benefit of effectively counteringadversary propaganda is in persuading theadversary’s populace that US/multinationaloperations are legitimate and in driving awedge between the adversary leadership andits populace in order to undermine theadversary leadership’s confidence andeffectiveness. PSYOP specialists andintelligence analysts can also produceinformation packets which commanders canuse to “immunize” their units againstadversary propaganda. Other PSYOPactivities to support C2-protect operationsinclude:

• Persuading the adversary forces that UShigh-technology can be used to identify

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OVERLORD: A CASE STUDY IN DECEPTION

Tactical deception had significant positive impacts on the success of OperationOVERLORD, and, thus the retaking of the European Continent in WW II.Deception worked hand in hand with OPSEC to keep the real OVERLORDcantonments; training sites, dumps, movements, and embarkation’s, carefullyhidden. Unbelievable effort was put into creating mock air fields and ports,phony ships, boats, planes, tanks, vehicles, and troop movement, both realand staged. A new era of deception was introduced—the electronic one.German coastal defense radars were destroyed in a calculated pattern.Deception planners purposely left some intact in the Calais region. The nightthe invasion was launched, the Allies began massively jamming German radarswith chaff. But they purposely did not completely cover their targets. Germanradar operators could “see” between Allied jamming curtains. And, what theysaw was a ghost fleet of small ships towing barges and blimps headed forCalais at eight knots, or the speed of an amphibious fleet. Powerful electronicemitters received the pulse of the German radar and sent it strongly back tothe German receivers. For each repetition of this deception it looked to theGerman operators like a 10,000 ton ship was out there. The small ships alsohad the recorded sounds of the amphibious assault at Salerno to play overspeakers from ten miles out. German troops ashore could hear the Allies“getting into their landing craft” for the run into the beach. This informationthrew German intelligence into chaos for several precious hours.

SOURCE: FM 100-6

• Overload the adversary’s intelligence andanalytical capability to create confusionregarding friendly intentions and toachieve surprise.

• Condition the adversary to particularpatterns of friendly behavior that can beexploited at a time chosen by the jointforce.

• Cause the adversary to waste combatpower with inappropriate or delayedactions.

b. Military Deception in C2-protect.Military deception can help protect thejoint force from adversary C2-attackefforts. Deception that misleads an adversarycommander about friendly C2 capabilitiesand/or limitations contributes to C2-protect.An adversary commander who is deceivedabout friendly C2 capabilities and limitationsmay be more likely to misallocate resources

in an effort to attack or exploit friendly C2systems.

5. Electronic Warfare

All three aspects of EW, electronic attack(EA), electronic protection (EP), andelectronic warfare support (ES), contributeto the C2W effort. EA is concerned withdenying an adversary commander use of theelectronic spectrum to effectively commandand control operating forces. EP is involvedwith guaranteeing use of the electronicspectrum for the JFC to command and controlfriendly forces. ES contributes to the JFC’saccurate estimate of the situation in theoperational area. Joint doctrine is containedin Joint Pub 3-51, “Electronic Warfare in JointMilitary Operations.”

a. EW in C2-attack. Each of the threedivisions of EW — ES, EA, and EP — cancontribute to C2-attack operations.

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• ES, in the form of combat information,can provide the real-time informationrequired to locate and identify C2 nodesand supporting/supported early warningand offensive systems during C2-attackmissions. ES, used to produce signalsintelligence (SIGINT), can providetimely intelligence about an adversary’sC2 capabilities and limitations that canbe used to update previously knowninformation about the adversary’s C2systems. This updated information canbe used to plan C2-attack operations andprovide battle damage assessment (BDA)and feedback on the effectiveness of theoverall C2W plan.

• EA — whether jamming, electromagneticdeception, or destruction of C2 nodeswith directed-energy (DE) weapons orantiradiation missiles (ARMs) — has amajor role to play in almost all C2-attack operations in a combatenvironment.

• EP’s role in C2-attack and otheroperat ions i s to p r o tec t theelectromagnetic (EM) spectrum foruse by friendly forces. Coordination of

the use of the EM spectrum by friendlyforces through the Joint RestrictedFrequency List (JRFL) is a means ofpreventing fratricide among friendlyelectronic emissions. Equipment andprocedures designed to prevent adversarydisruption or exploitation of the EMspectrum are the best means friendlyforces have to ensure their ownuninterrupted use of the EM spectrumduring C2-attack operations.

b. EW in C2-protect. Each of the threedivisions of EW can also make a contributionto friendly C2-protect efforts.

• ES, supported by SIGINT data, can beused to monitor for impendingadversary attack on friendly C2-nodes.ES, in the form of Signal Securitymonitoring, can be used to identifypotential sources of information for anadversary to obtain knowledge aboutfriendly C2 systems.

• EA, whether jamming, electromagneticdeception, or DE weapons/ARMs can beused to defend a friendly force fromadversary C2-attack.

Electronic warfare support in the form of combat information can provide thereal-time information required to locate and identify C2 nodes.

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• EP should be used in C2-protect tosafeguard friendly forces fromexploitation by adversary ES/SIGINToperations. Frequency deconflictionthrough the use of the JRFL is also a keyto a successful coordinated defenseagainst adversary C2-attack operations.

6. Physical Destruction inSupport of C2W

“In the practical art of war the best thingof all is to take the enemy’s countrywhole and intact; to shatter and destroyit is not so good. Hence, to fight andconquer in all your battles is notsupreme excellence; supremeexcellence consists in breaking theenemy’s resistance without fighting.”

Sun Tzu

a. General. The term “physicaldestruction” as an element of C2W refers tothe use of “hard kill” weapons againstdesignated targets as an element of anintegrated C2W effort. Although the word“destruction” is used in the term, “hard kill”weapons may be used in C2W for a purposeother than the actual “destruction” of aspecific target. Firepower demonstrations orselective degradation of certain parts of a C2-

Electronic attack, whether in the form of jamming, electromagnetic deception ordestruction of C2 nodes, has a major role to play in almost all C2 attack operations.

Which specific weapons should be used toaccomplish physical destruction as part of a C2Wplan is situation-dependent.

related target through weapons effects areexamples of the use of “hard kill” weaponsfor a purpose other than actual destruction thatmight be part of an integrated C2W plan.Normally, physical destruction would targetidentified C2 nodes. However, physicaldestruction may also be against targets otherthan adversary C2-nodes in support of one ormore of the other elements of C2W. Physical

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destruction may support both C2-attackand C2-protect operations.

• Which specific weapons should beused to accomplish physical destructionas part of a C2W plan is situationallydependent. Some examples of weaponssystems used for physical destruction toaccomplish C2W goals include aircraft-borne precision guided munitions, cruisemissiles, special operations forces, navalgunfire, artillery, and maneuver forces.These destruction efforts are normallycoordinated by functional or Servicecomponent commanders.

• The use of physical destruction is morelikely when the intent is to degrade theadversary’s C2 system as opposed toinfluencing it, but the two efforts are notnecessarily mutually exclusive. Ifphysical destruction is used as an elementof a particular C2W plan, C2W plannersshould recognize three constraints thatwill be imposed:

•• C2W planners must coordinateC2W destruction efforts using thestandard mechanisms (such as the JointTargeting Coordination Board) set up bythe JFC to coordinate and synchronizetargeting. The JFC’s guidance andpriorities should inform functional andService components how much of theirlimited resources should be devoted toattacking C2 targets. Since many of theweapons used for C2W destruction areaviation based, the air apportionmentdecision will be critical to C2W efforts.Most destructive attacks on C2Wnodes qualify as interdiction (an actionto divert, disrupt, delay or destroy theenemy’s surface military potential beforeit can be used effectively against friendlyforces). The JFC may identify C2Wtargets as a unique joint air apportionmentcategory to ensure that the JFC guidance

and apportionment decisions provideappropriate weight to the C2W effort.

•• After the JFC provides guidance aspart of the planning process, targets arenominated to support the targetingobjectives and priorities provided bythat guidance. C2W planners shouldensure that physical destruction targetsidentified during the planning process areincluded with these target nominations.This can be accomplished throughworking directly with componentplanners or by integrating physicaldestruction targets into the targetnomination list submitted by the jointtask force (JTF) staff (when used).Through these nominations and thereview process that follows, C2Wplanners work to ensure that physicaldestruction targets are included withappropriate priority on the JointIntegrated Prioritized Target List(JIPTL).

•• C2W planners should work withappropriate functional/Servicecomponent planners to ensure the bestweapon (e.g., air delivered precisionweapons, special operations forces,Tomahawk land attack missile) isselected to achieve the desired result.In some cases, C2W planners will needto become involved in detailed planningwith component planners. An exampleof such a requirement might be a physicaldestruction mission that had to occur ina special way or at a particular time inorder to support a military deception.

b. Guidance. Physical destruction fallswithin the application of traditional weaponstargeting. Numerous doctrine publicationsexist that address the targeting process.These publications are applicable to specificplanning for physical destruction.

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c. Physical Destruction PlanningProcess. Physical destruction as a integratedpart of C2W should not be considered asmerely the systematic elimination of all theadversary’s C2 nodes. Total destruction ofthe adversary’s C2 system may not beattainable, desirable, or supportable.Friendly forces may need to use adversary C2systems during the postconflict phase ofmilitary operations. Careful selection andstrict prioritization of physical destructionmissions build the strongest case whencompeting against other type missions forjoint force weapons and delivery platforms.Joint Pub 2-01.1, “Joint Tactics, Techniques,and Procedures for Intelligence Support toTargeting,” describes the planning processnecessary to select and prioritize targets in ajoint military operation. Since C2W plannerscan generally rely on the expertise of targetplanners in other targeting cells, a simplifiedplanning process to identify physicaldestruction requirements is sufficient tofamiliarize C2W planners with target planningprocedures. The following planning processprovides a way to ensure that physicaldestruction missions are carefully thought outand correctly prioritized.

• Analyze the JFC’s mission and conceptof operations to understand objectivesand means. Identify critical points inthe planned operation that may requiresupporting physical destruction missions.Critical points are times when either theJFC, adversary commander, or both needto have an effectively functioning C2system in order to accomplish criticaltasks. Knowledge of the critical pointsin the operation helps to identify whenthe joint force needs to destroy or disruptthe adversary’s C2, or protect key jointforce C2 systems.

• Analyze the adversary’s capabilitiesand limitations. Accurate, currentintelligence estimates are vital to provideC2W planners with an up-to-date picture

of the adversary’s current situation.Assessments of the criticality andvulnerability of various adversary C2nodes form the basis for C2W planners’selection and prioritization of targets forphysical destruction.

• C2W planners should nominatetargets or target sets through the targetnomination process established by theJFC. As the primary “advocate” for C2Wtargets, the C2W officer should ensurethat personnel determining thecomposition and priority of the JIPTLfully understand the importance ofstriking designated C2W targets atspecific times and in specific sequencein order to be integrated with ongoingefforts of other C2W elements and to gainthe desired synergistic effect.

• After C2 targets have been attacked,C2W planners must obtain feedbackabout the results of physicaldestruction. Traditionally, this has takenthe form of BDA based on overheadimagery and aircraft gun camera/videotape recorder film. The C2W cell mayalso request SIGINT support to measurethe effectiveness of physical destruction.Finally, the C2W officer should requestappropriate intelligence support (humanintelligence, SIGINT, measurement andsignature intelligence, and other types ofintelligence) to look for indicators ofadversary C2 and C2W efficiency. If theadversary’s reactions and initiatives havebecome sluggish and ineffective, that isan indicator of probable success ofphysical destruction. Adversaryrecovery of C2 effectiveness maywarrant another strike , or the use ofother C2W methods.

• Target planners may use physicaldestruction against both the commandand/or control portions of theadversary’s C2 system. However, the

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adversary may be able to recover fromphysical destruction, given sufficienttime, resources, and redundancy.Because of the importance of usingphysical destruction at critical points inthe operation, physical destructionshould be timed for just before theadversary needs a certain C2 functionto preclude reconstitution.

•• Against command. Seeking todestroy the adversary’s commandconsists of trying to “degrade” theadversary commander and immediatestaff by attacking the staff headquartersand associated communications. It maybe easier to attack and destroy theinfrastructure that supports theadversary commander than it is toattack the commander. In this regard,attacking the adversary commander’scommunications or intelligenceproduction facilities may pay gooddividends if the attacks are carried outwhen the adversary commander relies onthis infrastructure most.

•• Against control. Point targets in theadversary’s C2 infrastructure that areused to see the battlefield and executeorders are valid targets for physical

destruction. Unless the adversarycannot replace equipment or personnel,any effects from physical destructionshould be considered only degradation.Physical destruction missions should alsoconsider redundancy and robustness ofthe adversary’s C2 system. It may befeasible to functionally attack a particularC2 node by attacking some entity in anechelon above, below, or lateral to theinitial node and still degrade that node’seffectiveness for the desired amount oftime.

•• Post attack analysis ofreconstitution. In targeting eithercommand or control portions of theadversary’s C2 system, the adversary’sability to reconstitute the attackednode must be considered. C2Wplanners must have some preplannedmeasure of effectiveness with which tojudge the results of physical destruction.Intelligence should monitor the targetafter the strike and must be prepared toadvise target planners as to its status.Adversary C2 nodes identified aseffectively reconstituted should beconsidered for reattack if analysisdetermines that they are still critical inthe overall C2W effort.

CHAPTER IIIINTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO C2W

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1. General

Intelligence support is critical to theplanning, executing, and assessing of anymilitary operation. The joint staffintelligence (J-2) representative(s) assigned tosupport C2W should be the liaison forintelligence support for all C2W planning.Intelligence products support C2W operationspreplanning, provide analysis of adversary C2systems, and determine adversary C2Wcapabilities. These are accomplished to assistthe C2W cell in developing plans for both C2-attack and C2-protect operations. Finally,intelligence may provide indicators on theeffectiveness of the execution of these plans.Many of the potential uses of the fiveelements in a C2W plan affect theintelligence collection plan. For this reason,the J-2 representative in the C2W cell shouldalso assist in coordinating C2W plans withaffected intelligence activities. Mostintelligence support for C2W is provideddirectly to the organizations/personnel thatplan and execute the elements of C2W.However, all members of the C2W cellshould understand the sources andmethods of intelligence support in order touse the full capabilities of the joint intelligencecommunity and plan the C2 protection ofthose capabilities.

2. Intelligence Support

Intelligence support to C2W activities isthe result of collection, evaluation, analysis,and interpretation of all availableinformation that concerns one or more

aspects of foreign nations or areas. Thesuccess of those responsible for providingintelligence support depends on how well theyunderstand the commander’s intent and howquickly the intelligence support can beadapted to changing situations. Intelligenceproducts and support necessary to plan andexecute C2W include:

a. Data to support C2W, not only aboutthe geographical area of potential conflict, butalso to support aspects of the friendly C2systems protection, including those within thecontinental United States.

b. Assessments of potential adversaryC2 systems (including intelligence supportingthem) to identify critical/vulnerable C2systems, based on the characteristics of thefacilities and personnel as well as the role theyplay in supporting the leadership and militarycapabilities, and general/specific targets. Theassessments should include considerationof:

• the functions of the various C2 systemsduring different stages of militaryoperations.

• details on adversary communications,information, and sensor systems(including both peacetime and wartimeoperating modes).

• organizational structure.

• connectivity, procedures, and deploymentschedules/areas.

“Nothing is more worthy of a good general than the endeavor to penetratethe designs of the enemy.”

Machiavelli

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c. Assessments of the vulnerabilities ofpotential C2 targets to aid in identificationand selection of C2W elements appropriateto engage those targets.

d. Estimates of the benefits fromtargeting and/or protecting (for intelligencevalue) adversary C2 systems to assist inprioritizing C2 targets.

e. Estimates of adversary C2-attackcapabilities to enable C2W planners to assessthe vulnerability of US and friendly C2systems, prioritize C2-protect measures, andprioritize their recommendations for targetingadversary C2-attack capabilities.

f. All-source monitoring of allcomponents of the adversary’s C2 systems,commercial/government journalism (bothbroadcast and print) facilities, and morale“indicators.” These monitoring activitiesshould be conducted prior to, during, and afterthe military operation. Although anadversary’s news and other mass media oftenbroadcast government censored and biasedreporting, they can still provide intelligencecomponents with the feedback necessary todevelop valuable assessments for C2Wplanners regarding the effectiveness of C2Woperations.

g. Counterintelligence (CI) support toC2W includes investigations, operations,collection, analysis and production of foreignintelligence and security service (FISS) andterrorist data. CI provides assessments ofadversary vulnerabilities to friendly militarydeception efforts and nominates FISScol lect ion targets for explo i ta t ion,neut ra l i za t ion or des t ruc t ion . Acounterintelligence staff officer (CISO) isassigned to each combatant command. Oneof the CISO’s primary responsibilities is toact as the information CI coordinationauthority for that combatant command. In thisrole, the CISO works closely with other staff

planners and action officers within thatcombatant command as well as with CIpersonnel from support ing Servicecomponents to ensure that all special CIactivities (including CI operations, collectionand analysis) in the operational area are insupport of and compatible with ongoingOPSEC/ information security, PSYOP, andmilitary deception operations.

h. Deconfliction of planned C2Woperations with intelligence or CIoperations. Simultaneous or sequentialactivities can interfere with other C2W effortsif timing and techniques are not carefullydeconflicted. C2W destruction may affect theability to exploit a given adversary C2 elementor to assess the effectiveness of other C2Wactions such as military deception operations.The requirement for thorough intelligencegain/loss and political/military assessmentswhen determining which targets to select forphysical destruction is central to theintegrating effort of C2W and cannot be over-emphasized.

i. Assist C2-protect by locating andidentifying adversary C2-attack systems.

3. Sources of Intelligence Support

Through the J-2, C2W planners andsupporting joint organizations have accessto support from both the national andcombatant command-level intelligenceproducers and collectors. At the JTF level,the joint intelligence support element (JISE)supports C2W planning and execution. Atthe combatant command level, the theaterjoint intelligence center supports C2Wplanning and execution for combatantcommand C2W planners as well as providingsupport to JTF C2W planners through theJISE. In multinational operations, the J-2should provide assessments to C2W plannersindicating data that can be shared withcoalition planning elements.

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4. Intelligence Support to theElements of C2W

The joint intelligence communitysupports each of the organizations that planand direct use of the elements of C2W. Theunique requirements for, and applications ofintelligence support by the elements of C2Ware discussed below.

a. Intelligence Support for OPSECPlanning. The intelligence support necessaryfor OPSEC planning focuses on thecapabilities and limitations of the adversary’sintelligence gathering system.

• Specific intelligence about theadversary’s intelligence system neededto plan and execute effective OPSECincludes:

•• The adversary’s intelligenceobjectives.

•• The adversary’s means, methods, andfacilities used to collect, process, andanalyze intelligence.

•• Individual and cultural biases thatinfluence the adversary’s interpretationof intelligence information.

• Counterintelligence reporting isrequired for measuring the effectivenessof the OPSEC program.

b. Intelligence Support to PSYOP. TheJoint PSYOP Task Force (JPOTF) requiresseveral types of detailed intelligencesupport. PSYOP forces are often regionallyoriented and have intelligence personnelassigned to their units to coordinate with thejoint intelligence community for requiredintelligence support. Essential elements ofinformation that the JPOTF requires to planand integrate PSYOP effectively with otherelements of C2W are shown in Figure III-1.

c. Intelligence Support to MilitaryDeception. Accurate intelligence allowsmilitary deception planners to identify andanalyze the adversary’s biases andperceptions. During the execution of militarydeception operations, intelligence analysis ofthe adversary’s response to a deception givesplanners a means to gauge the success of thedeception in progress and modify, reinforce,or terminate the deception as necessary. Thesame type of intelligence that supportsmilitary deception may also support PSYOPand OPSEC. Intelligence support tomilitary deception, PSYOP, and OPSECshould be coordinated to allow planners forthese elements to work in tandem tomanipulate the adversary’s perception of theoperational area before, during, and after amilitary operation. The J-2 should view thesethree elements as mutually supporting whentasking collection assets and developingassessments.

• Assessments required to plan amilitary deception operation aresimilar to those identified previously toplan PSYOP. Intelligence requirementsto plan deception operations include:

•• Profiles of key adversary leaders.

•• Country studies that include detailedinformation on cultural, religious, social,and political peculiarities of the countryand region, as well as sources of military,economic, or political support.

•• Analysis of the adversary’sdecisionmaking processes, patterns, andbiases.

•• Current intelligence on the adversary’sperception of the military situation in theoperational area.

•• Assessments of the capabilities andlimitations of the adversary’s intelligencecollection system.

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•• Current intelligence on the adversary’sorder of battle, including assessments ofmorale, capabilities and limitations, unithistory, training, and other appropriateareas.

•• Information on the adversary’s currentforce dispositions and competingdemands for the use of those forces thatcould cause the adversary to redeployforces.

Figure III-1. PSYOP Essential Elements of Information

PSYOP ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION

Adversary command, control, communications, computersand intelligence architecture, including telephone/fax numbersof key command and control nodes and data networkaddresses

Basic area studies on foreign cultures and targeted groupswithin those cultures, to include popular radio/TV programsand personalities, popular periodicals and cartoons,mechanisms for political control, and important holidays andhistorical dates

Current intelligence on targeted group attitudes, alliances,and behavior, to include:

An assessment of the impact that planned PSYOP may haveon individuals outside the targeted group (such asmultinational partners and populations in neighboringcountries)

Determining what target audience can manifest thebehavior required to achieve psychologicaloperations (PSYOP) objectives

Identifying the leadership structure within thetargeted group and which individuals hold theleadership positions (both formal and informalpositions of leadership must be identified)

Assessing what influences the targeted groupand/or their leaders are subject to that could bemanipulated by PSYOP methods to achieve PSYOPobjectives

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•• Assessment of the adversary’s currentand past PSYOP and propagandaactivities and their effectiveness.

•• Assessments of the systems,especial ly communications andbroadcast systems, used by the adversaryto elicit support from the populace.

•• Assessment of the capabilities/l imi ta t ions o f the adversary ’scounterintelligence and security servicesin detecting deception operations orturning them around by doubling backthe intended results.

• Once a military deception has beenplanned and implemented, specific typesof intelligence information should becollected, assessed, analyzed anddisseminated to planners to assist inmeasuring the effectiveness of themilitary deception. Such assessmentsshould highlight:

•• Personnel or equipment movementsthat may have been motivated by thedeception.

•• All source indications of adversaryresponse to the military deception.

• Military deception planners andsupporting intelligence personnel shouldrecognize the difficulty in correctlyassessing information related to anadversary’s reaction to a deception.Any particular indicator or group ofindicators identified and observed by theintelligence community in support of amilitary deception could mean that theadversary:

•• Has been deceived and is respondingin the manner that the military deceptionintended.

•• Has recognized the military deceptionas a deception and is trying to counter-deceive the joint force by feeding falseinformation to the friendly intelligencesystem.

•• Has not received or incorrectlyinterpreted the deception but isresponding in a way that the militarydeception planned for reasons unrelatedto the deception.

Carrier-based electronic support assets provide responsive capabilities toexecute EW missions against specific targets.

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•• Has not received or has incorrectlyinterpreted the deception and is notresponding in the manner that the militarydeception intended.

d. Intelligence Support to EW. EWdepends on all-source, timely intelligence.SIGINT (both communications intelligence-and electronics intelligence-derivedintelligence products, particularly data bases)may be especially useful to joint EW planners.Primary intelligence support for EW is fromthe electronic order of battle (EOB) andsignal data bases such as the ElectronicWarfare Integrated Reprogramming DataBase. Direct support by national and Serviceagency analysts is also provided. EW plannerson the Joint Commanders Electronic WarfareStaff (JCEWS) derive EW targetinginformation from the EOB and use thisinformation to request that other jointorganizations allocate joint force resources toexecute EW missions against the identifiedtarget. The JCEWS may nominate C2 targetsto the C2W cell for consideration/incorporation into the C2W cell’s mastertarget nomination list, which is submitted intothe target nomination process established bythe joint staff operations officer (J-3). Othertypes of EW mission requests should be madeby the JCEWS through the Service orfunctional component commander whocontrols the assets necessary to execute themission.

e. Intelligence Support to PhysicalDestruction. Intelligence support forphysical destruction should be focused onsupporting the targeting process. Intelligenceproducts to support physical destructionmission targeting include:

• Identification of adversary C2 systems(including intelligence), the communicationsarchitecture of those systems, and thefacilities that house those systems.

• Assessments of the vulnerabilities ofadversary C2 systems.

• Identification of the defensive meansused to protect adversary C2 systems.

• Information gathered that may assistin BDA of adversary C2 targets once theyhave been subjected to attack by friendlyforces.

5. Intelligence Role in C2-Protect

Traditional military defensive means,implemented at the component level, shoulddefend against adversary efforts to employphysical destruction and EW against friendlyC2 systems. However, the JFC should takemeasures to protect friendly C2 systemsfrom adversary PSYOP, OPSEC, andmilitary deception operations. Even atechnically unsophisticated adversary may usePSYOP, OPSEC, and/or military deceptionefforts against friendly C2 systems toinfluence friendly perceptions. Protecting thejoint force from adversary OPSEC, PSYOP,and military deception is largely dependenton measures taken by the intelligencecommunity supporting the joint force. TheJFC has many sources to “sense” theoperational area, including information fromhis own forces on a wide range of activities,such as the status of friendly forces as well asintelligence provided by many sources, fromtactical to national. Although there is no wayto guarantee that adversary OPSEC, PSYOP,and/or military deception measures do notdistort the JFC’s perception of the battlefield,there are certain measures that can betaken within the intelligence communitythat should complicate the adversary’s effortsto manipulate friendly perceptions. Thesemeasures include:

a. Training intelligence analysts aboutmilitary deception methods and to consider

III-7


the possibility of military deception whenanalyzing collected intelligence information.

b. Enforcing information securityprocedures.

c. Training intelligence analysts torecognize their own cultural biases and to

use analytical procedures that shouldminimize the impact of those biases.

d. Cooperating with counterintelligenceefforts through active coordination with theCISO.

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Intentionally Blank

CHAPTER IVJOINT C2W ORGANIZATION

1. General

a. The organizational structure to planand coordinate C2W should be sufficientlyflexible to accommodate a variety of planningand operational circumstances. This chapterfocuses on how to organize to plan andexecute C2W operations.

b. To be successful, C2W should be anintegral part of all joint military operations .This requires extensive planning andcoordination among many elements of thejoint headquarters, component staffs, andother USG departments and agencies to ensurethat C2W operations are fully integrated withother portions of operation and campaignplans.

c. How the staff is organized to plan andcoordinate C2W is the joint forcecommander’s prerogative. Since joint forcecommanders are supported by staffs withdiverse structure, scope of responsibilities, andsupporting infrastructure, there is no single“correct” way to organize personnel to planand execute C2W.

d. The principal types of joint staffs thatmay be involved in C2W planning are thecombatant command staffs, subordinateunified command staffs, and the JTF staffs.The circumstances in which these types ofstaffs conduct C2W planning may affect theoptimal organization to carry out their duties.

• The combatant command andsubordinate unified command staffs,supported by relatively large andelaborate infrastructures, can call on the

expertise of personnel assigned to theircomponent commands to assist in theplanning process. These staffs use theplanning process specified by the JointOperation Planning and ExecutionSystem (JOPES) to carry out planningresponsibilities. During a crisis or othershort notice operation, the commandwhich is designated the “supportedcommand” can call on the expertise andtechnical support of all other commandsdesignated “supporting commands.”

• A JTF staff may be required to plan and/or execute C2W operations in an “adhoc” environment. With the exceptionof a few “standing” JTF staffs, these staffsdo not have the support of an elaborate,permanent infrastructure. A JTF staffmay be required to plan and/or executeC2W operations immediately uponarrival in the operational area, whileconducting forward presence operations,or after a short notice deployment whilethe infrastructure to support the staff isbeing built around them.

e. Joint force staffs already haveorganizations (staff elements and/orcomponents) that are tasked to manage theelements of C2W. The JFC should establishmechanisms to effectively coordinate theefforts of these organizations to build andexecute a synergetic C2W plan that supportsthe commander’s mission and concept ofoperations. There are a number of waysfor the JFC to organize the staff to ensureC2W efforts are fully coordinated. The useof the term “C2W cell” in this publicationshould not be taken as advocating one

“Good will can make any organization work; conversely the best organization inthe world is unsound if the men who have to make it work don’t believe in it.”

James Forrestal

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particular type of C2W staff organization.Some of the staff organization options forC2W include:

• Conducting C2W planning duringexisting daily planning meetings, suchas the Operations Planning Group usedon some staffs. This is done to ensuremacro-level synchronization of theelements of C2W. After macro-levelsynchronization is accomplished,detailed coordination could be conducteddirectly between affected staff elementsand components.

• Forming a C2W cell of selectrepresentatives from each of the staffelements and components responsible forthe five elements of C2W, other staffrepresentatives as required, andsupporting agency augmentees. This cellwould conduct brainstorming tosuccessfully merge the five elements ofC2W into a synergistic plan. The cellwould be a coordinating body and relyon the staff elements and/or componentsthat are represented in the C2W cell tocarry out the detailed support necessaryto plan and execute C2W. Figure IV-1shows a notional structure for a C2W cell.Applicabil ity to CINC staffs orsubordinate joint forces may vary due tostaff resources and responsibilities. Moststaffs already have C2W planning andcoordinating cells. Integration of C2Wresources into the larger IW cell canfacilitate deconfliction of compartmentedand noncompartmented IW activities andprovide planners more resources tosupport operational planning. Positionsare described as either resident ornonresident. Resident implies that theindividual fulfilling the function shouldpreferably be co-located with or in closeproximity to the other IW cell membersbecause of anticipated frequentcoordination with them. Nonresidentimplies that the individual performing the

function would not require frequentcontact with other IW cell members, butstill plays a critical role in planning andcoordination.

2. Joint Force C2W Organization

a. JFC. The JFC, whether a combatantcommander, subordinate unified commander,or CJTF designated for a particular operation,should provide guidance for planning andconduct of C2W operations and be assignedresponsibility for the employment of C2Wresources in joint operations within the scopeof his authority. In multinational operations,the US JFC may be responsible forcoordinating the integration of US joint C2Woperations and multinational C2W assets,strategy, and planning.

b. Joint Staff Operations Officer. Thejoint force commander may delegateresponsibility for C2W to a member of thejoint staff, normally the J-3. When soauthorized, the J-3 will have primary staffresponsibility for planning, coordinating,and integrating joint force C2Woperations.

c. C2W Organization. To assist the J-3in exercising joint C2W responsibilities, thejoint force commander will normallydesignate a C2W officer. The primaryfunction of a C2W officer should be to serveas a C2W “facilitator” for coordinating theintegration of C2W elements between variousparts of the JFC’s staff, higher echelon staffs,component staffs, and multinational staffs.The C2W officer will ensure that C2W isimplemented via the method chosen by theJFC. This may entail representing C2Wconcerns at critical planning meetings, leadingthe “C2W cell,” and/or directly facilitatingcoordination between the staff organization/components responsible for each of theelements of C2W. Assistance in establishingand maintaining a C2W organization forplanning and execution of C2W is available

IV-3


Figure IV-1. Nominal C2W Cell

J3

NOMINAL C2W CELL

C2W CELL

OTHERREPS

J5

J6

PAO

SERVICECOMPONENTS

FUNCTIONALCOMPONENTS

OTHER

C2W Command & Control WarfareEWO Electronic Warfare OfficerJCEWS Joint Commander of Electronic Warfare StaffJPOTF Joint Psychological Operations Task ForceTC Targeting Cell(s)OPSEC Operations SecurityPAO Public Affairs Officer

OPSECProgram Rep

PAO REP

J6 REP

J5 REP

MilitaryDeception Rep

J2 REP

PSYOPREP

EWO

TARGETINGREP

COMPONENTREPS

J2

C2W CELL

OTHER REPS

C2W OFFICER

JCEWS

JOINTOPSEC

PROGRAM

JCEWS

TC

MILITARYDECEPTIONPLANNERS

JPOTF

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from the Joint Command and Control WarfareCenter (JC2WC) as delineated in Chairmanof the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI)5118.01, “Charter for the Joint Command andControl Warfare Center.” (A portion of thisinstruction detailing the functions of theJC2WC is provided in Annex A to AppendixB, “Joint Command and Control WarfareCenter Support to C2W.” Assistance providedby other joint agencies supporting C2W arealso discussed in Appendix B, “SupportingAgencies Responsibilities in C2W.”)

• C2W officer functions: A C2W officershould normally be tasked with ensuringthe functions shown in Figure IV-2 areperformed.

• C2W cell methods. The methods usedby the C2W cell to carry out theirassigned responsibilities should bedetermined by the J-3 or C2W officer.During the planning phases of anoperation, C2W planners should facilitatethe coordination of planning effortsbetween various staffs, organizations, andparts of the JFC staff that are responsiblefor planning the five elements of C2W.During the execution phase of anoperation, C2W planners should beavailable to the Joint Operations Center(JOC) or its equivalent to assist indeconfliction, support, or adjustment ofC2W efforts as necessary. If C2Wmanning permits and the J-3 or C2Wofficer designates, C2W personnel maybe part of the JOC watch team orstand a separate watch during theexecution phase of an operation. Becauseof the need to integrate C2W efforts tosupport overall operation objectives, anyC2W watchstanders should be able tocoordinate C2W efforts with JOCwatchstanders. During the executionphase of an operation, C2W personnelshould have the communicationsconnectivity, either through the JOC orseparately, to effectively coordinate

changing C2W requirements in a timelymanner. Due to the sensitive nature ofsome aspects of C2W (such as militarydeception), all members of the C2Wcell should have the appropriatesecurity clearance and access necessaryto fulfill their C2W responsibilities.

• Planning organization of C2Welements. Planning necessary toaccomplish C2W should beaccomplished by the planningorganizations (JCEWS, JPOTF, andother planning organizations) for the fiveelements of C2W and their existingplanning processes. The organizationalrelationships between the joint C2W celland these organizations is the prerogativeof the JFC. These “element level”organizations provide guidance for theemployment of their respective elementsboth to the Service and functionalcomponents and to combatantcommanders which have operationalcontrol of the forces employing theelements of C2W against an adversary.The size, structure, and planning methodsused by these planning organizationsvary widely. The specific dut ies andresponsib i l i t ies of representativesfrom these element level organizationsshould be worked out between the C2Wofficer and the senior member of eachelement organization. Authorizedmanning levels, mission, and location ofthe JFC staff vis-a-vis each element-levelorganization are among theconsiderations that should be taken intoaccount in determining how element-level organizations are “represented” inthe JFC staff organization. Specificinformation about the organization of theelements of C2W is contained in otherjoint doctrine publications listed inAppendix C, “References.”

d. The Joint Staff Intelligence Officer(J-2) Role in C2W. The J-2 is responsible

IV-5


Figure IV-2. Command and Control Warfare (C2W) Officer Functions

for the timely collecting, processing,analyzing, tailoring, and disseminating ofall-source intelligence to support the

elements of C2W. The J-2 should ensure thatall-source intelligence is provided to C2Wplanners and the element planning

COMMAND AND CONTROL WARFARE (C2W)OFFICER FUNCTIONS

Coordinating and directing the overall C2W effort for the jointforce commander (JFC)

Coordinating C2W issues within the joint staff and counterpartC2W planners on the component staffs

Coordinating command and control (C2)-attack and C2-protectconcepts to support the JFC concept of operations

Establishing C2W priorities to accomplish planned objectives

Determining the availability of C2W resources to carry out C2Wplans

Recommending tasking to the J-3 for the joint organizations, staffand elements (i.e., Joint Commander's Electronic Warfare Staff,military deception planners) that plan and supervise the elementsof C2W. Consolidated J-3 tasking should ensure efficiency ofeffort in planning and executing integrated C2W operations. TheC2W officer should also deconflict taskings to prevent differentelements of C2W from working at cross purposes while pursuingthe same objective (e.g., electronic attack against target plannedfor receipt of deception material)

Serving as the primary "advocate" for C2W targets nominated forattack by physical destruction assets throughout the targetnomination and review process established by the joint forcecommander

Coordinating the planning and execution of C2W operationsbetween the joint organizations responsible for each element ofC2W

Coordinating intelligence suppor t to the five elements of C2W

Coordinating C2W support from the Joint Command and ControlWarfare Center and other joint agencies

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organizations of C2W. The J-2 shouldcoordinate with component and subordinatecommands’ intelligence sections to obtain thespecific intelligence needed to plan andexecute C2W. The J-2 should contribute tothe combat assessment efforts coordinated bythe J-3 in order to provide the timely feedbacknecessary to modify the C2W plan during allphases of an operation. Intelligence supportfor C2W is discussed at greater length inChapter III, “Intelligence Support to C2W.”

e. The Joint Plans Officer (J-5) role inC2W. The J-5 normally has responsibilityfor long-term planning on a joint staff. TheJ-5 should work with C2W planners todevelop long range C2W plans as part of theJOPES deliberate planning process. Since allC2W plans should support an overalloperation plan, long-range C2W plansshould be fully integrated into a specificoverall operation plan. Determiningwhether or not the J-5 is part of an operationalC2W cell involved in JOPES crisis actionplanning is the prerogative of the JFC.However, the necessity to coordinate jointC2W operations with ongoing national- andtheater-level operations during a crisis is arole with which the J-5 may be tasked as partof a C2W cell.

f. The Command, Control, Communications,and Computer Systems Officer (J-6) rolein C2W. The joint force commander’s staffJ-6 is normally responsible forcommunications and computer support forthe joint staff. C2W planners shouldcoordinate closely with the J-6 to ensure thatthe connectivity required to plan and executeC2W is planned for and provided during boththe planning and execution phase of anoperation. The J-6 should use the expertiseavailable from the elements of C2W, as wellas intelligence assessments of adversary C2-attack capabilities, in planning and buildingcommunications and information systemsarchitectures to support the joint staff. The

J-6 should work closely with C2W plannersin planning C2-protect measures for friendlyC2 infrastructure. J-6 coordination with C2Wplanners is also critical during developmentof the JRFL.

g. Special Technical Operations (STO).The Joint Staff, unified commands, andintelligence agencies all have STOorganizations. They communicate throughthe Planning and Decision Aid System. TheC2W planner should be fully integrated intothis cell to ensure that STO planning is fullyintegrated and coordinated.

h. PA Role in C2W. A representativefrom the joint public affairs office shouldbe designated to work with C2W plannersto ensure that public affairs programs andinitiatives complement C2W operations. ThePA representative should have an appropriatelevel of security clearance and have access,on a “need-to-know” basis, to those C2Woperations which could be impacted by publicaffairs initiatives that are inconsistent withthose operations. The PA representativecoordinating with the C2W planners shouldnot be the PA or any person acting as aspokesperson responsible for briefing mediapersonnel. However, this PA representativeshould have a comprehensive understandingof the friendly command information programand an understanding of media/militaryrelations and press pool operations. The PArepresentative should also be able to reporton current media activities and provide anassessment of media reports on currentoperations.

i. Role of Other Joint Staff Personnel inC2W. Figure IV-1 is not intended to be allinclusive in determining which members of ajoint staff should coordinate with C2Wplanners. Some joint force commandersmay desire other personnel, such as a judgeadvocate or civil affairs officer, to coordinatewith C2W planners. The JFC should tailor

IV-7


the composition of the cell as necessary toaccomplish the mission.

j. Role of Functional and ServiceComponent Representatives in C2W.Functional and Service componentcommanders should organize their staffsas required to plan and control C2W. AC2W point of contact or C2W officer shouldbe designated. This officer, or an assistant,will interface with the joint force C2Worganization to provide component expertiseand act as a liaison for C2W matters betweenthe joint force and the component. Theserepresentatives may also serve as membersof one or more of the element levelorganizations of C2W (i.e., the JCEWS).

k. Role of Non-DOD US GovernmentAgencies as well as Representatives ofMultinational Forces and TheirGovernments. Non-DOD US governmentdepartments and agencies may also have a rolein the accomplishment of C2W. JFCs andtheir C2W officers should ensure that non-DOD US departments and agencies that haveongoing programs and interests in the joint

operations area are consulted in thedevelopment of C2W plans. The support ofnon-DOD US government agencies should beconsidered as part of the C2W plan whenappropriate. Likewise, the potentialcontributions and concerns of multinationalforces and their governments should beconsidered when appropriate.

3. Relationship Between JointC2W and SupportingOrganizations

As discussed above, C2W planners useother joint organizations to plan andexecute joint C2W operations. Supportfrom these organizations includes, but is notlimited to, personnel augmentation from theJC2WC, Joint Spectrum Center (JSC), theJoint COMSEC Monitoring Activity(JCMA), and the Joint Warfare AnalysisCenter (JWAC). Additionally, through thevarious planning organizations that plan anddirect the five elements of C2W, the C2Wplanners have access to the Service orfunctional component expertise necessaryto plan the employment or protection ofService component systems or units. Each ofthe US Military Services is developingService-specific doctrine on IW and/or C2W.

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Intentionally Blank

CHAPTER VC2W PLANNING

V-1

1. General

All elements of C2W must be carefullyplanned. Whether C2W planning for aparticular military operation occurs as part ofthe deliberate planning cycle or in responseto a crisis, the key to building a successfulC2W plan is the integration of the elementsof C2W (both offensive and defensive). DetailedC2W planning and integrat ion isaccomplished by organizations and personnelcharged with planning the five elements of C2Wusing the JOPES planning process and other keystaff and support personnel.

2. C2W Planning as a Part ofJOPES

C2W plans should be developed insupport of the JFC’s overall operationalplanning. To do this, C2W planning shouldoccur simultaneously with operation planning.JOPES Volume II is the operational planner’sguide to developing operation plans throughthe deliberate planning process.

a. C2W in the Deliberate PlanningProcess. Figure V-1 provides a general guideto C2W planning as a part of the JOPESdeliberate planning process. As highlightedin Chapter II, “The Elements of C2W,” thecombatant commander and subordinateJFC determine the composition, authority,and duties of the C2W planning effort.There are a number of ways to organize toensure that the C2W effort is fully coordinated.Options available include planning meetings,informal coordination among staff elements,and forming standing C2W cells. The use ofthe term “C2W cell” in this chapter canaccommodate any of these options.

• Concept Development. The initial C2Wplanning effort in deliberate planningtakes place during the “ConceptDevelopment” phase (Phase II). Duringthis multi-step phase the C2W cellshould:

•• Meet to consider the scope of theplanning problem and evaluate whatinformation is required to develop aC2W plan. Initial steps should includetasking C2W cell members to identifyappropriate sections of completedoperation plans and search for relevanthistorical data, such as in the JointUniversal Lessons Learned System(JULLS) data base. Cell members shouldbe tasked to determine informationplanning requirements and taskrespective organizations to gather thenecessary information. (Phase II, Step 2)

•• The C2W officer should coordinatewith the J-3 and other operationalplanners to recommend appropriateC2W objectives and planningguidance to the JFC. (Phase II, Step 3)

•• Once the JFC has determined C2Wobjectives and provided planningguidance, the C2W officer and the“element” representatives in the cellshould work with the J-2, J-5, J-6, andother J-3 planners to develop a staffestimate of alternative courses ofaction (COAs). Service and functionalcomponent representatives from theC2W cell may also assist in thedevelopment of the staff estimate byproviding information about thecapabilities and/or limitations of

“If a man does not know to what port he is steering, no wind is favorable.”

Seneca

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C2W PLANNING RELATED TO DELIBERATE PLANNING

PLANNINGPHASE

JOPESC2W CELL PLANNING

ACTIONC2W PLANNING

OUTCOME

PHASE I Initiation Notify C2W cell members ofplanning requirement

N/A

PHASE II ConceptDevelopment

Step 1 Mission AnalysisC2W cell identifies informationrequirements needed for missionplanning.

Tasking to gather/obtain requiredinformation.

Step 2PlanningGuidance

C2W Officer/cell assists indevelopment of JFC's C2Wplanning guidance to supportoverall operational planningguidance.

JFC's planningguidance for C2W.

Step 3 Staff Estimates

C2W cell supports thedevelopment of intelligence,operations, and communicationsstaff estimates.

C2W portion of staffestimates.

Step 4Commander'sEstimate

C2W Officer/cell assists intransforming staff estimates intothe Commander's Estimate.

C2W portion ofCommander'sEstimate.

Step 5 CINC's ConceptC2W Officer/cell assists in thedevelopment of C2W aspect ofCINC's Concept as required.

C2W portion ofCINC's Concept.

Step 6CJCS ConceptReview

C2W Officer/cell assists in theC2W aspect of CJCS ConceptReview as required.

C2W portion ofoperational conceptapproved by CJCS.

PHASE IIIPlanDevelopment

C2W cell develops the completeC2W plan and the plans for eachof the C2W elements incoordination with appropriatestaff sections and operationalunits.

Draft C2W appendixwith element tabs.

PHASE IV Plan ReviewC2W cell modified/refines plan asnecessary.

Approved C2Wappendix.

PHASE V Support Plans

Subordinate units prepare theirown C2W plans. C2W cellcoordinates/assists subordinateC2W plan development asnecessary. Ensure TPFDDsupports C2W plan.

Completedsubordinatesupporting plans.C2W plan supportedby TPFDD.

Figure V-1. C2W Planning Related to Deliberate Planning

subordinate units. C2W planners shouldalso ensure that appropriate coordinationhas taken place with other departments/

agencies of the USG as well asmultinational partners to validatepotentially sensitive aspects of each

V-3

C2W Planning

prospective COA. During this step, theC2W planners should carefully reviewany C2W-related assumptions onwhich the staff estimate is to be based.This review of assumptions shouldensure that any assumptions made arereasonably based on known facts orprobable outcomes/actions. (Phase II,Step 3)

•• During the JFC’s process ofreviewing/altering the staff estimate tomake it the “Commander’s Estimate,”the C2W cell should assist in refiningthe role of C2W in each consideredCOA. (Phase II, Step 4)

•• If the joint staff involved in thedeliberate planning process to this pointis other than a combatant commander’sstaff, the JFC’s C2W officer shouldbrief the CINC’s C2W officer on therole of C2W in the various Commander’sEstimate COAs. After reviewing the roleof C2W in the Commander’s Estimate,the CINC’s C2W officer should workwith the CINC’s C2W cell to develop therole of C2W in the “CINC’s Concept.”(The CINC’s C2W officer and othermembers of the CINC’s C2W cell mayalready be assisting the JFC C2W cell’splanning to develop the “Commander’sEstimate.”) (Phase II, Step 5)

•• After approval of the “CINC’sConcept,” the CINC’s C2W officershould assist in briefing the Joint Staffin Washington D.C. on the role of C2Win the “CINC’s Concept” as part of theCJCS review. (Phase II, Step 6)

• Plan Development (Phase III). Oncethe concept has been approved, theplanning focus of the C2W cell turns todevelopment of the complete C2W planto support the approved overalloperational concept.

•• Methodology. The C2W cell shouldmeet frequently to exchange informationabout plans being developed for eachelement of C2W. The exchange of ideasand problem areas encountered byelement level planners are intended tostimulate discussion among the variouselement representatives in the C2W cell.These discussions should focus on howthe various elements complement eachother to accomplish mission objectivesas well as deconflict potential actions.These informational exchanges shouldstimulate a sense of “teamwork” amongthe various elements.

•• C2W Appendix. The basic C2Wappendix should be short, clearly statethe primary missions of each of theelements of C2W, and provide thenecessary guidance to ensure that theelements are all working towards theaccomplishment of the stated C2Wmission through coordinated actions.Detailed execution instructions foreach of the elements should beprovided in the tabs to the C2Wappendix. The C2W officer has primaryresponsibility for drafting the C2WAppendix for the OPLAN, while theelement representatives in the C2W celldevelop their respective element tabs tothe C2W Appendix.

•• C2W in Other Aspects of theOPLAN. In addition to drafting theirown portions of the OPLAN, the C2Wofficer and “element” representativesin the cell should work closely withother members of the joint staff (J-2,J-3, J-4, J-5, J-6) to ensure that C2Wrequirements/considerations areincorporated into all aspects of the jointplan.

•• Expert Support. Besides workingwith other “planners,” C2W planners

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Joint Pub 3-13.1

should consult with other members ofthe joint staff such as the public affairsofficer or the Judge Advocate General,as necessary, as part of the plandevelopment process. Likewise,functional/Service component andoutside agency (i.e., JC2WC, JSC,JWAC, JCMA) support should berequested as required during plandevelopment.

• Plan Review (Phase IV). The role ofthe C2W officer and C2W cell in the planreview phase are similar to the role inthe concept development phase. At eachlevel of review, the C2W officer andcell members should review thechanges, suggestions and concernsexpressed in the review process and makerefinements in the C2W plan and elementlevel plans. The C2W officer and cellmembers should be proactive in ensuringthat the review process includesconsideration and coordination withother departments and/or agencies of theUSG as well as multinational agenciesand military forces as required.

• Supporting Plans (Phase V). The C2Wofficer and other members of the C2Wcell should assist subordinate units in

the development of supporting C2Wplans. Cell members should workclosely with J-4 planners, subordinateunits, and support agencies integral to theC2W plan to ensure that all C2Wpersonnel/materiel support requirementsare included in time-phased force anddeployment data and promulgated in thetime-phased force and deployment list.

b. C2W in Crisis Action Planning.Figure V-2 provides a general guide toC2W planning as a part of the JOPES crisisaction planning process. In contrast todeliberate planning, crisis action planningnormally takes place in a compressed timeperiod. In crisis action planning, coordinationbetween all concerned with development ofthe C2W plan is even more crucial than indeliberate planning.

• Situation Development. Although acrisis requiring a military response mayarise with little or no notice, there isusually a period of days or weeks overwhich indications and warning giveplanners notice of a developing crisis.Although this “situation development”period requires plan development on ashortened time line, the C2W officer andC2W cell should meet to review

INFORMATION WARFARE PRINCIPLES OF THIRD-WAVE WAR

Centralize policy strategy and planning, but decentralized force planning andexecution. . . Use many thinking heads. Don’t make decapitation easy for theenemy. . . Take advantage of the inherent strength in the American military’spolicy that allows for local initiative and flexibility and eschews rigidlycentralized command and control. . . Take advantage of all sectors of society— television newscast, off-the-shelf computers or communications systems,existing COMSATs, fax machines, computer bulletin boards, and internationalcorporate connectivity. All these and other assets should be considered aspotential parts of the national war effort. . . Proliferation breeds survivability.In general, many nodes, many systems, many pathways make a harder targetthan just a few things. . .Use small, movable COMSAT receivers and movethem more often. . . Ensure that you have a technological C3 advantage.

SOURCE: Airpower Journal, Winter 1994

V-5

C2W Planning

C2W PLANNING RELATED TO CRISIS ACTION PLANNING

PLANNINGPHASE

JOPESC2W CELL PLANNING

ACTIONC2W PLANNING

OUTCOME

PHASE ISituationDevelopment

C2W cell identifies planninginformation requirements assituation develops.

Tasking to gather/obtain requiredinformation.

PHASE II CrisisAssessment

Same as Mission Analysis andPlanning Guidance steps indeliberate planning.

C2W planningguidance. Initialliaison with units thatmay participate inC2W operations.

PHASE III Course of ActionDevelopment

Same as Staff Estimates Stepsin deliberate planning.

C2W portion of staffestimates.

PHASE IV Course of ActionSelection

Same as Commander's Estimateand CINC Concept steps indeliberate planning.

C2W portion of overallplan approvedthrough CJCS.

PHASE VExecutionPlanning

Same as Plan DevelopmentPhase in deliberate planning.

Approved C2Wappendix and elementtabs, completedsupporting plans andinclusion of C2Wrequirements inTPFDL.

PHASE VI Execution

C2W cell monitors C2Woperations and adapts C2Wobjectives to support changingoperational objectives.

C2W objectivesmodified asnecessary to supportchanging operationalobjectives.

indications and warning informationwhen appropriate and begin the processof concept development just as would bedone in deliberate planning. Informationplanning requirements, existingoperation plans, previous lessons learned,and exercise/historical C2W plans shouldbe screened for usefulness.

• Crisis Assessment. When situationdevelopment evolves into a recognizedcrisis, C2W planning during the crisisassessment phase consists of missionanalysis and the development ofplanning guidance as discussed

previously in the deliberate planningprocess. Depending on the indicatedurgency of the crisis, the C2W officer and“element” cell members shouldsimultaneously begin working withsubordinate units and agencies to identifyand prepare personnel/ materiel that maybe required for C2W operations formovement in support of military responseto the crisis. As C2W intelligencerequirements are identified, the J-2representative on the C2W cell shouldforward requests for C2W intelligencesupport to higher echelons or outsideagencies as appropriate.

Figure V-2. C2W Planning Related to Crisis Action Planning

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• Course of Action Development. TheC2W cell should ensure that C2Wrelevant planning assumptions beingmade are related to known facts andprobable outcomes, and that noprobable crisis scenario is overlooked orassumed away in haste.

• Course of Action Selection. The courseof action selection phase of crisis actionplanning is comparable to theCommander’s Estimate. C2W cellmembers should continue tocoordinate with subordinate units andsupporting agencies on supportpreparations and plan development. Ifallies/coalition partners are proposed forinclusion in one or more proposedcourses of action, C2W cell membersshould identify their allied/coalitioncounterparts and seek approval toestablish contact with their counterparts.

• Execution Planning. Once a course ofaction has been selected and approved,C2W cell planning efforts should focuson the detailed planning necessary toexecute the chosen course of action. Inaddition to drafting the C2W appendix,supporting element tabs, and supportplans, the C2W officer and cell membersshould continue to monitor the unfoldingcrisis and indicators which could impacton C2W operations. Working relationshipswith multinational counterparts should beestablished if appropriate to the selectedcourse of action. Close liaison withC2W subordinate units andsupporting agencies should bemaintained to monitor movement ofunits to the deployed support locationwhile keeping apprised of the readinessstatus of personnel and equipment. TheC2W officer and other cell membersshould work closely with the J-4 toensure that those units required in placeearly on to support the C2W plan aregiven priority in obtaining the necessary

transportation. The C2W cell must alsowork closely with the J-6 to ensure thatthe necessary C2 infrastructure (hardware,software, and communications support) isin place to support C2W efforts, and thatC2-protect measures are implemented inbuilding the C2 infrastructure to supportthe crisis.

• Execution. During this phase, a militaryresponse is implemented and operationsare conducted by the supportedcommander until the crisis is resolved.During the execution phase, the C2Wcell should focus on ensuring that C2Woperations evolve along with theoverall operational objective. TheC2W officer should place heavyemphasis on focusing the elements ofC2W against specific C2W objectivesthat support the operational objectivesand on deconflicting individual C2Wactions with each other.

3. Differences in C2W Planningfor War and MOOTW

Planning C2W for military operationsin war and MOOTW uses basically thesame process. The differences in planningfor these two types of military operations liesin the specific inputs required and outcomesrecommended from the planning process. Theprincipal differences between planning C2Wto support military operations in war orMOOTW are the identification of the “threat”,the C2W objective, and appropriate C2Wactions and procedures for a specific militaryoperation.

a. In war, where the overall objective ofUS military operations is to fight and win,the primary threat to the friendly C2 “targetset” is usually an adversary’s military forces,but may include unconventional means todeny, degrade, influence or exploit the friendlyC2 target set. The C2W objective in war isto achieve C2 superiority over an identified

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adversary military force. The actions/procedures available to accomplish C2Wobjectives in war could include the entirerange of military and technical capabilitiesavailable to the USG — subject to rules ofengagement (ROE), legal, moral, diplomatic,and politico-military considerations andreview.

b. In MOOTW , where the overallobjective is to either deter war and resolveconflict or to promote peace and support UScivil authorities, the “threat” to the friendlyC2 “target set” as well as the C2Wobjective to support a specific militaryoperation may be less easily identifiable.Likewise, the actions/procedures available toaccomplish the C2W objective in MOOTWwill almost certainly be more restricted thanthose available for wartime operations.

• The key to successfully identifying the“threat” to friendly C2 is incomprehensive intelligence analysis.Possibilities of a “threat” to friendlyC2 during MOOTW could include:

•• organized military forces who areovertly or covertly opposed to thepresence or objectives of US or friendlymilitary forces.

•• paramilitary, guerrilla, or policeforces overtly or covertly opposed to thepresence or objectives of US or friendlymilitary forces.

•• political, religious or social factions/groups, inside or outside the theater ofoperations. If these groups are overtly orcovertly opposed to the presence orobjectives of US or friendly militaryforces on a specific mission, they maybe motivated to actively try to deny,degrade, influence or exploit the friendlyC2 target set to oppose US/friendlyobjectives.

•• individuals, inside or outside thetheater of operations. If individuals aremotivated to actively oppose the presenceor objectives of US or friendly militaryforces on a specific mission, they maytry to deny, degrade, influence or exploitthe friendly C2 target set to oppose US/friendly objectives.

• Once the C2 “threat” is identified, C2Wplanners should ensure that theformulation of a C2W objective isappropriate to the “non-traditional”aspects of the threat and to the specificoperation being supported.

• When the threat to friendly C2 isorganized military or paramilitary forces,the actions/procedures appropriate forachieving C2 superiority may besimilar to C2W in wartime militaryoperations. When the threat to friendlyC2 is from political, religious, socialfactions/groups or individuals, theactions/procedures to achieve C2superiority may be limited by legal,moral, diplomatic, or politico-militaryconsiderations. Against such a threat,the C2W actions/procedures may belimited to C2-protect of the friendly C2“target set” through OPSEC, PSYOP, andmilitary deception, while relying oninteragency and/or multinationalintelligence, law enforcement, diplomatic,and public affairs cooperation to conduct“C2-attack” against the “adversary.”

4. Coordination of C2W

The JFC should provide guidance andestablish procedures within the joint forcefor planning, coordinating, and executingC2W. Coordination of joint C2W supportshould be accomplished to the maximumextent possible at the lowest possible levelamong the Service and functionalcomponents.

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C2W IN THE PERSIAN GULF

Major emphasis was placed on command and control warfare during DESERTSHIELD and DESERT STORM. Commanders integrated security, deception,psychological operations and warfare efforts during DESERT SHIELD to pavethe way for successful combat operations. During planning for DESERTSTORM leadership recognized that Iraq’s command and control was a criticalvulnerability whose destruction could enable victory with minimal friendly loss.This is evident from the Secretary of Defense’s guidance outlining the militaryobjectives for DESERT STORM:

· Neutralize the Iraqi national command authority’s ability to direct militaryoperations.

· Eject Iraqi armed forces from Kuwait.

· Destroy the Iraqi Republican Guard.

· Destroy Iraqi ballistic missile and nuclear, biological, and chemical warfarecapabilities.

· Assist in the restoration of the legitimate government of Kuwait.

During DESERT STORM’s air operations, the enemy was selectively blindedby electronic warfare and physical destruction to mask friendly forcemovements and operations. Deception operations continued to enforceerroneous enemy perceptions of the CINC’s intentions. Electronic warfareand precision air strikes against command and control targets were used todisorganize and isolate Iraqi forces. When the ground attack commenced,Iraqi forces were close to disintegration, with numerous formations unable tocoordinate their efforts. The need for synchronization was an early lessonlearned and demonstrated immediate payoffs. Successfully denying SaddamHussein the ability to command and control his forces substantially reducedcasualties on all sides and significantly reduced the time required to achieveCoalition objectives.

SOURCE: R.J. Spiller, Combined Arms in Battle Since 1939

• Coordinate development of specific plansfor the elements of C2W among theorganizations responsible for theelements.

• Determine the availability of C2W assetsand ensure that all components are awareof those assets.

• Recommend priorities for C2W to the J-3.

• Coordinate component requirements andrequests for cross-Service C2W support.

a. Joint Coordination Procedures. TheC2W cell, under the supervision of the J-3,should serve as the focal point forpreplanning joint C2W within the jointforce. The C2W cell should ensure that C2Wis considered in each phase of the joint forceOPLAN or operation order. The C2W cellshould:

• Develop a concept on how availableC2W assets can best support the JFC’smission.

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• Coordinate intelligence requirementsbetween the various elements of C2W.

• Ensure C2-protect is adequately planned.

b. Component Coordination Procedures.C2W operations are executed by componentforces. Therefore, C2W operations arenormally centrally planned andcoordinated and decentrally executed. Anysupport required from another componentshould be approved by the JFC’s C2W officerand deconflicted by members of the jointC2W cell. The following paragraphs providea brief overview of how to coordinate witheach of the Service components and the jointforce special operations component.

• US Army Coordination Procedures.The Army component commander isresponsible for Army coordination of

inter-Service C2W support. Within theArmy component command staff,requirements for other Servicecomponent C2W support should beestablished by the C2W officer incoordination with the DivisionOperations Officer (G-3). If the Armycomponent command is a corps level

command, the C2W officer shouldcoordinate with both the G-3 and firesupport coordinator or fire supportelement (FSE). Conversely, othercomponents requiring Army C2Wsupport should initially coordinatethose support requirements with theC2W officer at the Army componentcommander’s headquarters or TacticalOperations Center. The Theater AirControl System (TACS) or Army Air-Ground System (AAGS) may be used tocoordinate immediate requests for ArmyC2W support. In this case, othercomponents should communicate theirC2W support requests via the TACS orAAGS to the FSE and C2W officer or tothe C2W section at corps or division level.Air Force and Army coordinationnormally flows through the battlefieldcoordination element at the air

operations center. C2W officers athigher echelons monitor C2W requestsand resolve conflicts when necessary.When Army component requirementsfor cross-Service C2W support cannotbe directly coordinated between components,the C2W officer should coordinatedirectly with the joint C2W cell.

When conducting joint operations, C-130 Compass Call aircraft provide supportto the JFC in executing the C2W mission.

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• US Navy Coordination Procedures. Innaval task forces, the Command andControl Warfare Commander is thepoint of contact for C2W coordinationbetween Service components comprisinga joint force.

• US Marine Corps CoordinationProcedures.

•• C2W is integrated into thecombined arms strategy under thestaff cognizance of the Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) G-3 orpossibly the G-5. The G-3, in coordinationwith other key principal and special staffofficers, advises and assists the MAGTFcommander in developing and executinga MAGTF C2W strategy and a jointC2W strategy, when applicable. C2Wplanning is closely involved withMAGTF targeting and integrates itsactions with fire support. The G-3deconflicts jamming, SIGINT, andcritical communications frequenciesthrough the SIGINT/EW CoordinationCenter (S/EWCC) located within theTactical Sensitive CompartmentedInformation Facility. The G-3 isrepresented in the S/EWCC by theElectronic Warfare Officer.

•• Actual MAGTF detailed C2Wplanning begins within the MAGTFfuture operations planning section whichuses the Maneuver Warfare PlanningProcess to execute its mission of planningoperations to be conducted 48 to 96 hoursout.

•• When the MAGTF operates as theMarine Service component within a jointforce, then the MAGTF futureoperations planning section retains thebroader planning responsibilities toinclude C2W strategy planning, andthus also serves as the C2Wcoordinating agency with other

components and the joint C2W cell.If a separate Marine Service componentstaff exists, its future operations planningsection will coordinate among itsMAGTFs, other components, and thejoint C2W cell.

•• When the Marine Corps isparticipating in amphibious operations,the commander of the MAGTF isdesignated the commander, landingforce (CLF). The CLF is coequal inplanning with the commander,amphibious task force (CATF). TheCLF coordinates C2W matters withthe CATF. The CATF staff handles C2Wexternal coordination for the entireamphibious task force. Once the CLF isashore and the amphibious objective areais disestablished, the MAGTF maybecome a component of the JTF.

• US Air Force CoordinationProcedures. The Air OperationsCenter (or equivalent) or the Directorof Operations (DO) staff C2W elementis responsible for coordinating jointaspects of C2W. Air Force requirementsfor other component C2W support areestablished by the DO, in coordinationwith the intelligence office or theirrepresentatives. The DO staff translatesrequirements for other component C2Wsupport into tasks and coordinates thosetasks with the component C2W agency.

• Joint Special Operations ComponentCoordination Procedures. The jointforce special operations componentcommander (JFSOCC) will establish aJOC to serve as the task integration andplanning center for theater specialoperations (SO). Requirements from SOemployment units for C2W supportshould be transmitted to the JFSOCCJOC for coordination with the joint C2Wcell.

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• Interagency Coordination Procedures.Since many aspects of C2W operationsare potentially sensitive, C2W plannersshould have a thorough understanding ofthe expertise and interest that other USGdepartments and agencies may have invarious aspects of C2W planning/operations. C2W planners should haveidentified points of contact atappropriate USG departments andagencies that can be consulted asnecessary in the development of C2Wplans. The JFC should provide clearguidance on the procedures forinteragency coordination. If C2Wplanners are in doubt as to which USGdepartments and agencies should beconsulted as part of the C2W planningprocess, the expertise of the JC2WCshould be consulted.

5. C4 Systems Support to C2W

a. Communications Support to C2W.The sophistication of modern communicationssystems and equipment offers a significantadvantage to the JFC if used properly andprotected adequately. C2W planners shouldnot view communications as the onlycomponent of C2. While communications

supports C2, a C2 system consists of morethan just communications.

• C2 facilities and equipment, adequateconnectivity, computer support, andinteroperable data bases are requiredif the joint force is to have effectivecommunications.

• Communications requirements insupport of C2W can vary widely, bothwithin and between joint forcecomponents, due to the use of unique orspecially-installed communicationssystems.

• Secure communications and datatransfer should be incorporated at alllocations where C2W planning occurs.

b. Computer Support to C2W.Computer support, including automateddecision aids, can assist C2W planners inplanning and monitoring C2W operations.

• Key components of computer support forC2W include computerized data basesthat support intelligence and the fiveelements of C2W. C2W planners shouldunderstand where they can access these

PSYOP are enhanced greatly by the sophistication of modern communicationssystems and equipment.

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data bases and what the data bases canand cannot do for them.

•• The majority of the intelligencesupport that the C2W plannersrequire for C2W comes from databases maintained by the J-2. The J-2will receive data from a number ofsources and may exploit existing databases or may create discrete ones for agiven scenario. C2W planners should askfor finished intelligence from the J-2 tosupport planning. If the C2W plannershave to access information data bases thatcontain unfinished intelligence to supportrapidly evolving requirements, theyshould ensure J-2 analysts validate theaccuracy of the material they are using.

•• The planning and coordinatingorganizations charged with theplanning for the five elements of C2Wmay have data bases and automaticdata processing (ADP) support to carryout their responsibilities. Target planningcells may have sophisticated ADPcapability used in targeting and thepreparation of targeting lists. TheJCEWS may also have significant ADPcapabilities associated with planning EW.OPSEC planners, deception planners,and the JPOTF may use some of the same

data bases that the J-2 will use forsupporting other C2W elements.

• C2W planners may also need accessto data bases on friendly communicationsmaintained by the J-6. Knowledge ofconnectivity, redundancy, and hardeningare useful for C2-protect planning.

6. C2W Reports and RequestProcedures

Inter-Service and joint C2W reports andrequests should be accomplished inaccordance with the US Message TextFormatting (USMTF) Program. USMTFwas designed to achieve compatibility andinteroperability and to enhance operationaleffectiveness in joint operations. CJCSManual 6120.05, “Tactical Command andControl Procedures for Joint Operations —Joint Interface Operational Procedures,” andinterim MILSTD 6040 provide guidance onUSMTF. If a preapproved message USMTFformat does not exist, C2W planners shoulduse the General Administration Messageformat. The use of USMTF may not beappropriate for multinational operations.Joint US forces operating with multinationalforces should coordinate the type of reportsto be used and the formats that are compatibleto all allied/coalition forces.

CHAPTER VIC2W TRAINING AND EXERCISES

VI-1

1. General

Effective employment of C2W in jointoperations depends on the ability to train theway the US intends to employ a joint militaryforce. The basic training task is to trainthose personnel responsible for planningthe individual elements of C2W on theconcepts and doctrine found in thispublication. Each combatant commandershould ensure that key personnel responsiblefor planning and implementing OPSEC,PSYOP, military deception, EW, and physicaldestruction receive training in C2W. The jointprofessional military education system shouldensure that officers understand the role C2Wplays in supporting joint force operations.

2. Training

a. Classroom Training. Classroomtraining in C2W concepts and principles isavailable at the Joint Command, Controland Electronic Warfare School at the ArmedForces Staff College in Norfolk, VA. A “JointC2W Staff Officer Course,” taught both at thesecret and sensitive compartmentedinformation level (beginning January 96), isoffered by this school several times a year.

“The Romans are sure of victory... for their exercises are battles withoutbloodshed, and their battles bloody exercises.”

Josephus

Quotas for this course are controlled bythe J-38 section of the Joint Staff (DSN 225-3330). This course should be completed bothby personnel assigned or transferring to thecombatant commander’s staff in C2W andrelated billets and similar personnel insubordinate operational or support billets thatmight be expected to be assigned to a jointtask force staff during joint operations. Thiscourse is also appropriate for subordinatecommand personnel as well as key personnelassigned to units specializing in one or moreof the five elements of C2W. Basic C2Wtraining is also appropriate for intelligence,communications, and information systemspersonnel to familiarize them with theconcepts and threats associated with C2W.

b. Joint Exercise Training. Jointexercises offer an opportunity for joint staffpersonnel, working together as a C2Wcell, to plan and monitor C2W operations.Exercises involving allied/coalition forcesoffer an opportunity for US forces todemonstrate the viability of C2W as a partof military strategy, while affording USplanners the opportunity to benefit fromlearning allied/coalition C2W capabilitiesand limitations.

INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY

As technology advances, the conduct of operations will continue to change.Each advance in information technology will help leaders form a more completepicture of the battlespace, generate faster, higher quality decisions, maneuvermore rapidly in time and space and increase a unit’s flexibility and agility.Nevertheless, this technology is only an enabling tool. Quality and well-trainedleaders remain the true centerpiece to successfully planning and operatingthis increasingly digitized and automated information system of systems.

SOURCE: FM 100-6, Information Operations

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3. C2W in Joint/MultinationalExercises

Exercises in the CJCS Exercise Program,both CJCS-sponsored and combatantcommander-sponsored, should routinelyinclude C2W.

a. Exercise Planning Considerations.When employing C2W in exercises,fundamental considerations must be given tothe items shown in Figure VI-1.

b. C2W Exercise Requirements

Figure VI-1. Fundamental Exercise Planning Considerations

FUNDAMENTAL EXERCISE PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

Developing concrete, attainable command and controlwarfare (C2W) objectives

Providing for sufficient C2W actions to support theobjectives of the exercise

Creating as realistic a C2W exercise environment aspossible

Assessing and evaluating the employment of C2W

Exercising both C2-attack and C2-protect using all theelements of C2W that are compatible with the exercisescenario

Exercising intelligence support to C2W

Using the appropriate security measures to protect C2Wtactics, techniques, and procedures

Evaluating the use of computer support products to planand evaluate C2W operations

Evaluating the possible use of simulations to fulfill someC2W training objectives. Force-on-force simulations providea capability to train the C2W cell in the planning, monitoring,and evaluation of C2W for any range of scenarios from asmall counterdrug exercise to a joint, multinational theateroperation. However, there currently exists an almost totalvoid of psychological operations impact/effect in anysimulations. The same exists for other elements of C2W

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C2W Training and Exercises

• Effective C2W operations requirespecific intelligence products onadversary C2, adversary intelligence, andadversary capabilities that may have tobe provided by exercise planners. Thedata needed to create, update and usethese products should be built into theexercise scenario and Master ScenarioEvents List.

• The Opposition Force (OPFOR)should have an intelligence capabilityconsistent with the OPLAN/operationplan in concept format scenario, whichis the basis for the exercise. RealisticOPFOR C2-attack and C2-protectoperations are essential to evaluatingfriendly C2W operations.

• Consistent with the tenants of theexercise, free play of C2W shouldbe allowed for both sides. Pre-structured,mechanical C2W may degrade theparticipant’s ability to gain valuableexperience from the demands ofmental agility and creativity thatunstructured C2W can provide. Seniorexercise participants should allow,even welcome, the command andcontrol chaos that effective C2W cancause to teach exercise participants towork through C2 problems created byC2W.

c. C2W Exercise Evaluation Criteria.C2W evaluation criteria should bemeasurable and compatible with overallexercise constraints. The exercise sponsorshould establish broad objectives that can betranslated into more specific objectives duringexercise planning conferences and reflectedwithin the Exercise Schedule. At a

minimum, the following aspects of theexercise C2W play should be evaluated:

• Intelligence support to C2W.

• The effective organization of the C2Wcell and working relationships betweenthe C2W cell and other staff planningorganizations.

• The effective integration of the fiveelements of C2W.

• Proper use of all available planningproducts and support.

• Optimal use of all available componentand allied/coalition C2W assets.

• C2W effectiveness monitoring toinclude execution and BDA.

• The ability of the friendly forces toachieve C2W objectives based on theexecution of the C2W exercise plan.

d. C2W Exercise Support. CJCSI5118.01, “Charter for the Joint Command andControl Warfare Center,” tasks the JC2WC,in collaboration with the Joint WarfightingCenter, to support C2W training by planning,conducting, and evaluating the C2W aspectsof joint exercises to include field trainingexercises, command post exercises, andcomputer simulations for wargaming. JointC2W exercise support is also available fromthe JWAC, the JCMA and the JSC.

e. C2W Lessons Learned. All C2Wlessons learned from joint operations andexercises should be submitted through theJULLS.

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CHAPTER VIIC2W IN MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

VII-1

1. General

The development of capabilities, plans,programs, tactics, employment concepts,intelligence, and communications supportapplicable to C2W as a part of militarystrategy requires coordination withresponsible DOD components and allied/coalition nations. Coordination with allieswill normally be effected within existingdefense arrangements. However, the use ofbilateral arrangements is not precluded. TheJoint Staff will coordinate US positions onall C2W matters discussed bilaterally orin multinational organizations to encourageinteroperability and compatibility in fulfillingcommon requirements. Direct discussionsregarding multinational operations in aspecific theater are the responsibility of thegeographic combatant commander.

2. The Multinational C2W Cell

a. When the JFC is also the multinationalforce commander (MFC), the joint force staffshould be augmented by planners andsubject matter experts from allied/coalitionforces. Multinational planners from the fiveelements of C2W should be educated in C2Wdoctrine, requirements, resources, and howallied/coalition forces are structured toconduct C2W. C2W planners should seekto accommodate the requirements of eachallied/coalition force with the goal of usingall the available C2W resources of themultinational force in a multinational C2Wplan.

b. In the case where the JFC is not theMFC, it may be necessary for the JFC to briefthe MFC and staff on the advantages of

“We are a strong nation. But we cannot live to ourselves and remain strong.”

George C. Marshall

C2W as a part of military strategy toachieve multinational force goals. The JFCshould propose organizing a multinationalC2W cell. If this is not acceptable to the MFC,the JFC should assume responsibility for usingC2W as a part of military strategy within thejoint force to support multinational forceobjectives.

c. Planning C2W operations to supportmultinational operations is more difficultbecause of complex security issues,differences in the level of training of involvedforces, interoperability of equipment, andlanguage barriers.

3. Multinational C2W Planning

a. How multinational C2W operationsare planned is the prerogative of the MFC.The size, composition, and mission of themultinational force, as well as diplomaticconsiderations, may determine howmultinational C2W operations are planned.Coordination at the C2W cell level withdetailed planning at the individual elementlevel would give multinational C2W planningthe most consistency with US C2W planningprocedures.

b. The multinational C2W plan shoulddirectly and demonstrably support theobjectives of the MFC. This is particularlyimportant when joint force planners areattempting to acquaint a non-US MFC withthe advantages of C2W as a part of militarystrategy.

c. All allied/coalition forces in themultinational force should be representedon the C2W cell in positions to contribute,

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when possible, to each of the five elements ofC2W. Direct representation ensures thatmultinational C2W assets are efficientlyused and that the multinational C2W plan iscoordinated with all other aspects of themultinational operation. As in jointoperations, how the elements available to themultinational force are employed depends onthe ROE applicable to the operation.

4. Multinational InformationSecurity

The senior US commander in amultinational operation should issue clearlystated guidelines for the release of classifiedUS information or capabilities to allied/

coalition forces using CJCSI 6510.01, “Jointand Combined Communications Security,” asguidance. The joint force may undertakeplanning and execution of independent C2Woperations in support of multinationalobjectives. It is not necessary for allied/coalition forces to be made aware of all USintelligence, capabilities, or procedures thatare required for planning and execution of USjoint C2W operations. However, the JFCshould request approval from higher USauthority for C2W operations that have notbeen cleared with allied/coalition partners.Requesting the approval of higher authorityis the best means of ensuring that allied/coalition diplomatic sensitivities areconsidered in the approval process.

Commando Solo PSYOP aircraft often provides appropriate PSYOP capabilitiesin support of allied / coalition forces.

APPENDIX ATHE DECISION CYCLE

A-1

1. General

Figure A-1 shows the decision cycle. Thismodel is applicable to all C2 systems —friendly or adversary. This decision model isbased upon the Observe, Orient, Decide, andAct loop.

a. Observation. In the observation portionof the decision cycle, the commander gathersinformation from the reconnaissance,surveillance, and target acquisition (RSTA)apparatus and from status reports of friendlyforces. Much of a commander’s RSTAcapability and knowledge of the status offriendly forces will come from the controlportion of the friendly force C2 system —that is, from subordinate commanders.

b. Orientation. In the orientation phaseof the decision cycle, information about theopposition’s status received in the observationportion of the cycle is converted intointelligence through the commander’sintelligence staff. Based upon this intelligenceand knowledge of the status of friendly forces,the commander will make an assessment ofthe “reality” of the operational area.

• The “reality” of the operational area isthe actual situation in the operational areaincluding, but not limited to, thedisposition of forces on both sides,casualties to personnel and equipmentsuffered by both sides, the weather in thearea, and morale on both sides.

• The commander’s assessment of the“reality” of the operational area is basedon the input of the commander’sintelligence system, sensors and lowerechelon commanders in the observationportion of the cycle. Since these sourcesof input are imperfect and subject to

manipulation by the opposing side, thecommander’s assessment of “reality”will invariably be something other thanthe actual “reality” of the operationalarea.

c. Decision. The commander will makemilitary decisions based on the assessment ofthe “reality” of the operational area. Thedecisions made by the commander will becommunicated to subordinate commanders asorders via various communications methods.

d. Action. Subordinate commanders at alllower echelons, the control portion of thefriendly force C2 system, will cause thecommander’s decisions to become actions thatimpact the “reality” of the operational area.

e. Continuity of the Cycle. Since thedecision cycle is a continuous process ratherthan a step-by-step process, all parts of thecycle are active simultaneously. Thecommander will be gathering information,forming appraisals, and making decisions forfuture operations at the same time that currentorders are being executed as actions bysubordinate commands. The same cycle isoccurring simultaneously for all opposingsides in an operation. The same cycle is alsooccurring at all subordinate levels at a scopecommensurate with the responsibilities of thecommander at that echelon. All of thesedecision cycles, on all sides and at all levelswill impact the “reality” of the theater ofoperations on a continuous basis.

f. Size of the Cycle. The amount of timetaken to observe, orient, decide and act isrepresented by the length of the arc betweenportions of the cycle. Consistent with classicmilitary doctrine, the commander that cangather and process information and initiateaction to affect the theater of operations

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quickest will have a decided militaryadvantage. Conceptually, the ability toprocess information into action via the cycleat a quicker pace than the opposition can be

thought of as getting “inside” the adversary’sdecision cycle by making the friendly forcecycle smaller than the opponent’s.

DECISION CYCLE

OBSERVATION

ACTION ORIENTATION

DECISION

Figure A-1. Decision Cycle

APPENDIX BSUPPORTING AGENCIES RESPONSIBILITIES IN C2W

B-1

1. General

Annexes in this appendix discuss thefunctions and responsibilities of jointagencies and have a major role to play in

C2W. C2W planners should review andbe famil iar with the functions andresponsibilities delineated in the appendixin order to know what support is availablefrom these agencies.

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Intentionally Blank

ANNEX A TO APPENDIX BJOINT COMMAND AND CONTROL WARFARE CENTER

SUPPORT TO C2W

B-A-1

1. General

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 5118.01, “Charter for the JointCommand and Control Warfare Center” dated 15 September 1994, is the charter for theJC2WC. This annex provides key excerpts from that document to provide combatantcommanders, JFCs, and other units requiring assistance in C2W with a ready reference of thesupport provided by the JC2WC.

2. Mission

The mission of the JC2WC, formerly the Joint Electronic Warfare Center, is to providedirect command and control warfare support to operational commanders. The JC2WC willsupport the integration of the constituent elements of C2W — OPSEC, PSYOP, militarydeception, EW, and physical destruction as well as the noncombat military applications ofinformation warfare — throughout the planning and execution phases of operations. Thisdirect support will be provided in the following priority order: joint force commanders(combatant commanders, subordinate unified commanders, and joint task force commanders),Service component commanders, and functional component commanders. Support will alsobe provided to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Staff, the Services,USG agencies, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and allied nations. The JC2WC willmaintain specialized expertise in C2W-related systems engineering, operational applications,capabilities and vulnerabilities. The JC2WC, through the Director for Operations, serves asthe principal field agency within the Department of Defense for non-Service specific C2Wsupport.

3. JC2WC Functions and Responsibilities

The JC2WC, acting through the Joint Staff J-3, will:

a. Interface with the Joint Staff, Services, DOD and non-DOD agencies to integrate IW(see DOD Directive S-3600.1, “Information Warfare”) with DOD C2W efforts.

b. Participate in Integrated Joint Special Technical Operations.

c. Serve as the Joint Staff central point of contact for reviewing joint C2W Mission NeedsStatements (MNS), except for those dealing exclusively with C2-protect.

d. Coordinate with the Director for Command, Control, Communications, and ComputerSystems, Joint Staff for C4I For the Warrior concept objectives, Global Command andControl System (GCCS) interoperability, C2W MNS interoperability certification and C2-protect issues.

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Joint Pub 3-13.1

e. Assist the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, through the Joint Staff J-3/SpecialTechnical Operations Division (who serves as the Doctrine Sponsor for C2W and EW), inthe development of joint doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures.

f. Evaluate C2W effectiveness in combat.

g. Serve as the DOD focal point for identifying, and coordinating integrated access to,those data bases/data and information systems necessary to establish a common joint“information base” for conducting C2W. This C2W information base will compriseintelligence and “operational” (i.e., data on US equipment, systems and forces) data bases/data systems as well as other data base types (e.g., Rest of World systems, geophysical,topographical, psychological and doctrinal) necessary to conduct C2W in the CINCs’battlespace. Include US and, as available, allied Wartime Reserve Mode descriptions as wellas descriptions of US manufactured systems sold to other nations (“gray” systems). TheJC2WC will seek releasability of this C2W information base to US allies and coalition partnersto the maximum extent possible.

• On an annual basis, in coordination with the Services, Intelligence Agencies, and othercognizant agencies and commands, provide a report to the Joint Staff J-3 on the currencyand shortfalls in the C2W information base.

• Participate in the development of decision aids used to manipulate the C2W informationbase.

• In cooperation with the DOD intelligence community and the Joint Staff J-6, orchestrateefforts for inclusion of C2W technical requirements into GCCS consistent with the GCCSmanagement structure.

h. Organize, manage, and exercise the joint aspects of EW reprogramming. Developprocedures to assist commanders with the identification, validation, and dissemination ofelectronic threat changes. Coordinate compatibility and facilitate exchange of data used injoint EW reprogramming among the intelligence community, Services and combatantcommands.

i. Organize and facilitate development of joint C2W simulations supporting wargamingamong the Joint Staff, Services, combatant commands, and combat support agencies inconjunction with the Joint Warfighting Center.

j. Serve as the Joint Staff’s point of contact through the J-3 for C2W Joint UniversalLessons Learned System reported under the Joint After-Action Reporting System and referredfor action as Remedial Action Projects.

k. Participate in C2W research or studies of an operational nature for DOD organizationsand agencies.

l. Maintain knowledge and coordinate with the Services on C2W systems engineeringinitiatives, laboratory programs, and industrial developments.

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Joint Command and Control Warfare Center Support to C2W

m. Perform vulnerability and effectiveness analyses of US equipment used in C2W.Coordinate C2 vulnerability analyses with the Joint Staff J-6.

n. When directed by the Joint Staff J-3, the JC2WC will support allied nations orinternational organizations on a case-by-case basis. This support includes representing theUS in appropriate international forums.

o. Produce, at the direction of the Joint Staff J-3, the annual DOD EW Plan in conjunctionwith OSD, the Services, and combat support agencies.

p. Develop and produce, at the direction of the Joint Staff J-3, an annual DOD C2W Planin conjunction with the Services and combat support agencies.

4. Combatant Commander Support

For direct combatant commander C2W support, the JC2WC will:

a. Maintain deployable C2W augmentation teams to support the combatant commanderas requested. These teams will:

• Maintain currency with the threat and operation plans in the respective combatantcommanders’ areas of responsibilities to provide timely analysis and advice for planningand coordination of C2W.

• Train with and develop routine working relationships with other organizations possessingspecialized expertise in the constituent elements of C2W.

• Provide C2W technical assistance.

• Function as the central coordinating element for organizations in support of the CINC’sC2W effort.

• Maintain the capability to assist in the planning and coordination of the employment ofjoint and multinational EW assets as part of the JCEWS.

• Provide in-theater guidance and assistance for the joint coordination of EWreprogramming.

• Provide timely advice and comprehensive EW analysis support, such as radar terrainmasking overlays and predictive analyses (e.g., PROUD FLAME).

b. Request augmentation from specialized organizations, as required, through the JointStaff J-3, for a deploying JC2WC team to provide a more comprehensive C2W capability tothe supported commander.

c. Maintain a dedicated action officer (AO) at the JC2WC so that each combatant commandmay interface with each CINC’s staff and integrate C2W into appropriate operation plans.

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Joint Pub 3-13.1

These AOs will be responsible for all JC2WC actions in C2W support of their respectiveCINCs.

d. Provide tactical and technical analyses of C2W in military operations.

e. Support C2W training by assisting combatant commanders in planning, conducting,and evaluating the C2W aspects of joint exercises including field training exercises, commandpost exercises, and computer simulations for wargaming in collaboration with the JointWarfighting Center.

f. Coordinate and conduct field demonstrations of emerging technologies responsive toCINC C2W needs.

5. Mailing Address:

Joint Command and Control Warfare CenterAttn:________________2 Hall Blvd Suite 217San Antonio TX 78243-7008

6. Message Address:

JC2WC SAN ANTONIO TX//DR/DV/DT/OE/OW/XR/OT/SI//

7. Special Telephone Numbers:

Gray: 973-6152DSN: 969-XXXX (STU III equipped)FAX: 969-4166 (UNCLASSIFIED)FAX: 969-4451/4682 (CLASSIFIED)

COMMERCIAL: (210) 977-XXXX

DR: Director 969-2071DV: Vice Director 969-2071DT: Technical Director 969-2071XR: Plans and Resources 969-4681

DIRECTORATES:

SI: Systems Integration 969-2579OW: Operations West 969-2911OE: Operations East 969-2174OT: Operations Support and Technology 969-2482

ANNEX B TO APPENDIX BJOINT COMSEC MONITORING ACTIVITY SUPPORT TO C2W

B-B-1

1. General

The JCMA is a Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)-sponsored organization operating under theauspices of the National Security Agency. This appendix provides information on the roleand mission of the JCMA. It is intended to be a ready reference for commanders on the typeand scope of support provided.

2. Mission

The mission of the JCMA is to conduct communications security (COMSEC) monitoring(collection, analysis, and reporting) of DOD telecommunications (encrypted and unencrypted)and automated information systems and monitoring of related noncommunications signals.The purpose is to identify vulnerabilities exploitable by potential adversaries and to recommendcountermeasures and corrective actions. JCMA provides COMSEC monitoring and analysissupport (less conventional wire-line telephone) to the unified commands, Military Departmentsand Services, DOD agencies, and the Joint Staff. JCMA’s priority for support is to the CINCs(and subordinate component commands), DOD agencies and the Joint Staff. JCMA willsupport Military Departments and Services through coordination with Service CryptologicElements (SCE) and through direct support when the Military Departments and Services donot possess the necessary organic capabilities. JCMA does not perform “traditional telephonemonitoring,” as this function is performed by the SCEs. However, if given Executive Agentauthority, JCMA will coordinate collection, analysis and reporting with SCEs to ensurecomplete support to the requesting elements and their Service components.

3. Role of JCMA in C2W

JCMA is a resource for commanders to use to minimize risk and provide for force protection.Integration of COMSEC monitoring into a warfighter’s C2W plan/operation enhances hisability to deny an adversary information of friendly operations as well as to protect friendlyC2 systems. Its efficient and effective application in exercises and real-world operations cansignificantly enhance a commander’s combat power. JCMA supports both C2-attack andC2-protect efforts. Specifically, JCMA support can:

a. Identify telecommunication systems susceptible to intercept and exploitation by potentialadversaries and, using a risk management approach, recommend sensible, cost-effectivecountermeasures.

b. Measure effectiveness of efforts taken to deny critical information to adversary signalsintelligence collectors.

c. Provide direct support to deception planners with regards to friendly communicationpatterns and assist in the planning and evaluation of the effectiveness of deception operations.

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d. Help identify and resolve interference and problems with secure communications, thusavoiding situations that may lead to denial of communications service.

e. Support information security and OPSEC assessments.

4. JCMA Functions

JCMA can support operations throughout the range of military operations. As stated in theconcept of operations, dated 18 June 1993, the JCMA will:

a. Provide COMSEC monitoring and analysis support to those commands and agenciesrequesting support during periods of crisis or during the conduct of joint operations.

b. Provide COMSEC monitoring and analysis support for selected joint exercises.

c. Maintain the expertise to provide a Joint COMSEC Monitoring and Analysis Team toprovide direct, deployable joint COMSEC monitoring support to combatant commandersduring exercises and real-world operations.

d. Conduct crypto/telecommunication system monitoring efforts. Systems monitoringmissions will be conducted in response to requests from those information systems orcommunications organizations responsible for the operations or management of DODcommunications systems after coordination with the affected organization. Examples of thistype of support include; Mobile Subscriber Equipment, Single-channel Ground and AirborneRadio System, and CHALLENGE ATHENA.

e. Annually solicit mission requirements for the upcoming fiscal year from unifiedcommands, Military Departments and Services, DOD agencies and Joint Staff. JCMA willconsolidate and prioritize the requests and submit to JCS for validation. Requests for supportfor real-world operations may be submitted directly to JCMA at anytime.

f. Ensure its reporting objectives are nonpunitive in nature. The primary purpose of JCMAreporting is to inform commanders of potential communications vulnerabilities in theirorganization and provide them with recommendations on how to solve problems.

g. Provide timely, tailored reporting to supported commanders. Various reports, as describedbelow, will be used to forward results of COMSEC monitoring. In all cases, reporting will beproprietary in nature and will not be released to another organization without permissionfrom the supported command/organization.

• Tactical Advisory — Used to provide notification of tactically significant, time-sensitiveinformation derived from COMSEC monitoring.

• Periodic Summary — Periodicity based upon supported command’s requirements.Provides a summary of the intelligence loss noted through COMSEC monitoring aswell as additional data provided by JCMA data bases over the reporting period.

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Joint COMSEC Monitoring Activity Support to C2W

• “Hot Wash” — A wrap-up brief immediately following an operation/exercise providinga summary of intelligence loss noted through COMSEC monitoring. Includesidentification of general vulnerabilities, trends and recommended countermeasures.

• Final Report — Forwards the results of COMSEC analysis after the completion of anoperation/exercise. This report will include a summary of the adversary threat and willprovide an in-depth systematic examination of electromagnetic emissions in order todetermine the presence of information. It will describe the degree to which the operation/exercise achieved established COMSEC objectives and include recommendations forimprovement.

h. Publish a quarterly and annual report which provides a summary of trends, commonproblems and lessons learned over the past year/quarter.

i. Ensure that all JCMA monitoring is done in full compliance with NTISSD 600, applicablefederal statutes and implementing regulation, Executive Orders, DOD Directives andRegulations. JCMA will obtain prior legal approval of all monitoring missions.

5. Mailing Address:

Attn: C5DirectorNational Security Agency9800 Savage Rd.Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6000

6. Message Address:

GENSER: DIRNSA FT GEO G MEADE MD//C5//DSSCS/CRITICOM: DIRNSA/C5//

7. Special Telephone Numbers:

NSTS/Gray: 972-2645DSN: 644-6145 or 8305COMM: (301) 688-6145 or 8305

These telephones equipped with STU-IIIs and secure facsimile equipment.24-Hour Point of Contact: National SIGINT Operations Center

COMM: (301) 688-7425

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Intentionally Blank

ANNEX C TO APPENDIX BDOD JOINT SPECTRUM CENTER SUPPORT TO C2W

B-C-1

1. General

On 28 September 1994, the DOD Joint Spectrum Center was activated. The JSC hasassumed all the missions and responsibilities previously performed by the ElectromagneticCompatibility Center, as well as additional functions. The JSC operates under the directionof the Joint Staff J-6.

2. Mission

The mission of the JSC is to ensure the DOD’s effective use of the electromagnetic spectrumin support of national security and military objectives. The JSC serves as the DOD focalpoint for electromagnetic spectrum management matters in support of the unified commands,Military Departments and Defense agencies in planning, acquisition, training and operations.The JSC serves as the DOD focal point for supporting the spectrum supremacy aspects ofInformation Warfare.

3. The JSC Supports C2W by Providing the Following to JFCs

a. Provide data about friendly force C2 system locational and technical characteristics foruse in planning C2-protect. Data bases maintained by the JSC provide C2W planners withinformation covering communications, radar, navigation aids, broadcast, identification, andelectronic warfare systems operated by DOD, other USG departments and agencies, andprivate businesses or organizations. Information from these data bases is available on a quickreaction basis in a variety of formats and media to support C2W planners and electromagneticspectrum managers.

b. Assist the JCEWS or C2W cell in the development of the Joint Restricted FrequencyList. The JSC provides an automated tool, the Joint Spectrum Management System (JSMS),to assist in the development and management of the JRFL. The JSC has designated CINCaugmentation teams that can be deployed to unified commands, subordinate componentcommands or JTFs when requested. These teams are trained to prepare JRFLs or providetraining and assistance in how to prepare a JRFL. The teams can also serve as on-site advisorsand assistants in electromagnetic spectrum management matters as required.

c. Assist in the resolution of operational interference and jamming incidents through theauspices of the Joint Spectrum Interference Resolution (JSIR) Program. The objective of theJSIR program is to resolve problems at the lowest possible level in the chain of command.The JSC maintains rapid deployment teams that are able to quickly locate and identifyinterference sources. These teams recommend technical and operational fixes to resolveidentified interference sources. The JSC also maintains a historical data base of interferenceand jamming incident reports and solutions to assist in trend analysis and correction ofrecurring problems. Unified commands, subordinate component commands, or JTFs shouldcontact the JSC to request assistance in resolving suspected spectrum interference problems.

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Annex C to Appendix B

Joint Pub 3-13.1

d. Provide data about foreign command, control, and communications (C3) frequencyand location data. Data bases containing this data are developed primarily from open sources.

e. Provide unclassified C3 area studies about the C3 infrastructure of over 100 countries.These area studies are developed entirely from open source material. Information providedin these studies includes: physical and cultural characteristics (geography, climate, andpopulation), overview of telecommunications systems, and electromagnetic frequenciesregistered for use within the geographic boundaries of each country. Data in these studiesincludes civilian, military, and radio/TV broadcast frequencies. Frequency data is providedin automated form to facilitate direct input into automated spectrum management tools suchas the widely used JSMS.

4. Mailing Address:

JSC-OP120 Worthington BasinAnnapolis, MD 21402-5064

5. Message Address:

JSC ANNAPOLIS MD//OP//

6. Telephone Numbers:

DSN: 281-9815 (UNCLASSIFIEDFAX: DSN 281-3763 (UNCLASSIFIED)FAX: DSN 281-2452 (CLASSIFIED)

COMMERCIAL: (410) 293-9815

JSIR HOTLINE: (410) 573-7007 (pager)

APPENDIX CREFERENCES

C-1

The development of Joint Pub 3-13.1 is based upon the following primary references.

1. DOD

a. DOD Directive C-3100.9, “Space Systems Policy”

b. DOD Directive S-3115.7, “Signals Intelligence (SIGINT)”

c. DOD Directive 3222.3, “Department of Defense Electromagnetic Compatibility Program(EMCP)”

d. DOD Directive 3222.4, “Electronic Warfare (EW) and Command, Control,Communications Countermeasures (C3CM)”

e. DOD Directive C-3222.5, “Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC) Management Programfor SIGINT Sites”

f. DOD Directive S-3321.1, “Overt Psychological Operations Conducted by the MilitaryServices in Peacetime and in Contingencies Short of Declared War”

g. DOD Directive S-3600.1, “Information Warfare”

h. DOD Directive 4630.5, “Compatibility, Interoperability, and Integration of Command,Control, Communications and Intelligence Systems”

i. DOD Instruction 4630.8, “Procedures for Compatibility, Interoperability, and Integrationof C3I Systems”

j. DOD Directive 4650.1, “Management and Use of the Radio Frequency Spectrum”

k. DOD Directive 5000.1, “Defense Acquisition”

l. DOD Instruction 5000.2, “Defense Acquisition Management Policies and Procedures”

m. DOD Manual 5000.2-M, “Defense Acquisition Management Documentation andReports”

n. DOD Directive 5100.1, “Functions of the Department of Defense and Its MajorComponents”

o. DOD Directive 5100.35, “Military Communications-Electronics Board”

p. DOD Directive 5105.21, “Defense Intelligence Agency”

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Joint Pub 3-13.1

q. DOD Directive 5137.1, “Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control,Communications, and Intelligence (ASD(C3I))”

r. DOD Directive 5200.1, “DOD Information Security Program”

s. DOD Directive S-5200.17, “Security, Use and Dissemination of CommunicationsIntelligence (COMINT)”

t. DOD Directive C-5200.5, “Communications Security (COMSEC)”

u. DOD Directive 5205.2, “DOD Operations Security Program”

v. DOD Directive 5230.11, “Disclosure of Classified Military Information to ForeignGovernments and International Organizations”

w. DOD Directive 8000.1, “Defense Information Management (IM) Program”

x. DOD Directive 8020.1, “Life Cycle Management (LCM) of Automated InformationSystems (AISs)”

y. DOD Directive 8320.1, “DOD Data Administration”

z. DOD Instruction 8120.2, “Automated Information System (AIS) Life-CycleManagement (LCM) Process, Review, and Milestone Approval Procedures”

2. Joint Staff

a. CJCS MOP 6, “Electronic Warfare”

b. CJCS MOP 7, “Joint Strategic Planning System”

c. CJCS MOP 24 “Tactical Employment of Directed-Energy Warfare Systems”

d. CJCS MOP 30, “Command and Control Warfare”

e. CJCS Instruction 2700.01, “International Military Rationalization, Standardization, andInteroperability Between the United States and Its Allies and Other Friendly Nations”

f. CJCS Instruction 3210.01, “Joint Information Warfare Policy”

g. CJCS Instruction 3211.01A, “Joint Military Deception”

h. CJCS Instruction 3213.01, “Joint Operations Security”

i. CJCS Instruction 3221.01, “Near-Real-Time Analysis of Electromagnetic Interferenceand Jamming to US Space Systems”

j. CJCS Instruction 3320.01, “Electromagnetic Spectrum Use in Joint Military Operations”

C-3

References

k. CJCS Instruction 3500.01, “Joint Training Policy for the Armed Forces of the UnitedStates”

l. CJCS Instruction 5118.01, “Charter for the Joint Command and Control Warfare Center”

m. CJCS Instruction 6010.01, “Coordination of US C3 Positions in International Forums”

n. CJCS Instruction 6510.01 “Joint and Combined Communications Security”

o. CJCS Notice 0002, “Consolidated Index of CJCS Instructions, Manuals, and Notices,CJCS and JCS Memorandums of Policy, and Other Directives to the Commanders ofCombatant Commands”

p. MCM-34-91, “Coordination of US Electronic Warfare Positions for NATO Meetings”

q. MCM-47-9l, “Guidelines for Armed Forces Staff College Joint Electronic Warfare andCommand, Control, and Communications Countermeasures Courses”

r. MCM-60-9l, “Joint Procedures for Intelligence Support to Electronic WarfareReprogramming”

s. MCM-117-91, “Combat Electronic Warfare Analysis Program - PROUD FLAME”

t. MCM-137-9l, “NATO Emitter Data Base Plan”

u. MCM-149-92, “Counterintelligence Support”

v. SM-90-85, “Plan for Integrated Intelligence Support to EW and C3CM”

w. Joint Pub 1, “Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States”

x. Joint Pub 1-02, “Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms”

y. Joint Pub 2-0, “Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations”

z. Joint Pub 2-01, “Joint Intelligence Support to Military Operations”

aa. Joint Pub 2-01.1, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Intelligence Supportto Targeting”

bb. Joint Pub 2-01.2, “Joint Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures forCounterintelligence Support to Operations”

cc. Joint Pub 2-02, “National Intelligence Support to Joint Operations”

dd. Joint Pub 3-0, “Doctrine for Joint Operations”

ee. Joint Pub 3-01.4, “JTTP for Joint Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses, (J-SEAD)”

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Joint Pub 3-13.1

ff. Joint Pub 3-05, “Doctrine for Joint Special Operations”

gg. Joint Pub 3-05.5, “Joint Special Operations Targeting and Mission Planning Procedures”

hh. Joint Pub 3-09, “Doctrine for Joint Fire Support”

ii. Joint Pub 3-51, “Electronic Warfare in Joint Military Operations”

jj. Joint Pub 3-53, “Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations”

kk. Joint Pub 3-54, “Joint Doctrine for Operations Security”

ll. Joint Pub 3-56, “Tactical Command and Control Planning Guidance and Proceduresfor Joint Operations, (Information Exchange Planning Guidance)”

mm. Joint Pub 3-56.1, “Command and Control of Joint Air Operations”

nn. Joint Pub 3-56.20, “Tactical Command and Control Procedures for Joint Operations -Joint Interface Operational Procedures - Planning Guide”

oo. Joint Pub 3-56.21, “Tactical Command and Control Procedures for Joint Operations -Joint Interface Operational Procedures - Description and Procedures”

pp. Joint Pub 3-56.22, “Tactical Command and Control Planning Guidance and Proceduresfor Joint Operations - Joint Interface Operational Procedures - Secret Supplement”

qq. Joint Pub 3-56.23, “Tactical Command and Control Procedures for Joint Operations -Joint Interface Operational Procedures - Air Control/Air Defense Procedures for Joint ServicesOperations”

rr. Joint Pub 3-56.24, “Tactical Command and Control Planning Guidance and Proceduresfor Joint Operations - Joint Interface Operational Procedures - Message Text Formats”

ss. Joint Pub 3-58, “Joint Doctrine for Military Deception”

tt. Joint Pub 5-00.2, “Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures”

uu. Joint Pub 5-03.1, “Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol I (PlanningPolicies and Procedures)”

vv. Joint Pub 5-03.2, “Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, Vol II (Planningand Execution Formats and Guidance)”

ww. Joint Pub 5-03.21, “Joint Operations Planning and Execution System, Vol II (Planningand Execution Formats and Guidance) Secret Supplement”

xx. Joint Pub 5-03.3, “Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, Vol III (ADPSupport)”

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References

yy. Joint Pub 6.0, “Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications and Computer (C4)Systems Support to Joint Operations”

zz. Joint Pub 6-04 Series, “US Message Text Formatting Program”

3. DIA

a. DIAR 55-3, “Intelligence Support for Defense Acquisition Programs”

b. DDB-1730-72-91, “Joint Procedures for Intelligence Support to Electronic WarfareReprogramming”

c. DOD-0000-151-94, “Department of Defense Intelligence Production Program”

4. NSA

a. NSTISSI 4009, “National INFOSEC Glossary”

b. USSID 58, “SIGINT Support to MIJI”

c. USSID 326, “Electronic Warfare Mutual Support Procedures”

d. USSID 328, “Command and Control Warfare”

e. USSID 412, “SIGINT Terminology”

5. ARMY

a. AR 105-2, “Electronic Counter-Countermeasures (ECCM)”

b. AR 105-3, “Meaconing, Intrusion, Jamming and Interference (MIJI)”

c. AR 381-3, “Signals Intelligence (SIGINT)”

d. AR 525-20, “Command, Control, and Communications Countermeasures (C3CM)Policy”

e. AR 525-21, “Battlefield Deception Policy”

f. AR 525-22, “Electronic Warfare Policy”

g. AR 530-1, “Operations Security (OPSEC)”

h. AR 530-2, “Communications Security (COMSEC)”

i. AR 530-3, “Electronic Security”

j. AR 530-4, “Control of Compromising Emanations”

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Joint Pub 3-13.1

k. FM 33-1, “Psychological Operations”

l. FM 34-1, “Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations”

m. FM 34-40, “Electronic Warfare Operations”

n. FM 34-60, “Counterintelligence”

o. FM 90-2, “Battlefield Deception”

p. FM 100-6, “Information Operations”

6. NAVY

a. OPNAVINST S3061.1 series, “Navy Capabilities Mobilization Plan”

b. OPNAVINST S3070.1 series, “Operation Security”

c. OPNAVINST S3430.21 series, “Electronic Warfare Operations Security”

d. OPNAVINST C3430.25 series, “IW and C2W”

e. OPNAVINST 3430.26 series, “Implementing Instruction for IW and C2W”

f. OPNAVINST S3490.1 series, “Military Deception”

g. NWP 10-1, “Composite Warfare Commander’s Manual”

h. NWP 10-1-40, “Electronic Warfare Coordination”

i. NWP 10-1-41, “Navy Operational Deception and Counterdeception”

j. NWP 10-1-42, “Command, Control and Communications Countermeasures (C3CM)”

k. NWP 11-4, “Characteristics and Capabilities of US Navy Weapons, Sensors, andCommunications Systems”

l. NWP 12-6, “Tactical Electronic Warfare Planning Guide”

m. NWP 33-1, “Emission Control”

n. CINCPACFLT/CINCLANTFLT Tacnote ZZ0010-1-94, “Command and ControlWarfare (C2W) Commander’s Manual”

7. AIR FORCE

a. AFM 1-1, “Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force”

C-7

References

b. AFM 1-9, “Doctrine for Electromagnetic Combat”

c. AFM 2-8, “Electronic Combat (EC) Operations”

d. AFPD 10-7, “Command and Control Warfare”

e. AFPD 10-11, “Operations Security”

f. AFI 10-702, “Psychological Operations”

g. AFI 10-703, “Electronic Warfare Integrated Reprogramming (EWIR)”

h. AFI 10-704, “Tactical Deception”

i. AFI 10-705, “Command and Control Warfare”

j. AFM 10-706, “Electronic Combat”

k. AFI 10-70, “Air Force Spectrum Interference Resolution Program”

l. AFI 10-1101, “Operations Security (OPSEC) Instructions”

m. AFR 55-50, “Command, Control, and Communications Countermeasures”

n. AFR 100-10, “Electronic Counter-Countermeasures for Command and ControlCommunications System”

8. MARINE CORPS

a. MCO 3430.2, “Electronic Warfare (EW) Policy”

b. MCO 3430.5, “Command and Control Warfare”

c. FMFM 3, “Command and Control”

d. FMFM 3-20, “Intelligence”

e. FMFM 3-23, “Signals Intelligence/Electronic Warfare Operations”

f. FMFM 3-30, “Communications”

g. FMFM 3-53, “Psychological Operations”

h. FMFM 3-54, “Operations Security”

i. FMFM 3-55, “Tactical Directed Energy”

j. FMFM 3057, “EW Officers Handbook”

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Joint Pub 3-13.1

k. FMFM 5, “MAGTF Aviation”

l. FMFM 5-41, “Close Air Support and Close-in Fire Support”

m. FMFM 5-60, “Control of Aircraft and Missiles”

n. FMFM 6, “Ground Combat Operations”

o. FMFM 6-18, “Techniques and Procedures for Fire Support Coordination”

p. FMFM 6-18.1, “Procedures for Marine Corps Fire Support Systems”

q. FMFM 7-12, “Electronic Warfare”

r. FMFM 7-13, “Military Deception”

s. FMFM 7-34, “MAGTF Civil Affairs”

t. FMFRP 6-6-20, “Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Targeting Process”

u. FMFRP 10 series, “Joint Munitions Effectiveness Manuals”

v. FMFRP 15-5, “Electronic Warfare in Combined Arms”

w. FMFRP 15-6, “Strategic and Operational Military Deception”

9. MULTI SERVICE

AFM 90-24, MACP 55-13, TACP 55-19, USAFEP 55-14, PACAFP 55-19, “Multi-ServiceProcedures for Command, Control, and Communications Countermeasures”

10. OTHER SOURCES

a. NSDD 130, “US International Information Policy”

b. Joint Universal Lessons Learned

APPENDIX DADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

D-1

1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to theJoint Warfighting Center, Attn: Doctrine Division, Fenwick Road, Bldg 96, Fort Monroe,VA 23651-5000. These comments should address content (accuracy, usefulness,consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

2. Authorship

The lead agent and doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Director for Operations(J-3).

3. Supersession

This publication supersedes Joint Pub 3-13, “C3CM in Joint Military Operations,” 10September 1987.

4. Change Recommendations

a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted:

TO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J38-IW-STOD-C2W/J-7-JDD//

Routine changes should be submitted to the Director for Operational Plans andInteroperability (J-7), JDD, 7000 Joint Staff Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20318-7000.

b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff that would change source document information reflected in thispublication, that directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as anenclosure to its proposal. The Military Services and other organizations are requestedto notify the Director, J-7, Joint Staff, when changes to source documents reflected inthis publication are initiated.

c. Record of Changes:

CHANGE COPY DATE OF DATE POSTEDNUMBER NUMBER CHANGE ENTERED BY REMARKS__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

D-2

Appendix D

Joint Pub 3-13.1

5. Distribution

a. Additional copies of this publication can be obtained through Service publicationcenters.

b. Only approved pubs and test pubs are releasable outside the combatant commands,Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any joint publication to foreign governments orforeign nationals must be requested through the local embassy (Defense Attache Office)to DIA Foreign Liaison Branch, C-AS1, Room 1A674, Pentagon, Washington D.C.20301-7400.

c. Additional copies should be obtained from the Military Service assignedadministrative support responsibility by DOD Directive 5100.3, 1 November 1988,“Support of the Headquarters of Unified, Specified, and Subordinate Joint Commands.”

By Military Services:

Army: US Army AG Publication Center2800 Eastern BoulevardBaltimore, MD 21220-2898

Air Force: Air Force Publications Distribution Center2800 Eastern BoulevardBaltimore, MD 21220-2896

Navy: CO, Naval Inventory Control Point700 Robbins AvenueBldg 1, Customer ServicePhiladelphia, PA 19111-5099

Marine Corps: Marine Corps Logistics BaseAlbany, GA 31704-5000

Coast Guard: Coast Guard Headquarters, COMDT (G-REP)2100 2nd Street, SWWashington, D.C. 20593-0001

d. Local reproduction is authorized and access to unclassified publications isunrestricted. However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified jointpublications must be in accordance with DOD Regulation 5200.1-R.

GLOSSARYPART I—ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

GL-1

AAGS Army air-ground systemADP automatic data processingAO action officerAOI area of interestARM antiradiation missile

BDA battle damage assessment

C2 command and controlC2W command and control warfareC3 command, control, and communicationsC4I command, control, communications, computers and

intelligenceCATF commander, amphibious task forceCI counterintelligenceCINC commander of a combatant command; commander in chiefCISO counterintelligence staff officerCJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of StaffCJCSI Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff InstructionCJTF Commander, Joint Task ForceCLF commander, landing forceCOA course of actionCOMSEC communications security

DE directed energyDII defense information infrastructureDO Director of OperationsDOD Department of Defense

EA electronic attackEM electromagneticEOB electronic order of battleEP electronic protectionES electronic warfare supportEW electronic warfare

FISS foreign intelligence and security serviceFSE fire support element

G-3 Division Operations Officer (Army)GCCS Global Command and Control SystemGII global information infrastructure

IW information warfare

GL-2

Glossary

Joint Pub 3-13.1

J-2 joint staff intelligence office (or officer)J-3 joint staff operations office (or officer)J-4 joint staff logistics office (or officer)J-5 joint staff plans office (or officer)J-6 joint staff command, control, communications, and computer

systems office (or officer)JC2WC Joint Command and Control Warfare CenterJCEWS Joint Commanders Electronic Warfare StaffJCMA Joint COMSEC Monitor ActivityJCS Joint Chiefs of StaffJFC joint force commanderJFSOCC joint force special operations component commanderJIPTL joint integrated prioritized target listJISE joint intelligence support elementJOC joint operations centerJOPES Joint Operation Planning and Execution SystemJPOTF Joint Psychological Operations Task ForceJRFL joint restricted frequency listJSC Joint Spectrum CenterJSIR Joint Spectrum Interference ResolutionJSMS Joint Spectrum Management SystemJTF joint task forceJULLS Joint Universal Lessons Learned SystemJWAC Joint Warfare Analysis Center

MAGTF Marine air-ground task forceMFC multinational force commanderMNS mission needs statementMOOTW military operations other than warMOP memorandum of policy

NII national information infrastructure

OPFOR opposition forceOPLAN operation planOPSEC operations securityOSD Office of the Secretary of Defense

PA public affairsPSYOP psychological operations

ROE rules of engagementRSTA reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition

SCE Service Cryptologic ElementS/EWCC signals intelligence/electronic warfare coordination centerSIGINT signals intelligenceSO special operations

GL-3

Glossary

STO special technical operations

TACS theater air control system

USG United States GovernmentUSMTF United States Message Text Formatting

GL-4 Joint Pub 3-13.1

air superiority. That degree of dominancein the air battle of one force over anotherwhich permits the conduct of operations bythe former and its related land, sea and airforces at a given time and place withoutprohibitive interference by the opposingforce. (Joint Pub 1-02)

air supremacy. That degree of air superioritywherein the opposing air force is incapableof effective interference. (Joint Pub 1-02)

area of influence. A geographical areawherein a commander is directly capableof influencing operations by maneuver orfire support systems normally under thecommander’s command or control. (JointPub 1-02)

area of interest. That area of concern to thecommander, including the area of influence,areas adjacent thereto, and extending intoenemy territory to the objectives of currentor planned operations. This area alsoincludes areas occupied by enemy forceswho could jeopardize the accomplishmentof the mission. (Joint Pub 1-02)

area of responsibility. 1. The geographicalarea associated with a combatant commandwithin which a combatant commander hasauthority to plan and conduct operations.2. In naval usage, a predefined area ofenemy terrain for which supporting shipsare responsible for covering by fire onknown targets or targets of opportunity andby observation. Also called AOR. (JointPub 1-02)

combat information. Unevaluated data,gathered by or provided directly to thetactical commander which, due to its highlyperishable nature or the criticality of thesituation, cannot be processed into tacticalintelligence in time to satisfy the user’s

tactical intelligence requirements. (JointPub 1-02)

combatant commander. A commander inchief of one of the unified or specifiedcombatant commands established by thePresident. (Joint Pub 1-02)

command and control. The exercise ofauthority and direction by a properlydesignated commander over assigned andattached forces in the accomplishment ofthe mission. Command and controlfunctions are performed through anarrangement of personnel, equipment,communications, facilities, and proceduresemployed by a commander in planning,directing, coordinating, and controllingforces and operations in theaccomplishment of the mission. (Joint Pub1-02)

command and control system. Thefacilities, equipment, communications,procedures, and personnel essential to acommander for planning, directing, andcontrolling operations of assigned forcespursuant to the missions assigned. (JointPub 1-02)

command and control warfare. Theintegrated use of operations security(OPSEC), military deception,psychological operations (PSYOP),electronic warfare (EW), and physicaldestruction, mutually supported byintelligence, to deny information to,influence, degrade, or destroy adversarycommand and control capabilities, whileprotecting friendly command and controlcapabilities against such actions. Commandand control warfare is an application ofinformation warfare in military operationsand is a subset of information warfare.Command and control warfare applies

PART II—TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

GL-5

across the range of military operations andall levels of conflict. Also called C2W.C2W is both offensive and defensive:

a. C2-attack. Prevent effective C2 ofadversary forces by denying information to,influencing, degrading or destroying theadversary C2 system.

b. C2-protect. Maintain effective commandand control of own forces by turning tofriendly advantage or negating adversaryefforts to deny information to, influence,degrade or destroy the friendly C2 system.(Upon revision of this publication, this termand its definition will modify the existingterm and its definition and will be includedin Joint Pub 1-02.)

commander’s estimate of the situation. Alogical process of reasoning by which acommander considers all the circumstancesaffecting the military situation and arrivesat a decision as to a course of action to betaken to accomplish the mission. Acommander’s estimate which considers amilitary situation so far in the future as torequire major assumptions is called acommander’s long-range estimate of thesituation. (Joint Pub 1-02)

communications intelligence. Technical andintelligence information derived fromforeign communications by other than theintended recipients. Also called COMINT.(Joint Pub 1-02)

communications security. The protectionresulting from all measures designed todeny unauthorized persons information ofvalue which might be derived from thepossession and study of telecommunications,or to mislead unauthorized persons in theirinterpretation of the results of suchpossession and study. Also calledCOMSEC. Communications Securityincludes a. cryptosecurity; b. transmission

security; c. emission security; and d.physical security of communicationssecurity materials and information.

a. cryptosecurity. The component ofcommunications security that results fromthe provision of technically soundcryptosystems and their proper use.

b. transmission security. The componentof communications security that resultsfrom all measures designed to protecttransmissions from interception andexploitation by means other thancryptanalysis.

c. emission security. The component ofcommunications security that results fromall measures taken to deny unauthorizedpersons information of value that might bederived from intercept and analysis ofcompromising emanations fromcrypto-equipment and telecommunicationssystems.

d. physical security. The component ofcommunications security that results fromall physical measures necessary tosafeguard classified equipment, material,and documents from access thereto orobservation thereof by unauthorizedpersons. (Joint Pub 1-02)

data. Representation of facts, concepts, orinstructions in a formalized manner suitablefor communication, interpretation, orprocessing by humans or by automaticmeans. Any representations such ascharacters or analog quantities to whichmeaning is or might be assigned. (Joint Pub1-02)

directed energy. An umbrella term coveringtechnologies that relate to the productionof a beam of concentrated electromagneticenergy or atomic or subatomic particles.Also called DE. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Glossary

GL-6

Glossary

Joint Pub 3-13.1

directed-energy warfare. Military actioninvolving the use of directed-energyweapons, devices, and countermeasures toeither cause direct damage or destructionof enemy equipment, facilities, andpersonnel, or to determine, exploit, reduce,or prevent hostile use of the electromagneticspectrum through damage, destruction, anddisruption. It also includes actions takento protect friendly equipment, facilities, andpersonnel and retain friendly use of theelectromagnetic spectrum. Also calledDEW. (Joint Pub 1-02)

directed-energy weapon. A system usingdirected energy primarily as a direct meansto damage or destroy enemy equipment,facilities, and personnel. (Joint Pub 1-02)

electromagnetic compatibility. The abilityof systems, equipment, and devices thatutilize the electromagnetic spectrum tooperate in their intended operationalenvironments without sufferingunacceptable degradation or causingunintentional degradation because ofelectromagnetic radiation or response. Itinvolves the application of soundelectromagnetic spectrum management;system, equipment, and device designconfiguration that ensures interference-freeoperation; and clear concepts and doctrinesthat maximize operational effectiveness.Also called EMC. (Joint Pub 1-02)

electromagnetic deception. The deliberateradiation, reradiation, alteration,suppression, absorption, denial,enhancement, or reflection ofelectromagnetic energy in a mannerintended to convey misleading informationto an enemy or to enemy electromagnetic-dependent weapons, thereby degrading orneutralizing the enemy’s combat capability.Among the types of electromagneticdeception are:

a. manipulative electromagnetic deception.Actions to eliminate revealing, or conveymisleading, electromagnetic telltaleindicators that may be used by hostileforces.

b. simulative electromagnetic deception.Actions to simulate friendly, notional, oractual capabilities to mislead hostile forces.

c. imitative electromagnetic deception. Theintroduction of electromagnetic energy intoenemy systems that imitates enemyemissions. (Joint Pub 1-02)

electromagnetic interference. Anyelectromagnetic disturbance that interrupts,obstructs, or otherwise degrades or limitsthe effective performance of electronics/electrical equipment. It can be inducedintentionally, as in some forms of electronicwarfare, or unintentionally, as a result ofspurious emissions and responses,intermodulation products, and the like.Also called EMI. (Joint Pub 1-02)

electromagnetic intrusion. The intentionalinsertion of electromagnetic energy intotransmission paths in any manner, with theobjective of deceiving operators or ofcausing confusion. (Joint Pub 1-02)

electromagnetic jamming. The deliberateradiation, re-radiation, or reflection ofelectromagnetic energy for the purpose ofpreventing or reducing an enemy’s effectiveuse of the electromagnetic spectrum, andwith the intent of degrading or neutralizingthe enemy’s combat capability. (Joint Pub1-02)

electromagnetic spectrum. The range offrequencies of electromagnetic radiationfrom zero to infinity. It is divided into 26alphabetically designated bands. (Joint Pub1-02)

GL-7

Glossary

electronic masking. The controlled radiationof electromagnetic energy on friendlyfrequencies in a manner to protect theemissions of friendly communications andelectronic systems against enemy electronicwarfare support/signals intelligence,without significantly degrading theoperation of friendly systems. (Joint Pub1-02)

electronics intelligence. Technical andgeolocation information derived fromforeign non-communications electromagneticradiations emanating from other thannuclear detonations or radioactive sources.Also called ELINT. (Joint Pub 1-02)

electronics security. The protection resultingfrom all measures designed to denyunauthorized persons information of valuethat might be derived from their interceptionand study of noncommunicationselectromagnetic radiations, e.g., radar.(Joint Pub 1-02)

electronic warfare. Any military actioninvolving the use of electromagnetic anddirected energy to control theelectromagnetic spectrum or to attack theenemy. Also called EW. The three majorsubdivisions within electronic warfare are:electronic attack, electronic protection, andelectronic warfare support.

a. electronic attack. That division ofelectronic warfare involving the use ofelectromagnetic, directed energy, orantiradiation weapons to attack personnel,facilities, or equipment with the intent ofdegrading, neutralizing, or destroyingenemy combat capability. Also called EA.EA includes: 1) actions taken to prevent orreduce an enemy’s effective use of theelectromagnetic spectrum, such as jammingand electromagnetic deception and 2)employment of weapons that use eitherelectromagnetic or directed energy as theirprimary destructive mechanism (lasers,

radio frequency, weapons, particle beams),or antiradiation weapons.

b. electronic protection. That division ofelectronic warfare involving actions takento protect personnel, facilities, andequipment from any effects of friendly orenemy employment of electronic warfarethat degrade, neutralize, or destroy friendlycombat capability. Also called EP.

c. electronic warfare support. That divisionof electronic warfare involving actionstasked by, or under direct control of, anoperational commander to search for,intercept, identify, and locate sources ofintentional and unintentional radiatedelectromagnetic energy for the purpose ofimmediate threat recognition. Thus,electronic warfare support providesinformation required for immediatedecisions involving electronic warfareoperations and other tactical actions suchas threat avoidance, targeting, and homing.Also called ES. Electronic warfare supportdata can be used to produce signalsintelligence (SIGINT), both communicationsintelligence (COMINT) and electronicsintelligence (ELINT). (Upon revision ofthis publication, this term and its definitionwill modify the existing term and itsdefinition and will be included in Joint Pub1-02.)

electronic warfare frequency deconfliction.Actions taken to integrate those frequenciesused by electronic warfare systems into theoverall frequency deconfliction process.(This term and its definition are providedfor information and are proposed forinclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub1-02 by Joint Pub 3-51.)

emission control. The selective andcontrolled use of electromagnetic, acoustic,or other emitters to optimize command andcontrol capabilities while minimizing, foroperations security: a. detection by enemy

GL-8

Glossary

Joint Pub 3-13.1

sensors; b. to minimize mutual interferenceamong friendly systems; and/or c. toexecute a military deception plan. Alsocalled EMCON. (Joint Pub 1-02)

foreign instrumentation signalsintelligence. Technical information andintelligence information derived from theintercept of foreign instrumentation signalsby other than the intended recipients.Foreign instrumentation signals intelligenceis a category of signals intelligence. Note:Foreign instrumentation signals include butare not limited to signals from telemetry,radio beacons, electronic interrogators,tracking/fusing/arming/firing commandsystems, and video data links. Also calledFISINT. (Joint Pub 1-02)

frequency deconfliction. A systematicmanagement procedure to coordinate theuse of the electromagnetic spectrum foroperations, communications, andintelligence functions. Frequencydeconfliction is one element ofelectromagnetic spectrum management.(Joint Pub 1-02)

global information infrastructure. Theworldwide sum of all interconnectedinformation systems and the systems thatconnect them. Also called GII. (Uponapproval of this revision, this term and itsdefinition will be included in Joint Pub 1-02.)

guarded frequencies. Enemy frequenciesthat are currently being exploited forcombat information and intelligence. Aguarded frequency is time-oriented in thatthe guarded frequency list changes as theenemy assumes different combat postures.These frequencies may be jammed after thecommander has weighed the potentialoperational gain against the loss of thetechnical information. (This term and itsdefinition are provided for information andare proposed for inclusion in the next

edition of Joint Pub 1-02 by Joint Pub3-51.)

imitative communications deception. Thatdivision of deception involving theintroduction of false or misleading butplausible communications into targetsystems that mimics or imitates the targetedcommunications. (This term and itsdefinition are provided for information andare proposed for inclusion in the nextedition of Joint Pub 1-02 by Joint Pub3-51.)

information. Facts, data, or instructions inany medium or form. (Upon revision of thispublication, this term and its definition willmodify the existing term and its definitionand will be included in Joint Pub 1-02.)

information superiority. That degree ofdominance in the information domainwhich permits the conduct of operationswithout effective opposition. (Uponapproval of this revision, this term and itsdefinition will be included in Joint Pub1-02.)

information system. The organizedcollection, processing, transmission, anddissemination of information, in accordancewith defined procedures, whetherautomated or manual. In informationwarfare, this includes the entireinfrastructure, organization, andcomponents that collect, process, store,transmit, display, disseminate, and act oninformation. (Upon approval of thisrevision, this term and its definition will beincluded in Joint Pub 1-02.)

information warfare. Actions taken toachieve information superiority by affectingadversary information, information-basedprocesses, information systems, andcomputer-based networks while defendingone’s own information, information-based

GL-9

Glossary

processes, information systems, andcomputer-based networks. Also called IW.(Upon approval of this revision, this termand its definition will be included in JointPub 1-02.)

joint operations area. That portion of anarea of conflict in which a joint forcecommander conducts military operationspursuant to an assigned mission and theadministration incident to such militaryoperations. Also called JOA. (Joint Pub1-02)

leveraging. The effective use of information,information systems, and technology toincrease the means and synergy inaccomplishing information warfarestrategy. (Upon approval of this revision,this term and its definition will be includedin Joint Pub 1-02.)

measurement and signature intelligence.Scientific and technical intelligenceinformation obtained by quantitative andqualitative analysis of data (metric, angle,spatial, wavelength, time dependence,modulation, plasma, and hydromagnetic)derived from specific technical sensors forthe purpose of identifying any distinctivefeatures associated with the source, emitter,or sender and to facilitate subsequentidentification and/or measurement of thesame. Also called MASINT. (Joint Pub1-02) Note: Following is not from JointPub 1-02. MASINT includes: AcousticalIntelligence (ACINT), Optical Intelligence(OPTINT), Electro-optical Intelligence(ELECTRO-OPTICAL), InfraredIntelligence (IRINT), Laser Intelligence(LASINT), and Unintentional RadiationIntelligence (RINT).

military deception. Actions executed tomislead adversary military decisionmakersas to friendly military capabilities,intentions, and operations, thereby causingthe adversary to take specific actions (or

inactions) that will contribute to theaccomplishment of the friendly mission.The five categories of military deceptionare:

a. strategic military deception. Militarydeception planned and executed by and insupport of senior military commanders toresult in adversary military policies andactions that support the originator ’sstrategic military objectives, policies, andoperations.

b. operational military deception. Militarydeception planned and executed by and insupport of operational level commandersto result in adversary actions that arefavorable to the originator’s objectives andoperations. Operational military deceptionis planned and conducted in a theater of warto support campaigns and major operations.

c. tactical military deception. Militarydeception planned and executed by and insupport of tactical commanders to result inadversary actions that are favorable to theoriginator’s objectives and operations.Tactical military deception is planned andconducted to support battles andengagements.

d. Service military deception. Militarydeception planned and executed by theServices that pertain to Service support tojoint operations. Service military deceptionis designed to protect and enhance thecombat capabilities of service forces andsystems.

e. military deception in support ofoperations security (OPSEC). Militarydeception planned and executed by and insupport of all levels of command to supportthe prevention of the inadvertentcompromise of sensitive or classifiedactivities, capabilities, or intentions.Deceptive OPSEC measures are designedto distract foreign intelligence away from,

GL-10

Glossary

Joint Pub 3-13.1

or provide cover for, military operations andactivities. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Military Intelligence Integrated DataSystem/Integrated Data Base. Anarchitectural concept for improving themanner in which military intelligence isanalyzed, stored and disseminated. TheIntegrated Data Base (IDB) forms the coredata base for the Military IntelligenceIntegrated Data System (MIIDS) program.It integrates the data resident in theAutomated Installation Intelligence File(AIF), and the Defense Intelligence Orderof Battle System (DIOBS) data files, theDIA equipment file, and selected ElectronicWarfare (EW) and Command, Control andCommunications data. The Integrated DataBase is the national-level repository for thegeneral military intelligence informationavailable to the entire DODIIS communityand maintained by DIA and the commandsunder the Distributed Production Program.The Distributed Production Programdelegates responsibility for maintainingeach portion of the IDB. The DIA andcommands’ IDBs are kept synchronized bysystem transactions to disseminate updates.Also called MIIDS/IDB. (This term andits definition are provided for informationand are proposed for inclusion in the nextedition of Joint Pub 1-02 by Joint Pub2-01.)

military strategy. The art and science ofemploying the armed forces of a nation tosecure the objectives of national policy bythe application of force or the threat of force.(Joint Pub 1-02)

national security strategy. The art andscience of developing, applying, andcoordinating the instruments of nationalpower (diplomatic, economic, military, andinformational) to achieve objectives thatcontribute to national security. Also called

national strategy or grand strategy. (JointPub 1-02)

operations security. A process of identifyingcritical information and subsequentlyanalyzing friendly actions attendant tomilitary operations and other activities to:

a. Identify those actions that can beobserved by adversary intelligence systems.

b. Determine indicators adversaryintelligence systems might obtain that couldbe interpreted or pieced together to derivecritical information in time to be useful toadversaries.

c. Select and execute measures thateliminate or reduce to an acceptable levelthe vulnerabilities of friendly actions toadversary exploitation. Also calledOPSEC. (Joint Pub 1-02)

operations security measures. Methods andmeans to gain and maintain essentialsecrecy about critical information. Thefollowing categories apply:

a. action control—The objective is toeliminate indicators or the vulnerability ofactions to exploitation by adversaryintelligence systems. Select what actionsto undertake; decide whether or not toexecute actions; and determine the “who,”“when,” “where,” and “how” for actionsnecessary to accomplish tasks.

b. countermeasures—The objective is todisrupt effective adversary informationgathering or prevent their recognition ofindicators when collected materials areprocessed. Use diversions, camouflage,concealment, jamming, threats, policepowers, and force against adversaryinformation gathering and processingcapabilities.

GL-11

Glossary

c. counteranalysis—The objective is toprevent accurate interpretations ofindicators during adversary analysis ofcollected materials. This is done byconfusing the adversary analyst throughdeception techniques such as covers. (JointPub 1-02)

protected frequencies. Those friendlyfrequencies used for a particular operation,identified and protected to prevent themfrom being inadvertently jammed byfriendly forces while active electronicwarfare operations are directed againsthostile forces. These frequencies are ofsuch critical importance that jammingshould be restricted unless absolutelynecessary or until coordination with theusing unit is made. They are generallytime-oriented, may change with the tacticalsituation, and must be updated periodically.(This term and its definition are providedfor information and are proposed forinclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub1-02 by Joint Pub 3-51.)

psychological operations. Plannedoperations to convey selected informationand indicators to foreign audiences toinfluence their emotions, motives, objectivereasoning, and ultimately the behavior offoreign governments, organizations,groups, and individuals. The purpose ofpsychological operations is to induce orreinforce foreign attitudes and behaviorfavorable to the originator’s objectives.Also called PSYOP. (Joint Pub 1-02)

signal security. A generic term that includesboth communications security andelectronics security. (Joint Pub 1-02)

signals intelligence. 1. A category ofintelligence information comprising eitherindividually or in combination allcommunications intelligence, electronicsintelligence, and foreign instrumentationsignals intelligence, however transmitted.

2. Intelligence derived from communications,electronics, and foreign instrumentationsignals. Also called SIGINT. (Joint Pub1-02)

spectrum management. Planning,coordinating, and managing joint use of theelectromagnetic spectrum throughoperational, engineering, andadministrative procedures, with theobjective of enabling electronic systems toperform their functions in the intendedenvironment without causing or sufferingunacceptable interference. (Joint Pub 1-02)

strategy. The art and science of developingand using political, economic,psychological, and military forces asnecessary during peace and war, to affordthe maximum support to policies, in orderto increase the probabilities and favorable,consequences of victory and to lessen thechances of defeat. (Joint Pub 1-02)

suppression of enemy air defenses. Thatactivity which neutralizes, destroys ortemporarily degrades surface-based enemyair defenses by destructive and/or disruptivemeans. Also called SEAD. (Joint Pub1-02)

system. Any organized assembly of resourcesand procedures united and regulated byinteraction or interdependence toaccomplish as set of specific functions.(Joint Pub 1-02)

taboo frequencies. Any friendly frequencyof such importance that it must never bedeliberately jammed or interfered with byfriendly forces. Normally these frequenciesinclude international distress, stop buzzer,safety and controller frequencies. Thesefrequencies are generally long standing.However, they may be time-oriented in that,as the combat or exercise situation changes,the restriction may be removed. (This termand its definition are provided for

GL-12

Glossary

Joint Pub 3-13.1

information and are proposed for inclusionin the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02 by JointPub 3-51.)

wartime reserve modes. Characteristics andoperating procedures of sensor,communications, navigation aids, threatrecognition, weapons, and countermeasuressystems that will contribute to military

effectiveness if unknown to ormisunderstood by opposing commandersbefore they are used, but could be exploitedor neutralized if known in advance.Wartime reserve modes are deliberatelyheld in reserve for wartime or emergencyuse and seldom, if ever, applied orintercepted prior to such use. Also calledWARM. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Assess-ments/

Revision

CJCSApproval

TwoDrafts

ProgramDirective

ProjectProposal

J-7 formally staffs withServices and CINCS

Includes scope of project,references, milestones,and who will developdrafts

J-7 releases ProgramDirective to Lead Agent.Lead Agent can beService, CINC, or JointStaff (JS) Directorate

STEP #2Program Directive

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18 to 24 months followingpublication, the Director J-7, willsolicit a written report from thecombatant commands andServices on the utility and qualityof each pub and the need for anyurgent changes or earlier-than-scheduled revisions

No later than 5 years afterdevelopment, each pub is revised

STEP #5Assessments/Revision

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Submitted by Services, CINCS, or Joint Staffto fill extant operational void

J-7 validates requirement with Services andCINCs

J-7 initiates Program Directive

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STEP #1Project Proposal

All joint doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures are organized into a comprehensive hierarchyas shown in the chart above. is in the series of joint doctrine publications.The diagram below illustrates an overview of the development process:

Joint Pub 3-13.1 Operations

JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY

JOINT PUB 1-0

PERSONNELand

ADMINISTRATION

JOINT PUB 4-0 JOINT PUB 5-0 JOINT PUB 6-0

LOGISTICS C4 SYSTEMSPLANS

JOINT PUB 0-2

JOINT PUB 1

UNAAF

JOINTWARFARE

JOINTDOCTRINE

PUBLICATION

Lead Agent forwards proposed pub to Joint Staff

Joint Staff takes responsibility for pub, makesrequired changes and prepares pub forcoordination with Services and CINCS

Joint Staff conducts formalstaffing for approval as a Joint Publication

STEP #4CJCS Approval

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PRA develops two draft pubs

PRA staffs each draft with CINCS, Services,and Joint Staff

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STEP #3Two Drafts

ENHANCEDJOINT

WARFIGHTINGCAPABILITY

INTELLIGENCE

JOINT PUB 2-0

OPERATIONS

JOINT PUB 3-0

jp 3_13_1 joint doctrine command and control warfare (c2w)

Documents