jones act final draft

Running head: Analysis of the Jones Act 1

The Jones Act:

An Analysis of It’s History and Effects on the American Maritime Industry

Luke Minicucci

Old Dominion University

Analysis of the Jones Act

Abstract

This paper explores multiple published articles and reports on the history of the Jones Act, the

U.S.-flag fleet, and corresponding economic impacts. The historical discussion involves the act’s

conceptual origins, associated reforms and major events driving reformation from the start of the

twentieth century through 2014. Observations throughout the analysis incorporate shipping

industry market share analysis in relation to cost comparisons of U.S. and foreign-flag vessels.

Referenced sources will also include data on the economic impacts of the Jones Act, implications

of the U.S.-flag fleet, and governmental intervention throughout. Notable sources include the

United States Maritime Commission (MARAD), the World Trade Organization (WTO), the

Transportation Institute, and the Capital Research Center among others.

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The Jones Act:

An Analysis of it’s History and Effects on the American Maritime Industry

The Merchant Marine Act of 1920, more commonly known as the Jones Act, is a United

States federal legislation that was created with the intention of strengthening national defense

and fostering the growth of foreign and domestic trade. The Jones Act states that any vessel

transporting cargo between U.S. ports must be built, repaired, overhauled, and registered in the

U.S., and must be owned and operated predominantly by U.S. citizens. Nearly a century later,

this statute has become a highly debated topic involving national security, economic vitality,

special interests, the future of the U.S.-flag, and the future of the American shipping industry.

Background and Revisions

Conceptual Origins

The United States’ principle that a strong naval fleet is a critical component of national

defense can be traced back to an 1890’s literature authored by former president of the Naval War

College, Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan. This writing, titled The Influence of Sea Power Upon

History 1660-1783, assessed the importance of having a powerful navy in the rise of the British

Empire. Mahan contended that with the combination of weak navies surrounding Great Britain

along with having their own strong navy, they were able to become a premier world power.

“Whoever rules the waves rules the world,” Mahan wrote. He has been called “the most

important American strategist of the 19th century,” and is often credited for shaping the current

naval strategies of the United States.

World War I (1914-1918). Nearly two decades after it’s publishing, Mahan’s teachings

became relevant during the First World War. The U.S. entered the war controlling less than 9%

of the total U.S. foreign maritime trade, and owned only 4% of the world’s steamships

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(Transportation Institute, 2010). It was a nation critically dependent on the availability of foreign

vessels, and at the start of World War I, vessels were all but available. Freight rates had

increased up to 1000% and vessel operators were buying ships for nearly five times their cost

before the war (Riordan, 1954). The government was forced to step in. Legislation was passed

allowing American owners of foreign-flagged ships to register them in the United States.

Congress also approved the Shipping Act of 1916. This act created the U.S. Shipping Board,

which authorized spending of over $3 billion into emergency shipbuilding programs

(Transportation Institute, 2010).

The Merchant Marine Act of 1920

The actions of the U.S. government during WWI were a success. By 1920, roughly 52%

of American maritime commerce was carried on U.S. ships (Transportation Institute, 2010). The

nation now looked to institute a policy that would sustain the success of the U.S.-flag during

peacetime in the global market. In addition, the U.S. sought to prevent desperate shipbuilding

measures in the future times of war or national emergency, and establish itself as the world’s

premier naval power. The result was the Merchant Marine Act of 1920. Section 1 of this act,

Purpose and Policy, states:

“It is necessary for the national defense and for the proper growth of its foreign and

domestic commerce that the United States shall have a merchant marine of the best

equipped and most suitable types of vessels sufficient to carry the greater portion of its

commerce and serve as a naval or military auxiliary in time of war or national

emergency, ultimately to be owned and operated privately by citizens of the United

States; and it is declared to be the policy of the United States to do whatever may be

necessary to develop and encourage the maintenance of such a merchant marine, and, in

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so far as may not be inconsistent with the express provisions of this Act, the Secretary of

Transportation shall, in the disposition of vessels and shipping property as hereinafter

provided, in the making of rules and regulations, and in the administration of the

shipping laws keep always in view this purpose and object as the primary end to be

attained.” (United States Government Publishing Office)

This Act authorizes government funding for construction of the U.S.-flag in order to

improve both the U.S. shipping industry and national defense, largely through indirect

subsidization. The most notable portion of this legislation appears in Section 27. This section

refers to the regulation of cabotage, or the movement of cargo between two domestic ports. In

accordance with Section 27, a vessel transporting cargo between two U.S. ports must be built,

documented, and maintained in the U.S., owned by a U.S. citizen, and operated by a crew of at

least 75% U.S. citizens (MARAD, 2013). These vessels receive subsidies from the U.S., and in

return the U.S. will have access to these vessels during times of war or national emergencies,

while also preserving shipbuilding tactics and technologies within the nation. In addition to

preserving national defense, requiring all U.S.-flagged vessels be built in the U.S. would also, in

theory, stimulate and maintain shipbuilding jobs in the U.S.

Mandating that the majority of foreign trade be transported by U.S. vessels and manned

by U.S. crews raised initial concerns. United States mariners demanded higher wages and the

U.S. requires more regulation than most foreign countries. Thus, U.S.-flag ships have higher

operating costs than other developing foreign countries who have crews that work for a fraction

of the cost, and do not require nearly as many regulations or tariffs. The U.S.-flag could not

compete with its foreign counterparts on the free market, so the size and performance of the

merchant marine began to decline.

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The Jones Act also authorized the American government to divest in the extreme surplus

of ships left after the war, and help fund the construction of newer vessels. While the Shipping

Act of 1916 aided American victory, an estimated one-third of the ships built by the program

were not begun until after the Treaty of Versailles and the war’s end (Transportation Institute,

2010). Consequentially, the U.S. was left with a large supply and no corresponding demand, a

problem that is inherent to the shipping industry. To fix this issue, the Jones Act allowed the U.S.

to sell off the large fleet to U.S. vessel operators, and use the funds gained from selling the older

vessels to award construction contracts of newer and more modern vessels.

The immediate result of selling off the old fleet proved to be all but beneficial to

America. The U.S. was not the only country with a surplus of ships; the shipping boom brought

by the war was on a global scale. European and Asian countries were also left with thousands of

vessels that were no longer needed. As a result, ships were being sold for just a fraction of what

was paid to build them just a few years earlier. There were vessels that the U.S. paid as much as

$400 per ton for, and sold for $14 per ton just a few years later (Transportation Institute, 2010).

The ships that were not sold were burned for their steel and scrapped for parts.

Furthermore, the cost of building ships in the United States was considerably higher than

doing so in foreign countries. The U.S. had higher wages, higher steel prices, as well as higher

costs of other shipbuilding materials. The subsidies offered by the American government were

not enough for shipping firms to want to build vessels. Combine that with the incredibly cheap

prices that the U.S. government was offering for vessels, and there was no longer incentive to

build ships in America. In fact, between 1922 and 1928, not a single ocean-going vessel was

built in American shipyards (Riordan, 1954).


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In an effort to stimulate the shipbuilding industry, Congress passed the Merchant Marine

Act of 1928. This legislation authorized an expansion in the construction loan budget and

reduced interest rates on construction loans. The Act served its purpose as new ships started to be

built, and many old ones were restored. Though similar to the 1920 Act, its insufficiencies were

uncovered over time, and were magnified by the effects of the Great Depression. Its flaws are

observed in a report published in 1950 by the U.S. Government Printing Office discussing five

issues:

“First, the compensation granted to American lines was not based upon actual condition

encountered on the particular route served, so that some lines got more than they needed, while

others competing with subsidized foreign companies were given too little aid.

Second, the ship replacement provisions were somewhat too laxly enforced.

Third, loans for ship-building were made at varying rates, so that lucky lines got money

at almost nominal interest charges, while others paid several times as much, creating an element

of unfairness. This, however, was not due to favoritism, but to legal interpretation of carelessly

worded section of the Act….

Fourth there was inadequate supervision over the use to which subsidy money was put by

liners, officers or one or two companies paying themselves huge bonuses and dividends when

their companies were almost going bankrupt.

Fifth, there was a complaint that, in violation of law, contracts were so worded that

public bidding was frustrated and only a predetermined line could comply.” (United States

Government Printing Office) (Riordan, 1954)


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The performance of the United States Merchant Marine continued to decline and the

nation sought further change. The next revision came in form of the Merchant Marine Act of

1936. This bill replaced the U.S. Shipping Board with the U.S. Maritime Commission. It also

authorized both direct and indirect federal subsidies with the use of Operational Differential

Subsidies (ODS) and Constructional Differential Subsidies (CDS). These programs would

provide contracts to domestic operators and shipbuilders in order to bridge the growing gap

between U.S. and foreign prices. This was a more direct way for the federal government to

subsidize the industry and close the gap between foreign and domestic costs.

Despite this effort, the U.S. fleet continued to shrink. When the Jones Act was established

in 1920, registered vessels carried roughly 16 million tons and 52% of America’s seaborne trade.

By beginning of 1939, the carrying capacity shrunk to 12 million tons and accounted for 22% of

the nation’s commerce (Transportation Institute, 2010).

World War II (1939-1945). When the United States entered World War II, the demand

for ships skyrocketed once again. Similar to the World War I, heroic shipbuilding efforts were a

necessity for American survival. The U.S. shipbuilding industry reached its peak in 1944 when it

produced 19.3 million gross tons of shipping capacity, representing well over 90% of the world’s

shipbuilding market share (Stopford, 2009). When the war ended in 1945, there were over 5,500

U.S.-flagged vessels with a combined carrying capacity of roughly 40 million tons, representing

60% of the world’s seaborne carrying capacity (Transportation Institute, 2010). Though the U.S.

was once again among the leaders in world trade, nearly a decade had passed since the ODS and

CDS programs were established, and lack of a steady demand pattern prevented any accurate

determinations of their impacts during peacetime.

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The Merchant Ship Sales Act of 1946. The U.S. was once again left with thousands of

unwanted ships, and once again wanted to divest. In order to do so, Congress passed the

Merchant Ship Sales Act of 1946. This legislation placed thousands of unwanted ships into what

is known as the National Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF). The NDRF’s purpose is to act as a

protective measure in the case of another war or a national emergency. Roughly 2,000 of the

vessels that survived WWII were placed in harbors on the east and west coasts and in the gulf.

The Merchant Ship Sales Act of 1946 also authorized the selling and disposing of the

wartime fleet to foreign countries. Due to the severe imbalance of supply and demand identical

to the post-WWI shipping boom collapse, these vessels were sold at a fraction of their production

cost. Yet this time, foreign countries with much lower operating costs now owned nearly one

million tons of shipping capacity. As a result, the American fleet soon faced more intense

competition.

In 1950, Congress eliminated the U.S. Maritime Commission, and created the Federal

Maritime Board (FMB) and the U.S. Maritime Administration (MARAD). Despite the Maritime

Commission’s critical efforts during World War II, President Truman felt that this would allow

for the two organizations to better specialize in their responsibilities. The FMB now handled the

subsidies, and MARAD oversaw the shipping interests for the American government.

Korean War (1950-1953). Though not nearly as substantial of a war as World Wars I

and II, very minimal shipbuilding efforts were needed during the Korean War. The U.S. still had

a strong enough fleet left from WWII, and the newly formed National Defense Reserve Fleet

also proved useful. According to the Transportation Institute, an estimated 31.5 million tons of

war materials were transported out of the United States, 95% of which were transported by ship,

and 80% of which were carried by privately owned U.S.-flag vessels. The U.S. activated 540

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NDRF vessels to ship the remaining 15% of war material (Transportation Institute, MARAD).

However, the size of the U.S. Merchant Marine has declined ever since. In 1950, the number of

the NDRF reached its highest mark of 2,277 vessels. In 1951, the number of U.S. privately

owned vessels stood at 1,288 vessels, a figure that has not since been reached (MARAD, 2015).

At the start of the 1960’s, U.S.-flagged vessels carried roughly 20% of foreign trade, and carried

only 5.6% by the end of decade.

Vietnam War (1965-1973). By the start of the war in Vietnam, the U.S.-flag privately

owned fleet had shrunk to 948 vessels. As a result, these vessels could only carry 65% of the war

materials needed, which left the rest to be carried by government owned or foreign-flagged

vessels. However, much of the National Defense Reserve Fleet was outdated, and many foreign

countries did not allow their vessels to be used to help the Unites States’ war efforts. According

to the U.S. Maritime Administration, just 172 NDRF vessels were activated for the Vietnam

War. The shipping industry was rapidly growing and changing, meanwhile the American

Merchant Marine continued to age and decline.


This new legislation served as virtually an update of the 1936 Act. With industry changes

such as containerization and specialized cargo, the U.S. sought to provide further constructional

subsidies, but in a more efficient way. The act increased the variety of vessels qualified to be

subsidized, but reduced the total percentage of allowed funding for individual vessels. Another

addition was the establishment of the Commission of American Shipbuilding, which was created

to observe the results of the revision and report the findings with recommendations to the

President and Congress (Cohn, 1983).

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Operational efficiencies of the transportation industry in the U.S. as well as around the

world were improving and world trade continued to grow faster than ever. Despite the help of the

federal government, the performance of the U.S.-flag continued to decline. By 1990, just 4% of

American commerce was carried by U.S.-flagged ships (Transportation Institute, 2010).

The Maritime Security Act of 1996

The Merchant Marine Acts of 1936 and 1970 were replaced by the Maritime Security Act

of 1996 in the form of the Maritime Security Program (MSP). Described by the U.S. Maritime

Administration, the MSP “provides a fixed retainer payment to U.S.-flag vessel owners in

exchange for providing the Department of Defense with assured access to their vessels and

related transportation services and infrastructure during times of war, national emergency, or

when otherwise deemed necessary by the Secretary of Defense”. The MSP was authorized to run

for 10 years and allow up to 47 vessels to participate. In 2003, the program was extended for 10

more years and allowed for the participation of 60 vessels. When the 10 years was up, the

President passed the National Defense Authorization Act of 2013 (NDAA), which extended the

MSP through 2025 (MARAD, 2015).

The U.S.-Flag Today

As of 2014, there are a total of 179 U.S.-flag privately owned vessels (Figure 1)

(MARAD, 2014). Of those, 110 engaged in foreign commerce, 60 of which are a part of the

Maritime Security Program (Lincicome, 2015. The number of U.S.-flagged ships has decreased

by an average of 18 for the last 63 years. Due to the construction of larger vessels throughout the

decades, these numbers slightly exaggerate the American performance. While the number of

U.S.-flag vessels was basically cut in half from the 1950s-1990s, the overall carrying capacity of

the U.S. fleet slightly increased over that time (Figure 2). In fact, throughout the 1980’s and

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1990’s, the U.S. privately owned fleet had a carrying capacity of around 13 million gross tons

per year, the most since the post World War II vessel surplus. However, the 179 vessels that

remain carry a total of roughly 7 million gross tons, the lowest since 1946.

Since 1948, the World Trade Organization estimates the value of worldwide merchandise

trade imports grew by a factor of 95 times (P.F. Johnson, M.R. Leenders, and A.E. Flynn, 2011).

In 2013, the U.S. accounted for 12.4% of the total value of world merchandise imports, the most

of any country (Figure 3) (WTO, 2013). Despite these numbers, the U.S.-flag has become

virtually non-existent in the global market (Figure 4). In fact, the U.S. Maritime Administration

stopped tracking its performance in 2003, when the percentage of the U.S.-flag privately owned

fleet in waterborne foreign trade dipped below 2% (Figures 5, and 6). Over the lifespan of an

average person, the U.S.-flag went from carrying nearly two-thirds of the world’s merchant

tonnage, to a now estimated 1% (Arizona Small Business Association, 2012).

Comparison of Industry Costs

Operating Costs. The U.S. Maritime Administration (MARAD) conducted a report

comparing the operating costs of U.S.-flag and foreign-flag vessels. According to the report, the

total average operating costs for a U.S. vessel in foreign trade in 2010 was $20,000, roughly 2.7

times higher than foreign-flag vessels (Figure 7). As of January 2015, the MSP can provide $3.1

million in retainer payments to a qualified vessel per year, which is roughly $8,500 per day

(MARAD, 2015). Nonetheless, the gap between foreign and domestic operating costs was at its

highest point, and the retainer payments are not enough. After the retainer payment, there

remains roughly a $4,100 per day unfunded gap in operating costs (Figure 8), which is about

$1.5 million per year.

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The U.S. Maritime Administration recognizes labor costs as the single leading driver of

the high operating costs of American vessels. Due to the Jones Act restriction that U.S.-flag

vessels must be crewed by 75% U.S. citizens, powerful labor unions have been able to leverage

incredibly high wages over the years. As of 2010, American crews average wages over five

times higher than foreign crews. According to MARAD’s report, crew costs represent 68% of the

total cost to operate a U.S.-flag ship, compared to 35% of the cost of foreign-flags. These high

operating costs are too unattractive for shipowners, and are largely responsible for the U.S.-flag

now representing 1% of the market share of foreign commerce. Recall that this number reached

60% in 1945, as previously mentioned.

Shipbuilding Costs. As of 2013, Asian countries dominate the shipbuilding industry,

representing roughly two-thirds of the market share. In terms of gross tonnage of vessels

produced, China led all nations, followed by South Korea and Japan (Statista, 2013). These

countries have been able to efficiently produce vessels at the cheapest prices. China and South

Korea have made a jump ahead of Japan due largely to the abundance of cheap labor. In China

the average ship costs $34 million, $36 million in South Korea, $38 million in the small Japanese

yards, and $43 million in the big Japanese yards (Stopford, 2009).

Similar to operating American ships, there is a significant gap between shipbuilding costs

in America versus foreign countries. Building a new ship in the U.S. is nearly three times the

cost doing so in Japan or South Korea (Lincicome, 2015). Despite millions of dollars being

available in grants, U.S. shipyards produce just 1% of the global shipbuilding market share

(Walker, 2011). Keep in mind that it was in the United States that much of the world’s

shipbuilding technology originated, and as previously mentioned, represented over 90% in 1945

(Stopford, 2009). Figure 9 illustrates the U.S.-flag fleets decline in market share.

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The Jones Act Debate

As many arguments as there are in opposition of the Jones Act, there are just as many in

favor. To name a few, discussions regarding national security, availability of jobs, cost of living,

and emergency response all involve completely opposing opinions.

National Security

At its height in 1950, the NDRF consisted of 2,277 ships, but as of March 31, 2015,

there are just 100. While its possible that the Jones Act is at least partially responsible for the

decline of the U.S. Merchant Marine, it is possible that without the Jones Act, the U.S. Merchant

Marine would cease to exist. History has shown the importance of having a viable fleet in

preserving national defense. As the world’s largest importer by volume, the U.S. economy is

largely dependent on foreign countries. As seen in the recent events on the west coast, this

dependence leaves the American economy vulnerable. So while the Jones Act could be partially

blamed for the small remaining fleet and current dependency, it does in fact preserve a bit of

independency.

Availability of Jobs

According the MARAD, the total direct, indirect, and induced employment associated

with the American shipbuilding and repairing industries accounted for .2% of total jobs in the

United States in 2011. These industries also directly provided $7.9 billion in labor income and

$9.8 billion in GDP. The Jones Act is able to sustain these jobs. However, others would argue

that protecting these jobs takes away any incentive for the industry to grow. If a U.S. vessel

operator can still profit from using an old and inefficient ship, and does not have to worry about

foreign competition, there are fewer motives to build a newer vessel in the overpriced American

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shipyards. This methodology is used by many economists to explain the lack of market share

held by the U.S. shipping industry.

Cost of Living

Hawaii State Senator, Sam Slom, stated that the cost of living in Hawaii is 49% higher

than the U.S. mainland because of the Jones Act. According to Slom, “it costs about $790 to ship

a 40-foot container from Los Angeles to Shanghai, but it costs $8,700 to ship the same container

from Los Angeles to Honolulu” (Bussewitz, 2014). Studies done by the General Accounting

Office of the United States done in the 1990’s found that the Jones Act costs Hawaii, Alaska, and

Puerto Rico between $2.8 billion and $9.8 billion per year (CRC, 2013). In 1995, the U.S.

International Trade Commission reported that the Jones Act costs the American economy at least

$2.8 billion per year, or $4.37 billion adjusted for inflation, and if removed, shipping prices

would drop by 26%. (CRC, 2013). However, for almost every report in opposition of the act,

there is one in favor. In an excerpt from the Journal of Commerce, Gary Ferrulli stated, “Assume

a price of $2,500 per 40-foot container for loads of soda, beer or canned fruits and vegetables.

Each 40-footer holds about 2,000 cases of 24 cans per case. The additional cost of 20% equates

to about one cent a can.” (CRC, 2013).

Emergency Response

The government has been criticized for not temporarily relieving the Jones Act during

times of emergency. A small example occurred in 2013, during one of New Jersey’s worst

winters. Some of New Jersey’s major cities were unable to function and were desperately in need

of more road salt. The state’s last hope was sitting on a foreign vessel in Maine that had 40,000

tons of salt on board. Unfortunately, the Jones Act prevented the vessel from traveling directly

from Maine to New Jersey, and no salt was ever delivered (Meyer, 2014).

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A more impactful example of the Jones Act slowing disaster relief occurred in 2010

during the Gulf Coast BP oil spill. There were approximately 1,500 vessels that were able to help

the relief effort, but could not due to Jones Act restrictions. Senators of both Texas and Florida

reportedly both filed for a temporary Jones Act waiver, but were unsuccessful. However, there

have been many cases where the Jones Act has been waivered temporarily in order to respond to

disasters. During Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Sandy, President Bush and President Obama

signed such waivers to allow emergency supplies to be shipped to the devastated areas.

Special Interest Support

Speculations of special interests involving the Jones Act date back to when it was written.

The author, Wesley Jones, was a Senator from Washington State, a state that holds many jobs in

the shipping industry. In addition, as Alaska’s economy was developing, and being Alaska’s

closest neighbor, Washington could benefit greatly from not having to compete with foreign

shipping firms. Inevitably, onlookers formed their assumptions about Jones’ true intentions.

Labor unions have been able to leverage political power over the years. According to the

Capital Research Center, between 2006 and 2012, merchant mariner and longshoremen unions

have contributed over $2.4 million to the House and Senate. One of the biggest critics of the

Jones Act, Senator John McCain, spoke on these special interests during his floor statement on

his proposed amendment to repeal the Jones Act on January 22nd, 2015:

“And yet, as clear as the benefits of free trade are, actually taking action to remove trade

barriers and open markets can be almost impossible here in Congress. Special interests

that have long and richly benefited from protectionism flex their muscles and issue

doomsday warnings about the consequences of moving forward on free trade. And,

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judging from the hysterical reaction by some of the special interests to my simply filing

this amendment, the debate over the Jones Act will be no different.”

McCain’s amendment was a part of a bill attempting to authorize the construction of the

Keystone XL oil pipeline, from Canada to the United States. McCain’s amendment to the bill

sought to repeal the section of the Jones Act requiring U.S.-flag ships be built in the United

States. Senate passed the bill 62-26 without McCain’s amendment, however it was later vetoed

by President Obama, a long time supporter of the Jones Act.

Conclusions and Future Study

You can find Captain Alfred Mahan’s picture hanging in nearly every U.S. Navy training

building, but his lessons were never fully embraced by the United States. Whether it was during

the two World Wars, or through the trends of world power centuries before, history has

demonstrated the importance of a strong merchant fleet in maintaining world power time and

time again. This is something that the U.S. undoubtedly has learned and understands, however,

has not implemented the necessary measures. What are the right measures?

Repealing the Jones Act would allow the shipping industry to flow freely. Economists

agree that allowing the free flow of markets provides the best long-term benefits. After all, that is

a broad way to describe how America became a world power in the first place. However, what

would happen without the Jones Act? Hundreds of thousands of American jobs could be lost to

the cheaper foreign labor. Repealing the Jones Act could be the end of the U.S.-flag, intensifying

vulnerability of the world’s most powerful nation. The U.S. Merchant Marine, left smaller than

ever almost solely because of the Jones Act, now clings to it like a life-ring.

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Cohn, Michael B. “Maritime Subsidies: Overregulation.” The Freeman. March 1, 1983. http://fee.org/freeman/detail/maritime-subsidies-overregulation

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Appendix

Figure 1: U.S.-Flag Privately-Owned Merchant Fleet, 1946-Present*

*Oceangoing Self-Propelled Vessels of 1,000 Gross Tons and Above*Tonnage in thousands *Data retrieved from MARAD’s U.S.-Fleet Summary Table, 2014

Year

Total

No. GT Dwt

1946 644 4,627 6,989

1950 1,087 8,797 13,197

1955 1,075 9,177 13,597

1960 1,008 9,610 14,088

1965 948 10,149 14,650

1970 793 9,780 14,406

1975 580 10,103 15,028

1980 578 13,467 21,103

1985 477 13,490 21,195

1990 408 13,306 20,771

1995 316 10,563 14,982

2000 282 9,583 12,408

2005 231 7,920 9,597

2010 221 8,014 9,547

2014 179 6,912 7,802

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Figure 2: U.S.-Flag Privately-Owned Fleet*1946-2014

*Ocean-Going, Self-Propelled, Cargo Carrying Ships over 1,000 GT*Retrieved from MARAD’s National Maritime Strategy Symposium, 2014

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Figure 3: The World’s Leading Exporters and Importers, 2013

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*$bn and %*Retrieved from the World Trade Organization’s 2014 Press Release

Figure 4: U.S. Waterborne Foreign Trade, 1946-2012U.S.-Flag Share 1946-2003*

*Data discontinued in 2003*Retrieved from MARAD’s National Maritime Strategy Symposium, 2014

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Figure 5: U.S.-Flag Privately-Owned Fleet Share of Waterborne Foreign Trade, 1946-2003*


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Figure 6: U.S.-Flag Privately-Owned Fleet Share of Waterborne Foreign Trade, 1961-2003*


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Figure 7: Average Daily Operating Costs by Flag, 2009 and 2010*

*U.S.-flag costs are weighted by the number of vessels in each operator’s U.S.-flag fleet*Retrieved from MARAD’s Comparison of U.S. and Foreign-Flag Operating Costs, 2011

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Figure 8: Average Daily Operating Costs by Flag, 2009 and 2010*

*U.S.-flag costs are weighted by the number of vessels in each operator’s U.S.-flag fleet*Retrieved from MARAD’s Comparison of U.S. and Foreign-Flag Operating Costs, 2011

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Figure 9: U.S. Shipbuilding Market Share, 1902-2002*

*Retrieved from Chapter 15 of Maritime Economics 3rd Edition, (Stopford, 2009)

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Analysis of the Jones Act 30

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