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Jonathan Edwards‟

Incompatibility Argument

The Incompatibility of Divine

Foreknowledge and Libertarian

Free-will

Nathan Brummel

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Published by:

Bound, Yet Free Publications

Copyright 2007

Contact author at:

Cornerstone Protestant Reformed Church

13251 W. 109th Ave., Dyer, IN 46311

www.cornerstoneprchurch.org

219-365-0144

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Contents

Preface………………………………………………………….…5

Introduction……………………………………………………….7

Chapter 1: Edwards Incompatibility Argument………………….13

Introduction

Part I: Argument for Perfect Divine Foreknowledge

Part II: The Incompatibility Argument

Part III: Incompatibility Argument Consistent with

Ordinary Language

Part IV: Evidence needed for Foreknowledge

Part V: Whitby‟s objection

Part VI: An Objection from God‟s Timelessness

Chapter 2: “The Ockhamist response”………………………….37

Introduction

Part I: The Incompatibility Argument Derived from

Aquinas

Part II: Wierenga‟s Development of the Argument

Part III: An Argument for Fatalism

Part IV: The Prophetic Argument

Part V: The Ockhamist Hard/Soft Fact Distinction

Part VI: Objections to Ockhamist Hard/Soft Fact

Distinction

Part VII:: Theological Objections to Ockhamism

Chapter 3: The Molinist Response”……………………………69

Introduction

Part I: The Source Question

Part II: The Reconciliation Question

Part III: Theological Objections to Molinism

Part IV: Philosophical Objections

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Preface

This book is a discussion of the argument that Jonathan

Edwards gives in Freedom of the Will for the incompatibility of

perfect divine foreknowledge and libertarian freedom. Edwards‟

argument is defended by an analysis of the two most plausible

Arminian responses to it. The first response is the Ockhamist reply

that has recently been defended by the philosopher Edward Wierenga

of the University of Rochester. The second response is the Molinist

reply that has recently found a defender in Alfred Freddoso of Notre

Dame University. Both of these methods of objecting to the

incompatibility argument are claimed to be problematic because first,

Edwards has anticipated some serious problems that they have, and

secondly, he has shown why his position is attractive. The conclusion

is that neither the Molinist nor the Ockhamist have given plausible

reasons for rejecting the incompatibility argument.

The issues discussed here are part of an ancient discussion in

the history of Christianity. Yet the issues are of increasing

importance today because of the influence of the “openness of God”

theology. This theology became influential in evangelical circles in

the twentieth century. In some sense it develops Arminian theology

to its logical conclusions. But it also involves a redefining of the

attributes of God that is out of sync with orthodoxy.

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Introduction

Jonathan Edwards (1703-1758) published the Freedom of the

Will in 1754 to attack the „prevailing notions‟ about human freedom.

This book was written in the last part of Edward‟s life, shortly before

he became president of Princeton. He was at this time missionary to

the Indians in Stockbridge, Connecticut. The Editor of the Yale

edition points out in his Introduction that as one reads the book it is

interesting to remember that while Edwards was writing it he had to

take time out to catechize and teach English to the Indian children.

Freedom of the Will is the shortened version of the title that in its

entirety is A careful and strict Enquiry into the Modern Prevailing

Notions of that Freedom of Will. Which is Supposed to be Essential to

Moral Agency, Virtue and Vice, Reward and Punishment. Praise and

Blame.

Edwards‟ later writings were an extended criticism of

Arminian theology. Freedom of the Will attacked the Arminian view

of freedom, and The Great Christian Doctrine of Original Sin that

was written in the same period defended the Calvinistic view of

original sin and total depravity. The word „Arminianism‟ is derived

from the 17th century Dutch theologian Jacobus Arminius. He

disagreed with the doctrines of Calvinism that were predominant in

the Dutch Reformed churches. In opposition to the five points of

Calvinism, namely; total depravity, unconditional election, limited

atonement, irresistable grace, and perseverance of the saints,

Arminius formulated five points that took issue with each of the

above. The Canons of Dordt and the Westminster Confession were

written in defense of Calvinism as a response to the growing

influence of Arminius‟ thought.

Edwards realized that the intellectual culture of his day was

moving against Calvinism, especially its conception of freedom.

Hobbes‟ philosophical determinism had so prejudiced many thinkers

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in the 18th century against any concept of determinism that any

defense of a Calvinistic view of freedom was caricatured as

Hobbesian.

The concept of freedom is important to the controversies

involving the Christian doctrines of sin and grace because one‟s

position on freedom affects one‟s views of salvation and one‟s

understanding of the doctrines of original sin, total depravity,

sovereign grace, election, predestination, and providence. Two

traditions in the Christian church disagree about the nature of human

freedom. One is the Augustinian/Calvinistic tradition and the other

the other the Pelagian/Arminian tradition. Calvinists believe that God

has predestinated certain people to be saved and that he gives these

elect people faith so that they will be saved. The emphasis is on

Divine Sovereignty, God being the first cause of everything that

occurs in the salvation process, Humans are dependent on God for

their salvation in every way. They define human freedom in terms of

people choosing what they want in a spontaneous way. „Spontaneous‟

is not being used here in contradistinction from acting deliberately.

The idea is that the agents choices are reflections of their desires and

inclinations. For example, Martin Luther defined freedom in terms of

lack of compulsion. (Kenny, 73) This definition of freedom is

compatible with God predestining every choice. Humans are saved

only when God irresistably gives his Spirit to them so that they are

converted. God is in control of the act of salvation in all of its parts-it

is not in any important sense dependent on humans autonomously

choosing him.

The distinguishing feature of Arminian theology is that

humans freely choose to believe or not believe in God. Although

Arminians lay varying emphasis on the nature and influence of grace

on the free-will, the will is defined as free in a libertarian sense.

Libertarian views of freedom suppose that God does not determine

what humans choose. Rather, free creatures have the ability to be

originating causes of the choices they make. The Arminians that we

shall deal with, define freedom in terms of the ability of the free

creature to do otherwise than they in fact do.

The controversy discussed in this essay is abstracted from the

main theological controversy between Calvinism and Arminianism.

Edwards gives an argument against the Arminians that claims that if

God has foreknowledge of future human actions, libertarian freedom

cannot exist. This argument doesn‟t depend on which view of

freedom is theologically correct. But, we shall pay attention to the

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relationship between Edwards‟ and his opponents‟ theological

positions and the influence that they exert on their philosophical

thought.

Freedom of the Will is Edwards‟ attempt to show that

Christianity could best defend itself against Deists and Atheists by

adopting Calvinism. Edwards adopted this strategy because an

important element of orthodox Christian Apologetics in New England

during the 18th century was developing a theology that would most

effectively reveal the inadequacies of Deism and Atheism.

Edwards reacts especially to three men whom he thought

exemplified the contemporary Arminian position. Among the three

were a famous hymn writer, Isaac Watts, a Deist, Thomas Chubb, and

a professing Calvinist, Daniel Whitby.

The three were different in many ways. It seems that part of

the reason Edwards chose them was to show that many Deists,

Arminians, and „alleged‟ Calvinists were really in the same boat with

respect to their mistaken ideas of freedom. Edwards probably saw that

it was rhetorically effective to put intellectual foes like Watts and

Whitby who were favourably viewed by orthodox evangelicals in the

same camp as someone like Chubbs, whose views were regarded as

quite unorthodox by New England standards.

Sections 11 and 12 of Part II of Freedom of the Will are the

focus of the first chapter. The title of these sections are, respectively,

“The Evidence of God‟s Certain Foreknowledge of the Volitions of

Moral Agents” and “God‟s Certain Foreknowledge of the Future

Volitions of Moral Agents, Inconsistent with such a Contingence of

Those Volitions, as Is without All Necessity. And Infers a Necessity

of Volition, as Much as an Absolute Decree.” In these sections

Edwards develops his argument for the incompatibility of Arminian

freedom and divine foreknowledge. Although this argument is

important for the book, it is not his central argument that is probably

his argument for psychological determinism. To see where the

sections on foreknowledge fit into the book as a whole, I shall

summarize the content of Freedom of the Will.

Freedom of the Will has five main divisions-- Parts I-IV and

“The Conclusion”. Part I provides the definitions of terms. Edwards

defines what he means by the following terms; „will‟, „the

determination of the will‟, „necessity‟, „impossibility‟, „inability‟,

„contingence‟, „natural necessity‟, „moral necessity‟, „liberty‟, and

„moral agency‟. The first division, then, is an introduction to the

controversy and the terms that are important for it.

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Edwards has been called a psychological determinist. He

develops this view in sections 1-10 of Part II. That Part is entitled

“Wherein It Is Considered, whether There Is, or Can Be Any Such

Sort of Freedom of Will, as That wherein Arminians Place the

Essence of the Liberty of All Moral Agents; and Whether Any Such

Thing Ever Was, or Can Be Conceived of” (Edwards, x). Edwards

argues against the self- determining power of the will, using a famous

„infinite regress‟ argument. Each choice that humans make must have

an antecedent cause. The Arminians claim that the will makes a

choice without being affected causally in any way by anything. The

will freely chooses because it is intrinsic to the will that it be the

originating cause of its choices. Edwards argues that there must he

some reason for the will making a choice, and he wants to define this

as the cause of the choice. He claims that it is incoherent to think that

the will can choose anything without there being a causal history that

brings about that choice. So it is up to the Arminian to show what

causes the will to choose.

But Edwards thinks that they cannot do this because their

theory has claimed that the will sovereignly chooses without any

outside causes. Part of the problem with the Arminians‟ argument is

that they assume they do not need to be able to exhibit a causal

history, while Edwards thinks that they should. Edwards argues that

given their theory, when asked to explain the causes of the will

choosing they will be forced to deny that the choice has causes or

assert that the choice is dependent on a preceding choice, that itself is

dependent on another preceding choice, and so on ad infinitum. This

is because there can be no cause for the choice in the sense Edwards

requires. Instead, the Arminians are left with the view that the will is

the only cause. For Edwards that is not a proper cause.

In sections 6 and 7 Edwards argues against the Arminian

idea of liberty of indifference. In section 8 he argues against the idea

that human liberty is opposed to all necessity. In section 9 he argues

that there is a connection between the way the will acts and the

„dictates of the understanding‟. Edwards‟ argument culminates in

section 10 where he claims that motives necessarily determine how

we act. He claims that there is a necessary connection between what

humans will and the strongest motive presented to them.

The next two sections in the book are the ones we will focus

on. In them Edwards argues, first, that God has perfect foreknowledge

of future human volitions. Second, he claims that if God foreknows

what humans will do, it is not possible that future human volitions are

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free in such a way as to be without necessity. He argues that God‟s

foreknowledge makes a future action as necessary as if God had

decreed that it take place. Therefore the Arminians, who endorse

foreknowledge, have as much of a problem with determinism as the

Calvinists. In the final section Edwards claims that even if future

human volitions are not connected with anything antecedent, they are

still necessary.

The above three sections conclude Part II. Part II has asked

whether the Arminians are correct with respect to their view of

freedom. Part Ill asks whether they are correct in claiming that people

must he free in the Arminian sense in order to be held morally

responsible for the acts they perform. Edwards puts the Arminians on

the defensive, claiming that freedom in their sense is incompatible

with moral responsibility. This is ironic because Arminians have

traditionally used this kind of argument against the Calvinistic

conception of freedom.

Part IV consists of Edwards‟ attempt to understand why

Arminians have the sort of views they do. He attempts to show that

their reasons for their beliefs are wrong, and in the course of that part

he responds to Arininian objections against the reasoning in Parts I-

III.

In “The Conclusion‟‟ Edwards shows what moral should he

derived from the conclusions which he has drawn in the book. He

argues that the Calvinistic doctrines are theologically defensible if

there is a philosophically defensible view of the presupposed idea of

freedom.

The intent of this book is to examine three different ways of

understanding arguments for the incompatibility of divine

foreknowledge and human freedom. Along with Edwards‟ views we

shall study the Ockhamist and Molinist responses to the

incompatibility argument. I have chosen two leading contemporary

defenders of Ockhamism and Molinism, respectively: Edward

Wierenga of the University of Rochester and Alfred Freddoso of the

University of Notre Dame, as spokesmen for their views. We shall

look at their objections to the incompatibility argument, noticing how

Edwards anticipates and objects to them.

This book is divided into three chapters. The first one is an

explication of Edwards‟ views, the second is a study of the Ockhamist

objection to them, and the final chapter explicates the Molinist

objection to the incompatibility argument.

This book is written in defense of Edwards project in

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Freedom of the Will to show the truth of Calvinism and the

inconsistency of Arminian theology. An important part of Edwards‟

argument in this book is his incompatibility argument. Arminian

critics can object to Edwards in two important ways. Therefore, a

large amount of space will be given to an explication and critique of

these two objections. The first chapter will be an explication of

Edwards‟ position and I will not be overly critical of Edwards‟

arguments because the Ockhamist and Molinist positions will bring

out all the important objections. I will focus on showing the problems

with the Ockhamist and Molinist positions, since a contemporary

defense of Edwards involves showing these two objections to be

implausible. If both of these Arminian attempts to object to the

incompatibility argument are problematic, then the Arminian is in a

difficult position because there does not seem to be any other

attractive line of argumentation left open to them. But if the

incompatibility argument is defensible, then libertarian freedom

cannot exist and therefore Arminian theology must be abandoned.

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1

EDWARDS‟

INCOMPATIBILITY

ARGUMENT

Introduction

Anthony Kenney has some flattering words to say about the

incompatibility argument that Edwards gives in Freedom of the Will:

But...certain foreknowledge...is not, in fact, consistent with a

genuine lack of necessity in future events. This was shown

conclusively by the eighteenth—century American Calvinist

theologian Jonathan Edwards, in the chapter of his book On

the Freedom of the Will which bears the heading „Gods

certain Foreknowledge of the future volitions of moral agents,

inconsistent with such a contingence of those volitions as is

without all necessity‟ (Kenny, 82).

Edwards is attempting to prove that given perfect divine

foreknowledge, future events are necessary. His first step is to show

that God does have perfect foreknowledge. This will be the first thing

that we look at in this chapter. The rest of the chapter will be spent

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developing the incompatibility argument and examining the reasons

with which Edwards supports it. We will look at some objections that

he considers and his response to them.

Part I: Argument for Perfect Divine Foreknowledge

The incompatibility argument assumes that God has perfect

foreknowledge of the future. Edwards sets out to prove this

assumption in Section 11 of Part II. This is an attempt by Edwards to

show that both Calvinists and Arminians agree on the nature of divine

foreknowledge. He thinks that if he can get the Arminian to agree

with him that God has absolute and certain foreknowledge, he will be

able to show them how this is incompatible with libertarian freedom.

Edwards claims that divine foreknowledge as distinguished

from simple foreknowledge is absolute and certain. Simple

foreknowledge is something that humans can have. Many times they

know what is going to happen in the future, for example, that the sun

is going to rise tomorrow. But there are other more questionable

things that they believe themselves to know about the future and

which do in fact come to pass. For example, I justifiably believe that I

will teach a class on Wednesday. When Wednesday comes about and

I teach the class, this means that I had simple foreknowledge that I

would. Since simple foreknowledge is fallible, it might have been the

case that I got sick on Wednesday and had to miss the class, making

my simple foreknowledge false. The foreknowledge that humans have

can be false. However Edwards claims that God‟s foreknowledge is

infallible. God has certain and absolute foreknowledge because He

has predicted future events. If God does not foreknow future volitions

then He cannot certainly and „peremptorily‟ foretell future events.

While Edwards thinks it should not he necessary to prove this point to

Christians, he provides Biblical proof.

Edwards gives four reasons for certain foreknowledge by

showing that God has foretold 1) many instances of peoples moral

conduct or actions; 2) many events that were consequences of or

dependent on the actions of certain persons; 3) the future actions of

nations and peoples; and 4) many actions that were consequences of

the actions of nations and peoples. He gives numerous biblical

examples for each of these categories (Edwards, 240-244).

Edwards sets out to prove that God must have perfect and

complete foreknowledge of the future in order to have made the

prophecies that He did. This is because each prediction that God

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made was dependent in innumerable ways on many different

volitions. Edwards thinks that God must know a vast number of

volitions in order to foreknow events like the virgin birth or that Jesus

would be betrayed for 30 pieces of silver. In order to foreknow these

things God would have to have known all the volitions that figure in

their causal history. For it seems questionable that God could know

such specific consequences if he did not know all the preceding

causes of them. One might object that God need not know everything

about the future in order to predict certain events, for He could predict

an event and then when it came time for the prediction to be fulfilled,

use His power to interpose in the world and establish the end He

wanted. Edwards does not think this objection works. For if God

cannot foresee the state of the world, then He will not he able to

foresee when to miraculously interpose in it (Edwards, 250).

Edwards claims that Gods foreknowledge is a fundamental

belief for Christians because it is presupposed by many things that

they consider unquestionably true. For example, he argues that

Christians believe that God has foretold the future Antichristian

apostasy and the universal future reign of the Messiah. Christians also

believe that God promised to Abram, Isaac, and Jacob that they would

be saved. God promised Adam and Eve that the seed of the woman

would defeat Satan. Edwards rightly expects his orthodox readers to

be as convinced as he is that these specific instances of

foreknowledge are trustworthy and correct and therefore examples of

perfect divine foreknowledge. He points out that if God does not have

foreknowledge then these beliefs of God are based on conjecture-- a

view that Christians of his day would have rejected out of hand

(Edwards, 245, 246).

Edwards gives two further arguments for God‟s certain

foreknowledge. First he says that historical Christianity teaches that

God is immutable, i.e., unchangeable. Edwards argues that if God

does not know future volitions, then he must change his mind

continually. Since He is trying to bring about certain things He will be

constantly “changing his mind and intentions..[and] relinquishing his

old designs” (Edwards, 253). But this conflicts with the scriptures,

which show Him as knowing the end from the beginning and having

an unchangeable counsel, as Isaiah 46:10 says, “Declaring the end

from the beginning, and from ancient times the things that are not yet

done; saying, my counsel shall stand, and I will do my pleasure‟

(Edwards. 254).

The second argument is that if God does not have perfect

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foreknowledge then there is a significant chance that He will be

frustrated regarding His purpose in the creation. Edwards thinks that

it is possible that God might be frustrated by humans if what He

wants to accomplish is dependent on their cooperating with what He

desires. He thinks that it is not consistent with the Bible that God

could possibly he frustrated in his endeavors (Edwards, 255).

An objection has been given to the idea that perfect

foreknowledge is needed. It has been claimed that God might know

that his desires very probably would come about. The possibility of

them not obtaining might be so low that God does not have to worry

about being frustrated. But this position would entail that God would

gain in knowledge after He saw what actually would come about. For

one thing, He would not longer have knowledge of what was only

possible, instead He would know what was actual. But, as Charles

Hodge states, such a position that claims God gains knowledge “[I]s

so incompatible with all proper ideas of the infinite mind that it has

been almost universally rejected, both by philosophers and by

Christian theologians‟ (Hodge, 545).

Peter Geach claims that it might he plausible to think about

God as a Grand Master at chess who is in control of the game. Some

of the players in the game will support Him while others will oppose

Him. But no matter what moves the players make God can execute

His plan. He cannot be surprised because he knows all of the possible

moves that can be made. Herman Bavinck in attempting to explain

what such a situation would involve states:

God is ready for whatever may happen. He foreknows and

sees all possibilites, and he has made provision for all of

them. He knows beforehand what he is going to do if Adam

falls, and also if he does not; if David goes to Keilah, and also

if he does not; if Tyre and Sidon are converted, and also if

they are not, etc. Hence, the knowledge of “future contingent

events” precedes the decree concerning “absolutely future

events”. At every moment man chooses with complete

freedom and independence, but he is never able to surprise

God or annul his plans, for God in his foreknowledge has

taken into account every possibility (Wierenga, 1989, 161).

Contra Edwards the chess argument is assuming that God does not

have knowledge of future contingents. Instead, He only has an idea of

what is possible and probable. It could be argued that if the state of

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affairs that God wants to bring about is overwhelmingly probable,

then He would not have to worry about having his desires thwarted.

So this means that one need not follow Edwards in claiming that if

God does not have perfect foreknowledge His end in creation will be

thwarted. The central problem for such a response to Edwards is that

it falls short of the doctrine of divine omniscience. For according to it,

God does not have knowledge of future contingents.

Another way that some Arminians have sought to avoid the

conclusion that God has perfect foreknowledge of future contingents

is to deny that God has knowledge of the future. But they claim it is

not because God is limited by anything outside of Himself. Rather,

God willed that certain of his knowledge be hid from Him. The

example of Jesus can be used to increase the plausibility of this

position. It seems that as a man Christ‟s knowledge was limited in

certain ways even though He was a divine person. But this position

seems unattractive because it is not clear how God could choose not

to be omniscient. “This is to suppose that God wills not to be God;

that the Infinite wills to be finite” (Hodge, 546). Hodge argues that

the knowledge of God “is not founded on his will, except so far as the

knowledge of vision is concerned, i.e., his knowledge of his own

purposes, or of what he has decreed shall come to pass (Hodge, 546).

If knowledge is “not founded on his will, it cannot be limited by it.

Infinite knowledge must know all things, actual or possible” (Hodge,

546).

Part II: The Incompatibility Argument

In section 11 Edwards takes himself to have shown that God

has certain foreknowledge of future volitions. In section 12 he wants

to show how this proves that “events are necessary with a necessity of

connection or consequence (Edwards, 257).

It will help to have a broad overview of how this section is

divided in order to see how Edwards develops the argument and

where he lays the most stress. The section is divided by three roman

numerals. The first subsection, which is only a page and a half long,

presents the incompatibility argument. The second is about three

pages long and provides an argument and an example that allegedly

prove that if a future event is contingent, then it is impossible for God

to have certainly foreknown it. The third and longest discusses a

number of miscellaneous points. The incompatibility argument itself

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has four premises. Since they depend on his view of philosophical

necessity, I will first explain this.

Philosophical Necessity

Edwards says that certain philosophers have used an

incorrect definition of „necessity‟, saying that it is “that by which a

thing cannot but be, or whereby it cannot be otherwise” (Edwards,

152). This definition is problematic for two reasons. First, defining

philosophical necessity in terms of “cannot” does not work because

“cannot” is synonymous with necessity. Secondly, „cannot‟ is a

relative term that has „relation to power exerted, or that may be

exerted, in order to the thing spoken of; to which, as I have now

observed, the word “necessity,” as used by philosophers, has no

reference” (Edwards, 152).

Philosophical necessity involves a certain and unbreakable

connection between two things--which Edwards calls the “subject”

and the “predicate”. Properly defined, it “is really nothing else than

the full and fixed connection between the things signified by the

subject and predicate of a proposition, which affirms something to he

true” (Edwards, 152). “When the subject and predicate of the

proposition, which affirms the existence of anything, either substance,

quality, act or circumstance, have a full and certain connection, then

the existence or being of that thing is said to be necessary in a

metaphysical sense” (Edwards, 152).

Edwards explains necessity in terms of a “certain and fixed

connection” between the subject and predicate. He claims that there

are three different ways that things can be necessarily connected, the

third of which is important for the incompatibility argument. The first

is “a full and perfect connection in and of themselves” (Edwards,

152). He thinks that some things are intrinsically connected because

of their nature. For example, it is necessary that a triangle have three

sides. Edwards uses the existence of Being as another example of this

type of connection. He thinks that it is necessary in and of itself that

Being eternally exists. In contemporary language we might say that a

term is analytic. A popular example of this is a bachelor is an

unmarried man.

The second sort of connection Edwards mentions is necessary

because the existence of that thing is already come to pass; and either

now is, or has been; and so has as it were made sure of existence”

(Edwards, 153). Everything that has come into existence, already has

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been, and therefore it is now impossible that it not be. This idea is

sometimes referred to as the “fixity of the past”. In contemporary

philosophical language, following William of Ockham, this is called

„accidental necessity‟.

The third sort of necessary connection is a “certain

connection consequentially and so the existence of the thing may be

consequentially necessary; as it may he surely and firmly connected

with something else, that is necessary in one of the former

respects”(Edwards, 153). This sort of necessity is important for the

foreknowledge controversies because God is said to have past

foreknowledge of future human volitions. Edwards will argue that the

past foreknowledge has the proposition foreknown attached to it

necessarily, since they both already exist in the past, and therefore are

necessarily connected. Volitions are thus necessarily connected to a

past event (God having the foreknowledge) and hence necessary.

The incompatibility argument

Edwards begins by observing that:

„Tis very evident, with regard to a thing whose existence is

infallibly and indissolubly connected with something which

already hath, or has had existence, the existence of that thing

is necessary (Edwards. 257).

The first assumption he makes in the incompatibility argument is that

things that existed in the past are now necessary. Since the thing

already existed it is too late for any possibility of alteration in that

respect” (Edwards, 257).

Secondly, Edwards observes that God long ago has had

foreknowledge of future actions. He says that this foreknowledge

Is a thing which already has, and long ago had existence; and

so, now its existence is necessary; it is now utterly impossible

to be otherwise, than that this foreknowledge should be, or

should have been (Edwards. 257).

God‟s complete foreknowledge eternally has existed, since God is

outside of time. But it has also many times been revealed by prophets

in history. At any time in the past God could have revealed through

prophets what He foreknew. Edwards believed in the Bible and

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therefore thought that this had been done many times.

Edwards‟ third observation is that when two things are

necessarily connected, and one of them is necessary, then so is the

other. Because they are indissolubly connected, even if the latter is

not intrinsically necessary, it is made necessary, because it is

indissolubly connected to a necessary thing (this is Edwards third sort

of necessary connection) (Edwards, 153). Edwards says:

To say otherwise, would be a contradiction; it would be in

effect to say, that the connection was indissoluble, and yet

was not so, but might be broken. If that whose existence is

indissolubly connected with something whose existence is

now necessary, is itself not necessary, then it may possibly

not exist, notwithstanding that indissoluble connection of its

existence. Whether the absurdity bent glaring, let the reader

judge (Edwards, 258).

The argument gets its force from the fact that an „indissoluble‟

connection is by definition a connection that cannot be broken, i.e., a

necessary connection.

Edwards uses these points to draw conclusions about God‟s

foreknowledge of future human volitions. He thinks it is evident then

that if God has foreknowledge (which is something that already

existed in the past) of something that will occur in the future, namely

a future human volition, then it is the case that the future volition is

indissolubly connected with the previous foreknowledge. Since the

foreknowledge already has had existence, the future human volition is

indissolubly tied (the third type of necessary connection) to

something that already is accidentally necessary (Edward‟s second

type of necessary connection). This means that both the

foreknowledge and the future volition are necessary (Edwards, 258).

His answer, in other words, is this:

(1) The past is accidentally necessary; i.e. nothing can change

it, [Assumption]

(2) God‟s forebeliefs are past in relation to the events he

foresees will happen. [Assumption]

Therefore,

(3) God‟s forebeliefs are accidentally necessary in relation to

21

the events He foresees will happen [I & 2]

(4) Necessarily, if God forebelieves that an event e will

occur, it will occur (God is essentially omniscient)

[Assumption]

(5) What is necessarily implied by a necessary fact, is itself

necessary. [Assumption]

Therefore,

(6) What God forebelieves occurs necessarily [3,4,&5]

The conclusion of this argument is compatible with Edwards‟

conception of human freedom. He argues that it is also compatible

with common sense intuitions about the nature of necessity and

contingence. He defines necessity, contingence, and freedom in an

interesting way that is favorable to Calvinism.

Part III: Incompatibility Argument Consistent with Ordinary

Language

Necessity in common speech, according to Edwards, is

A relative term; and relates to some supposed opposition

made to the existence of the thing spoken of, which is

overcome, or proves in vain to hinder or alter it....which is, or

will be, notwithstanding all supposable opposition. To say,

that a thing is necessary, is the same thing as to say, that it is

impossible (it) should not be: but the word “impossible” is

manifestly a relative term, and has reference to supposed

power exerted to bring a thing to pass, which is insufficient

for the effect (Edwards, 149).

Necessity is important for Edwards‟ view of freedom, because he

thinks that human freedom when correctly defined is compatible with

it. He intends to prove that acts of the will are necessary and because

of this incompatible with Arminian freedom which is defined in terms

of libertarian freedom.

Edwards says that in vulgar use something is necessary:

22

When we can‟t help it, let us do what we will. So anything is

said to be impossible to us, when we would do it, or would

have it brought to pass, and endeavor it; or at least may be

supposed to desire and seek it; but all our desires and

endeavors are, or could be vain (Edwards, 150).

In this way it is impossible that the convict escape from the locked

cell, because no matter what he does or wants to do, his desires will

be frustrated. So impossibility is defined in terms of being presented

by some opposition that no matter what a person tries to do can

overcome it. This definition is favorable to Calvinism because it is

not defining necessity in terms of determinism. If it was, then it

would imply that the opposite of it--freedom, would need to be

defined in a non-determinist sense. Edwards‟ point is that ordinary

language does not support this libertarian way of defining

impossibility.

When „necessity‟ is used in a context where there is no

opposition involved; then the word is not being used with its ordinary

meaning (Edwards, 151). An instance of this would be the Arminian

claiming that humans act in the Calvinistic framework in a

determined way and therefore act out of a fatalistic necessity.

Edwards would respond that the person is using „necessity‟ in either a

nonsensical way or is redefining the term (Edwards, 151). This is

because the Arminian has not presented anything as opposing the

humans in this situation.

In ordinary language, according to Edwards, something is

called contingent when one cannot see what the connection is

between an event and the causal structure that must have brought it

about. Therefore we might claim it to be contingent that we picked

the specific flower that we did out of a field of tulips. Edwards is

claiming that we call this a contingent action because we do not know

what the causal structure was that brought us to pick the specific

flower that we did. Contingence in this sense is compatible with

Calvinism.

Edwards realizes that Arminians and others have defined

contingence in other ways. For example, as something which has

absolutely no previous ground or reason, with which its existence has

any fixed and certain connection”(Edwards, 155). He claims that

these meanings are unnatural and forced.

Edwards gives a definition of „freedom‟ in terms of common

usage. He says that liberty (or freedom) is the “power, opportunity, or

23

advantage, that anyone has, to do as he pleases. Or in other words, his

being free from hindrance or impediment in the way of doing, or

conducting in any respect, as he wills” (Edwards, 163). It is not

properly speaking the will that is free but the agent who has the

freedom to do as he wills (Edwards, 163).

Edwards claims that „freedom‟ in ordinary language is

defined as the ability of one to do and conduct as he will, or according

to his choice” (Edwards, 164). He adds that if “there is nothing in the

way to hinder his pursuing and executing his will, the man is fully

and perfectly free, according to the primary and common notion of

freedom” (Edwards, 164). This definition of freedom is the important

sense in which Calvinists think that humans are free. That means that

the fundamental concept behind the ordinary meaning of freedom

supports Calvinistic intuitions.

Edwards claimed that the Arminians use “freedom” in a non-

standard way. Their definition consists of three parts: first, the will is

sovereign over itself because it is a “self-determining power”. The

Arminians claim that the will determines the volitions that will be

made and is not causally dependent on anything other than itself for

its volitions. Nor is it causally affected or determined by previous

choices that it has made (Edwards, 164). The second part is that the

mind is indifferent before the act of volition because it is in

equilibrium. Edwards attacks this view and considers himself to have

shown that Arminian freedom is clearly wrong. Commentators have

pointed out that in attacking this view Edwards has only shown some

of his contemporary Arminian opponents to be wrong, but he has not

shown more respectable Arminian definitions of freedom to be

implausible. The third part of the Arminian definition of “freedom”

states that contingence is defined in such a way that it is

Opposed to all necessity, or any fixed and certain connection

with some previous ground or reason of its existence. They

suppose the essence of liberty so much to consist in these

things, that unless the will of man be free in this sense, he has

no real freedom, how much soever he may be at liberty to act

according to his will (Edwards, 165).

Edwards does not mention it but included in this definition of

freedom are the Molinist and Ockhamist shared view that agents are

free only if they have the power not only to act otherwise if they

choose (which Calvinists allow) but also a power to choose otherwise.

24

This view came to be called liberty of indifference (Kenny, 61).

The Arminians suppose that future events that are free in the

libertarian sense (in a way opposed to all necessity) are contingent

events that God knows. This is why they explain how God can know

future contingent free choices and yet explain how the free agent

made a free choice.

Part IV: Evidence needed for Foreknowledge

Edwards wants to prove that “no future event can be

certainly foreknown, whose existence is contingent” (Edwards, 258).

He thinks he can prove this by showing that it is self-evident that it is

impossible for something to be certainly known without evidence. If

one has no evidence for something, then Edwards thinks that it is

clear that one cannot claim that one knows it, because there is no way

of knowing it. It is, he says, a contradiction to think that something

can be known which is without evidence. And it is this alleged

contradiction which he uses to argue that future contingent events,

cannot be known by God or man, because contingent things are by

definition things that do not have certain evidence for them (Edwards,

258-259).

Things are evident in two ways: they are either self-evident

or are proved by something else that is self-evident. Edwards claims

that future contingents cannot have evidence in either of these ways.

First, he thinks future contingent events cannot be self-evident.

[I]f it be, it may be now known by what is now to be seen in

the thing itself; either its present existence, or the necessity of

its nature: but both these are contrary to the supposition. It is

supposed, both that the thing has no present existence to be

seen; and also that it is not of such a nature as to be

necessarily existent for the future: so that its future existence

is not self-evident (Edwards, 259).

The point is that future contingent events are not self-evident because,

first, they are not necessary, and secondly, they are not in the present.

Since they are in the future they are not now present to the mind.

Therefore, Edwards concludes that propositions about future

contingent events cannot be self-evident.

The other way that things have evidence is by being proved

by something else, but Edwards shows this also to be problematic for

25

future contingent events. He says:

[N]either is there any proof, or evidence in anything else, or

evidence of connection with something else that is evident;

for this also is contrary to the supposition. „Tis supposed, that

there is now nothing existent, with which the future existence

of the contingent event is connected. For such a connection

destroys its contingence, and supposes necessity (Edwards,

259).

Once again we see Edwards using the definition of contingence to

show that a future contingent event cannot be proved by something

else. For if it could there would have to be a necessary connection

between the event and something that exists that it is connected with,

and if there were, then the event would not be contingent. He

concludes that future contingent events cannot be proved by

something else or by self-evidence.

Edwards uses an example to show what he means. He wants

us to suppose that 5,760 years ago only God existed. Next, we must

imagine that something else other than God, either the actual world or

another being came into existence out of nothing. It is to he supposed

that this being or world came into existence in absolute contingence.

Edwards reminds the person in the thought experiment what it is like

for something to come into existence by absolute contingence: (1) it

involves the thing coming into existence without being caused either

by God or by anything else; (2) the thing coming into existence has

no connection with anything prior to its existing; and (3) there can be

no reason for its beginning to exist. If it is the case that the thing did

come into existence in absolute contingence, defined in this way, then

Edwards is convinced that there cannot be any evidence present for

any mind, Gods included, for the thing before it comes into existence.

One could not find prior evidence in the thing itself because the thing

did not exist prior to its existing, so one could not have evidence of it

in this way. Also one could not have evidence about it from anything

else because this would involve there being some connection between

something else and the thing that comes into existence, but by

definition absolute contingence rules this out. The thing that comes

into existence then would be absolutely unknowable because there

would be no reason to think that it should come into existence, and

there is no evidence for it. Even a mind with infinite power of insight

could not find evidence where none exists (Edwards, 259-260).

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Inconsistency in God’s knowledge

Edwards argues that God‟s knowledge would have to be

inconsistent for Him to foreknow something and yet know that this

thing is contingent. For if God truly knows that something is

contingent then He cannot really know that the thing will certainly be.

For if it will certainly be, and God knows it, it cannot be contingent.

Edwards thinks that some objectors might believe that God has

knowledge of both of these things at once but in a way that we

ourselves cannot understand. Edwards responds that this is no more

plausible than defending the claim that God can believe contradictory

things by saying that we cannot understand how God can know

contradictory things but He nevertheless does (Edwards, 260-261).

But clearly few thinkers are willing to defend the idea that God

believes contradictory things, so they will also want to reject the idea

that God knows events that are absolutely contingent.

Arminians must believe in necessity as much as Calvinists

The conclusions to be drawn from the incompatibility

argument are that one of the major weapons in the Arminian

theological arsenal can no longer be used as an objection to

Calvinism. The Arminians claimed that the necessity incurred by

Calvinistic divine decrees is incompatible with liberty and moral

responsibility. Edwards points out that the incompatibility argument

has shown that the Arminian belief in God‟s absolute foreknowledge

and divine omniscience also implies that future human volitions are

necessary.

There is no geometrical theorem or proposition whatsoever,

more capable of strict demonstration, than that God‟s certain

prescience of the volitions of moral agents is inconsistent

with such a contingence of these events, as is without all

necessity; and so is inconsistent with the Arminian notion of

liberty” (Edwards,268-269).

Since he believes that his argument has shown that consistent

Arminians must believe in the necessity of future human volitions, he

thinks that their system is as incompatible with libertarianism as the

Calvinist‟s. Arininian necessity is as strong as the necessity that

27

comes from God‟s decrees:

And it being so, the certainty can‟t be increased; and

therefore the connection between the knowledge and the

thing known, can‟t be increased; so that if a decree be added

to the foreknowledge, it don‟t at all increase the connection,

or make it more infallible and indissoluble. If it were not so,

there certainty of knowledge might be increased by the

addition of a decree; which is contrary to the supposition,

which is, that the knowledge is absolutely perfect, or perfect

to the highest possible degree (Edwards, 261).

The point is that the certainty of the connection (between the past and

the future) can‟t be increased by adding a decree.

Part V: Whitby’s Objection

Edwards introduces an objection that Whitby had earlier

made in response to an incompatibilist argument. Whitby‟s argument

is concerned with the origin of God‟s foreknowledge. Whitby says

that divine foreknowledge does not cause the future event to be,

rather it is the future event that causes God to have the foreknowledge

that He does. The foreknowledge is not the cause of the event, it is the

effect. Because of this, Whitby claims that foreknowledge cannot

make the event necessary, because it does not causally bring about the

event. Edwards quotes Whitby‟s Discourse on the Five Points where

that latter states:

God‟s prescience has no influence at all on our

actions….Should God (says he) by immediate revelation,

give me the knowledge of the event of any man‟s state of

actions? Surely none at all....Our knowledge doth not affect

the things we know, to make them more certain, or more

future, than they would be without it. Now foreknowledge in

God is knowledge. As therefore knowledge has no influence

on things that are, so neither has foreknowledge on things that

shall be. And consequently, the foreknowledge of any action

that would be otherwise free, cannot alter or diminish that

freedom (Edwards, 262).

Whitby assumes that showing something to be logically

28

necessary involves proving it to be causally necessary. If one cannot

show that something makes another thing causally necessary, then

one can have no reason to believe that it is necessary. Applying this to

the foreknowledge controversy, it means that if one cannot prove that

God‟s foreknowledge produces the necessity of future actions, then

one can have no reason to believe that the future actions are

necessary. And of course Edwards did not argue that foreknowledge

causally produces the necessity of the future events.

Edwards responds to this objection by claiming that although

foreknowledge may not be the cause of the event being necessary,

contra Whitby, it may still prove its necessity. Edwards points out that

Whitby‟s objection rests on the questionable assumption that one

thing can only prove a second to be necessary only if it is the cause of

its necessity. So foreknowledge might prove future events to be

necessary, while leaving open where the necessity comes from

(Edwards, 263). Even if foreknowledge is not the cause of future

actions being necessary, yet it can still be used to demonstrate that it

is necessary (Edwards, 263). He says:

„Tis as evident, as „tis possible anything should be, that it is

impossible a thing which is infallibly known to be true,

should prove not to be true: therefore there is a necessity that

it should (not) be otherwise; whether the knowledge be the

cause of this necessity, or the necessity the cause of the

knowledge (Edwards, 264).

Edwards presents an argument to show that knowledge, even

though it does not causally produce the necessity of something, can

show it to be logically necessary. His uses the example of “after-

knowledge”. This is knowledge of something that has already

happened in the past; and as Edwards has argued elsewhere, when we

have knowledge of something that occurred in the past, it is now too

late for that occurrence not to exist.

Certain after-knowledge proves that it is now, in the time of

the knowledge, by some means or other, become impossible

but that the proposition which predicates past existence on the

event, should be true (Edwards, 264).

Therefore, after-knowledge is knowledge of things that are now

necessary, because they have already come into existence, and it is

29

now impossible that they did not exist (Edwards, 264).

After-knowledge has proved that it is now necessary, for

example, that 200 years ago we had the American Revolution.

Edwards wants to argue that after-knowledge clearly implies that the

American Revolution is now necessary. Yet it did not cause it. But

this is precisely what Whitby claims does not work, for according to

Whitby something must causally produce the necessary event in order

to demonstrate that it is necessary. And since after-knowledge can

demonstrate the necessity of events, Edwards thinks that

foreknowledge can also do so. He says:

And so does certain foreknowledge prove, that now, in the

time of the knowledge, it is by some means or other, become

impossible but that the proposition which predicates future

existence on the event, should be true. The necessity of the

truth of the propositions, consisting in the present

impossibility of the non-existence of the event affirmed, in

both cases, is the immediate ground of the certainty of the

knowledge; there can be no certainty of knowledge without it

(Edwards, 264).

Since the proposition about the future that God knows is part

of the past, what the proposition affirms is also part of the necessary

past, hence is necessary. Edwards agrees with Whitby‟s claim that

“mere knowledge don‟t affect the thing known, to make it more

certain or more future” (Edwards, 265). But Edwards adds: „But yet, I

say, it supposes and proves the thing to be already, both future, and

certain; i.e. necessarily future” (Edwards, 265).

Edwards next turns the objection around to show that it

provides support for the incompatibility argument. If foreknowledge

does not cause the future event, but the opposite, then:

This is so far from shewing that this foreknowledge don‟t

infer the necessity of the existence of that event, that it rather

shews the contrary more plainly. Because it shews the

existence of the event to be so settled and firm, that it is as if

it had already been; inasmuch as in effect it actually exists

already; its future existence has already had actual influence

and efficiency, and has produced an effect, viz, prescience:

the effect exists already; and as the effect supposes the cause,

is connected with the cause, and depends entirely upon it,

30

therefore it is as if the future event, which is the cause, had

existed already (Edwards, 265).

Edwards uses the example of a telescope to show how this

argument works (Edwards 265-266). He asks us to imagine a person

looking at the stars through a telescope. The images we receive are

effects of the heavenly bodies. From these effects Edwards thinks it is

reasonable to infer that a cause of them must exist.

The effects are tied to their causes, and as the image which is

an effect of the heavenly body shows there to be an actual heavenly

body that is the cause of the ray of light, in the same way God‟s

foreknowledge which is „telescopically‟ pointed to the future captures

images that are effects of what is actually going to be in the future,

and these effects must have a cause (the event that is going to occur).

Just as the image of the stars must have a cause (that already actually

exists), so too an image of a future human volition must have a cause

that already actually exists for God to be affected by it. Since the

effect surely exist, the cause must also exist.

The existence of the things which are their causes, is also

equally sure, firm and necessary; and that it is alike

impossible but that they should be, as if they had been

already, as their effects have” (Edwards, 266).

Edwards concludes by noting that Gods foreknowledge of future

events is eternally present in his mind, and so the causes of these

events also eternally exist (Edwards, 266).

Part VI: An Objection from God’s Timelessness

This last point leads Edwards to discuss an objection given

by “some Arminians”, he says, who appeal to the idea of divine

timelessness to evade the incompatibility argument. Two historical

examples of theologians who used this objection are Boethius and

Aquinas, both of whom used versions of the argument. According to

Edwards, the Arminian would object

That when we talk of foreknowledge in God, there is no strict

propriety in our so speaking; and that although it be true, that

there is in God the most perfect knowledge of all events from

eternity to eternity, yet there is no such thing as before and

31

after in God, but he sees all things by one perfect

unchangeable view, without any succession (Edwards, 266).

This means that God does not have foreknowledge in a real sense.

Therefore the premises in the incompatibility argument that state that

he has foreknowledge, can be rejected. Hence the argument can be

rejected.

Edwards responds to this in three ways. First, he thinks that

strictly speaking the objector is correct in saying that God does not

have foreknowledge. But Edwards reminds us that this is because all

events are eternally present before God

As if they already had existence: and that is as much as to

say, that future events are always in God‟s view as evident,

clear, sure, and necessary, as if they already were” (Edwards,

267).

That these events are continually present to God‟s view is a sufficient

reason for believing that the incompatibility argument is correct. For

if God has all the events that will happen eternally before His mind,

future and past and present events are all as surely there before His

mind as if they already existed. If God is outside of time (as He is for

orthodox theology) then all things in time are there at the same „time‟

for God. Edwards thinks that God‟s having all events continually

present before Him establishes the certainty and necessity of all

events because whether future or past they all have existed eternally

in God‟s mind. When they do in fact occur in time, nothing changes

with respect to God (Edwards, 268). Edwards points out that the

orthodox doctrine of the immutability of God also supports this

reasoning. If God‟s knowledge is perfect and unchangeable, then it is

impossible for the knowledge of future events that are eternally

present before His mind, to change. Therefore if God has any future

event present in His knowledge, it is necessary that it occur and at the

time foreseen. If it were possible for God‟s eternally present

knowledge to change, then, says Edwards,

It would be possible for there to be a change in God‟s

knowledge and view of things. For if the known event should

fail of existence, and not come into being, as God expected,

then God would see it, and so would change his mind, and

see his former mistake; and thus there would be change and

32

succession in his knowledge (Edwards, 268).

So Edwards uses the immutability and timelessness of God to provide

further support for the incompatibility of divine foreknowledge and

Arminian freedom.

The Prophetic Response

Edwards argues that divine prophecy also shows that God‟s

timelessness cannot be used to avoid the incompatibility argument.

God can record his knowledge of future voluntary actions in a book

such as the Bible. This shows that the same necessary connection that

exists between a prophecy and the future event can be made to obtain

between any belief of future contingents that God has and those

events. He does not need to write the foreknowledge down for them

to be in the same way necessarily connected with the future event.

God‟s mind does not need to be in time for the knowledge of future

contingents to be infallibly connected with the event foreknown. This

is because His knowledge is symmetrical to any prophecies that He

would cause to be written in a book, because He simply could cause

His knowledge to be written down at any time (Edwards, 267).

Edwards believes that divine prophecy shows that divine

foreknowledge is incompatible with libertarian freedom. The

argument goes like this:

(1) God has foreknowledge of every future voluntary action.

[Assumption]

(2) He can cause this knowledge to be written down in a

book. [Assumption]

(3) If God‟s “foreknowledge is infallible, then the

expression of it in the written prediction is infallible”

(Edwards, 267) [Assumption]

(4) Written foreknowledge is temporally before the event

foreknown. [Assumption]

(5) Prophetically foretold events are necessary. [3,4]

(6) Eternal divine foreknowledge is in some sense equivalent

33

to temporally revealed foreknowledge. [1,2]

(7) The necessary connection between divine foreknowledge

and the thing known is as necessary as if the

foreknowledge existed temporally before the event, as

the written prophecy does.[5,6]

Therefore,

(10) Divine foreknowledge shows the necessity of future

voluntary action.

The original incompatibility argument argued that divine

foreknowledge was accidentally necessary because it was a part of the

past that it was at a later time impossible to change. So according to

the argument future contingent events were not free because they

were necessarily connected to the accidentally necessary

foreknowledge.

This concludes the overview of Edwards‟ reasons for

supporting the incompatibility argument. Now we will study two

prominent Arminian methods of objecting to Edwards‟ argument. I

will argue that there are internal inconsistencies in both these

objections. I will also claim that Edwards has anticipated various

problems that significantly affect the plausibility of the Ockhamist

and Molinist responses.

34

35

2

THE OCKHAMIST

RESPONSE

Introduction

A contemporary defender of the Ockhamist response to the

incompatibility argument is Edward Wierenga. He discusses this issue

in his book The Nature of God and in an article called; “Prophecy,

Freedom, and the Necessity of the Past.” The Nature of God is an

examination of the divine attributes, although a substantial part of the

book focuses on the issue of freedom and foreknowledge. For

example, there are long chapters on such subjects as “accidental

necessity” and “middle knowledge”. The article is an examination of

prophecy and its relation to the foreknowledge/freedom controversy,

It is in part a response to the claim of Alfred Freddoso that prophecy

causes a serious problem for the Ockhamist.

Part I: The Incompatibility Argument Derived from Aquinas

Wierenga develops the Ockhamist response by first laying

out what he takes the incompatibilty argument to be. He derives the

36

basic argument from Thomas Aquinas:

Further, every conditional proposition, of which the

antecedent is absolutely necessary, must have an absolutely

necessary consequent. For the antecedent is to the consequent

as principles are to the conclusion: and from necessary

principles only a necessary conclusion can follow, as is

proved in Poster. i [Aristotles‟ Posterior Analytics,I,61. But

this is a true conditional proposition, If God knew that this

thing will be, it will be, for the knowledge of God is only of

true things. Now the antecedent of this conditional

proposition is absolutely necessary, because it is eternal, and

because it is signified as past. Therefore, the consequent is

also absolutely necessary; and so [the] knowledge of God is

not of contingent things (Wierenga, 1991, 425-426).

Wierenga says that the kind of necessity that Aquinas is discussing is

accidental necessity or what William Ockham called necessity per

accidense. This is the necessity that is attached to something that is

specified as past. Since a past event has already obtained, it is now

too late for that event not to have occurred, so that event is now

necessary. Since God‟s past foreknowledge of what will occur in the

future is now in the past, it cannot change, and because of that the

consequent or the thing known to occur in the future is also necessary.

Wierenga extracts three ideas from Aquinas. First, “true

propositions about the past (“signified as past”) are in some sense

necessary.” Hence,

(1) Propositions reporting God‟s past beliefs are now

accidentally necessary.1

Second, accidental necessity is closed under entailment. That is,

(2) If p is accidentally necessary and p entails q, then q is

accidentally necessary (Wierenga, 1989, 67).

Hence,

1 I will sometimes number the premises of the arguments differently from

what they are in the text to keep them consistently numbered.

37

(3) Any (contingent) proposition that is entailed by an

accidentally necessary proposition is itself accidentally

necessary.

Aquinas is assuming that if something is accidentally necessary then

it is something that cannot be made false (Wierenga, 1989, 67).

Hence:

(4) If it is accidentally necessary that a person perform a

certain action, then, since there is nothing the person can do

to avoid it, the action is not free (Wierenga, 1991, 426).

Wierenga employs these assumptions to construct the following

argument using the popular example of God foreknowing that Jones

will mow his lawn:

(5) Eighty years ago God foreknew that Jones will mow his

lawn tomorrow...

(6) It is accidentally necessary that eighty years ago God

foreknew that Jones will mow his lawn tomorrow…[1,5]

(7) “Eighty years ago God foreknew that Jones will mow his

lawn tomorrow” entails “Jones will mow his lawn

tomorrow”;..

(8)It is accidentally necessary that Jones will mow his lawn

tomorrow...[3,6,7]

Therefore,

(9) Jones‟ mowing his lawn tomorrow is not free...[4,8]

(Wierenga, 1991, 426-427).

Part II: Wierenga’s Development of the Argument

Chapters 3,4, and 5 of The Nature of God discuss the

incompatibility argument in greater detail. Wierenga begins by giving

a preliminary account of the concept of accidental necessity required

by the argument:

38

(C) There is a concept of accidental necessity satisfying the

following conditions: (i) if God in the past believed a

proposition about the future, it is now accidentally necessary

that he did, (ii) accidental necessity is closed under

entailment, and (iii) if a proposition p is accidentally

necessary at a time t, then no one is able at t or later to act in

such a way that p is false (Wierenga, 1989, 69).

He then provides an incompatibility argument, which he calls

„Argument A‟:

(12) Necessarily, if (C) then divine foreknowledge of human

actions is incompatible with anyone being able to do anything

other than what he or she does do.

(13) Necessarily, if no one is ever able to do anything other

than what he or she does do, then no one ever acts freely.

Therefore,

(14) Necessarily, if (C) then divine foreknowledge of human

actions is incompatible with anyone ever acting freely

(Wierenga, 1989, 70).

Wierenga first argues that if we slightly revise (C) to (C*)

then (12) is plausible. Let us first see why (C) needs revision. (C)‟s

first condition does not involve a problem for premise (12). He

clarifies the intuitions behind (C)(i), changing it to:

(i) for all times t1 and t2 such that t1 is earlier than t2 and for

every proposition p, if at t1 God believes p, then at t2 the

proposition, At t1 God believes p, is accidentally necessary

(Wierenga, 1989, 71).

But the second condition (ii) is problematic because it contradicts

“the claim...that only logically contingent propositions are

accidentally necessary” (Wierenga, 1989, 71). Wierenga assumes that

it is accidentally necessary that Carter was elected president. Now

consider a proposition of this form: Either Carter was elected

President in 1976 or 2+2=4. Wierenga points out that if “accidental

39

necessity is closed under entailment, this disjunction should be

accidentally necessary; but it is logically necessary, so it should not

be accidentally necessary” (Wierenga, 1989, 7 1-72). To avoid this

conclusion he changes condition (C)(ii) so that logically necessary

things cannot be classified as accidentally necessary. He does this by

stipulating that accidentally necessary things must be possibly false.

(C*)(ii) for every time t and for all propositions p and q, if p

is accidentally necessary at t, p entails q, and it is possible

that q is false, then q is accidentally necessary at t

(Wierenga, 1989, 74).

Wierenga says that the final condition of (C) is ambiguous.

The claim is: “If a proposition p is accidentally necessary at a certain

time then no one is able at that time or later to act in such a way that p

is false” (Wierenga, 1989, 72). This can be interpreted in two ways.

First, “It might be that a person S is able to act in such a way that p is

false just in case S is able to cause p to be false” (Wierenga, 1989,

72). Secondly, “It might be that S is able to act in such a way that p is

false is just in case there is an action A that S is able to perform and

that is such that if S were to perform A then p would be false”

(Wierenga, 1989, 72). Wierenga presents a counter-example to the

third condition on the first interpretation.

[I]f what the third condition of (C) tells us is that

Jones is unable to cause p to be false, does it follow that

Jones cannot refrain from mowing his lawn tomorrow? It is

not clear that it does. Perhaps Jones can go on an all-day bike

trip tomorrow, and if he did that action would be sufficient

for the falsehood of p even if Jones would not thereby cause

p to be false (Wierenga, 1989, 72).

In other words, Jones might be able to do something else which is

such that if he were to do it, p would be false without causing p to be

false. For example,

Let q be the proposition that last week Smith correctly

believed that Jones would trim his evergreens tomorrow, and

suppose that q is true. If Jones cannot cause q to be false,

does it follow that Jones is unable to refrain from trimming

his evergreens tomorrow? Clearly not. Jones can falsify

40

Smiths belief without practicing backward causation. Jones‟s

not triming [sic] his evergreens tomorrow would be sufficient

for the falsehood of q, and if Jones were not to trim his

evergreens tomorrow, Jones can plausibly be said to have

made q false. But Jones can be able to make q false without

having the ability to cause it to be false (Wierenga, 1989, 72-

73).

The idea is that one can make something false without being able to

cause it to be false. Wierenga qualifies (C)(iii) to include this insight:

(C*)(iii) for every time tl and proposition p, if p is

accidentally necessary at t1, then there is no person S, action

A, and time t2 at least as late as t1 such that S can do A at t2

and if S were to do A at t2 then p would be false (Wierenga,

1989, 74).

Frankfurt Style Counterexamples

Wierenga next examines the plausibility of premise (13) of

„Argument A‟. It reads:

(13) Necessarily, if no one is ever able to do anything other

than what he or she does do, then no one ever acts freely

(Wierenga, 1989, 74).

Wierenga says that until recently this would have been

uncontroversial. But Harry Frankfurt has argued that examples show

this premise to be problematic.

Frankfurt objects to the „Principle of Alternative Possibilities‟,

which he defines as

(PAP) A person is morally responsible for an action he has

done only if he could have done otherwise (Wierenga, 1989,

75).

Wierenga presents a counter-example invented by Peter van Inwagen

that is similar to the one Frankfurt has given. A person named Gunnar

is planning to shoot Ridley. A third person, Cosser, also wants Ridley

shot. Cosser has the ability to play with Gunnar‟s mind so that he can

cause him to shoot Ridley, even if in the situation where he is

41

presented with the possibility, Gunnar decides not to. The point is that

Gunnar is morally responsible even though he could have done

nothing but kill Ridley. For if he chooses to shoot Ridley, then he is

responsible, but also if he decides not too, Cossar can still influence

him sufficiently so that he will shoot Ridley after all. So PAP does

not seem to Work.

Does it follow that (13) is false? No, for it:

Does not deny that it can happen that an action is both free

and that its agent could not have done otherwise. What (13)

says is that, necessarily, if no one is ever able to do other than

what he or she does so, then no one ever acts freely. Thus

(13) leaves it open that some actions are both free and such

that their agents could not have avoided them (Wierenga,

1989, 76).

So (13) is problematic only if it is shown that it is possible that all

free actions are unavoidable. Wierenga thinks that we can approach

this by asking “Whether Frankfurt-style counterexamples can be

constructed for every free action” (Wierenga, 1989, 77). He argues

that the example that Frankfurt gives, where one person causally

influences another‟s will, does not have much force since it is not

clear that such a thing is really possible. But he concedes that there is

a Christian tradition that believes that God can cause a person to will

in certain ways. Yet even if PAP is subject to counter examples, a

related principle is not:

(PAPC) Necessarily, for every person S and act of will A

such that S causes A, S is morally responsible for performing

A only if S could have refrained from causing A (Wierenga,

1989, 85).

Wierenga thinks that this principle is defensible because it ensures

that free creatures cannot be forced by another agent to choose

something that is contrary to their wills. The idea is that Cossar, who

can play with Gunnar‟s mind can not intrude into Gunnar‟s decision

making process in such a way that Gunnar cannot refrain from doing

what Cossar wants. Gunnar can be free only if he can refrain from

doing what Cossar is trying to get him to do. If when God causes a

free agent to choose something, the agent is not free, then likewise, if

another agent (Cossar) causes Gunnar to choose something, Gunnar is

42

not free (Wierenga, 1989, 85).

In addition, any act of an agent is free only if it is an act of will

caused by the agent or if it is caused by such an act. But then if

(PAPC) is true, so is (13). For if no one is ever able to do

anything other than what he or she does do, then no one ever

causes an act of will, and if no one ever causes an act of will,

then no one ever performs a free action (Wierenga, 1989, 85).

(12) and (13) are thus defensible.

Part III: An Argument for Fatalism

Wierenga uses an analogous argument for fatalism to

undermine the plausibility of the incompatibility argument.

He begins by claiming that, “Perhaps, every proposition

about the past is accidentally necessary, in which case (C*) may be

seen as an instance of a more general principle.” He then gives the

definition of the more general principle that he calls „(F)‟:

(F) There is a concept of accidental necessity satisfying the

following conditions: (i) for all times U and t2 such that t1 is

earlier than t2 and for every proposition p, if at t1 p is true,

then at t2 p is accidentally necessary, (ii) for every time t and

for all propositions p and q, if p is accidentally necessary, p

entails q, and it is possible that q is false, then q is

accidentally necessary, and (iii) for every time t1 and

proposition p, if p is accidentally necessary at t1, then there is

no person S. action A, and time t2 at least as late as t1 such

that S can do A at t2 and if S were to do A at t2 then p would

be false (Wierenga, 1989, 87-88).

The difference between (C*) and (F) is that (C*) only refers to God‟s

past foreknowledge, while (F) is more general and refers to all past

events. Wierenga then makes the claim that the “Ockhamist response

may be seen as a natural extension of a plausible response to an

analogous argument for fatalism” (427). He presents more general

propositions corresponding to (12), (13), and (14) of „Argument A‟:

(15) Necessarily, if (F) then all past events are incompatible

43

with anyone being able to do anything other than what he or

she does do.

(16) Necessarily, if no one is ever able to do anything other

than what he or she does do, then no one ever acts freely.

Therefore,

(17) Necessarily, if (F) then all past events are incompatible

with anyone ever acting freely.

Then he shows how these can be used to construct an argument about

Jones mowing his lawn, corresponding to the earlier argument ((5)-

(9)) Wierenga derived from Aquinas.

(18) Eighty years ago it was true that Jones will mow his

lawn tomorrow

(19) It is accidentally necessary that 80 years ago it was true

that Jones will mow his lawn tomorrow.

(20) “Eighty years ago it was true that Jones will mow his

lawn tomorrow” entails “Jones will mow his lawn

tomorrow”.

(21) It is accidentally necessary that Jones will mow his lawn

tomorrow.

Therefore,

(22) Jones‟ mowing his lawn tomorrow is not free

(Wierenga, 1991, 426-427).

Wierenga believes that this argument for fatalism is analogous to the

argument for incompatibility. To avoid its conclusion, he denies that

(18) “is strictly about the past” (Wierenga, 1991, 428). This is

because it also refers to the future and so it is not accidentally

necessary. Now (18) is analogous to

(4) Eighty years ago God foreknew that Jones will mow his

44

lawn tomorrow (Wierenga, 1991, 426).

For both (4) and (18) depend for their truth on the future. So if (4) is

accidentally necessary, so too is (18). But then we are forced into

fatalism (Wierenga, 1991, 428). Since fatalism is implausible, we

have reason to believe that (4) is not accidentally necessary. So if one

wants to claim that (4) is accidentally necessary as the original

incompatibility argument did, then one must also conclude that (18) is

accidentally necessary and that fatalism is true (Wierenga, 1991,

428).

Wierenga also wonders whether (C*) is just an implication

of a more general fact. For (C*) might just be one example of the

truth that all things that are in the past are accidentally necessary i.e.,

(C*) might be a special case of (F). But

(F) provides an argument for fatalism. I think that is sufficient

reason for rejecting (F), and if (C*) is supposed to be

supported by being an instance of (F), that is slim support

indeed. Of course, some philosophers have accepted fatalism,

and examining their arguments in favor of it is a worthwhile

philosophical activity. But we may legitimately decline to

engage in it here. We are also entitled to reject any argument

for the incompatibility of divine foreknowledge and human

free action which entails fatalism independently of premisses

[sic] about divine omniscience (Wierenga, 1989, 89).

Wierenga has argued that one must first accept fatalism if the

incompatibility argument is to work. But since he doesn‟t believe in

fatalism he claims that the incompatibility argument, which depends

on fatalism, can be rejected. The point is that the incompatibility

argument depends on (C*) and (C*) depends on (F). But (F) entails

fatalism. Hence, since fatalism is false, so is (F). Hence (C*) lacks

support. Consequentially, there is no reason to accept the

incompatibility argument.

Objection concerning Wierenga’s use of “Fatalism”

Wierenga might he criticised for running together

determinism, soft determinism, and fatalism in his definition of

fatalism. Does he misunderstand the position of the Calvinist such

that he does not see that they do not define fatalism in his way? Or is

45

he just equating all theories that are deterministic, including soft-

determinism, with fatalism? But there are theories that have been

traditionally distinguished for certain reasons. Following Peter van

Inwagen, Wierenga defines fatalism as:

The doctrine that it is a conceptual truth that no one is able to

act otherwise than he or she does (Wierenga, 1991, 427).

Jonathan Edwards believes that no one is ever able to do other than

what they in fact do, but Calvinists have always distinguished their

belief in the sovereignty of God from philosophical fatalism. Fatalism

as distinguished from Calvinism says that since the future is

determined to be the way that it will be and the future cannot be other

than the way that it will be, (since everything is determined) humans

do not need to act in any certain ways. They need not do anything,

need not strive to do good, do not need to try to serve God, because

everything will be the same no matter what they do. So fatalism is

distinguished from Calvinistic predestination in that Calvinists

believe that they should actively work at changing the world and their

lives, while the fatalist says that there is no reason to do anything.

Calvinists think that God uses humans who are consciously and

actively at work to create the future, while the fatalist thinks that

everything just comes about no matter what the person does.

Wierenga is equating fatalism and divine sovereignty in a way that

Calvinists would object to.

„Fatalism‟ in theological terms differs from Calvinistic

divine decrees in four ways. First, fatalism “excludes the idea of final

causes” whereas Calvinistic decrees are ordained “to accomplish the

highest conceivable or possible good” (Hodge, 549). Secondly,

fatalism claims that “the sequence of events is determined by an

unintelligent concatenation of causes and effects” while the Calvinist

claims that “the sequence is determined by infinite wisdom and

goodness” (Hodge, 549), Third, Fatalism does not believe in free

causes. This means that the choices of free agents are “as much

determined by a necessity out of themselves as the operation of

nature” (Hodge, 549). This is contrary to the Calvinistic view that

“the freedom and responsibility of man are fully preserved” (Hodge,

549). “The two systems differ, therefore, as much as a machine

differs from a man; or as the actions of infinite intelligence, power,

and love differ from the law of gravitation” (Hodge, 549). The final

difference is that fatalism gets rid of “moral distinctions” and leads to

46

“stolid insensibility or despair” whereas the Calvinistic decrees lead

to no such conclusion (Hodge, 549).

The incompatibilist might want to respond to Wierenga‟s

fatalistic argument by claiming that (F) does not in fact have a

conclusion that differs from (C*). For (C*) also concludes that

humans are not free and hence some sort of necessity must be the

case. So (F) should not be seen as providing a lack of support for the

plausibility of (C*) because (C*) itself leads to the same conclusions.

Here Wierenga is begging the question. The question at issue is

whether humans can freely choose. The two arguments (C*) and (F)

both conclude that they do not freely choose, therefore Wierenga sees

(F) as implausible and (C*) not supported. The problem with

Wierenga‟s move is that libertarian freedom is the issue at stake, so

Wierenga cannot just assume it, even though the arguments he gives

show it not to be possible. It seems that Wierenga is operating under

the assumption that something can show another to be necessary, only

if the first is causally necessitating the second. Since neither the

incompatibility or fatalistic argument show that human wills are

causally necessitated, Wierenga is concluding that they do not work.

But as we have seen in this essay, Edwards has argued in his reply to

Whitby that this is a problematic assumption.

I understand that Wierenga is claiming that (F) is a more

general instance of the particular case (C*). He thinks that since the

general rule (F) is not supported, therefore, (C*) also is not supported.

However, he has not given good philosophical reasons for rejecting

(F). In fact, he has given no argument at all, except that he believes in

libertarian freedom. He begs the question by simply assuming

libertarian freedom to get himself out of a difficult situation. I do not

think that he has sufficiently shown that this is a rational, much less a

biblical thing to do.

Part IV: The Prophetic Argument.

Wierenga is interested in showing that the Ockhamist

response to the incompatibility argument can be applied to the

prophetic argument. How does prophecy affect the incompatibility

controversy? Alfred Freddoso claims that “Ockhamism simply cannot

deal adequately with genuine prophecy of future contingents”

(Wierenga, 1991, 433). Why is this?

Stump and Kretzmann suggest that it is because “a prophecy

47

brings some of God‟s eternal knowledge into time, thus

converting at least the revealed bit of it into foreknowledge.”

And they add, “Even though it is not God who has the

foreknowledge generated in this way, the standard arguments

against the compatibility foreknowledge and freedom would

apply to the prophet‟s foreknowledge which stems from God”

(Wierenga, 1991, 433).

This is a rejoinder to those who think they can evade the

problem by denying that God is in time.

Wierenga uses the example of Jesus prophesying that Peter

will deny him three times. The utterance “Peter will disown Christ

three times” seems to be accidentally necessary (Wierenga, 1991,

434).

(23) Christ uttered (Aramaic words whose translation into

English is), “Tonight before the cock crows you will disown

me three times” (Wierenga, 1991, 434).

Because this utterance is accidentally necessary the following

statement is accidentally necessary as well:

(24) Peter will disown Christ three times. (Wierenga, 1991,

434).

Wierenga says that the Ockhamist objection to the argument

from prophecy, is equivalent to its objection to the original

incompatibility argument (of Aquinas). (23) can be more accurately

stated as

(23‟) There was a token T such that (i) Christ used T, and (ii)

as used by Christ T expressed p. the proposition that Peter

will disown Christ three times, (iii) Christ believed p. and (iv)

Christ intended to assert p with T (Wierenga, 1991, 438).

Now it is accidentally necessary that Jesus say the prophetic words

that He does and it is accidentally necessary that those words are

expressed. “But it is not apparent that (23) as a whole is accidentally

necessary” (Wierenga, 1991, 439). Wierenga develops this idea:

It was clear from our discussion in Section 2 above that the

48

Ockhamist is already committed to holding that God‟s past

knowledge of the contingent future need not be accidentally

necessary. Of course, the same holds for God‟s past belief,

for, necessarily, God believes a proposition if and only if he

knows it. So the Ockhamist will naturally want to deny that

the third clause of (23‟), that Christ believed that Peter would

disown him three times, is accidentally necessary, for this is a

belief about the contingent future. It is not a very large step to

hold the same thing about other divine mental states (or other

aspects of the divine mental state). In particular, the

Ockhamist can deny that the fourth clause of (23‟), that Christ

intended to assert that Peter will disown him, is accidentally

necessary. What Christ intends to assert is closely tied to

what he thinks is the case. And if what he thinks to be the

case is not fixed and inevitable, then what he intends to assert

is not, either (Wierenga, 1991, 439).

Wierenga concludes that the prophetic argument and the original

argument can both be handled by the Ockhamist. “Divine prophecy of

the future, like divine knowledge of the future, is not fixed, inevitable,

or accidentally necessary” (Wierenga, 1991, 439).

Freddoso claims that according to the Ockhamist, “Divine

prophecies might be deceptive and mistaken” (Wierenga, 1991, 440).

According to Freddoso:

Ockhamism commits one to having to choose between the

Scylla of claiming that God can undo the causal history of the

world and the Charybdis of claiming that divine prophecies

might be deceptive or mistaken (Wierenga, 1991, 439-440).

Wierenga replies that the Ockhamist too denies that God can change

the causal history of the world. But does this mean that the Ockhamist

is caught on the second horn of the dilemma--that claims that

prophecies might be mistaken? Wierenga claims that the Ockhainist

does not have to believe:

(25) It is possible that some divine prophecy is mistaken

(Wierenga, 1991, 440).

Instead, he is only committed to:

49

(26) Some divine prophecy is such that it is possible that it is

mistaken (Wierenga, 1991, 440).

Wierenga explains himself:

That is, the Ockhamist will insist that nothing could be both a

divine prophecy and mistaken. Something that is a divine

prophecy, however, might not have been a divine prophecy,

and hence, could have been false: Christ‟s utterance might

have been mistaken, but if it had been, it would not have been

intended by him to express (24), and so would not have been

prophecy (Wierenga, 1991, 440).

The Ockhamist, in other words, thinks that if something was a divine

prophecy, it does not have to have been one, and therefore, might

have been mistaken, and as such would not have been a divine

prophecy.

We can formalize Wierenga‟s argument. The argument for

prophecy makes this kind of move:

(27) Christ asserted p entails p

(28) Christ asserted p is accidentally necessary

Therefore

(29) p is accidentally necessary

Wierenga believes that (28) is equivalent to a further proposition (30)

which is an explication of what Christ asserting p involves:

(30) [(a) Christ utters u. (b) u expresses p. (c) Christ believes

p and (d) intends to assert p by uttering U] is accidentally

necessary.

Wierenga thinks that (a) is accidentally necessary, but (c) is not. And

for a conjunction like (30) to be accidentally necessary, the individual

conjuncts must all be accidentally necessary. Therefore, premise (28)

is false. This means that the argument from prophecy does not cause

any special problem for the Ockhamist. In the original argument they

50

claimed that Gods past belief was a soft fact about the past. In the

same way they can claim that Christs belief and hence his assertion is

a soft fact about the past.

Objection to the Prophetic argument

An objection to Wierenga is that he makes a distinction in his

discussion of the prophetic argument between the possibility of Jesus

speaking mistakenly as the divine person versus being infallible when

his prophetic utterances are meant. This distinction seems problematic

because as I read Wierenga, he is saying that Jesus can speak

mistakenly. If we understand „speak‟ in the normal way it seems that

there is a problem here. Wierenga is apparently trying to distance

himself from the idea that when Jesus speaks mistakenly he means

what he says. But it is hard to think what it might mean to say that a

divine person utters words that he does not mean. It would of course

be deceptive for him to do this, because we would not know that He

did not mean them. Wierenga seems to make the distinction in order

to claim that some of Jesus‟ prophecies might not have been meant by

Him. So we must see which of the prophecies come true, and then

from that look back and decide which utterances Jesus meant. But this

view will not be attractive to most Christians. Wierenga claims that

“Christ‟s utterance might have been mistaken” (Wierenga, 1991,

440). It is objectionable to suppose that Christ‟s prophetic utterances

could be mistaken because it goes against an orthodox presupposition

that Wierenga himself has emphasized earlier when he talked about

Jesus speaking as a divine person and meaning what He says.

Wierenga claimed that the Ockhamist can claim that “What

Christ intends to assert is closely tied to what he thinks is the case.

And if what he thinks to be the case is not fixed and inevitable, then

what he intends to assert is not either” (Wiernga, 1991, 439). The

problem with this statement is that it assumes that God does not have

eternally fixed knowledge. But the Ockhamists assume that God‟s

knowledge does not change. They hold future contingent acts to be

soft facts relative to humans at another time. But Gods knowledge is

eternal and this is the knowledge Christ would have. Therefore it

seems problematic to claim that Christ would intend to assert

something to be the case that He does not think is fixed.

Further, Wierenga is led to make the claim:

(26) Some divine prophecy si such that it is possible that it is

51

mistaken (Wierenga, 1919, 440).

Once again, this seems to make assumptions about prophecy that are

not plausible for Christians. For if something is by definition a

prophecy--by that is meant that it is a divine prophecy. And few

Christians would be attracted to the idea that a divine prophecy could

possibly be wrong, once it was made.

We shall later argue that Wierenga‟s argument is dependent

on a problematic view of what elements of revealed prophecy or

foreknowledge are a hard fact about the past. Here he seems to claim

that only the utterance is a hard fact about the past. The

incompatibilist can respond that if a prophecy is defined as an

utterance, then Wierenga‟s argument works. But the problem is that

there is more needed for something to qualify as a biblical prophecy.

It must include a dispositional belief state by a prophet in which the

prophet believes what God‟s revelation to him or her is. And as we

shall argue later in our discussion of hard and soft facts, the

Ockhamist is incorrect in assuming that only utterances are hard

aspects of the past.

Part V: The Ockhamist Hard/Soft Fact Distinction

Wierenga has drawn a distinction between hard and soft facts

to account for the reason why Gods foreknowledge of Jones mowing

his lawn in 80 years does not show that it is necessary that Jones mow

his lawn in 80 years. He claims that hard facts are facts that are fully

about the past. For example, the fact that Felix Mendelssohn

Bartholdy scored great musical successes in London in the 1830‟s is a

hard fact about the past because it is now at this later time--say the

year 2006, impossible that those events have not occurred. But the

Ockhamist will say that God‟s foreknowledge of the proposition

„Jones will mow his law in the future‟ is only a soft fact about the

past. This is because the proposition is not entirely about the past; for

it is also about the future--the future event of Jones actually mowing

his lawn at the predicted time. Wierenga writes.

Some propositions are about the past “as regards their

wording only and are equivalently about the future”...

Following recent tradition, we can put this point by saying

that (18) expresses a “soft” fact about the past as opposed to a

“hard” fact about the past (Wierenga, 1989, 90).

52

Only hard facts are accidentally necessary. This means that human

actions are not necessary because of the fact that they exist in God‟s

foreknowledge.

We can put the Ockhamist position in terms of present

foreknowledge about the future. Consider a proposition about the

present, such as „God has foreknowledge today that in eighty years

Jones will mow his lawn‟. The Ockhamist says that since this

statement involves something about the future, the truth of this

proposition, is dependent on the truth of a further proposition about

the future. The future proposition in this example, would be „eighty

years from now Jones is mowing his lawn‟. The Ockhamist is saying

that the first proposition “God foreknows that eighty years from now

Jones will mow his lawn” is dependent for its‟ truth on a second

proposition, namely; „eighty years from now Jones is mowing his

lawn”. The first proposition therefore expresses a soft fact. It will not

become accidentally necessary until Jones mows his lawn eighty

years from now.

Part VI: Objection to the Ockhamist Hard/Soft Fact Distinction

Anthony Kenny, responding to the Ockhamist hard/soft fact

distinction, says “In our time, Nelson Pike has shown that this escape

route is not open” (Kenny, 56). This is because

Any difficulty which arises from God has always known that

there will be a sea-battle tomorrow arises equally with „God

has always believed that there will be a sea-battle tomorrow”

(Kenny, 56).

For we can imagine that God has a past belief that Jones will mow his

lawn in 80 years. Eighty years later Jones will not he able to not mow

his lawn, because God‟s past belief is something about the past. Since

God is essentially omniscient, his past belief entails that Jones will

mow his lawn. There is nothing that Jones can do that could make it

that God had not earlier held the belief He did. So Jones is not free

with respect to mowing his lawn (Kenny, 56). Both Edwards and

Molina believe that God‟s past beliefs are as necessary as other facts

about the past. To this extent they agree in rejecting the Ockhamist

claim that God‟s past beliefs about the past are soft facts and

contingent, while other facts about the past are necessary (Freddoso,

53

58).

John Martin Fischer claims that the Ockhamist distinction

between hard and soft facts is problematic. He wants to show that any

conception of God‟s foreknowledge being a soft fact about the past

does not help the Ockhamist avoid necessity. He does this by

attempting to show that even if God‟s foreknowledge about a future

proposition is a soft fact about the past, it at the same time has a hard

property. He makes a distinction between “relational” and “non-

relational” properties. An example of a non-relational property is

“waking up at eight o‟clock”. This is distinguished from relational

properties like “waking up four hours prior to eating lunch.” Non-

relational properties are called “hard properties” while relational ones

are called “soft properties”. Fischer discusses non-relational

properties:

If one wakes up at eight, then “waking up and “waking up at

eight” are hard properties relative to eight o‟clock, as they

should be. And notice that, in general, when one combines a

soft property with an ordinary object, one gets a soft fact (for

example, In 44 B.C. Caesar dies prior to Fischer‟s writing

this paper in /985). Further, when one combines a hard

property with an ordinary object, one gets a hard fact (for

instance, In 44 B.C. Caesar dies on the steps of the senate.)

(Fischer, 1986, 597).

A problem arises for the Ockhamist when the hard property relative to

T1; “believing that Jones will mow his lawn at T2” is combined with

the person who bears this hard property--namely, God. God presents a

peculiar difficulty for the Ockhamist. It would be no problem for

them if it was a human that held this belief, because humans are

fallible and do not have perfect foreknowledge. But God‟s essential

omniscience creates a problem for the Ockhamist. This is because

God has his knowledge in eternity, and as the Ockhamist allows it is

unchangeable and fixed relative to him. So God has the hard property

of „believing that Jones will mow his lawn at T2‟. But this hard

property is combined with a soft fact because “an agent‟s [God]

having it [the belief that he does] at a time is a soft fact about that

time” (Fischer, 1986, 598). Fischer thinks that dispositional states like

having a „belief that Jones will mow his lawn‟ is something that is a

hard property because it is a state of affairs that is non-relational. A

human can have a belief that Jones will mow his lawn tomorrow even

54

though Jones will not mow his lawn tomorrow. This is because

human belief dispositions can be wrong. But it is different with God.

Now, when God believes at T1 that Jones will mow his lawn

at T2, it is logically impossible for God to be in that same

dispositional state and for Jones not to mow, but this does not

show that “believing that Jones will mow his lawn at T2” is

not a hard property (relative to T1), At most, it shows that

God believes at TI that Jones will mow his lawn at T2 is not a

hard fact about T1 (Fischer, 1986, 598).

So the Ockhamist must show how Jones can act in such a

way that God does not have the hard property he does at T1. Fischer

thinks that God‟s forebelief being a hard-type soft fact means that it is

already fixed, and there is nothing that Jones can do to make it such

that the hard property did not exist at T1. Fischer‟s point is that the

fact about God‟s belief is fundamentally different from the other soft

facts to which the Ockhamist assimilates it. It (unlike the others) is a

hard-type soft fact (Fischer, 1986, 599). The examples that

Ockhamists give of softs facts in support of their interpretation of

divine foreknowledge are not hard-type soft facts. Hence they do not

show that divine foreknowledge is contingent as these other soft facts

might be.

Fischer concedes that he has not shown that a free creature

cannot act so as to falsify a hard property about the past. The

Ockhamist might respond to his argument by claiming that just as soft

facts can be falsified, so too--hard-type soft facts can be falsified. But

Fischer‟s central point is that the Ockhamist will not he able to make

the ability to falsify hard-type soft facts plausible by using examples,

as they traditionally have, of soft facts being falsifiable. They must

show on other grounds that it is plausible to believe that hard-type

soft facts like instances of divine foreknowledge can be falsified

(Fischer, 1986, 600).

Fischer here has been arguing against Ockhamists who deny

“that God‟s belief is a genuine feature of the past” (Fischer, 1986,

600). He says that there are other Ockhamists who deny that “God‟s

existence is a genuine feature of the past” (Fischer, 1986, 600). His

argument against this position is similar to his claim that God‟s

foreknowledge of an event is a hard-type soft fact. So we will not

look at it. The insight that there are hard aspects to soft facts is the

important idea we are taking from Fischer. He explains what he is

55

doing in his critique of these two different Ockhamist positions:

[The] two criticism correspond to two different ways of

decomposing facts. One way fragments facts into component

states of affairs; this yields the response to the Ockhamist

strategy (suggested by Adams and Pike) which holds that

God‟s existence in the past is a soft fact about the past.

Another way fragments facts into constitutent properties and

their bearers; this yields the response to the Ockhamist

strategy which holds that God‟s belief in the past is a soft fact

about the past (Fischer, 1986, 601).

~

Fischer has suggested some ideas that are problematic for

Ockhamists. He has claimed that dispositions of God which are

forebeliefs about future contingent conditionals are dispositions that

existed in the past. Therefore it is a fact about the past that God had a

belief, just as it is another fact about the past that Julius Caesar was

assassinated. Facts about the past like these have had existence and

therefore seem to be fixed in some way (since soft facts have hard

parts). Fischer focuses our attention on the actual world and the

beliefs that God actually has and how these are eternally fixed. The

Ockhamists seem to support their intuitions about soft facts merely by

describing possible worlds. My intuitions tell me that the plausibility

of the Ockhamist position is lessened when one thinks about facts

about the past--like Christ‟s or prophet‟s belief dispositions (that are

revealed foreknowledge)--that are part of the actual world. For then,

if they are part of the actual world, this means that they come from

God‟s actual eternally fixed knowledge. And this means the events

foreknown will happen because they are a part of God‟s eternal and

fixed knowledge.

Edwards gave two objections against compatibilists. First he

said that it was impossible that God could have certain knowledge of

things that were contingent. Secondly, he claims that for God to have

knowledge there must be some evidence which provided him with

grounds for that knowledge. The Ockhamist answers these two

objections in an unsatisfactory way. The explanation that they give

for God knowing contingent things is that God knows them because

he knows what the creatures choose to do from His observing what

they do in fact choose to do. So the evidence that God has for a

contingent event is that He views the event taking place. But this

response ignores other claims that the Ockhamist makes. For they

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make the claim that soft facts are facts about the past that are not

fixed and might therefore turn out otherwise. But this clearly indicates

that God can reveal a belief that is a soft fact and yet is not true. But

God‟s revealing a belief of His should lead anyone to assume that it is

a certain truth. For if it is not a certain truth, then God could possibly

be wrong, which is impossible. Furthermore, if this soft fact is

something that can he changed, then it is plausible to suppose it

possible that God has a belief that he holds and has revealed to

humans even though he does not have sufficient proof to back it tip.

But this implies that God is not perfectly rational.

The Ockhamist position seems to hinge on the ability to say

that a soft fact might not have been true, and that if it were not, God

would have believed something else at that point. But this mode of

argumentation is dependent on the idea that one can never allow that

one is talking about the actual world. If one is talking about the actual

world and about the soft facts that are a part of that world, then these

soft facts will always be true, because they proceed from the eternal

knowledge that God has. However, if you are talking about a non-

actual world, then there seems more plausibility in talking about soft

facts not coming about, because when something else comes about

than what the original soft fact claims, then that means we are in a

different world than what we were first supposing, and because of

that God would have believed otherwise, and would not have had the

wrong soft fact. This shows that when the Ockhamist is pressed into

discussions concerning the actual world, he or she will be pushed

towards intuitions that soft facts are necessary because of their

attachment to eternally fixed knowledge in the actual world.

The Ockhamist must not be thinking of a possible world as

an entire state of affairs which involves all that will happen in that

world throughout its history. Such a world will also involve God

holding all the beliefs about what will happen in that world. This is

the only way that I think it is correct to think of a possible world. It

must involve the entire history of that world, or it is by definition not

a possible world, but only part of one, The problem for the Ockhamist

is that once a possible world begins to be actualized, because the

history of that world begins occurring, at that time God is existing in

eternity. But if he is in eternity, then as Edwards has pointed out, all

times will be before His consciousness. But this means that God

already at an early time in the earth‟s history can reveal perfectly

what will happen in the future. What he knows will necessarily occur

because it is already occurring for him.

57

The Ockhamist claims that backward causation occurs. This

means that what people do in the future can change what occurred in

the past. This position will be seen by most Christians as very

implausible. For it goes against normal intuitions that something that

has occurred can be made not to have occurred. The weakness of this

claim is very problematic for the Ockhamist. Furthermore, it does not

help them with respect to God. For as I was arguing in the previous

paragraphs, if God is outside of time, there is not really any

backwards causation in time that can affect the beliefs that God holds.

Only if he was in time could there properly be said to be backward

causation by future human choices on what Gods beliefs were.

Instead, the Ockhamist is forced to make the further questionable

claim that humans can freely choose certain things that will somehow

exert a backward causation on God in eternity. But such a backward

causation would deny that God is in eternity because it assumes that

he did not know what was going to happen in the future, and therefore

has need of changed or revised beliefs.

Humans Create the God who Exists

John Martin Fischer argues that one who follows the sort of

thinking that Wierenga does--in arguing that God‟s foreknowledge is

dependent on human volitions--must be seen as logically claiming

that humans by their acts of will create the God who exists. This is

because there are infinitely many possible beings who are God who

all have varying beliefs about the future. We may suppose that there

are an infinite set of possible God‟s who all have different

foreknowledge. This foreknowledge is comprehensive knowledge of

what will happen in the future. Now the God that exists in the actual

world is the one that has foreknowledge of what does in fact occur in

the entire history of that world. Since the Ockhamist has claimed that

God is dependent for his knowledge on what free creatures choose to

do in the actual world, the God that actually exists is the particular

one that free creatures instantiate by their free choices. And this view

runs counter to the orthodox Christian view that the being who is God

is absolute and is the cause of everything outside himself, and not

vice versa, This argument against the Ockhamists will have strength

for anyone who disagrees with Process theology, which is the idea

that God is evolving or changing through his interaction with the

world.

But the Ockhamists have a response to this. They can object

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that the God that exists is not being created by the free choices of

humans, rather it is only the beliefs of God which are being created

by the free creatures. The Ockhamist can plausibly respond that the

God who exists is defined by his attributes and not by what

contingent beliefs he holds.

However, a critic of the Ockhamists can respond that they

are depending on a view that implies that a God who has a belief x is

necessarily the same God as one who does not have belief x, but

rather some other belief y. The problem with this is that we have

intuitions for there being two possible worlds in which there are Gods

who have different beliefs. And if it is plausible to think of a belief as

an attribute of some kind, then possible Gods who differ in beliefs can

be seen as distinct in some sense from each other, and therefore

making it plausible to claim that the Ockhamists have a theory in

which humans choose which possible God exists.

Ockhamists limit God’s ability to reveal Foreknowledge

It seems that the Ockhamist must logically be led to the

conclusion that at this present time, God cannot have perfect and

certain foreknowledge of all future human acts. Of course Wierenga

will object to this, but there is sufficient reason to doubt that he has

reason to. If we could get God to write out many of the future

volitions that were going to be done by humans, then it would seem

that the Ockharnist would soon convert to incompatibilism. The idea

here is that if the Ockhamist experientially saw that God knew

everything that he or she would do, then they would find their

position problematical. Imagine that God could write down for a

person his foreknowledge of what that person would do in all

important situations---in great detail. Then as the person read the

book and lived their life, they would find that what they read about

themselves doing the next hour, day, or year would always come to

pass. The person could actively try to do something different from

what is predicted in the book, but would find out that this was

impossible.

This leads one to think that the Ockhamist does not really

believe in divine foreknowledge. It seems that the Ockharnist allows

God to have foreknowledge that is hidden away in his mind, but that

cannot be revealed. One is led to think that they must have a weak

sense of divine foreknowledge, because it is necessary for their theory

that no free agents can know his foreknowledge in depth.

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The Ockhamist might respond that maybe it is not possible

for God to reveal his foreknowledge in an extensive way to free

creatures because that will interfere with their freedom. For it seems

plausible to think that there is no possible world where free creatures

can exist along with an extensive revelation of what they will do. So

Ockhamists will be willing to limit God‟s ability to reveal his

foreknowledge, not because he cannot do it, but because if he would

do it his free creatures would not be able to choose freely. This

explanation does seem to carry weight. Calvinists would disagree that

God cannot reveal his foreknowledge but their reasoning for this

would come from their reading of the Bible. It would not be clear

how they might come up with an argument against the Ockhamist.

They might try showing that in the Bible there were some instances

where revelations were made of some specific things that a free

creature would do, and these did not interfere with his or her freedom.

But the Ockhamist could respond that the revelations were not as

extensive as is needed for the above argument to work.

But what about the person of Jesus? Since He was a divine

person He would have perfect knowledge of what his future held.

Arminians would allow that He still lived out his life as a proper

functioning free creature. But this means that a free creature is not

disabled from freely choosing even though he or she has a knowledge

of the future. And Jesus had quite a bit of knowledge from quite

specific Old Testament prophecies about what He would do. The

Ockhamist can plausibly respond that Jesus limited his knowledge

while He was on earth--and therefore He did not know the future in

precise details. This would allow that free creatures can function

properly if they have limited knowledge of the future, even though

extensive knowledge might be problematic.

It is hard to conceptualize what it might be like in the

Ockhamist paradigm for God to reveal his foreknowledge. Let us

think about whether it is possible for God to reveal extensive

foreknowledge. We have seen that there might be a problem with God

revealing his foreknowledge in extensive detail to the free creatures

that the foreknowledge is about. But what if we picture God revealing

the future volitions of humans to a select group of angels who exist in

time? Since God‟s foreknowledge is dependent in the Ockharnist

paradigm on what humans in fact choose to do--the soft facts that he

has in his mind are not fixed until the events corresponding to them

actually occur. This means that a soft fact is not fixed until the free

creature actually makes the decision which is foreknown. But if God

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would reveal the future history of humans to angels, this would mean

that he would also be revealing to them soft facts about the future.

But this would mean that these soft facts might not occur, because the

humans whom these soft facts are about can choose to do something

else.

How can the Ockhamist respond to this? They might try to

say that if the human in question does decide to do otherwise than

what God had a soft fact foreknowledge of, then God would have

believed differently and would have written that out instead. But that

means that God would not have been able to reveal the

foreknowledge to the angels as we presupposed earlier, because the

foreknowledge we supposed to have been revealed involved soft facts

which did not occur. But then it would seem that any possible

foreknowledge that God might reveal to any angels could never be

said to be foreknowledge of what is actually going to occur in the real

world, unless it would necessarily be the case that no human ever did

anything other than what the soft facts that were revealed contained

knowledge of.

Since Angels are in time like humans it would seem that the

time at which God reveals his knowledge to the angels is a time at

which the future volitions are not yet fixed. So the angels would know

soft facts but they would already be fixed because they came from

God in eternity where He sees all temporal moments at once. Hence

the soft facts in the actual world seem to be necessary because they

come from a source for which the facts were already metaphysically

fixed. The Ockhamist claims that God has eternally fixed knowledge.

This knowledge is not fixed relative to the angels. The actual eternal

knowledge God has involves soft facts that are, according to the

Ockhamists, facts that are not yet fixed, and because of this the facts

contained in them can possibly not happen. But then God would

mislead the angels by giving them foreknowledge that includes soft

facts. The point is that the soft facts are dependent for their fixity on

what humans actually choose, and this is not fixed until they actually

make the choice. Therefore, the actual knowledge that God had in the

actual world would be knowledge that was certain because it comes

from his eternally fixed knowledge. But this would mean that every

soft fact would actually occur. If every soft fact were to occur it

would seem that it is wrong to think that in the actual world the soft

facts that are revealed can possibly not come about; for it will never

be the case that a soft fact does not come about. From this it is

rational to assume that every prophecy will necessarily come about.

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For it would be impossible for a prophecy in the actual world not to

come to pass.

This discussion implies that the Ockhamist paradigm with its

claim that soft facts in the actual world are changeable is false. So

changeable soft facts will never be revealed. Hence in the actual

world, contra the Ockhamists, God cannot reveal knowledge of future

contingents that are not fixed. This means that there are two

limitations attached to the Ockhamist conception of the ability of God

to reveal foreknowledge. First, God cannot reveal extensive

foreknowledge to free creatures because their freedom might not be

compatible with this. Secondly, he cannot reveal extensive

foreknowledge (that involves soft facts as the Ockhamists conceive

them) to anyone in the actual world (including angels).

Part VII: Theological Objections to Ockhamism

Weak view of Providence

Wierengas use of the word „dependency‟ rests on a weak

view of providence. He used this word to argue that God‟s

foreknowledge is dependent on the happening of the future event for

its existence. „Dependency‟ can be used in a strong or in a weak

sense. Wierenga takes himself to be using it in a strong sense, while

the incompatibilist defender, like Edwards would claim that he is

using it in a trivial manner. Wierenga claims that the proposition

“God foreknows that eighty years from now Jones will mow his lawn‟

is dependent for its truth on a second proposition “Jones is now eighty

years later mowing his lawn.” Wierenga takes there to be a strong

dependency of God‟s foreknowledge on the future event. Edwards

would agree that it is a necessary condition that the future event occur

for God‟s foreknowledge having been correct. But he would object

that the future event is not the cause of God having the knowledge

that he does. Rather, God knows what is going to happen from his

decrees. Wierenga‟s position is the opposite of Edwards on this point.

For the former, humans are trivially dependent on God‟s

foreknowledge for doing what they do. For if God exists necessarily

and is essentially omniscient it is necessary that he have

foreknowledge of what is going to happen in the future. But the real

cause of the future action is the free choice by the secondary agent.

The incompatibilist will respond that Wierenga has reversed

the situation that exists between God and humans. On his view

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humans are the cause of the events that occur, rather than God‟s

providential decrees being the cause of everything that occurs in the

actual world. Edwards, the Molinists, and Banezians all claim that all

the events that occur in the world originate in God‟s decrees. His

providential decrees are therefore the sole cause of his knowledge of

the actual world for the Calvinist. The Molinists combines God‟s

decrees together with his knowledge of what creatures will freely

choose in the situations he puts them in to explain how God knows

the future. If one has a strong view of divine providence then the

Ockhamist position will not seem attractive.

Neo-Barthian objection to Ockhamism

Karl Barth is known for doing theology from the top down.

This means that he begins by studying who God is and then proceeds

to draw conclusions from this about the nature of humans and the

world. Edwards tries to do something like this in his incompatibility

argument. He argues from the nature of God and his attributes to the

conclusion that humans are not free in the Arminian sense. Wierenga

seems to be doing something else. He does of course discuss the

attributes of God, but right or wrong. his focus is first on the nature of

human freedom, from which he comes to conclusions about how God

interacts with the humans who are free in the sense that Wierenga

thinks that they are. His compatibility argument seems to focus on

humans and makes them the criterion by which one decides whether

humans are free. So the claim that is being made here is that Edwards

is taking the Barthian approach by starting first with the nature of

God and working from there to the nature of human freedom. If

Wierenga is not taking the nature of God seriously enough in his

discussion, then he might be led to conclusions that a person using

Barthian methodology would not be led to. So if a thinker agrees with

the Barthian way of doing theology, then he or she will find reason to

object to Wierenga.

Edwards claims that God can’t know contingent facts

The Ockhamist claims that God has foreknowledge of future

contingent acts. Edwards has argued that God cannot have

foreknowledge of anything unless that thing is necessary. If God

knows that something will be contingent, then it means just that that

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thing might not be. But if it might not be, and God knows that, how

can he believe that it certainly will be? If he knows that it will be

because he causally brings it about that the fact will occur, then it

seems that he is causally determining it. And if God knew that there

were certain probabilities operating, that said that a future contingent

had such and such a probability of occurring, then he could only

believe that it was probable. He could not believe that it would

certainly take place. But if God foreknows things to be probable then

he does not have certain and absolute knowledge of the event

occurring.

If prophesies were based on probabilities, then it seems that

God would be deceptive if He revealed them as based on perfect

foreknowledge, without adding the qualification that they were only

probable. But this seems to contradict the Bible where many times the

prophetic writers claim that the prophecy will surely come about. The

tone of biblical prophecy does not give the impression that it is

probability based. If God‟s knowledge was based on probabilities He

would be ignorant of many future actions. Many things that have a

low probability could not be foreknown because God would not have

sufficient grounds to make an educated guess either way. But the

Ockhamist cannot use probability to avoid the problem of how God

knows future contingents. For they hold that God has perfect

knowledge. Their theory suffers from the fault of not being able to

explain how it is that God can know future contingents. This is a

problem for the Molinists also, as we shall see. It is a weakness for

Ockhamism that its proponents are forced to plead ignorance of how

God can know future contingents. It is not strange that contemporary

Ockhamists cannot answer this question, for

Ockham was himself unable to present any coherent account

of divine foreknowledge. „I maintain‟, he says, „that it is

impossible to express clearly the way in which God knows

future contingents. Nevertheless, it must be held that he does

so, but contingently. This must be held because of the

pronouncements of the Saints‟ (Kenny,58).

In conclusion, I have argued that the Ockhamist response has

three central weakness. First, it depends on a weak view of

providence. Secondly, it cannot explain how God can have

knowledge of contingent future conditionals. Finally, I have pointed

out certain problems with the Ockhamist claim that divine forebeliefs

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are soft facts about the past. I have argued that these forebeliefs are

more a part of the past than Wierenga has claimed. Therefore, the

Ockhamists have not given a plausible response to Edwards

incompatibility argument.

65

3

THE MOLINIST

RESPONSE

Introduction

Luis de Molina (1535-1600) was a Catholic theologian whose

book Concordia caused an outburst of controversy in 1588 over how

to reconcile divine foreknowledge and human freedom. Molina was a

member of the recently founded Society of Jesus (the Jesuits). The

Jesuits disagreed with the Dominicans about how to reconcile human

freedom with God‟s providence, foreknowledge. and predestination.

The Jesuits emphasized the freedom of created creatures while the

Dominicans, led by Domingo Banez, promoted the „divine

prerogative‟ (Freddoso, vii.). The debate between the two orders had

been smoldering, but with the publication of Molina‟s book, the

Roman Catholic church was plunged into twenty years of bitter

controversy. Concordia became “one of the most carefully scrutinized

books in Western intellectual history”, says Freddoso, after pope

Clement VIII established a Commission on Grace in 1597 to study the

issue of foreknowledge and freedom (Freddoso, viii.). Pope Paul V in

1607 forbade the Dominicans and Jesuits from calling each other

heretics and commanded them to refrain from “sour words showing

bitterness of soul” (Kenny, 65). He said that he would personally

66

resolve the issue “at an opportune time” (Freddoso, viii.). However,

neither he nor later popes ever did so (Freddoso, viii.).

Anthony Kenny writes that “In our own time there has been a

surprising revival of Molinism, not among theologians but among

philosophers” (Kenny, 65). Alfred Freddoso recently translated Part

IV of Concordia from the Latin to enable contemporary philosophers

to read Molina in English. His Introduction to this translation is a

development of the Molinist theory of middle knowledge and a

defense of it.

Freddoso hopes his translation of Molina will make

contemporary philosophers sensitive to the broader theological

context within which questions about God‟s knowledge have

traditionally arisen” (Freddoso, ix.). By looking at the theological

context he thinks that we can see what the problem is and the criteria

for an adequate resolution of it” (Freddoso, ix). He thinks that

contemporary solutions of the foreknowledge/freedom issue “have

only a loose connection with the problem that those who established

the tradition took themselves to be dealing with” (Freddoso, ix).

These quotes show Freddoso‟s interest in locating the controversy

within the orthodox theological framework that governed the early

Molinists and Dominicans.

The complete title of Concordia is: Liberi Arbitrii turn

Gratiae Donis, Divina P roes cientia, Pro videntia, Praedestinatione

ci Reprohatione Con corlia. Translated this is: The Compatibility of

Free Choice with the Gifts of Grace, Divine Foreknowledge,

Predestination arid Reprobation (Freddoso, ix.). This book is divided

into seven parts. Freddoso is interested in Part IV, which is entitled

“On Divine Foreknowledge”. He develops his views on Molinism and

objections to it in an eighty-one page introduction to his translation of

Part IV. We will concentrate on this in our examination of the

Molinist response to the incompatibility argument. Freddoso states

that the Introduction serves three purposes: 1) to help the reader

understand the modal notions and concept of freedom presupposed in

Part IV; 2) to make Molina‟s theory and criticisms clearer; and 3) to

show ways that a Molinist can respond to objections to their view,

Freddoso distinguishes two questions that are important for

understanding God‟s foreknowledge. The first he calls the “source

question”. This question asks how God can have certain knowledge of

future human contingent acts. The second important question is the

“reconciliation-question‟. This asks how divine foreknowledge can be

reconciled with the contingency of things foreknown. He thinks that

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the reconciliation question cannot he answered „until we grasp clearly

the criteria for an adequate answer to the source-question‟ (Freddoso,

2). The first part of this chapter will focus on the source question and

the second part on the reconcilation question.

Part I : The Source Question

Molina’s definition of freedom

Molina has a libertarian view of freedom. He wants to solve

the problem of „foreknowledge and freedom” without abandoning a

theory of freedom that is defined in terms of the ability of a free

creature to choose to do otherwise than what he or she does in fact

choose to do. He believes that the will is free when it has three

options when presented with a state of affairs. These options include

the ability to; 1)choose an object, 2) reject it, or 3) refrain from either

choosing or rejecting it.

Molina claims that one is free only if one is not causally

necessitated by nature or by another free agent. Freddoso uses the

example of a woman named „Katie‟ voting in the presidential

elections. He asks us to imagine that a “powerful genius‟ is closely

watching her as she votes. The genius has the power to intervene in

her decision process so that she decides to vote for whoever the

genius wants elected. The genius will do nothing if Katie votes for

Mondale, but if she begins to vote for Reagan, then he will suddenly

interfere to insure that she votes for Mondale. Molina thinks that

contrary to the Banezians, our intuitions tell us that Katie is not free if

the genius interferes with her voting (Freddoso, 26-27).

Contingent Effects

The Molinist must define what is to count as a contingent

effect in order to be able to determine when free creatures are in fact

free. Because God is the undetermined first cause of everything, it

clearly will not work to claim that any effect is contingent if it has an

indeterministic cause somewhere in its history. For every effect has

God‟s action in its causal history and would therefore be free. Molina

thinks that if God is the only indeterministic cause then all

“contingency would be taken away from all the effects of secondary

causes and everything would have to happen by a kind of fatalistic

necessity” (Freddoso, 19). He thinks that for there to be actual

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freedom for free agents, secondary causes must be able to act

indeterministically. A contingent effect for humans or angels is

therefore defined by Molina as one whose causal ancestry includes at

least one indeterministic action by a secondary agent.

Shared views of divine Providence

Molina, Banez, and Edwards share some important beliefs

about the nature of divine providence. They all agree in defining

providence as the doctrine that God decrees everything that will

happen in the world. He plans the entire history of the world down to

the smallest details and then makes sure that everything occurs at its

correct time. Each action in the world is either intended by God or

permitted by him. When he permits a creature to do a defective thing,

then God uses this wrong act, for a good purpose (Freddoso, 3).

Molina and the Dominicans both held that God has 1) the

power to choose one out of the many possible worlds which he can

bring into existence, and 2) the ability to then will that the chosen

plan be causally brought about by his own causal action. (Freddoso,

4). Further, the Banezians and Molinists agree that God has

perfect knowledge of what will occur in the world because he is

provident. “More precisely, God‟s speculative postvolitional

knowledge of the created world--His so-called knowledge of vision--

is to he explained wholly by reference to (i) His prevolitional

knowledge and (ii) His knowledge of what He Himself has willed to

do” (Freddoso, 4). Because of this they hold that God does not

depend on causes external to him for his knowledge. Freddoso writes

that according to this view, God “as a being who is „pure actuality‟, ...

cannot depend causally on any other being for His perfections”

(Freddoso, 5).

This means that the Jesuits and Dominicans both agreed that

no contingent categorical truth is true prior to God‟s choosing a

certain possible world and willing it to be. This view of postvolitional

knowledge that is shared by the Molinists and Banezians shows that

“an adequate answer to the source-question must essentially appeal to

Gods active causal role in the created world and must eschew even

the faintest suggestion that God‟s knowledge of effects produced in

the created world is causally dependent on the activity of His

creatures” (Freddoso, 5).

Edwards, Banez, and Molina in that order have weaker views

of providence, from one perspective. Later we will see why Freddoso

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claims that Molina has a sufficiently strong view of providence.

Edwards has the strongest. He claims that God predestines everything

that is going to happen. This includes all the actions and choices of

secondary causes. Creatures have no autonomy. Domingo Banez has

a weaker view of providence than Edwards because he claims that

humans have a libertarian free will. They can autonomously choose

certain things, but Banez believes that they can only do what they will

if God concurs with them in the action. According to the Banezian

schema, in distinction from the Edwardian, God and created free

creatures act together, each as originating causes. Although creatures

cannot act without God‟s concurrence, God can also not act without

the creatures concurrence.

Molina goes beyond Banez by claiming that God does not

need to concur with free choices. Molina defines concurrence in a

different sense. Concurrence is simply God‟s choosing to create the

specific world that he does knowing that the free creatures in it will

do what he knows they will do.

The important idea of concurrence needs to be expounded to

explain some relevant distinctions that Molina makes. He thinks that

God is the indeterministic first cause of everything that occurs. All

creatures act as secondary causes who have this causal power only

because God continually conserves their causal power in existence.

(Freddoso, 16). The Molinists, being Aristotelians, believed that

human beings have authentic causal power. This was in opposition to

the occasionalists (like Edwards) who claimed that God alone had

causal power. Molinists make a distinction between primary and

secondary causes and, related to that, general and particular causes.

Freddoso explains:

When He thus cooperates with secondary causes, He acts as

a general or universal cause of the effect, and His causal

contribution is called His general concurrence or concourse

(con cursus generalis). The nomenclature is indicative of the

fact that in such a case the particular nature of the effect is

traceable not to God‟s causal contribution, necessary though

it is in order for any effect to be produced at all, but rather to

the natures and causal contributions of the relevant secondary

causes, which acts as particular causes of the effect”

(Freddoso, 17).

Medieval thinkers used the sun as an analogy to explain how God‟s

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general concurrence operates. The sun is the general cause of light--

and a calf being born is a result of the sun providing light and warmth

for (among other things) sufficient food to grow for the calf‟s parents.

The sun is needed for the particular causes in the world to bring about

the calls birth. The general cause of the calf is the sun, while the

particular causes are all the particular things contributing to bring the

calf about. in the same way God is the general cause of everything

that occurs but the particular causes are the various secondary causes

(among which are human actions) (Freddoso, 17).

The Molinists and Banezians both accept the idea that

secondary agents “make a unique and unduplicated causal

contribution” when they causally act (Freddoso, 18). And this causal

contribution exists only when it is contemporaneous with God‟s

positively acting with the secondary agent. The two factions disagree

on two aspects of the doctrine of general concurrence. First, the

Molinists think that God acts only on the effect and not on the

secondary agent, while the Banezians believe that God acts on the

effect only through his acting directly on the agent. The Banezian

believes that secondary agents can only act when God concurs with

the acting of the agent, while the Molinist thinks that the agent can act

without God‟s concurrence.

The second disagreement is over how to view the effects of

the human actions that God has concurred with. The Banezians

believe that God has two distinct ways of concurring with human

actions. On the one hand he can efficaciously concur with a certain

effect. This means that he will make sure that this effect comes about.

On the other hand, he can concur in a “sufficient” way--in which case

the concurrence is inefficacious with respect to any one desired event.

It is the secondary agent‟s fault when the concurrence is inefficacious,

because the agent did not choose to act with God. The Molinists claim

that God‟s concurrence is inherently neutral. It is not God who

decides whether his concurrence is efficacious or not, rather that is

left up to the secondary cause (Freddoso, 18). Why Molina claims this

will become clearer once his theory of middle knowledge is

understood.

Three rejected responses to the source question

Freddoso is unhappy with the popular view that the source

question is unimportant because it might be a “brute inexplicable fact

that God has foreknowledge” (Freddoso, 2). He decries this as a result

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of the ahistorical perception of the controversy. The pervasiveness of

this idea “is symptomatic of the surprising extent to which the lively

contemporary discussion of foreknowledge and freedom is detached

from the theological context within which perplexities about

foreknowledge and contingency have traditionally risen”(Freddoso,

2).

Molina thinks that three different accounts of foreknowledge

are the most plausible alternatives to his view. The first account is his

reading of the Thomistic view of eternity which involves the claim

that future contingents are now eternally present for God. The second

account of foreknowledge is the Banezian reading of Aquinas which

includes their rejection of the theory of middle knowledge. The final

account is based on the notion of „concomitant decrees‟. This theory

holds that God‟s decreeing and knowing of a future contingent are

simultaneous or concomitant with its obtaining. Freddoso shows what

Molina‟s reservations are about these answers to the source question.

Aquinas claims that God knows future contingents because

they exist before him in the eternal present (Freddoso, 30). All

moments of time in the created world, are on this view, present to

God at once. Even though a future contingent event C does not exist

at an earlier time T, since God has all of times present before him, it is

correct to believe that at T God has eternal knowledge of C. The point

is that although God does not know C at a temporal time T (because

then he would be in time), it is the case that at time T it is true that

God knows C. Aquinas‟ view seems to depend on some sort of

relationship between eternal and temporal time. The intuitions

supporting such a relationship come from the doctrine of divine

timelessness, according to which all temporal times exist at once

before God.

Freddoso points out that the „Aristotelian Scholastics‟ all

agree that God exists in eternity and not everlasting time. Because

God is pure actuality he “does not have potentialities that need time in

order to be actualized (Freddoso, 31). Further, they try to explain

God‟s eternity by an analogy with His omnipresence. This latter was

taken to mean that God is present at every place that exists. He is not

present at some places and not others because he is equally present in

every place to which he gives existence. In the same way, God is

eternally present to every temporal moment. He is not bound to time

and is never present at one temporal time in distinction from others.

Therefore, Aquinas concluded that at any one time, God has

foreknowledge of what happens at all times. Molina criticizes this

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claim because he thinks it depends on an equivocation on the word

„now‟.

He thinks it wrong to draw the conclusion that since God is

eternal, all temporal moments „now‟ exist. Molina objects to the idea

that at a present time God has eternal knowledge of future

contingents. For when we say that God „now‟ has eternal knowledge

we are seduced into thinking that at this present moment God has

knowledge of future contingents--i.e. that God knows future

contingents in the temporal present. Molina only allows that God has

knowledge in the eternal present (Freddoso, 33).

Aquinas would most likely respond that he is not claiming

that God exists in the temporal present. Instead, he is claiming that

because God is in the eternal present it is plausible to infer that each

temporal time is always before God. Hence, one can truthfully say

that at any temporal present time Clod knows all things. Molina is

trying to gain more ground philosophically with this argument than he

can. He wants to draw the conclusion that eternal knowledge of future

contingents do not affect his theories. But he has not given an

argument for that.

Molina has a deeper criticism. As we shall see, Molina thinks

that God‟s knowledge of future contingents comes from his middle

knowledge. He thinks that God‟s knowledge of future conditioned

conditionals originates in his middle knowledge while his knowledge

of absolute future contingents originates from his knowledge of what

he has willed to do, or his free knowledge. Because of this “the

presence of things in eternity is wholly irrelevant to the question of

how a perfectly provident being comes to know absolute future

contingents” (351).

Edwards would probably respond that although eternal

knowledge might not be the cause of God knowing the absolute future

contingents that he does, yet they might still show their necessity.

Molina also thinks that the “perceptual metaphors” of the

standard interpretation lead to a problematic conceptual sequence. For

according to this view it seems that “A future contingent effect is first

there to be seen by God; then it is in fact seen and known by God; and

only then is it specifically decreed, that is, willed or permitted by

Him, depending on whether or not He approves of what He sees”

(Freddoso, 35-36). But this view of providence differs from Molina‟s

view that “a perfectly provident being knows each absolute future

contingent in, and not before, His specifically willing or permitting

it” (Freddoso, 35).

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The second alternative answer to the source question that

Freddoso discusses is Banezianism, While Molina begins his theory

focusing on human freedom, as Freddoso states, the Banezians have

another approach:

Whereas Molina starts „from below‟ with creaturely freedom,

Banezians begin „from above‟ by stressing that God is

sovereign and the source of all goodness. Because God is

sovereign, they claim, no metaphysically contingent state of

affairs, not even a conditional future contingent, can obtain

without His antecedent approbation or permission (Freddoso,

36-37).

They claim that all goodness comes from God alone. No secondary

cause can originate any true goodness. It follows that God can know

both good and bad future contingent effects. He knows the good

because He knows that He will efficaciously concur with the

secondary agent to produce goodness, while He knows future evil

contingents because He knows that He will not efficaciously concur

(Freddoso, 37). Their answer to the source question is that God has

foreknowledge of conditional future contingents because he knows

which ones he will concur with efficaciously and which he will not.

The final alternative to Molinism is what Freddoso calls the

“concomitance theory‟ (Freddoso, 43). This theory comes from a

combination of two presuppositions, one of which is Molinist, while

the other is Banezian. According to this theory; l) God‟s decreeing

some contingent event as future, 2) his knowing it as future, and 3) its

obtaining are all things that occur simultaneously . They are

concomitant. (Freddoso, 43) The Molinist presupposition

“undergirding” this is that a contingent effect has “metaphysical

certitude” only after it is actually produced. The Banezian

presupposition is that a contingent effect can not have “epistemic-

certitude” until it has metaphysical certitude” (Freddoso, 43). This

last presupposition explicitly contradicts Molina‟s view of middle

knowledge. For his theory of middle knowledge claims that God can

have epistemic certitude prior to metaphysical certitude.

Concomitance theorists claim that as a future contingent

occurs, God at that moment makes it the case that he has always

known that that event would occur. So those theorists who believe

that God has eternal knowledge will say that „as (and not before)

contingent effects occur in time, God concomitantly causes it to he

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the case that He eternally knows and decrees them”(Freddoso, 44).

Therefore, they can be taken to deny “that God antecedently plots out

in detail the whole history of the world, complete with all its

contingent effects”([44]). Before contingent effects occur God can

only know all the possible things that will happen in the world--but

not what will in fact occur.

Molina has three objections to this view. First, he points out

that it has a weak view of providence because God‟s knowledge of

future contingents is not based on his knowledge of possible worlds

and his creatures intentions. Rather than God providing for future

contingents, He literally reacts to them as to effects brought about

independently of His specific approval or permission” (Freddoso, 45).

God is not according to the concomitance theory bringing about His

foreknown future contingents, instead He is reacting to the secondary

causes that operate independently of Him in such a way that He then

makes them something He has always known.

Secondly, the Molinist objects that since the concomitance

theory cannot explain how God might have knowledge of conditional

future contingents, concomitance theorists seem forced to deny that

He knows them. Because they do not believe in either middle

knowledge or anterior decrees they have no grounds for claiming that

God has knowledge of conditional future contingents (Freddoso, 45).

Freddoso claims that Molina‟s third objection to the

concomitance theory is the most original. According to their theory

God must have control over and the ability to change not only soft

facts about the past, but also hard facts. The example that Freddoso

uses is of Jesus prophesying that Peter will deny him three times. The

concomitance theorist will claim that in the case of the prophecy of

Jesus, if we say that at an earlier time T1 Jesus makes the prophecy,

then at a later time T2, if the prophecy is not fulfilled, then at T2 God

makes it the case that at T1 Jesus did not make the prophecy that He

did. So we have a situation where a hard fact about the past, namely

the prophecy of Jesus, is now no longer a fact about the past. The

problem with this for Molina is that Jesus prophecy was a hard fact

and even the concomitance theorists do not believe that hard facts can

be changed (Freddoso, 46).

Middle Knowledge

Molina‟s answer to the source question is his theory of

middle knowledge. According to this theory God can have knowledge

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of the truth value of conditional future contingents. This is

prevolitional knowledge that Molina thought exists in a certain sense

„between‟ God‟s natural knowledge and his free knowledge. Natural

knowledge is God‟s knowledge of necessary truths. It involves his

knowledge of what is metaphysically necessary, metaphysically

contingent, and metaphysically impossible in every possible world.

When God is in a creation situation (deciding what world to create)

His natural knowledge tells Him what any world that He created

necessarily would or would not have and what would be contingent in

that world.

Free knowledge is God‟s knowledge of the things that he has

decreed. When God decides which world that He is going to

actualize, and wills that that world be actualized, then He knows from

His decrees what the actual world will be like, and this is called

God‟s free knowledge‟. Natural knowledge is prevolitional because it

exists in the mind of God prior to any decision to actualize any

specific world while free knowledge is postvolitional knowledge

because it comes from his decrees.

Middle knowledge is distinct from natural and free

knowledge because it is God‟s prevolitional knowledge of what free

creatures would choose to do in any possible situation that they might

be in. In the creation situation God can know, claims Molina, what

any free creature will do in any possible situation that God

providentially puts them in. Because of this God can

providentially plan to put creatures into situations where he knows

what they will choose and thereby put them in situations where they

will choose certain things that will bring about the events that God

wants to take place. God by comprehending what humans would do

in any possible situation can therefore actualize the world in which

what he wants to obtain will obtain. Freddoso says that--

[Gods] natural knowledge tells Him only what each in

deterministic secondary cause is able to do, not what it would

in fact do....So, according to Molina, if there is genuine causal

indeterminism in the created world, God can be provident in

the way demanded by orthodoxy only if His prevolitional

knowledge includes an understanding of which effects would

in fact result from causal claims involving indeterministic

created causes. (Freddoso, 23)

The point is that the only way that God can be providential, given free

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creatures, is if he can know what they would do in any counterfactual

situation. In contemporary philosophical jargon, the infinite

conditional future conditionals that God has knowledge of are called

„counterfactuals of freedom‟.

Molina differentiates between three kinds of future

contingents. Conditional future contingents are prevolitionial future

contingents that are known by middle knowledge. They are distinct

from absolute and conditioned future contingents which are

postvolitional. Absolute future contingents are those conditional

future contingents that God has decreed will obtain in the actual

world by instantiating the antecedent of the relevant counterfactuals,

while conditioned future contingents are those that will not obtain,

because their antecedents have not been decreed ([22]).

The antecedent of a conditional future contingent

(counterfactual of freedom) has the form; „if God were to put a free

creature P into a certain situation X‟. The consequent has the form;

„then P would freely choose to do some action M‟. According to the

Molinist, God will know what every free creature will do in every

possible situation that God might put him or her in. Molina thought

that „If David were to remain in Keilah, Saul would freely besiege the

city‟ was a biblical example of a true counterfactual of freedom and

that the counterfactual of freedom „If David were to remain in Keilah,

Saul would not freely choose to besiege the city‟ is therefore false.

Supercomprehension

How is it that God can have middle knowledge? According

to the Molinists, there must be „positive‟ conditional future

contingents that God knows. Freddoso points out that the Banezians

do not have a problem explaining how God might know positive

conditional future contingents, because they claim that God simply

wills that the counterfactuals of freedom obtain. For them positive

conditional future contingents cannot exist in God‟s prevolitional

knowledge. This avenue is not open to Molina. Instead he appeals

“simply to God‟s cognitive perfection and to the depth of His

prevolitional grasp of all possible creatures” (Freddoso, 51).

Later Molinists claimed that God needs

„supercomprehension‟ to be able to know conditional future

contingents. This word is derived from the theological use of the term

„comprehension‟. For example, Molina defined God‟s comprehension

in terms of his natural knowledge. It involves “grasping the

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metaphysical modality of every state of affairs involving” a certain

entity (Freddoso, 51). Since middle knowledge requires more than

„comprehension‟ later Molinists referred to God‟s ability to know

positive conditional future contingents as an act of

„supercomprehension‟. Supercomprehension involves the ability to be

epistemically certain of events that do not yet have metaphysical

certitude (Freddoso, 52). Counterfactuals of freedom are

epistemically certain because they correspond to objectively existing

conditional facts. Molina thinks that humans (like God) can have a

good idea of how they would freely act in certain hypothetical

situations (Freddoso, 52). But divine knowledge of conditional future

contingents differs from human knowledge in that God‟s knowledge

is infallible and certain (Freddoso, 52).

An adequate view of Providence?

Freddoso argues that Molina‟s theory leaves enough room for

providence. He gives five reasons for why the theory of middle

knowledge supports a sufficient view of providence. First, God

chooses what world, if any, to create. Second, Molina claims that no

secondary cause can produce any effect without God‟s concurrence.

Third, according to this view a free creature needs assistance from

God to do good actions. For God must give grace to the creature for it

to be able to do a good act, although Molina admits this grace is not

in itself efficacious or deterministic. It is the situation that the creature

is placed in that makes it efficacious. Fourth, God is in control of evil

because no evil can come into existence unless he permits it. The final

reason that Freddoso gives for Molina having a strong view of

providence is that according to his view “Molina can still consistently

hold that God‟s providential act of will is absolutely comprehensive‟

(Freddoso, 50). Molina thinks that God‟s providence is “absolutely

comprehensive‟ because God decrees not only which possible world

is actualized, but also what he would decree in whatever possible

creation situation he might find himself in. Molina believes this to be

the strongest view of providence that is compatible with libertarian

freedom (Freddoso, 50).

Creation Situations

An important concept for Molina is the idea of a creation

situation. By this is meant the situation that God is in when he is

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„thinking about‟ creating a possible world. All of God‟s prevolitional

knowledge will exist in this creation situation. The Banezians claim

that the only prevolitional knowledge that God has in the creation

situation is his natural knowledge. Molina on the other hand thinks

that God by his middle knowledge can also know all of the future

contingents in every possible world. Freddoso describing the creation

situation states:

Creation situations constitute the antecedently fixed

frameworks within which God operates as a cause. So, as

intimated above, God has no control over the states of affairs

that belong to the creation situation He finds Himself in.

What He does have control over is each state of affairs that is

such that neither it nor its complement is a member of that

creation situation (Freddoso, 48).

Freddoso divides up the possible worlds known by middle

knowledge into possible worlds and galaxies. A galaxy is a set of

possible worlds that share the same counterfactuals of freedom.

According to Freddoso, “each possible world belongs to at most one

galaxy. What‟s more, it follows from what was said above that each

possible world belongs to at least one galaxy” (Freddoso, 49).

Part II: The Reconciliation Question

Freddoso says that the strong doctrine of providence

accepted by the Molinists has two consequences for the

reconciliation-question. First, an answer to the reconciliation-question

involves two things: 1) an understanding of simple precognition, and

2) an understanding of how contingency and freedom can be

reconciled with God‟s knowledge originating in his providential

decrees (Freddoso, 5).

The second consequence is that if one does not respect the

role that providence plays in foreknowledge then one will be led to

simplistic solutions that do not take providence seriously and because

of this attempt to answer the reconciliation-question in terms of

foreknowledge alone. Freddoso mentions three different ways in

which he thinks that this is done. First, certain Ockhamists claim that

creatures cause God to have the beliefs that He does and that they can

cause Him to have always had beliefs about the future other than what

He has (Freddoso, 6). This solution is incompatible with God‟s

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providential decrees being the sole origin of his knowledge. The

second problematic solution is “Thomistic” and says that God has

perceptual knowledge without “spatial or temporal limitations” of

future contingents (Freddoso, 6). Freddoso states that “this solution

apparently entails that God acquires His knowledge of vision from

created things themselves and thus that true future contingents have

their truth conceptually, if not temporally, prior to God intending or

permitting them to be true” (Freddoso, 6).

The third response that Freddoso finds problematic is the

view that God has no knowledge of future contingents. These three

alleged solutions should be rejected because they are contrary to

scripture and tradition. “Molina, like St. Thomas before him, would

undoubtedly respond in the first place that the theological authority of

Scripture and Tradition, along with sound philosophical scrutiny of

the notion of a perfect being, militates forcefully against any such

move” (Freddoso, 7). The strength and genius of Molina‟s work in

Freddoso‟s eyes, is that he retains the traditional view of providence

while employing a strong idea of freedom and contingency

(Freddoso, 7).

Molina attempts to reconcile foreknowledge with freedom.

Freddoso states that there is a “traditional maxim according to which

it is not the case that a contingent effect S will obtain because God

foreknows that S will obtain, but rather God foreknows that S will

obtain because S will in fact obtain” (Freddoso, 53). This is a maxim

that any orthodox answer to the reconciliation question must satisfy.

Molina claims that his theory of middle knowledge supports the

maxim (Freddoso, 53).

Freddoso argues that both parts of this maxim are

corroborated by the Molinist perspective. The first half says that the

event will not occur because God has foreknowledge of it. On the

Molinist scheme God‟s foreknowledge comes from His middle

knowledge of what the free creature will choose to do freely in the

situation. So His foreknowledge in no way is the originating cause of

the event (Freddoso, 53).

The second half of the maxim claims that “God‟s knowledge

that S will obtain depends on the fact that S obtains”. Molina‟s

explanation of how this happens involves pointing out that the event

will occur because God has decreed one specific possible world. And

this world is one that He chose because he saw by his infallible

knowledge what would happen in that world. God‟s infallible and

perfect supercomprehension allowed Him to see how the free

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creatures would act in that world--so the answer to the question “Why

does this event occur?” is that it will occur because the relevant

counterfactual of freedom is true and God chooses to make the

antecedent true (Freddoso, 54). Now if we use Peter denying Christ

as the example of a conditional future contingent, as Freddoso does,

then we see that Peter is not the cause of God having the knowledge

He does. God had the middle knowledge of what Peter would do,

long before he existed. Freddoso states:

So God freely knows that Peter will sin because it is already

true by divine decree that Peter will sin, just as God freely

knows that a given necessary effect will obtain because it is

already true by divine decree that it will obtain. And it is in

this sense--and this sense alone--that God knows by His free

knowledge that S will obtain because S will in fact obtain

(Freddoso, 54).

The actual free creature is not the cause of God having the middle

knowledge that He does. It was the possible free creature known by

supercomprehension together with God‟s free knowledge of which

available world He will instantiate that provided God with His

foreknowledge.

The Incompatibility Argument

The reconciliation question must be answered by showing

what is problematic about the incompatibility argument. Freddoso

presents what is generally acknowledged to be the most powerful

argument for the incompatibility of divine foreknowledge and human

freedom (Freddoso, 55). This argument includes premises having to

do with accidental necessity. The first is an attempt to define what

accidental necessity is:

(A) p is accidentally necessary at t if and only if (i) p is

metaphysically contingent and (ii) p is true at t and at every

moment after t in every possible world that shares the same

history with our world at t (Freddoso, 55).

Freddoso states that: “From (A) it follows directly that this necessity

is closed under entailment for metaphysically contingent

propositions:” (Freddoso, 55). „(B)‟ is a formulation of this intuition:

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(B) if (i) p entails q and (ii) q is metaphysically contingent

and (iii) p is accidentally necessary at t, then q is accidentally

necessary at t (Freddoso, 55).

The idea is that if an accidentally necessary event p entails a

contingent event q, then it must be the case that q is also accidentally

necessary. „(C)‟ states that if a proposition is accidentally necessary,

then it is now at a later time too late for any agent to he able to make

the proposition false:

(C) If p is accidentally necessary at t, then no agent has the

power at or after t to contribute causally to p‟s not being true

(Freddoso, 55).

The fourth premise “gives a sufficient condition for a propositions

being accidentally necessary” (Freddoso, 55):

(D) If p is true at t, then the proposition Pp is accidentally

necessary at every moment after t (Freddoso, 55).

The point made here is that if a proposition is ever true at one time, it

is necessarily true at all later times (Freddoso, 55). Freddoso then

formalizes the incompatibility argument using the example of Peter

sinning:

(1) The proposition God foreknows, infallibly and with

certainty, that Peter will sin at T is now true. [assumption]

(2) So at every future moment the proposition God foreknew,

infallibly and with certainty, that Peter would sin at T will be

accidentally necessary. [(1) and (D)]

(3) But the proposition God foreknew, infallibly and with

certainty, that Peter would sin at T entails the metaphysically

contingent proposition If T is present, Peter is sinning.

[assumption]

(4) So at every future moment the proposition If T is present,

Peter is sinning will be accidentally necessary. [(2), (3) and

(B)]

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Therefore, no agent will have the power at any future moment

to contribute causally to its being the case that the proposition

If T is present, Peter is sinning is not true. That is, no agent

(Peter, God) will have the power at any future moment to

make it true that Peter is not sinning when T is present. [(4)

and (C)] (Freddoso, 56).

Three Types of Necessity

Three different types of necessity play a role in Molina‟s

argument--metaphysical, temporal, and causal. Metaphysical

necessity is the strongest. Only those things are metaphysically

necessary that are absolutely necessary in every possible world.

God‟s knowledge of what is metaphysically necessary is called his

„natural knowledge‟. This is because every possible world will

automatically possess whatever characteristics are metaphysically

necessary and will not possess any characteristic that is

metaphysically impossible. God‟s prevolitional knowledge includes

his natural knowledge. But he can only know metaphysically

contingent events with postvolitional knowledge because anything

that is metaphysically contingent can only he known to be true once

God has willed it to be by willing a possible world (Freddoso, 12).

Temporal necessity has to do with the passing of time.

Things are temporally necessary when contingent events are

necessary because they are part of the past history of the world. For

example, if Susannah played baseball at an earlier time T, it is at a

later time T* necessary that at time T she did play baseball. Freddoso

points out that it is temporally necessary that Susannah played

baseball, even if at the time by supposition she freely decided to play

the game (Freddoso, 11).

Freddoso says that to understand Molina‟s view of causal

necessity it is necessary to understand the metaphysical framework

that medieval Aristotelians” use to approach such problems

(Freddoso, 14). They thought that the world was „a dynamic system

of interacting substances endowed by nature with causal powers,

dispositions, and inclinations‟ (Freddoso, 14). A substance‟s nature

provides it with different active and passive causal abilities.

Substances act upon each other to create certain affects. If one sets a

kettle of water over a flame, then that will bring about the effect of

the water boiling. Freddoso states that “The system is dynamic

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because the various substances are poised to make characteristic

causal contributions in the appropriate circumstances unless they are

in some way impeded or prevented from doing so” (Freddoso, 15).

Freddoso writes of “deterministic causation‟ by which he

means the state of affairs where a certain effect comes about as a

result of the cause‟s characteristic activity. For example, the water

will be caused to boil if it is kept over the flames in the appropriate

situation. Freddoso defines a “deterministic natural tendency” to be

“an all-things-considered deterministic propensity on the part of the

world towards [a] given state of affairs S at a given time T, a

propensity that, if left unimpeded by indeterministic causes, issues

forth in S‟s obtaining at T by a necessity of nature” (Freddoso, 15).

On the other hand, something is naturally contingent only if it occurs

at a time T by an „indeterministic cause,” an example of which would

he a free choice (Freddoso, 16).

Three Responses to Incompatibility Argument

The Molinist disagrees with three standard responses to the

incompatibility argument. First, they will disagree with the

Aristotelian response which is to claim that if the future sinning of

Peter truly is contingent then God cannot infallibly know that it will

occur. Molina finds this problematic “because he believes that future

contingent propositions are true from eternity by divine decree and

hence can be known from eternity by God as future” (Freddoso, 57).

Freddoso calls a second way of responding to the

incompatibility argument the Geachian response‟. According to this

view line (3) in the incompatibility argument is false because it claims

that Peter will certainly sin. Instead, the Geachian responder will

claim that the proposition “God foreknew, infallibly and with

certainty, that Peter will sin at T entails only that the world was at

one time tending toward Peter‟s sinning at T” (Freddoso, 57). He or

she will claim that this tendency can change by being impeded or

reversed. The problem with this response is that it entails that God

simply does not have comprehensive knowledge” of conditional

future contingents, which Molina clearly disagrees with (Freddoso,

57).

The third response to the incompatibility argument that

Molina disagrees with is the Ockhamist response. The Ockhamist

rejects (1) and (2) because they depend on (D) which does not

sufficiently distinguish, they claim, between hard and soft facts about

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the past. They claim that hard facts involve the “real‟ history of the

world” while soft facts are those facts in the past that are “still under

God‟s control” (Freddoso, 57). The Ockhamist believes that God at

later times can still change soft facts about the past. Molina disputes

this position because he thinks that no proposition that is a part of the

history of the world and was true at one point can later become false

and no longer part of history. Not even God can change the past, he

thinks (Freddoso, 57).

Molina’s Response

Molina‟s response to the incompatibility argument might be

astonishing at first glance, says Freddoso. Molina denies that „(B)‟ is

correct, which states that „accidental necessity is closed under

entailment” (Freddoso, 58). Molina explains what it means that

accidental necessity is not closed under entailment:

Even if (i) the conditional is necessary (because.. these two

things cannot both obtain, namely, that God foreknows

something to he future and that the thing does not turn out

that way), and even if (ii) the antecedent is necessary in the

sense in question (because it is past-tense and because no

shadow of alteration can befall God), nonetheless the

consequent can be purely contingent (Fredddoso, 58).

Freddoso says that since (B) follows from (A), (A) must be rejected.

But let us look at the reasoning behind Molina denying that accidental

necessity is closed under entailment, This is Freddoso‟s way of

justifying the move:

If God knew from eternity that Peter would deny Christ at T,

then no agent can now cause it to be true that God never

knew this. But if God‟s past foreknowledge is thus

accidentally necessary and entails that Peter will sin at T, and

if, in addition, Peter‟s action will satisfy the causal conditions

necessary for it to be free, then accidental necessity must not

be closed under entailment. Since this conclusions conflicts

with (A), it must be the case that (A) does not correctly

capture the necessity of the past (Freddoso, 58).

In the light of this criticism Freddoso comes up with (A*):

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(A*) p is accidentally necessary at t if and only if (i) p is

metaphysically contingent and (ii) p is true at t and (iii) for

any possible world w such that w shares the same causal

history with our world at t, no agent has the power at or after t

in w to contribute causally to p‟s not being true (Freddoso,

59).

Molina claims that the past cannot be changed and hence a

future human action cannot change a belief that God earlier had.

Humans cannot bring it about that God believed something other than

what he did. So before a certain time T it is false that „Peter now has

the power to contribute causally to its being false that God foreknew

that Peter will sin at T” (Freddoso, 60). But it is true that “Peter now

has the power to contribute causally to its being false that he sins

when T is present” (Freddoso, 60). Hence (A*) does not imply that

accidental necessity is not closed under entailment. The point is that

Peter causally can contribute to his free action but he cannot causally

contribute to God believing something else. For the past belief of God

cannot be changed.

Freddoso does not think that the prophetic utterance of Christ

that Peter will deny him “make Peter‟s denial at T a necessity of

nature; nor is it a contemporaneous cause of Peter‟s sin” (Freddoso,

61). Therefore, Freddoso claims that even though Christ‟s uttering of

the prophecy is accidentally necessary before T, “Peter‟s denial

satisfies the causal preconditions for free action” (Freddoso, 61).

Freddoso closes by wondering whether (A*) is plausible as a

substitute for (A). He thinks that

[O]ur preanalytic intuitions are not, I believe, subtle enough

to yield a clear and definitive answer. So the choice between

(A) and (A*) in the final analysis must be made on systematic

grounds. But that puts Molinism in a relatively favourable

position, since the theory of middle knowledge is a tool of

immense philosophical and theological power (Freddoso,

61).

One thing that lessens the plausibility of denying that

accidental necessity is closed under entailment is divine timelessness.

Even if we suppose with the Molinist that foreknowledge is not the

cause of the contingent event, it may show it to be necessary. This is

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the claim that Edwards makes in reply to Whitby. It might be that

even though the Molinist assumes that free choices are not necessary,

their belief that God has eternal fixed knowledge implies that they are

necessary. Every event that God has knowledge of will necessarily

happen because if it did not happen, he would not have had certain

foreknowledge of it. So it seems impossible that the events which

God foreknows that the free creatures in the Molinist paradigm will

choose can be events that do not come about. But to say that

something is impossible is to say that it is necessary. It is true that the

necessity that is argued for here did not come from an analysis of how

the will is causally necessitated. In fact an argument has not been

given for how this might occur. But as Edwards would claim, the

argument shows the necessity of the free choices nevertheless.

The central problem with denying that accidental necessity is

closed under entailment is that there seems to be no positive reason to

think that such might be the case. No plausible reason can be given in

support of this, in fact our common intuitions seem to tell us that if all

other necessities are closed under entailment, it would be queer if

accidental necessity was not. Therefore, Molina‟s response appears to

be ad hoc.

Part III: Theological Objections to Molinism

Freddoso considers four theological and three philosophical

objections to Molinism. He wants to show that the Molinist can give

plausible responses to these objections. He states that he hopes “to

show at least that none of the objections is decisive as it stands and to

indicate promising lines of defense‟ for Molinist defenders (Freddoso,

62).

The first theological objection to be considered has been

given by Anthony Kenny. He claims that there is insufficient Biblical

proof for the view that God knows conditional future contingents. For

example, he argues that Jesus‟ statement about Tyre and Sidon is

rhetorical. Jesus said that if the acts that he had done in Chorazin and

Bethsaida had been done in Tyre and Sidon the people would have

repented. Because of this the citizens of Chorazin and Bethsaida

would be judged more severely. Kenny thinks that Jesus was doing

nothing but drawing conclusions from his knowledge of the character

and dispositions of the people in Tyre and Sidon. He takes Jesus to be

making a purely rhetorical claim. Three biblical passages were used

by Molina to defend middle knowledge. Kenny discussing them says:

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It would commonly be thought nowadays by theologians that

the biblical texts quoted by Molina do not prove his case. The

passage about Tyre and Sidon is clearly rhetorical. The

knowledge of what people would have done if they had not

died, as attributed to God by the Wisdom of Solomon, is no

more than a knowledge of their characters and dispositions

when alive. The oracle consluted by David, the ephod, had

only two sides to it, probably marked yes and „no. Such an

apparatus would be incapable of marking the difference

between knowledge of counterfactuals and knowledge of the

truth-value of material implications. Since the antecedent of

David‟s questions was false, the same answers would have

been appropriate in each case (Kenny, 64).

Freddoso admits that it is a rhetorical claim but believes that it is also

more than that (Freddoso, 63). Nevertheless, if the Molinist is

dependent on these passages for the theory of middle knowledge,

there will be trouble. But the main strength of the Molinist position

comes from other positive aspects of it, for example, its explanatory

power, as Freddoso suggests.

Secondly, the Banezians object that since the Molinists hold

that Gods general concurrence is neutral, “God is related in exactly

the same way to both good and evil free actions” (Freddoso, 64). The

general grace that God gives is nondetermining and will therefore

result in both good and evil actions. The Banezians claim that this

leads to the view that just as God is the cause of good, he is also the

cause of evil. And the Molinist cannot deny that God is the cause of

evil without also denying the symmetrical claim that he is the cause

of good (Freddoso, 64). Molina responds to this objection by claiming

that grace is particular. But it is not efficacious. He describes grace as

being something that inclines the agent to good. This tendency is non-

determining and is a partial cause of the good event occurring. The

Molinist scheme can be viewed as asymetrical in the sense that God

inclines secondary agents to good, while those who do evil do so in

spite of God‟s influence. So God is not the cause of evil in the same

sense as he is of good (Freddoso, 64-65).

This shows that the Molinist position depends on intuitions

that support the idea that grace is inherently inefficacious. Various

theological traditions have defended the reasonableness of the

Molinist reply. Of course, the Molinist claims that grace is efficacious

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in certain circumstances, viz, in those circumstances in which God

knows by his middle knowledge that it will work. But this involves

classifying the situations that God decrees you to be in as grace. So

the Molinist does believe in the efficacy of grace but only in a limited

sense.

The modern Banezian, Reginal Garrigon-Lagrange, gives a

third objection. He claims that Christianity supports the “principle of

predilection‟, according to which „no one would be better than

another unless he were loved more and helped more by God‟

(Freddoso, 65). Unfortunately the Molinist theory leaves open the

possibility that two people could receive an equal quantity of grace,

but because of their differing situations, the one might do good, while

the other will not. This is because one person might be in situations

where he was tempted very much, so more grace would needed to

overcome the temptation, while the other person was presented with a

weak temptation, and the grace given him or her would be sufficient

to overcome the temptation. However, the Molinist can respond to

this that even if God gives the same amount of inclining towards

good‟ grace to two people--yet he can at the same time give more

grace to one of them overall by putting one in better situations than

the other i.e. into situations where good is more easily done. This

means that the definition of grace is broadened to also include God‟s

putting a person in a good situation. For example, God‟s choosing

Peter to have the life he does comes from His love for him while

Judas‟ life situation is a result of less grace on God‟s part. (Freddoso,

65) Therefore, the Molinist does have a plausible response to this

objection.

The final theological objection to Molinism that Freddoso

considers is that it entails that God is in some way dependent on

creatures. Because he knows by his middle knowledge what

conditional future contingents will obtain, it seems that he is

dependent on free creatures for his knowledge of what they will do

(Freddoso, 66). For he has to look at their autonomously and freely

functioning minds and conclude what they would do in certain

situations. This passivity in Gods knowledge is an imperfection. God

according to this view does not determine which future contingents

will obtain. He is instead passively affected by the secondary agents

of whom he has middle knowledge (Freddoso, 67).

Freddoso thinks that this argument does not have much force

coming from Banezians or other defenders of natural knowledge. For

they see no inconsistency in God‟s being the “sovereign “first

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determining Being” and yet (apparently) passively receiving his

knowledge of what is metaphysically necessary in every possible

world (Freddoso, 67). If this is not a problem for the Banezians, then

it is also not a problem for the Molinists that middle knowledge has

an ontological status (whatever it might be) that is similar to natural

knowledge (Freddoso, 67). For Molina denies that God gets his

foreknowledge from actual created free creatures. Middlle knowledge

is God‟s knowledge of counterfactuals of freedom.

Part IV: Philosophical Objections

The first philosophical objection Freddoso presents is the

Banezian objection that God cannot know conditional future

conditionals until He has willed them. The Molinist claim that by

middle knowledge God has supercomprehension of conditional future

contingents before he has decided whether or not to will a possible

world. The problem rests on the nature of supercomprehension. Many

thinkers find this concept problematic because it can not be

understood very well. The vagueness of how super-comprehension

works against it.

Furthermore, Robert Adams gives a „sophisticated argument‟

against middle knowledge claiming that “adequate metaphysical

grounds” are needed for the truth of propositions allegedly known by

supercomprehension (Freddoso, 69). Adams does not think that a

strong view of libertarianism is compatible with there being adequate

metaphysical grounds for the truth of the propositions about

creaturely free choices that God allegedly knows at the time He

allegedly knows them. And this means that there cannot be true

conditional future contingents” (Freddoso, 69).

Freddoso admits that the intuitions that Adams appeals to

have considerable intuitive appeal” (Freddoso, 70). Edwards has also

used this line of argumentation in claiming that events must have

metaphysical certitude to provide epistemic certititude. Adams is

doing something related to this, but weaker. For he is not claiming

that epistemic certitude depends on metaphysical certitude. He makes

the weaker claim that epistemic certitude is dependent on “adequate

metaphysical grounds” (whatever these might be). Freddoso notes

that Alvin Plantinga too has pointed out that what provides “adequate

metaphysical grounding” is far from clear (Freddoso, 69). We will

return to this objection in discussing the claim that conditional future

contingents are unknowable.

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In the final two philosophical objections that Freddoso

discusses, he presents two objections that “try to show that Molinism

suffers from irremediable defects even if it is granted that there are

true conditional future contingent propositions” (Freddoso, 75). The

first of these is William Hasker‟s claim that an argument can be made

against Molinism based on its denial that created agents bring about

the truth of conditional future contingents. The Molinist claims that

God‟s knowledge of conditional future contingents exists before the

creaturely agents do. But if so, they do not play a role in determining

the truth of the proposition. Since the conditional and the antecedent

entail that an agent will do so and so, and since he or she has no

control over the antecedent and the conditional (i.e. they don‟t make

them true) they aren‟t free. Hasker claims that this contradicts the

important libertarian tenet that creatures are free only if they have the

power to choose what they will or will not do. Since actual free

creatures don‟t make the counterfactuals true but only conceptually

existing ones do, the latter may be free, but the former are not. By

„conceptually existing free creatures‟ I mean the possible free

creatures which God can instantiate and which are part of his natural

and middle knowledge.

Hasker claims that creatures need to be able to make

conditional future contingents true in order to be free. He states that

principle „Z‟ proves this:

(Z) If (i) agent A has the power to bring it about that p is true

and (ii) p entails q and (iii) q is false, then A has the power to

bring it about that q is true (Freddoso, 76).

Hence if Peter has the power not to deny Christ in some situation e,

then, since “Peter does not deny Christ in e” entails “If Peter were in

e, he would not deny Christ”, Peter has the power to bring about the

truth of the counterfactual.

Freddoso replies “that Hasker is taking the phrase „bring it

about that p is true‟ to be equivalent to „cause p to be true‟ or, better,

„causally contribute to p‟s being true,‟ (Freddoso, 77). The point is

that while (existing) creatures have the power to act in such a way

that if they were to act in that way the counterfactuals of freedom

would be different from what they in fact are, this kind of

counterfactual dependence does not involve causal dependence.

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Freddoso claims that the ability of free creatures to act in such a way

that a counterfactual of freedom would be false is not a causal

dependency. Instead, such an action would mean that God would

never have believed that counterfactual of freedom.

The Molinist might also respond that the created creature is

the one that causally contributes to an event p occurring, but that the

conceptual creature brought it about that God knew what conditional

future contingent would occur in the situation where p occurred.

Behind Hasker‟s objection must lurk a mistrust of the Molinist

conception of what a conceptual created creature is. To what extent

can that thing be related and identified with the actually created

creature?

The force of this objection comes from the intuition that by

God‟s middle knowledge he knows the truth value of a counterfactual

of freedom. Now if it is true, then God knows that the agent will

make it true because he sees this by his supercomprehension. But if

God sees with his supercomprehension that if the agent is put into the

situation in question that then the counterfactual of freedom will be

true, then it is impossible that when God actually creates the agent

and actualizes the situation the person has an ability to choose to do

otherwise than what God supercomprehended. Hence the person is

not free.

The Molinist reacts to this by being vague about what

happens during supercomprehension. They will claim that God does

not know that the person when actually created will necessarily

choose to do the action that was supercomprehended. For if he or she

necessarily chooses then there is no freedom. But this claim is

question begging.

Conditional Future Contingents must be Knowable

The final objection Freddoso considers is that it might seem

that even if conditional future contingents are true they are

intrinsically unknowable. The objection claims that the Molinist must

not only show that there are true future propositions, but also that they

are knowable (Freddoso, 78). Freddoso states that Suarez, a

contemporary of Molina, responded to this objection by claiming that

if a proposition is true, it is by definition intelligible which is the

same as saying that it is knowable (Freddoso, 78). However, as

Freddoso points out, Suarez‟s view can be criticized by drawing an

analogy between omnipotence and omniscience. In studying the

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attribute of omnipotence one „must distinguish what can obtain from

what can be caused to obtain by even the most powerful conceivable

agent” (Freddoso, 79). In the same way a study of omniscience must

involve a distinction between what is true and therefore intrinsically

knowable versus what is knowable to the divine intellect.

Freddoso pursues another line of argumentation against this

objection. He claims that we humans know certain conditional future

contingents about ourselves that we take to be true. For example, he

claims that he knows that if he was “offered a no-strings attached

grant to do research for five years and to do just as much teaching” as

he wanted, that he would accept the position (Freddoso, 79). He takes

himself to know that this that situation. Freddoso takes himself to

„have a highly justified belief” that he would accept the grant.

(Freddoso, 79) He thinks many philosophers would agree that there

are grounds for considering a belief like this to he justified, even

though it is epistemically only probable. The probability is high

enough for it to be considered a justified belief to hold. Freddoso

states: “The upshot is that if even we can have some limited

knowledge of conditional future contingents, it is hardly surprising

that God can know them” (Freddoso, 79). But there is a difference

between human and divine knowledge. Humans know by inference

and with varying degrees of justification, while God is completely

justified in all of his beliefs and has his knowledge non-inferentially.

Robert Adams argues convincingly that our knowledge of

what we would do in other situations is a far cry from proving that

there actually are true conditional future contingents. Adams claims

that he can not understand how it is that statements like Freddoso‟s

about accepting a grant, can possibly be true and therefore cannot

understand how God could know them (Adams,l977,1l0). Adams is

discussing the example of David deciding to leave the city of Keilah.

He had rescued the city from the Philistines. When he was in the city

he enquired of God whether or not he should stay in the city because

he had heard that Saul had plans to besiege it. David asks God by

means of the ephod (which would reply yes or no) whether Saul

would come to besiege the city and whether the inhabitants of Keilah

would surrender him to Saul. God answered „yes to both of these

questions.

Adams points out that as a result of the answer of the ephod,

Molinists claim that there are two propositions that God knows by

middle knowledge, and are therefore true conditional future

contingents:

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(1) If David stayed in Keilah, Saul would besiege the city.

(2) If David stayed in Keilah and Saul besieged the city, the

men of Keilah would surrender David to Saul (Adams,

1977,110).

These must be true, Adams points out, to be examples of middle

knowledge. But what might this involve? He cannot understand how

it can be maintained that the free agents still act freely and yet these

are true conditional future contingents. (Adams, I 977, 110) He sees

four possible ways of reconciling free action with true conditional

future contingents but he does not think that any of them works.

First, he claims that the items of knowledge that are supposed

to be middle knowledge are not „categorical predictions‟. They can

not be because the objects of middle knowledge never did take place

in the future. Middle knowledge is not simple foreknowledge of what

is going to happen in the future. Since there will never actually be a

besieging of Keilah or an opportunity for the Keilahites to give David

up to Saul, (I) and (2) cannot be viewed as items of foreknowledge

that have a future event corresponding to them (Adams, 1977, 110).

So true conditional future contingents cannot be true because they

describe an event that will occur. This means that God can not know

counterfactuals from his knowledge of what will occur. The future

event never will occur and therefore cannot provide God with

grounds for knowing it would.

Adams next asks whether it is by logical or causal necessity

that Saul will besiege the city and answers that it cannot because then

Saul would no longer be acting freely. To reconcile true conditional

future contingents with freedom we must find non-necessitating

grounds for the truth of the middle knowledge. For example, it might

be claimed that Saul‟s besieging the city follows from his intentions,

desires, and character. But Adams agrees that this “is inadequate

precisely because it is not necessitating. A free agent may act out of

character, or change his intentions, or fail to act on them” (Adams,

1977, Ill).

The problem with the fourth suggestion is that the

conditional future contingents would only be probable. Instead of

saying that „If David stayed in Keilah, then Saul would besiege it‟ we

must say „If David stayed in Keilah, Saul probably would besiege it‟.

But the defenders of middle knowledge claim that God infallibly

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knows what will happen, not whether the event is probable (Adams,

1977, 111). Freddoso responds to this kind of objection by claiming

that the conditionals are made true by the conditional facts they

describe and God knows them by supercomprehension.

Objection to Supercomprehension

Edwards claimed that two things could not be explained by

objectors to the incompatibilist argument. First, they could not

explain how it could be that God could have certain knowledge of

contingent events. Second, he argued that objectors to his argument

would not be able to come up with a coherent explanation of the

origin and nature of the evidence that God would have for belief

about future contingents.

As we saw earlier he thinks that it is impossible for God to

have certain knowledge of something that is metaphysically

contingent. This would mean that God can only have certain

knowledge of something that was no longer contingent. Therefore,

God could only know contingent events after they had occurred. This

is a problem for the Molinist perspective, because the theory of

middle knowledge claims that God can have knowledge of future

contingents based on his supercomprehension and his decrees. But the

event has not yet occurred. And if the event has not occurred, then

according to Edwards God cannot know the contingent event.

The Molinist is then pressed to give an explanation of how

God can know future contingents. And his reply is the theory of

supercomprehension. The infinite nature of Gods cognitive faculties

allows him to know what humans will freely choose. But how might

Gods cognitive faculties operate in this situation? The Molinists

cannot give an explanation.

The reason they cannot give a plausible explanation is

because all the plausible answers to the question involve an implicit

rejection of human autonomy. The only plausible explanation that I

can think of is that God can know what free creatures will choose

because he understands what they are like. He has infinitely detailed

knowledge of their mind, knowing everything about them, and can

therefore know what they will choose. The Molinists will agree to this

point. But now the question arises as to how there might be a

connection between understanding a persons mind and having

knowledge of what they will do. The only plausible explanation that I

can think of is that God knows all of the attributes of the person, since

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he knows everything about them in infinite detail, and can look at

certain situations and know that a person with such and such

attributes will make a certain choice p whenever he or she is in that

situation.

It is necessary that God knows that every time that a person

N is put into a specific situation S that he or she will choose p every

time. This is necessary for God to have middle knowledge. For if N

would sometimes do other than p in situation S then God would not

have grounds for his middle knowledge. For middle knowledge

depends on the idea that God knows the one choice that N would

make in any given situation. But of course if there are certain

attributes, characteristics, (or whatever one might want to call them)

that always lead a person to make the same choices, then it seems that

there is a necessary connection between these attributes and the

choices that result from them. Therefore, the Molinist will reject this

explanation. That is he is left simply appealing to the depth of Gods

cognitive perfection combined with His omniscience. Therefore, the

Molinist cannot provide an explanation of how God could know

future contingents or how God could have certain knowledge of

future contingents. The Molinist cannot come up with a plausible

explanation of the nature of the evidence that provides this

knowledge.

Final Objection

An argument can be made against the Molinist along the

following lines. In every possible world where God believes that a

free creature N will choose to do an action p, then in that world it is

necessary that N choose p. This is because it is impossible that there

be any possible world where God has a belief that is false. So if the

proposition “God believes that N will choose p‟ is true in a possible

world, then it is impossible that the proposition “N does not choose p‟

obtain. If this is a general truth that applies to every possible world

that God exists in, then in every world God exists if one of these

propositions obtains, the other must necessarily obtain. Molina

responds to this objection:

The second error has to do with the composed sense, namely,

we should not claim that because the divine foreknowledge

already exists beforehand, Peter is in reality not able not to

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sin, as if because of the preexisting divine knowledge he has

lost something of his freedom and power not to sin in reality

should he so will....Indeed, even though that knowledge did

exist beforehand, it was just as truly within his power not to

sin as it would have been had that knowledge not existed, and

he was just as truly able to refrain from the act in light of

which he was foreknown to be a future sinner as he would

have been had that knowledge not existed, as has been

explained; thus this interpretation is not the one that the

theologians have in mind. Rather they are claiming,

absolutely correctly, that given the divine knowledge, Peter is

not able in the composed sense not to sin, because these two

things, namely, Peters being such that he is not going to sin

and God‟s knowing that he is going to sin, cannot both obtain

together. But if, as is now truly possible, he were not going to

sin, then that knowledge would not have existed in God, and

so that knowledge, which would not have existed if, as is

possible, Peter were not going to sin, does not in any way

prevent Peter‟s now being able in the divided sense not to sin,

in just the way he would have been able not to sin had such

knowledge not existed beforehand (Freddoso, l86).

But Molina‟s response is unsatisfactory because it depends on the

idea that something can only be shown to be necessary if one can give

arguments for how it is causally necessitated. Edwards has argued

that the necessity of something can be proved without showing the

necessity of the causes. He would argue against Molina, as he did

against Whitby that certain after-knowledge can show something to

be necessary even though it is not the cause of the thing being

necessary. Therefore, in the same way certain foreknowledge can

show a future event to be necessary without being the cause of the

necessity. For example, if in a possible world it obtains that God

reveals his foreknowledge that N will choose p, then it is necessary

that the state of affairs in which N chooses p obtains.

The Molinists can to a limited extent successfully conceive

of a coherent situation in which creatures freely choose. But any

explanation also has to cohere with the attributes of God, and it seems

that they are unsuccessful in this project. This is because divine

timelessness, omniscience, and immutability imply that if God reveals

foreknowledge of the future to humans then it is necessary that the

foreknown events occur. The Molinist project therefore fails for an

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orthodox Christian because any Christian world view must be able to

reconcile the nature of free creatures with the orthodox doctrines of

the nature of God.

In conclusion, the Molinists have not given a plausible

response to Edwards incompatibility argument. Edwards has

anticipated the weakness of the Molinist position in several ways.

First, he has pointed out that divine timelessness, immutability, and

omniscience work against any attempt at compatibilism. Secondly, he

has argued that the necessity of something can be shown without

showing how it is causally necessitated. Thirdly, his criticisms of the

impossibility of God knowing future contingents also apply to the

Molinists. Finally, his arguments that God needs evidence to have

knowledge of future contingents are not plausibly answered by the

Molinist‟s theory of supercomprehension.

Neither the Ockhamist nor Molinist responses to the

incompatibility argument are plausible for orthodox Christians. This

means that Edwards argument can be defended against the best

objections that Arminians can propose to it. This is problematic for

them because the incompatibility argument shows that divine

foreknowledge is incompatible with libertarian freedom. Therefore, if

Arminians admit that God has perfect foreknowledge then they must

abandon their theology which is dependent on a concept of libertarian

freedom.

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Works Cited

Adams, Robert Merrihew. “Middle Knowledge and the Problem of

Evil”. American Philosophical Ouarterly. Volume 14,

Number 2, April 1977.

Edwards, Jonathan. Freedom of the Will. New Haven and London:

Yale University Press, 1985.

Fischer, John Martin. “Hard-type Soft Facts”. The Philosophical

Review. XCV, No. 4. October, 1986.

Freddoso, Alfred J. Ed. Luis Dc Molina. On Divine Foreknowledge

(Part IV of the Concordia). Ithaca and London: Cornell

University Press, 1988.

Hodge, Charles. Systematic Theology. Vol. II. New York: Scribner,

Armstrong, and Co. 1876.

Kenny, Anthony. The God of the Philosophers. Oxford: Clarendon

Press; New York:Oxford University Press, 1979.

Wierenga, Edward R. The Nature of God: An Inquiry into Divine

Attributes. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press,

1989.

_______. “Prophecy, Freedom, and the Necessity of the Past”.

Philosophical Perspectives. 5, Philosophy of Religion, 1991.