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JointContribution

GeneralcommentNo.37bytheUnitedNationsHumanRightsCommitteeontheRighttoFreedomofPeacefulAssembly(Art.21,ICCPR)

February2020

EsteemedCommitteeMembers:

WeaddresstheCommitteeinrepresentationofagroupofLatinAmericanhumanrightsorganizationsinrelationtotheCommittee'sopenconsultationwithregardtothelatestdraft of General Comment No. 37 on the right to freedom of peaceful assembly(hereinafter, "the draft") in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights(hereinafter,"theCovenant").

ThispresentationresultedfromtheexchangethattookplaceattheregionalconsultationfortheAmericasorganizedbyArticle19onthe4thand5thofDecember2019atMexicoCity with the participation of twomembers of the Committee. It aims to put at yourdisposalconsiderationsonthedraftandthespecificcontentoftherighttofreedomofpeaceful assembly, based on our organizations' experiences on the ground, aswell asdevelopmentsinstandardsandrecommendedpracticesinrecentyearsattheregionalandinternationallevels.

Thedocumentfocusesonthefollowingissues:1)generalconsiderationsandlanguageinthe report; 2) the notion of "violent protests;" 3) authorization and prior notice; 4)illegitimate restrictions on the right of peaceful assembly; 5) obligations of the StatesPartyinrelationtotherighttofreedomofpeacefulprotest;6)accountability.Theannexcontainssuggestionsonalternativewordingtothecurrenttextinavarietyofparagraphswithaviewtowardincorporatingtheseobservationsintothemainbodyofthisreport.

Weareatyourdisposaltoexpandonorclarifyanythingyoudeemnecessary.

AlianzaRegionalporlaLibreExpresióneInformación1

Article19–OficinaparaMéxicoyCentroamérica

BlogueirasNegras(Brasil)

1Integran la Alianza Regional las organizaciones:Acción Ciudadana (Guatemala), Artigo 19 (Brasil),AsociaciónNacionaldelaPrensa–ANP(Bolivia),CentrodeArchivosyAccesoalaInformación–Cainfo(Uruguay),ComitéporlaLibreExpresión–C-Libre(Honduras),EspacioPúblico(Venezuela),FundaciónDemocraciasinFronteras–FDsF(Honduras),FundaciónSalvadoreñaparaelDesarrolloEconómicoySocial–FUSADES(ElSalvador),FundaciónCiudadaníayDesarrollo–FCD(Ecuador),FundaciónVioletaBarriosdeChamorro–FVBCH(Nicaragua),Fundar,CentrodeAnálisiseInvestigación(México),InstitutodeDerechoyEconomíaAmbiental–IDEA(Paraguay),InstitutodePrensayLibertaddeExpresión–IPLEX(CostaRica),Observatorio Cubano de Derechos Humanos (Cuba), Participación Ciudadana (República Dominicana),TransparenciaporColombia(Colombia),yTransparenciaVenezuela(Venezuela).

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CasadaCulturaDigitalPortoAlegre(Brasil)

CentrodeEstudiosdeDerecho,JusticiaySociedad-DeJusticia(Colombia)

CentrodeEstudiosLegalesySociales-CELS(Argentina)

CentroporlaJusticiayelDerechoInternacional–CEJIL

DerechosDigitales(AméricaLatina)

FundaciónConstruir(Bolivia)

FundaciónInternet(Bolivia)

GreenpeaceUSA(EstadosUnidos)

InternetLab-PesquisaemDireitoeTecnología(Brasil)

NationalLawyersGuild(EstadosUnidos)

POJOAJUAsociacióndeONGsdelParaguay

RedenDefensadelosDerechosDigitales-R3D(México)

SurSiendo–ComunicaciónyCulturaDigital(México)

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1. GeneralConsiderations

1.1.Draftstructure

Oneofthestructuralproblemswiththedraftisthatkeyissuesfortherightofassemblyare developed in a dispersed way throughout the document, in many cases withsignificantdifferencesinwordingindifferentparagraphs.Theresultofthisisthatwefinddifferent,andevencontradictory,standardsinthedraftforseveralsuchissues.

Oneexampleisthedefinitionof"peacefulassembly"andthelimitsonstateresponseinthe event of verification of acts of violence in these contexts. There are clearcontradictionsanddifferentwordingsinparagraphs10,17,19,20,21and49thatmustberesolvedinthenewdraft.

1.2.Contradictionswiththemostrecentstandardsontherightofassembly

GeneralCommentNo.37isbeingdiscussedinacontextinwhichtheissueoftherightofassembly has in recent years been the object of numerous consultations by regionalsystemsofprotection,internationalorganizationsand,particularly,bytheUnitedNationsSpecialRapporteursontherightstofreedomofpeacefulassemblyandassociation,andonextrajudicial,summaryorarbitraryexecutionsand,attheAmericaslevel,theInter-AmericanCommissiononHumanRights(IACHR)andtheInter-AmericanCourtofHumanRights.

Thenumerousspaces fordiscussion, formsanddraftsdistributedhaveresulted in theproduction of valuable reports that are moving forward to precisely define Stateobligations in the context of assemblies. These documents constitute a valuablefoundationfortheinterpretationofArt.21oftheCovenantinthattheytakeintoaccounttherealityoftheexerciseofthisrightontheground,inparticulartherealitiesofStates’responses to protest. These responses tend increasingly toward the repression,criminalization and hindering of the exercise of assembly throughout the world.Nevertheless, at various points the draft presents a lower, more flexible or generalstandardthanthatdevelopedinrecentreports.

Forinstance,thedraftmovesbackwardinrelationtotheconclusionreachedbydifferentmechanismsinthesensethatsystemsofpriorauthorizationareincompatiblewiththerightofassembly,andthataccordingtohowtheyareused,notificationproceduresmayalsobeincompatiblewiththisright(seeSect.3ofthisdocument).Initsparagraph84,thedraftadmitsproceduresofpriorauthorizationbynotestablishingitsincompatibilitywithArt. 21 of the Covenant. Insofar as systems of advance notification are concerned, itaddresses them in general as positive and necessary, and a responsibility held byprotestersthat, ifunmet,wouldwarrantrestrictivemeasuresontherightofassembly.Paragraph88ofthedraftreferstotheneedtoimposepolicingmeasuresatassemblies“forwhichtheauthoritiesarenotnotifiedinadvanceandwhichmayaffectpublicorder.”Thisisadangerousstandardthatauthorizesintrusivemeasuresandassociatesthefailuretoprovidenotificationwithaneffectonpublicorder.Thisstandardiscontrarytotheoneby the European Court of Human Rights, which considered that the dissolution of apeaceful assembly for not having compliedwith the requirement to provide advance

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notification constitutes a disproportionate restriction on the freedom of peacefulassembly.2

At the same time, the wording in regard to use of force throughout the text makesreferenceto“control”and“policing”ofassemblies,insteadofstandardsonthepositiveobligationsoffacilitationandguaranteeoftherightandprotectionofpeople.Thisposesaproblemfortheprogressivedevelopmentofinternationallawandfortheinstrumenttobeaneffectivetool toprotect theexerciseof therightsofassemblybypersonsontheground.

Insofarastheconceptofpeacefulprotestsandviolence,asthedraftalsotakesastepbackinrelationtothedocumentsbyUnitedNationsSpecialRapporteursfrom2015-2017,thereportbytheIACHRRapporteuronFreedomofExpression2019,andtheOrganizationfor Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Guidelines for 2007, aswe explain insection2ofthisreport.

1.3.LaxlanguageregardingStateobligations

ManyparagraphsofthedraftpresentlaxlanguagewithrespecttotheStateobligationscontainedinArt.21.

ThisisapparentinthewordingchosentorefertoStatepracticeswithaprovenimpactonhumanrightsintermsof“opportunitiesandchallenges;”measuresthatmay“restrictorprotect” protests; suggestions for authorities to “consider carrying out partialrestrictions;” the use, without further explanation, of theword “undue” formeasurestakenbytheStatesortheimprecisereferencetohavingtoconformto“theinternationalstandardsonthematter”withoutsayingwhichones;thereiterateduseoftheexpression“totheextentpossible”or“ingeneral.”Thiscanbeseeninparagraphssuchas38,41,74and75,amongothers.

Thegenericstatementsabout“costsandbenefits”eludetheCommittee'sessentialrolewhendevelopingGeneralCommentsofclarifyingtheobligationsheldbyStates.Instead,itlegitimizesthecurrentpoliticalagendaonvariousissues;forinstance,theuseofnewtechnologiesproventohaveconsequencesintermsofrightsviolations,withoutmakinganyspecificationastotheseriousimpactsthesemayhaveontherightscontainedinArt.21andotherprovisions in theCovenant.The language inparagraphs suchas11mayrenderGeneralCommentNo.37,ratherthananinstrumentthatsetstheconditionsforStateactionandtheprotectionofpeople,onethatleavesthemevenlessprotected.

ThissamelogicappliestoParagraph41,which,insteadofsettingaclearstandardthatlimits restrictions in a total or general sense, given their inherent disproportionality,seems to recommend, without further clarification, that States should apply partialrestrictions,evenwhenit isevidentthatevenpartialrestrictionsmaybeincompatiblewithArt.21.Inouropinion,weunderstandthatconsiderationsregardingmeasuresofStateinterventionmustbeclearlyframedwithinitspositivedutytofacilitatetheexerciseoftherightor,asanexception,initsdutytoprotecttherightsatstake.Theauthorization

2Buktaandothersvs.Hungary,Applicationno.25691/04(2007).

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of restrictive measures outside the framework of human rights protection puts theirguaranteeatriskandimpliesdisregardfortheCommittee’smandate.

Thelanguageusedbyothermechanismsofprotectionandexpertsonthesubjectconveyspresumptionofthepeacefulnatureofprotestandtheobligationtofacilitate,i.e.,notonlymustStatesnotprohibitprotest,theyalsomustnotrestrictitand,whentheydecidetodoso,theymuststrictlyrespectthetestof legality,necessityandproportionality,andthelegitimateobjectivesestablishedundertheCovenant.TheCommitteecontradictsexistingstandards on the matter by recommending, in an abstract fashion, “intermediate” or“partial”restrictions.

ThesamelaxlanguagecanbeseenwithregardtoStates’obligationswhenitcomestothemanagementofconnectivityandinternetaccess–forexample,onparagraph38ofthedraft.JustasexpressedbytheUNRapporteuronfreedomofexpression,theblockingorslowingdownofinternetaccessbefore,duringorafteranassemblyisarestrictionofthatright.Atthementionofself-regulation,itdoesnotopposetheconsiderationofpoliciesofregulationandcontrolbytheStateoftheactivityofprivateinternetprovidersinordertoprotect the rights contained in the Covenant. General Comment No. 37 must clearlyindicatethattheStatehastheobligationtoguaranteeinternetprovisionandaccessinthecontextofexercising therightofassembly, includingwhen this isprovidedbyprivateentities.

Thefirstsentenceofparagraph75ofthedraftrestrictstheuseofcriminallawagainstassemblyorganizersforactscommittedbythirdparties.However,theambiguityofthewording subsequent to that relativizes the standard established by the UN SpecialRapporteursand Inter-AmericanCommissiononHumanRights: it isnot clearwhat ismeantby“couldhaveforeseenandprevented”suchacts“withreasonableefforts.”Suchlanguage poses serious risks and could be used to incriminate social leaders andprotesters.

1.4.TheroleofnewtechnologiesandtheupholdingofthehumanrightsenshrinedintheUnitedNationssysteminonlineactivities

Paragraph11ofthedraftreferstothetransformationinthewaypublicgatheringshavebeenheldovertime,whichimpactsthewayinwhichtheauthoritieshandletherightofpeacefulassemblyandassociation.Thereflectioncontainedinthisparagraphshouldbelinked to a more general consideration that the right of peaceful assembly can beexercisedinthephysicalworld,oritmaybeexercisedorfacilitatedbyactivitiesthattakeplaceindigitalspacesand,therefore,theprotectionoftheexerciseofthisrightmustbeguaranteedinbothcases,asdifferentUnitedNationsbodieshavestated.

TheHumanRightsCouncilhasaffirmedinitsresolutiononthePromotion,protectionandenjoymentofhumanrightsontheInternet:3

"that the same rights that people have offline must also be protectedonline,inparticularfreedomofexpression,whichisapplicableregardlessof frontiers and through anymedia of one’s choice, in accordancewith

3 A/HRC/38/L.10/Rev.1,availableat:https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/LTD/G18/203/76/PDF/G1820376.pdf?OpenElement

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article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and of theInternationalCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRights."

This has also been expressly addressed by the United Nations General Assembly ininsistingthatallStates:

"ensurethatthesamerightsthat individualshaveoffline, includingtherightstofreedomofexpression,ofpeacefulassemblyandofassociation,arealsofullyprotectedonline,inaccordancewithhumanrightslaw."4

IntheInter-AmericanSystem,theSpecialRapporteuronEconomic,Social,CulturalandEnvironmentalRights(ESCER)hasobservedinitsmostrecentreport:

“queInternetydiversosmedioselectrónicosodigitalesdecomunicaciónconstituyen una plataforma para el ejercicio de derechos humanos,incluyendoderechoscivilesypolíticos,comotambiénderechoseconómicos,sociales,culturalesyambientales.”5

Therelevanceofprotectingdigitalspacesfortheexerciseoftherightofpeacefulassemblyand association is not limited to the State’s obligation to abstain from generatinginterference in that right but, as indicated by the Special Rapporteur, also coversinitiativesthataimto:

"bridge the digital divides, including the gender digital divide, and toenhancetheuseofinformationandcommunicationstechnology,inorderto promote the full enjoyment of human rights for all" set forth inparagraph5oftheresolutiononthePromotion,protectionandenjoymentofhumanrightsontheInternet.6

Finally,theSpecialRapporteuralsoobservesthat:

"the obligation to protect requires that positive measures be taken toprevent actions by non-State actors, including businesses, that couldunduly interferewith therights to freedomofpeacefulassemblyandofassociation."7

Withregardtotheconnectionoftherightsofpeacefulassemblyandassociationwiththeexercise of other rights, contemporary understanding of the legal frameworkrequired forArt. 21 tohave full effect requires thatprivacybe addressedas anessentialbasisfortheexerciseofsaidright.

4GeneralAssemblyResolution73/173adopted17December2018.Availableat:https://undocs.org/pdf?symbol=es/A/RES/73/173

5 ThereportisstillnotavailableinEnglish.See:REDESCA,InformeEmpresasyDDHH,January2020.Para.267,availableat:http://www.oas.org/es/cidh/informes/pdfs/EmpresasDDHH.pdf6 A/HRC/38/L.10/Rev.1

7 A/HRC/41/41,para.14.

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When it comes to therisksofuseof surveillance technologies that impact therightofpeacefulassembly,itisworthrecallingtheHumanRightsCouncilResolutionontherighttoprivacyinthedigitalera,whichsetsforththat:

"therighttoprivacycanenabletheenjoymentofotherrightsandthefreedevelopment of an individual’s personality and identity, and anindividual’sabilitytoparticipateinpolitical,economic,socialandculturallife;""violationsorabusesoftherighttoprivacymightaffecttheenjoymentofotherhumanrights,includingtherighttofreedomofexpressionandtoholdopinionswithoutinterference,andtherighttofreedomofpeacefulassemblyandassociation."8

TheUnitedNationsSpecialRapporteurontheprotectionandpromotionoftherighttofreedomofopinionandexpressionalsonotesthat:

"[v]iolationsoftherightsofpeacefulassemblyandassociationmayalsointerferewiththeenjoymentotherhumanrights,bothofflineandonline.Theseincludetherighttoprivacyandtherighttofreedomofopinionandexpression, which are intimately related to the enjoyment of peacefulassembly and association rights. Other rights may also be affected,particularlyeconomic,socialandculturalrights."9

Inthesamesense,the2013jointdeclarationbytheUNandIACHRSpecialRapporteursontheprotectionandpromotionoftherighttofreedomofopinionandexpressionstatesthat:

"The rights of freedom of assembly and freedom of expression,guaranteed by the American Convention on Human Rights and theInternationalCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRights,arefundamental,andguaranteeing them is a vital condition to the existence and properfunctioning of a democratic society. A State may impose reasonablelimitations on demonstrations for purposes of ensuring that they areconductedpeacefully,ortodispersethosethatturnviolent,providedthatsuch limits are governed by the principles of legality, necessity, andproportionality.Inaddition,thebreaking-upofademonstrationmustbewarrantedbythedutytoprotectindividuals,andauthoritiesmustusethemeasuresthataresafestandleastharmfultothedemonstrators.Theuseof force at public demonstrations must be an exception, used understrictly necessary circumstances consistent with internationallyrecognizedprinciples."10

8 A/HRC/42/L.18,availableat:https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/LTD/G19/282/26/PDF/G1928226.pdf?OpenElement 9 A/HRC/41/41,para.16. 10 UnitedNationsSpecialRapporteurontheProtectionandPromotionoftheRighttoFreedomofOpinionandExpressionandSpecialRapporteurforFreedomofExpressionoftheOASInter-AmericanCommissiononHumanRights.Jointdeclarationonviolenceagainstjournalistsandmediaworkersinthecontextofprotests,2013.Availableat: http://www.oas.org/es/cidh/expresion/showarticle.asp?artID=951&lID=2

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2. Theconceptof“violentprotests”

2.1.Internationalandregionalstandardsonthedefinitionof“peacefulprotest”

The discussion about the meaning of the word “peaceful” present in Art. 21 is offundamentalimportance;nevertheless,thedraftversionofGeneralCommentNo.37addressesitinanimpreciseandcontradictorymanner.

It is commonknowledge tocivil societyorganizationsworkingon theground that theargumentthataprotest“isviolent”andtherefore“illegal”isregularlyusedbyStatestojustifyrepressiveresponsesdoprotests,theirdispersalorrestrictionandcriminalizationofparticipantsandorganizers.Thishighlightstheprimaryimportanceofhavingaprecisedefinitionoftheword“peaceful.”

IntheAmericas,astheIACHRhasacknowledged:

"Thenotionofpublicorderandsocialpeacethatisimposedappearstobe concerned solely with guaranteeing order as an expression of thepowerofthestate,anditaccordsprioritytotherightsandinterestsofthosewhomaybenegativelyimpactedbytheprotests.Eventhoughsomenormativeadvancescanbeidentified,thedisproportionateuseofforceobservedindicatesthatstateauthoritiesintheAmericasarestillinclinedtoquicklyde-legitimate socialprotestsbecauseof thenegative impactthey may have on, for example, traffic, failing to acknowledge theimportanceoftherightstoexpressionandpetitionthatareatstakeandhowtheyareboundupwithdemocracy."11

Forthisreason,andthroughtheuseofextensiveprocessesofconsultation,theIACHRandtheUNSpecialRapporteursonfreedomofassociationandassemblyandonextrajudicial,summaryor arbitrary executions, have jointly developed standards in recent years tomakethequalificationof“peaceful”morepreciseininternationalstandardsontherighttoassembly.InitsrecentreportonProtestandHumanRights,theIACHRconsidered:

"Asforrestrictionsonmodesofprotest,“therightofassembly,asdefinedininternationalinstrumentsandinthedomesticlawsthathavetheforceofconstitutionallawinthecountriesoftheregion,isthatitbeexercisedpeaceably and without arms.” Given the State's obligation to protecthuman rights in protest contexts, including the life and safety ofdemonstrators,thisqualificationinArticle15oftheAmericanConventionmust be interpreted as meaning that the State may restrict the

11IACHR,AnnualReport2015,chap.IV.A,“UseofForce,”para.59.

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participation in public demonstrations and protests of persons whocommitactsofviolenceorwhocarryweapons."12

ThedraftversionofGeneralCommentNo.37,paragraph19,correctlyincorporatestheinter-Americanstandardofthepresumptionofthepeacefulnatureofassemblies.Italsostates that acts of violence committedby someparticipantsmustnotbe attributed tootherparticipants.Thislastpointisconsistentwithfundamentalstandardsofcriminallaw,butinsufficienttoprotecttherightofassembly.Itisessentialthatthedraftclarifythatactsofviolencecommittedinthecontextofaprotestdonotwarrantdeclaringtheentireprotestasviolentinordertostop,restrict,repressitorcriminalizeitsorganizersandparticipants.

Thisisnotthestandardsetinthedraft.Paragraph10,forinstance,establishesthatentireprotests could be unprotected under the Covenant based on a general and uncleardefinition of violence. Paragraph 17, in turn, contains a new formulation of theword"peaceful”thatdepartsfromrecentdevelopmentsattheEuropeanandInter-AmericanlevelsandUNSpecialProcedures toclassifyanentireassemblyaspeacefulorviolent;worsestill,itincludesthepossibilityofStatesdeclaringanassemblytobeviolentbasedon vague concepts such as “incitement,” the “intention to provoke” or “because theviolenceisimminent.”

Inturn,paragraph21ofthedraftenablesentireassembliestogounprotectedduetosuchvagueconceptsastheincitementorintentionofviolence,“generalizedviolence”orthatanassembly’s“leadersconvey”aviolentmessage.Thisparagraphneedsreformulatingandclarificationthatinanyscenario,thisrestrictionoftherightofassemblymustbebasedonthedutytoprotectotherrights,inparticular,therighttolifeandthephysicalintegrityofpersons.Otherwise,thesewillbestandardsusedtojustifyviolentresponsesbytheState,withseriousconsequencesforpeople’ssafety.

Likewise,paragraphs17and49ofthecurrentdraftareparticularlyconcerninginthattheyinclude“seriousdamagetoproperty”ascriteriaforclassifyingaprotestasviolent.

TheCommitteeofferstworeferencestospeakofpropertydamage.Inparagraph49, itcitestheSyracusePrinciples,adocumentfromthe1980s.Paragraph17citesmuchmorerecentstandardsinkeepingwiththelatestlegaldevelopmentsonthesubject:the2010OSCEGuidelinesonFreedomofPeacefulAssembly:13

26. The term “peaceful” shouldbe interpreted to include conduct thatmayannoyorgiveoffencetopersonsopposedtotheideasorclaimsthatit is seeking to promote, and even include conduct that temporarilyhinders,impedesorobstructstheactivitiesofthirdparties.Thus,bywayof example, assemblies involving purely passive resistance should be

12 IACHR–SpecialRapporteurforFreedomofExpression,"ProtestandHumanRights:Standardsontherights involved insocialprotestandtheobligations toguide theresponseof theState,"OEA/Ser.L/V/IICIDH/RELE/INF.22/19, September 2019, para. 81. Available athttp://www.oas.org/es/cidh/expresion/publicaciones/ProtestayDerechosHumanos.pdf 13 OSCE,GuidelinesonFreedomofPeacefulAssembly,2010,para.26–27,15

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characterizedaspeaceful.Furthermore,inthecourseofanassembly,“anindividual does not cease to enjoy the right to peaceful assembly as aresultofsporadicviolenceorotherpunishableactscommittedbyothersinthecourseofthedemonstration,iftheindividualinquestionremainspeacefulinhisorherownintentionsorbehaviour.

27. The spectrum of conduct that constitutes “violence” should benarrowly construed but may exceptionally extend beyond purelyphysical violence to include inhuman or degrading treatment or theintentional intimidationorharassmentofa“captiveaudience.” Insuchinstances,thedestructionofrightsprovisionsmayalsobeengaged.[15 - The imperative of adopting a holistic approach to freedom ofassembly is underscored by the “destruction of rights” provisionscontained in Article 30 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights(UDHR),Article5oftheICCPRandArticle17oftheECHR.]

Acarefulreadingrevealsthatparagraph17erroneouslycitestheOSCEGuidelinesonFreedomofPeacefulAssembly.Theguidelinesareveryclear in formulatingabroadinterpretation of the classification of “peaceful” and a strictly concise concept of“violence.”Thisconcisedefinitionincludesphysicalviolence,cruel,inhumanordegradingtreatment and intentional intimidation or harassment of a captive audience. Thisdocumentdoesnotmentionseriousdamagetopropertyasacriterionforclassifyingan assembly as violent; what it does mention is the possibility of considering “thedestructionofrightsprovisions”aspartofthedefinitionofviolence.

Paragraph93ondetentionscontainsthesamebroadandimprecisewordingasparagraph21, and the problem with the definition of “violence.” The ANNEX hereto proposesmodificationinthesenseofwithdrawingthestandardof“intention”or“incitement"to“violence” and limiting the possibility of detention to the commitment of crimes,consideringtheseriousnessofthecrimeanditseffectonpeople'srights.

2.2.Scopeofincitementtoviolenceondigitalmedia

TheinterpretationofthescopeoftherightofpeacefulassemblypursuanttoArt.21oftheCovenantfacesthechallengeoftheuseofdigitalmediatodefinethepurpose,expressivecontentorthecourseofanassembly.

One of the trends noted in the most recent report by the Special Rapporteur on thefreedom of peaceful assembly is the criminalization of activities on social networksbelongingtoindividualsororganizations.14Insomecases,attemptshavebeenmadetocriminalizeactsofexpressiontocallanassembly,aswellastheeventitself.Thishasaparalyzingeffect:ifthecalltoassemblecanbearbitrarilydeemedaformofincitementtoviolence,thisdiscouragesparticipationinthatassemblyevenwhenitmaybepeaceful.

Itistruethatthemereactofconveninganassembly,whichcanbedoneviadigitalmedia,isarelevantindicatoroftheendspursuedinthatactandprobableexpressivecontent(including whether such ends are covered under Art. 21); however, acts of violence-

14 1A/HRC/41/41,para.39.

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incitingrhetoricondigitalmedia(forexample,insulting,threateningordiscriminatoryrhetoric)mustreceivespecificlegaltreatmentinaccordancewithinternationalhumanrights standards, and particularly the guarantees to protect freedom of expressioncontainedinArt.19oftheCovenant.

Collectiveactsofviolentexpressiononline,whetherprior,simultaneousorsubsequenttoanassembly,mustbeassessedbasedonanalysisthatisnotnecessarilyequivalenttoarisk assessment of physical acts committed in the context of an assembly. Becauseexclusion of an assembly from protection based on acts of expression around saidassemblywouldrestrictbothfreedomofexpressionaswellasfreedomofassembly,webelieveitisnecessarytoonlyexceptionallyconsidertheincitementtoviolenceviadigital media as grounds for determining the exclusion of protection providedunderArt.21oftheCovenant;anyrestrictionmustbesubmittedtothetestoflegality,proportionalityandnecessity.ThenecessitytoprotectpeoplecannotserveasthebasisfortheStatetodisproportionatelyrestrictotherrights.Andwewouldunderscorethat,indigitalmediainparticular,falseactsofincitementtoviolenceareincreasinglycommonandintendedtodelegitimizeandcategorizetheeventasillegalornotcoveredbytherighttopeacefulassembly.

Moreover,giventhecomplexityinvolvedintheregulationofdigitalformsofexpressionreflecting discrimination, hate and incitement to violence under the terms of Art. 20,regulatingitposesacomplextaskforStatesandfortheinternationalcommunity, thatmustnotbecarriedoutbasedonpolicycontingenciesorcontingenttensionswithotherStatesorinstitutions.

Asageneralrule,theconveningofmeetingsandassembliesforthepurposeofprotestand demonstration against authority cannot be classified as a form of incitement toviolence,norasadvocacyfornational,racialorreligioushatethatconstitutesincitementtodiscrimination,hostilityorviolenceunderthetermsofArt.20oftheCovenant.Inotherwords,theStatecannottakeadvantageofitsobligationsunderArt.20torestrictbylawactstoorganizeorconvenemeetingsorassemblieswithcontentthatiscontrarytothegovernmentoritsinterests,noringeneraltoavoiditsStatedutytomaintainneutralitywhenitcomestotheexpressivecontentofanassembly.

Itisforthisreasonthatwedonotconsiderthefirstoptioncontainedinparagraph22ofthedrafttobeadequate insofarasit isalaxinterpretationofwhatconstitutesincitementtoviolenceunderthetermsofArt.20oftheCovenant.

3. Advancenotificationandauthorization

With regard to the procedures for notification and authorization, the draft version ofGeneralCommentNo.37establishesinitsparagraph80adutytoinformtheauthoritiesinadvanceofanyintentiontocarryoutapeacefulassembly.Thewording,alongwiththatcontainedinparagraphs84and88,mustbereformulatedinordertoclarifythenatureofthisrequirement.

Therighttopeacefulassemblyis,initsessence,disruptive.SystemsofnotificationmayexistinaState,buttheyshouldnotbemandatory.Whentheydoexist,theymustbe

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dulyjustifiedbasedonlegitimateendssuchastoensureparticipants’rightsduringtheassembly.Theymustbeunderstoodasameansofsafeguardinglegitimaterightsandinterestsandnotasanendinandofthemselves.Inthissense,theIACHRhasexpressedthroughitsRapporteuronfreedomofexpression:

"The Special Rapporteur believes that the exercise of fundamental freedomsshouldnotbesubject topreviousauthorizationby theauthorities (asexplicitlyexpressed in the Spanish Constitution), but at the most to a prior notificationprocedure,whoserationaleistoallowStateauthoritiestofacilitatetheexerciseoftherighttofreedomofpeacefulassemblyandtotakemeasurestoprotectpublicsafetyandorderandtherightsandfreedomsofothers.Suchanotificationshouldbesubjecttoaproportionalityassessment,notundulybureaucratic."15

These systems of notificationmust not, in being too burdensome or difficult tomeet,become an obstacle for the people organizing or participating in a peaceful assembly.They must instead be quick, efficient, accessible and, above all, proportionate to thepossiblerepercussionsthatmayarisefromtheassemblyontherightsofthosewhodonotparticipate.Advancenoticemustnotberequiredforassembliesinwhichthenumberofparticipantsdoesnotwarranttakingmeasurestomitigatesuchrepercussionsorstrikeabalancewiththerightsofthosewhodonotparticipateorwhentheplaceanddurationare limited.Nor should suchnoticebe requiredwhenpeaceful assemblies are formedspontaneously,sincetimewouldnotallowforit.

Statesshouldnotimposeanysanctionintheeventthatadvancenoticeisnotgivenandthe peaceful assembly takes place without notification. Participation in a peacefulassemblywithoutnotificationinkeepingwiththerequirementsisnotillegal.Ifthereisany type of sanction, regardless of the nature, this turns into an authorizationsystem. And authorization systems are incompatiblewith the exercise of the right ofpeacefulassembly.16

Thistypeofauthorizationorpermitsystemmustbeeradicatedfromcountriesthatstillhaveit,eveninpractice,giventhatitbecomesadisproportionatelimitontheexerciseoftherightofpeacefulassembly.Inthissense,theIACHRSpecialRapporteurontheexerciseofthefreedomofexpressionpointsout:

“Prior notice, generally justified by States on the basis of the need to provide greater protection to a demonstration, cannot function as a covert authorization mechanism. The IACHR maintained in its report on the “Criminalization of the Work of Human Rights Defenders” that the requirement of prior notification must not be confused with the requirement of prior authorization granted in a discretional manner, 91 which must not be established in the law or practice of the administrative authorities, even when it comes to public spaces”17.

15 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights of freedom of peaceful assembly and of association,A/HRC/20/27,May2012,para.28.16A/HRC/23/39,April24,2013,para.51.

17OEA/Ser.L/V/IICIDH/RELE/INF.22/19,September2019,para.57.

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4. Illegitimaterestrictionsontherightofpeacefulassembly

4.1.Surveillance

Surveillance activities conducted by the State have increased in their level ofsophistication to apply restrictions on the exercise of rights, including the freedomofpeacefulassemblyandassociation.ThethematicreportbytheSpecialRapporteurontherightstofreedomofpeacefulassemblyandassociationpointsoutthat:

"[t]hedigitalagehasopenednewspacefortheenjoymentoftherightstofreedom of peaceful assembly and of association. There are numerousexamples across the globe which demonstrate the power of digitaltechnology inthehandsofpeople lookingtocometogethertoadvancedemocracy,peaceanddevelopment.However,thedigitalrevolutionhasalso brought a range of new risks and threats to these fundamentalrights." Adding to this that "over the past decade, States have usedtechnologytosilence,surveilandharassdissidents,politicalopposition,human rights defenders, activists and protesters, and to manipulatepublic opinion. Governments are ordering Internet shutdowns morefrequently,aswellasblockingwebsitesandplatformsaheadofcriticaldemocraticmomentssuchaselectionsandprotests."18

These tendencies include intervention in telephoneor electronic communications, theimplantation of malicious code to extract information from electronic devices, themonitoring of communications metadata or other types of data, either analogue orelectronic, the collection and analysis of metadata obtained in various ways, and thecollectionofbiometricdata,amongothers.19

Surveillance actions have been implemented on different occasions as an excuse toinfringe the rights guaranteed under the Covenant, among them the right to privacy,freedom of expression and of peaceful assembly and association.20 From the Inter-AmericanSystemofHumanRights,arecentreportbytheSpecialRapporteuronfreedomofexpressionhasidentified:

“reports in the region of police and military officers infiltrating social networks or using false identities in order to obtain information about social movements and the organization of demonstrations and protests”21

18 A/HRC/41/41,ReportoftheSpecialRapporteurontherightstofreedomofpeacefulassemblyandofassociation,ClémentNyaletsossiVoule,17May2019,paras.2and3. 19 A/HRC/41/35, Surveillance and Human Rights, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, 28 May 2019. Available at: https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G19/148/79/PDF/G1914879.pdf?OpenElement 20 Ibid, para. 21. 21 IACHR–SpecialRapporteurforFreedomofExpression,"ProtestandHumanRights:StandardsontherightsinvolvedinsocialprotestandtheobligationstoguidetheresponseoftheState,"OEA/Ser.L/V/IICIDH/RELE/INF.22/19,September2019,para.300.

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These actions include interventions in communications and withholding of data, asrecognizedbytheUNHumanRightsCouncilinitsperiodicreviewsofcompliancewiththeCovenant,22andwhichalsoexpressedconcern in2017over theuseofhacking forsurveillancepurposes.23

Authorities of international human rights organizations have on different occasionsexpressedtheirconcern24abouttheimpactofthisonboththepopulationingeneralaswell as specific groups, such as human rights defenders, journalists or socialcommunicators.25The interception, collection anduseofmetadata interfereswith theright to privacy, as pointed out by human rights experts, including the UN SpecialRapporteuron freedomofexpression, theUNSpecialRapporteuron theprotectionofhuman rights and fundamental freedoms in the fight against terrorism26 and theHighCommissionerforHumanRights.27Onthissubject,theIACHRSpecialRapporteurforfreedomofexpressionhasconcludedthat"[s]uchapracticemaybeconsideredaseriousviolationoftherightsofassemblyandfreedomofassociation,andevenoftherighttoprivacy"andsignalingthat"[u]ndernocircumstancesareonlineintelligenceactionsallowedtomonitorpeoplewhoorganizeortakepartinsocialprotests.”28TheEuropeanUnionCourtofJustice(EUCJ)hasconsideredthatthewithholdingofmetadatarelatedtoaperson’sprivatelifeandcommunicationsis,inandofitself,aninfringementupontherighttoprivacy.29

Suchinterferencesmaybeinviolationoftherighttopeacefulassembly.TheIACHR,initsdeclarationontheuseofsurveillanceontheInternet,inanyofitsformatsornuances,hasfoundthatit

22 Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations of the Fourth Periodic Report of the United States of America, UN Doc. CCPR/C/USA/CO/4, 23 April 2014, para. 22. 23 Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations of the Fourth Periodic Report of Italy, UN Doc. CCPR/C/ITA/CO/6, 28 March 2017, para. 36. 24 UN. General Assembly. Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 17 December 2018. 73/179. The right to privacy in the digital age. A/RES/73/179. Available at <https://undocs.org/en/A/RES/73/179>. 25 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders. UN Doc. A/70/217, 30 July 2015, para. 46, available at: https://www.acnur.org/fileadmin/Documentos/BDL/2016/10399.pdf. United Nations (UN) Special Rapporteur on the Protection and Promotion of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression of the OAS Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. Joint declaration on violence against journalists and media workers in the context of protests. 2013. Available at: http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/expression/showarticle.asp?artID=951&lID=1 26A/69/397,23/09/2014.ReportoftheSpecialRapporteuronthepromotionandprotectionofhumanrightsandfundamentalfreedomswhilecounteringterrorism,para.18,availableat:https://undocs.org/pdf?symbol=es/A/69/39727 A/HRC/27/37,30/06/2014.ReportoftheHighCommissionerforHumanRightsontherighttoprivacyinthedigitalage.Para.s19and20,Availableat:https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Session27/Documents/A.HRC.27.37_en.pdf

28 OEA/Ser.L/V/IICIDH/RELE/INF.22/19,para. 300. 29 Judgment of the Court, 8 April 2014, Digital Rights Ireland Ltd, C-293/12 and Kärntner Landesregierung, C-594/12, EU:C:2014:238, para. 27, available at: http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=150642&mode=req&pageIndex=1&dir=&occ=first&part=1&text=&doclang=EN&cid=635772

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"constitutes interference in the private lives of people and, when conducted illegally, can also affect the rights to due process and a fair trial, freedom of expression, and access to information. It is recognized both regionally and universally that illegal or arbitrary surveillance and interception and collection of personal data affect not only the right to privacy and freedom of expression but can also run contrary to the precepts of a democratic society.”30

In turn, the Special Rapporteur on the freedom of expression for the Inter-AmericanSystemrecentlyexpressedthat

"[in]nocasecanmereparticipationinprotests,orintheirannouncementororganization,justifytheviolationoftherighttoprivacywithrespecttoprivatecommunicationsmadebyaperson,whetherinwriting,byvoiceor images, and regardless of the platform used. The right to privacyencompasses not only individual communications, but alsocommunicationsthattakeplaceinclosedgroupstowhichonlymembershaveaccess."31

ThisSpecialRapporteurlikewiseindicatesapresumptionagainstintelligenceactivitiesappliedtocontextsofprotest,deemingsuchactivitiestobe,inprinciple,contrarytoInter-Americanstandards:

"Any intelligence activity related to the political freedoms and rightsinvolvedinaprotestmusthaveawarrantandexternaloversight."32

Because of the intimate relationship previously examined between the freedoms ofexpression,privacyandpeacefulassembly,theabovealsoappliestosurveillanceactionsthatmay impact the fullexerciseofsuchrights,asexplicitlyrecognizedbythespecialrapporteursonfreedomofexpressioninajointstatementin2015:

"Conflict situations should not be used to justify an increase insurveillancebyStateactorsgiventhatsurveillancerepresentsaninvasionofprivacyandarestrictiononfreedomofexpression.Inaccordancewiththe three-part test for restrictions on freedom of expression and, inparticular, the necessity part of that test, surveillance should beconductedonlyona limitedand targetedbasisand inamannerwhichrepresentsanappropriatebalancebetweenlawenforcementandsecurityneeds, on the one hand, and the rights to freedom of expression andprivacy, on the other. Untargeted or "mass" surveillance is inherentlydisproportionateandisaviolationoftherightstoprivacyandfreedomofexpression."33

30AnnualReportoftheInter-AmericanCommissiononHumanRights2016,para.212,availableat: http://www.oas.org/es/cidh/expresion/docs/informes/anuales/InformeAnual2016RELE.pdf

31OEA/Ser.L/V/IICIDH/RELE/INF.22/19,para.299. 32Ibid,para.346.

33UnitedNationsandIACHRSpecialRapporteursonFreedomofOpinionandExpression.JointDeclarationonFreedomofExpressionandResponsestoConflictSituations.2015.Para.8,availableat:http://www.oas.org/es/cidh/expresion/showarticle.asp?artID=987&lID=2

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ThedraftneedstoclearlyanddirectlyincorporatetheseelementstodefineaframeworktobeabletoidentifyillegitimateinterferencesintherightofassemblyestablishedunderArt. 21 of the Covenant. Surveillance tasks in the context of assemblies must beexceptionalandauthorizedbyindependentjudicialauthorities,34whomustaccountfor thereasonsthemeasure iscalled for toattain theendspursued inanygivencase;whetherthemeasureissufficientlylimitedsoasnottoaffecttherightinvolvedanymorethan necessary; andwhether it is proportionate to the interest it seeks to promote.35Measuresofmasssurveillance,suchastechnologiesoflarge-scaleinterventionrepresenta form of indiscriminate surveillance that goes against all considerations ofproportionality.36

Inthissense,ourviewisthatareviewofparagraphs11,29,38,70,71,72and105of thedraft isessential.The languageherenormalizesandusespermissivewordingwithregardtosurveillanceactivities.ThedraftdoesnotsufficientlyestablishtheState’sobligation to limit the use of technologies for the mass monitoring or recording ofparticipationinassemblies.Noristhereanyreferencetotheneedforfocusedsurveillancetoabidebytheminimumrequirementsofnecessityandproportionality.

WebelieveitisparticularlyrelevanttobearinmindwhattheIACHRhaspointedoutwithregard to conditions of surveillance that are permissible and compatible with theobservationandprotectionofhumanrights,which

"must be established beforehand in a law and established explicitly,strictly, precisely and clearly, both substantively and procedurally. Inview of the inherent risk of abuse of any surveillance system, thesemeasuresshouldbebasedonlegislationthatisparticularlyprecise,clearanddetailed, and Stateshave to ensure aplural, democratic, andopenconsultation prior to the adoption of the applicable regulations. Theobjectivesforwhichsurveillanceortheinterceptionofcommunicationswouldbepermissiblemustbeexplicitlyestablishedinthelaw,andinallcasesthelawsmustestablishtheneedforapriorcourtorder.Thenatureofthemeasures,aswellastheirscopeandduration,mustberegulated,establishingthefactsthatcouldleadtothemandthebodiesresponsibleforauthorizing,implementingandmonitoringthem."37

34UNSpecialRapporteurforFreedomofOpinionandExpressionandtheOASSpecialRapporteurforFreedomofExpression.JointDeclarationonsurveillanceprogramsandtheirimpactonfreedomofexpression,21June2013,points1-3and9;UNSpecialRapporteuronthePromotionandProtectionoftherighttofreedomofOpinionandExpression,theOrganizationforSecurityandCo-operationinEurope(OSCE)RepresentativeonFreedomoftheMedia,theOrganizationofAmericanStates(OAS)SpecialRapporteuronFreedomofExpressionandtheAfricanCommissiononHumanandPeoples'Rights(ACHRP)SpecialRapporteuronfreedomofExpressionandAccesstoInformation.1Jun2011.JointDeclarationonFreedomofExpressionandtheInternet.Points1(a)and(b).35Para.165.Availableat:http://www.oas.org/es/cidh/expresion/docs/informes/2014_04_08_internet_web.pdf36HRC.ReportoftheSpecialRapporteuronthepromotionandprotectionoftherighttofreedomofopinionandexpression,FrankLaRue.A/HRC/23/40.17April2013,para.62.Availableat:https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session23/A.HRC.23.40_EN.pdf37IACHR,SpecialRapporteurforFreedomofExpression,"StandardsforaFree,Open,andInclusiveInternet,"15March2017,para.217-218.

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Furthermore,werecommendthatthedraftincorporatethecallfortheStatesoftheUnitedNationsGeneralAssemblyto:

“a)Torespectandprotecttherighttoprivacy,includinginthecontextofdigitalcommunication;b)To takemeasures toput an end to violations of those rights and tocreate the conditions to prevent such violations, includingby ensuringthat relevantnational legislation complieswith their obligationsunderinternationalhumanrightslaw;c) To review their procedures, practices and legislation regarding thesurveillanceofcommunications, their interceptionandthecollectionofpersonal data, includingmass surveillance, interception and collection,with a view to upholding the right to privacy by ensuring the full andeffective implementation of all their obligations under internationalhumanrightslaw;d) To establish or maintain existing independent, effective domesticoversightmechanismscapableofensuringtransparency,asappropriate,and accountability for State surveillance of communications, theirinterceptionandthecollectionofpersonaldata.”38

4.2.Criminallawandcriminalization

GeneralCommentNo.37doesnotincludeanyexpressmentionofthedutiesoftheStatespartyinrelationtothecriminalizationoftheexerciseoftherighttopeacefulassembly.

Criminalizationisunderstoodtomeanasystematicstrategyofsilencingthatoperatesbydelegitimizing the motives and repertoires of action by leaders and participants inpeacefulassembliesthroughtheuseofarbitrarydetentionsandjailingwithoutrespectfordueprocess;judicialpersecutionthroughcriminalormisdemeanorchargesfiledfororganizingorparticipatinginanassembly;punitivelegislationthatseekstosuppressorplace limits upon the exercise of the right,39 among others. In this sense, the SpecialRapporteuronfreedomofexpressionfortheIACHRhasasserted:

38UnitedNations.GeneralAssembly.ResolutionadoptedbytheGeneralAssemblyon18December2013.68/167.Therighttoprivacyinthedigitalera.A/RES/68/167.21January2014.Para.4.Availableforconsultationat:http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/68/167;GeneralAssembly.DepartmentofPublicInformation.GeneralAssemblyAdopts68Resolutions,7DecisionsasItTakesActiononReportsofItsThirdCommittee.39“Criminalizationandregulatorysuppressionofprotestdoesnotonlytakeforeformofrepressive,blanketrestrictionsonfreedomofassemblysuchasthosefoundinsomeundemocraticregimes.Italsooperatesmoresubtly,throughlawsthatareusedtostifleorputachillingeffectonparticipationinpublicassemblyor in protest.” Take back the streets: Repression and criminalization of protest around the world,InternationalNetworkofCivilLibertiesOrganizations-INCLO,Oct.2013,p.63.

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"ThecriminalizationofsocialprotestconsistsintheuseofthepunitivepoweroftheStatetodeter,punish,orpreventtheexerciseoftherighttoprotest, and in some cases, to social and political participation morebroadly,throughthearbitrary,disproportionate,orrepeateduseofthecriminal justice system against demonstrators, activists, and social orpolitical leaders for participating in or allegedly organizing a socialprotest,orforbeingpartoftheorganizingorconveninggrouporentity.As the Inter-American Commission has pointed out, its effects oftenincludearbitraryandprolongedprosecutionformisdemeanororcriminaloffenses,theimpositionoffines,and/orarbitraryarrestswithorwithoutaconviction."40

The aim is to single out thosewho exercise this right as a threat to public order andnational security, which ultimately has a dissuasive effect that hinders the right topeacefulassembly.TheIACHRhasestablishedthatcriminalizationhasaneffectbothonapersonallevel,inthatitincitesfearandanguishintheindividualduetothepotentialloss of freedom, as well as in a collective dimension, because it has the effect ofintimidatingorinhibitingmorepeoplefromexercisingtheirrighttopeacefulassemblyinthe future for fear of reprisals or also being subjected to unfounded criminalproceedings.41

General Comment No. 37must bemore precise about the duties held by judicialsystemswithinStatestocomplywiththeirobligationtorespectandguaranteetheright of assembly. The State itself uses criminal andmisdemeanor laws to discredit,stigmatize and pursue organizers and participants in peaceful assemblies merely forexercisingthatright.Beforeorduringtheassembly,arbitrarydetentionsaremadeandchargedwith crimes related to public order, or even formore serious crimes such asterrorism,withnoproofotherthanparticipationintheassembly.Itmustbeemphasizedthat individual conduct must be evaluated independently from that of the otherparticipantsinademonstration.TheStateholdstheburdenofproving,throughtheproperauthorities,anyviolentactionbyanindividualparticipant,andmustnotjustifycriminalchargesbasedondifferentactsofviolence thatmayhavearisenduringtheassembly.

Thecriminalizationoftherighttopeacefulassemblythroughtheexcessiveandarbitraryuseofcriminallawisincompatiblewiththeruleoflawthatguaranteesthefreedomofexpressionandfreedomofassemblyasoneofitsprecepts.

"[…]States have the obligation to take all necessary measures to avoid having State investigations lead to unjust or groundless trials for individuals who legitimately claim the respect and protection of human rights. Opening

40“ThecriminalizationofsocialprotestconsistsintheuseofthepunitivepoweroftheStatetodeter,punish,orpreventtheexerciseoftherighttoprotest,273andinsomecases,tosocialandpoliticalparticipationmorebroadly,throughthearbitrary,disproportionate,orrepeateduseofthecriminaljusticesystemagainstdemonstrators,activists,andsocialorpoliticalleadersforparticipatinginorallegedlyorganizingasocialprotest,orforbeingpartoftheorganizingorconveninggrouporentity.AstheInter-AmericanCommissionhaspointedout,itseffectsoftenincludearbitraryandprolongedprosecutionformisdemeanororcriminaloffenses,theimpositionoffines,and/orarbitraryarrestswithorwithoutaconviction.”OEA/Ser.L/V/IICIDH/RELE/INF.22/19,para.188. 41IACHR.SecondReportontheSituationofHumanRightsDefendersintheAmericas.OEA/Ser.L/V/II.Doc.6631December2011,para.79.

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groundless criminal investigations or judicial actions against human rights defenders not only has a chilling effect on their work but it can also paralyze their efforts to defend human rights, since their time, resources, and energy must be dedicated to their own defense”42

Furthermore,theformulationofcriminaloffensesmustcomplywithaseriesofelementssoastoimpedethepersecutionofcertainindividualsthroughallegedprotectionoflegalassets,accusingthemofcrimeswithoutsufficientcriminal-politicalgrounds.Definitionsofcriminaloffensesmustemploystrict,unmistakabletermsthatleavenoroomforbroadinterpretationorapplicationbyjudges,butinsteadareclearlyconstrainedtopunishableconduct.43Inotherwords,criminallegislationanditsapplication,casebycase, must always be circumscribed to the principle of legality so as to prevent thecriminalization of legitimate conduct by individuals while exercising their right topeacefulassembly,butthatmaybeseenasathreatorobstacletotheState.

4.3.Detentions

ThedraftversionoftheGeneralCommentrepeatedlymentionselementsrelatedtothedetentionofparticipants.Inbroadstrokes,itestablishesthattheprotectionoftherighttopeacefulassemblyisrelatedtotherighttonotbesubmittedtoarbitrarydetention,i.e.,tonotbeillegallydeprivedofone'sfreedom.Itlikewiseestablishesthat,incaseswherethedetentionofcertainindividualsislegalandrequired,saiddetentionmustcomplywithinternationalandnationallegislationontheuseofforce.

We recommend, however, that the draft incorporate themost advanced standardsregarding detentions and their use in the context of the exercise of the right ofassembly as a way to impede the exercise of that right, deter, punish, prevent therecordingandspreadof imagesofpoliceactionandgenerateadissuasiveeffect inthepopulation,particularlythoseestablishedbytheInter-AmericanSystemofHumanRights.

Thesedetentionsmustadherenotonlytonationalandinternationalstandardsontheuseof force, but also "those that refer to the rights of privacy, liberty and proceduralguarantees."44 Indeed, detentions must be sufficiently justified and grounded inreasonablemotives,notsimplyasaconsequenceoftheexerciseoftherightofassembly.Noparticipantinapeacefulassemblycanbesubjectedtoarbitrarydetentionorprison,because

"Nooneshallbedeprivedofhisphysicallibertyexceptforthereasonsandunderthe conditions established beforehand by the constitution of the State Partyconcernedorbyalawestablishedpursuantthereto."45

42Ibid,para.76.43OEA/Ser.L/V/II.Doc.6631December2011,para.80and81.

44 OEA/Ser.L/V/IICIDH/RELE/INF.22/19,para.128,availableat:https://www.oas.org/es/cidh/expresion/publicaciones/ProtestayDerechosHumanos.pdf 45 ConvenciónAmericanadeDerechosHumanos,art.7.2.

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Thatsaid,"theforceusedbypoliceofficerstoimmobilizeorarrestsomeoneatademonstrationmustbestrictlyproportionaltotheintendedobjectiveandshallonlybeappliedtotheextentnecessaryaccordingtotheresistanceofferedbythepersonagainstwhomitistobeused."46Oncethepersonisdetained,protectioncannotbesuspendedfromtheotherrightsprotected,suchastherighttolife,humandignity,non-discrimination,privacy,therighttonotbesubmittedtocruel,inhumanordegradingtreatment,amongothers.Inthissense:

"Detained persons have the right to live in conditions of detention that arecompatiblewiththeirpersonaldignityandtheStatemustguaranteetheirrighttolifeandtohumanetreatment.StateauthoritiesexercisetotalcontroloverpersonsundertheircustodyandthereforeStatesareguarantorsofthephysicalintegrityofdetainees."47

Detentions,retentionsortransfersofpersonsincontextsofassemblies,demonstrationsorsocialprotestsmustnotbeusedforthepurposeofrepressing,punishing,stigmatizing,pursuingordiscouragingparticipationinfutureassemblies.Inotherwords,

"An arrest based exclusively on the act of participating in a protest or publicdemonstration does not meet the requirements of reasonableness andproportionalityestablishedbyinternationalstandards.Thedeprivationoflibertyduringademonstrationhastheimmediateeffectofpreventingthedetaineefromexercisingtherighttoprotestandhasachillingeffectonparticipationinpublicdemonstrations, all ofwhich affects the enjoyment and exercise of the right tosocialprotest."48

It is important to remember that arbitrary detentions are a practice which lawenforcementofficialsoftenresorttoinordertopunishparticipantsinademonstration,thus failing tocomplywithall internationalprotocolsandstandardswhen itcomestoprocedural guarantees and the principle of legality. It is intimately related to thecriminalizationoftheexerciseoftherightofassembly.Moreover,duringthecourseofthedetention, it is common for other rights to be violated, such as the right to physicalintegrity,toinformation,privacy,anddefense,amongothers.Inthissense,anydetentionorarbitraryincarcerationmustbeinvestigatedandsanctioned.Statesmustcomplywithaseriesofspecificobligationsonthissubject,including:

i.stipulatingthatnopersonshallbedeprivedofhisorherlibertyexceptunderthecircumstancesthatthelawspecificallyprescribes;ii.guaranteeingthatpersonsinthecustodyofStateauthoritieswillreceivedecenttreatment;

46 OEA/Ser.L/V/IICIDH/RELE/INF.22/19,para.129,availableat:https://www.oas.org/es/cidh/expresion/publicaciones/ProtestayDerechosHumanos.pdf 47 OEA/Ser.L/V/II.Doc.57,2009,para.151,availableat:https://www.cidh.oas.org/pdf%20files/SEGURIDAD%20CIUDADANA%202009%20ESP.pdf 48 OEA/Ser.L/V/IICIDH/RELE/INF.22/19,para.228,availableat:https://www.oas.org/es/cidh/expresion/publicaciones/ProtestayDerechosHumanos.pdf

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iii.incorporatingintoitsdomesticlawstheobligationofStateagentstoimmediatelyinformthepersondetainedofthereasonsforhisorherdetention;

iv.immediatelyreportingthedetentiontothecompetentjudgeforadeterminationofthedetainedperson’srights;

v.informingthedetainedperson’snextofkinandlovedonesofhisorherwhereaboutsandthereasonsforthedetention;

vi.guaranteeingthedetainedpersontheservicesoflegalcounselfromthemomentofhisorherarrest;and

vii.organizingapublicrecordofpersonstakenintocustody.49

5. ObligationsofStatespartiesregardingtherighttopeacefulassembly

5.1.ExclusionoftheArmedForces

ThestandardexcludingtheArmedForcesfromsecuritytasksisextensivelydevelopedintheInter-AmericanHumanRightsSystem.Theattacheddocumentproposesre-wordingparagraph 92 by deleting the expression “generally” and inserting greater precisionregardingtheneedtoexcludetheArmedForcesfromfunctionsoffacilitatingassemblies,inlinewithstateobligationswithintheframeworkofarticle21.AstheInter-AmericanCourtobserved,

“States should limit to the utmost the use of the armed forces for controllinginternaldisturbancesbecausetheirtrainingisaimedatdefeatingtheenemy,notatprotectingandcontrollingcivilians,whichiswhatpoliceforcesaretrainedtodo.”50

Broadening this principle, in the 2007 Zambrano Vélez vs. Ecuador case, the Courtconsideredthatitis

“[a]bsolutelynecessarytoemphasizetheextremecarethatstatesshouldexerciseuponusingtheArmedForcesasameanstocontrolsocialprotest,internalriots,internal violence, exceptional situations and common crime. As noted by thisCourt, ‘states should limit to theutmost theuseof the armed forces to controlinternal riots because their training is aimed at defeating the enemy, not atprotectingandcontrollingcivilians,whichiswhatpoliceforcesaretrainedtodo’.

49 OEA/Ser.L/V/IICIDH/RELE/INF.22/19,para.140,availableat:https://www.oas.org/es/cidh/expresion/publicaciones/ProtestayDerechosHumanos.pdf 50 Inter-AmericanCourtofHR,MonteroArangurenetal.(ReténdeCatia)vs.Venezuela,2006,para.78.

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The boundary between military and police functions should guide strictcompliancewith thedutyofpreventionandprotectionof the rightsat risk, forwhichdomesticauthoritiesareresponsible.”51

Withinacontextofrapidmilitarizationofstateactioninthecontextofassemblies,weconsider itcrucialthatGeneralObservationNo.37shouldincludethesedevelopmentsmadeoverseveralyearsintheInter-AmericanHumanRightsSystem.

6. Accountability

6.1.TransparencyandAccesstoInformation

IndifferentpartsoftheAmericancontinent,people’srighttoassembleandprotesthasbeenviolated.Therighttoprotestarisesfromthearticulationoftherighttoassemblyandtherighttofreedomofexpression,aswellasfromtherighttopoliticalparticipation.

ItfallstotheStatetoensurethattheserightscanbeexercisedeffectively,whereforeitisessential to activate effective mechanisms of citizen oversight of state action. Thisrequirestransparency,accesstoinformationandaccountability.Insuchregard,wenotethat General Observation No. 37 is not precise in its reference to the stateobligationsofproducinginformationandensuringthatitisavailabletocitizens.

Freedom of information is part of the fundamental right to freedom of expressionrecognizedbyResolution59 of theUnitedNationsGeneralAssembly of 1946, andbyarticle19oftheUniversalDeclarationofHumanRights,whichestablishesthateveryonehas the right to freedomof expression,which includes the right to “seek, receive andimpartinformationandopinionsthroughanymediaandregardlessoffrontiers.”

Moreover,freedomofinformationhasalsobeenenshrinedasderivingfromfreedomofexpression in other international human rights instruments, such as the Pact andAmericanConventiononHumanRights,whichindicate:

“Everyone has the right to freedomof expression; this right includesfreedomtoseek,receiveandimpartinformationandideasofanykind,regardlessoffrontiers,eitherorally, inwriting, inprint, intheformofart,orthroughanymediumprocedureofone’schoice.”52

Accesstoinformationisconsidereda“keyright”becauseitenablescitizenstoenjoyotherrights.Forthepurposeshereof,itwouldinvolve,forexample,accesstotheinformationneededtoexercisetherighttoprotestandtherighttoassembly;butalsotoinformationthatmaybeessentialtoenablingotherrightssuchastherighttoaccessjusticeifthereareviolationsofdemonstrators’rightsorexcessiveuseofforcebysecurityforcesduringanassembly;ortoprotecttherighttoprivacyinthecaseofsomeonebeingtheobjectofsurveillancepolicies.Forthesecases,itisessentialthatcitizensshouldbeabletoknowinadvance the intended security arrangements or action protocols, and subsequently to

51 Inter-AmericanCourtofHR,ZambranoVélezvs.Ecuador,2007,para.51.52 United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966. Article 19. OAS, American Convention on Human Rights (Pact of San José), 1969. Article 13.

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have access to accounts of the actual useof arms, video recordingsor otherdata andrecords.

Itisthusessentialforcitizenstohaveaccesstotheinformationneededtoexercisetherightsrelatedtoarticle21ofthePact,forwhichitisessentialthatthereshouldnotbeundue restrictions to information. In such regard, the IACHR Office of the SpecialRapporteur for Freedom of Expression has expressed itself by developing a set ofstandardsonaccesstoinformationrelatedtotherighttosocialprotest53,whichnotethatthereshouldbebroadcriteriaforaccesstoinformationandtheconsequentobligationfortheStatetoproduceinformationandrecords.

WebelievethatitiscriticalthattheUnitedNationsinternationalstandardshouldnotbelowerthantheregionalstandard,andinthisregard,thesignatoryorganizationsadoptas our own the suggestions of the aforementioned RFOE report which includespreviousstandardsandopinionsgeneratedbyvarious internationalbodies.Thereportalsoaddssomeclarifications,stressingthattheStateshouldguaranteethatcitizenscanaccessinformation,whichmustcoveratleastthefollowing:

● Theright toaccess information includes theright to “recordanassembly,whichincludestherighttorecordthelawenforcementoperation.Thisalsoincludes theright torecordan interaction inwhich theheorshe isbeingrecordedbyastateagent,sometimesreferredtoastherightto“recordback.”Thestateshouldprotectthisright.Confiscation,seizureand/ordestructionof notes and audio or audiovisual recording equipment without dueproceduralguaranteesshouldbeprohibitedandpunished.”54

● TheStatehasthedutytodocumentandrecordtheactionsofitsagents,inorder toenable reviewand improvementof theiractions,with theaimofenablinganynecessaryoversightincaseofanyirregularity.55

● Theregulationsgoverningsocialprotestshouldbeaccessibleandpublished.This includesnotonly laws,butalsoprotocolsorproceduralmanualsandordersonhowtoconductoperations.56

53OEA/Ser.L/V/IICIDH/RELE/INF.22/1954 HumanRightsCouncil.“JointreportoftheSpecialRapporteurontheRightstoFreedomofPeacefulAssemblyandofAssociationandtheSpecialRapporteuronExtrajudicial,SummaryorArbitraryExecutionsonthepropermanagementofassemblies,”A/HRC/31/66,4February42016,para.71/Alsoat:OEA/Ser.L/V/IICIDH/RELE/INF.22/19,para.308.55ROEA/Ser.L/V/IICIDH/RELE/INF.22/19,para.309.56 “Legislationguidingthepoliceshallbeaccessibletothepublicandsufficientlyclearandpreciseand,ifneedbe,completedbyclearregulationsequallyaccessibletothepublic.”EuropeanCodeofPoliceEthics.RecommendationRec.(2001)10oftheCommitteeofMinisterstothememberstatesontheEuropeanCodeofPoliceEthics.II4)/Alsoin:OEA/Ser.L/V/IICIDH/RELE/INF.22/19,para.310.

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● The state should keep a detailed record of assigned weapons andammunition,andestablishproceduresandformsofsupervisionsothat,inthecontextofdemonstrations,onlypermittedweaponsareassigned.57

6.2.Protocolsforcriteriaforuseofforce

RelatedtothegeneralobligationofStatespartiestorespectandguaranteetherighttopeaceful assembly is the obligation of accountability andproviding effective remedieswhenthisrightisviolated.

General Observation No. 37mentions accountabilitywith regard to its importance inpreventingviolationsandabusesofrights(paragraph71),thedutytoreportanyuseofforce(paragraph88),stateresponsibilityforactionsandomissionsofitslawenforcementagencies(paragraph100)andtheuseofrecordingdevicesbylawenforcementofficials(paragraph105).

However,thereisnospecificdevelopmentofthedutyofaccountabilityinrelationto the protocols and criteria for use of force. Transparency and the possibility ofeveryonebeingabletoaccesstheinformationontheuseofforcearehighlyrelevantinthecontextoftherighttopeacefulassembly.Thismeansthattherulesandregulationsonthissubjectmustclearlyestablishthedutiesandresponsibilitiesofthoseofficialswhoparticipateinmanagingassemblies,theprocedurestobefollowedinrelationtothe exercise of the right, which authorities are responsible and what resources areavailable in the event that there is as violation of this right and others within theframeworkofapeacefulassembly.

Giventhatduringtheexerciseoftherighttheremaybedifferenteventsinvolvinguseofviolencebyparticipantsorothersinfiltratedintheassembly,thepossibilityarisesthatthe law enforcement agents may employ force. This use of force cannot under anycircumstancesbearbitrary,excessiveordiscriminatory.Inthiscontext:

“Legislationshouldmandatecollectionandreportingofdataontheuseof force, including: numbers and types ofweapons deployed; arrests;stops and searches conducted; and the training that officers havereceived on the use of CCWs and equipment. There should be acentralizedsystemforreportingeachinstanceaCCWorafirearmisusedordrawn,whetheritresultedininjuryordeath,andthedemographicinformation of the individuals against whom force was used. Anunjustifiedfailuretoreportorkeepadequaterecordsshouldconstitutegroundsfordisciplinaryaction.”58

57BasicPrinciplesontheUseofForceandFirearmsbyLawEnforcementOfficials,Principle11.IACHR,AccesstoJusticeandSocialInclusion:TheRoadtowardsStrengtheningDemocracyinBolivia,OEA/Ser.L/V/II.Doc.34,28June2007ChapterI,Introduction.Par.45b)/Alsoin:OEA/Ser.L/V/IICIDH/RELE/INF.22/19,para.312.58Defendingdissent:TowardsStatePracticesthatProtectandPromotetheRightstoProtest.InternationalNetworkofCivilLibertiesOrganizations-INCLO&TheInternationalHumanRightsClinic(IHRC).2018.p.11.

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Theuseofforceshouldfollowaseriesofprotocolspreviouslyestablishedinthenational legislation, respecting the highest international standards, withsufficientlyclearprinciplesandcriteriaenablingevaluationofwhenforcewasdeployed adequately and when it was not. Thus, said protocols should beavailableandeasilyaccessibletoeveryone,whetherornottheyparticipateinapeacefulassembly.

“All regulations governing social protest must be accessible andpublished. These regulations include not only laws, decrees andordinances,butalsogeneralprotocols,proceduralmanualsandspecificordersonhowtoconductoperations.Theknowledgeanddisclosureofthese protocols and ethical norms reduce the arbitrary margins ofdecisionsandactionsbystateagentsinrelationtosocialprotests.”59

Being easily accessible means not only that they are easy to find, but also that theirlanguagecanbeunderstoodbyeveryonewithoutmajordifficulty.Moreover,thecriteriagoverning the use of force: legality, necessity, proportionality, caution andnon-discrimination,shouldbedefinedasclearlyaspossible inordertopreventbroad,ambiguousinterpretationsthatcouldcauseanillegitimateuseofforcetobeconsideredacceptable,therebyenablingagentswhocommitabuseandarbitraryactionsnottobeheldaccountablefordoingso.

Agentsshouldapply techniquesofsocialdialogandde-escalatingconflictbeforeusingforce,whichshouldonlybeemployedasthelastresort.AsnotedbytheUN,governmentsshall ensure that arbitrary or abusive use of force is punished as a criminaloffence60.Thisincludesknowledgeandtimelyaccesstolegalremediesbyanyoneincaseofallegedviolationsoftherighttopeacefulassemblyorotherrightsthatmaybeaffectedduringitsexercise.However,knowingthelegalremediesthatareavailabletoindividualsisnotsufficienttoensureprotectionofrights.Accesstolegalremediesmustbeeffectiveandefficient;theauthoritiesinchargeofprocessingtheremediesmustactindependentlyandtransparentlysothat investigationshavethenecessarymomentum,theymustnotallow themselves to be influenced by corruption, and theymust be able to impose apenaltyattheendoftheprocess.

Inaddition to theabove,wehighlight theobligation toprovidecommandstructureswhich are clear and known to everyone, in order to support accountabilityregardingthemanagementofpeacefulassemblies61and, ifrelevant,alsoregardingtheuseforce.Anyuseofforcebylawenforcementagentsmustbereported,notified,recordedindetailanddulyjustified.

59OEA/Ser.L/V/IICIDH/RELE/INF.22/19,para.310.60 UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials,principles6,7and22.61 “It is also important that the operational planning instructions identify the senior commandofficersresponsiblefortheoperationandtheparticipatingunits.Themainordersandinstructionsgivenduringtheoperation must also be recorded and substantiated. Protocols should clearly set out the levels ofresponsibilityfordifferentorders..”OEA/Ser.L/V/IICIDH/RELE/INF.22/19,para.315.

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“Itisthedutyofthestatetokeepadetailedrecordofassignedweaponsand ammunition. It is essential to establish procedures and forms ofsupervision so that, in the contextofdemonstrations, onlyauthorizedofficials are assigned theweaponspermitted forpotentialuse.This isdone by individually assigning weapons and ammunition, as well asidentifying the officers responsible for supervising and documentingproperandeffectivecompliancewiththeseprovisions.”62

When,asaconsequenceoftheuseofforce,whetherlegitimateorillegitimate,therearedeathsorinjuries,theseeventsshouldbereportedandsubjecttoastrictinvestigationprocess inorder todeterminewhetherornot the statewas responsible for improperprocedure.These investigations,atbothcriminalandadministrativelevel,shouldbetransparent,independentandfair.Thiscontributestopreventingthestateanditsagentsfromcommittingfurtherviolationsoftherighttopeacefulassemblyandtheotherrightswhichmaybeaffectedduringitsexercise,sinceinadditiontoindividualcriminalliabilitythatmaybeidentified,theresponsibilityoftheinstitutioncanalsobedetermined,aswell as relatedorganizational factors suchas linesof command,proceduralnorms,operationplanning,typeofweaponsusedandevenagenttraining.

“TheStatealsohasthedutytodocumentandrecordtheactionsofitsagents,inordertoallowforthereviewandimprovementoftheiractions[…].Theaccessibilityandconservationoftheserecordsalsofacilitatethenecessaryoversightofanyreportedirregularities.”63

Thus,robustmechanismsforaccountabilityareanessentialcomponentforprotectingtheright to peaceful assembly, because they enable detailed knowledge of the legalframework governing the action of law enforcement agents, thereby monitoring itscompliancewithrequiredhumanrightsstandards,applyingpenaltieswhenthereisanyshortcomingintherighttopeacefulassemblyandotherrightsrelatedtoitsexercise.

6.3.Accountabilityregardinguseofsurveillancetechnologies

Consideringthattheuseofsurveillancetechnologiesbystatesinvolvesinterferencewiththeinherentrighttoprivacyandsubsequentimpactonotherrights,includingtherighttoassembly,additionalmeasuresshouldbeadoptedtoenableconditionsoftransparencyandaccountabilityintheacquisitionanduseofthesetechnologies.

Throughout the wording of General Observation No. 37 proposed by the Committee,reference is made to various ways of using technologies during surveillance tasks.However, it does not address the importance of havingmonitoring tools, amongwhichwehighlightmeasuresof transparencyandaccessto informationincaseswhenthesetechnologiesareimplementedbefore,duringoratactivitiesrelatedtotherighttopeacefulassembly.

In relation to these ideas, both the regulation of the conditions and exceptionalcircumstancesthatauthorizesurveillanceactivities,andtheprocedurefortheirlicituse,

62 Ibid,para.312.63 Ibid,para.309.

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shouldbeincludedinthelaw,knownbycitizens.Moreover,monitoringtoolsforcitizensshouldbeprovidedlegally,includingobligationsofactiveandpassivetransparency,andthemechanisms for evaluation andpenalty of abuse in surveillance actions. Similarly,there isaneed for transparencyandaccess to informationonthecontracts,remedies,practicesandstatisticsreflectinghowthestatesperformtheseintrusiveactivities.

Faced by the risk of arbitrary action, which is especially evident in cases wherediscretionalfacultiesareexercised,theEuropeanCourtofHumanRights(ECtHR)takestheviewthatregardingsecretsurveillancemeasures,therequirementthattheymustbeprovidedbylawmeansthatsufficientlycleartermsmustbeusedtoindicateadequatelythecircumstancesandconditionsunderwhichpublicauthoritiesareauthorizedtotakesuchmeasures,becauseitisessentialtohaveclear,detailedrulesonthesubject.64

TheformerUnitedNationsSpecialRapporteurforthepromotionandprotectionoftherighttofreedomofexpressionandopinion,FrankLaRue,hascalleduponthestatestoreviewnationallegislationregulatingsurveillanceofcommunicationssothatitadaptstointernational standards through measures such as independent judicial supervision;establishment of measures related to the scope, nature, duration and circumstancesunderwhichsurveillancecanbeadopted;deferrednotificationof theaffectedperson;accesstoadequate,effectivejudicialremedy;respectoftheprincipleofproportionality;supervisionbyan independentagency;measuresof transparencyandothermeasuresinhibitingabuseofsurveillancepowers.65

The lackofoversighton the surveillanceactivitiesemployed in the contextof apeacefulassembly,whethermassivelyorspecificallyregardingagivenparticipant,involves the inherent risk of abuse;66 therefore, tools such as transparency areessentialtotheexistenceofsocialoversightoverthistypeofmeasures,inordertoinhibitrisksofabuseandensureadequateinformedpublicdiscussionoftherisksinvolvedinsurveillancemeasures,particularlywhenperformedsecretlyorinamannerunknowntothepersonsaffected.

Theimportanceoftransparencyregardingsecretsurveillancemeasureshasbeenwidelyrecognized by various international human rights agencies; among others, in theresolution“Therighttoprivacyinthedigitalage,”adoptedbyconsensusbythemembersoftheUNGeneralAssemblyofDecember18,2013andagainonNovember19,2014:

Recommends that states should establish or maintain “independent,effective domestic oversight mechanisms capable of ensuringtransparency,asappropriate,andaccountabilityforstatesurveillanceofcommunications,theirinterceptionandcollectionofpersonaldata”67.

64EuropeanCourtofHR.Uzunvs.Germany.ApplicationNo.35623/05.Sentenceof2September2010,para.61;ValenzuelaContrerasvs.Spain.ApplicationNo.58/1997/842/1048.Sentenceof30July1998,para.46.65UN.ReportoftheSpecialRapporteuronthepromotionandprotectionoftherighttofreedomofopinionandexpression,FrankLaRue.17April2013.A/HRC/23/40.66EuropeanCourtofHR.CASEOFTHEASSOCIATIONFOREUROPEANINTEGRATIONANDHUMANRIGHTSANDEKIMDZHIEVvs.BULGARIA,paras.90-94.67UN.GeneralAssembly.ResolutionapprovedbytheGeneralAssemblyonDecember18,2013.68/167.Therighttoprivacyinthedigitalage.A/RES/68/167.21January2014.

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AsimilarideawasexpressedintheJointDeclarationonSurveillanceProgramsandtheirImpact on Freedom of Expression by the UN and the IACHR Special Rapporteur forFreedomofExpression:

“All persons have the right to access information held by the state,includinginformationhavingtodowithnationalsecurity.Thelawmayestablishspecificexceptionsaslongasthoseexceptionsarenecessaryinademocraticsociety.The lawsmustensure that thepubliccanaccessinformation on private communications surveillance programs,including their scope and any regulation that may be in place toguarantee that they cannot be used arbitrarily. Consequently, statesshould, at the very least, make public any information regarding theregulatoryframeworkofsurveillanceprograms;theagenciesinchargeoftheirimplementationandoversight;theproceduresforauthorization,selectionoftargets,anddatamanagement;andinformationontheuseofthesetechniques, includingaggregatedataontheirscope.Atall times,states must establish independent oversight mechanisms that arecapableofensuringprogramtransparencyandaccountability.(…)

Thestatehastheobligationtomakeknownwidelyanyinformationonthe existence of illegal programs of surveillance of privatecommunication. This duty must be satisfied without prejudice to theright topersonal informationof anyone affected. In every case, statesmustperformexhaustive investigations to identifyandpunishanyoneresponsibleforthesetypesofpracticesandprovidetimelynotificationtothosewhomayhavebeenvictims.”68

Notwithstanding the above, states often adopt laws and procedures that fosteruncertainty and serve as protection for abuse by authorities; the example parexcellence is withholding information on surveillance for reasons of “nationalsecurity.”Relianceonreasonsofnationalsecurityinordernottodeliverinformationonintrusiveactivitiesandtechnologiesconstitutesarisktotheobligationsandtransparencyand makes accountability impossible, seriously limiting the exercise of fundamentalrightsincludedintherighttoassembly.

Insuchregard,Principle1.3oftheJohannesburgPrinciples69establishesthatinordertoimposea restrictionon freedomofexpressionor information, itmustbenecessary toprotectalegitimateinterest,andthegovernmentmustprovethat:

“1.The expressionor information at issueposes a serious threat to alegitimatenationalsecurityinterest;

68TheUnitedNations(UN)SpecialRapporteuronFreedomofOpinionandExpression,SpecialRapporteurforFreedomofExpressionoftheInter-AmericanCommissiononHumanRightsoftheOAS,JointDeclarationonSurveillanceProgramsandtheirImpactonFreedomofExpression.Availableat:https://www.oas.org/es/cidh/expresion/showarticle.asp?artID=926&lID=269 Article 19. The Johannesburg Principles on National Security, Freedom of Expression and Access toInformation.November1996.Availableat:https://www.article19.org/data/files/medialibrary/1803/Johannesburg-Principles.Spa.pdf

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2. The restriction imposed is the least restrictive means possible forprotectingthatinterest;and

3.Therestrictioniscompatiblewithdemocraticprinciples.”

The above was reinforced by the development of instruments such as the GlobalPrinciples on National Security and the Right to Information (Tshwane Principles)70,whichhaveworkedontherequirementstorestricttherighttoinformationduetoreasonsofnationalsecurity,emphasizingthat:

“No restriction on the right to information may be imposed on thegrounds of national security unless the government can demonstratethat:(1)therestriction(a)isprescribedbylawand(b)isnecessaryinademocratic society (c) to protect a legitimate interest of nationalsecurity;and(2)thelawprovidesadequatesafeguardsagainstpotentialabuse, including prompt, full, accessible, and effective scrutiny of thevalidityoftherestrictionsbyanindependentoversightauthorityandfullreviewbythecourts.”71

TheTshwanePrinciplesmakeverycleartheneedtorecognizetheobligationofstatestoensuretransparencyregardingsurveillanceprogramsforpurposesofnationalsecurity,because,asnotedinPrinciple10,theinformationcategoriesonwhichthereisastrongassumptionoressentialinterestinfavorofitbeingmadepublicconsistofthefollowing:

“E. Surveillance (1) The laws andmain regulations concerning secretsurveillance of all kinds, aswell as the procedures to be followed forauthorizing such surveillance, selecting targets, and using, sharing,storing,anddestroyinginterceptedmaterial,shouldbeaccessibletothepublic.

(2) The public should also have access to information about entitiesauthorizedtoconductsurveillance,andstatisticsabouttheuseofsuchsurveillance.

(3) In addition, the public should be informed regarding illegalsurveillance.Informationaboutsuchsurveillanceshouldbedisclosedtothemaximumextentwithoutviolatingtheprivacyrightsofthosewhoweresubjecttosurveillance.

(4)ThesePrinciplesaddresstherightofthepublictoaccessinformationandarewithoutprejudicetotheadditionalsubstantiveandproceduralrightsofindividualswhohavebeen,orbelievethattheymayhavebeen,subjecttosurveillance.”

70 GlobalPrinciplesonNationalSecurityandtheRighttoInformation(“TshwanePrinciples”)concludedinTshwane, South Africa and published on 12 June 2013. Available at:https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/spanish-version_of_the_tshwane_principles.doc71 GlobalPrinciplesonNationalSecurityandtheRighttoInformation(“TshwanePrinciples”)concludedinTshwane, South Africa and published on 12 June 2013. Principle 3. Available at:https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/spanish-version_of_the_tshwane_principles.doc

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Considering the importance of reiterating the need to have in place measures fortransparencyassociatedtosurveillanceactivitiesbystates,itisequallyimportantnottoignore the mechanisms by which authorities may disregard their obligations oftransparency. It is therefore suggested that the General Observation should add aparagraphconsideringthissituation.

Conclusion

ThegroupofLatinAmericanhumanrightsorganizationssigningthiscontributioncallforthereviewofthedraftofGeneralObservationNo.37ontherighttoassemblyinthelightoftheinformationsharedhereinbasedontheexperienceinthefieldofourorganizations.

ItisessentialthattheGeneralObservationshouldbeclearregardingstateobligationsinrelation to Article 21 of the Pact and consistentwith developments in standards andpracticalrecommendationsinrecentyearsatregionallevel,inparticularintheEuropeanand InteramericanSystem, and thosedevelopedat international level by thedifferentagenciesencompassedintheUnitedNations.

WeurgeCommitteemembers to review the specific suggestions for improvements oradjustmentsinthewording,whichwehaveattachedasanANNEXtothisdocument.