joint doctrine for amphibious operations · amphibious forces may be especially suited to conduct...

19 September 2001

Joint Doctrine forAmphibious Operations

Joint Publication 3-02

PREFACE

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1. Scope

This publication is a doctrine document inthe joint operations series. It providesfundamental principles that guide the ArmedForces of the United States in the conduct ofamphibious operations.

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared underthe direction of the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff. It sets forth doctrine to governthe joint activities and performance of theArmed Forces of the United States in jointoperations and provides the doctrinal basis forUS military involvement in multinational andinteragency operations. It provides militaryguidance for the exercise of authority bycombatant commanders and other jointforce commanders (JFCs) and prescribesdoctrine for joint operations and training. Itprovides military guidance for use by theArmed Forces in preparing their appropriateplans. It is not the intent of this publication torestrict the authority of the JFC fromorganizing the force and executing the missionin a manner the JFC deems most appropriateto ensure unity of effort in the accomplishmentof the overall mission.

3. Application

a. Doctrine and guidance established inthis publication apply to the commandersof combatant commands, subunifiedcommands, joint task forces, and subordinatecomponents of these commands. Theseprinciples and guidance also may apply whensignificant forces of one Service are attachedto forces of another Service or whensignificant forces of one Service supportforces of another Service.

b. The guidance in this publication isauthoritative; as such, this doctrine will befollowed except when, in the judgment of thecommander, exceptional circumstancesdictate otherwise. If conflicts arise betweenthe contents of this publication and thecontents of Service publications, thispublication will take precedence for theactivities of joint forces unless the Chairmanof the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally incoordination with the other members of theJoint Chiefs of Staff, has provided morecurrent and specific guidance. Commandersof forces operating as part of a multinational(alliance or coalition) military commandshould follow multinational doctrine andprocedures ratified by the United States. Fordoctrine and procedures not ratified by theUnited States, commanders should evaluateand follow the multinational command’sdoctrine and procedures, where applicable andconsistent with US law, regulations, anddoctrine.

S. A. FRYVice Admiral, U.S. NavyDirector, Joint Staff

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

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PAGE

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................ ix

CHAPTER ICONCEPT OF AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS

• General ..................................................................................................................... I-1• Applications .............................................................................................................. I-2• Types of Amphibious Operations .............................................................................. I-2• Characteristics ........................................................................................................... I-4• Capabilities ............................................................................................................... I-6• Sequence ................................................................................................................... I-6• Initiating an Amphibious Operation .......................................................................... I-6• Termination of an Amphibious Operation ................................................................. I-8

CHAPTER IICOMMAND AND CONTROL

• General .................................................................................................................... II-1• Organization of Joint Forces ..................................................................................... II-1• Command and Control of Amphibious Forces .......................................................... II-2• Operational Control ................................................................................................. II-4• Tactical Control ........................................................................................................ II-5• Support .................................................................................................................... II-5• Parallel Chains of Command .................................................................................... II-7• Amphibious Force Task Organization and Task Designators .................................... II-8• Operational Areas .................................................................................................... II-9

CHAPTER IIIAIR COMMAND AND CONTROL

• Joint Air Operations ............................................................................................... III-1• Airspace Control in Amphibious Operations .......................................................... III-1• Navy Tactical Air Control Center ........................................................................... III-4• Marine Corps Tactical Air Command Center .......................................................... III-5• Tactical Air Operations Center ............................................................................... III-6• Counterair Operations During Amphibious Operations .......................................... III-6• Air Command and Control Procedures ................................................................... III-8

CHAPTER IVAPPROACH TO PLANNING AND PRIMARY DECISIONS

• General .................................................................................................................. IV-1• Tenets of Amphibious Planning .............................................................................. IV-1

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• Planning Directive ................................................................................................. IV-2• Amphibious Planning Process ................................................................................ IV-2• Primary Decisions .................................................................................................. IV-4• Crosstalks and Confirmation Briefs ........................................................................ IV-8

CHAPTER VTHE INTELLIGENCE CYCLE AND AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS

• Introduction: Amphibious Operations Intelligence, Surveillance, andReconnaissance ..................................................................................................... V-1

• Required Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Capabilities ..................... V-1• The Intelligence Cycle and Amphibious Operations ................................................ V-2• Key Intelligence Activities and Goals During Planning ........................................... V-3• Intelligence Support to Operations .......................................................................... V-4

CHAPTER VICOMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS, AND COMPUTER SYSTEMSSUPPORT PLANNING

• Requirements of Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems .... VI-1• General C4 Systems Support Planning Considerations ........................................... VI-2• C4 Systems Support During the Planning Phase ..................................................... VI-2• C4 Systems Support During the Embarkation Phase ............................................... VI-3• C4 Systems Support During the Rehearsal Phase ................................................... VI-3• C4 Systems Support During the Movement Phase .................................................. VI-3• C4 Systems Support During Advance Force Operations ......................................... VI-3• C4 Systems Support During the Action Phase ........................................................ VI-3• Responsibilities ...................................................................................................... VI-3• Communications Deception and Countermeasures ................................................. VI-4• C4 Systems Support Plan ....................................................................................... VI-4• Landing Force C4 Systems ..................................................................................... VI-4

CHAPTER VIIFIRE SUPPORT PLANNING AND COORDINATION

• General ................................................................................................................. VII-1• Fire Support Systems ............................................................................................ VII-1• Planning and Coordination .................................................................................... VII-4

CHAPTER VIIILOGISTICS PLANNING

• General ................................................................................................................ VIII-1• Logistic Planning Responsibilities ........................................................................ VIII-2• Logistic Planning Considerations and Factors ...................................................... VIII-3• Logistic Planning Sequence ................................................................................. VIII-4• Logistic Plans ....................................................................................................... VIII-5

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• Embarkation and Loading Plans ........................................................................... VIII-7• Health Service Support Plans ............................................................................... VIII-7• Landing Force Support Party Plans .................................................................... VIII-10• Pontoon Causeway and Lighterage Plans ........................................................... VIII-13• Engineer Plans ................................................................................................... VIII-13• Advanced Base Development and Garrison Plans .............................................. VIII-13

CHAPTER IXAMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS AGAINST COASTAL DEFENSES

• General .................................................................................................................. IX-1• Anti-landing Doctrine ............................................................................................ IX-1• Amphibious Breach of Coastal Defenses ................................................................ IX-2• Integrated Mine Countermeasures and Amphibious Breaching Operations ............. IX-3• Operations in Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Environments ............................. IX-4

CHAPTER XEMBARKATION

• General ................................................................................................................... X-1• Embarkation Planning ............................................................................................. X-1• Embarkation Planning Responsibilities ................................................................... X-2

CHAPTER XIREHEARSALS

• General .................................................................................................................. XI-1• Requirements ......................................................................................................... XI-1• Rehearsal Plans ...................................................................................................... XI-1• Security .................................................................................................................. XI-2

CHAPTER XIIMOVEMENT TO THE OPERATIONAL AREA

• General ................................................................................................................. XII-1• Echelons of the Landing Force .............................................................................. XII-1• Organization for Movement .................................................................................. XII-3• Planning Responsibilities ...................................................................................... XII-4• Sea Routes to the Operational Area ....................................................................... XII-5• Sea Routes in the Operational Area ....................................................................... XII-5• Staging Areas ........................................................................................................ XII-6• Sea Areas .............................................................................................................. XII-6• Regulating Points .................................................................................................. XII-8• Geographic Reference Points ................................................................................ XII-8• Security ................................................................................................................. XII-8• Protective Measures .............................................................................................. XII-8• Electronic Warfare En Route ................................................................................. XII-9

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• Intelligence En Route ............................................................................................ XII-9• Coordination During Passage ................................................................................ XII-9• Approach to the Operational Area ......................................................................... XII-9

CHAPTER XIIISUPPORTING, ADVANCE FORCE, AND PREASSAULT OPERATIONS

• General ................................................................................................................ XIII-1• Supporting Amphibious Operations ..................................................................... XIII-1• Advance Force Operations ................................................................................... XIII-2• Preassault Operations ........................................................................................... XIII-3

CHAPTER XIVSHIP-TO-SHORE MOVEMENT PLANNING

• General ............................................................................................................... XIV-1• Relationship to Other Planning ............................................................................ XIV-3• Responsibilities for Ship-to-Shore Movement Planning ...................................... XIV-3• Ship-to-Shore Movement Planning Considerations ............................................. XIV-4• Over-the-Horizon Amphibious Operations .......................................................... XIV-5• Navigational Aids ............................................................................................... XIV-8

CHAPTER XVACTION

• General ................................................................................................................. XV-1• Organization and Command Relationships ............................................................ XV-1• Control .................................................................................................................. XV-2• Final Preparations for the Ship-to-Shore Movement .............................................. XV-3• Subsidiary Landings .............................................................................................. XV-3• MPF and APF Operations ..................................................................................... XV-4• Follow-up Transport Ships and Aircraft ................................................................ XV-4• Assault .................................................................................................................. XV-4• Amphibious Withdrawals ...................................................................................... XV-5• Amphibious Demonstrations ................................................................................. XV-6• Amphibious Raids ................................................................................................. XV-9• Amphibious Operations in Support of MOOTW ................................................. XV-11

APPENDIX

A References ........................................................................................................ A-1B Administrative Instructions ................................................................................ B-1

GLOSSARY

Part I Abbreviations and Acronyms ................................................................... GL-1Part II Terms and Definitions .............................................................................. GL-5

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FIGURE

I-1 Phases of an Amphibious Operation ............................................................. I-7II-1 Examples of Shifts in the Support Relationship ........................................... II-7III-1 Command and Control of Joint Air Operations .......................................... III-2III-2 Coordination Responsibilities .................................................................... III-4III-3 The Counterair Framework ........................................................................ III-7III-4 Conceptual Amphibious Defense Zone ...................................................... III-8IV-1 Steps in the Amphibious Planning Process ................................................ IV-3IV-2 Primary Decisions Responsibilities Matrix ................................................ IV-5IV-3 Landing Area Selection ............................................................................. IV-6VI-1 Communications Support Requirements .................................................... VI-2VI-2 Command, Control, Communications and Computer Systems Support

Plan ......................................................................................................... VI-5VII-1 Joint Targeting Cycle Phases .................................................................... VII-6VIII-1 Logistic and Combat Service Support Plans ............................................. VIII-5VIII-2 Contents of the Health Service Support Plan ............................................ VIII-8VIII-3 Health Service Support Planning Considerations ..................................... VIII-9VIII-4 Landing Force Health Service Support Plan........................................... VIII-10VIII-5 Landing Force Support Party Planning Considerations .......................... VIII-12IX-1 Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defense Priorities ................................ IX-6XII-1 Sea Areas ................................................................................................. XII-7XIV-1 Planning Sequence ................................................................................. XIV-4XIV-2 Landing Plan Documents ........................................................................ XIV-5XIV-3 Over-the-Horizon Operations ................................................................. XIV-7XV-1 Assault Sequence ...................................................................................... XV-5XV-2 Types of Military Operations Other Than War ........................................ XV-12XV-3 Considerations During Military Operations Other Than War .................. XV-13

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARYCOMMANDER’S OVERVIEW

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An amphibious operationis a military operationlaunched from the sea byan amphibious forceembarked in ships or craftwith the primary purposeof introducing a landingforce (LF) ashore toaccomplish the assignedmission.

Amphibious operationsapply maneuver principlesto expeditionary powerprojection in joint andmultinational operations.

Clarification of terms.

General Concepts

Discusses the Types and Characteristics of AmphibiousOperations

Covers Command Relationships for AmphibiousOperations

Discusses Air Command and Control Arrangements

Covers Amphibious Operations Planning and ExecutionConsiderations

Types of amphibious operations include assaults, withdrawals,demonstrations, raids, and other operations in a permissive,uncertain, or hostile environment.

An amphibious force conducts amphibious operations. Anamphibious force is defined as an amphibious task force(ATF) and a landing force (LF) together with other forces thatare trained, organized, and equipped for amphibious operations.

Amphibious operations seek to exploit the element of surpriseand capitalize on enemy weakness by projecting and applyingcombat power precisely at the most advantageous location andtime. Amphibious forces provide the joint force commander(JFC) with a balanced, mobile force flexible enough to providethe required capability at the right time and place with sufficientendurance to accomplish the mission.

The terms “commander, amphibious task force” (CATF) and“commander, landing force” (CLF) have been used doctrinallyin the past to signify the commanders assigned to spearheadamphibious operations. This doctrine disassociates (fromprevious doctrine) any historical implications of the terms“CATF” and “CLF” from command relations. The terms“CATF” and “CLF” do not connote titles or commandrelationships. Rather, they refer to those commanders who areinstrumental to the conduct of amphibious operations in a

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joint environment. Under Joint Publication (JP) 0-2, UnifiedAction Armed Forces (UNAAF), the establishing authoritymay choose from a variety of command relationship optionsbetween the CATF, CLF, and other designated commandersinvolved in amphibious operations.

Conducted alone, or in conjunction with other militaryoperations, amphibious operations can be designed for thefollowing purposes.

Achieve campaign objectives in one swift stroke by capitalizingon surprise and simultaneous execution of supportingoperations to strike directly at enemy critical vulnerabilitiesand decisive points in order to defeat operational or tacticalcenters of gravity (COGs).

Comprise the initial phase of a campaign or majoroperation where the objective is to establish a militarylodgment to support subsequent phases.

Serve as a supporting operation in a campaign in order to denyuse of an area or facilities to the enemy, or to fix enemy forcesand attention in support of other combat operations.

Support military operations other than war in order to deterwar, resolve conflict, promote peace and stability, and supportcivil authorities in response to domestic crises.

Amphibious Assault. The establishment of an LF on a hostileor potentially hostile shore.

Amphibious Withdrawal. The extraction of forces by sea inships or craft from a hostile or potentially hostile shore.

Amphibious Demonstration. A show of force conducted todeceive with the expectation of deluding the enemy into acourse of action unfavorable to it.

Amphibious Raid. A swift incursion into, or a temporaryoccupation of, an objective, followed by a planned withdrawal.

Other Amphibious Operations. The capabilities ofamphibious forces may be especially suited to conduct other

Amphibious operationscan be used in many waysto support the joint forcecommander’s (JFC’s)campaign or operationplan.

Amphibious operationscan generally be brokendown into five majortypes: assaults,withdrawals,demonstrations, raids, andother amphibiousoperations.

Types of Amphibious Operations

Applications

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Executive Summary

types of operations, such as noncombatant evacuationoperations and foreign humanitarian assistance.

Integration between the Navy and landing forces. The keycharacteristic of an amphibious operation is close coordinationand cooperation between the ATF, LF, and other designatedforces.

Rapid buildup of combat power from the sea to shore. Thesalient requirement of an amphibious assault is the necessityfor swift, uninterrupted buildup of sufficient combat powerashore from an initial zero capability to full coordinated strikingpower as the attack progresses toward amphibious forceobjectives.

Task-organized forces, capable of multiple missions acrossthe full range of military operations to enable joint, allied, andcoalition operations. Amphibious forces are task-organizedbased on the mission.

Unity of Effort and Operational Coherence. The complexityof amphibious operations and the vulnerability of forcesengaged in amphibious operations require an exceptionaldegree of unity of effort and operational coherence.

The command relationships established within the amphibiousforce are in accordance with the concepts and principlesdelineated in JP 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF).

The JFC may establish unity of command over amphibiousforces by retaining operational control (OPCON) over theService or functional component commands executing theamphibious operation, or by delegating OPCON or tacticalcontrol (TACON) of the amphibious force to a Service orfunctional component commander.

If organizing forces along Service components, the JFC mayestablish a support relationship between the Navy componentcommander and the Service component commander of the LF,or delegate OPCON or TACON of the assigned or attachedamphibious forces to a Service component.

Characteristics of Amphibious Operations

Amphibious operationshave four keycharacteristics.

Amphibious operationsare normally part of ajoint operation.

The JFC ensures unity ofeffort in achievingamphibious objectives byestablishing unity ofcommand overamphibious forces.

The JFC will organize theamphibious force in sucha way as to bestaccomplish the missionbased on the concept ofoperations.

Command and Control of Amphibious Operations

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If organizing the joint force with a combination of Service andfunctional component commands with operationalresponsibilities, the JFC may establish a support relationshipbetween the functional components, Service components, orother appropriate commanders, or delegate OPCON or TACONof the assigned or attached amphibious forces to a functionalcomponent or Service component commander.

The command relationships established among the CATF,CLF, and other designated commanders of the amphibiousforce is important. The type of relationship chosen by thecommon superior commander (or establishing authority) forthe amphibious force should be based on mission, nature andduration of the operation, force capabilities, command andcontrol (C2) capabilities, battlespace assigned, andrecommendations from subordinate commanders.

The commanders designated in the order initiating theamphibious operation are coequal in planning matters anddecisions. All decisions must be reached on a basis of commonunderstanding of the mission, objectives, and procedures andon a free exchange of information. Any differences betweencommanders that cannot be resolved are referred to theestablishing authority.

The amphibious operational area must be of sufficient size toconduct necessary sea, land, and air operations required toexecute the mission of the amphibious force. The operationalareas that may be assigned to an amphibious force in an orderinitiating the amphibious operation are an amphibious objectivearea (AOA) or an area of operations normally in conjunctionwith a high-density airspace control zone.

During maritime operations such as amphibious operations,the airspace control authority will normally designate themaritime commander as the control authority for a specificairspace control area during the conduct of the amphibiousoperation (JP 3-52, Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control inthe Combat Zone). The complexity and size of an amphibiousoperation directly affects the amount of airspace allocated.

Typically, a supportrelationship is establishedbetween the commandersand is based on thecomplementary ratherthan similar nature of theamphibious task force andLF.

Regardless of thecommand relationships,when the order initiatingthe amphibious operationis received, uniquerelationships are observedduring the planning phase.

Amphibious operationsnormally encompass athree-dimensionalgeographic area, withinwhich is located theamphibious objective(s).

Assignment of airspaceallows the commander toexercise command andcontrol of forces,deconflict high volumes ofdifferent types of aircraftand missiles, and defendforces.

Air Command and Control

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The area air defense commander (AADC) bears overallresponsibility for air defense activities of the joint force. Theregional air defense commander is normally established withinthe ATF organization and is responsible for the airspaceallocated for amphibious operations, including but not limitedto the AOA (if established). The CATF will coordinate activedefense plans and procedures with the AADC and attackoperations with the joint force air component commanderunless otherwise specified in the order initiating the amphibiousoperation or the establishing directive. The designatedcommander assigns an air warfare commander, normally onthe most capable air defense platform, to actually carry out airdefense operations.

For transfer of airspace control and counterair responsibilitiesashore to occur, an appropriate agency must be establishedthat is responsible for air operations planning, air control,and counterair. This agency is either tactical air commandcenter (ashore) when the LF is Marine Corps, or an air operationscenter when the LF is an Army task organization. It is phasedashore as part of the LF. To facilitate an orderly transfer ofcontrol, specific control functions may be incrementally passedas facilities ashore become operational.

Top-Down Planning. Planning is a fundamental responsibilityof commanders. The complexity of amphibious operationsrequires amphibious force commanders to drive the planningprocess. Their guidance and intent are central to planning andmust be translated into a design for action by subordinates.

Unity of Effort. Unity of effort in the operational area allowsthe CATF and CLF to effectively focus the amphibious forceon mission accomplishment. They must view their battlespaceas an indivisible entity, for operations or events in one areamay have profound and often unintended effects on other areasand events.

Integrated Planning. Integrated planning in amphibiousoperations has two parts. The first part is the assembly of theamphibious force commanders and their staffs in the samelocality. When such arrangements are not practicable, theexchange of liaison officers qualified to perform planningfunctions and the use of advanced technology, collaborative

Tenets of Amphibious Planning

The joint counterairmission is used to gain andmaintain air superioritythrough mutuallysupporting offensive anddefensive measures.

During amphibiousoperations, airspacecontrol and counterairresponsibilities in theoperational area may betransferred ashore.

The tenets of successfulamphibious planning aretop-down planning, unityof effort (within thedesignated operationalarea), and an integratedplanning effort.

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planning aids, and video teleconferencing are necessary. Thesecond part of integrated planning occurs across functionalareas. The use of functional areas, such as maneuver,supporting arms and fires, intelligence, C2, logistics, and forceprotection enable amphibious force planners to integrate theplanning effort and supervise the plan. The use of functionalareas helps the planners to consider all relevant factors andminimize omissions.

Fire support planning integrates and synchronizes theamphibious force organic fires with non-organic supportingfires to achieve the commander’s intent. Maneuver and firesare complementary functions. Fires in support of amphibiousoperations (amphibious fire support) is the synergistic productof three subsystems: target acquisition (TA), C2, and attackresources. TA systems and equipment perform the key tasksof target detection, location, tracking, identification, andclassification in sufficient detail to permit the effective attackof the target. C2 systems bring all information together forcollation and decision making. Vertical and horizontalcoordination is essential, requiring a hierarchy of mutuallysupporting fire support coordinators and agencies. Attacksystems include fires delivered from air, surface, land, andsubsurface attack systems. Navy, Marine Corps, Army, andAir Force aircraft may perform air-to-surface attack andelectronic warfare within the operational area. Land-basedattack systems typically include Marine Corps and Armyartillery, mortars, rockets, missiles, and electronic warfaresystems. Sea-based attack systems include Navy guns,missiles, and electronic warfare systems.

Effective fire support depends on planning for the successfulperformance of the following four basic tasks.

Support forces in contact. The amphibious force providesresponsive fire support that protects and ensures freedom ofmaneuver to forces in contact with the enemy throughout theoperational area.

Support the concept of operations. Shaping the battlespaceand setting the conditions for decisive action are successfullyaccomplished by achieving the commander’s stated effects andattacking high-payoff targets to exploit critical vulnerabilities,the destruction or neutralization of which significantlycontributes to the success of the amphibious operation bydefeating the enemy’s COGs.

Fire support planning andcoordination inamphibious operations arecontinuous processesseeking timely andappropriate application offorce to achieve the desiredeffects within theoperational area.

Fire support planning isthe continuous andconcurrent process ofanalyzing, allocating, andscheduling of fire supportto integrate it with theforces to maximize combatpower.

Fire Support During Amphibious Operations

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Logistic Planning During Amphibious Operations

Synchronize fire support. Fire support is synchronized throughfire support coordination, beginning with the commanders’estimate and concept of operations. Fire support must beplanned for continuously and concurrently with thedevelopment of the scheme of maneuver.

Sustain fire support operations. Fire support plannersformulate realistic and achievable fire support plans to achievethe commander’s stated effects by exploiting logistic capabilitiesto overcome logistic limitations.

The CATF is normally responsible for determining overalllogistic requirements for the amphibious force. Thoserequirements that cannot be supported from resources availablewithin the ATF are directed to the applicable Servicecomponent through the chain of command as established inthe order initiating the amphibious operation.

Development of effective logistic systems must take intoaccount the planning considerations and factors listed below.

Orderly assembly and embarkation of personnel andmaterial based on anticipated requirements of the LF schemeof maneuver ashore.

Establishment and maintenance of a logistic system in theoperational area that will ensure adequate support to allelements of the amphibious force, and subsequent support ofbase development and garrison forces as directed.

Impetus of logistic support from sea, or the rear, and directedforward to the point of application at the using unit.

Preservation of tactical security during logistic planning.Nonsecure logistic planning can compromise tactical surpriseand landing location.

This publication provides fundamental principles that guidethe Armed Forces of the United States in the conduct ofamphibious operations. It covers all aspects of amphibiousoperations.

Logistic planning for anamphibious operationincludes all facets oflogistics.

The amphibious forcelogistic systems must beresponsive, simple,flexible, economical,attainable, sustainable,and survivable.

CONCLUSION

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CHAPTER ICONCEPT OF AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS

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1. General

a. An amphibious operation is a militaryoperation launched from the sea by anamphibious force, embarked in ships or craftwith the primary purpose of introducing alanding force (LF) ashore to accomplish theassigned mission. Types of amphibiousoperations include assaults, withdrawals,demonstrations, raids, and other amphibiousoperations in a permissive, uncertain, orhostile environment.

b. An amphibious force conductsamphibious operations. An amphibiousforce is defined as an amphibious task force(ATF) and an LF, together with other forcesthat are trained, organized, and equipped foramphibious operations.

• An ATF is defined as a Navy taskorganization formed to conductamphibious operations.

• An LF is defined as a Marine Corps orArmy task organization formed toconduct amphibious operations.

c. The terms “commander, amphibious taskforce” (CATF) and “commander, landingforce” (CLF) are used throughout thispublication solely to clarify the doctrinalduties and responsibilities of thesecommanders. In operations and exercises,amphibious commanders are referred to byeither their operational command titles (i.e.,Commanding General, 2d MarineExpeditionary Brigade (CG2d MEB),Commander, Amphibious Group TWO (CPG2)) or assigned task force designators (i.e.,

“A landing on a foreign coast in the face of hostile troops has always beenone of the most difficult operations of war.”

Captain Sir Basil H. Liddell Hart

Combined Task Force (CTF) 62.1), not by theterms “CATF” or “CLF.” The terms “CATF”and “CLF” do not connote titles or commandrelationships.

Refer to Chapter II, “Command andControl,” for information on amphibiouscommand relationships.

d. Amphibious operations apply maneuverprinciples to expeditionary power projectionin joint and multinational operations.Maneuver is used to destroy or seriouslydisrupt the enemy’s cohesion through a varietyof rapid, focused, and unexpected actions thatcreate a turbulent and rapidly deterioratingsituation with which the enemy cannot cope.

• The goal of maneuver is theapplication of strength against selectedenemy weakness. Maneuver relies onspeed and surprise to gain not onlypositional advantage, but to also generatea faster operational tempo than the enemyto gain a temporal advantage.

• Amphibious operations seek to exploitthe element of surprise and capitalize onenemy weakness by projecting andapplying combat power precisely at themost advantageous location and time.Amphibious forces provide the jointforce commander (JFC) with a balanced,mobile force flexible enough to providethe required capability at the right timeand place with sufficient endurance toaccomplish the mission.

e. The threat of amphibious operationsalone may be sufficient to induce enemies to

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concentrate forces and make them susceptibleto fires, or disperse forces and make themsusceptible to destruction. The enemy cannever be certain that its response to theamphibious threat will be effective; thusuncertainties are induced into the enemy’sdecision making process that can be exploitedin a number of ways.

2. Applications

Amphibious operations can be used inmany ways to support the JFC’s campaign oroperation plan. Conducted alone, or inconjunction with other military operations,they can be designed to:

a. Achieve campaign objectives in oneswift stroke by capitalizing on surprise andsimultaneous execution of supportingoperations to strike directly at enemy criticalvulnerabilities and decisive points in order todefeat operational or tactical centers of gravity(COGs).

b. Comprise the initial phase of acampaign or major operation where theobjective is to establish a military lodgmentto support subsequent phases.

c. Serve as a supporting operation in acampaign in order to deny use of an area orfacilities to the enemy, or to fix enemy forcesand attention in support of other combatoperations.

d. Support military operations otherthan war (MOOTW) in order to deter war,resolve conflict, promote peace and stability,and support civil authorities in response todomestic crises.

3. Types of AmphibiousOperations

Amphibious operations can take placeacross the range of military operations, fromoperations other than war to a major theater

war. They can generally be broken down intofive major types: assaults, withdrawals,demonstrations, raids, and other amphibiousoperations.

a. Amphibious Assault. An amphibiousassault involves the establishment of an LFon a hostile or potentially hostile shore. Theorganic capabilities of amphibious forces,including fire support, logistics, and mobility,allow the United States to gain access to acrisis area by forcible entry. Forcible entryoperations can be accomplished throughamphibious operations, airborne operations,air assault operations, or a combination of anyor all of these forcible entry techniques. Ifthe JFC’s decision is to use a combinationof forcible entry techniques to seize alodgment, the JFC must further decide,based on maritime factors and mission,enemy, terrain and weather, troops andsupport available, time available analysis,whether to conduct the forcible entries asconcurrent or integrated. Concurrentforcible entry operations occur when acombination of amphibious, airborne, and/or air assault forcible entry operations areconducted simultaneously, but as distinctoperations with separate operational areasand objectives. Integrated forcible entryoperations result when amphibious, airborne,and/or air assault forcible entries are conductedsimultaneously within the same operationalarea and with objectives that are mutuallysupporting.

Refer to Joint Publication (JP) 3-18, JointDoctrine for Forcible Entry Operations, formore information.

b. An amphibious withdrawal is theextraction of forces by sea in ships or craftfrom a hostile or potentially hostile shore.

c. An amphibious demonstration is ashow of force conducted to deceive with theexpectation of deluding the enemy into acourse of action (COA) unfavorable to it.

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d. An amphibious raid is a swift incursioninto, or a temporary occupation of, anobjective, followed by a planned withdrawal.

e. Other Amphibious Operations. Thecapabilities of amphibious forces may beespecially suited to conduct MOOTW suchas noncombatant evacuation operations(NEOs) and foreign humanitarian assistance(FHA). NEOs may use amphibious raidtechniques and require relatively minoradjustments to planning. FHA and disasterrelief may require more flexibility duringplanning and execution based on theassistance and/or relief required.

f. Within the five major types ofamphibious operations, there are a numberof tasks that amphibious forces canaccomplish to facilitate joint operations. Thefollowing are representative, but not all-inclusive, of tasks that may be performed.

• Attack enemy critical vulnerabilities ordecisive points that lead to the defeat ofoperational or tactical COGs;

• Seize a lodgment, to include ports andairfields, for the introduction of follow-on forces;

• Seize areas for the development ofadvanced bases;

• Destroy, neutralize, or seize enemyadvanced bases and support facilities;

• Seize or conduct a preemptive occupationof areas that block free passage byadversaries;

• Provide an afloat strategic, operational,or tactical reserve to exploit opportunitiesand counter threats;

• Provide strategic, operational, or tacticaldeception to force the enemy to defendalong littoral areas;

• Evacuate US citizens, selected citizensfrom the host nation, or third countrynationals whose lives are in danger froma foreign country to a designated safehaven; and

• Provide a secure environment until otherforces arrive on-scene to allowhumanitarian relief efforts to progress andfacilitate the movement of food andmedical care to relieve suffering andprevent the loss of life.

Inchon Landing

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g. Some combat operations involvingwaterborne movement possess characteristicsand employ some of the same techniques asan amphibious operation. Examples are:maritime pre-positioning force (MPF); afloatpre-positioning force (APF); riverineoperations; inland-water ferrying; and waterterminal and logistics over-the-shore (LOTS)operations. While these may be part of anamphibious operation, they are not bythemselves amphibious operations asdescribed by this doctrine.

4. Characteristics

a. Integration Between the Navy andLanding Forces. The key characteristic ofan amphibious operation is close coordinationand cooperation between the ATF, LF, andother designated forces. An amphibiousoperation is ordinarily joint in nature andmay require extensive air, maritime, land,space, and special operations forcesparticipation. It is typified by close integrationof forces trained, organized, and equipped fordifferent combat functions.

b. Rapid Buildup of Combat Power fromthe Sea to Shore. The salient requirement ofan amphibious assault is the necessity forswift, uninterrupted buildup of sufficientcombat power ashore from an initial zerocapability to full coordinated striking poweras the attack progresses toward amphibiousforce objectives. To achieve success, anamphibious force should be assured ofmaritime superiority against enemy surfaceand subsurface forces at sea, air superioritythroughout the operational area, and asubstantial superiority over enemy forcesashore. In the face of compelling necessity,commanders may undertake an amphibiousoperation on the basis of a reasonablesuperiority of the entire force. For example,maritime and air superiority may justify alanding even though the LF does not possessthe desired numerical superiority in groundforces, if friendly surface and air units can be

used effectively to negate the enemy’sadvantage. In addition to reasonablesuperiority within the landing area, anamphibious force should have the ability toprovide continuous support for forces ashore.

c. Task-organized forces are capable ofmultiple missions across the full range ofmilitary operations to enable joint, allied, andcoalition operations. Amphibious forces aretask-organized based on the mission. Whileforward-deployed amphibious forcesroutinely deploy with a similar taskorganization, they can be quickly reinforcedor augmented with other assets in theater,adjacent theaters, or the continental UnitedStates. These forces provide sustainablepower projection to respond to a full range ofcrisis, from forcible entry to humanitarianassistance. The command and control (C2)capabilities of the Navy and LF facilitate theaccomplishment of multiple missions and theintegration of joint and multinational forces.

d. Other Factors. Other factors that mustbe considered when planning and conductingamphibious operations include the following.

• Natural forces such as weather, sea state,wind, waves, surf, tides, and currents;bathymetry and hydrography; and beach,gradient, soil bearing capacity,trafficability, beach exits, and adjoiningtransportation networks as well as accessto inland lines of communications(LOCs).

• Technical, operational, and logisticproblems associated with the following.

•• Combat loading large numbers oftroops, equipment, and supplies in ships(possibly at geographically separatedembarkation points).

•• Protecting essential information whileassembling, embarking, rehearsing, andmoving the amphibious force to the

I-5


operational area, as well as denial anddeception measures to be employed atvarious stages of the operation to denyenemy intelligence collection.

•• Enemy surface, subsurface, air, andmine threats.

•• Conducting planning among forcesphysically separated among various shipsand shore-based locations.

•• Reconfiguring the combat loading of theamphibious ships in response to changingsituations in the operational area.

•• Maintaining surprise whileconducting reconnaissance and detectingand eliminating mines, surf zone andbeach obstacles, and other threats to theamphibious force.

•• Conducting complex ship-to-shoremovement using multiple landing means(e.g., amphibious assault vehicles(AAVs), surface craft, and aircraft),possibly in the face of enemy defenses.

•• Ensuring close cooperation anddetailed coordination among allparticipating forces. Forces involved

should train and/or rehearse together andeach possess a clear understanding of themutual obligations and the specialcapabilities and limitations of every otherelement of the joint force.

•• Establishing reliable and securecommunications between all forces (USand multinational) to ensure commonality,redundancy, security, and reliability inadvance of any operation.

•• Ensuring force protection, asapplicable.

•• Providing C2 in the littoralenvironment using a full complement ofsystems and sensors (radars, data links,etc.) whose performance may bedegraded at the land and sea interface.

•• Considering the impact of theamphibious operation on theenvironment.

Refer to JP 4-0, Doctrine for LogisticSupport of Joint Operations, for furtherinformation.

e. Unity of Effort and OperationalCoherence. The complexity of amphibious

Amphibious forces are task-organized based on the mission.

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operations and the vulnerability of forcesengaged in amphibious operations require anexceptional degree of unity of effort andoperational coherence. The difficultiesinherent in amphibious operations maydictate that the JFC participates inplanning, theater integration, and support. Tomeet contingencies, commanders of assignedand supporting forces must prepare inanticipation of the needs of the amphibious force.

5. Capabilities

a. The adaptability and versatility ofamphibious forces provide unique warfightingcapabilities to the JFC, along with being wellsuited to accomplish a wide variety ofmissions.

b. The conduct of an amphibious operationis possible under a wide variety of weatherconditions, various types of emission control(EMCON), and by either surface, submarine,or air insertion forces.

c. Amphibious forces have the capabilityto conduct amphibious operations from overthe horizon (OTH), beyond visual and radarrange of the shoreline. OTH capability alsoprovides flexibility in MOOTW. Politicalsituations may require keeping ATF ships outof view of a foreign shore, while retainingthe capability to insert LF ashore via air andlanding craft assets.

d. Routinely forward-deployed amphibiousforces, comprised of an ATF and an LF,provide the JFC with a force proficient in time-sensitive planning and capable of rapidresponse to taskings in crisis situations. Theseamphibious forces operate without therequirements for bases, ports, airfields, oroverflight restrictions. They can perform awide range of mission-essential tasks tofacilitate the accomplishment of the joint forcemission. Through enhanced training andspecial equipment, these forces may also becapable of special operations.

6. Sequence

Amphibious operations generally followdistinct phases, though the sequence may vary(see Figure I-1).

a. While planning occurs throughout theentire operation, it is normally dominant priorto embarkation. Successive phases bear thetitle of the dominant activity taking placewithin the phase.

b. When amphibious forces are forward-deployed, or when subsequent tasks areassigned, the sequence of phases may differ.Generally, forward-deployed amphibiousforces use the sequence “embarkation,”“planning,” “rehearsal” (to includepotential reconfiguration of embarkedforces), “movement to the operationalarea,” and “action”. However, significantplanning is conducted prior to embarkationto anticipate the most likely missions and toload assigned shipping accordingly. The samesequence is useful for subsequent tasks orfollow-on amphibious missions.

In short, the five phases of an amphibiousoperation are always required, but thesequence in which they occur may be changedas circumstances dictate.

7. Initiating an AmphibiousOperation

Amphibious operations commence withan order issued by the commander withestablishing authority to the amphibiousforce commanders. The order initiatingthe amphibious operation may come in theform of a warning order, an alert order, aplanning order, or an operation order(OPORD). The complete informationrequired to conduct an amphibiousoperation may come from a combinationof these orders (e.g., a warning orderfollowed by an alert or operation order).The order initiating the amphibious

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operation should normally provide thefollowing information.

a. The establishing authority’s mission,intent, and concept of operations (CONOPS).

Figure I-1. Phases of an Amphibious Operation

The planning phase normally denotes the period extending from the issuanceof an order that directs the operation to take place and ends with theembarkation of landing forces. However, planning is continuous throughoutthe operation. Although planning does not cease with the termination of thisphase, it is useful to distinguish between the planning phase and subsequentphases because of the change that may occur in the relationship betweenamphibious force commanders at the time the planning phase terminates andthe operational phase begins.

The embarkation phase is the period during which the landing forces, withtheir equipment and supplies, embark in assigned shipping. The organizationfor embarkation needs to provide for flexibility to support changes to theoriginal plan. The landing plan and scheme of maneuver ashore are based onconditions and enemy capabilities existing in the operational area beforeembarkation of the landing force. A change in conditions of friendly or enemyforces during the movement phase may cause changes in either plan with noopportunity for reconfiguration of the landing force. The extent to whichchanges in the landing plan can be accomplished may depend on the ability toreconfigure embarked forces.

The movement phase is the period during which various elements of theamphibious force move from points of embarkation or from a forward-deployed position to the operational area. This move may be via rehearsal,staging, or rendezvous areas. The movement phase is completed when thevarious elements of the amphibious force arrive at their assigned positions inthe operational area.

The decisive action phase is the period from the arrival of the amphibiousforce in the operational area, through the accomplishment of the mission andthe termination of the amphibious operation.

The rehearsal phase is the period during which the prospective operation isrehearsed for the purpose of:

Rehearsal may consist of an actual landing or may be conducted as acommand post exercise.

Testing the adequacy of plans, timing of detailed operations, and combatreadiness of participating forces

Ensuring that all echelons are familiar with plansProviding an opportunity to reconfigure embarked forces and equipment

PHASES OF AN AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION

PLANNING

EMBARKATION

MOVEMENT

ACTION

REHEARSAL

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b. Designation of required commanders,establishment of their command relationships,and provision of special instructions asrequired to support the amphibious forceorganization and mission.

NOTE: Special instructions may include anestablishing directive if a support relationshipis established among designated commandersof the amphibious force. The establishingdirective is discussed in detail in Chapter II,“Command and Control.”

c. Designation of assigned, attached, andsupporting forces to the amphibious force.

d. Assignment of an operational area asappropriate.

e. Assignment of tasks.

f. Assignment of responsibility andprovision of necessary coordinating

instructions for the conduct of supportingoperations.

g. Target dates for execution of theoperation.

h. Additional coordinating instructions, asrequired.

8. Termination of anAmphibious Operation

The termination of the amphibiousoperation is predicated on the accomplishmentof the amphibious mission in accordance withthe specific conditions contained in the orderinitiating the amphibious operation. Uponcompletion of the amphibious operation,the establishing authority will provideinstructions as required for commandarrangements and assignment ofamphibious forces.

CHAPTER IICOMMAND AND CONTROL

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1. General

a. Overview. Amphibious operations arenormally part of a joint operation. Thecommand relationships established within theamphibious force are in accordance with theconcepts and principles delineated in JP 0-2,Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF).

b. Multinational Operations. Commandrelationships during multinational operationsare based on international standardizationagreements or on bilateral agreementsbetween nations. The command relationshipsfor these operations will be defined in theorder initiating the amphibious operation.This allows the commander directing theamphibious operation to define therelationships in accordance with existingmilitary and political agreements. Simplicity

“Amphibious warfare requires the closest practicable cooperation by all thecombatant services, both in planning and execution, and a commandorganization which definitely assigns responsibility for major decisionsthroughout all stages of the operation, embarkation, overseas movement,beach assault, and subsequent support of forces ashore.”

Admiral Henry K. Hewitt, USN

and clarity of expression concerningcommand relationships are critical.

Refer to JP 3-16, Joint Doctrine forMultinational Operations, for moreinformation.

2. Organization of Joint Forces

a. General. “JFC” is a general termapplied to a combatant commander,subunified commander, or joint task force(JTF) commander authorized to exercisecombatant command (command authority) oroperational control (OPCON) over a jointforce. A JFC has the authority to organizeforces to best accomplish the assigned missionbased on the concept of operations. Theorganization should be sufficiently flexible tomeet the planned phases of the contemplated

Command relationships in a joint amphibious operation must be clearly defined.

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operation and any development that maynecessitate a change in plan. The JFC willestablish subordinate commands, assignresponsibilities, establish or delegateappropriate command relationships, andestablish coordinating instructions forthe component commanders. Soundorganization should provide for unity ofeffort, centralized planning, anddecentralized execution. Refer to JP 0-2,Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), formore details on joint force organization.

b. Service Components. All joint forcesinclude Service component commands thatprovide administrative and logistic support.The JFC may conduct operations through theService component commanders or, at lowerechelons, Service force commanders. Thisrelationship is appropriate when stability,continuity, economy, ease of long-rangeplanning, and scope of operations dictateorganizational integrity of Service forces forconducting operations. The JFC has fullauthority to assign missions, redirect efforts,and direct coordination among subordinatecommanders. The JFC should allow Servicetactical and operational assets and groupingsto function generally as they were designed.The intent is to meet the needs of the JFCwhile maintaining the tactical and operationalintegrity of the Service organizations.

c. Functional Components. The JFC canestablish functional component commands toconduct operations. Functional componentcommands can be appropriate when forcesfrom two or more Military Departments mustoperate in the same dimension or medium orthere is a need to accomplish a distinct aspectof the assigned mission. Joint force land, air,maritime, and special operations componentcommanders are examples of functionalcomponent commanders.

NOTE: Functional component commands arecomponent commands of a joint force and donot constitute a “joint force” with the

authorities and responsibilities of a joint forceas normally described in JP 0-2, UnifiedAction Armed Forces (UNAAF), even whencomposed of forces from two or more MilitaryDepartments. The JFC establishing afunctional component command has theauthority to designate its commander.Normally, the Service component commanderwith the preponderance of forces to be taskedwill be designated as the functionalcomponent commander; however, the JFCwill always consider the mission, nature, andduration of the operation, force capabilities,and C2 capabilities in selecting a commander.The JFC must designate the military capabilitythat will be made available for tasking by thefunctional component commander and theappropriate command relationship(s) that thefunctional component commander willexercise. Most often joint forces are organizedwith a combination of Service and functionalcomponent commands with operationalresponsibilities.

d. Subordinate Joint Task Forces. A JFCmay also establish a subordinate JTF on ageographical area or functional basis whenthe mission has a specific, limited objectiveand does not require centralized control oflogistics. The mission assigned to a JTFshould require execution of responsibilitiesinvolving a joint force on a significant scaleand close integration of effort, or shouldrequire coordination within a subordinate area.A JTF is dissolved by the JFC when thepurpose for which it was created has beenachieved or when it is no longer required.

3. Command and Control ofAmphibious Forces

a. Unity of Command. The JFC ensuresunity of effort in achieving amphibiousobjectives by establishing unity ofcommand over amphibious forces. The JFCmay establish unity of command overamphibious forces by retaining OPCON overthe Service or functional component

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Command and Control

commands executing the amphibiousoperation, or by delegating OPCON ortactical control (TACON) of the amphibiousforce to a Service or functional componentcommander. Forces, not command relationships,may be transferred between commands.When forces are transferred, the commandrelationship the gaining commander willexercise (and the losing commander willrelinquish) over those forces must bespecified.

b. Control of Amphibious Forces. TheJFC will organize the amphibious force insuch a way as to best accomplish the missionbased on the concept of operations.

• If conducting operations through theService components, the JFC mayestablish a support relationship betweenthe Navy component commander and theService component commander of theLF, or delegate OPCON or TACON ofthe assigned or attached amphibiousforces to a Service component.

• If conducting operations through acombination of Service and functionalcomponent commands with operationalresponsibilities, the JFC may establish asupport relationship between thefunctional components, Servicecomponents, or other appropriatecommanders, or delegate OPCON orTACON of the assigned or attachedamphibious forces to a functionalcomponent or Service componentcommander. Normally, joint forces areorganized with a combination of Serviceand functional component commandswith operational responsibilities.

c. Command Authority Options BetweenAmphibious Forces. The commandrelationships established among the CATF,CLF, and other designated commanders of theamphibious force is an important decision.The type of relationship chosen by the

common superior commander, or establishingauthority, for the amphibious force should bebased on mission, nature and duration of theoperation, force capabilities, C2 capabilities,battlespace assigned, and recommendationsfrom subordinate commanders. Commandrelationship options include either anOPCON, TACON, or support relationshipsas described in JP 0-2, Unified Action ArmedForces (UNAAF).

Typically a support relationship isestablished between the commanders andis based on the complementary rather thansimilar nature and capabilities of the ATFand LF. However, it is not the intent tolimit the common superior’s authority toestablish either an OPCON or TACONcommand relationship as appropriate.

d. Planning Relationships. Regardless ofthe command relationships, when the orderinitiating planning for the amphibiousoperation is received, unique relationships areobserved during the planning phase. Thecommanders designated in the orderinitiating the amphibious operation arecoequal in planning matters and decisions.All decisions must be reached on a basis ofcommon understanding of the mission,objectives, and procedures and on a freeexchange of information. Any differencesbetween commanders that cannot be resolvedare referred to the establishing authority. If achange in the mission occurs aftercommencement of operations or if anamphibious operation is initiated from anafloat posture, coequal-planning relationships(either as described above or as specified inthe order initiating the amphibious operation)will apply to any subsequent planning.However, as the operational situation dictates,the commander delegated OPCON of theamphibious force may specify planningrelationships to coordinate planning efforts,especially where time-sensitive planning isrequired under the provisions of the Chairmanof the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM)

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3122.01, Joint Operation Planning andExecution System, Vol I: (Planning Policiesand Procedures).

e. Establishing Directive. An establishingdirective is essential to ensure unity of effortwithin the amphibious force. Normally, thecommanders within the amphibious force willdevelop a draft establishing directive duringthe planning phase to provide the specifics ofthe support relationship. The commanderswithin the amphibious force submit the draftestablishing directive to the establishingauthority for approval. The establishingdirective is normally issued to specify thepurpose of the support relationship, the effectdesired, and the scope of the action to be taken.It may also include but is not necessarilylimited to the following.

• Forces and other resources allocated tothe supporting effort.

• Time, place, level, and duration of thesupporting effort.

• Relative priority of the supporting effort.

• Authority, if any, of the supportingcommander(s) to modify the supportingeffort in the event of exceptionalopportunity or an emergency.

• Degree of authority granted to thesupported commander over thesupporting effort.

• Establishment of air, sea, and groundmaneuver control measures.

• Development of joint tactical air strikerequests and air support requests.

• Development of target nominations,establishment of fire supportcoordinating measures, integration of airdefense, and the role of the supportingarms coordination center.

• Development of the amphibious forceintelligence collection plan.

• Non-organic logistic support.

• Force protection responsibilities afloatand ashore.

Unless otherwise stated in the orderinitiating the amphibious operation or theestablishing directive, the CATF and CLF willidentify the events and conditions for anyshifts of the support relationship throughoutthe operation during the planning phase andforward them to the establishing authority forapproval.

The establishing authority will resolve anydifferences among the commanders.

4. Operational Control

a. General. The establishing authoritymay choose to delegate OPCON to a singlecommander within the amphibious force.When OPCON is delegated, it will includethe following authority (in accordance withJP 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces(UNAAF)) unless otherwise specified.

• Exercise or delegate OPCON andTACON, establish support relationshipsamong subordinates, and designatecoordinating authorities.

• Give direction to subordinate commandsand forces necessary to carry out missionsassigned to the command, includingauthoritative direction over all aspects ofthe amphibious operation and training.

• Prescribe the chain of command to thecommands and forces within thecommand.

• Organize commands and employ forceswithin the amphibious force, asnecessary, to carry out assigned missions.

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Command and Control

• Employ forces within the command, asnecessary, to carry out missions assignedto the command.

• Assign command functions tosubordinate commanders.

• Plan for, deploy, direct, control, andcoordinate the action of subordinateforces.

• Establish plans, policies, priorities, andoverall requirements for the intelligenceactivities of the command.

• Suspend from duty subordinatecommanders and recommend reassignmentof any officer assigned to the command.

• Assign responsibilities to subordinatecommanders for certain routineoperational matters that requirecoordination of effort of two or morecommanders.

• Establish an adequate system of controlfor local defense and delineate such areasof operation for subordinate commandersas deemed desirable.

• Delineate functional responsibilities andgeographic areas of operation ofsubordinate commanders.

b. OPCON normally provides fullauthority to organize commands and forcesand employ those forces as the commanderin OPCON considers necessary to accomplishassigned missions. It does not, in and of itself,include authoritative direction for logistics ormatters of administration, discipline, internalorganization, or unit training.

5. Tactical Control

a. General. TACON is the commandauthority over assigned or attached forces orcommands (or military capability or forces

made available for tasking) that is limited tothe detailed and usually local direction andcontrol of movements or maneuvers necessaryto accomplish assigned missions or tasks. Theestablishing authority may choose todelegate TACON to a single commanderwithin the amphibious force. WhenTACON is delegated, it will include thefollowing authority (in accordance with JP0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF))unless otherwise specified.

• Give direction for specified militaryoperations.

• Control designated forces.

b. TACON does not provide organizationalauthority or authoritative direction foradministrative and logistic support; thecommander of the parent unit continues toexercise these authorities unless otherwisespecified in the establishing directive.

6. Support

a. General. Support is a commandauthority. The establishing authority of theamphibious operation establishes a supportrelationship between commanders withinthe amphibious force as well as otherdesignated commanders as appropriate.This relationship is appropriate when oneorganization should aid, protect, complement,or sustain another force. The designation ofthe supporting relationships is important as itconveys priorities to the commanders andstaffs who are planning or executing theoperation. The support relationship is, bydesign, a somewhat vague and therefore veryflexible arrangement. This flexibility isenhanced by the publishing of an establishingdirective to specify the purpose of the support,the desired effect, and the scope of action tobe taken.

b. Planning. In a support relationship, theCATF and CLF and other commanders

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designated in the order initiating planning forthe amphibious operation are coequal. Alldecisions made by these commanders arereached based on a common understandingof the mission, objectives, and procedures andon a free exchange of information. Unlesspublished in the order initiating theamphibious operation, the CATF and CLFwill identify the events and conditions for anyshifts of the support relationship throughoutthe operation during the planning phase andforward them to the establishing authority forapproval. The establishing authority willresolve any differences among thecommanders.

c. Supported Commander. A supportedcommander may be designated for the entireoperation, a particular phase or stage of theoperation, a particular function, or acombination of phases, stages, events, andfunctions. Unless limited by the establishingdirective or the order initiating the amphibiousoperation, the supported commander hasthe authority to exercise general directionof the supporting effort. General directionincludes the designation and prioritization oftargets or objectives, timing and duration ofthe supporting action, and other instructionsnecessary for coordination and efficiency. Theestablishing authority is responsible forensuring that the supported and supportingcommanders understand the degree ofauthority that the supported commander isgranted.

• If not specified in the order initiating theamphibious operation, the CATF andCLF will determine who has primaryresponsibility for the essential tasksduring the mission analysis in theplanning process.

See Chapter IV, “Approach to Planningand Primary Decisions,” for missionanalysis and the planning process.

• In an operation of relatively shortduration, normally the establishingauthority will choose one commander forthe entire operation. When there is nolittoral threat to the amphibious force (forexample, in a particular NEO) theestablishing authority may designate theCLF as the supported commander for theentire operation. During the movementor transit phase, the CATF may bedesignated the supported commanderbased on having responsibility for themajor action or activity during that phase.The CATF may be designated thesupported commander based oncapabilities for airspace control and airdefense for the entire operation if, forexample, the landing force does notintend to establish a tactical air commandcenter ashore (see Figure II-1).

• The establishing authority shouldconsider several factors whendesignating the supported commander atvarious phases and events during theamphibious operation, including butlimited to the following.

•• Responsibility for the preponderanceof the mission.

•• Force capabilities.

•• Threat.

•• Type, phase, and duration ofoperation.

•• C2 capabilities.

•• Battlespace assigned.

•• Recommendations from subordinatecommanders.

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Command and Control

d. Supporting Commander. Thesupporting commander determines the forces,tactics, methods, procedures, andcommunications to be employed in providingthis support. The supporting commander willadvise and coordinate with the supportedcommander on matters concerning theemployment and limitations (e.g., logistics)of such support, assist in planning for theintegration of such support into the supportedcommander’s effort as a whole, and ensurethat support requirements are appropriatelycommunicated throughout the supportingcommander’s organization. The supportingcommander has the responsibility to ascertainthe needs of the supported force and take fullaction to fulfill them within existingcapabilities, consistent with priorities andrequirements of other assigned tasks. Whenthe supporting commander cannot fulfill theneeds of the supported commander, theestablishing authority will be notified by eitherthe supported or supporting commander. The

establishing authority is responsible fordetermining a solution.

7. Parallel Chains of Command

Elements of the amphibious force (ATF, LF,and other forces) may be embarked for whatcould be extended periods of time on the sameplatforms, but responsible to different orparallel chains of command. Such parallelchains of command create specialrequirements for coordination. Except inemergencies, no significant decisioncontemplated by a commander in the chainof command that affects the plans,disposition, or intentions of acorresponding commander in anotherchain of command will be made withoutconsultation with the commanderconcerned. In emergency situations, thecommander making an emergency decisionwill notify corresponding commanders of hisor her action at the earliest practicable time.

Figure II-1. Examples of Shifts in the Support Relationship

EXAMPLES OF SHIFTS IN THE

SUPPORT RELATIONSHIP*

Assault

Raid with coastal threat

Inland Raid with no coastal threat

Demonstration

Withdrawal

Humanitarian Assistance

CATF

CLF

Commander, Amphibious Task Force

Commander, Landing Force

MISSION SUPPORTED COMMANDER

CATF, then CLF

CATF, then CLF, then CATF

CLF

CATF

CLF, then CATF

CATF or CLF

*Actual supported-supporting commanders will be designated by theestablishing authority based on the specific mission requirements

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8. Amphibious Force TaskOrganization and TaskDesignators

a. Task Organization. Amphibious forcesare task-organized based on the mission. Nostandard organization is applicable to allsituations that may be encountered in anamphibious operation. Flexibility is essential.Once the organization has been promulgated,numerical task organization designations (e.g.,CTF 62.1) or unit command titles (e.g., CG 2dMEB, CPG 2) will be used exclusively foroperational purposes.

b. Task Designators. The taskdesignators utilized by US and NorthAtlantic Treaty Organization naval forcesthat assign forces in a task force, task group,task unit, and task element hierarchicalstructure are utilized for task structuring ofthe amphibious force.

c. Navy Forces. At the CATF’s discretionand as promulgated in the order initiating theamphibious operation and establishingdirective, two or more of these groups may becombined and others added or deleted asdictated by operational requirements. For

example, control groups may not be requiredwhen conducting OTH operations.

d. Landing Forces. The LF consists ofground combat units and any of its associatedsupport units assigned to the CLF to conductthe amphibious operation. The LF may becomposed of Marine Corps and/or Armyforces, other forces, and multinational forces.The amphibious operation requires that theLF be organized at various times in one ofthree functional forms. The first two arespecific to amphibious operations.

• Organization for Combat. Taskorganizat ion of LF uni ts foraccomplishment of missions ashore. Thisorganizational form is employed as soonas possible following the landing ofvarious assault elements of the LF.

• Organization for Landing. Specifictactical grouping of forces for a landing.

• Organization for Embarkation.Temporary adminis t ra t ive taskorganization of forces established tosimplify planning and facilitate executionof embarkation at all levels of command.

Organization for combat and landing is specific to amphibious operations.

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9. Operational Areas

a. General. To assist in the coordinationand deconfliction of joint action, JFCs maydefine operational areas or joint areas. Thesize of these areas and the types of forcesemployed within them depend on the scopeand nature of the crisis and the projectedduration of the operation. Amphibiousoperations normally require a three-dimensional geographic area, within whichis located the amphibious force’sobjective(s). The operational area must beof sufficient size to conduct necessary sea,land, and air operations required to executethe mission of the amphibious force. Inaddition, JFC’s employ various maneuver andmovement control and fire supportcoordinating measures to facilitate effectivejoint operations. These measures includeboundaries, phase lines, objectives,coordinating altitudes to deconflict airoperations, air defense areas, amphibiousobjective areas, submarine operating patrolareas and minefields. JFCs may useboundaries to define areas of operations (AOs)for land and naval forces. Within thedesignated operational area, the designatedcommander will synchronize maneuver, fires,and interdiction. The operational areas thatmay be assigned to an amphibious force in anorder initiating the amphibious operation arean amphibious objective area (AOA) or anAO normally in conjunction with a high-density airspace control zone (HIDACZ).

• An AOA is a geographical area(delineated for C2 purposes in the orderinitiating the amphibious operation)within which is located the objective(s)to be secured by the amphibious force.This area must be of sufficient size toensure accomplishment of theamphibious force’s mission and mustprovide sufficient area for conductingnecessary sea, air, and land operations.

• An AO is an operational area defined bythe JFC for land and naval forces. AOsdo not typically encompass the entireoperational area of the JFC, but shouldbe large enough for componentcommanders to accomplish theirmissions and protect their forces.

• A HIDACZ is airspace designated in anairspace control plan (ACP) or airspacecontrol order (ACO) in which there is aconcentrated employment of numerousand varied weapons and airspace users.A HIDACZ has defined dimensions thatusually coincide with geographicalfeatures or navigational aids. Access toa HIDACZ is normally controlled by themaneuver commander. The maneuvercommander can also direct a morerestrictive weapons status within theHIDACZ.

For additional guidance on boundariesand synchronization of joint efforts withinland and naval AOs, refer to JP 3-0,Doctrine for Joint Operations.

b. Assigned Area. The commanderdesignated in the order initiating theamphibious operation is responsible forairspace control, defense of friendly forces,and direction and deconfliction of supportingarms. The order initiating the amphibiousoperation will also specify the degree ofauthority that the designated commander hasover supporting forces entering the assignedgeographic area. The designated commanderwill request the air control measures requiredfor inclusion in the establishing directive (fora support relationship) or in the concept ofoperations to further ensure success of themission.

c. Disestablishment of Assigned Area.Once the type of operational area (AOA orAO) is defined, it is not necessarily dissolved

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upon termination of the amphibious operation.The operational area may be required for thecoordination of follow-on logistic support ofthe operation. As with its establishment,disestablishing the area is the decision of

the establishing authority (with CATF or CLFrecommendations) and should be delineatedin the order initiating the amphibiousoperation or in follow-on orders.

CHAPTER IIIAIR COMMAND AND CONTROL

III-1

1. Joint Air Operations

Joint air operations are performed with aircapabilities and forces made available bycomponents in support of the JFC’s operationor campaign objectives, or in support of othercomponents of the joint force. To createsynergy and avoid duplication of effort, theJFC synchronizes and integrates theactions of assigned, attached, andsupporting capabilities and forces in time,space, and purpose. This is normallyaccomplished through designation of a jointforce air component commander (JFACC),area air defense commander (AADC), andairspace control authority (ACA). A briefdescription of these functions is provided inFigure III-1. With current capabilities, thesefunctions could be performed afloat or ashore,and normally a single functional componentcommander will be designated to perform allthree roles. It is within this context that jointair tasking, air defense activities, and airspacecontrol are conducted during amphibiousoperations.

For more information, see JP 3-30, Commandand Control for Joint Air Operations (formerlyJP 3-56.1).

2. Airspace Control inAmphibious Operations

a. Assignment of airspace allows the JFCto exercise C2 of forces, deconflict highvolumes of different types of aircraft and

“The doctrine and performance of Marines and airmen matured in Pacificcampaigns as the hesitancy and missteps of Guadalcanal, New Guinea,and Tarawa were heeded. Coordinated amphibious assault and air warfarebecame irrepressible.”

“Struggle for the Marianas,” CAPT Bernard D. Cole, USNJoint Force Quarterly, Spring 95

missiles, and defend forces. During maritimeoperations such as amphibious operations, theACA will normally designate the maritimecommander as the control authority for aspecific airspace control area during theconduct of the amphibious operation. Thecomplexity and size of an amphibiousoperation directly affects the amount ofairspace allocated.

See JP 3-52, Doctrine for Joint AirspaceControl in the Combat Zone, for furtherinformation on control authority designation.

b. The level of air control allocated to theamphibious force depends on the degree ofair control measures approved by the ACA.If only an AO is established, theamphibious force may request that theACA establish a HIDACZ over thisgeographic area. A HIDACZ is airspacedesignated in an ACP or ACO in which thereis a concentrated employment of numerousand varied weapons and airspace users.Access is normally controlled by themaneuver commander who can direct a morerestrictive weapons status within thedesignated area. The items shown belowshould be considered when establishing aHIDACZ.

• Airspace control capabilities of theamphibious force.

• Minimum risk routes into and out of theHIDACZ and to the target area.

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• Air traffic advisory as required.Procedures and systems must also beconsidered for air traffic control serviceduring instrument meteorologicalconditions.

• Procedures for expeditious movement ofaircraft into and out of the HIDACZ.

• Coordination of fire support, as well asair defense weapons control orders orstatus within and in the vicinity of theHIDACZ.

• Range and type of naval surface firesupport (NSFS) available.

Figure III-1. Command and Control of Joint Air Operations

COMMAND AND CONTROLOF JOINT AIR OPERATIONS

The joint force commander (JFC) normally assigns a JFACC to plan,coordinate, allocate, and task joint air operations based on the JFC’s conceptof operations and air apportionment decision. The authority and commandrelationships of a JFACC are established by the JFC. These typically includeexercising operational control over assigned and attached forces and tacticalcontrol over other military capabilities and forces made available for tasking. Ifa JFACC is not designated, the JFC may plan, direct, and control joint airoperations. If this option is exercised, the JFC’s staff will assist in providingdirection and coordination of the forces assigned.

The JFC normally designates an AADC with the authority to plan, coordinate,and integrate overall joint force defensive counterair operations. AADCimplements theater- and joint operations area-(JOA) wide defense prioritiesthrough promulgation of a joint air defense plan. AADC’s focus is ondefensive counterair measures that include all measures designed to detect,identify, intercept, and destroy or negate enemy air and missile forcesattempting to attack or penetrate the friendly air environment. Both activeand passive measures are employed to protect joint force assets andinterests.

ACA is designated by the JFC to assume overall responsibility for theoperation of the airspace control system in the airspace control area. ACAdevelops, coordinates, and publishes airspace control procedures for thearea of responsibility or JOA. The airspace control plan (ACP) isimplemented through airspace control orders. The ACP is directive, but doesnot imply operational control or tactical control over any air assets.

The responsibilities of the JFACC, AADC, and ACA are interrelated and are normallyassigned to one individual, but they may be assigned to two or more individuals whenthe situation dictates. Based on the situation, if the JFC decides not to assign theJFACC, AADC, or ACA as one individual, then close coordination between all threepositions is essential. For additional details concerning these functions see JP 3-01

, JP 3-30,(formerly JP 3-56.1), and JP 3-52,

Joint Doctrine for Countering Air and Missile Threats Command and Controlof Joint Air Operations Doctrine for Joint AirspaceControl in the Combat Zone.

JOINT FORCE AIR COMPONENT COMMANDER (JFACC)

AREA AIR DEFENSE COMMANDER (AADC)

AIRSPACE CONTROL AUTHORITY (ACA)

III-3


• Location of enemy forces inside and inclose proximity to the HIDACZ.

• At a minimum, the HIDACZ shouldcover the amphibious task force seaechelon areas and extend inland to theLF’s fire support coordination line.Additionally, the HIDACZ should belarge enough to accommodate the flowof fixed-wing aircraft into and out of theamphibious airspace.

c. Under the ATF, the Navy tactical aircontrol center (TACC), typically onboardthe amphibious flagship, will normally beestablished as the agency responsible forcontrolling all air operations within theallocated airspace regardless of mission ororigin, to include supporting arms. Anairborne element or surface combatant withthe requisite air C2 capabilities may also servethis function. Regardless of where actualairspace control is exercised, close andcontinuous coordination between airspacecontrol and air defense agencies is essentialin any amphibious operation. Emphasis willbe placed on simple, flexible air traffic controlplans and a combination of positive andprocedural airspace control. Most amphibiousoperations will take place in a radar

environment, allowing for increased controlover air missions. There are three levels ofcontrol: procedural, positive, and acombination of the two. Amphibious forcesoperating in a non-radar environment will relyexclusively on procedural control.Amphibious air control plans employ acombination of positive and proceduralcontrol methods.

• Positive Airspace Control. Positiveairspace control uses radar, electronicwarfare support, identification, friend orfoe/selective identification feature, visualmeans, digital data links, and elementsof the air defense network command,control, communications, and computer(C4) systems to positively identify, track,and direct air assets.

• Procedural Airspace Control.Procedural control methods supplementthose methods utilized in positiveairspace control. Procedural control willbe used when electronic or visualidentification, tracking, or communicationmeans are unavailable or inadequate toprovide positive airspace control. Thesemethods are often used when adequatecoverage does exist to complement

The Navy TACC will normally be established as the agencyresponsible for controlling air operations.

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positive control methods. Proceduralairspace control relies on a combinationof previously agreed upon andpromulgated orders and procedures.

See JP 3-52, Doctrine for Joint AirspaceControl in the Combat Zone, for moredetails.

d. To ensure unity of effort and minimalinterference along adjacent boundariesthroughout the operation, the amphibiousforce air control agency must coordinate theitems listed in Figure III-2 with the ACA.Navy TACC prepares and submits airspacecontrol measures for the amphibious forcefor inclusion in the ACA’s ACP. The ACPprovides the basic information needed tooperate within the amphibious airspace.Changes to established procedures will becoordinated with all airspace users. The ACOand special instructions to the air tasking order(ATO) may contain changes to airspacecontrol procedures and must be reviewed dailyby all users of amphibious airspace.

3. Navy Tactical Air ControlCenter

The senior Navy amphibious air controlagency is the Navy TACC. The functions ofthe TACC may be spread across several ships.The Navy TACC possesses the functionalityof future plans and current operations. Duringamphibious operations, the Navy TACCcoordinates the types of airspace controlmeasures and controls all air operationswithin the operational area until a land-based air control agency is establishedashore. Once a land-based air control agencyreceives control of all LF air operations, theNavy TACC becomes a tactical air directioncenter (TADC) supporting the land-based aircontrol agency. Ideally, the Navy TACC iscollocated with the supporting armscoordination center (SACC). The NavyTACC has five sections, four of which controland integrate aircraft. The first three sectionsreside in current operations and the fourth inthe plans, execution, and support section.

a. Air Traffic Control Section (ATCS).The ATCS is located in the Navy TACC andprovides initial safe passage, radar control, andsurveillance for close air support (CAS)aircraft in the operational area. The ATCSalso controls and routes rotary-wing CASaircraft and assault support aircraft andcoordinates with individual shipboardhelicopter direction centers (HDCs) duringamphibious operations.

b. Air Support Control Section (ASCS).The ASCS is located in the SACC and is thesection of the Navy TACC designated tocoordinate, control, and integrate all directsupport aircraft (i.e., CAS) and assault supportoperations.

c. Air Defense Section (ADS). The ADS,located in the Navy TACC, provides liaisonwith air defense commanders and providesearly detection, identification, and warning ofenemy aircraft.

Figure III-2. Coordination Responsibilities

Procedures for coordination offlight information

Clearance of aircraft to enter anddepart the airspace sector

Procedures for assisting andcoordinating with airspace controlelements that respond to adjacentor supporting componentcommanders

Procedures for deconfliction ofoperations during transitionaloperations and during operationsin overlapping airspace areas

COORDINATIONRESPONSIBILITIES

III-5


d. Plans, Execution, and Support Section.The plans cell section participates in thetargeting effort as air operations subjectmatter experts through the targeting board.The section’s planning will coincide with theATO process. The section forwards excessair sorties and air support requests to theestablishing authority for tasking andallocation. The input from the targeting boardis processed by the ATO planning,production, and execution cell. This cellnormally produces the following amphibiousproducts: the ACO, the ATO, SPINS, andadditional fire support asset requests. If theNavy TACC is acting as the joint air operationscenter for an enabling JFACC, the plans cellsection may be required to produce the airapportionment recommendation for the JFC.

4. Marine Corps Tactical AirCommand Center

a. The Marine Corps' tactical air commandcenter (TACC) is the senior agency of theMarine air command and control system(MACCS). When established ashore, itprovides the facilities for the aviation combatelement (ACE) commander and staff toconduct amphibious air operations. OtherService’s comparable agencies include the US

Air Force air operations center (AOC) and theNavy’s TACC. If the ACE is afloat, the MarineTACC may be incrementally phased ashore.Initially, a Marine TADC is established ashoresubordinate to the Navy TACC and isresponsible for air operations in the landwardsector of the operational area. Uponcompletion of its build-up and when airspacemanagement functions are passed from afloatto ashore, the Marine TADC assumes the titleand responsibilities of the Marine TACC. TheNavy TACC then becomes a TADC, in supportof the Marine TACC.

b. Direct Air Support Center (DASC).The DASC is an organization within theMACCS and serves as the centralcoordination point for all direct support airrequests. Based upon the tactical situation,the DASC is normally located with either thesenior ground combat element (GCE), firesupport coordination center (FSCC), or theMarine air-ground task force (MAGTF) forcefires coordination center (FFCC). The DASCassigns direct air support aircraft to terminalcontrol agencies, provides aircraft ingress andegress route instructions, and disseminatesadvisory information. When control is afloat,the Navy TACC supervises the DASC’soperations. When control is ashore, the

The air traffic control section provides initial safe passage, radar control, andsurveillance for close air support aircraft in the operational area.

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Marine TADC or Marine TACC supervisesthe DASC’s operations. The DASC isnormally the first major LF air control agencyto come ashore, typically landing in the samewave as the FSCC.

5. Tactical Air OperationsCenter

The tactical air operations center (TAOC)provides safe passage, radar control, andsurveillance for CAS aircraft en route to andfrom target areas. Until the Marine TADCor Marine TACC is established ashore, theTAOC normally reports to the Navy TACC.The TAOC, or elements thereof, can bedeployed to support a Marine expeditionaryunit (MEU), but typically deploy with theland elements of a Marine expeditionaryforce (MEF). Its capabilities incrementallyincrease as the size of the land forcecomponent increases (i.e., MEU- to MEF-size land force).

6. Counterair OperationsDuring AmphibiousOperations

a. The joint counterair mission is used togain and maintain air superiority throughmutually supporting offensive and defensivemeasures.

• Offensive counterair (OCA) operationsconsist of measures to destroy, disrupt,or neutralize enemy aircraft, missiles,launch platforms, and their supportingstructures and systems. Ideally, mostjoint OCA operations will prevent thelaunch of aircraft and missiles bydestroying them and their supportinginfrastructure prior to launch. Offensivemeasures include attack operations,fighter sweep and escort missions, andsuppression of enemy air defenses.

• Defensive counterair (DCA) operationsinclude all measures designed to detect,

identify, intercept, and destroy or negateenemy air and missile forces attemptingto attack or penetrate the friendly airenvironment. These operations employboth active and passive measures toprotect US or multinational forces, assets,population centers, and interests.

• Counterair operations within anoperational area can include, but are notlimited to, defense against missiles andaircraft, attack operations against targetssuch as ballistic missile transporter-erector launchers, and attack operationsagainst airfields and C2 facilities. FigureIII-3 distinguishes between OCA andDCA measures employed.

b. The AADC bears overallresponsibility for air defense activities ofthe joint force. The AADC may, however,designate subordinate regional air defensecommanders (RADCs) for specificgeographic regions to accomplish the jointforce mission. Additionally, sector air defensecommanders (SADCs) may be designatedwithin and subordinate to RADCs. TheRADC is normally established within theATF organization and is responsible for theairspace allocated for amphibiousoperations, including but not limited to theAOA (if established). The CATF willcoordinate active defense plans andprocedures with the AADC and attackoperations with the JFACC unless otherwisespecified in the order initiating the amphibiousoperation or the establishing directive. TheCATF usually assigns an air defensecommander (ADC), normally on the mostcapable air defense platform, to actually carryout air defense operations. The ADCcoordinates with the Navy TACC to maintaina current air picture.

c. When an AOA is established, theairspace assigned to the amphibious forceusually includes a margin of airspacesurrounding the AOA called the amphibious

III-7


defense zone (ADZ). An ADZ is the areaencompassing the AOA and the adjoiningairspace required by accompanying navalforces for the purpose of air defense (FigureIII-4 depicts a conceptual ADZ). The actualsize and shape of an ADZ is dependent uponthe capabilities of air defense platformsassigned to the CATF; the size of the AOA;and agreement between the amphibiousforce’s RADC, the AADC, and adjacent airdefense commanders. Within the ADZ, theamphibious force air defense agency maintainspositive identification of all aircraft and conductsair defense with the authority to engage inaccordance with established rules of engagement(ROE) and AADC established procedures.

d. Planning Considerations

• A coherent air defense plan requires thedesignated commander to conductcoordinated planning with all supportingand adjacent commanders and the JFCto establish a robust C2 arrangement.Effective air defense operations require acontrol system that functions despite a

high volume of all types of friendly aircraftoperations within the operational area andthe difficult overland target detectionenvironment present in amphibiousoperations.

• The area air defense plan must be writtenwith detailed engagement procedures thatare consistent with the ACP andoperations in the combat zone. Thegeographic arrangement of weapons andthe location of specific types of air defenseoperations, as well as specific proceduresfor identification of aircraft, are importantfactors to include in planning.

Refer to JP 3-09.3, Joint Tactics,Techniques, and Procedures for Close AirSupport, and JP 3-01.3, Joint Doctrinefor Defensive Operations for Counter Airand Missile Threats, for additionalinformation.

Other key factors to consider are describedin JP 3-52, Doctrine for Joint Airspace Controlin the Combat Zone.

Figure III-3. The Counterair Framework

THE COUNTERAIR FRAMEWORK

OffensiveCounterair

DefensiveCounterair

COUNTERAIR

Attack Operationsattacks on missile sites,airfields, command andcontrol, and infrastructure

Fighter SweepFighter EscortSuppression of Enemy

Air DefensesElectronic Warfare

Active DefenseInterception of ballisticmissiles, cruise missiles,and aircraft

Passive DefenseCamouflage and DeceptionDetection and WarningReconstitutionNuclear, Biological, andChemical Facilities

HardeningDispersal

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7. Air Command and ControlProcedures

The air C2 procedures described below arefrequently associated with an establishedAOA; however, the underlying principlesapply for most amphibious operations,whether an AOA is established or otherairspace allocation methods are used.

a. Pre-D-day Operations. Prior to thecommencement of amphibious operations,airspace control and air defense operationsthroughout the area of responsibility (AOR)and/or joint operations area will be the directresponsibility of the ACA and AADC,respectively. The CATF normally will assume

RADC duties for a specified area under theAADC and control authority for a specificairspace control area or sector as designatedby the ACA. Control is exercised through thedesignated air control agency which, asdescribed earlier, could be an airborne element,surface combatant, or Navy TACC.Subordinate TADCs, as designated, monitorair control circuits in readiness to assume allor part of the duties of the air control agency,if necessary.

b. Advance Forces. If advance forceoperations are conducted in the operationalarea, the designated commander normallyexercises air C2 through an advance forcecommander. The advance force commander

Figure III-4. Conceptual Amphibious Defense Zone

CONCEPTUAL AMPHIBIOUS DEFENSE ZONE

III-9


controls operations in the designated areathrough an air control agency tailored andtrained for the mission. CATF typicallyassumes responsibility for local airspacecontrol and air defense operations upon arrivalof the main body of the amphibious force inthe operational area.

c. Control by Attack Groups. Whensubordinate attack groups are formed foroperations in widely separated landing areas,the designated commander normallydelegates to each attack group commanderauthority for control of airspace and airoperations in the immediate areasurrounding the respective landing areas.The attack group commander exercisescontrol through a local air control and defenseagency consisting of airborne elements, anescorting surface combatant, or a TADC onthe appropriate attack group ship. Overalldirection of air operations as they apply tothe amphibious mission is normally retainedby the CATF and exercised through thedesignated air control agency.

d. Air Tasking. The commanderdesignated in the order initiating theamphibious operation is responsible forcoordinating the air support requirementsfor the amphibious force. The commandercoordinates the submission of air supportrequests through preparation of an allocationrequest (ALLOREQ). An ALLOREQmessage provides, among other things, thevehicle for requesting additional air supportbeyond the capability of the amphibious forceand its direct support components.Depending on the command relationships thatthe establishing authority promulgates in theorder initiating the amphibious operation, thedesignated commander coordinates thetargeting process for the amphibious forcethrough preparation and submission of targetnominations and fire support coordinatingmeasures (FSCMs).

See JP 3-30, Command and Control of JointAir Operations (formerly JP 3-56.1), andChapter VII, “Fire Support Planning andCoordination,” for more discussion of the jointair tasking cycle.

e. Air Defense Transition Ashore. Assufficient air defense assets are establishedashore, the CLF will coordinate with theCATF to assume SADC responsibility in thelandward sector of the operational area, thedimensions of which will have beenpredetermined during the planning phase ofthe operation.

f. Shift of Control Ashore. Duringamphibious operations, airspace control andcounterair responsibilities in theoperational area may be transferredashore. For this to occur, an appropriateagency must be established that is responsiblefor air operations planning, air control, andcounterair. This agency is either the MarineTACC when the LF is Marine Corps, or anAOC when the LF is an Army taskorganization. It is phased ashore as part ofthe LF. To facilitate an orderly transfer ofcontrol, specific control functions may beincrementally passed as facilities ashorebecome operational. After passage of controlashore, afloat control centers continue tomonitor air circuits in a standby status, readyto assume control in the event of anemergency. The CATF will normally beassigned SADC responsibility for the seawardsector of the operational area.

g. Termination of the AmphibiousOperation. Upon termination of theamphibious operation, the amphibious forcewill be dissolved, and air control and defenseresponsibilities in the area passed to theappropriate commander in accordance withthe establishing authority’s guidance.

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Intentionally Blank

CHAPTER IVAPPROACH TO PLANNING AND PRIMARY DECISIONS

IV-1

1. General

This chapter provides general guidance onthe amphibious planning process. The processis designed for use by any size amphibiousforce, to conduct any operation, and facilitatescommanders making the ten primary decisionsrequired in most amphibious operations,discussed later in this chapter. The process isbased on joint and Service models. It provideslogical procedures to follow from the receiptof an order initiating the amphibious operationthrough the amphibious force commanders’development of operation plans (OPLANs),OPORDs, operation general matters(OPGENs), or operation tasks (OPTASKs).

For more information on joint planningmodels, see JP 5-00.2, Joint Task ForcePlanning Guidance and Procedures. ChaptersV through X of this publication provideguidance on functional area planningconsiderations.

The amphibious planning process is capableof Service component interface with the jointdeliberate planning process during thesupporting plan development phase or Serviceor functional component interface during thecrisis action planning (CAP) process,beginning in the situation development phaseand continuing throughout the CAP process.The focus of the planning process is to linkthe employment of the amphibious forceto the attainment of strategic and/or

“Gallipoli was a tragedy for the Allies in World War I, but it was a failure inexecution — not in concept. The lessons drawn from this campaign providedthe framework for modern amphibious doctrine, which later would help theMarines defeat the Japanese in the Pacific. Everything is good for something— if only to serve as a horrible example.”

From Gallipoli and the Role of IntelligenceNaval Institute Proceedings

June 1995

operational objectives through the design,organization, integration, and conduct ofthe amphibious operation within the JFC’soverall campaign.

2. Tenets of AmphibiousPlanning

Planning for an amphibious operation iscontinuous, from the receipt of the orderinitiating the amphibious operation throughthe termination of the operation. The tenetsof successful amphibious planning are top-down planning, unity of effort (within thedesignated operational area), and anintegrated planning effort.

a. Top-Down Planning. Planning is afundamental responsibility of commanders.The complexity of amphibious operationsrequires amphibious force commanders todrive the planning process. Their guidanceand intent are central to planning and mustbe translated into a design for actionby subordinates. Their decisions (e.g.,amphibious force objectives, amphibiousforce CONOPS, landing beaches, commanders’critical information requirements, andpromulgated essential elements of friendlyinformation) during the planning process arerequired before additional steps in the processcan proceed.

b. Unity of Effort. Unity of effort in theoperational area allows the amphibious force

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commanders to effectively focus theamphibious force on mission accomplishment.They must view their battlespace as anindivisible entity, for operations or events inone area may have profound and oftenunintended effects on other areas and events.

c. Integrated Planning. Integratedplanning in amphibious operations has twoparts. The first part is the assembly of theamphibious force commanders and theirstaffs in the same locality. When sucharrangements are not practicable, theexchange of liaison officers qualified toperform planning functions and the use ofadvanced technology, collaborative planningaids, and video teleconferencing are necessary.During planning, and particularly in CAP,amphibious force commanders must ensurethat their planning efforts are parallel andconcurrent with those of their higherheadquarters. The same degree of integrationby amphibious force commanders and theirstaffs must also be achieved with subordinateunits to ensure a coordinated and thoroughplan. The second part of integratedplanning occurs across functional areas.The use of functional areas, such as maneuver,supporting arms and fires, intelligence, C2,logistics, and force protection enableamphibious force planners to integrate theplanning effort and supervise the plan. Theuse of functional areas helps the planners toconsider all relevant factors and minimizeomissions. The key to this part of integratedplanning is the assignment of appropriatepersonnel to represent each functional area.Integrated planning is facilitated by the useof operational planning teams which aredynamic, ad hoc organizations formed aroundplanners from functional areas, appropriatestaff representatives, subordinate andsupporting command liaison officers, andother subject matter experts.

3. Planning Directive

Following receipt of the order initiating theamphibious operation, the amphibious forcecommanders will issue a coordinated planningdirective to ensure that plans are harmonized,thorough, and completed in the time allowed.The planning directive specifies the planof action and milestones to complete eachmajor step in the planning process, and thetimeline for the development of OPLANs,OPORDs, OPGENs, and OPTASKs.

4. Amphibious PlanningProcess

a. Six Step Process. The amphibiousplanning process establishes procedures foranalyzing a mission, developing andwargaming COAs against the threat,comparing friendly COAs against thecommander’s criteria and each other,selecting a COA, preparing an order forexecution, and transitioning the OPLAN,OPORD, OPGEN, and/or OPTASK tothose tasked with its execution. The processorganizes these procedures into sixmanageable, logical steps. These stepsprovide the amphibious commanders and theirstaffs with a means to organize their planningactivities, to transmit plans to subordinates andsubordinate commands, and to share acommon understanding of the mission andcommander’s intent. Interactions amongvarious planning steps allow a concurrent,coordinated effort that maintains flexibility,makes efficient use of time available, andfacilitates continuous information sharing (seeFigure IV-1).

b. Mission Analysis. Mission analysis isthe first step in planning as it facilitates theorganization of the amphibious planningprocess. Its purpose is to review andanalyze orders, guidance, and other

IV-3

Approach to Planning and Primary Decisions

information provided by the establishingauthority in the order initiating theamphibious operation and to produce anamphibious force mission statement(s).The commanders will provide planningguidance upon the completion of this step thatwill focus the staffs during step two, COAdevelopment.

c. Course of Action Development. COAdevelopment is the phase of the JointOperation Planning and Execution Systemwithin the crisis action planning process thatprovides for the development of militaryresponses and includes, within the limits ofthe time allowed: establishing force and

sustainment requirements with actual units;evaluating force, logistic, and transportationfeasibility; identifying and resolving resourceshortfalls; recommending resourceallocations; and producing a COA via acommander’s estimate that contains a conceptof operations, employment concept, riskassessments, prioritized COA, and supportingdatabases.

d. Course of Action War Game. COAwargaming involves a detailed assessment ofeach COA as it pertains to the enemy and thebattlespace. Each friendly COA iswargamed against selected threat COAs.COA wargaming assists planners in

Figure IV-1. Steps in the Amphibious Planning Process

STEPS IN THE AMPHIBIOUS PLANNING PROCESS

1

2

34

5

6

MISSION ANALYSIS

Higher commander’swarning order,OPLAN, or OPORD

LF

OPGEN

OPLAN

OPORD

Landing Force

Operation General Matters

Operation Plan

Operation Order

LF commander’s OPLAN

COURSE OF ACTIONDEVELOPMENT

COURSE OF ACTIONWAR GAME

ORDERS AND OPGENDEVELOPMENT

COURSE OFACTION

COMPARISON ANDDECISION

TRANSITION

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identifying strengths and weaknesses,associated risks, and asset shortfalls for eachfriendly COA. COA wargaming alsoidentifies branches and potential sequels thatmay require additional planning. Branchesare contingency plans or COAs for changingthe mission, disposition, orientation, ordirection of movement of the amphibiousforce to aid success of the operation based onanticipated events, opportunities, ordisruptions caused by enemy actions. Sequelsare major operations that follow the currentmajor operation based on possible outcomes,such as success or a setback (e.g., theamphibious force may plan a sequel based ona successful landing that requires re-embarkation and another assault). Short ofactually executing the COA, COA wargamingprovides the most reliable basis forunderstanding and improving each COA.Computerized simulations can also be usedto conduct wargaming.

e. Course of Action Comparison andDecision. In COA comparison and decision,amphibious force commanders evaluate allfriendly COAs against established criteria,then against each other. The COA that willbest accomplish the mission will then beselected.

f. Orders and OPGEN Development.During orders and OPGEN development, thestaffs use command COA decisions, missionstatements, and intent and guidance to developorders and OPGENs that direct unit actions.Orders and OPGENs serve as the principalmeans by which the commanders expresstheir decisions, intents, and guidance.

g. Transition. Transition is an orderlyhandover of an OPLAN, OPORD, OPGEN,or OPTASK as it is passed to those taskedwith execution of the operation. It providesthose who will execute the plan or order withthe situational awareness and rationale for keydecisions necessary to ensure that there is acoherent shift from planning to execution.

5. Primary Decisions

Amphibious force commanders, as theprincipal force providers of the amphibiousforce, must make certain primary decisionsduring the planning process before furtherplanning for an amphibious operation canproceed. In some cases, these decisions mayhave been made by the establishing authorityand promulgated in the order initiating theamphibious operation. The decisions and whomakes them are described below. In the caseof mutual decisions, both commandersmust concur or the decision is referred tothe establishing authority for resolution(see Figure IV-2).

a. During “Mission Analysis,” the firststep of the amphibious operation planningprocess, the following decisions must be made.

• Determine Amphibious ForceMission(s). Amphibious forcecommanders may decide on acoordinated mission statement or developseparate but supporting missionstatements. The determination of acoordinated amphibious force missionstatement is a mutual decision. If separatebut supporting mission statements arechosen, then each commander must develophis or her respective mission statement.

• Select Amphibious Force Objective(s).Amphibious force objectives arephysical objectives, either terrain,infrastructure (e.g., ports or airfields),or forces, that must be seized, secured,or destroyed in order to accomplish themission. Amphibious force objectivesare designated in alphabetic order (e.g.,Amphibious Force Objective A andAmphibious Force Objective B). Theselection of amphibious force objectivesis a mutual decision.

b. During “COA Development,” the secondstep of the amphibious operation planning

IV-5


process, amphibious force planners mustfurther develop COAs based on the guidancefrom the amphibious force commanders.Normally, the LF planners will provide an LFCOA for the ATF planners to build asupporting COA. At a minimum, COAsinclude the general area for a landing (whichmay already be specified by higherheadquarters), designation of the main effort,the scheme of maneuver, and the taskorganization. The selected COAs will bewargamed and compared based on criteriaestablished by the commanders. The selectionof amphibious force COAs is a mutualdecision.

c. No later than during “COAComparison and Decision,” the fourth stepof the amphibious planning process, thefollowing decisions must be made.

• Select Course of Action. At this point aCOA is selected and the CONOPS(including fire support planningguidance) is prepared. The CONOPS isusually a written and graphicrepresentation, in broad outline, of theintent of both of the commanders withrespect to their portion of the operation.It gives an overall picture of theoperation, including the transit, formationfor landing, and the scheme of maneuverfor accomplishing the amphibious forceobjectives. Both commanders preparemutually supporting CONOPS.

• Select Landing Areas. The landingarea is that part of the operational areawithin which the landing operations ofan amphibious force are conducted. Itincludes the beach, the approaches to

Figure IV-2. Primary Decisions Responsibilities Matrix

PRIMARY DECISIONS RESPONSIBILITIES MATRIX

PRIMARY DECISION

May be contained inthe order initiating

the amphibiousoperation

Decision Decisionmade notlater than

step

1. Determine Amphibious ForceMission(s)

X MUTUAL 1

1

2

4

4

4

4

4

4

4

MUTUAL

MUTUAL

MUTUAL

MUTUAL

MUTUAL

CATF

CATF Commander, Amphibious Task Force

CLF

CLF Commander, Landing Force

CLF

MUTUAL

X

X

X

2. Select Amphibious ForceObjective(s)

4. Select Course of Action

6. Select Landing Beaches

8. Select Landing ForceObjectives

10. Select Date and Hour ofLanding

3. Determine Courses of Actionfor Development

5. Select Landing Areas

7. Determine Sea Echelon Plan

9. Select Landing Zones andDrops Zones

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the beach, the transport areas, the firesupport areas, the airspace occupied byclose supporting aircraft, and the landincluded in the advance inland toaccomplish the initial objectives. Theselection of the landing area is a mutualdecision (see Figure IV-3).

• Select Landing Beaches. A landingbeach is that portion of a shorelineusually required for the landing of abattalion landing team. However, itmay also be that portion of a shorelineconstituting a tactical locality (such asthe shore of a bay) over which a forcemay be landed. Landing beaches areselected from within the selected landing

areas. Principal factors in the selectionof landing beaches (in addition to thosepreviously described for selection oflanding areas) are as follows.

•• Suitability for landing craft andAAVs.

•• Offshore approaches and tidalconditions.

•• Number, location, and suitability ofbeach support areas, beach exits, andnearby infrastructure. Landing beachesare designated by color, andsubdivisions are further designatedwith the addition of a number (Green

Figure IV-3. Landing Area Selection

LANDING AREA SELECTION

NAVAL CONSIDERATIONSLANDING FORCE

CONSIDERATIONS

AIR CONSIDERATIONS

Ability to support the landingand subsequent operations

Degree of shelter from sea andweather

Hydrography of beachapproaches, offshore, and nearshore areas

Extent of mineable waters

Hostile ability to defeat minecountermeasures

Practicality of improvingunloading facilities

Hostile capabilities anddisposition

Possibility of early seizure andrehabilitation of port facilities

Suitability of landing area

Hostile capabilities

Coastline configuration

Inland terrain

Combat service supportrequirements

Possiblity of early seizure andrehabilitation of air facilities

Ability to achieve and maintainlocal air superiority and performinterdiction and close air support

Own forces locally based airwarfare capabilities

Command and control capabilitiesto include deconfliction ability


Hostile counterair capabilitiesand disposition

Possibility of early seizureand rehabilitation of facilities


Degree of shelter from sea andweather

Hydrography of beachapproaches, offshore, and nearshore areas

Extent of mineable waters

Hostile ability to defeat minecountermeasures

Practicality of improvingunloading facilities

Hostile capabilities anddisposition

Possibility of early seizure andrehabilitation of port facilities

IV-7


Beach, Red Beach 1, and Red Beach 2).The selection of landing beaches is amutual decision. Commanders and theirstaffs must also begin developing their“commander’s guidance for fires.” Theyshould also ensure that the JFC targetingprocess is responding to their need for‘shaping’ fires and incorporating theminto an integrated joint fire support plan.

• Determine Sea Echelon Plan. The seaechelon plan is the distribution plan foramphibious shipping in the transport areato minimize losses due to threat attacksand to reduce the area swept by mines.The CATF determines the sea echelonplan. The design of the amphibiousairspace must take into account, as ageneral rule, the lateral limits of theamphibious area above the sea echelonareas.

• Select LF Objectives. LF objectivesfacilitate the attainment of amphibiousforce objectives and/or ensure thecontinuous landing of forces andmaterial. LF objectives are normallydesignated by LF and a number (e.g., LFObjective 1). LF objectives are selectedby the CLF.

• Select Landing Zones (LZs) and DropZones (DZs). An LZ is a specified zoneused for the landing of aircraft. An LZmay contain one or more landing sites.A DZ is a specific area upon whichairborne troops, equipment, or suppliesare air dropped. Fixed-wing LZs andDZs are designated when airborne or air-transported forces are employed. TheCLF selects LZs and DZs.

• Select Date and Hour of Landing. Thedate and hour of the landing are selectedunless they are specified in the orderinitiating the amphibious operation. H-hour is the time the first assault elementsare scheduled to touchdown on the beachor an LZ and, in some cases, thecommencement of counterminebreaching operations. L-hour is definedin amphibious operations as the time atwhich the first helicopter of thehelicopter-borne assault wave touchesdown in the LZ. H- and L-hour areconfirmed prior to commencement of thelanding based on the weather, enemysituation, and other pertinent factors. Ifnot specified in the order initiating theamphibious operation, this is a mutualdecision.

The commander, landing force selects landing and drop zones.

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6. Crosstalks and ConfirmationBriefs

a. Order and OPGEN Crosstalk. Afterthe primary decisions have been made and stepfour of the planning process is completed, theamphibious force commanders develop theirOPLANs, OPORDs, OPGENs, or OPTASKs.The staffs must maintain constant contact toensure continued harmonization of theirefforts. Depending upon time available,once final drafts of the OPORD andOPGEN have been completed a crosstalkand confirmation brief should beconducted between the commanders andstaffs. The purpose of the orders and OPGENcrosstalk is to compare these documents withhigher and adjacent orders to ensure unity ofeffort and to identify any discrepancies orgaps. Following the staff correction of anydiscrepancies identified during the crosstalkand confirmation brief, the OPORD andOPGEN will be submitted for approval.

b. Confirmation Brief. A confirmationbrief is given by a subordinate commanderonce planning is complete. Subordinatecommanders confirm the plan to theirsubordinates who will actually execute themission with the amphibious forcecommanders in attendance. Theparticipants brief the execution portions oftheir subordinate plans, including thecommander’s intent, specific task andpurpose, the relationship between their unit’smission and the other units in the operation,and their detailed operational plans includingactions on the objective. The confirmationbrief allows the higher commander to identifydiscrepancies between his or her order andthe subordinates’ plan(s) and learn how thesubordinate commanders intend toaccomplish their mission.

CHAPTER VTHE INTELLIGENCE CYCLE AND AMPHIBIOUS

OPERATIONS

V-1

1. Introduction: AmphibiousOperations Intelligence,Surveillance, andReconnaissance

a. Amphibious operations have beencharacterized as the most complex anddifficult of military operations; however, thebasic nature of intelligence, surveillance,and reconnaissance (ISR) does not changein amphibious operations. The intelligencecycle (planning and direction; collection;processing and exploitation; analysis andproduction; dissemination and integration;and evaluation and feedback) remains thesame. Intelligence is still required to assessbasic infrastructure data, weather andterrain, and threats to friendly forces in thearea of interest (AOI). Amphibiousoperations differ from other militaryoperations due to significant challenges posedby a lack of amphibious force ISR assets inthe operational area during the planning phase,a heavy initial reliance on national and theatercollection assets, the transition to shore, andthe ability to provide predictive analysis tocompensate for relatively longer periods ofuncertainty and, in many cases, total chaos.

b. Amphibious operations involveextensive planning in all functional areas toensure that ships, aircraft, landing craft, andsupporting fires are synchronized to arrive atspecific points at specific times to takeadvantage of enemy critical vulnerabilities andexpedite combat power build-up and

“For the whole reason-for-being of all military intelligence personnel is tofacilitate accomplishment of the mission, and to save lives. When they fail,all the wrong people are hurt.”

Stedman Chandler and Robert W. RobbFront-Line Intelligence

sustainment ashore. This requirescomprehensive intelligence preparation ofthe battlespace (IPB), includingharmonization of intelligence and operationalplanners to ensure that COAs are feasible andthat enemy capabilities, vulnerabilities, andCOGs are identified and taken intoconsideration.

c. Amphibious operations rely onintelligence to support planning, COAselection, and maneuver. Amphibious forceintelligence operations are conducted acrossstrategic, operational, and tactical levels ofwar. From National Military Strategyconsiderations down to tactical doctrine,intelligence analysis reveals enemy COGs,strengths, and vulnerabilities. Intelligencealso assesses potential for maneuver offeredby the battlespace, to include identifyinglanding force zones of entry. Intelligencesupport throughout the operation provides asolid foundation for effective force protectionefforts for the amphibious force.

2. Required Intelligence,Surveillance, andReconnaissance Capabilities

The following intelligence capabilities arerequired to support amphibious operations.

a. Broad maneuver space and commandsupport in order to enable intelligence todetermine enemy strengths to be avoided andweaknesses to be exploited.

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b. Detailed terrain and hydrographicanalysis to identify suitable zones of entry(e.g., beaches, helicopter landing zones, DZs,etc.).

c. Information systems interoperabilitywith national, theater, and joint forceintelligence organizations, to provideintelligence in time for amphibious planningand rehearsals.

d. Standoff collection assets capable ofsatisfying ATF and LF requirements fromOTH.

e. Intelligence dissemination systemslinking widely dispersed forces afloat andashore.

f. Flexible intelligence assets capable ofrapidly transitioning ashore with minimaldegradation of support.

3. The Intelligence Cycle andAmphibious Operations

a. Planning and Direction. There are anumber of unique intelligence considerationsfor amphibious operations. During theembarked planning phase, the co-equalamphibious and landing force intelligenceofficers direct their personnel from theintelligence center established within theamphibious force to support the intelligenceneeds of embarked commands. Theintelligence center brings together ship’scompany, amphibious force, and otherembarked component intelligence-relatedactivities. While personnel and materialremain organic to their respective commands,they may task-organize to performintelligence work necessary for completionof the mission.

b. Collection. During the planning phase,amphibious force collections are primarilyconducted by national, theater, JTF, and othernaval assets. These assets collect information

in denied and remote areas withoutcompromising operations security (OPSEC)and perform missions at significant distancesfrom embarked forces. The paucity of thesesystems and their inherent limitations oftenresult in an incomplete intelligence picture.Advance force or pre-assault collectionoperations by ATF, LF, and other navalassets are often required to confirm andfurther develop the operational picture. Anintensive pre-assault intelligence effort willprovide support for target selection whileensuring that collection operations do notexpose the commander’s intent.

c. Processing and Exploitation.Individual intelligence sections will normallyconcentrate on their particular areas ofexpertise, satisfying their units’ requirementswhile contributing a broad-scope product tothe general intelligence production effort. Forexample, LF intelligence could analyze theland battlespace, to include the enemy’s C2,ground forces, logistics, and reserves, whileATF intelligence could analyze enemymaritime forces and coastal defense threats.Air threats could be analyzed from a combinedamphibious force perspective.

d. Analysis and Production. During theanalysis and production phase, all availableprocessed information is integrated, analyzed,evaluated, and interpreted to create productsthat will satisfy the amphibious forcecommanders’ requirements. Intelligenceproducts are generally placed in one of sixcategories: indications and warning; currentintelligence; general military intelligence;target intelligence; scientific and technicalintelligence; and counterintelligence.

e. Dissemination and Integration.Intelligence dissemination and integrationduring amphibious operations presentssignificant challenges. Amphibious force andsupporting forces can be widely dispersed andmay not assemble until late in the planningphase, if at all. Advances in technology have

V-3

The Intelligence Cycle and Amphibious Operations

improved intelligence dissemination betweenafloat forces, but limitations still exist in thequantity and quality of intelligenceexchanged. The immense volume of datarequired overtaxes communications andintelligence systems, to include criticalgraphic products that must be distributedduring the planning phase. Intelligenceofficers at all levels, working in coordinationwith unit operations and communications-information systems officers, must developplans that provide dissemination of actionableintelligence in a timely manner to all elementsof the amphibious force. Units located onships not equipped with the latest C2,communications, or intelligence systems willbe a high priority. Intelligence must bedisseminated in a timely manner to ensure thatit is integrated into the amphibious planningand decision making processes. Rather thanan end of a process, the integration ofintelligence is a continuous dialogue betweenthe user and the producer.

f. Evaluation and Feedback. During theevaluation and feedback phase, intelligencepersonnel at all levels assess how each phaseof the intelligence cycle is being performed.Commanders and staffs throughout theamphibious force must provide feedback ifthey are not receiving timely, accurate, usable,complete, and relevant information to supportthe operation. Within the intelligence center,the amphibious force intelligence officers arealso evaluating the intelligence cycle toimprove performance.

4. Key Intelligence Activitiesand Goals During Planning

a. Mission Analysis. Intelligence activitiessupport mission analysis by providing basicintelligence on the nature of the area ofoperations and the threat. Concurrently, whilemission analysis is ongoing, intelligenceindications and warning will monitor the AOIand identify developing crisis situations and/or potential amphibious force missions.

During mission analysis, intelligenceoperations must:

• Orient the commander and operationalplanners to the battlespace and the natureof the threat;

• Aid in the development of commander’sintent by outlining what is operationallypossible and most advantageous; and

• Receive guidance from the commanderto help shape intelligence operations.

b. Course of Action Development.Intelligence operations support COAdevelopment by:

• Defining operational possibilitiesthrough the IPB process;

• Continuously updating the view of thebattlespace and estimates of enemycapabilities, intentions, and activities;

• Providing focus on the adversary throughidentification of threat COGs, criticalvulnerabilities, and potential COAs, withemphasis on the most likely and mostdangerous COAs; and

• Assisting in the prioritization of targetsof interest.

c. Course of Action Analysis.Intelligence operations assist COA analysisby:

• Identifying and refining likely anddangerous enemy COAs and actions and/or reactions to friendly COAs underconsideration;

• Playing the role of the enemy duringwargaming of COAs;

• Developing an independent evaluation ofeach friendly COA based upon an

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understanding of the environment and thepotential threat response as well as onthe ability to provide intelligence supportto that COA; and

• Helping to focus planners on the threatand environment, with emphasis on thedegree of uncertainty and resulting riskassociated with each friendly COA.

d. Plans and Orders Development. Oncethe commander has selected a COA and givenadditional guidance, intelligence operationsshift from the development of basic and broad-scope intelligence in support of conceptualplanning to providing specific and detailedcurrent intelligence to aid functional anddetailed planning in all areas and ultimatemission execution.

5. Intelligence Support toOperations

During execution, intelligence operationsmust ensure a continuous flow of timely,pertinent, and tailored intelligence throughoutthe ATF and LF to maintain a shared pictureof the battlespace while rapidly identifyingnew intelligence requirements (IRs) ofcommanders and the operating forces.

a. The Environment of Execution.Intelligence support to execution differssignificantly from its support to planning.Most importantly, intelligence support toexecution involves the satisfaction of amuch larger body of IRs, involving asignificantly greater degree of detail.Additionally, time is a greater factor duringexecution than it was during planning. Whiledays, weeks, and longer periods often areavailable during planning, intelligencesupport to execution must be planned,executed, and the resulting intelligenceproducts provided in hours, minutes, andeven seconds. Finally, the uncertainty anddisorder inherent in war or other operationsmanifest themselves primarily during

execution; once execution begins, interactionbetween the opposing forces normally leadsto significant and fundamental changes in thesituation.

b. Intelligence Focus During Execution.Intelligence support during execution focuseson providing practical knowledge thatprovides an exploitable advantage over theenemy. Accordingly, intelligence operationsfocus on providing situational awareness,identifying new enemy activities and friendlyopportunities, aiding with friendly maneuverand targeting, and supporting force protection— all while continuing to support futureoperations planning. Three key factors forensuring effective intelligence support duringexecution are as follows.

• Resource Allocation. As IRs willalways exceed available intelligenceresources, intelligence operations mustbe focused where they can have thegreatest effect and value. A detailed, wellthought out concept of intelligencesupport in accordance with thecommander’s intent and synchronized tohis or her CONOPS will lead to the bestallocation of intelligence capabilitiesbetween the main and supporting effortsand between current and futureoperations.

• Linkage to Operations. Intelligencecollection, production, and disseminationplans are developed to support theexecution of specific tactical operations,the engagement of targets, the protectionof the force, and the selection of branchesand sequels to the OPLAN. Close andcontinuous coordination betweenintelligence and operations personnel isessential to maintain common situationalawareness of ongoing and planned futureoperations, monitor potential enemyreactions, identify new opportunities, andassess the effects of friendly actions onthe enemy.

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The Intelligence Cycle and Amphibious Operations

• Generation of Tempo. Intelligenceoperations during execution mustfacilitate the generation of operationaltempo. First, intelligence operationsgenerate tempo by focusing on satisfyingpriority intelligence requirements andsupporting the main effort. Next,intelligence facilitates tempo bysupporting the decision making processthrough accurate situational awareness

and by recognizing emerging patternsthat enable the commander to rapidlymake decisions. Finally, intelligencefacilitates tempo by providing knowledge— key elements of data and informationthat have been analyzed, synthesized, andplaced in context to help providesituational awareness — not just a massof unprocessed information or unrelatedpieces of data.

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Intentionally Blank

CHAPTER VICOMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS, AND

COMPUTER SYSTEMS SUPPORT PLANNING

VI-1

1. Requirements of Command,Control, Communications,and Computer Systems

a. Amphibious operations require aflexible C2 system capable of supportingrapid decision making and execution tomaintain a high tempo of operations. C4systems and equipment support effective C2.These systems must be robust, flexible, andas expeditionary as the amphibious force. C4systems architecture must provide strategicand tactical connectivity to a variety of tailoredamphibious forces across the full spectrum ofamphibious operations, from humanitarianassistance to an amphibious assault. Theamphibious force must have the ability to planfor, provide C2 for, and support all functionalareas (fires, aviation, intelligence, and combatservice support, etc.) afloat and ashore.Communications support requirements inamphibious operations are summarized inFigure VI-1.

C4 systems support functions will beperformed in accordance with JP 6-0,Doctrine for Command, Control,Communications, Computer (C4) SystemsSupport to Joint Operations, and series 6231of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staffmanuals.

b. An effective C4 systems support planmust ensure the following.

“Command and control is just one element in the complex tapestry of warfare.A poor system well executed can beat a good system when that system’sexecution breaks down . . . any command and control system must becomplemented by sound tactical doctrine, realistic training, and superblymotivated troops.”

Extract from Army Command and General Staff College FC 101-34

• Provide an EMCON plan and informationsecurity (INFOSEC) posture thatbalances OPSEC versus operationalrequirements.

• Provide transmission and cryptographicsecurity.

• Provide C2 protection.

• Avoid mutual interference throughout theelectromagnetic spectrum. C4 systemssupport plans of the amphibious forcemust be integrated into the JFC’s jointcommunications-electronics operatinginstructions.

• Deconflict friendly electronic attack (EA)with other friendly frequency use inaccordance with the joint restrictedfrequency list.

• Provide monitoring and defense oftactical and non-tactical computernetworks.

• Provide friendly forces’ positionreporting to the Global Command andControl System-Maritime commonoperational picture.

• Use common agencies and alternatemeans of communications to assist inreducing mutual interference anddecreasing frequency requirements.

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• Provide access to meteorological andoceanographic forecasts and informationimpacting amphibious planning andexecution.

2. General C4 Systems SupportPlanning Considerations

a. Each major command of the force musthave compatible and interoperablecommunications that will support the tacticsand techniques employed by that force.Circuits provided must assure effectiveexercise of command and coordination ofsupporting fires.

b. Subordinate commands of theamphibious force may operate in widelyseparated areas during some phases of the

amphibious operation. The communicationsplan must permit rapid integration of theforce without undue interference betweenelements.

c. Local frequencies and communicationsstandards in use in the landing area must beconsidered to ensure compatibility and toprevent interference.

3. C4 Systems Support Duringthe Planning Phase

C4 systems connectivity must beestablished among all major participatingcommands at commencement of the planningphase. Communications security (COMSEC)is essential and must be maintained throughoutplanning.

Figure VI-1. Communications Support Requirements

COMMUNICATIONS SUPPORTREQUIREMENTS

A reliable, secure, rapid, flexible, and interoperablecommand, control, communications, and computersystem is required in both planning and execution

SUPPORT PLANNING

CONTROL SHIP-TO-SHOREMOVEMENT

COORDINATE PROTECTIONOF THE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

CONTROL TACTICAL AIROPERATIONS

CONTROL ASSAULTVEHICLES AND CRAFT

MONITOR COMMAND ANDCONTROL OF ADVANCEFORCE OPERATIONS

SUPPORT PLANNING

CONTROL SHIP-TO-SHOREMOVEMENT

COORDINATE PROTECTIONOF THE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

CONTROL TACTICAL AIROPERATIONS

CONTROL ASSAULTVEHICLES AND CRAFT

MONITOR COMMAND ANDCONTROL OF ADVANCEFORCE OPERATIONS

COORDINATE SUPPORTINGARMS

COORDINATE LOGISTICSUPPORT AND COMBATSERVICE SUPPORT

COORDINATE SUPPORTPROVIDED BY OTHERFORCES

MEDICAL REGULATION

COORDINATE USE OFCOMMUNICATIONS ANDELECTRONIC WARFARE

COORDINATE SUPPORTINGARMS

COORDINATE LOGISTICSUPPORT AND COMBATSERVICE SUPPORT

COORDINATE SUPPORTPROVIDED BY OTHERFORCES

MEDICAL REGULATION

COORDINATE USE OFCOMMUNICATIONS ANDELECTRONIC WARFARE

VI-3

Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems Support Planning

4. C4 Systems Support Duringthe Embarkation Phase

Before embarkation, planners must providefor adequate C4 systems support between theamphibious force and any external agenciesinvolved in transportation. The CLF willnormally plan and provide LF C4 systems inthe embarkation area, to include coordinatingthe use of established facilities (military orcivilian).

5. C4 Systems Support Duringthe Rehearsal Phase

To test C4 systems equipment andtechniques, plans should provide for a full-scale rehearsal for all elements of theamphibious force as early as the operationalsituation permits. OPSEC requirements maydictate adoption of the following COMSECprocedures and considerations during therehearsal.

a. Maximum use of secure voiceequipment.

b. Use of minimum power on electronicemitters.

c. Assignment of call signs and frequenciesfor rehearsal use only.

d. Rehearsal scheduled to minimize enemysatellite surveillance.

6. C4 Systems Support Duringthe Movement Phase

The use of equipment, particularlytransmitters and emitters, may be severelyrestricted to prevent disclosure of locations,movements, and intentions of the force. TheCATF normally prescribes conditions ofEMCON in effect during the movementphase. The C4 systems support plan must

reflect restrictions applicable to radio circuitsand provide for handling important messageswithin imposed limitations.

7. C4 Systems Support DuringAdvance Force Operations

a. Before advance force operations begin,plans must be made for communicationsamong elements of the advance force,supporting forces, and the main amphibiousforce. Special consideration must be given topassing intelligence between the advanceforce and the main body of the amphibiousforce.

b. Pre-H-hour traffic will be minimized toavoid revealing the intention to conduct anamphibious operation and to keep circuitsclear for high precedence traffic.

8. C4 Systems Support Duringthe Action Phase

Primary reliance must be placed on singleand multi-channel radio communications.Communications plans must providesufficient channels of communications duringship-to-shore movement to facilitate controland coordination at all echelons.Communications plans must also provide forthe rapid development of communications andinformation systems ashore.

9. Responsibilities

a. CATF and CLF are responsible for C4systems support planning, with the designatedcommander consolidating the requirements.CATF responsibilities normally include thefollowing.

• Preparation and promulgation of acoordinated plan for employment ofamphibious force communicationsduring the operation.

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• Acquisition and assignment ofnecessary communications assets tosubordinate elements of the force.

• Preparation of appropriate OPSEC andmilitary deception guidance.

• Preparation and promulgation of acoordinated electronic warfare (EW) planfor the force.

• Providing necessary shipboard C4facilities and services in support of theembarked LF.

• Development of a coordinatedcommunications plan for the ATF forinclusion in the overall C4 systemssupport plan.

• Development and promulgation of a planfor communications connectivity withother maritime forces.

b. Specific C4 systems support planningresponsibilities of CLF include the following.

• Development of a coordinatedcommunications plan for the LFcomponent of the amphibious force forinclusion in the overall force C4 systemssupport plan.

• Development and promulgation of a planfor communications connectivity withother ground forces ashore.

• Establishment of computer and networkrequirements while embarked.

• Ident i f ica t ion of connect iv i tyrequirements prior to movement ashorefor follow-on operations, if required.

c. Other commanders of the amphibiousforce are responsible for determination of their

C4 systems requirements and submission ofthose requirements.

10. Communications Deceptionand Countermeasures

The scope of employment of communicationsdeception and countermeasures will normallybe specified in the initiating guidance.Additional amphibious force requirements foremployment of these techniques will be madeknown to and coordinated with higherauthority during planning.

11. C4 Systems Support Plan

a. The C4 systems support plan must reflectthe coordinated C4 systems requirements ofthe amphibious force. The requirements mayinclude radio and weapon guidance andcontrol frequencies, call signs, compatiblecryptographic and authentication systems, andspecial communications equipment, computerequipment and systems, or support.

b. The C4 systems support plan fulfills C4systems requirements of the amphibiousOPLAN in terms of circuits, channels andsystems required, and policies and proceduresgoverning the operation and coordination ofthe overall system. The plan includes theitems listed in Figure VI-2.

c. The plan is prepared in detail to facilitateuse by commanders at all echelons.

d. Subordinate commanders’ C4 systemssupport plans are based on the force C4systems support plan.

12. Landing Force C4 Systems

The landing force will embark infunctionally operational spaces normally builton a Navy C2 infrastructure. These spaceswill be complete with permanent access to

VI-5

Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems Support Planning

voice, data, and video systems necessary forthe landing force’s situational awareness. Theinfrastructure is based on joint standards and

Figure VI-2. Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems Support Plan

COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS, ANDCOMPUTER SYSTEMS SUPPORT PLAN

General coverage of the communications situation, includingassumptions, guiding principles, and the concept ofoperational communications employment

Announcement of the communications mission

Delegation of communications tasks and responsibilities tomajor elements of the force

Detailed instructions for organization, installation, operation,coordination, and maintenance of the communicationssystem

Assignment and employment of call signs, frequencies,cryptographic aids, and authentication systems

Instructions on countermeasures, operations security,military deception, and communications security

Interoperability of computer systems, to include hardwareand software

Logistic support for communications and electronics

architectures and allows units, to draw upona baseline of C4 systems capabilities,regardless of their Service.

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Intentionally Blank

CHAPTER VIIFIRE SUPPORT PLANNING AND COORDINATION

VII-1

1. General

Keep in mind the following.

a. Fires are the effects of lethal or nonlethalweapons.

b. Joint fires are fires produced during theemployment of forces from two or morecomponents in coordinated action toward acommon objective.

c. Joint fire support is joint fires that assistair, land, maritime, amphibious, and specialoperations forces to move, maneuver, andcontrol territory, populations, airspace, andkey waters.

d. Fire support planning andcoordination in amphibious operations arecontinuous processes seeking timely andappropriate application of force to achieve thedesired effects within the operational area.

e. Fire support planning integrates andsynchronizes the amphibious force organicfires with non-organic supporting fires toachieve the commander’s intent.

f. Maneuver and fires are complementaryfunctions.

2. Fire Support Systems

a. Overview of Systems. Fires in supportof amphibious operations (amphibious firesupport) is the synergistic product of three

“With God and the US Navy in direct support of the 2nd Marine Divisionthere was never any doubt that we would get Betio. For several hours,however, there was considerable haggling over the exact price we were topay for it.”

Colonel David M. ShoupMedal of Honor recipient

subsystems: target acquisition (TA), C2, andattack resources. TA systems and equipmentperform the key tasks of target detection,location, tracking, identification, andclassification in sufficient detail to permit theeffective attack of the target. C2 systemsbring all information together for collation anddecision making. Vertical and horizontalcoordination is essential, requiring a hierarchyof mutually supporting fire supportcoordinators and agencies. Attack systemsinclude fires delivered from air, surface, land,and sub-surface attack systems. Navy, MarineCorps, Army, and Air Force aircraft mayperform air-to-surface attack, including EW,within the operational area. Land-based attacksystems typically include Marine Corps andArmy artillery, mortars, rockets, missiles, andEW systems. Sea-based attack systemsinclude Navy guns, missiles, and EW systems.

b. Target Acquisition

• Organic. The typical amphibious forcehas numerous organic TA assets, such asreconnaissance units, sea-air-land teams(SEALs), unmanned aerial vehicles,shipboard and artillery counterfire radars,naval aviation, and ground sensors, aswell as other observers, spotters, andcontrollers.

• Non-organic. The typical amphibiousforce has the capability to exploit theinformation provided from non-organicaerial systems (manned and unmanned),subsurface, surface (ground and sea),

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military space systems, and nationalsystems.

• Intelligence Integration. Theintelligence center established within theamphibious force supports the TA systemby coordinating the use of limitedcollection assets throughout theoperational area. No fielded TA systemexists solely to support fires, and allintelligence collection assets cancontribute to TA.

See Chapter V, “The Intelligence Cycleand Amphibious Operations,” for moreinformation.

c. Command and Control Agencies

• Overview. The establishing directive orthe order initiating the amphibiousoperation should identify responsibilitiesfor fire support planning andcoordination among the commanders ofthe amphibious force. For the purposesof this chapter, the term “designatedcommander” will refer to thecommander who has been delegated thecommand authority to plan andcoordinate fires either for the entire

amphibious operation or a particularphase of it. The effectiveness of firesupport in amphibious operations ispredicated on the designated commanderproviding clear and coordinated guidanceto the forces involved, since unity ofeffort is key.

See Chapter II, “Command andControl,” for more information.

• Supporting Arms CoordinationCenter. Upon initiation of planning, aSACC is established. The SACC plans,coordinates, and controls all organicand non-organic fires within theoperational area in support of theamphibious force. It is located aboardan amphibious ship or appropriate shipconfigured with the requisite C2facilities, enabling coordination of allforms of supporting fires (land, air, andsea based). The designated commandermay choose either the ATF’s supportingarms coordinator (SAC) or the LF’s forcefires coordinator (FFC) to supervise theSACC. Whether the SAC or FFCsupervises the SACC, fire supportpersonnel from both the ATF and LFoperate the SACC. The organization

Land-based attack systems typically include Marine Corps and Army artillery,mortars, rockets, missiles, and electronic warfare systems.

VII-3

Fire Support Planning and Coordination

of the SACC is typically the same forany size amphibious operation, however,variations in operations may requirespecific needs. The organizationdescribed below is therefore to be usedonly as a guide.

•• Naval Surface Fire Support Section.The ATF staff mans the NSFS section.This section monitors the naval gun firecontrol net, support net, and other gunfirenets as appropriate. The LF staff providesliaison to the section.

•• Air Support Section. This section ismanned by members of a Navy AirControl Agency (e.g., tactical air controlsquadron or tactical air control group)and directed by the air supportcoordinator who reports to the tacticalair officer. This section supports the NavyTACC by controlling, supporting, ortransferring control to subsidiary tacticalair direction controllers afloat or ashore.The section is located in the SACC andcoordinates with the Navy TACC to assistin the deconfliction of air missions,routes, and requests with fires. The LFstaff provides liaison to the section.

•• Target Information Center (TIC).The TIC is responsible for targetinginformation and intelligence. It ismanned by the ATF target intelligenceofficer, ATF air intelligence officer, LFtarget information officer, and otherpersonnel, as required. TIC memberswill normally operate in the SACC. TheATF target intelligence officer supervisesthe TIC and maintains close liaison withATF and LF intelligence and operationsstaff. The LF target information officernormally works in the intelligence centerof the amphibious force.

• Force Fires Coordination Center.When the responsibility for fire supportplanning and coordination is passed

ashore, the FFCC is the Marine Corps’senior fire support coordinationagency and is responsible for theplanning, execution, and coordinationof all organic and non-organic fireswithin the operational area. Prior tocontrol being passed ashore, the FFCCincrementally assumes responsibility forfire support planning and coordinationfrom the SACC. The FFCC is organizedand supervised at the MAGTF-level bythe FFC who is responsible to the LFoperations officer for MAGTF fires. Theorganization operates at both the tacticaland operational level addressing currentand future fire support issues.

For further information, refer to JP 3-09,Doctrine for Joint Fire Support.

• Fire Support Coordination Center.The FSCC is the fire supportcoordination agency within the LF GCE.FSCCs are established at the battalion,regiment, and division level. The FSCCis responsible for the planning, execution,and coordination of all forms of firesupport within the GCE’s area ofoperations. The FSCC is organized andsupervised by the fire support coordinatorwho is responsible to the appropriatelevel GCE operations officer for GCEfires. FSCCs are initially subordinate tothe SACC and, if the FFCC is establishedashore, subordinate to that agency.

d. Attack Resources

• Organic. The amphibious force’sorganic attack resources are capable ofdelivering lethal and nonlethal fires, andinclude naval aviation, NSFS, EWsystems, artillery, and mortars.

• Non-organic. The SACC and the FFCCare able to coordinate and control non-organic attack resources in support of theamphibious operation. Aircraft, missiles,

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rockets, guns, special operations forces(SOF), and nonlethal systems attackingtargets within the operational area mustbe coordinated through the senior firesupport coordination agency.

3. Planning and Coordination

a. Fire Support Planning. The purposeof fire support planning is to optimize theemployment of fire support to achieve thedesignated commander’s intent by shapingthe operational area and providing supportto maneuver forces. Fire support planningis the continuous and concurrent process ofanalyzing, allocating, and scheduling of firesupport to integrate it with the forces tomaximize combat power.

• Commander’s Guidance. Commandersdetermine how to shape the operationalarea with fires to assist both maritime andland maneuver forces and how to usemaritime and land maneuver forces toexploit fires. When developing the firesupport plan, the designatedcommander will formulate the“commander’s guidance for fires.” Itis from this guidance that supporting andsubordinate commanders and fire supportpersonnel begin to frame the role of fire

support in the plan. The commander’sguidance for fires should articulate theeffects desired on the enemy’scapabilities and how these effects willcontribute to the overall success of theoperation. The designated commanderidentifies targets that are critical to thesuccess of the operation (high-payofftargets), force protection issues, and anyprohibitions or restrictions on firesupport. A clear determination of theenemy’s COGs, decisive points, andcritical vulnerabilities is central to firesupport planning.

• Basic Fire Support Tasks. Theeffectiveness of the fire support effort ismeasured by achieving desired effects onthe enemy, setting conditions for decisiveoperations, and providing support to theamphibious force. Effective fire supportdepends on planning for the successfulperformance of the following four basictasks.

•• Support Forces in Contact. Theamphibious force provides responsivefire support that protects and ensuresfreedom of maneuver to forces in contactwith the enemy throughout theoperational area.

Commanders determine how to shape the operational area with fires.

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•• Support the Concept of Operations.Shaping the battlespace and setting theconditions for decisive action aresuccessfully accomplished by achievingthe commander’s stated effects andattacking HPTs in order to exploit criticalvulnerabilities. The destruction orneutralization of these vulnerabilitiessignificantly contributes to the successof the amphibious operation by defeatingthe enemy’s COGs. The focus of effortremains on enemy capabilities, notindividual targets.

•• Synchronize and Integrate FireSupport. Fire support is synchronizedand integrated through fire supportcoordination, beginning with thecommanders’ estimate and concept ofoperations. Fire support must be plannedfor continuously and concurrently withthe development of the scheme ofmaneuver. Synchronization andintegration enable the synergisticcombination of all types of fires andmaneuver to achieve the commander’sobjectives.

•• Sustain Fire Support Operations.Fire support planners formulate realisticand achievable fire support plans toachieve the commander’s stated effectsby exploiting logistic capabilities toovercome logistic limitations.

• Apportionment and Allocation. Inorder to develop the fire support plan,limited attack resources may beconsidered for apportionment andallocation to the amphibious force. Inthe general sense, apportionment is thedistribution for planning of limitedresources among competingrequirements. Specific apportionments(e.g., air sorties and forces for planning)are described as apportionment of airsorties and forces for planning, etc. For

example, air apportionment is adetermination and assignment of the totalexpected air effort by percentage and/orpriority that should be devoted to thevarious air operations and/or geographicareas for a given period of time. Theamphibious force could use this toinfluence and shape the conduct of theoperation. Allocation, in a general sense,is the distribution of limited resourcesamong competing requirements foremployment. Specific allocations (e.g.,air sorties, nuclear weapons, forces, andtransportation) are described as allocationof air sorties, nuclear weapons, etc. Forexample, air allocation is the translationof the air apportionment decision intototal numbers of sorties by aircraft typeavailable for each operation or task. Theapportionment and allocation processrequires input from the subordinatecommands within the amphibious forceto ensure that their requirements areaddressed.

•• Direct support air requirements andany excess sorties (ALLOREQs) areidentified to the establishing authority forfurther tasking.

•• Normally, the JFC will apportionassigned air assets (by priority orpercentage) to support the amphibiousforce. The JFC may also task supportingcommands for air support as required.

• Wargaming Process. Fire supportpersonnel are key players in step threeof the amphibious planning process foramphibious operations and COAwargaming. They advise on the firesupport assets available and the mosteffective use of these assets against theprobable enemy COAs. The finishedproduct is a fire support plan integratedand synchronized with the scheme ofmaneuver.

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b. Targeting. Targeting is the process ofselecting targets and matching the appropriateresponse to them, taking account ofoperational requirements and capabilities.

Refer to JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations,JP 3-09, Doctrine for Joint Fire Support, andJP 3-60, Joint Doctrine for Targeting.

• Joint Targeting Cycle Phases.Targeting is a cyclic process involvingsix phases, beginning with guidance and

priorities issued by the designatedcommander, proceeding throughexecution, and ending with a combatassessment (see Figure VII-1).

•• Phase I — Commander’s Objectives,Guidance, and Intent. Phase I describeshow the commander visualizes theoperation, or phase of an operation,unfolding based on the selected COA.The commander provides target planningand execution guidance based on the

Figure VII-1. Joint Targeting Cycle Phases

JOINT TARGETING CYCLE PHASES

JOINT TARGETINGCYCLEPHASES

Commander’sDecision and Force

Assignment

Target Development,Validation,

Nomination, andPrioritization

Commander’sObjectives,

Guidance, and Intent

Mission Planning andForce Execution

CombatAssessment

CapabilitiesAnalysis

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assessment of the desired effects. Theseeffects can be expressed in terms of typesof targets, priorities, and restrictions, andmay be both lethal and nonlethal. Thecommander’s objectives, guidance, andintent provide the critical basis in thetargeting process.

•• Phase II — Target Development,Validation, Nomination, andPrioritization. Phase II analyzespotential targets , their components, andelements in order to determine theirsignificance and relevance based on thecommander’s objectives, guidance, andintent. Targeting strategies are studiedin order to determine the best way toachieve the desired effect and statedobjectives. Integrating the intelligenceplanning, collection, execution, andanalysis cycle is essential to support thetargeting effort. Targets are prioritizedbased on the commander’s prioritizedobjectives and guidance and thennominated through the targeting boardof the amphibious force for approval bythe designated commander.

•• Phase III — Capabilities Analysis.Phase III is a predictive analysis toestimate the most likely outcome whenusing a lethal or nonlethal capability toachieve an effect against a specific target.Once the predictive analysis isaccomplished, target and weapon pairingis conducted.

•• Phase IV — Commander’s Decisionand Force Assignment. Phase IVincludes the development of detailedmission orders, TA, target validation,identification of overall mission supportrequirements, and rehearsals as needed.

•• Phase V — Mission Planning andForce Execution. Phase V involves theeffective coordination, deconfliction, and

synchronization to maximize the effectsagainst targets.

•• Phase VI — Combat Assessment.Phase VI is the assessment of the degreeof success attained in the application offires. Combat assessment is composed ofthree interrelated components: (1) battledamage assessment; (2) munitions effectassessment; and (3) future COA or re-attack recommendations. This phase isthe commander’s primary feedbackmechanism within the targeting process.Assessment mechanisms must be able toprovide the commander with a methodto gauge the level of success in obtainingdesired effects, particularly when thoseeffects are psychological vice physicalin nature.

• Targeting Board for the AmphibiousForce. The amphibious force normallyconducts an integrated targetingboard to provide broad fire supportand targeting oversight functions.These functions may include:coordinating desired effects; providingtargeting guidance and priorities(targeting objectives, high-value andhigh-payoff targets); identifying no strikeor prohibited targets; preparing theamphibious target list; evaluating theeffectiveness of fires; and establishingand shifting of FSCMs. The designatedcommander during the period withinwhich the targets are attacked has finalapproval authority over the fire supportplan and target list. Those targets to beserviced by organic assets are passed tothe appropriate agencies for servicing.Targets identified for servicing by non-organic attack systems are forwarded tothe next higher-level targeting board forconsideration. The amphibious force willprovide, at a minimum, liaison officersto this targeting board (i.e., component-level) and may provide liaison officers

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to the senior joint targeting board (i.e.,the JFC’s joint targeting coordinationboard), if established. Targetingtimelines for the amphibious force mustmatch the targeting timelines of the JFC,which normally requires planning out to72-96 hours.

Refer to JP 3-60, Joint Doctrine forTargeting.

• Submission of target nominations forsupporting operations. Theamphibious force may seek to shape theirdesignated (but not activated) operationalarea prior to the arrival of amphibiousforces through target nominations forattack by other components’ forces.Restrictions on the attack of certaintargets may also be requested, if thedesignated amphibious force commanderdesires to exploit them at a future time,such as certain enemy communicationssites or bridges.

c. Fire Support Coordination. Thefollowing are principles for fire supportplanning and coordination (in relation toamphibious operations).

• Plan Early and Continuously. Toeffectively integrate fire support with thescheme of maneuver, amphibious firesupport planning must begin withmission analysis and the designatedcommander’s planning guidance. Thefire support personnel should solicitguidance from the commander wheneverneeded during the planning of anoperation. Fire support planning iscontinuous.

• Continuous Flow of TargetingInformation. Fire support planners and/or coordinators should ensure thatacquisition requirements for fire supportare identified and focused on detectingpriority targets. An integrated target

acquisition plan, coupled with responsivecommunication paths, enhances thecontinuous flow of targeting information.

• Consider the Use of All Available Fires.Fire support personnel will consider theuse of available organic and non-organiclethal and nonlethal assets in support ofthe amphibious force commander’sintent.

• Use the Lowest Echelon Capable ofFurnishing Effective Support. Thelowest echelon that has the necessarymeans to accomplish the mission shouldfurnish the fire support. Whencoordination cannot be accomplished oradditional guidance is required, the nexthigher echelon should be consulted (e.g.,a battalion FSCC would contact theregimental FSCC if it lacked thenecessary means to accomplish amission, and the regimental FSCC wouldcontact the SACC or FFCC, if required).

• Use the Most Effective Fire SupportMeans. Requests for fire support are sentto the supporting arm capable ofdelivering the most effective fires withinthe required time. Factors to beconsidered include the nature andimportance of the target, the engagementtime window, the availability of attackmeans, and the results desired. Thecommander may also consider assets todelay or suppress the target until a moreeffective means to attack it becomesavailable.

• Furnish the Type of Fire SupportRequested. The fire support requesteris usually in the best position to determinefire support requirements. However, theSAC or FFC is in a position to weigh therequest against the commander’sguidance and the current and future needsfor fire support. If a request for firesupport is disapproved, the SAC or FFC

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stops the request and notifies allconcerned. When possible, thecoordinators recommend a new fire supportmeans and alert the agencies that mayprovide the support to the requesting unit.

• Avoid Unnecessary Duplication. A keytask for fire support personnel is to ensurethat unnecessary duplications of firesupport are resolved and that only theminimum force needed to get the desiredeffects is used. This does not mean thatonly one asset is used; taking advantageof the complementary characteristics ofdifferent types of assets and integratingtheir effects provides the synergy ofcombined arms.

• Coordinate Airspace. Inherent in firesupport coordination is the deconflictionof airspace by supporting arms. Thecollocation of the SACC and TACC canfacilitate the coordination and integrationof airspace, air defense, and fires.FSCMs and coordination procedures areused to provide a measure of protectionto the aircraft while incorporating CASwith indirect fires.

• Provide Adequate Support. Themission and the commander’s guidancedetermine the effects that fire supportshould achieve for the fire support planto succeed.

• Provide Rapid Coordination.Procedures for rapid coordination ensurespeed and flexibility in delivery of fires.SACC and FFCC personnel must knowthe characteristics of available firesupport weapons, the weapons’ status,and maintain situational awareness inorder to attack both planned targets andtargets of opportunity effectively.

• Provide Safeguards and Survivability.Force protection includes considerationsof enemy threats and the potential for

fratricide. Detailed integration ofmaneuver and fire support is required toprevent fratricide. SACC and FFCCpersonnel seek to prevent fratricidethrough close coordination at all levelsand situational awareness. Threedimensional radars and digital data linksshould be used for safeguards and forenhancing survivability. Use of FSCMs,coordination of position areas, and theconsideration of the locations of friendlyforces during target analysis all contributeto safeguarding friendly units.

• Establish Communications Support.Timely and efficient exchange ofinformation is a key requirement for allsuccessful operations. The physicalcollocation of coordinating agencies(SACC or TACC and FSCC or DASC)provides the surest form ofcommunication, but is not alwayspossible or practical. Therefore, reliableand extensive networking among TAassets, the fire support coordinationagencies, and attack resources is requiredto increase the responsiveness of fires insupport of the amphibious operation andto increase the amphibious force’soperational tempo. Timely and efficientcommunications with adjacent forceswill also be required.

• Establish Fire Support CoordinatingMeasures. FSCMs facilitate the rapidengagement of targets throughout theoperational area and, at the same time,provide safeguards for friendly forces.The CLF designates all land fire supportcoordinating measures within theoperational area. The CATF designatesprimary and alternate fire support areas(FSAs) as required to support the LFmaneuver ashore. FSCMs must becoordinated with the ACP.

For more details, see JP 3-09, Doctrinefor Joint Fire Support.

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d. Other Planning and CoordinationConsiderations

• Air Defense. The CATF usually assignsan ADC, normally on the most capableair defense platform, to carry out airdefense operations. The ADCcoordinates with the TACC to maintainsituational awareness. A coherent airdefense plan also requires coordinatedplanning with the SACC to ensure thephysical location of air defense weaponssystems afloat, ashore, and aloft. Theprocedures for identifying aircraft andother relevant information are shared.

• Advance Force SACC. Althoughnormally only one SACC is active at anyone time, advance force operations mayrequire the establishment of a fire supportagency to coordinate fires in support ofthe neutralization or destruction ofenemy high value assets or the

emergency extraction of SOF orreconnaissance units. The advance forceSACC must maintain situationalawareness on the insertions andextractions of teams, locations of teamsashore, and mine warfare operationswithin the area, to include sea and airassets. The amphibious force SACCassumes responsibility as the primary firesupport agency from the advance forceSACC, upon its arrival in the operationalarea.

• NSFS Ships in Support of the LF.During planning, the CLF identifiesspecific NSFS missions to the CATF.Based on the LF requirements, thenumber of ships available, and their otherassigned tasks, the CATF organizesNSFS assets and assigns ships in amanner that will best support the LFscheme of maneuver ashore.

CHAPTER VIIILOGISTICS PLANNING

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1. General

a. Logistics is the science of planning andcarrying out the movement and maintenanceof forces. In its most comprehensive sense,logistics includes those aspects of militaryoperations that deal with:

• Design and development, acquisition,storage, movement, distribution,maintenance, evacuation, and dispositionof materiel;

• Movemen t , evacua t ion , andhospitalization of personnel;

• Acquis i t ion or cons t ruc t ion ,maintenance, operation, and dispositionof facilities as well as equipment, weaponsystems, and transportation assets; and

• Acquisition and delivery or furnishing ofservices.

b. Combat service support (CSS) involvesthe essential logistic functions, activities, andtasks necessary to sustain all elements ofoperating forces in an AO. At the tacticallevel in amphibious operations, CSSincludes but is not limited to that supportrendered by service troops in ensuring theoperational and tactical levels of supply,maintenance, transportation, engineer,health services, and other services required

“The logistical effort required to sustain the seizure of Iwo Jima was enormous,complex, largely improvised on lessons learned in earlier . . . operations inthe Pacific. . . . Clearly, no other element of the emerging art of amphibiouswarfare had improved so greatly by the winter of 1945. Marines may havehad the heart and firepower to tackle a fortress-like Iwo Jima earlier in thewar, but they would have been crippled in the doing of it by limitations inamphibious logistical support capabilities. These concepts, procedures,organizations, and special materials took years to develop. . . .”

From Closing In: Marines in the Seizure of Iwo Jima, Joseph Alexander

by the amphibious force. Operationallogistics encompasses those activities at theoperational level that link strategic objectivesto tactical objectives.

JP 4-0, Doctrine for Logistic Support of JointOperations, provides amplifying information.

c. This chapter addresses both externallogistic support provided to the amphibiousforce and the narrower focus of CSS of forcesoperating within the objective area. Differingprimarily in the point of application, the twoterms essentially have the same broadmeaning, and therefore will be referred to as“logistics” except where distinction isnecessary.

d. Logistic planning for an amphibiousoperation includes all facets of logistics.

e. The CATF is normally responsible fordetermining overall logistic requirementsfor the amphibious force. Thoserequirements that cannot be supported fromresources available within the ATF aredirected to the applicable Service componentthrough the chain of command as establishedin the order initiating the amphibiousoperation.

Additional guidance for joint logisticoperations in support of amphibiousoperations is contained in JP 3-02.1, Joint

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Doctrine for Landing Force Operations, andJP 4-01.6, Joint Tactics, Techniques, andProcedures for Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore.

2. Logistic PlanningResponsibilities

Amphibious force commanders havespecific and often complementary logisticsplanning responsibilities as listed below.

a. The CATF is responsible for thefollowing.

• Coordination of logistic requirements forall elements of the ATF.

• Determination of requirements that canbe met by internal resources. Thosewhich cannot are directed to a higherauthority or the appropriate Servicethrough the chain of command.

• Establishing priorities and allocatingresources to meet the logisticrequirements of the ATF.

• Notification of appropriate responsibleagencies early in the planning phase of

any unusual requirements or specialsupplies or equipment required.

• Providing the means required for theestablishment and operation of a logisticssystem in the designated amphibiousobjective area.

• Development of plans for handlingenemy prisoners of war (EPWs) andcivilian evacuees and internees.

• Development of the overall plan forhealth service support (HSS), includingevacuation of casualties.

• Preparation of the logistics annex to theOPLAN.

b. For forces assigned, the CATF isresponsible for the following.

• Determination of the overall logisticrequirements of the forces assigned.

• Determination and allocation of themeans to meet the logistic requirementsof the forces assigned.

The CATF is normally responsible for determining overall logisticrequirements for the amphibious force.

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Logistics Planning

• Ensuring the promulgation of the overallschedule to include plans for theassembly of shipping at points ofembarkation.

• Review and approval of embarkation andloading plans.

• Ensuring the organization of assignedshipping into echelons as necessary forcontinued support of the LF OPLAN.

c. The CLF is responsible for the following.

• Determination of overall logisticrequirements of the LF, including units,special equipment, and shipping.

• Determination and allocation of themeans to meet logistic requirements ofthe LF.

• Determination of logistic requirementsthat cannot be met by the LF andsubmission of these requirements to thesupported commander, CATF, ordesignated commander as appropriate.

• Development of plans for the assemblyof supplies and equipment to beembarked, including the supplies andequipment of other assigned forces forwhich the LF is responsible.

• Preparation of the LF embarkation andship loading plans and orders, incoordination with the CATF.

• Planning for the coordination of logisticsrequired by all elements of the LF.

• Planning for the conveyance anddistribution of logistics required by theLF.

• Preparation of the logistics annex to theLF OPLAN.

d. Other designated commanders of theamphibious force are responsible fordetermining their logistic requirements andsubmitting to the CATF or appropriatecommander those requirements that cannot bemet internally.

3. Logistic PlanningConsiderations and Factors

The requirement for afloat forces to provideseamless support to the LF during the periodin which its logistic system is primarily sea-based has a significant influence on logisticplanning for an amphibious operation. Likeall logistic systems, the amphibious forcelogistic systems must be responsive, simple,flexible, economical, attainable,sustainable, and survivable. Developmentof effective logistic systems must take intoaccount the planning considerations andfactors listed below.

a. Planning Considerations

• Orderly assembly and embarkation ofpersonnel and material based onanticipated requirements of the LFscheme of maneuver ashore.

• Establishment and maintenance of alogistic system in the operational area thatwill ensure adequate support to allelements of the amphibious force, andsubsequent support of base developmentand garrison forces as directed.

• Impetus of logistic support from sea, orthe rear, and directed forward to the pointof application at the using unit.

• Preservation of tactical security duringlogistic planning. Nonsecure logisticplanning can compromise tacticalsurprise and landing location.

b. Planning Factors. Logistic planningfactors are as follows.

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• Character, size, and duration of theoperation.

• Target date.

• Objective area characteristics.

•• Terrain and hydrography.

•• Climate and weather.

•• Distance from support bases.

•• Indigenous support.

•• Facilities available.

•• Transportation systems.

•• Local resources.

•• Throughput capacity.

• Enemy capabilities.

•• Freedom from interference.

•• Vulnerability to enemy.

• Strength and composition of landingforce.

• Distribution means.

• LOCs and transportation networks.

• Support base resupply.

• Progressive increase in level and formof logistics.

• Support required for EPWs.

• Availability of logistic means.

• Compatibility and capability of supportsystems.

• Communications means.

• Base defense and garrison plans.

• Requirements for rehabilitation orconstruction of airfields.

• Impact of weapons of mass destruction.

• Availability of assault echelon (AE) andassault follow-on echelon (AFOE)shipping.

• Indigenous health risks and diseasesprevalent.

4. Logistic Planning Sequence

Logistic planning begins with receipt of theorder initiating the amphibious operation.Planning must be coordinated and proceedconcurrently with operations planning duringdevelopment. Although the major stepsoverlap, they will usually be accomplished inthe following general sequence.

a. The CATF and CLF determine overalllogistic requirements for the ATF and LFcomponents of the amphibious force.

b. Other designated commanders in theamphibious force determine their logisticrequirements and submit those requirementsthat cannot be met internally to the CATF oras directed by the establishing authority.

c. If logistic requirements are insufficientwithin the amphibious force, affectedcommanders will have to adjust plans asappropriate or request additional support fromhigher authority.

d. The CATF, CLF, and other designatedcommanders formulate logistic plans.

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Logistics Planning

5. Logistic Plans

Logistic matters in an amphibious operationthat affect only one element of the force areprepared by that individual element. Theremainder of this chapter addresses logisticand CSS plans (Figure VIII-1) concerningmore than one element of the force that requirea certain degree of coordination.

a. The necessity to provide continuing andcoordinated logistics to the LF when itslogistic system is primarily sea-based requirescoordination between the amphibious forcecommanders to develop a control and deliverysystem that will ensure that the LF is providedthe necessary support from embarkationthrough rehearsal, movement, execution, andcontinued operations ashore. Whereverpossible, sustainment planning shouldencompass the concept of direct ship-to-user delivery.

b. Logistic planning is accomplished undertwo major categories: initial supply andsustainment.

• Initial Supply. Initial supply comprisesthe logistic levels carried asaccompanying supplies in assaultshipping, both AE and AFOE to providerequired initial support for the assaultlanding and initial operations ashore.Plans for initial supply include thefollowing.

•• ATF provision for: (1) Loading shipswith supplies to prescribed levels asmuch as practicable considering theembarkation of troops; (2) Rations forLF while embarked; (3) Special facilitiesrequired for refueling and maintenanceof aircraft, landing craft, amphibiousvehicles, and other equipment as well asfuel for boat pools, beach groups,transportation pools, and other shorecomponents; and (4) Water for the LFashore until supply from sources ashoreis available.

•• LF provision for: (1) Assembly andloading of supplies to be landed with theLF in such a manner as to ensure

Figure VIII-1. Logistic and Combat Service Support Plans

LOGISTIC AND COMBATSERVICE SUPPORT PLANS

Logistic Plans (supply and resupply)

Embarkation and Loading Plans

Health Service Support Plans

Landing Force Support Party Plans

Pontoon Causeway and Lighterage Plans

Engineering Plans

Advanced Base Development and Garrison Plans

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availability for issue before and duringdebarkation; (2) Establishment of pre-positioned emergency supplies (floatingdumps) containing limited amounts ofselected supplies for emergency issue;(3) Establishment of selected pre-stagedsupplies for ship-to-shore movement byvertical takeoff and landing (VTOL)aircraft (pre-staged VTOL-liftedsupplies); (4) Selective discharge ofrequired supplies in accordance with thelanding plan; (5) Positive and efficientcontrol of the movement of supplies fromship to desired locations ashore; and (6)Establishment of logistic heads ashore (ifrequired) and the distribution of thosesupplies to forward units.

• Sustainment. Sustainment compriseslogistic support transported to the landingarea in follow-up shipping and aircraftto support tactical operations ashore.

•• Sustainment is provided througheither one or a combination of thefollowing systems: (1) Maintainingshipping and aircraft in an on-call statusto be ordered into the landing area by theCATF, as requested by the CLF; and (2)Establishing fixed schedules for bringing

shipping or aircraft into the landing areaautomatically as planned by the CLF.

•• Factors affecting decisions in thisregard depend primarily on: (1) Distancebetween the landing area and loadingpoints; (2) Availability of forwardsheltered ports or anchorages for use asregulating stations; (3) Requirement forconvoy escort; (4) Availability of aircraftdedicated for sustainment lift; (5) Hostileactivity on LOCs; (6) Plans for civilengineering support, including facilitiesrequired to accommodate supplies andthe phase-in of LF units to handlesupplies; (7) Availability of manpower,materials handling equipment, andlighterage to off load shipping; and (8)Availability of LOTS resources.

c. Logistic plans are prepared by the CATF,CLF, and other designated commanders of theamphibious force and include the following.

• Primary source(s) of supply andresponsibilities.

• Levels of supply to be carried in AE,AFOE, and follow-up shipping.

Logistic planning is accomplished under initial supply and sustainment categories.

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Logistics Planning

• Control and distribution of supplies.

• Plan for landing supplies.

• Resupply responsibilities, schedules, andsources.

• Air delivery responsibility, procedures,and methods.

• Captured material dispositioninstructions.

• Salvage instructions.

• Retrograde.

• Casualties.

6. Embarkation and LoadingPlans

See Chapter X, “Embarkation,” forembarkation and loading plan considerations.

7. Health Service Support Plans

a. The HSS plan is usually issued as AnnexQ to the OPLAN. It provides for HSS to allelements of the amphibious force inaccordance with the foregoing responsibilitiesand includes the items listed in Figure VIII-2.HSS planning considerations are detailed inFigure VIII-3.

b. The LF HSS plan is issued as Annex Qto the LF OPLAN and includes the items listedin Figure VIII-4.

c. Medical Regulating Plan. This plancontains policies and procedures forevacuation and primary medical regulation ofcasualties to designated casualty receiving andtreatment ships (CRTSs) in the landing areaby medical evacuation VTOL aircraft or bysurface craft, and provides for medicalservices. It also provides for secondarymedical regulating evacuation of casualties by

air to medical treatment facilities outside theoperational area or to rear areas followingmedical or surgical treatment onboard theCRTSs.

d. Planning Responsibilities

• The designated commander isresponsible for overall preparation ofplans, taking into account the following.

•• Coordinating, with the JFC orestablishing authority, patient evacuationby sea or air from the operational area toHSS facilities outside the area.

•• Air transport of HSS supplies andequipment, which may involveintratheater airlift assets.

•• Formulation, in conjunction withamphibious force commanders, of arecommended evacuation policy for theoperation.

•• Establishment of HSS requirementsand standards for the civilian populationin the operational area, when notprescribed by higher authority.

•• Development of procedures forregulating movement of casualties andpatients within the landing area inconjunction with amphibious forcecommanders.

For more information, see JP 4-02.2,Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Proceduresfor Patient Movement in JointOperations.

• The CATF is responsible for thefollowing.

•• Provision for HSS service to includeall embarked personnel between pointsof embarkation and the objective area.

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•• Provision for HSS personnel, supplies,and equipment for all units based ashoreand not attached to the LF.

•• In conjunction with the CLF,development of a procedure for

movement of patients within the landingarea.

•• Seaward evacuation from the beach,including communications to supportmovement of patients, receipt of patients,

Figure VIII-2. Contents of the Health Service Support Plan

CONTENTS OF THE HEALTHSERVICE SUPPORT PLAN

Statement of the health service support (HSS) situation

Statement of the evacuation policy

Clear delineation of HSS responsibilities, organization,and employment of the several elements, with particularemphasis on shifts in responsibility during several phasesof the operation and measures necessary to ensurecoordinated HSS action by all elements of the amphibiousforce

Provision for delivery and regulation of HSS in theobjective area

HSS medical logistics, including operation of HSS supplystocks afloat and provision for pre-plannedreplenishment, repair, and exchange of supplies andmedical equipment

Procedures and responsibilities for keeping necessaryrecords and reports on the flow of casualties

Provision for HSS to patients while afloat

Provision for obtaining medical intelligence

Measures for preventive medicine, hygiene, and sanitation

Procedures for distribution of whole blood and colloids

Organization and operation of the patient movementsystem

Development of preventive and environmental healthplans and annex coordinated with the engineerenvironmental management plans and annex

VIII-9

Logistics Planning

hospitalization afloat within theoperational area, and initial casualtyreporting for the ATF, LF, and otherforces assigned.

•• Establishment of HSS requirementsfor the civilian population in the objectivearea, when not prescribed by higherauthority.

•• Coordination of HSS for the civilianpopulation with nongovernmentalorganizations (NGOs) and coalitionforces.

•• Positioning and employment ofhospital ships within the operational area.

• The CLF identifies and coordinates LFHSS requirements with the CATF. Oncecommand is passed ashore, closecoordination with the CATF is stillrequired. The CLF is responsible forpreparation of plans, taking into accountthe following.

•• Providing HSS to LF personnel beforeembarkation.

•• Assistance to ship’s HSS departmentby providing HSS personnel to care forLF personnel while embarked.

•• Development, in conjunction with theCATF, of the evacuation policy for theoperation.

Figure VIII-3. Health Service Support Planning Considerations

HEALTH SERVICE SUPPORTPLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

GOALProviding for the health of the command and evacuation

and hospitalization of sick and wounded

Planning Must Consider:

Overall mission of the force andthe supporting medical mission

Policies of higher commanders

Landing area characteristics

Physical, biological, andpsychological threats topersonnel

Lines of communications andevacuation

Evacuation policies andprocedures

Medical supplies required

Blood and colloid requirements

Casualty estimates

Medical personnel available andstatus of their training

Supporting medical facilitiesand forces outside the objectivearea

Medical needs for civilianpopulation and enemy prisonersof war, if authorized

Need for service medical unitaugmentation

Requirements for casualtyreceiving and treatment ships

Aircraft and landing craft toprovide ambulance facilities

Medical augmentationrequirements for common-usershipping

Other medical facilities availablewithin the objective area

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•• Execution of the patient movementplan to the rear and from the operationalarea as directed.

•• Providing HSS to all personnel ashorein the operational area who are nototherwise provided for.

•• Determination o f t h e H S Srequirements of the LF that must befurnished by the other amphibious forcecommanders, and submission of theserequirements to the designatedcommander.

See JP 4-02, Doctrine for Health ServiceSupport in Joint Operations, foradditional information regarding HSS.

8. Landing Force Support PartyPlans

a. The landing force support party(LFSP) is a temporary LF organization,composed of ATF and LF elements, thatfacilitates the ship-to-shore movement andprovides initial combat support and CSSto the LF. The CLF is responsible fororganizing a system to accomplish thismission and other specific support functionswithin the landing area. Other missions ofthe LFSP are as follows.

• Facilitate the landing and movement ofpersonnel, supplies, and equipmentacross the beach, into a vertical landingzone (VLZ), or through a port.

Figure VIII-4. Landing Force Health Service Support Plan

LANDING FORCE HEALTHSERVICE SUPPORT PLAN

Organization and employment of landing force (LF) health service support (HSS)facilities in support of the operation

Provision for collection of medical intelligence

Provision for zones and phases of HSS responsibility

Provision for casualty evacuation

Announcement of the evacuation policy

Provision for HSS supply and re-supply and its control

Provision for whole blood and colloids supply from afloat units during the actionphase and later when facilities are established ashore

HSS instructions to subordinate units of the command

Measures for preventive medicine, weapons of mass destruction medicine,hygiene, and sanitation

Provision for HSS reports and records

Provision for mass casualty evacuation

Organization and operation of LF HSS regulating system in accordance with forceHSS regulating plan

VIII-11

Logistics Planning

• Evacuate casualties and EPWs from thebeach.

• Beach, retract, and salvage landing shipsand craft.

• Facilitate the establishment of the combatservice support element (CSSE), ACE,and naval beach group. Its specificorganization depends on the number ofbeaches or zones through which the LFwill land and the size of the units usingthe beaches or zones. For planningpurposes, the basic LFSP structureconsists of the LFSP commander, theshore party, the beach party, specialattachments, and ships’ platoons.

•• LFSP Commander. The designatedcommander of the LFSP controls landingsupport operations within the landingarea. The LFSP commander ensureseffective landing support through closecoordination with subordinate units,timely reinforcement, and consolidationof shore party and beach party elements.Initially, LFSP operations aredecentralized to the shore party and beachparty teams per established code (GreenBeach, Red Beach 1, etc.). TACON forlanding support operations on thesebeaches resides with the shore party teamcommander. When the shore party andbeach party groups are establishedashore, they assume TACON of theirrespective teams. TACON for landingsupport operations on each coded beachresides with the shore party groupcommander. When the shore party andbeach party are established ashore andthe shore party commander hasconsolidated command of the shore partygroups, TACON of the shore party andbeach party groups transitions to theshore party and beach party commandersrespectively. Concurrent with thistransition, the LFSP is established ashoreand the LFSP commander assumes

TACON of the shore party, beach party,special attachments, and all other LFSPunits ashore. If the LFSP is notestablished ashore concurrently with thebeach party and shore party, TACON forlanding support operations resides withthe shore party commander until theLFSP commander assumes TACON.The LFSP personnel and equipmentlanded are minimal as the shore party andbeach party form the predominant partof the LFSP.

•• Shore Party. The shore party is theLF component of the LFSP. The nucleusfor the shore party is the transportationsupport battalion, augmented withpersonnel and equipment from the GCE,ACE, and other CSSE units.

•• Beach Party. The beach party is theNavy component of the LFSP and isunder the TACON of the LFSPcommander. Personnel and equipmentfor the beach party comes from the navalbeach group.

•• Special Attachments. Specialattachments are made to the LFSP fordefense of the beach support area, toprovide liaison personnel, and forspecialized tasks.

•• Ships’ Platoons. A ship’s platoonconsists of assigned LF personnelresponsible for loading, stowing, andoffloading LF equipment and supplies.When a ship carries equipment andsupplies that belong only to LF unitsembarked on that ship, the ship’s platoonis sourced from the ship’s embarkedtroops at the direction of the commandingofficer of troops.

Detailed information about the LFSP iscontained in Naval Warfare Publication(NWP) 3-02.1, Ship-to-ShoreMovement, NWP 3-02.14, The Naval

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Beach Group, and Marine CorpsWarfare Publication (MCWP) 4-11.3,Transportation Operations.

For further information, refer to JP4-01.6, Joint Tactics, Techniques, andProcedures for Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore (JLOTS).

b. LFSP Plan

• The CLF and appropriate subordinatecommanders prepare LFSP planscontaining instructions for thefunctioning of the LFSP, including thebeach party and helicopter/VTOL aircraftsupport team, and air mobile supportparty requirements.

• The LFSP plan includes the following.

•• Organization and mission of the LFSP.

•• Instructions to all subordinateelements.

•• LFSP communications instructions.

•• Beach, DZ, and LZ defenseinstructions.

•• Administrative instructions.

c. LFSP Planning Considerations. Indeveloping the LFSP plans, considerationmust be accorded the factors shown in FigureVIII-5.

d. LFSP Planning Responsibilities

• The CLF is responsible for the timelyactivation of the LFSP and the conductof LFSP operations; however,amphibious force elements participate inand contribute to the development ofplans for its organization andemployment. The CLF is responsible forthe tactical employment and securityashore of all elements of the LFSP, andwill integrate requirements into the firesupport plan. The CLF determines and

Figure VIII-5. Landing Force Support Party Planning Considerations

LANDING FORCE SUPPORT PARTYPLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

Landing force scheme of maneuver and related landing plan

Enemy disposition in the landing area

Mine and obstacle clearance in the landing area

Landing area weather, terrain, and hydrographic conditions

Requirements for multiple, separate logistic installations to provide for passivedefense against weapons of mass destruction

Requirement for beach development and clearance of landing zones

Amounts and types of supplies and equipment to be landed

Types of ships (amphibious and commercial), landing craft (displacement orair-cushion), and aircraft to be unloaded

Availability of personnel and equipment for landing force support partyoperations

Policy concerning method of handling and disposition of enemy prisoners ofwar

Casualty evacuation and health service support regulating policies

Coordination required with other agencies

Provision for inter-Service support

VIII-13

Logistics Planning

presents requirements for support ofLFSP operations to the CATF. Theserequirements will be presented as earlyas possible in the planning phase.

• The CATF is responsible forpreparation of related plans thatprovide facilities and means to ensureeffective support of LFSP operations.Examples of such plans are the pontooncauseway and lighterage plan, unloadingplan, casualty evacuation plan, and EPWevacuation plan. Integrated training ofshore party and beach party elements willbe conducted before embarkation begins.

9. Pontoon Causeway andLighterage Plans

a. The CLF is responsible for presentingto the CATF requirements on which plans forpontoon causeways and lighterage support forthe operation are based. The CATF preparesthe pontoon causeway and lighterage plan inconsultation with the CLF considering thefollowing:

• LF requirements;

• Hydrographic conditions; and

• Availability of required types of sealift.

b. The plan should include details onloading, transportation, launching, initialoperational assignment, and provisions formaintenance and salvage of the causeway andlighterage equipment. It also contains specificinstructions for transition of control. The planwill include provisions for retaining lighteragein the area after the assault shipping departs,for use in unloading follow-up shipping, andfor other support of tactical operations. Theplan is published as an annex to the CATF’slogistic plan.

10. Engineer Plans

Engineer operations support thedevelopment of the battlespace for maneuver,enhance strategic and operational movement,and provide infrastructure for force protection.In addition to normal engineer operations (i.e.,combat, general, and topographic), specialconsiderations must be made for minecountermeasures and amphibious breaching,joint reception, staging, onward movement,and integration, offshore petroleum dischargesystems (OPDSs), and amphibious assaultbulk fuel and water systems connectivity.Involvement of the engineer staff is essentialin the planning and execution of all phases ofamphibious operations.

Further guidance can be found in JP 3-34,Engineer Doctrine for Joint Operations, andJP 4-04, Joint Doctrine for Civil EngineeringSupport.

11. Advanced BaseDevelopment and GarrisonPlans

Advanced base development and garrisonplanning is carried out in accordance withdirectives of the JFC or higher authority andresponds to requirements of the strategic plan.The CATF may be required to include in theplan provisions for initiation of civilengineering support.

a. Advanced Base Development andGarrison Plans. Advanced basedevelopment and garrison plans are issuedseparately from plans for an amphibiousoperation. They are prepared by a level ofcommand higher than the amphibious forcecommander. Pertinent extracts may beincluded in the amphibious force plan.

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b. Planning Considerations. Preparationof advanced base development and garrisonplans are covered herein only as they influencethe planning for an amphibious operation.Because of the progressive nature of advancedbase development, which may commenceduring the action phase and continue long afterthe amphibious operation is completed, a highdegree of planning coordination must beachieved among the ATF, LF, logistic forces,and other supporting forces.

c. Planning Responsibilities.

• The CATF has planning responsibility forthe following.

•• Allocation of shipping from the ATFto lift advanced base development forces.

•• Embarkation and movement of forcesand equipment to the operational area.

•• Allocation of means to control,support, and coordinate base and garrisonoperations during the amphibiousoperation.

• The CLF is responsible for the followingduring planning.

•• Plans to initiate advanced basedevelopment.

•• Plans to coordinate, control, andsupport garrison operations ashore.

•• Security measures.

CHAPTER IXAMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS AGAINST COASTAL DEFENSES

IX-1

1. General

Coastal defenses against amphibiousoperations have become a military necessityfor a number of countries considered a threatto regional stability and national interests. Anintegrated anti-landing doctrine hasevolved incorporating the use of land, sea,air and, in some cases, space assets. Thed o c t r i n e i n v o l v e s i n t e g r a t i o n o freconnaissance, long range interdiction by airand sea forces, and a combined arms groundforce at the beach. Central to most anti-landing defenses is the use of littoral minewarfare. In addition, some countries maybase their coastal defense on the threatenedemployment of nuclear, biological, andchemical (NBC) weapons or may integrateNBC weapons into their existing coastaldefense. The preferred tactic foramphibious forces operating againstcountries or organizations employingcoastal defenses is to avoid, bypass, orexploit gaps in these defenses wheneverpossible. However, operational limitationsmay preclude this tactic and a breach of thesedefenses may be required.

2. Anti-landing Doctrine

Coastal defenses depend on thehydrography, terrain, resources, developmenttime available, and ingenuity of theantagonists. Anti-landing doctrine usuallyfocuses on the development of four layeredbarriers within the littorals. These barriersare under observation and covered by shore

“A comparison of the several landings leads to the inescapable conclusionthat landings should not be attempted in the face of organized resistance if,by any combination of march or maneuver, it is possible to land unopposedwithin striking distance of the objective.”

MajGen A.A. Vandegrift, USMCCG, 1st Marine Division, 1 July 1943

based fires. Due to the littoral nature of thesebarriers, they generally fall within thehydrographic description of shallow water (upto 200 feet in depth). The four barriers fromthe littorals to land are perimeter, main,engineer, and beach.

a. Perimeter Barrier. The first littoralbarrier encountered is the perimeter minefield.This minefield, located at the maximumrange of ground-based covering fires, hasa mission to delay and break up the ATF.Delay at the perimeter minefield could allowcoastal defenses time for final preparation andmovement of reserves to potential landingbeaches. Antiship cruise missiles and coastalartillery may provide covering fires. Electricand diesel submarines and aircraft mayattempt to attack the amphibious force.

b. Main Barrier. The main barrier holdsthe primary minefield. The minefield maybe four (4) to six (6) kilometers off the coastand is intended to deny the maneuver of ATFships and landing craft during ship-to-shoremovement. Land-based artillery, air-defensesystems, and potentially small boats andaircraft cover the main barrier.

c. Engineer Barrier. The engineerbarrier is located at or near the shorelineand contains both minefields and obstacles.The engineer barrier is often laid in veryshallow water (VSW) from 40 to 10 feet ofwater and the surf zone (SZ) from 10 feet ofwater to the high water mark. Installed byground force engineers, the barrier targets

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landing craft and amphibious vehicles andattempts to deny access to the beach. Land-based artillery, air-defense systems, and crew-served weapons cover the engineer barrier.

d. Beach Barrier. The beach barriercanalizes the landing force forcounterattacks by tactical reserve forces.Minefields and obstacles are placed alongavenues of egress off the beach and in frontof defended positions. Land-based artillery,air-defense systems, and crew-servedweapons all provide support to a counterattackby the reserve.

3. Amphibious Breach ofCoastal Defenses

a. Amphibious forces should requestnational and theater collection assets toconduct reconnaissance and surveillance ofthe defended coastal area to determine thebest landing area to conduct the breach. Thecollection request should focus on locationof mines, obstacles, and enemy locations inthe area, to include air, naval, and groundforces.

b. Mine Threat. Because mines continueto proliferate and incorporate new technology,

current information on a potential adversary’smine resources is crucial to planning. Thetypes, characteristics, numbers, and storagelocations of mines as well as thetransportation assets and at-sea deliverycapability are vital information.

c. Operational Area Characteristics.Efforts required to clear, remove, or sweep aminefield depend significantly on the minedarea’s physical environment. Water depthand beach characteristics are key factors.Significant ocean currents increase thedifficulty of sweeping moored mines. Tidalranges expose mines in VSW, making themeasy to detect but placing a burden on clearingteams to finish their task within a prescribedtime limit. Natural and manmade obstaclesalso hinder breaching operations. Highdensities of mine-like objects on the bottomcomplicate operations. Once the landing areais chosen, the coastal defenses in the vicinityare degraded to the desired level throughsupporting operations conducted by forcesother than the amphibious force, to includemine countermeasure (MCM) forces (if notpart of advance forces) and the advance force.

Refer to Chapter XIII, “Supporting, AdvanceForce, and Preassault Operations,” for

Minefields and obstacles are placed along avenues of egress off thebeach and in front of defended positions.

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Amphibious Operations Against Coastal Defenses

information on supporting and advance forceoperations.

d. Local air and maritime superiority in theoperational area is required in order for theMCM forces to commence operations.Supporting operations may also be conductedfor offensive MCM and to wear down land forces.

e. Offensive MCM. If ROE permit, MCMis best accomplished by destruction of minesprior to their deployment. Proactive MCMinclude attacks on production and storagefacilities, transportation assets, and forcesused to plant mines. A key consideration inany potential littoral conflict is theestablishment of ROE that allow for early,aggressive, and proactive MCM operations.

f. MCM Forces. The time required forMCM operations will usually require MCMforces to commence operations prior to thearrival of the amphibious force and,potentially, the advance force. MCM forcesare extremely vulnerable and will requireconstant protection from hostile forces.Due to the limited assets available for anMCM operation, the CATF will need toprioritize the MCM effort in the operationalarea. There should also be an awareness thatMCM operations have the potential tocompromise the OPSEC of the impendingamphibious operation. Appropriateconsideration or measures should beimplemented to minimize the operationalimpact. Two primary MCM techniques aremine hunting and mine sweeping.

• Mine Hunting. Mine hunting is a time-consuming operation. During minehunting, the MCM platform uses itsavailable assets to locate, classify, andmark all mine-like contacts. Generally,surface or airborne platforms markpossible mine contacts and thenexplosive ordnance disposal MCM unitspositively identify, dispose of, or removethem for further exploitation.

• Mine Sweeping. Mine sweeping isperformed at slightly faster speeds thanhunting, which allows for a larger areaof coverage. Surface or airborneplatforms accomplish sweeping againsteither bottom influence or moored mines.

Advance force assets will operate insupport of breaching operations inaccordance with Chapter XIII,“Supporting, Advance Force, andPreassault Operations.”

4. Integrated MineCountermeasures andAmphibious BreachingOperations

a. The responsibility for breachingcoastal mine barriers may be phased. TheMCM commander, who is usually subordinateto the CATF upon the arrival of theamphibious force in the operational area, isresponsible for the breach of the outer minebarriers up to the SZ. The CATF is responsiblefor the breach of any mines and obstacles fromthe SZ to the high water mark. The CLF isresponsible for the breach of any mines andobstacles from the high water mark inland.MCM and amphibious breachingoperations must be synchronized. Lanerequirements of the landing force and mineor obstacle construction will dictate size andcomposition of the amphibious breach force.

b. Fundamentals. Suppression,obscuration, security, and reduction arefundamentals that must be applied toamphibious breaching operations to ensuresuccess.

• Suppression. Effective suppression isthe mission-critical task during anybreaching operation. Suppressionprotects forces reducing andmaneuvering through the obstacle andfixes the enemy in position. Suppressivefires include the full range of lethal and

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nonlethal fires, from NSFS and CAS toEA.

• Obscuration. Obscuration hampersenemy observation and TA, and concealsfriendly activities and movement. EAprevents the enemy use of radar and radiosignals to observe and report theoperation.

• Security. Support forces prevent theenemy from interfering with obstaclereduction and the passage of the assaultwaves through the breach lanes. Securitymust be effective against coastal defensesand counterattack forces. Vertical assaultforces may seize and deny routes ofingress into the landing area to preventthe counterattack of the landing beaches.

• Reduction. Reduction forces, normallycomposed of ATF and LF elements,create lanes through the mines andobstacles, allowing the assault waves topass. The location of lanes dependslargely on identified weaknesses in themine and obstacle belt. If the amphibiousforce cannot find gaps or weak coveragein the obstacles, they will applyconcentrated force at a designated pointto rupture the defense and create a gap.Units reducing the obstacle mark the laneand report the obstacle type, location, andlane locations to higher headquarters.Lanes are handed over to follow-onforces who further reduce or clear theobstacles, if required.

5. Operations in Nuclear,Biological, and ChemicalEnvironments

The employment or threat of NBC weaponsand other toxic materials poses uniquechallenges when conducting amphibiousoperations. NBC-capable nations, includingmany developing nations, may use theseweapons to achieve political and military

objectives. The NBC threat occurs across thefull range of military operations, includingMOOTW. Improvements in missiletechnology that increases the range andprecision of NBC weapons and the use ofmines and barriers to canalize or impede theamphibious forces may make it vulnerable toattack. These trends require amphibious forcecommanders to consider the challenges posedby NBC weapons when conductingamphibious operations. There should be aclear understanding of the potential NBCthreats, and planning should include plans tominimize amphibious force vulnerabilities.

Refer to JP 3-11, Joint Doctrine for Operationsin Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC)Environments.

a. Responsibilities. Combatantcommanders must be able to executecampaigns under NBC threats andenvironments through unified action at thetheater level. Unified action encompasses notonly NBC-related actions but also all otheractions that permit continuation of theateroperations and focus on attaining the singletheater military objective in line with the JFC’sintent. The amphibious force must becapable of operating in an NBCenvironment to attain the amphibious forceobjectives, which are a part of the JFC’soverall objectives. Within the amphibiousforce, the CATF is responsible for NBCdefense of the assigned amphibious forceafloat, including the LF while embarked. TheCLF is responsible for NBC defense of thelanding force once ashore.

b. Planning Considerations. Amphibiousforce commanders must address potentialNBC threats during the planning phase.

• NBC defense plans must includeprovisions for the following.

•• Requesting supporting operations toeliminate or reduce an adversary’s NBC

IX-5


capabilities within the operational areaprior to the arrival of the amphibiousforce.

•• Planning advance force operations tofurther degrade an adversary’s NBCcapabilities and to detect contaminatedareas that may interfere with the conceptof operations.

•• Planning offensive and defensiveactions taken by the amphibious force tominimize the vulnerability to and mitigatethe effects of NBC attacks that may impacton the operational area, to include thedevelopment of branches and sequels.

• The amphibious force’s IPB process mustaddress the capabilities and limitationsof an adversary’s NBC weapons anddelivery systems; their C2 and releaseprocedures; and indicators of intent toemploy NBC weapons. The amphibiousforce commanders should provide targetplanning and execution guidance usingthe full extent of actions allowed by theROE based on the effects needed to beachieved against the adversary’s NBCweapons, delivery means, and C2capabilities.

• The principles of NBC defense must befactored into planning and specificallyaddress the hazards created by NBCweapons: avoidance of NBC hazards,particularly contamination; protection ofindividuals and units from unavoidableNBC hazards; and decontamination inorder to restore operational capability.Application of these principles (seeFigure IX-1), helps to minimizevulnerabilities, protect the amphibiousforce, and maintain the operational tempoin order to achieve the amphibious forceobjectives.

• Contamination Avoidance.Contamination avoidance prevents the

disruption of the amphibious operationby eliminating unnecessary time incumbersome protective postures thathave the potential to degrade the forceand minimizing decontaminationrequirements. Avoiding contaminationrequires the ability to recognize thepresence or absence of NBC hazards inthe air, on water, land, personnel,equipment, and facilities, at both long-and short-range. Supporting and advanceforce operations should provide for long-range surveillance and detectioncapabilities focusing on such areas as thelanding beaches, helicopter landingzones, and the amphibious forceobjectives. Preassault operations andactions taken throughout the remainderof the amphibious operation shouldprovide for short-range surveillance anddetection capabilities in support of thelanding force units operating ashore andATF ships within the sea echelon area.

• NBC Protection. Specific actionsrequired of the ATF and LF before,during, and after NBC attacks should beclearly communicated and rehearsed.NBC protection conserves the force byproviding individual and collectiveprotection capabilities.

•• Individual Protection. Commandersmust adopt a mission-oriented protectiveposture (MOPP) to establish flexibleforce readiness levels for individual NBCprotection. MOPP analysis (the processof determining a recommended MOPP)integrates NBC protection requirements— derived from NBC threat assessments— with mission requirements in light ofthe performance degradation caused bywearing protective equipment. The LFand ATF personnel manning flight decks,well decks, and landing craft as well asoperating ashore (such as beachmasterunits) require individual protectiveequipment and must be capable of

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operating in MOPP-levels commensuratewith the threat.

•• Collective Protection. Sustainingoperations in NBC environments mayrequire collective protection equipment,which provides a toxic-free area forconducting operations and performinglife support functions such as rest, relief,and medical treatment. When collectiveprotection is not available ashore, plansmust be developed, exercised, andevaluated to move personnel toalternative toxic free areas afloat that arewell away from contaminated areasashore.

• Decontamination. When contaminationavoidance is not possible, decontamination

supports the post-attack restoration ofthe amphibious force and the resumptionof operations to a near-normal capability.Decontamination is intended to minimizethe time required to return personnel andmission-essential equipment to amission-capable state. Becausedecontamination may be labor andlogistically intensive and assets arelimited, the amphibious forcecommanders must prioritize requirementsand decontaminate only what isnecessary. Commanders may choose todefer decontamination of some items and,depending on agent type and weatherconditions, opt to either defer use ofequipment or allow natural weatheringeffects (temperature, wind, salt water,and sunlight) to reduce hazards.

Figure IX-1. Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defense Priorities

NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, AND CHEMICAL

DEFENSE PRIORITIES

CONTAMINATION AVOIDANCE

Anticipate; use intelligence preparation of the battlespace,sensors; avoid hazards BEFORE contamination affects

operations

NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, AND CHEMICAL

PROTECTION

Apply individual and collective protection to conservecombat power

DECONTAMINATION

Decontaminate (immediate, operational, orthorough) when needed to restore combat power

IX-7


Decontamination is organized into threecategories that reflect operationalurgency: immediate, operational, andthorough. In order to maintain theoperational tempo, the amphibious forceuses immediate and operationaldecontamination to the maximum extentpossible until the amphibious forceobjectives are secured. During anoperat ional pause , thoroughdecontamination is conducted. Servicepublications provide detailed tactics,techniques, and procedures for thetechnical aspects of decontamination.

•• Immediate Decontamination. Thegoal of immediate decontamination is tominimize casualties, save lives, and helpto limit contamination exposure andspread. Upon becoming contaminated,individuals should carry out immediatedecontamination, which includes threetasks: skin decontamination, personalwipedown (hood, mask, gloves, andindividual equipment), and operatorspraydown of frequently touchedequipment surfaces using on-sitedecontamination equipment.

•• Operational Decontamination.Operational decontamination limitscontamination exposure and spread, andhelps to sustain operations by providingtemporary and, in some cases, long-termrelief from wearing protectiveequipment. Operational decontaminationincludes two techniques: MOPP gearexchange for personnel, and operatorwashdown for mission-essentialequipment.

•• Thorough Decontamination.Thorough decontamination reduces oreliminates the need for wearing ofprotective equipment. Specializeddecontamination units and personnelsupport thorough decontamination.There are three thorough decontaminationtechniques: detailed personneldecontamination, detailed equipmentdecontamination, and detailed aircraftdecontamination. Thorough decontaminationis required for total reconstitution of theamphibious force and the return tounrestricted embarkation of personnel,equipment, and materiel.

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Intentionally Blank

CHAPTER XEMBARKATION

X-1

1. General

The embarkation phase is the periodduring which the forces, with theirequipment and supplies, are embarked inassigned shipping. The primary goal of thisphase is the orderly assembly of personnel andmateriel and their embarkation in assignedshipping in a sequence designed to meet therequirements of the LF concept of operationsashore. Detailed guidance on the organizationfor embarkation, planning, and execution ofthis phase of the operation, including MilitarySealift Command (MSC) support toamphibious operations and associated specialconsiderations, is provided in JP 3-02.2, JointDoctrine for Amphibious Embarkation, andNWP 3-02.22M, MSC Support of AmphibiousOperations.

“The amphibious landing is the most powerful tool we have.”

General Douglas MacArthurPlanning conference for Inchon landing

23 August 1950

See JP 3-02.1, Joint Doctrine for LandingForce Operations; JP 4-01.1, Joint Tactics,Techniques, and Procedures for AirliftSupport to Joint Operations; and JP 4-01.3,Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures forMovement Control, for additionalinformation pertaining to embarkation ofairlifted forces in support of amphibiousoperations.

2. Embarkation Planning

Plans for assembly of assault shipping andmovement of troops to embarkation points areprepared by the CATF and CLF, respectively,as separate documents in the form ofmovement orders and embarkation andloading plans. These plans must becoordinated and distributed as soon as possible

Plans for assembly of assault shipping and movement of troops toembarkation points are prepared by the CATF and CLF.

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to permit initiation of preliminary movementsand preparations to ensure that theembarkation is begun without delay.

3. Embarkation PlanningResponsibilities

ATF and LF commanders’ planningresponsibilities are as follows.

a. The CATF is responsible for:

• Allocating assault shipping and sealift.

• Providing ship’s loading characteristicspamphlets to the CLF.

• Organizing Navy forces for embarkation.

• Preparing movement orders for ships.

• Approving LF embarkation and loadingplans.

• Planning for external support.

• Advising the CLF on support forces’embarkation requirements.

b. The CLF is responsible for:

• Determining LF requirements for assaultshipping.

• Developing LF organization forembarkation.

• Determining embarkation supportrequirements.

• Preparing detailed embarkation andloading plans.

c. Other commanders must:

• Provide their lift requirements;

• Organize their units for embarkation; and

• Participate in embarkation planningmeetings.

CHAPTER XIREHEARSALS

XI-1

1. General

Rehearsal is the period during which theprospective operation is practiced to:

a. Test adequacy of plans, timing ofdetailed operations, and combat readiness ofparticipating forces;

b. Ensure that all echelons are familiar withthe plan; and

c. Test communications-information systems.

2. Requirements

The rehearsal phase may be conductedconcurrently with other phases of theamphibious operation but most often isassociated with the movement to theoperational area phase. During this periodthe amphibious force or elements conduct one(or more) rehearsal exercise(s), ideally underconditions approximating those to beencountered in the littorals and landing area.The objective during this phase will be toexercise as much of the force and the OPLANas the situation permits, with OPSEC being alimiting factor.

JP 3-02.1, Joint Doctrine for Landing ForceOperations, provides further detail on varioustypes of rehearsals.

3. Rehearsal Plans

Responsibility for preparation of rehearsalplans is the same as for preparation of theOPLAN. Rehearsal plans will be issuedseparately from actual plans and require

“Like other amphibious animals we must come occasionally on shore. . . .”

Lord Bolingbroke:Idea of a Patriot King, 1749

execution of the various tasks and functionsparalleling those required during the operation.

a. The number, nature, and scope ofrehearsals will be influenced by the followingconsiderations.

• The complexity of the tasks.

• Time available for rehearsals.

• State of training.

• Suitability of available areas.

• Special or unusual problems to be facedin the actual operation.

• Intelligence and counterintelligence.

• Adequacy of C4 plan.

• Logistic and CSS availability toreplenish, replace, or repair assets used.

• OPSEC to prevent disclosure of timing,location, or intent to conduct anamphibious operation.

• Organic modeling and simulation ability.

b. The dates on which rehearsals areconducted and the time allocated for themmust provide for the following.

• Complete and careful execution of theentire rehearsal.

• Re-embarkation of all troops, equipment,and supplies.

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• Replenishment, repair, or replacement ofequipment and supplies used duringrehearsals including landing craft, ships,or aircraft.

• Critiques at all levels of command forevaluation and correction of problems.

• Time to revise areas of the plan in whichthe rehearsal identified problems.

c. Selection of the rehearsal area isinfluenced by the following.

• Suitability.

• Similarity of the rehearsal area to theactual landing area.

• Feasibility of employing liveammunition.

• OPSEC.

• Susceptibility to enemy interference.

• Location of the rehearsal area in relationto the operational area and to points ofembarkation.

• Health conditions at the rehearsal area.

• Activity of civilian personnel, vehicles,shipping, and small craft that mayinterfere with the rehearsal.

• Environmental and managementrestrictions.

d. Testing the effectiveness ofcommunications-information systems planswill be influenced by the following.

• Level of training of communications-information systems personnel andtraining time available.

• Level of training of intelligence, maneuver,fires, logistics, and other functional areapersonnel regarding their use ofcommunications-information systemsresources.

• Status of communications-informationsystems equipment.

• OPSEC and INFOSEC restrictions.

4. Security

a. Because of similarity between therehearsal and the actual operation, strictsecurity measures must be enforced duringrehearsals. The reconnaissance for, selectionof, and arrangements for the use of the areasin which rehearsal(s) are to be held must beaccomplished carefully. Deception measuresmay be necessary to ensure the security ofthe rehearsal.

b. Unauthorized observation by personnelnot part of the amphibious force orunauthorized communications by personnelwithin the amphibious force with externalagencies must be prevented. The primarymeans of limiting unauthorized observationare restricting movements of personnel andships, and establishing security perimeterpatrols around the rehearsal area, both at seaand ashore. Special precautions must be takento achieve communications security.

c. The threat of reconnaissance satellitescannot be ignored. Execution of therehearsal may have to be timed to coincidewith those time periods when satellites cannotobserve the rehearsal area, which may or maynot coincide with planned execution times.Adjustment to the rehearsal (e.g., selection ofmisleading terrain, decentralized rehearsals,subordinate rehearsals separated by time anddistance, and deliberately executed deceptionoperations) may also be used to mask the

XI-3

Rehearsals

purpose, location, and timing of theamphibious operation.

d. In order to avoid enemy detection ofrehearsal activities, maximum use of

wargaming and simulation will be considered.There are many events that take place in anamphibious operation that lend themselvesto simulations. Denying the enemyobservation of intentions is critical.

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Intentionally Blank

CHAPTER XIIMOVEMENT TO THE OPERATIONAL AREA

XII-1

1. General

The movement phase commences upondeparture of ships from loading points in theembarkation areas, and concludes when shipsarrive at assigned stations in the operationalarea. During this phase, the amphibiousforce is organized into movement groups,which execute movement in accordancewith the movement plan on prescribedroutes (with alternate routes designated foremergency use). Movement of the force tothe operational area may be interrupted byrehearsals, stops at staging areas for logisticreasons, or pauses at rendezvous points.Execution of a postponement plan due toadverse weather or other unfavorablesituations may necessitate a revised movementplan.

2. Echelons of the LandingForce

The echelons of the LF will include the AE,and may include the MPF, APF, AFOE, andfollow-up transport ships and aircraft asdescribed below.

a. AE. The AE is that element of a forcecomprised of tailored units and aircraftassigned to conduct the initial assault on theoperational area. The AE is normallyembarked in amphibious assault ships. TheAE ships are combat loaded with troops,equipment, and supplies that typically provideat least 15 days of sustainment. Otherelements included in the AE are:

“The seas are no longer a self contained battlefield. Today they are a mediumfrom which warfare is conducted. The oceans of the world are the base ofoperations from which navies project power onto land areas and targets.”

Timothy SheaProject Poseidon, February 1961

• LF elements of the advance force thatdeploy with sufficient supplies toaccomplish their mission and sustainthemselves until subsequent forcesarrive; and

• LF elements (including airborne and airassault forces) positioned at support basesand airfields, in and adjacent to theoperational area prior to the assault, thatprovide initial combat capability tosupport the operation.

b. MPF and APF. MPF and APFoperations that augment the LF willnormally occur before the arrival of theAFOE. The MPF can provide a Marineexpeditionary brigade at a permissive locationin the AOR. These additional troops, supplies,and equipment can then be transported by ATFassets or other means to reinforce or augmentthe landing and support forces ashore.

c. AFOE. The AFOE is that echelon ofthe assault troops, vehicles, aircraft,equipment, and supplies which, although notneeded to initiate the assault, are required tosupport and sustain the assault. The AFOEis normally required in the operational areano later than 5 days after commencementof the assault landing.

• The AFOE is divided into airlifted andsealifted forces and supplies. Requiredarrival time in theater, suitability ofmaterial for air and sea lift, and liftavailability, in that order, will determinetransportation mode.

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• The AFOE is organized for landing andembarkation, respectively, based onanticipated requirements of operationsashore. Units, personnel, and materialconfigured in shipload and planeload lotsas dictated by landing and embarkationplans are then organized into movementgroups.

• Units and their equipment are marshalledat their home stations and staged at portsof embarkation (POEs) in accordancewith their time-phased deploymentschedules. Materiel arriving fromlogistic sources is assembled at POEsunder LF supervision.

• The requirement to containerizeAFOE material cannot beoveremphasized. The capability ofcommands to containerize AFOEmaterial will range from 30 to 70 percent,depending on the source o faccompanying supplies and time-phasedforce requirements (additional timewould allow more containerization).

• Although the CATF and CLF areresponsible for planning and executingembarkation, civilian stevedores,

contracted by the Military TrafficManagement Command at commercialports and by the Navy and navalinstallations, are used to load common-user shipping provided by theCommander in Chief, United StatesTransportation Command. Due to thelarge number of foreign nationalsemployed by foreign flag shippers andport facilities, it may be necessary forcommanders of amphibious transportgroups to augment port and/or embarkedsecurity forces to protect against sabotageof equipment, either in port or whileembarked.

• Ship unloading is directed by the normalATF-LF ship-to-shore control andsupport activities (primary controlofficer, HDC, tactical-logistical group(TACLOG), LFSP, etc.). The size andorganization of these agencies willchange as the operation matures.Additional cargo handling battalion andamphibious construction battalion forcesare required to support the offload ofmerchant ships. As they becomeaccessible, developed seaports and aerialports are used to supplement traditionalbeach operations, expanding the ship-to-

Materiel arriving from logistic sources is assembled at portsof embarkation under LF supervision.

XII-3

Movement to the Operational Area

shore organization accordingly. TheCATF and CLF are responsible fordebarkation and offload until terminationof the amphibious operation. In the caseof an amphibious assault, the amphibiousoperation would not normally beterminated until the entire AFOE isashore. At that time, the responsibilitiesfor offload of follow-up material may bepassed to another offload organizationdesignated by higher authority.

d. Follow-up Ships and Aircraft. Inamphibious operations, follow-up is thelanding of reinforcements and stores after theAEs and AFOEs have landed. Follow-up iscarried by transport ships and aircraft notoriginally part of the amphibious force.

3. Organization for Movement

Based on the landing plan, amphibiousforce assets are organized for embarkationand deployment to support the amphibiousoperation. This organization is based on thetime-phased force requirements of theamphibious force in the operational area.

a. Transport Groups. Those elements thatdirectly deploy and support the landing of theLF are functionally designated as transportgroups in the ATF organization.

• Amphibious transport groups provide forembarkation, movement to the landingarea, landing, and logistic support of theLF. They are comprised of all the assetsin which the LF is embarked, includinglighterage and cargo offloading anddischarge systems to be employedin ship-to-shore movement. Theamphibious transport group can includeships from commercial and other sourcesthat include the following.

•• The MSC’s APF has approximately35 strategically located ships laden withmilitary equipment, supplies, and fuel.

This force has three separate elements:The Marine Corps’ MPF, the Army’s pre-positioning ships, and a collection ofvessels that support the Navy, Air Force,and Defense Logistics Agency.

•• MSC’s surge sealift fleet consisting of8 fast sealift ships and 11 large mediumspeed roll-on/roll-off (RO/RO) shipscapable of moving large amounts ofheavy unit equipment such as tanks, largewheeled vehicles, and helicopters.

•• Other MSC-provided ships,consisting of commercial ships (both USand foreign flag) acquired for specific liftrequirements.

•• Two MSC operated hospital ships.

•• The Ready Reserve Force consistingof commercial or former military vesselsof high military utility including RO/RO,barge, container, tanker, crane, andbreakbulk ships. Some of these vesselshave had their military capabilitiesenhanced with the addition of systemssuch as the modular cargo deliverysystem and the OPDS. Some have beenaltered for specific missions such asaviation logistic support ships andauxiliary crane ships. The MaritimeAdministration maintains these vesselsin a 4-, 5-, 10-, or 20-day readiness status.When activated, these ships are under theoperational control of MSC.

•• Ships provided by allied and friendlygovernments.

• Airlift is used for amphibious operationsinvolving the fly-in echelon to join upwith equipment delivered by the MSC.Aircraft assigned can be organic militaryor commercial, to include:

•• Aircraft under civil reserve air fleetcontrol;

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•• Aircraft requisitioned by the USGovernment; and

•• Aircraft provided by allied andfriendly governments.

b. Multiple Transport Groups. If morethan one landing area is established in theoperational area, additional transport groups(one for each landing area) are formed.Transport groups are combat loaded to supportthe landing plan of the assigned landing area.Each amphibious transport group is assignedassault ships and lighterage required by theLF in its assigned landing area.

c. Movement Group(s). The ATF maybe task-organized into movement groupsbased on POEs, and individual ship speed,mission, and required arrival time in theoperational area. Using the above criteria, allNavy forces, self-deploying LF aircraft, andself-deploying Air Force units should be task-organized into separate movement groups. Amovement group will include all requiredscreen and logistic support.

d. Pre-D-day Groups. The advance force,when used, usually proceeds to the landingarea as a single movement group. However,if there is a wide disparity of speed betweenvarious ships, or if part of the LF is requiredto capture nearby islands or other key terrainbefore the arrival of the main body of theamphibious force, it may be necessary toorganize the advance force into two ormore movement groups, each with a screen.

• The main body of the amphibious forcemust arrive on or before D-day andshould consist of the following groups,each with a screen: one or more transportgroups, one or more combat logisticgroups, and one or more support battlegroups.

• Under certain conditions, it may bedesirable to attach all or part of the

combat logistic groups and support battlegroups to the transport groups to providesupport and protection from attack whileen route. Protection from attack whileen route may also be provided by forcesnot part of the amphibious force.

• Elements of the amphibious force maybe phased into the operational area byechelons, instead of being brought insimultaneously. The elements arrivingon D-day may consist only of the forcesrequired to initiate the assault landing.The remaining elements may be phasedin during succeeding days.

e. Post-D-day Groups. Movement groupsof the amphibious force scheduled to arrivein the operational area after D-day will usuallybe assigned a screen for force protection.

f. Follow-up. The first follow-up elementsmay arrive in the operational area beforeunloading of the AE or AFOE ships iscomplete. In such cases, OPCON or TACONof these elements will normally be passed tothe CATF at a designated point before theirarrival in the operational area. The CATFretains OPCON or TACON of these elementsuntil such time as the amphibious operationis terminated, the elements are detached fromthe amphibious force, or another offloadauthority has been designated.

See JP 4-01.6, Joint Tactics, Techniques, andProcedures for Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore(JLOTS), and JP 4-01.5, Joint Tactics,Techniques, and Procedures forTransportation Terminal Operations forfurther information.

4. Planning Responsibilities

a. Movement Plan. The CATF isresponsible for preparing a movement planduring the planning phase. In operationsinvolving several attack groups, the CATFusually prepares a general movement plan in

XII-5


which coordinating measures are included asnecessary. Subordinate force and groupcommanders will prepare their own detailedmovement plans. Because details of themovement depend on overall requirementsof the operation, the movement plans aregenerally among the last to be completedduring the planning phase. Each movementplan is normally included as an annex to theappropriate operation plan or order.

b. Coordination with Other Forces.Coordination measures to be taken betweenforces supporting the amphibious operationand the amphibious force will normally beprovided in planning guidance issued by theJFC or designated commander.

c. Postponement Plan. Postponement maybe necessary because of weather conditions,unexpected movement of major enemy forces,or failure to meet go/no-go criteria after theamphibious force has started its movementfrom final staging areas toward the operationalarea. This contingency is provided for in thepostponement plan. Usually, postponementis on a 24-hour basis, which involvesbacktracking or diversion of ships into adesignated sea area. A longer postponementmay involve return of the force to a stagingarea. The postponement plan will be preparedby the CATF and is usually promulgated aspart of the OPLAN. Execution of thepostponement plan will normally be controlledby the JFC or designated commander, basedon the recommendations of the CATF andCLF.

d. Alternate Plans. The alternate plan foran amphibious operation may differ from thepreferred plan and necessitate separatemovement or approach plans. It is seldompossible to determine far in advance the timeat which an alternate plan will be placed ineffect. Movement plans must therefore beflexible enough for execution of alternateplans at any point between the final stagingarea and the operational area.

5. Sea Routes to the OperationalArea

Sea routes and route points to theoperational area will normally bedetermined by the CATF, subject to theapproval by the fleet or area commanderor designated representative. Routesselected should lead from all possible portsof departure to the operational area. Alternateroutes should also be provided to avoidinterference between forces and to permitdiversion should the threat of enemy attackor weather prevent use of primary routes.Routes and route points should be named tofacilitate reference. Small-scale charts, whichshow sea routes and route points, are preparedand included in the operation plans and ordersof appropriate ATF echelons. All sea routesshould be wide enough for a movement groupcommander to maneuver his group withoutinterfering with the movement of othergroups.

6. Sea Routes in theOperational Area

CATF determines sea routes in theoperational area. During planning, sea routeselection must take into consideration themissions of various task forces, groups, units,and elements in the amphibious force, so theymay proceed expeditiously to their assignedstations without interference. Sea routes tothe operational area will connect with searoutes within the operational area atdesignated points just outside the area screento minimize interference during thedeployment and movement of forces fromtheir cruising or approach formations toassigned stations or areas.

a. Requirements. Sea routes in theoperational area should be selected that:

• Ensure a minimum of interference amongships and formations;

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• Are clear of mines and navigationalhazards to the maximum extent possible;

• Provide sufficient dispersion to preventconcentrations that would make theamphibious force a desirable target forNBC attack; and

• Provide for economy of screening forces.

b. Charts. Large-scale charts showing thesea areas in and adjacent to the operationalarea must be available to assist C2 functions.

7. Staging Areas

Plans will be made by the CATF, inconsultation with the CLF, to use staging areaswhile en route to the operational area. Theamphibious force may stage at one or moreintervening ports for logistic support,emergency repairs, or final rehearsals. TheCATF will select the staging area requiredand will ensure that:

a. Necessary service craft are available.

b. A general logistics schedule ispromulgated.

c. Anchorages are assigned based onconsideration for expediting logistics whilefacilitating entry and sortie of movementgroups staging through the area and avoidingvulnerable concentrations.

d. Provision is made for replacing orrepairing any critical supplies or equipmentexpended or damaged during rehearsal.

8. Sea Areas

a. To minimize the possibility ofinterference between various elements of theamphibious force and other supporting forces,sea areas in the vicinity of the landing areawill be selected by the CATF and designatedby the higher commander. The sea areas will

be divided into a number of operating areasas depicted in Figure XII-1 and describedbelow.

b. Ocean Operating Areas. Three kindsof ocean operating areas may be selected.

• Close support areas near, but notnecessarily in, the landing area. Theseareas are assigned to support carrier battlegroups, surface action groups, surfaceaction units, and certain logistic elements.

• Distant support areas located in thevicinity of the landing area but atconsiderable distance seaward of it.These areas are assigned to distantsupport forces, such as striking forces,surface action groups, surface actionunits, and their logistic groups.

• A distant retirement area located toseaward of the landing area. This area isdivided into a number of operating areasto which assault ships may retire andoperate in the event of heavy weather orto prevent concentration of ships in thelanding area.

c. Sea Areas Within the Landing Area.Areas in the landing area extending outwardto the inner limits of the close support areasare known as the sea areas within the landingarea.

• Sea Echelon Area. An area to seawardof a transport area from which assaultships are phased into the transport areaand to which assault ships withdraw fromthe transport area. The use of a seaechelon area allows for dispersion as adefense against weapons of massdestruction, surface, subsurface, or airthreats.

• Transport Area. In amphibiousoperations, an area assigned to a transportorganization for the purpose of debarking

XII-7


troops and equipment. It consists ofmineswept lanes, areas, and channelsleading from a sea echelon area to thebeaches. The maximum number of shipsin the transport area is determined bydispersion requirements, availability offorces for MCM operations, and localhydrography and topography. Transportlanding areas include:

•• Helicopter/VTOL Aircraft TransportAreas are areas, preferably inside the areascreen, for launching and recoveringhelicopters/VTOL aircraft. The areashould provide ample maneuvering room

to maintain required relative winds duringhelicopter/VTOL operations.

•• Outer Transport Areas are areas insidethe screening area to which assaulttransports proceed initially after arrivalin the objective area. It will be locatedover the horizon for OTH operations.

•• Inner Transport Areas are areas asclose to the landing beach as depth ofwater, navigational hazards, boat traffic,and enemy action permit. Transport shipsmove to the inner transport area toexpedite unloading.

Figure XII-1. Sea Areas

SEA AREAS

INNERTRANSPORT

AREALANDING

AREA

OCEANOPERATING

AREAS

OCEANOPERATING

AREAS

LANDINGAREA OUTER TRANSPORT

AREATRANSPORT

AREA

VTOL AIRCRAFTTRANSPORT

AREA

SEA ECHELON AREASEA ECHELON AREA

CLOSE SUPPORT AREACLOSE SUPPORT AREA

DISTANT SUPPORT AREADISTANT SUPPORT AREA

DISTANT RETIREMENT AREADISTANT RETIREMENT AREA

AAV

CLA

VLZ

VTOL

amphibious a ehicle

landing craft air cushion launch area

ssault v vertical landing zone

vertical takeoff and landing

CUSHIONLANDING ZONE

CUSHIONLANDING ZONE

VLZ

CausewayOperating Area

AAV LaunchingArea

CausewayOperating Area

AAV LaunchingArea

CLA

BOAT LANES

FIRESUPPORT

AREA

X

CLA

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• Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC)Launch Area (CLA). CLAs are locatedin the transport area and sea echelon area.The CLA (the sea component) andcushion landing zone (CLZ) (the beachcomponent) are connected by transitlanes.

• Control Ship Stations. Stationsassigned to control ships for controllingthe ship-to-shore movement. Thesestations need not be on the line ofdeparture (LOD), and may be assignedas underway sectors to avoid a shore-based threat. Control ship stations mayeven be located OTH.

• AAV Launch Area. Areas located nearand to seaward of the LOD to whichlanding ships proceed to launch AAVs.

• Causeway Operation Area. Causewayoperating areas, which include causewaylaunching areas, are normally on the flankof boat lanes and include both a sea andbeach component. These areas are usedfor causeway launching, placement, andanchoring.

• FSA. A maneuver area or exact locationassigned to fire support ships from whichsurface fire support is delivered.

9. Regulating Points

a. A regulating point is an anchorage,port, or ocean area to which AE, AFOE,and follow-up transport ships proceed ona schedule and are normally controlled bythe CATF until needed in the transportarea for unloading. It also serves as arendezvous point to which ships proceed whenempty to await makeup of a convoy ormovement group for movement toward basesoutside the operational area.

b. The passage of designated movementgroups may be interrupted by stopping at

regulating points where they wait until calledforward to the landing area by the CATF. Inthis manner, congestion of ships in transportareas off assault beaches can be reduced. Thiscontributes greatly to passive defense againstNBC attack.

10. Geographic ReferencePoints

A complete system of geographic referencepoints for the operational area andsurrounding ocean area should be formulatedduring planning. The points may be used toindicate routes (particularly where thedirection of the routes changes), to depict theshape and location of the areas discussedabove, and for certain locations not related toareas or routes. Reference points will beencoded and defined by exact latitude andlongitude.

11. Security

In formulating plans for movement to theoperational area, sea routes and rendezvouspoints must be carefully selected. Sea routesthrough mineable waters, or close to enemyshore installations from which the enemy cancarry out air, surface, or subsurface attacks,are to be avoided if possible. To minimizeprobability of detection, routes will be plannedto avoid known or probable areas of enemysurveillance. Flexibility must be given inallocation of transit time to permit evasivecourses to be steered by movement groups ifit becomes necessary to avoid surface orsubsurface threats.

12. Protective Measures

The LF must arrive in the landing areawithout critical reduction of its combat power.Measures necessary for protection of themovement groups making a passage at seainclude all those taken by any ATForganization operating at sea.

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13. Electronic WarfareEn Route

Subject to restrictions imposed in theinitiating guidance, normally the CATFcontrols employment of EW within theamphibious force during movement to theoperational area. This control includescommunications of the embarked LF. Varyingdegrees of EMCON are normally imposedduring the movement phase.

14. Intelligence En Route

a. The amphibious force, or elementsthereof, may receive significant intelligenceinformation while en route to the operationalarea. This is particularly true in situationswhere advance forces or forces external tothe amphibious force, such as theater air, SOF,or carrier strike forces, conduct pre-D-dayoperations in the operational area or whereremote sensor data is provided.

b. The intelligence center is responsible fortimely dissemination of pertinent intelligenceinformation to the CATF and CLF. ATF shipsreceiving such information are responsible forpassing it to the embarked landing forces.

15. Coordination DuringPassage

a. In an amphibious operation, forces nota part of but supporting the amphibious forcemust coordinate their operations with the ATF.This coordination must be delineated in theplans of the JFC or designated commander.

b. Individual commanders must remainaware of the need for maintaining the scheduleand proceeding along prescribed routes. Ifdeviation is required, the commander of thegroup will determine whether to breakEMCON to advise other commands of thesituation. In certain situations, there may beserious consequences if friendly land orcarrier-based search aircraft observe a force

in a position not indicated in the aircrewbriefing. All commanders must be fullycognizant of the general scheme and area ofoperations of other forces.

16. Approach to theOperational Area

a. Approach to the operational areaincludes the arrival of various task groups inthe vicinity of the operational area anddeployment of task groups from cruisingformations, reforming as necessary accordingto assigned tasks and proceeding to designatedpositions in the operational area. During thiscritical period, additional protective measuresmay be necessary. These provisions shouldencompass:

• Special air defense measures, includingtimely air strikes against enemy airfieldswithin range of the landing area;

• Location and neutralization of enemysubmarines, surface craft, minefields, andshore batteries that can interfere with theapproach; and

• Selection of approach routes that avoidlengthy exposure to fire from enemyshore batteries.

b. Approach of the main body of theamphibious force is usually more complicatedthan the advance force, because it involves agreater number of ships and because the arrivalof the main body must be carefully timedrelative to H-hour. If, however, an advanceforce has been employed, protective measuresfor the main body during the approach aregenerally easier because the advance forcemay have been in the area for some time andhad time to take many of the necessaryprotective measures. In particular, minesweepassets of the advance force will normally haveswept enough of the landing area to permitthe main body to approach with less risk. Thesame considerations apply to the approach of

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the demonstration force as to the approach ofthe main body.

c. Proper coordination and timing is ofutmost importance in the final stages of theapproach of all elements of each movementgroup to prevent interference betweenelements and permit each to arrive at itsassigned position at the proper time tocommence its task. Careful, precise, andaccurate navigation is essential. Additionalcomplications for the main body may be

caused by the presence of an advance forcealready in the landing area. The advance forcecommander is responsible to ensure thatelements of the advance force do not interferewith the approach of the main body. Whenthe amphibious force is composed of two ormore task groups, the CATF normallycoordinates the approach of the various taskgroups, but the task group commander isresponsible for the movements of eachindividual task group.

CHAPTER XIIISUPPORTING, ADVANCE FORCE, AND PREASSAULT

OPERATIONS

XIII-1

1. General

Prior to the execution of the decisive actionphase of an amphibious operation, theamphibious force commanders may seek toshape their battlespace through threecomplementary operations. Although theseoperations are usually referred to in the contextof an amphibious assault or raid, they may beused to shape the battlespace for a NEO orhumanitarian operation. The exact mannerin which these operations are conducted willdepend on the type of amphibious operation.The force and the time period in whichthese operations are conducted typicallydefine the operation. These shapingoperations usually occur sequentially, but mayin some instances occur simultaneously.These operations are, in order of occurrence,supporting amphibious, advance force, andpreassault operations.

a. Supporting amphibious operationsare conducted by forces other than theamphibious force in support of the amphibiousoperation; are ordered by a higher authority,normally based on a request from theamphibious force commanders; and may setthe conditions for the advance force to moveinto the operational area.

“The key to successful amphibious operations in the future is the ability tolaunch from ’over the horizon.’ Previously, an amphibious force relied onextensive firepower to suppress and destroy enemy defensive positions whilethe landing force approached the beach at a speed of only six to eight knots.Clearly the firepower possessed by even most Third World military forceswould make such an amphibious assault extremely risky. For amphibiousoperations to succeed in the future, the amphibious force must be able toact faster than the enemy can react.”

Fundamentals of Force PlanningVol II: Defense Planning Cases

b. Advance force operations are conductedin the operational area by a task-organizedelement of the amphibious force, prior to thearrival of the amphibious force in theoperational area.

c. Preassault operations are conducted bythe amphibious force upon its arrival in theoperational area and prior to the time of theassault or decisive action, normally delineatedby H- and L-hour

See also Chapter IV, “Approach to Planningand Primary Decisions.”

2. Supporting AmphibiousOperations

Supporting operations conducted byforces other than the amphibious force mayestablish the prerequisites for anamphibious operation (e.g., establishmentof air and maritime superiority).Supporting operations are ordered by the JFCor a designated commander and are to a largedegree based on requests for certain actionsfrom the amphibious commanders. Theseoperations are normally conducted by naval,air, and special operations forces prior to thearrival of the advance force; however, theymay occur at any time before or after H-hour.

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a. Supporting maritime operations mayinclude establishing maritime superiority, theinitiation of MCM operations, deception, andhydrographic survey of potential landingbeaches. Meteorological and oceanographic(METOC) data, including tailored imagery,may be obtained directly from the NavalOceanographic Office or via a joint or ServiceMETOC forecast activity in support of navalforces.

b. Supporting air operations, either sea- orland-based, may include establishing airsuperiority, reconnaissance, and the attack ofland targets that may impact on theamphibious operation.

c. Supporting SOF operations may includebut is not limited to psychological operations,surveillance, reconnaissance, and the attackof strategic or operational targets in theoperational area.

See JP 3-05, Joint Doctrine for SpecialOperations, for more information.

3. Advance Force Operations

a. The advance force conducts operationswithin the amphibious force operational areaestablished by the order initiating theamphibious operation. However, based on thelimited capabilities of the advance force, thisoperational area may not be activated untilthe arrival of the amphibious force. Theadvance force may be assigned a smalleroperational area (AOA or AO) if it hassufficient assets to control it or an operationalarea may not be established. Advance forcesare task-organized to perform tasks that mayinclude, but are not limited to:

• MCM operations with emphasis on theclearance of mines in the transport areas,FSAs, and sea approaches to the landingbeaches;

• Hydrographic reconnaissance of thelanding beaches and seaward approaches;

• Reconnaissance and surveillance ofamphibious force objectives, landingbeaches, LZs, DZs, and high speedavenues of approach into the landingarea; and

• Neutralization or destruction of adversaryhigh value assets.

b. Decision to Employ an AdvanceForce. The JFC or other higher authority mayrestrict or deny the use of an advance forcebased on the political and/or military situation.If advance force operations are authorized,the decision to employ an advance force ismade after weighing the advantages ofoperational and tactical surprise and therequirements for preparation of thelanding area. Knowledge of the operationalarea, the indigenous population, extent ofadversary fixed defenses, air defenses, minesand obstacles, must be evaluated.

c. Planning Advance Force Operations.Planning the advance force operation willnormally be conducted in a manner similarto planning the amphibious operation. Thecommand relationships between commanderswithin the advance force must be specified inthe order initiating the advance forceoperation. Specific planning responsibilitiesare as follows.

• The CATF designates the amphibioustask group (ATG) commander for theadvance force, provides forces, andensures that the requisite command andinformation systems are available toconduct the operation.

• The CLF designates the advance forcelanding or reconnaissance groupcommander and provides to that

XIII-3

Supporting, Advance Force, and Preassault Operations

commander the requisite staff and forcesto accomplish assigned tasks.

•• A landing group commander will beused when offensive landings or strikesare conducted by landing force units ofthe advance force.

•• A reconnaissance group commanderwill be used when the mission of landingforce units of the advance force is toconduct only reconnaissance andsurveillance.

d. The decision on establishment of anadvance force operational area must be madeafter considering the advance force’s mission,forces, ability to control an assigned area, andthe threat.

e. Depending on the scope of thesupporting operations taking place in thevicinity of the operational area, commandrelationships between the advance force andother forces in the area and coordinationmeasures must be established to ensuredeconfliction and unity of effort.

f. SOF employed during advance forceoperations may be OPCON or TACON, or insupport of the CATF and CLF and the ATGcommander or landing and/or reconnaissancegroup commander depending on the locationand nature of the mission.

g. Upon arrival of the amphibious force inthe operational area, the advance force isusually disestablished and forces revert tocontrol of CATF and CLF or other designatedcommanders. Certain tasks may dictate thatthe OPCON or TACON of SOF orreconnaissance teams remains with theadvance force to minimize disruptions priorto the decisive action. The most importantconsideration is to maintain as intact the SOF

chain of command so that the gainingcommander can have available appropriatelevels of SOF C2 for the assigned or attachedSOF forces.

4. Preassault Operations

a. Final preparations of the landing area areusually under the control of the CATF andCLF. These preparations are usually of a moreovert nature and may include the following.

• Demolition of visible obstacles, clearanceof required mines, breaching of anyremaining seaward minefields andbarriers to the beach, overt marking ofusable channels, direct action missions,TA and spotting for NSFS, and initialterminal guidance for designated assaultlandings.

• Air operations in accordance with airsupport plans, including EW, andpreplanned air strikes against adversaryinstallations en route to and in the vicinityof beaches, DZs, LZs, and targets ofopportunity.

• NSFS in accordance with the NSFS plan,including destruction or neutralization ofadversary installations that mightinterfere with the approach and finaldeployment of the amphibious force orotherwise interfere with the operation.

• Artillery support on landing areas inaccordance with artillery fire supportplans if artillery has been put in placeduring preassault operations.

b. With the completion of preassaultoperations, the amphibious force will conductsurface and/or vertical assaults into the landingarea to accomplish the decisive action.

XIII-4

Chapter XIII

JP 3-02

Intentionally Blank

CHAPTER XIVSHIP-TO-SHORE MOVEMENT PLANNING

XIV-1

1. General

a. The plan for ship-to-shore movement isdeveloped by the CATF and CLF to ensurethat troops, equipment, and supplies arelanded at the prescribed times, places, and inthe formation required by the LF scheme ofmaneuver.

b. Organizations and agencies may beestablished to support the ship-to-shoremovement plan. These organizations andagencies (i.e., terminal service battalion,amphibious construction battalion, or cargo

“It was to be a brutal day. At first light on 15 June 1944, the Navy firesupport ships of the task force lying off Saipan Island increased their previousdays’ preparatory fires involving all caliber of weapons. At 0542, Vice AdmiralRichmond K. Turner ordered, “Land the landing force.” Around 0700, thelanding ships, tank (LSTs) moved to within approximately 1,250 yards behindthe line of departure. Troops in the LSTs began debarking from them inlanding vehicles, tracked (LVTs). Control vessels containing Navy and Marinepersonnel with their radio gear took their positions displaying flags indicatingwhich beach approaches they controlled.”

John C. Chapin:Breaching the Marianas: The Battle for Saipan

handling and port group units) may berequired to support the offload of merchantships. As developed seaports and airportsbecome available, they are used to supplementtraditional beach operations and the ship-to-shore organization is revised accordingly.Unloading operations are divided into twoperiods.

• The initial landing and unloadingperiod is tactical and must provide rapidbuild-up of combat forces ashore andquick response to LF requirementsashore.

The size and organization of ship-to-shore control agencies willchange as the operation matures.

XIV-2

Chapter XIV

JP 3-02

THE INVASION OF NORMANDY

The invasion of Normandy was without question the most important battlefought in western Europe in the second world war. The Allies’ success inlanding their troops and securing a beachhead on June 6, 1944, doomed Hitler.The landings at Anzio only a few months earlier had shown that success wasby no means certain. Amphibious landings were inevitably extremely riskyoperations. Years of careful planning — and a certain amount of luck at thelast moment — led to the Allied victory in Normandy.

Allied strategists meeting in Washington in May 1943 set the date for the crosschannel invasion of France as May 1, 1944. Due to a shortage of landing craft,however, the invasion date would be postponed from May to June 1944.Planning for the invasion had been going on since 1942. The raid at Dieppehad provided an early and disastrous dress rehearsal. The fighting in NorthAfrica, Sicily, and Italy had taught the Allies valuable lessons. If there was onelesson above all that the Allies had been forced to learn, it was not tounderestimate the abilities of their enemy.

The Allies had decided in July 1943 that the Cotentin peninsula of Normandyoffered the best location for the invasion. The Germans, who had 3000 milesof coastline to defend, did not know where the invasion would come. Theyput up their heaviest defenses in the Calais region of the French coast. Nazileaders disagreed on the most likely site for the invasion and on the strategyfor employment of their forces. This lack of unity in the German commandwould prove a great weakness to them.

In England the troops who would land on D-day went through endlessrehearsals for the invasion. For veterans of combat in North Africa, Sicily, andItaly, the training seemed like a waste of time. Those who had never seencombat tried to imagine what the real thing would be like. In late May 1944, therehearsals came to an end. Soldiers were confined to their quarters, thenshipped to “concentration areas” near ports and airfields from which theywould depart. For security reasons they were not told their ultimate destination.When they were safely at sea they would finally be told they were headed toNormandy.

By the end of the day of June 5, 1944, over 2500 ships carrying the Alliedinvasion force were heading toward the Normandy coast. More than 1000planes and gliders were being readied to carry the airborne troops into battle.Every man who boarded a ship or plane for Europe was given a letter fromEisenhower with his order of the day.

“You are about to embark on a great crusade, toward which we have striventhese many months. . . . The tide has turned. The free men of the world aremarching together to victory. . . .”

SOURCE: World War II — America at War, Maurice Isserman, 1991

• The general unloading period, ifrequired, is primarily logistic-orientedand emphasizes rapid completion of the

unloading of required personnel andmateriel.

XIV-3

Ship-to-Shore Movement Planning

c. Amphibious operations involve complexinter-relationships between the LFs, ATF, andother assigned and supporting forces,especially during the action phase. Planningis a synergistic effort which must ensure thatboth ATF’s, LF’s, and other forces’considerations are adequately addressed. TheCATF is responsible for preparation andcoordination of the ship-to-shoremovement plan. The CATF and CLF arecoequal during the planning phase.Differences that cannot be resolved will bereferred to the common superior. The CATFis responsible for the ship-to-shoremovement, but will coordinate with the CLFfor changing situations that affect theamphibious operation as revealed byintelligence sources or landing forces ashore.

Basic CATF, CLF, and/or supportedcommander planning decisions are containedin Chapter IV, “Approach to Planning andPrimary Decisions.”

d. The landing plan will be designed tosupport the ashore concept of operations,keeping in mind the inherent capabilities andoperational characteristics of availableamphibious ships and landing craft. The planwill also provide maximum flexibility torespond to unexpected changes in the tacticalsituation.

See JP 3-02.1, Joint Doctrine for LandingForce Operations, and NWP 3-02.2 (series),Ship-to-Shore Movement, for additionalguidance.

2. Relationship to OtherPlanning

Detailed planning for the ship-to-shoremovement can begin only after the LF schemeof maneuver ashore is determined. Thelanding and fire support plans must becarefully integrated. The landing plan shouldprovide for requisite logistic support of all

forces. Maximum attention will be given topreserving OPSEC during planning.

3. Responsibilities for Ship-to-Shore Movement Planning

a. The CATF, in close coordination withthe CLF, is responsible for the preparation ofthe overall ship-to-shore movement andlanding plan. Included in the planning is theselection of necessary approach and retirementlanes, check points, rendezvous areas, and aidsto navigation to facilitate movement of air-landed troops. Where appropriate, other forcecommanders participate in this process. TheCATF is responsible for debarkation untiltermination of the amphibious operation,at which time the responsibilities for offloadof follow-up ships and LOTS operations maybe passed to another organization designatedby higher authority. In the case of anamphibious assault, the operation willnormally be terminated only after the entireAFOE is ashore. See Figure XIV-1 for theship-to-shore movement planning sequence.

b. Commanders of other forces assignedto the amphibious force (including thoseassigned for movement to the operational areafor tasks not part of the amphibious operation)are responsible for determining and presentingtheir requirements to the CATF.

c. The landing plan is prepared after thefinal allocation of means has been made. Itrepresents the integrated sum of detailed plansfor waterborne and airborne ship-to-shoremovement prepared by corresponding ATFand LF echelons at all levels. This plan shouldmaximize range and speed capabilities ofsurface assault craft and VTOL aircraft thatallow a coordinated assault over a wide rangeof potential landing zones. A flexible landingplan enables CATF and CLF to gain and retaintactical initiative, enhances operationalflexibility, takes advantage of enemy forcedispositions and weaknesses, and employs the

XIV-4

Chapter XIV

JP 3-02

element of surprise to the maximum extent.The landing plan is composed of certainspecific documents that present, in detail, thenumbers of land craft, helicopters, and surfacecraft available for use and the exact personneland equipment that will be loaded on each,along with embarkation and landing times.These documents should be incorporated inannexes to operation and administrative plansand orders (Figure XIV-2).

d. Hydrographic conditions.

For more information, see JP 3-02.1, JointDoctrine for Landing Force Operations.

4. Ship-to-Shore MovementPlanning Considerations

Principal factors that influence planning areas follows.

a. Basic requirements for providingmaximum support for accomplishment ofinitial tactical objectives ashore, includingmaintaining tactical integrity of the LF, andachieving the required degree of concentrationor dispersion.

b. Required degree of dispersion of assaultshipping, to include contemplatedemployment of a sea echelon plan.

See JP 3-02.1, Joint Doctrine for LandingForce Operations.

c. Air and surface craft availability.

d. Threat to and protection available to theamphibious force.

e. Need to maintain sufficient flexibility toexploit weaknesses in enemy defenses.

Figure XIV-1. Planning Sequence

PLANNING SEQUENCE

PLANNINGSEQUENCEPLANNINGSEQUENCE

LF scheme of maneuver ashore

CLF identifies requirementsand LF assets (e.g., AAV, helos)

CATF identifies Navy assets(e.g., LCAC, LCM, LCU)

CATF determines if more assetsare required and requests themfrom the establishing commander

Plans adjusted to matchassets available

Final allocation of means

Detailed landing plan developed

AAV

CATF

CLF

LCAC

LCM

LCU

LF

amphibious a ehicle

commander, amphibious task force

commander, landing force

landing craft, air cushion

landing craft, mechanized

landing craft, utility

landing force

ssault v

LF scheme of maneuver ashore

CLF identifies requirementsand LF assets (e.g., AAV, helos)

CATF identifies Navy assets(e.g., LCAC, LCM, LCU)

CATF determines if more assetsare required and requests themfrom the establishing commander

Plans adjusted to matchassets available

Final allocation of means

Detailed landing plan developed

XIV-5


f. Availability and planned utilization ofsupporting arms.

g. Need for speed and positive centralizedcontrol.

h. MCM and obstacle reductionrequirements.

i. Go/no-go criteria.

j. Hydrographic conditions

5. Over-the-Horizon AmphibiousOperations

a. General. An OTH amphibious operationis an amphibious operation initiated frombeyond visual and radar range of the enemyshore. It is based on the premise that OTHassault platforms will be available to the

Figure XIV-2. Landing Plan Documents

COMMANDER, AMPHIBIOUSTASK FORCE RESPONSIBILITY

Naval Landing Plan

Landing Craft Availability Table

Landing Craft Employment Plan

Debarkation Schedule

Ship’s Diagram

Pontoon Causeway Plan

Unloading Plan

Approach Schedule

Assault Wave Diagram

Landing Area Diagram

Transport Area Diagram

Beach Approach Diagram

Sea Echelon Area

Landing Control Plan

Medical Regulating Plan

Amphibious Assault Bulk FuelSystem and Offshore PetroleumDischarge System Plan

LANDING PLAN DOCUMENTS

COMMANDER, LANDING FORCERESPONSIBILITY

Landing Force Landing Plan

Amphibious Vehicle AvailabilityTable

Landing Craft and AmphibiousVehicle Assignment Table

Landing Diagram

Landing Force SerialAssignment Table

Landing Priority Table

Landing Force Sequence Table

Assault Schedule

Amphibious VehicleEmployment Plan

Helicopter Availability Table

Heliteam Wave and SerialAssignment Table

Helicopter Enplaning Schedule

Helicopter Landing Diagram

Helicopter Employment andAssault Landing Table

Ground Combat ElementLanding Plan

Consolidated Landing andApproach Plan

Aviation Combat Element andLanding Force Aviation LandingPlan

XIV-6

Chapter XIV

JP 3-02

commander as well as the requisitecommunications architecture to control theseassets. The goal of OTH operations is toachieve operational surprise through creationof multiple threats, and ultimately to shatteran enemy’s cohesion through a series of rapid,violent, and unexpected actions that create aturbulent and rapidly deteriorating situationwith which an adversary cannot cope. SeeFigure XIV-3 for advantages anddisadvantages inherent to an OTH operation.

b. Scope. An OTH operation is a tacticaloption to hide intentions and capabilities andto exploit the element of tactical surprise toachieve amphibious force objectives. Itprovides greater protection to the amphibiousforce from near-shore threats, and providesescort ships a greater opportunity to detect,classify, track, and engage incoming hostileaircraft and coastal defense missiles whileexpanding the shoreline the enemy must beprepared to defend. Conversely, the expandedOTH battlespace increases ship-to-shoretransit distance and time, complicates C2, andmay strain logistic sustainment of the LF.Conceptually, the operation will still beviewed as a single integrated evolutionrather than as two or three paralleloperations (e.g., airborne assault,

conventional surface assault, LCAC assault).As the situation ashore develops, the CATFand CLF adjust the ship-to-shore maneuverto reinforce successes, and may changepenetration points, VLZs, and CLZs to keepenemy forces off balance. To increase combatpower, ease the logistic strain for forcesashore, and support follow-on forces, thedesignated commander may shift all or partof the amphibious force to near-shoreoperations, based on the threat to forcesafloat, CLF requirements, and the situationashore.

c. Planning Considerations. While OTHtechniques are applicable to any type ofamphibious operation, special considerationsare required. Command and control inter-relationships are even more critical in OTHamphibious operations. An OTH operationrequires that the landing plan be fluid,containing alternate landing sites that mayeven be selected while landing craft are intransit. Operational requirements forplanning an OTH amphibious operationinclude the following.

• Developing and maintaining anaccurate and timely tactical picture ofthe operational area. The need for

OTH operations should achieve operational surprisethrough creation of multiple threats.

XIV-7


timely intelligence data is increased forOTH operations because the number ofpossible landing sites is increased. Theseaward tactical picture, as it pertains tothe presence or absence of enemy navalforces between the ATF and shore, playsa significant role in the selection ofpossible landing sites and thereforeaffects the scheme of maneuver. UsingOTH tactics requires consolidation of thetactical picture of land and water toprovide the CATF and CLF with aconsolidated base from which to plan andmake tactical decisions. Interoperable C2systems for maintaining situationalawareness and a common tactical picturefor the CATF and CLF are absolutelyessential in OTH operations.

• Surveillance and reconnaissance of theoperational area with emphasis onpossible landing sites. Positioning theamphibious force OTH allows thelanding site location to remain flexible.

Landing sites may be chosen just beforelaunching the first wave, which requirestimely surveillance and hydrographicreconnaissance and accurate intelligenceof landing sites.

• Real-time intelligence, reliablecommunications, and accuratenavigation. OTH operations planningis more complex than traditionalamphibious planning because of theincreased distances between launchplatforms, landing beaches, supportingfires, and control platforms. This in turnrequires greater coordination andcommunications capability. Flexibilitymust be maintained throughout theoperation since VLZs and CLZs may bewidely separated. The vertical assaultmay land forces inland where they willbe able to threaten key enemy positions,facilities, and LOCs. The surface assaultpoints of entry are sites along thecoastline where the hydrography, terrain,

OVER THE HORIZON OPERATIONS

PROS CONS

Reduced risk toamphibious taskforce ships

Simplified air defense

Reduced mine threatto amphibious taskforce ships

Enhanced operationalor tactical surprise

Increased flexibility

Extendedvulnerability oflanding craft

Expanded battlespacerequiring more self-defense assets

Increased cycle timefor landing craft andaircraft

Lost or reducedavailability of navalsurface fire support

Figure XIV-3. Over-the-Horizon Operations

XIV-8

Chapter XIV

JP 3-02

and enemy situation allow the LF torapidly move ashore and thrust inland.

• Naval surface fire support may be arequirement for successful prosecutionof an amphibious assault. However,since one underlying reason for an OTHassault is the strength of coastal defenses,the primary mission of NSFS may shiftfrom destroying enemy forces at adefended landing beach to isolating thelanding area(s). Preassault fire supportin the vicinity of landing sites may alsobe restricted, especially prior to D-dayand H-hour, to preserve tactical surprise.NSFS ships may initially be OTH withthe ATF, closing the beach along withthe initial waves of landing craft.Although ships can use land attackmissiles for OTH fire support, theirquantities are limited to fully supportingan amphibious assault at OTH distances.Consequently, missions normallyconducted by NSFS will initially restwith aviation assets.

d. Seabasing. Seabasing may occur for aportion of all OTH amphibious operations.Seabasing is a conceptual technique of basingcertain LF support functions aboard ship,thereby minimizing the footprint ashore ofselected landing force support. Seabasing

increases the maneuver options for elementsashore by reducing the need to protectelements such as C2 and logistic supplies.The duration of seabasing depends on thetactical situation and the size and intensity ofthe operation.

6. Navigational Aids

Because of the exact timing required duringmovement to the landing area and thenecessity for exact positioning of elements inthe landing area, accurate and precisenavigation is mandatory. Special navigationalaids are frequently necessary to supplementnormal aids. Examples of such aids are:

a. Global Positioning System equipment.

b. Radar reflector buoys to mark sweptchannels, limits of minefields, and hazards tonavigation.

c. Beacons or lights on shore to mark exactpoints of land or to mark channels (usuallyplaced after the assault, but may be placedbeforehand by SEALs, reconnaissance, orother SOF units).

d. Corrected charts, hydrographic surveys,and national intelligence reports.

CHAPTER XVACTION

XV-1

1. General

In an amphibious operation, the actionphase is the period of time between the arrivalof the landing forces of the amphibiousforce in the operational area and theaccomplishment of their mission.

2. Organization and CommandRelationships

Organization of forces, responsibilities foraccomplishment of tasks, and commandrelationships during the action phase of alltypes of amphibious operations are essentiallythe same. Variations in responsibility andauthority as required by the individualsituation will be specified in the initiatingguidance.

a. Organization for the action phase of anamphibious operation is based on the parallelorganization of the ATF, LF, and otherdesignated forces. LF organization for landingis the specific tactical grouping of forces foraccomplishment of the assigned mission.

“The capture of Seoul in 1950 was a classic example of an OperationalManeuver from the Sea. It was a completely focused operation, unifiedunder a single commander, that flowed coherently from San Diego, Sasebo,and Pusan, through an amphibious power projection at Inchon, to keyobjectives well inland.

The Seoul operation was focused on a critical North Korean vulnerability,the lines of support (and withdrawal) through the Han River Valley at Seoul.It maintained that focus and with it an unmatched tempo of aggressive action.As a result, it was crushingly successful, leading to the destruction of theNorth Korean Army and the liberation of South Korea.

If the operation had lost its focus, however, and been planned and executedas merely an amphibious lodgment at Inchon, it would have generated onlyan operationally insignificant tactical ’victory.’”

Naval Expeditionary Logistics:Enabling Operational Maneuver From The Sea, 1999

Tactical integrity of landing elements ismaintained insofar as practicable during ship-to-shore movement. The ATF and LForganizations should parallel one another tofacilitate execution of the landing plan andthe LF scheme of maneuver ashore.

b. The organization of ATF forces for theaction phase is as follows.

• ATF forces afloat provide the transportgroups for the vertical and surface ship-to-shore movement and also provide thenecessary landing craft and AAV controlorganization.

• For the surface movement, the landingforce may be landed from ships bylanding craft, AAVs, small boats, oraviation assets organic to the landingforce (e.g., combat rubber raiding craft).

• The amphibious shipping, landing craft,AAVs, and organic aviation are organizedto correspond to the tactical organizationof troops to ensure control and

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JP 3-02

maneuverability. This organizationincludes boat waves, boat groups, andboat flotillas.

•• A boat wave consists of the landingcraft or AAVs within a boat group thatcarries the troops, equipment, or cargothat are to be landed simultaneously.

•• The boat group is the basicorganization of landing craft. One boatgroup is organized for each surfacelanding force element to be landed asscheduled waves at a designated beach.

•• The boat flotilla is an organization oftwo or more boat groups.

•• Although LCACs are landing craft,their employment differs slightly fromdisplacement landing craft. Undernormal circumstances, LCACs proceedto and from the beach in formations oftwo or more craft. Timing of LCACoperations will be coordinated withVTOL aircraft and AAV elements tosupport the landing plan. Operationsconducted from 25 nautical miles (nms)offshore or more are usually consideredOTH. Limited operations using one ormore LCAC groups may be conductedfrom as far as 100 nms offshore.However, this distance approaches themaximum capability of the craft andrequires careful planning.

3. Control

a. The CATF is responsible for overallcontrol of both surface and air ship-to-shore movement. Initially, ship-to-shoremovement, both on the surface and throughthe air, is centrally controlled to permitcoordination of support for LF elements.Later, as circumstances permit, control ofsurface movement is decentralized forefficient and rapid execution. However,

VTOL aircraft movement remains undercentralized control.

b. Control and coordination measuresnecessary for employment of airborneelements of the LF will be established by theCATF in conjunction with the CLF and otherconcerned commanders specified in the orderinitiating the amphibious operation andestablishing directive, if appropriate. TheCATF is also responsible for coordinating andcontrolling the movements of any airborneforces to and within the operational area withappropriate agencies.

c. Control Organizations

• Control of waves of surface landing craftand amphibious vehicles from thetransport and landing ship areas to the

Amphibious operations planning must take intoaccount the limitations of landing craft.

XV-3

Action

beaches is exercised through a Navycontrol group. Organization of thecontrol group is based on the arrangementand number of beaches on which the LFis to land.

See NWP 3-02.2, Ship-to-ShoreMovement, for detailed discussion of theorganization and functions of the Navycontrol group.

• VTOL aircraft units employed in theship-to-shore movement are subordinateelements of the LF. These units executethe ship-to-shore movement inaccordance with the landing plan. Plansinclude provisions for shifting control ofVTOL aircraft operations to the CLFwhen the situation ashore permits.During the ship-to-shore movement,the CATF coordinates and controls airoperations through the Navy TACC(afloat). Within the TACC (afloat),coordination of VTOL aircraft operationsis accomplished by the helicopter/VTOLaircraft coordination section. Control ofVTOL aircraft ship-to-shore movementis further delegated to the HDC, whichis the primary direct control agency forthe helicopter/VTOL aircraft transportunit. Once established ashore, the CLFcoordinates and controls air operationsthrough the Marine TACC (ashore).

See JP 3-02.1, Joint Doctrine for LandingForce Operations, and NWP 3-02.2(series), Ship-to-Shore Movement, forfurther detailed discussion of theorganization and control of the VTOLassault.

• Tactical-Logistical Group. TheTACLOG is a temporary agency,composed of landing force personnel,that advises the Navy controlorganization of landing forcerequirements during ship-to-shore

movement. TACLOGs assist the Navycontrol organization in expediting thelanding of personnel, equipment, andsupplies in accordance with the landingforce landing plan. TACLOGs also serveas the primary source of information tothe CLF regarding the status of landingforce units during ship-to-shoremovement. The TACLOG provides thelink between the LFSP and advises thelanding force operations center and theNavy control organizations on the statusof the offload.

4. Final Preparations for theShip-to-Shore Movement

Upon completion of any pre-executionoperations as described in Chapter XIII,“Supporting, Advance Force, and PreassaultOperations,” the ATF starts the final approachto assigned positions for the landings. Shipsprepare for the debarkation of the embarkedtroops, equipment, and supplies in accordancewith previously prepared plans. Thecommencement of debarkation and the timingof the ship-to-shore movement depend on thedesignated H-hour. All elements must beprepared to modify plans on short notice toconform to changes in H-hour.

5. Subsidiary Landings

In an amphibious operation, a subsidiarylanding is a landing, normally conductedby elements of the amphibious force,usually made outside the designatedlanding area to support the main landing.An amphibious operation may require one ormore subsidiary landings conducted before,during, or after the main landing. If madebefore, the effect on the main landing mustbe considered in terms of possible loss ofsurprise. Subsidiary landings must be plannedand executed by commanders with the sameprecision as the main landing. Division offorces to conduct subsidiary landings is

XV-4

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JP 3-02

justified only when such employment will beof greater value than commitment to the mainlanding. Forces employed in subsidiarylandings that precede the main landing maybe re-embarked and employed as a tacticalreserve supporting the main landing.Subsidiary landings may be executed toaccomplish one or more of the followingspecific purposes.

a. Seize specific areas to be used in supportof the main landing; i.e., seizing islands ormainland areas adjacent to the main landingarea for use as:

• Artillery, missile, and rocket firingpositions;

• Airfields or vertical and short takeoff andlanding aircraft-capable locations;

• Protected anchorage, temporaryadvanced naval bases, or logistics andCSS sites from which the main landingcan be supported; and

• Air warning and control system sites.

b. Seize an area to deny its use to the enemyin opposing the main landing.

c. Divert enemy attention and forces fromthe main landing or fix enemy defensive forcesin place as part of a deception operation.

6. MPF and APF Operations

MPF and APF operations can be used toaugment or reinforce the amphibious forces.MPF and APF forces, equipment, and suppliesmay arrive to support the CLF prior to arrivalof the AFOE and follow-up ships. Doctrineand procedures concerning the transition fromamphibious operations to joint logistics over-the-shore operations across the full range ofmilitary operations shall be accomplished inaccordance with JP 4-01.6, Joint Tactics,

Techniques, and Procedures for JointLogistics Over-the-Shore (JLOTS), FleetMarine Force Manual 1-5, Maritime Pre-positioning Force Operations (to be revisedas MCWP 3-32), naval warfare publications,OH 1-5-1, TRIMEF (Maritime Pre-positioning Force (MPF) Standard OperatingProcedures), and HS Army Publication, FM55-550 (Marine Terminal Operations).

7. Follow-up Transport Shipsand Aircraft

Follow-up ships and aircraft carryreinforcements and stores for use after landingof the AE and AFOE. The CATF will assumecontrol of follow-up ships and aircraft uponarrival in the operational area.

8. Assault

a. Scope. The amphibious assault is theprincipal type of amphibious operation thatinvolves establishing a force on a hostile orpotentially hostile shore.

b. Action. The assault begins on order,after sufficient elements of the main body ofthe amphibious force that are capable ofbeginning the ship-to-shore movement arrivein the operational area. For an assault, theaction phase ends when conditions specifiedin the initiating guidance are met, asrecommended by the CATF and CLF andapproved by the JFC or designatedcommander.

c. Sequence. The assault is the mostdifficult type of amphibious operation and oneof the most difficult of all military operations.Many of the principles and procedures of theassault apply to other types of amphibiousoperations. The normal sequence during theaction phase of the operation is depicted inFigure XV-1.

XV-5

Action

Detailed information concerning the assaultas well as operations under unusualconditions (limited visibility and coldweather) is contained in JP 3-02.1, JointDoctrine for Landing Force Operations.

9. Amphibious Withdrawals

a. Scope. Amphibious withdrawals areoperations conducted to extract forces bysea in ships or craft from a hostile orpotentially hostile shore. They may beconducted under enemy pressure, underoperational urgency to obtain forces neededelsewhere, or to remove forces whose missionis completed. Withdrawal begins withestablishment of defensive measures in theembarkation area and ends when all elementsof the force have been extracted and embarkedon designated shipping.

b. Characteristics. While sharing manytraits of the amphibious assault, theamphibious withdrawal embraces thefollowing distinguishing characteristics.

• Except in the case of withdrawalsassociated with amphibious raids,planning processes will usually beabbreviated.

• Time available to execute will be limitedwhen enemy action against the LF beingwithdrawn is substantial or when therequirement for forces elsewhere isurgent.

• Facilities and equipment for embarkation,available fire support means, and meansfor C2 of the withdrawal may be limited.

• The operation may be conducted underadverse weather condit ions orunfavorable terrain or hydrographicfeatures.

• The force to be withdrawn may nothave been inserted by an amphibiousoperation and units may be unfamiliarwith amphibious procedures, thussignificantly complicating the operation.

Figure XV-1. Assault Sequence

ASSAULT SEQUENCE

ASSAULTSEQUENCEASSAULT

SEQUENCE

Preparation of the landing area by supporting arms

Ship-to-shore movement of the landing force

Air and surface assault landings

Link up operations between surface and air landed forces

Provision of supporting arms and logistics and/orcombat service support

Landing of remaining landing force elements

Preparation of the landing area by supporting arms

Force Arrives in Operational Area

Mission Accomplishment

Ship-to-shore movement of the landing force

Air and surface assault landings

Link up operations between surface and air landed forces

Provision of supporting arms and logistics and/orcombat service support

Landing of remaining landing force elements

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c. Execution. The amphibious withdrawalwill be executed in accordance with thefollowing general sequence of steps.

• Establish defense of the embarkation areaby air, naval, and ground covering forceswhile organizing and embarking LFpersonnel, supplies, and equipment notrequired for support of operations ashore.It is important to maintain local air andmaritime superiority to ensure the successof the withdrawal.

• Progressively reduce troop strength andquantity of material and equipmentashore under protection of air, naval, andground covering forces. Depending onlimitations in afloat cargo capacity andloading time, all usable military materialis either evacuated or destroyed. Duringthis phase, specific provisions are madefor the evacuation of casualties.

• Withdraw the ground covering force.Consideration must be given to difficultyof embarking heavy elements such asartillery and armor.

d. Supporting Arms. As in the amphibiousassault, defense of an embarkation area on ahostile or potentially hostile shore requiresclosely coordinated employment of allavailable supporting arms. Procedures used inthe coordination are essentially the same in bothcases. The primary difference is that in the assault,supporting arms and control facilities areprogressively built up ashore, whereas in awithdrawal, supporting arms and control facilitiesare progressively decreased ashore until allfunctions are performed afloat.

e. Embarkation Procedures

• If embarkation is preparatory toimmediate reemployment of the force,planning for embarkation of forces isconducted in accordance with normalplanning procedures, as set forth in

Chapter X, “Embarkation,” and JP3-02.2, Joint Doctrine for AmphibiousEmbarkation. Combat loading will beemployed in preparation for a subsequentamphibious operation. Embarkation formovement to base areas will normallyemploy administrative loading.

• Initial size of the embarkation areadepends on several factors, such as:

•• Terrain essential for defense in theevent that the embarkation is conductedunder enemy pressure;

•• Number of personnel and amount ofequipment and supplies to be embarked;

•• Artillery, NSFS, and air supportavailable for defense;

•• Nature and extent of usable beaches; and

•• Time available for the embarkation.

10. Amphibious Demonstrations

a. Scope. The amphibious demonstrationis intended to confuse the enemy as to time,place, or strength of the main operation.Amphibious demonstrations may beconducted in conjunction with otherdeception operations in order to delude orconfuse the enemy. In the operational area,an amphibious demonstration may beconducted in or near the landing area inconjunction with an amphibious assault. Instill other cases, a demonstration may beconducted outside the operational area byforces not attached to the main amphibiouseffort to divert or immobilize enemy strategicreserve forces that could threaten theamphibious assault. Likewise, thedemonstration could be used to divert enemyattention from other operations.

b. General. Effectiveness of ademonstration increases in direct proportion

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to the degree of realism involved in itsexecution. It is crucial that the enemyreceive a convincing impression ofpreparations for a landing. All visible,audible, and electronic aspects of thedemonstration must appear to be authentic.A demonstration normally includes theapproach of forces to the demonstration area,at least a part of the ship-to-shore movement,and employment of supporting fires. A briefbut intense preliminary bombardment willusually be more effective than deliberateharassing fire over longer periods of time. Acommunications deception plan will be used.SOF and tactical deception units may beemployed.

c. Demonstrations Within theOperational Area. An amphibiousdemonstration may be conducted by a portionof the force within the operational area whenit is intended to influence enemy action withinthat area. The intended purpose may be tocause the enemy to employ its reservesimproperly, to disclose weapon positions byinducing premature firing, to distract attention,to place an early burden on C4 systems, toprecipitate a general air or naval engagement,or to harass. The decision to conduct such ademonstration is made during the planningphase, in consultation with supportingcommanders as appropriate.

d. Demonstrations Outside theOperational Area. An amphibiousdemonstration may be conducted outsidethe operational area to divert or immobilizeenemy strategic reserves or other forcescapable of affecting the amphibiousoperation, to distract hostile attention fromsuch an operation, or to precipitate a generalair or naval engagement. Such ademonstration may be executed as asupporting operation by a separateamphibious force. The time and place ofthe demonstration is decided by the JFC orhigher authority based on therecommendations by the CATF and CLF.

e. Demonstrations in Support of OtherOperations. An amphibious demonstrationmay be conducted with the intent ofsupporting other operations in the theater ordesignated operational area. A demonstrationconducted before, during, or aftercommencement of another operation maydistract the attention of enemy commandersand induce the enemy to divert majorresources from the main area of operations.The decision to conduct such a demonstrationis made by the JFC or higher authority on thebasis of the recommendations by the CATFand CLF and other designated commandersas appropriate.

f. Planning Considerations. In planningamphibious demonstrations, considerationmust be given to the following.

• Location. The demonstration area mustbe near enough to the main operation areato permit subsequent employment of thedemonstration force in accordance withthe plan. On the other hand, it will besufficiently separated from the maineffort to avoid interference and to ensurethat the enemy will be materiallydelayed in repositioning forces. Thedemonstration area must be suitable foran actual landing, for only in such an areacan the threat of landing be plausible.The demonstration area should appear tobe a viable threat to the enemy, otherwisethe enemy may not react. An alternatelanding area will often prove suitable fordemonstration purposes. If the purposeof the demonstration is to cause theenemy to prematurely disclose itspositions or for harassment, it may beconducted in the vicinity of the mainoperation area prior to execution.

• Timing. The timing of a demonstrationconducted in support of anotheroperation must be coordinated to achievethe maximum desired level of reactionfrom the enemy force.

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•• Prior to Main Operation. Ademonstration before the main operationis conducted to: (1) Draw enemy forcesto the demonstration area and away fromthe area of the main operation; (2) Causethe enemy to disclose its positions; (3)Provide protracted and systematic

harassment; (4) Divert the attention ofthe enemy from the main operation; and(5) Cause premature commitment ofenemy forces.

•• Simultaneously with Main Operation.A demonstration may commence at the

AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS DURING THE GULF WAR

During the Gulf War, an additional dimension of deception activity, besidesmasking the stealthy relocation of the coalition line, was the demonstration ofamphibious assault capabilities. As part of this ruse, an impressive amphibiousassault task force was stationed conspicuously off the coast of Kuwait. Thisfleet was comprised of forty amphibious landing craft, the largest such forceto be assembled since Inchon. The force contained the most up-to-date,equipment-laden amphibious ships, as well as aircraft carriers to providepreparatory air bombardments, close combat support, and helicopter airlift.Battleships provided offshore artillery support. For movement to the beach,these forces were equipped with new LVTP-7s (landing, vehicle, track,personnel), LCAC (landing craft, air cushion) hovercraft, and CH-53E SuperStallion helicopters. In short, this was a powerful and credible force stationedthreateningly close to the Iraqi defenses along the coast.

To solidify what must have been the Iraqi military’s predicted axis of attack,CENTCOM regularly made references to the press concerning the trainingcapabilities and presence of the amphibious force in the Persian Gulf and,later, off the coast of Kuwait. On 1 February, Newsweek magazine carried afeature article on the planned amphibious invasion. To keep the idea of abeach assault in the news, large-scale amphibious rehearsals were conducted,including, notably, the one held during the last 10 days of January in which8,000 US Marines landed on the coast of Oman. Moreover, during this period,Navy SEALs (sea-air-land teams) carried out numerous missions along theKuwaiti coast to gather information on the beach gradients and firmness ofthe sand, the nature and location of minefields, and the disposition of enemyforces. Carrier air and naval artillery missions were also executed throughoutthe period to support suspicions of a major coalition amphibious assault.

So that Iraqi commanders would continue to anticipate an amphibious attack,US amphibious support vessels along the coast remained positioned as ifthreatening to attack, and the battleships Missouri and Wisconsin and carrier-based aircraft continued bombardments. The object was to fix the six Iraqiinfantry divisions deployed along the shoreline, and this was achieved. Iraqistrategists made no early effort to withdraw their forces from the coastaldefense works, with the consequence that those forces were rapidly pinnedagainst the coast by the 1st and 2d Marine Divisions, which had broken throughthe lines in the south.

SOURCE: Deception: Deceiving the Enemy in Operation DESERT STORM,Thomas M. Huber, 1992

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same time as the main operation if it isdesired to prevent redeployment ofenemy forces and delude the enemy asto the location of the main operation.

•• Subsequent to Main Operation. Ademonstration may be conductedsubsequent to the main operation if thedesired effect is to divert enemy forcesor fire from the point of the main effort.Successive demonstrations may beexecuted at a number of points after themain operation commences.

• Forces. The demonstration force mustappear to be of such composition and sizeas to cause the desired reaction. Whenthe demonstration force is constitutedfrom within the amphibious force, the LFreserve and the shipping in which it isembarked may be employed if thepresence of the reserve is not required inthe immediate area of the main landing.

• Supporting Arms. The demonstrationforce will execute supporting fires of anature and scope that ensures credibility.Factors that may serve to limit the amountof supporting fires are the availability ofNSFS ships, aircraft, and ammunitionsupply.

• Rehearsals. Sufficient rehearsals will beheld to ensure that the demonstration willbe realistic.

g. Action. The demonstration must occurover a long enough period to allow the enemyto react. The movement of waves toward thebeach or LZs must be conducted as a normalship-to-shore movement, except that boatwaves normally do not actually beach andVTOL aircraft waves do not land. Emptylanding craft must maintain sufficient distancefrom the beach to preclude close enemyobservation. At a prearranged time or distancefrom the beach or VLZ, or on signal, the boatwaves and VTOL aircraft waves withdraw.

On completion of the demonstration, thedemonstration force is dissolved and itselements are reassigned in accordance withthe operation order or plan.

11. Amphibious Raids

a. Scope. An amphibious raid is anoperation involving a swift incursion intoor the temporary occupation of anobjective to accomplish an assigned missionfollowed by a planned withdrawal.Amphibious raids are conducted asindependent operations or in support of otheroperations, such as another amphibiouslanding or land, air, or naval operation.Depending on the purpose of the raid, it maybe conducted using covert insertion means,relying on stealth to approach the objective,or overtly with full fire support in a mannerthat may resemble the early stages of anamphibious assault. Generally, amphibiousraids are conducted to:

• Destroy certain targets, particularly thosethat do not lend themselves to destructionby other means;

• Harass the enemy by attacks on isolatedposts, patrols, or headquarters;

• Capture or neutralize key personnel;

• Support forces engaged with the enemyby attacking the enemy rear or flankpositions on a seacoast;

• Obtain information on hydrography,terrain, enemy dispositions, strength,movements, and weapons;

• Create a diversion in connection withstrategic deception operations;

• Evacuate individuals or materiel; and

• Establish, support, or coordinateunconventional warfare activities.

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b. General. Rehearsals are more importantin preparation for amphibious raids than forother types of amphibious operations.Thorough, integrated rehearsals are essentialto precision and speed in executing a raid. Allparticipating forces must be drilled in everydetail of debarkation, movement ashore,operations ashore, withdrawal, and re-embarkation.

c. Planning Considerations. Anamphibious raid is planned and executed inthe same general manner as an amphibiousassault, except that a raid always includes aprovision for withdrawal of the raiding force.The following factors must be consideredwhen planning an amphibious raid.

• The size of the raid force is normallylimited to the essential number ofpersonnel required to accomplish themission. This is done in order to increasethe chance of maintaining security andachieving surprise at the objective andto facilitate rapid withdrawal uponcompletion of the mission.

• It may be unnecessary for selectedbeaches or LZs to meet all therequirements of an amphibious assault.In small-scale raids, beaches or LZs arechosen from the point of view of ensuringtactical surprise.

• A raid will be of limited duration.

• Final deployment of the raiding forcemay not be required until it reaches itsobjective ashore.

• Limited objective and short duration ofthe amphibious raid will usually simplifylogistic requirements.

d. Detailed Planning Considerations.The following basic considerations must beconsidered when planning a raid.

• Surprise is an essential ingredient in thesuccess of an amphibious raid and offsetsthe lack of logistic and fire supportnormally associated with amphibiousoperations.

• Security during the planning andexecution of a raid must receive particularattention, to include full exploitation ofdeceptive measures. Such deceptivemeasures may take the form of elaboratecover plans or may be confined to simpleruses.

• The following factors will influence thechoice of landing areas for the raid force.

•• Enemy disposition.

•• Sea approaches.

•• Hydrographic and beachcharacteristics.

•• Availability of LZs.

•• Avenues of approach to the objectiveand beach exits.

• The estimated time that the raiding forcewill have to be ashore may influence thechoice of H-hour and, consequently, theconditions of visibility under which theraiding force may be landed andwithdrawn. It will likewise affect thescope of logistic arrangements.

• Purpose of the raid, including its relationto other concurrent or imminentoperations that it may support, willinfluence the selection of D-day for theraid. In addition, these same factors mayaffect the availability of shipping,aircraft, and logistic and fire supportmeans for the raid.

• Planning for the embarkation of forcesassigned to participate in an amphibious

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raid is similar to preparation for theamphibious assault, includingconsideration of OPSEC measures.

• Fire support planning is similar to thatfor an amphibious assault, except that,where surprise is a major factor,supporting fires usually are withheld andEMCON is maintained until surprise islost.

• Planning for ship-to-shore movement isgenerally similar to that for anamphibious assault, except thatmovement may be made entirely byVTOL aircraft, raiding craft, or LCACs.

• Withdrawal must be planned in detail,including provisions as to time and placefor re-embarkation. If the landing pointand withdrawal point are not the same,positive means of location andidentification of the latter must beestablished. Special situations maypermit planning for withdrawal of theraiding force directly into friendlyterritory without re-embarkation.Withdrawal by air may be possible whenthe area of the raid includes a usableairfield or terrain suitable for landingVTOL aircraft. Detailed planning mustinclude provisions for an alternateextraction method in the event ofinclement weather. One considerationmay be to have the raid force remainashore in a hiding position untilextraction can be executed.

12. Amphibious Operations inSupport of MOOTW

a. Increasingly, US forces are being calledupon to participate in MOOTW thatencompass the use of military capabilitiesacross the range of operations short of war.

JP 3-07, Joint Doctrine for MilitaryOperations Other Than War, as well as other

joint and naval warfare publications in the3-07 series contain additional information.

b. Amphibious forces are particularlywell suited to conduct many types ofMOOTW. The ability of amphibious forcesto operate either OTH or within sight of landprovides the ability to demonstrate a varyingdegree of US force presence. Task-organizedamphibious elements, precisely tailored forspecific missions, can be inserted, employed,and withdrawn to meet specific military orpolitical objectives. The ability to operatefrom a sea base reduces the overall “footprint”ashore, thus reducing the potential politicalimpact of the amphibious force as well asreducing the potential threat to soft targetssuch as logistic support areas and C2 facilities.The maneuverability of amphibious forcesalso allows them to conduct operations overa large area. Finally, the ship-to-shoremovement capability and the ability to shelter,feed, and provide medical care providesamphibious forces with a unique capabilityto conduct a NEO.

c. The types of MOOTW that may employamphibious assets are listed in Figure XV-2.

d. Characteristics

• Amphibious forces must be prepared forinvolvement in a wide range ofMOOTW. In general, MOOTW focuson deterring war, resolving conflict,promoting peace, and supporting civilauthorities in response to domestic crises.MOOTW are very sensitive to politicalconsiderations due to the overriding goalto prevent, preempt, or limit potentialhostilities. In addition, the amphibiousforce may be only one of manyparticipating US and foreign governmentor NGOs. As a result, these operationsnormally have more restrictive ROE thanwar. As in war, the goal is to achievenational objectives as quickly as possibleand conclude operations on terms

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favorable to the United States and itsallies.

• MOOTW are normally conductedoverseas in support of US foreign policyor national security objectives. They mayalso be conducted on US territory or onthe seas contiguous to US territory, foroperations such as a disaster relief insupport of US domestic civil authorities.

• The term “other than war” does notexclude the possibility that combat

operations may be necessary to achievethe overall objectives of the operation.While force commanders mustunderstand the demands of MOOTW andbe prepared to tailor warfighting skillsto meet the MOOTW situation, they mustlikewise be prepared for transition tocombat.

e. MOOTW Planning Considerations.There are many similarities in the planningand execution of various amphibiousoperations in support of MOOTW andconventional amphibious operationsconducted during war. The mission analysisand command estimate processes, forexample, are as critical. Of particularimportance in the planning process is thedevelopment of a clear definition,understanding, and appreciation for allpotential threats. Considerations especiallypertinent to amphibious operations are shownin Figure XV-3. Increasingly, NGOs areassuming a wider role in internationalhumanitarian situations, and should be a factorfor mission planners to consider. In additionto the mere presence of these noncombatantorganizations, there is the real possibility thatNGO facilities will attract a largeconcentration of displaced persons withinoperational areas. Further, planners mustaddress the likelihood that NGOs have beenpenetrated by hostile intelligence services, orthat operatives of such services are presentwithin the population of displaced persons.

JP 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military OperationsOther than War, provides detailed planningguidance for preparing for these operations.

f. Training for MOOTW. Key tosuccessful participation in MOOTW iseducation and training of personnel. For mosttypes of operations, warfighting skills may beadaptable to the particular situation. However,for some MOOTW, warfighting skills are notalways appropriate. Since forward-deployedcombat elements may be called upon on

Figure XV-2. Types of MilitaryOperations Other Than War

TYPES OF MILITARYOPERATIONS OTHER

THAN WAR

Arms Control

Peace Operations

Enforcing Exclusion Zones

Ensuring Freedom of Navigationand Overflight

Recovery Operations

Humanitarian Assistance

Enforcement of Sanctions andMaritime Intercept Operations

Nation Assistance and Support toCounterinsurgency

Department of Defense Supportto Counterdrug Operations

Protection of Shipping

Show of Force Operations

Strikes and Raids

Military Support to CivilAuthorities

Combatting Terrorism

Noncombatant EvacuationOperations

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Action

relatively short notice to participate in a widevariety of MOOTW, predeployment trainingin appropriate subjects should be conductedfor all commanders, staffs, and individuals.

g. The Afloat Pre-positioning Force inSupport of MOOTW. Because of the large

Figure XV-3. Considerations During Military Operations Other Than War

CONSIDERATIONS DURING MILITARYOPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

Requirements to comply with more restrictive rules of engagement and a clearunderstanding of national objectives in what may be a very uncertain, volatileenvironment.

Difficulty in maintaining unit integrity.

Development of a multidisciplinary intelligence gathering agency with a strongfocus on the political, cultural, and economic factors that affect the situation.

Need for establishment of flexible and responsive command and controlarrangements.

Requirement for a comprehensive public affairs capability.

Establishment of civil affairs organizations.

Need for coordination with nongovernmental organizations, other governmentagencies and departments, and multinational partners that may not betraditional US allies and who may harbor long-standing animosities towardother participating nations.

Unique legal issues requiring legal staff personnel to respond to a variety ofcomplex international and operational legal and regulatory issues.

Logistics elements employed in quantities disproportionate to their normalmilitary roles, especially during disaster relief and humanitarian assistanceoperations. Logistic units, like all other units, must be capable of defense,particularly if they deploy alone or in advance of other military forces.

Medical planning to include the potential to treat host nation population orallied military personnel.

Requirements for reserve units and individuals not found in the activecomponent to perform specialized functions required in military operationsother than war (MOOTW).

Requirements to plan for eventual transition from MOOTW to combatoperations and vice versa to ensure that desired political objectives areachieved and the force is protected. Likewise, plans must be developed fortermination of operations, to include transition to civil authorities, marking andclearing minefields, closing financial obligations, and disengagement andredeployment of forces.

and varied quantity of supplies and equipmentembarked, MSC’s APF is particularly wellsuited to support particular types of MOOTW,especially humanitarian assistance anddisaster relief operations.

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Intentionally Blank

APPENDIX AREFERENCES

A-1

The development of JP 3-02 is based upon the following primary references.

1. JP 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States.

2. JP 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF).

3. JP 1-01, Joint Doctrine Development System.

4. JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.

5. JP 2-0, Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations.

6. JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations.

7. JP 3-01, Joint Doctrine for Countering Air and Missile Threats.

8. JP 3-02.1, Joint Doctrine for Landing Force Operations.

9. JP 3-02.2, Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Embarkation.

10. JP 3-04.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Shipboard Helicopter Operations.

11. JP 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations.

12. JP 3-05.3, Joint Special Operations Operational Procedures.

13. JP 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War.

14. JP 3-09, Doctrine for Joint Fire Support.

15. JP 3-11, Joint Doctrine for Operations in Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC)Environments.

16. JP 3-15, Joint Doctrine for Barriers, Obstacles, and Mine Warfare.

17. JP 3-18, Joint Doctrine for Forcible Entry Operations.

18. JP 3-52, Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in the Combat Zone.

19. JP 3-56.1, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations.

20. JP 4-0, Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations.

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21. JP 5-0, Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations.

22. JP 5-00.2, Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures.

23. JP 6-0, Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) SystemsSupport to Joint Operations.

24. CJCSM 3122.02, Manual for Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data (TPFDD)Development and Deployment Execution.

25. Concept for Future Joint Operations, Expanding Joint Vision 2010.

26. Naval Doctrine Pub 1, Naval Warfare.

27. Draft Naval Doctrine Pub 3, Naval Operations.

28. FM 3-0, Operations.

29. FM 100-7, Decisive Force: The Army in Theater Operations.

30. FM 100-17, Mobilization, Deployment, Redeployment, Demobilization.

31. FM 100-26, The Air/Ground Operations Systems.

32. AFM 1-1, Basic Air Space Doctrine of the US Air Force.

33. Naval Warfare Publication 3-02.1, Ship to Shore Movement.

34. Naval Warfare Publication 3-02.14, The Naval Beach Group.

35. Naval Warfare Publication 3-02.22M, MSC Support of Amphibious Operations.

36. Naval Warfare Publication 3-09.11M, Supporting Arms in Amphibious Operations.

37. MCDP 1, Warfighting.

38. MCDP-6, Command and Control.

39. MCWP 3-13, Employment of Assault Amphibious Vehicles.

40. MCWP 3-25.10, Low Altitude Air Defense Handbook.

41. MCWP 3-23, Offensive Air Support.

42. COMSURFWARDEVGRU TACMEMO/OH-17, Amphibious Operations in a MineEnvironment.

A-3

References

43. Forward . . . From the Sea: The Navy Operational Concept.

44. Joint Universal Lessons Learned System (JULLS).

45. Universal Joint Task List.

A-4

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Intentionally Blank

APPENDIX BADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

B-1

1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to:Commander, United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Warfighting Center Code JW100,116 Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435-2697. These comments should addresscontent (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

2. Authorship

The lead agent for this publication is the US Navy. The Joint Staff doctrine sponsor forthis publication is the Director for Operational Plans and Joint Force Development (J-7).

3. Supersession

This publication supersedes JP 3-02, 8 October 1992, Joint Doctrine for AmphibiousOperations.

4. Change Recommendations

a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted:

TO: CNO WASHINGTON DC//N511//INFO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J7-JDETD//

Routine changes should be submitted to the Director for Operational Plans and JointForce Development (J-7), JDETD, 7000 Joint Staff Pentagon, Washington, DC20318-7000, with info copies to the USJFCOM JWFC.

b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff that would change source document information reflected in thispublication, that directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as anenclosure to its proposal. The Military Services and other organizations are requestedto notify the Director, J-7, Joint Staff, when changes to source documents reflected inthis publication are initiated.

c. Record of Changes:

CHANGE COPY DATE OF DATE POSTEDNUMBER NUMBER CHANGE ENTERED BY REMARKS__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

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5. Distribution

a. Additional copies of this publication can be obtained through Service publicationcenters listed below (initial contact) or the USJFCOM JWFC in the event that the jointpublication is not available from the Service.

b. Only approved joint publications and joint test publications are releasable outsidethe combatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any classified jointpublication to foreign governments or foreign nationals must be requested through thelocal embassy (Defense Attaché Office) to DIA Foreign Liaison Office, PSS, PO-FL,Room 1A674, Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301-7400.

c. Additional copies should be obtained from the Military Service assignedadministrative support responsibility by DOD Directive 5100.3, 1 November 1988,Support of the Headquarters of Unified, Specified, and Subordinate Joint Commands.

Army: US Army AG Publication Center SL1655 Woodson RoadAttn: Joint PublicationsSt. Louis, MO 63114-6181

Air Force: Air Force Publications Distribution Center2800 Eastern BoulevardBaltimore, MD 21220-2896

Navy: CO, Naval Inventory Control Point700 Robbins AvenueBldg 1, Customer ServicePhiladelphia, PA 19111-5099

Marine Corps: Commander (Attn: Publications)814 Radford Blvd, Suite 20321Albany, GA 31704-0321

Coast Guard: Commandant Coast Guard (G-OPD), US Coast Guard2100 2nd Street, SWWashington, DC 20593-0001

CommanderUSJFCOM JWFC Code JW2102Doctrine Division (Publication Distribution)116 Lake View ParkwaySuffolk, VA 23435-2697

d. Local reproduction is authorized and access to unclassified publications isunrestricted. However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified jointpublications must be in accordance with DOD Regulation 5200.1-R, InformationSecurity Program.

GLOSSARYPART I — ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

GL-1

AADC area air defense commanderAAV amphibious assault vehicleACA airspace control authorityACE aviation combat element Marine air-ground task force

(MAGTF)ACO airspace control orderACP airspace control planADC air defense commanderADS air defense sectionADZ amphibious defense zoneAE assault echelonAFOE assault follow-on echelonALLOREQ allocation requestAO area of operationsAOA amphibious objective areaAOC air operations centerAOI area of interestAOR area of responsibilityAPF afloat pre-positioning forceASCS air support control sectionATCS air traffic control sectionATF amphibious task forceATG amphibious task groupATO air tasking order

C2 command and controlC4 command, control, communications, and computersCAP crisis action planningCAS close air supportCATF commander, amphibious task forceCG commanding generalCJCSM Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff ManualCLA cushion launch areaCLF commander, landing forceCLZ cushion landing zoneCOA course of actionCOG center of gravityCOMSEC communications securityCONOPS concept of operationsCPG Commander, Amphibious GroupCRTS casualty receiving and treatment shipCSS combat service supportCSSE combat service support element (MAGTF)CTF combined task force

GL-2

Glossary

JP 3-02

DASC direct air support centerDCA defensive counterairD-day unnamed day on which operations commence or are scheduled

to commenceDZ drop zone

EA electronic attackEMCON emission controlEPW enemy prisoner of warEW electronic warfare

FFC force fires coordinatorFFCC force fires coordination centerFHA foreign humanitarian assistanceFSA fire support areaFSCC fire support coordination centerFSCM fire support coordinating measure

GCE ground combat element (MAGTF)

HDC helicopter direction centerH-hour specific time an operation or exercise beginsHIDACZ high-density airspace control zoneHSS health service support

INFOSEC information securityIPB intelligence preparation of the battlespaceIR intelligence requirementISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

JFACC joint force air component commanderJFC joint force commanderJP joint publicationJTF joint task force

LCAC landing craft, air cushionLF landing forceLFSP landing force support partyL-hour specific hour on unnamed day at which a deployment operation

commences or is to commenceLOD line of departureLOC line of communicationsLOTS logistics over-the-shoreLZ landing zone

MACCS Marine air command and control systemMAGTF Marine air-ground task forceMCM mine countermeasure

GL-3

Glossary

MCWP Marine Corps Warfare PublicationMEF Marine expeditionary forceMETOC meteorological and oceanographicMEU Marine expeditionary unitMOOTW military operations other than warMOPP mission-oriented protective postureMPF maritime pre-positioning forceMSC Military Sealift Command

NBC nuclear, biological, and chemicalNEO noncombatant evacuation operationNGO nongovernmental organizationnm nautical mileNSFS naval surface fire supportNWP naval warfare publication

OCA offensive counterairOPCON operational controlOPDS offshore petroleum discharge systemOPGEN operation general matterOPLAN operation planOPORD operation orderOPSEC operations securityOPTASK operation taskOTH over the horizon

POE port of embarkation

RADC regional air defense commanderROE rules of engagementRO/RO roll-on/roll-off

SAC supporting arms coordinatorSACC supporting arms coordination centerSADC sector air defense commanderSEAL sea-air-land teamSOF special operations forcesSZ surf zone

TA target acquisitionTACC tactical air control center (USN); tactical air

command center (USMC)TACLOG tactical-logistical groupTACON tactical controlTADC tactical air direction centerTAOC tactical air operations center (USMC)TIC target information center

VLZ vertical landing zoneVSW very shallow waterVTOL vertical takeoff and landing

GL-4

Glossary

JP 3-02

action phase. In an amphibious operation,the period of time between the arrival ofthe landing forces of the amphibious forcein the operational area and theaccomplishment of their mission. (This termand its definition are approved for inclusionin the next edition of JP 1-02.)

afloat pre-positioning force. Shippingmaintained in full operational status toafloat pre-position military equipment andsupplies in support of combatantcommanders’ operation plans. The afloatpre-positioning force consists of the threemaritime pre-positioning ships squadronsand the afloat pre-positioning ships. Alsocalled APF. (JP 1-02)

airspace control area. Airspace that islaterally defined by the boundaries of theoperational area. The airspace control areamay be subdivided into airspace controlsectors. (JP 1-02)

airspace control authority. The commanderdesignated to assume overall responsibilityfor the operation of the airspace controlsystem in the airspace control area. Alsocalled ACA. (JP 1-02)

amphibious assault. The principal type ofamphibious operation that involvesestablishing a force on a hostile orpotentially hostile shore. (JP 1-02)

amphibious demonstration. A type ofamphibious operation conducted for thepurpose of deceiving the enemy by a showof force with the expectation of deludingthe enemy into a course of actionunfavorable to him. (JP 1-02)

amphibious force. An amphibious task forceand a landing force together with otherforces that are trained, organized, and

equipped for amphibious operations. Alsocalled AF. ( JP 1-02)

amphibious objective area. A geographicalarea (delineated for command and controlpurposes in the order initiating theamphibious operation) within which islocated the objective(s) to be secured bythe amphibious force. This area must be ofsufficient size to ensure accomplishment ofthe amphibious force’s mission and mustprovide sufficient area for conductingnecessary sea, air, and land operations.(This term and its definition modify theexisting term and its definition and areapproved for inclusion in the next editionof JP 1-02.)

amphibious operation. A military operationlaunched from the sea by an amphibiousforce, embarked in ships or craft with theprimary purpose of introducing a landingforce ashore to accomplish the assignedmission. (JP 1-02)

amphibious raid. A type of amphibiousoperation involving swift incursion into ortemporary occupation of an objectivefollowed by a planned withdrawal. (JP1-02)

amphibious task force. A Navy taskorganization formed to conduct amphibiousoperations. The amphibious task force,together with the landing force and otherforces, constitutes the amphibious force.Also called ATF. (This term and itsdefinition modify the existing term and itsdefinition and are approved for inclusion inthe next edition of JP 1-02.)

amphibious withdrawal. A type ofamphibious operation involving theextraction of forces by sea in ships or craftfrom a hostile or potentially hostile shore.

PART II — TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

GL-5

GL-6

Glossary

JP 3-02

(This term and its definition modify theexisting term and its definition and areapproved for inclusion in the next editionof JP 1-02.)

area air defense commander. Within aunified command, subordinate unifiedcommand, or joint task force, thecommander will assign overallresponsibility for air defense to a singlecommander. Normally, this will be thecomponent commander with thepreponderance of air defense capability andthe command, control, and communicationscapability and the command, control, andcommunications capability to plan andexecute integrated air defense operations.Representation from the other componentsinvolved will be provided, as appropriate,to the area air defense commander’sheadquarters. Also called AADC. (JP1-02)

area of operations. An operational areadefined by the joint force commander forland and naval forces. Areas of operationdo not typically encompass the entireoperational area of the joint forcecommander, but should be large enough forcomponent commanders to accomplishtheir missions and protect their forces. Alsocalled AO. (JP 1-02)

assault echelon. In amphibious operations,the element of a force comprised of tailoredunits and aircraft assigned to conduct theinitial assault on the operational area. Alsocalled AE. (This term and its definitionmodify the existing term and its definitionand are approved for inclusion in the nextedition of JP 1-02.)

assault follow-on echelon. In amphibiousoperations, that echelon of the assaulttroops, vehicles, aircraft, equipment, andsupplies that, though not needed to initiatethe assault, is required to support and sustain

the assault. In order to accomplish itspurpose, it is normally required in theobjective area no later than five days aftercommencement of the assault landing. Alsocalled AFOE. (JP 1-02)

attack group. A subordinate taskorganization of the navy forces of anamphibious task force. It is composed ofassault shipping and supporting naval unitsdesignated to transport, protect, land, andinitially support a landing group. (JP 1-02)

beachhead. A designated area on a hostileor potentially hostile shore that, whenseized and held, ensures the continuouslanding of troops and materiel, and providesmaneuver space requisite for subsequentprojected operations ashore. (JP 1-02)

beach party. The naval component of theshore party. (JP 1-02)

centers of gravity. Those characteristics,capabilities, or sources of power fromwhich a military force derives its freedomof action, physical strength, or will to fight.Also called COGs. (This term and itsdefinition are provided for information andare proposed for inclusion in the nextedition of JP 1-02 by JP 3-0.)

close support area. Those parts of the oceanoperating areas nearest to, but notnecessarily in, the objective area. They areassigned to naval support carrier battlegroups, surface action groups, surfaceaction units, and certain logistic combatservice support elements. (JP 1-02)

combat loading. The arrangement ofpersonnel and the stowage of equipmentand supplies in a manner designed toconform to the anticipated tactical operationof the organization embarked. Eachindividual item is stowed so that it can beunloaded at the required time. (JP 1-02)

GL-7

Glossary

commander, amphibious task force. TheNavy officer designated in the orderinitiating the amphibious operation as thecommander of the amphibious task force.Also called CATF. (This term and itsdefinition modify the existing term and itsdefinition and are approved for inclusion inthe next edition of JP 1-02.)

commander, landing force. The officerdesignated in the order initiating theamphibious operation as the commander ofthe landing force for an amphibiousoperation. Also called CLF. (This term andits definition modify the existing term andits definition and are approved for inclusionin the next edition of JP 1-02.)

control group. Personnel, ships, and craftdesignated to control the waterborne ship-to-shore movement. (JP 1-02)

distant retirement area. In amphibiousoperations, that sea area located to seawardof the landing area. This area is dividedinto a number of operating areas to whichassault ships may retire and operate in theevent of adverse weather or to preventconcentration of ships in the landing area.(This term and its definition are approvedfor inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

distant support area. In amphibiousoperations, the area located in the vicinityof the landing area but at considerabledistance seaward of it. These areas areassigned to distant support forces, such asstriking forces, surface action groups,surface action units, and their logisticgroups. (This term and its definition areapproved for inclusion in the next editionof JP 1-02.)

embarkation phase. In amphibiousoperations, the phase that encompasses theorderly assembly of personnel and materieland their subsequent loading aboard ships

and/or aircraft in a sequence designed tomeet the requirements of the landing forceconcept of operations ashore. (JP 1-02)

embarkation plans. The plans prepared bythe landing force and appropriatesubordinate commanders containinginstructions and information concerning theorganization for embarkation, assignmentto shipping, supplies and equipment tobe embarked, location and assignmentof embarkation areas, control andcommunication arrangements, movementschedules and embarkation sequence, andadditional pertinent instructions relating tothe embarkation of the landing force. (JP1-02)

establishing directive. An order normallyissued to specify the purpose of the supportrelationship, the effect desired, and thescope of the action to be taken. (This termand its definition are applicable only in thecontext of this publication and cannot bereferenced outside this publication.)

fire support area. An appropriate maneuverarea assigned to fire support ships by thenaval force commander from which theycan deliver gunfire support to anamphibious operation. Also called FSA.(JP 1-02)

follow-up. In amphibious operations, thereinforcements and stores carried ontransport ships and aircraft (not originallypart of the amphibious force) that areoffloaded after the assault and assaultfollow-on echelons have been landed.(This term and its definition modify theexisting term and its definition and areapproved for inclusion in the next editionof JP 1-02.)

force protection. Actions taken to prevent ormitigate hostile actions against Departmentof Defense personnel (to include family

GL-8

Glossary

JP 3-02

members), resources, facilities, and criticalinformation. These actions conserve theforce’s fighting potential so it can beapplied at the decisive time and place andincorporates the coordinated andsynchronized offensive and defensivemeasures to enable the effectiveemployment of the joint force whiledegrading opportunities for the enemy.Force protection does not include actionsto defeat the enemy or protect againstaccidents, weather, or disease. (This termand its definition are provided forinformation and are proposed for inclusionin the next edition of JP 1-02 by JP 3-0.)

go/no-go. The condition or state of operabilityof a component or system: “go,” functioningproperly; or “no-go,” not functioningproperly. Alternatively, a critical point atwhich a decision to proceed or not must bemade. (JP 1-02)

H-hour (amphibious operations). Foramphibious operations, the time the firstassault elements are scheduled totouchdown on the beach, or a landing zone,and in some cases the commencement ofcountermine breaching operations. (Thisterm and its definition are approved forinclusion in in the next edition of JP 1-02under the entry for “times.”)

high-density airspace control zone.Airspace designated in an airspace controlplan or airspace control order, in whichthere is a concentrated employment ofnumerous and varied weapons and airspaceusers. A high-density airspace control zonehas defined dimensions, which usuallycoincide with geographical features ornavigational aids. Access to a high-densityairspace control zone is normally controlledby the maneuver commander. Themaneuver commander can also direct amore restrictive weapons status within thehigh-density airspace control zone. Alsocalled HIDACZ. (JP 1-02)

integrated planning. In amphibiousoperations, the planning accomplished bycommanders and staffs of correspondingechelons from parallel chains of commandwithin the amphibious task force. (This termand its definition are approved for inclusionin the next edition of JP 1-02.)

intelligence preparation of the battlespace.An analytical methodology employed toreduce uncertainties concerning the enemy,environment, and terrain for all types ofoperations. Intelligence preparation of thebattlespace builds an extensive database foreach potential area in which a unit may berequired to operate. The database is thenanalyzed in detail to determine the impactof the enemy, environment, and terrain onoperations and presents it in graphic form.Intelligence preparation of the battlespaceis a continuing process. Also called IPB.(JP 1-02)

landing area. 1. That part of the operationalarea within which are conducted the landingoperations of an amphibious force. Itincludes the beach, the approaches to thebeach, the transport areas, the fire supportareas, the airspace occupied by closesupporting aircraft, and the land includedin the advance inland to the initial objective.2. (Airborne) The general area used forlanding troops and materiel either byairdrop or air landing. This area includesone or more drop zones or landing strips.3. Any specially prepared or selectedsurface of land, water, or deck designatedor used for takeoff and landing of aircraft.(This term and its definition modify theexisting term and its definition and areapproved for inclusion in the next editionof JP 1-02.)

landing beach. That portion of a shorelineusually required for the landing of abattalion landing team. However, it mayalso be that portion of a shorelineconstituting a tactical locality (such as the

GL-9

Glossary

shore of a bay) over which a force larger orsmaller than a battalion landing team maybe landed. (JP 1-02)

landing force. A Marine Corps or Army taskorganization formed to conduct amphibiousoperations. The landing force, together withthe amphibious task force and other forces,constitute the amphibious force. Also calledLF. (This term and its definition modify theexisting term and its definition and areapproved for inclusion in the next editionof JP 1-02.)

landing force support party. A temporarylanding force organization composed ofNavy and landing force elements, thatfacilitates the ship-to-shore movement andprovides initial combat support and combatservice support to the landing force. Thelanding force support party is brought intoexistence by a formal activation orderissued by the commander, landing force.Also called LFSP. (This term and itsdefinition modify the existing term and itsdefinition and are approved for inclusion inthe next edition of JP 1-02.)

landing group. In amphibious operations, asubordinate task organization of the landingforce capable of conducting landingoperations, under a single tacticalcommand, against a position or group ofpositions. (JP 1-02)

landing group commander. In amphibiousoperations, the officer designated by thecommander, landing force as the singletactical commander of a subordinate taskorganization capable of conducting landingoperations against a position or group ofpositions. (This term and its definition areapproved for inclusion in the next editionof JP 1-02.)

landing plan. 1. In amphibious operations, acollective term referring to all individuallyprepared naval and landing force

documents that, taken together, present indetail all instructions for execution of theship-to-shore movement. (JP 1-02)

landing site. 2. In amphibious operations, acontinuous segment of coastline over whichtroops, equipment and supplies can belanded by surface means. (JP 1-02)

L-hour (amphibious operations). Inamphibious operations, the time at whichthe first helicopter of the helicopter-borneassault wave touches down in the landingzone. (This term and its definition areapproved for inclusion in the next editionof JP 1-02.)

lighterage. A small craft designed to transportcargo or personnel from ship to shore.Lighterage includes amphibians, landingcraft, discharge lighters, causeways, andbarges. (JP 1-02)

logistics over-the-shore operations. Theloading and unloading of ships without thebenefit of deep draft-capable, fixed portfacilities in friendly or nondefendedterritory and, in time of war, during phasesof theater development in which there isno opposition by the enemy; or as a meansof moving forces closer to tactical assemblyareas dependent on threat force capabilities.Also called LOTS operations. (JP 1-02)

maritime pre-positioning force operation.A rapid deployment and assembly of aMarine expeditionary force in a secure areausing a combination of strategic airlift andforward-deployed maritime pre-positioningships. (JP 1-02)

military operations other than war.Operations that encompass the use ofmilitary capabilities across the range ofmilitary operations short of war. Thesemilitary actions can be applied tocomplement any combination of the otherinstruments of national power and occur

GL-10

Glossary

JP 3-02

before, during, and after war. Also calledMOOTW. (JP 1-02)

Military Sealift Command-controlled ships.Those ships assigned by the Military SealiftCommand (MSC) for a specific operation.They may be MSC nucleus fleet ships,contract-operated MSC ships, MSC-controlled time or voyage charteredcommercial ships, or MSC-controlled shipsallocated by the maritime administration toMSC to carry out DOD objectives. (JP 1-02)

movement phase. In amphibious operations,the period during which various elementsof the amphibious force move from pointsof embarkation to the operational area. Thismove may be via rehearsal, staging, orrendezvous areas. The movement phase iscompleted when the various elements ofthe amphibious force arrive at their assignedpositions in the operational area. (This termand its definition are approved for inclusionin the next edition of JP 1-02.)

movement plan. In amphibious operations,the naval plan providing for the movementof the amphibious task force to the objectivearea. It includes information andinstructions concerning departure of shipsfrom embarkation points, the passage at sea,and the approach to and arrival in assignedpositions in the objective area. (This termand its definition modify the existing termand its definition and are approved forinclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

naval surface fire support. Fire provided byNavy surface gun and missile systems insupport of a unit or units tasked withachieving the commander’s objectives.Also called NSFS. (This term and itsdefinition modify the existing term and itsdefinition and are approved for inclusion inthe next edition of JP 1-02.)

operational control. Command authority thatmay be exercised by commanders at any

echelon at or below the level of combatantcommand. Operational control is inherentin combatant command (commandauthority) and may be delegated within thecommand. When forces are transferredbetween combatant commands, thecommand relationship the gainingcommander will exercise (and the losingcommander will relinquish) over theseforces must be specified by the Secretaryof Defense. Operational control is theauthority to perform those functions ofcommand over subordinate forces involvingorganizing and employing commands andforces, assigning tasks, designatingobjectives, and giving authoritativedirection necessary to accomplish themission. Operational control includesauthoritative direction over all aspects ofmilitary operations and joint trainingnecessary to accomplish missions assignedto the command. Operational control shouldbe exercised through the commanders ofsubordinate organizations. Normally thisauthority is exercised through subordinatejoint force commanders and Service and/orfunctional component commanders.Operational control normally provides fullauthority to organize commands and forcesand to employ those forces as thecommander in operational control considersnecessary to accomplish assignedmissions; it does not, in and of itself, includeauthoritative direction for logistics ormatters of administration, discipline, internalorganization, or unit training. Also calledOPCON. (JP 1-02)

organization for combat. In amphibiousoperations, task organization of landingforce units for combat, involvingcombinations of command, ground andaviation combat, combat support, andcombat service support units foraccomplishment of missions ashore.(This term and its definition are approvedfor inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

GL-11

Glossary

organization for embarkation. In amphibiousoperations, the organization for embarkationconsisting of temporary landing force taskorganizations established by thecommander, landing force and a temporaryorganization of Navy forces established bythe commander, amphibious task force forthe purpose of simplifying planning andfacilitating the execution of embarkation.(This term and its definition modify theexisting term and its definition and areapproved for inclusion in the next editionof JP 1-02.)

organization for landing. In amphibiousoperations, the specific tactical groupingof the landing force for the assault. (JP1-02)

outer transport area. In amphibiousoperations, an area inside the antisubmarinescreen to which assault transports proceedinitially after arrival in the objective area.(JP 1-02)

over-the-horizon amphibious operations.An operational initiative launched frombeyond visual and radar range of theshoreline. (JP 1-02)

parallel chains of command. In amphibiousoperations, a parallel system of command,responding to the interrelationship of Navy,landing force, Air Force, and other majorforces assigned, wherein correspondingcommanders are established at eachsubordinate level of all components to facilitatecoordinated planning for, and execution of,the amphibious operation. (JP 1-02)

planning directive. In amphibious operations,the plan issued by the designatedcommander, following receipt of the orderinitiating the amphibious operation, toensure that the planning process andinterdependent plans developed by theamphibious force will be coordinated,completed in the time allowed, and

important aspects not overlooked. (Thisterm and its definition modify the existingterm and its definition and are approved forinclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

planning phase. In amphibious operations,the phase normally denoted by the periodextending from the issuance of the orderinitiating the amphibious operation up tothe embarkation phase. The planning phasemay occur during movement or at any othertime upon receipt of a new mission orchange in the operational situation. (Thisterm and its definition are approved forinclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

preassault operation. Operations conductedby the amphibious force upon its arrival inthe operational area and prior to H and/orL-hour. (This term and its definition modifythe existing term and its definition and areapproved for inclusion in the next editionof JP 1-02.)

regulating point. An anchorage, port, or oceanarea to which assault and assault follow-upechelons and follow-up shipping proceedon a schedule, and at which they arenormally controlled by the commander,amphibious task force, until needed in thetransport area for unloading. (This termand its definition are approved for inclusionin the next edition of JP 1-02.)

rehearsal phase. In amphibious operations,the period during which the prospectiveoperation is practiced for the purpose of:(1) testing adequacy of plans, the timing ofdetailed operations, and the combatreadiness of participating forces; (2)ensuring that all echelons are familiar withplans; and (3) testing communications-information systems. (This term and itsdefinition are approved for inclusion in thenext edition of JP 1-02.)

screening group. In amphibious operations,a task organization of ships that furnishes

GL-12

Glossary

JP 3-02

protection to the task force en route to theobjective area and during operations in theobjective area. (JP 1-02)

sea areas. Areas in the amphibious objectivearea designated for the stationing ofamphibious task force ships. Sea areasinclude inner transport area, sea echelonarea, fire support area, etc. (This term andits definition are approved for inclusion inthe next edition of JP 1-02.)

seabasing. In amphibious operations, atechnique of basing certain landing forcesupport functions aboard ship whichdecreases shore-based presence. (Thisterm and its definition are approved forinclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

sea echelon. A portion of the assault shippingwhich withdraws from, or remains out of,the transport area during an amphibiouslanding and operates in designated areas toseaward in an on-call or unscheduled status.(JP 1-02)

sea echelon area. In amphibious operations,an area to seaward of a transport area fromwhich assault shipping is phased into thetransport area, and to which assault shippingwithdraws from the transport area. (JP1-02)

sea echelon plan. In amphibious operations,the distribution plan for amphibiousshipping in the transport area to minimizelosses due to enemy attack by weapons ofmass destruction and to reduce the area tobe swept of mines. (This term and itsdefinition modify the existing term and itsdefinition and are approved for inclusion inthe next edition of JP 1-02.)

ship-to-shore movement. That portion of theassault phase of an amphibious operationwhich includes the deployment of thelanding force from the assault shipping todesignated landing areas. (JP 1-02)

shore party. A task organization of the landingforce, formed for the purpose of facilitatingthe landing and movement off the beachesof troops, equipment, and supplies; for theevacuation from the beaches of casualtiesand enemy prisoners of war; and forfacilitating the beaching, retraction, andsalvaging of landing ships and craft. Itcomprises elements of both the naval andlanding forces. (JP 1-02)

staging area. 1. Amphibious or airborne - Ageneral locality between the mounting areaand the objective of an amphibious orairborne expedition, through which theexpedition or parts thereof pass aftermounting, for refueling, regrouping ofships, and/or exercise, inspection, andredistribution of troops. Also called SA.(JP 1-02)

subsidiary landing. In an amphibiousoperation, a landing usually made outsidethe designated landing area, the purposeof which is to support the main landing. (JP1-02)

support. 1. The action of a force that aids,protects, complements, or sustains anotherforce in accordance with a directiverequiring such action. 2. A unit that helpsanother unit in battle. 3. An element of acommand that assists, protects, or suppliesother forces in combat. (JP 1-02)

supported commander. 1. The commanderhaving primary responsibility for all aspectsof a task assigned by the Joint StrategicCapabilities Plan or other joint operationplanning authority. In the context of jointoperation planning, this term refers to thecommander who prepares operation plansor operation orders in response torequirements of the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff. 2. In the context of a supportcommand relationship, the commander whoreceives assistance from anothercommander’s force or capabilities, and who

GL-13

Glossary

is responsible for ensuring the supportingcommander understands the assistancerequired. (This term and its definition areprovided for information and are proposedfor inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02by JP 3-0.)

supporting arms. Weapons and weaponssystems of all types employed to supportforces by indirect or direct fire. (JP 1-02)

supporting commander. 1. A commander whoprovides augmentation forces or othersupport to a supported commander or whodevelops a supporting plan. Includes thedesignated combatant commands andDefense agencies as appropriate. 2. In thecontext of a support command relationship,the commander who aids, protects,complements, or sustains anothercommander’s force, and who is responsiblefor providing the assistance required by thesupported commander. (This term and itsdefinition are provided for information andare proposed for inclusion in the nextedition of JP 1-02 by JP 3-0.)

supporting operations. In amphibiousoperations, those operations conducted byforces other than those conducted by theamphibious force. (This term and itsdefinition modify the existing term and itsdefinition and are approved for inclusion inthe next edition of JP 1-02.)

tactical control. Command authority overassigned or attached forces or commands,or military capability or forces made availablefor tasking, that is limited to the detaileddirection and control of movements ormaneuvers within the operational areanecessary to accomplish missions or tasksassigned. Tactical control is inherent inoperational control. Tactical control may bedelegated to, and exercised at any level ator below the level of combatant command.When forces are transferred between

combatant commands, the commandrelationship the gaining commander willexercise (and the losing commander willrelinquish) over these forces must bespecified by the Secretary of Defense.Tactical control provides sufficientauthority for controlling and directing theapplication of force or tactical use of combatsupport assets within the assigned missionor task. Also called TACON. (JP 1-02)

target information center. The agency oractivity responsible for collecting,displaying, evaluating, and disseminatinginformation pertaining to potential targets.(This term and its definition are approved forinclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

transport area. In amphibious operations, anarea assigned to a transport organizationfor the purpose of debarking troops andequipment. (JP 1-02)

vertical landing zone. A specified groundarea for landing vertical takeoff and landingaircraft to embark or disembark troops and/or cargo. A landing zone may contain oneor more landing sites. Also called VLZ. (Thisterm and its definition are approved forinclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

vertical takeoff and landing aircraft. Fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters capable oftaking off or landing vertically. Also calledVTOL aircraft. (This term and its definitionare approved for inclusion in the nextedition of JP 1-02.)

vertical takeoff and landing aircraft transportarea. Area to the seaward and on the flanksof the outer transport and landing shipareas, but preferably inside the area screen,for launching and/or recovering verticaltakeoff and landing aircraft. Also calledVTOL aircraft transport area. (This termand its definition are approved for inclusionin the next edition of JP 1-02.)

GL-14

Glossary

JP 3-02

Intentionally Blank

Assess-ments/

Revision

CJCSApproval

TwoDrafts

ProgramDirective

ProjectProposal

J-7 formally staffs withServices and CINCs

Includes scope ofproject, references,milestones, and who willdevelop drafts

J-7 releases ProgramDirective to Lead Agent.Lead Agent can beService, CINC, or JointStaff (JS) Directorate

STEP #2Program Directive

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The CINCs receive the JP andbegin to assess it during use

18 to 24 months followingpublication, the Director, J-7,will solicit a written report fromthe combatant commands andServices on the utility andquality of each JP and theneed for any urgent changes orearlier-than-scheduledrevisions

No later than 5 years afterdevelopment, each JP isrevised

STEP #5Assessments/Revision

�

ENHANCEDJOINT

WARFIGHTINGCAPABILITY

Submitted by Services, CINCs, or Joint Staffto fill extant operational void

J-7 validates requirement with Services andCINCs

J-7 initiates Program Directive

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STEP #1Project Proposal

All joint doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy asshown in the chart above. is in the series of joint doctrinepublications. The diagram below illustrates an overview of the development process:

Joint Publication (JP) 3-02 Operations

JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHYJOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY

JP 1-0 JP 2-0 JP 3-0

PERSONNEL

JP 4-0 JP 5-0 JP 6-0

LOGISTICSINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS C4 SYSTEMSPLANS

JOINTDOCTRINE

PUBLICATION

Lead Agent forwards proposed pub to JointStaff

Joint Staff takes responsibility for pub, makesrequired changes and prepares pub forcoordination with Services and CINCs

Joint Staff conducts formal staffing forapproval as a JP

STEP #4CJCS Approval

� Lead Agent selects Primary ReviewAuthority (PRA) to develop the pub

PRA develops two draft pubs

PRA staffs each draft with CINCs,Services, and Joint Staff

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STEP #3Two Drafts

JP 1

JOINTWARFARE

JP 0-2

UNAAF

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