JOINT ALASKA INLAND &ARCTIC AND WESTERN ALASKA AREA COMMITTEE

Alaska Inland Update

INLAND AK PLANNING TOOL

ALASKA INLAND AREA CONTINGENCY PLAN

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• Approved September 14, 2018

• New contingency planning

framework for the State of Alaska

• ADEC currently hosting all the AK

Area Contingency Plan

• Working towards Area

Contingency Plan web pages with

associated response tools

Alaska Inland Area Committee

EPA

FOSC:

Co-Chair

ADEC Central

Area SOSC:

Co-Chair

ADEC Northern

Area SOSC:

Co-Chair

EPA

FOSC:

Co-Chair

ADEC Southeast

Area SOSC:

Co-Chair

Mission Statement

The Alaska Inland Area Committee (AI-AC) provides the

platform for consistent coordination between federal,

state, tribal and local emergency planners and responders.

Objectives:

1. The AI-AC is the venue for public input on all relevant

government processes and scientific issues related to oil

and hazardous substance spill prevention, preparedness,

planning and response within the Arctic and Western

Alaska.

2. Provide public transparency and communicate widely

the efforts to develop and maintain the Nation’s best

coordinated system of highly trained and experienced

National Response System planners, regulators and

responders from all relevant public and private sector

stakeholders.

3. The AI-AC manages and continuously improves upon the

Area Contingency Plan,

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Area Steering Committee

ALASKA INLAND AREA STEERING COMMITTEE

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• Meeting held on April 17th.

• Established Protocols for the

Alaska Steering Committee

• Established Protocols for the ACP

Administration Subcommittee

• ACP Administration

Subcommittee Brief to OSCs.

Inland Area Steering

Committee

ACP Administration Subcommittee

AK Inland Area Committee Protocols

Administration Subcommittee Workplan

Task Description Status

Tech Edit “High level’ editorial review Completed; results of the tech edit informs the ACP

style guide; identified systemic issues to be tracked

to resolution.

Resolve outstanding

Version 1.0 Public Review

Comments

Address / resolve comments from DOI

and ADF&G that were not included in

Version 1

These are still being worked through efforts to

update the ACP.

Incorporate text from

outside (non-Alaska

Unified Plan / SCP) plans,

guidance and other

references.

Assess and include appropriate text or

reference to NCP, agency guidance,

handbooks, manual, and other ACPS,

etc.

Information from the superseded Alaska plans and

guidance are being reviewed for content inclusion or

update into the ACP.

Other government tools and resources are being

considered for inclusion as references and tools.

ACP Revision 1.1 Version 1.1 is to be edited to facilitate

intuitive use by responders, include

references and tools needed to

support response efforts.

Agency planners are coordinating to take the first

hard edit of the plan, to identify tools and

references that may be used to support response,

and to identify continuous improvement

considerations for future revision cycles.

ALASKA INLAND AREA COMMITTEETom DeRuyter, State On Scene CoordinatorMatt Carr, Federal On Scene CoordinatorArea Committee BriefMay 15, 2019

RESPONSE TRENDS

• North Slope Well Subsidence

• Moose Pass Incident

• Trucking

PROBLEM STATEMENT• Crude oil released from two separate well control events

• Loss of well control and the sudden ~3ft rise of 2 separate wellheads

• Incident Management Teams formed • Unified Command structure formed for DS 02-03B event

Well Tree DS 02-03B Well Tree DS 02-02A

DS 02-03B• April 2017

• Surface casing rose abruptly ~3ft above conductor casing

• Well tree collided with well house ceiling causing damage to gauge assembly and flange

• 5 barrels of crude oil released

• Crude misted onto gravel pad outside of well house covering ~0.36 acres

• DS 02-03B was flowing at the time of the incident

• 3-string casing design with 20” surface casing

• Surface casing shoe set in permafrost

DS 02-02A• December 2018

• Surface casing rose abruptly ~3ft above conductor casing

• Well tree collided with well house ceiling

• Damaged master flange source of crude release

• 2 gallons of crude oil released but contained within the well house

• DS 02-02A had been shut in/suspended for over 12 years

• 3-string casing design with 20” surface casing• Surface casing shoe set in permafrost

BPXA HYPOTHESIS: LOCALIZED PERMAFROST SUBSIDENCE MECHANISM

Well goes into production

•Production fluids are high temperature

Ice lenses within permafrost melt

•Meltwater is displaced away from the wellbore

Displaced water replaced

by the upper formation layers

•Results in downward load on adjacent surface casing

POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

• Location• Both failures occurred on Drill Site 2

• Well design• Two-string casing design vs three-string casing design

• Surface casing shoe set within permafrost

• Casing size

• Localized permafrost subsidence

FINDINGS

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Casing Design Surface Casing Shoe

in Permafrost

Surface Casing Shoe

below Permafrost

Three-string Design 14 Wells

• Including DS 02-

03B and DS 02-02A

9 Wells

Two String Design (no

intermediate casing)

None Most Prudhoe Bay

Wells

• BPXA identified 23 three-casing string design wells out of approximately 1700 wells in Prudhoe Bay.

• AOGCC ordered a North-Slope-wide assessment of all wells and found no other wells with similar

3-string casing designs.

• AOGCC confirmed three-casing string well designs can lead to sudden catastrophic failures.

• Two-casing string designs are not necessarily more secure.

• AOGCC concluded BPXA does not have sufficient evidence that permafrost subsidence

loads applied to two-casing string well designs will not lead to sudden catastrophic

failures.

PLAN FORWARD

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• AOGCC ordered BPXA to plug and abandon wells.

• 14 three-casing string designed wells that have casing shoe in permafrost.

• AOGCC ordered further investigations for three string casing designed wells.

• BPXA will continue a study to determine permafrost thaw behavior on its existing pads.

• Permafrost soil types and ice contents are believed to be highly irregular and

localized.

• BPXA plans to undertake an independent geotechnical study at Drill Site 2 to

understand permafrost loading across casing strings.

• Areas of uncertainty include:

• Implications of surface casing placement relative to permafrost depth.

• Implications of surface loads on the 20” surface casing vs. smaller casing.

• An unknown variability in rock properties in geologic strata within permafrost

zone.

CASE SUMMARY – MOOSE PASSTHE HUMAN SIDE OF SPILL RESPONSE

• On March 13, 2019 the principal of a family owned business was killed in a motor vehicle accident that resulted in spilling up to 300 gallons of diesel fuel into the Kenai Lake drainage.

• Accident occurred on Forest Service land. USFS supported the response.

• ADEC conducted containment and recovery, assessment and investigation support. Monitoring continues.

Incident response cost recovery is not being pursued against the family business due to their devastating personal loss.

CASE SUMMARY – MOOSE PASS (CON’T)

CASE SUMMARY – COLVILLE FRANKLIN BLUFFS TANKER ROLLOVER• Background;

• Occurred on August 24, 2018 near Dalton Highway Milepost (DHMP) 382.5.

• Departed highway and rolled on to tundra with standing water.

• Driver killed during incident.

CASE SUMMARY – COLVILLE FRANKLIN BLUFFS TANKER ROLLOVER, CONT.

• Tanker carrying 9,716 gallons at time of

incident:

• 7,937 gallons lightered by another tanker

• 1,779 gallons released to tundra

• 1,413 gal recovered by vaccum truck

from standing water

• 93 gal by sorbent material

• 273 gal unrecovered during initial

response actions

CASE SUMMARY –COLVILLE FRANKLIN BLUFFS TANKER ROLLOVER, CONT.

• Product released on to BOTH Alyeska Pipeline Service Company (APSC) fuel gas line right-of-way and fiber optic lines owned by AT&T, Inc. (AT&T) and General Communications Inc (GCI).

• Initial site investigation during September 2018, but soil removal actions occurred in November 2018 to allow for less saturated soils and design of earthen ramps over APSC gas line.

CASE SUMMARY – COLVILLE FRANKLIN BLUFFS TANKER ROLLOVER

Approx 120 cyds of affected

soils removed using

excavators, water knife, and

vaccum trucks.

Presence of fuel gas line and

fiber optic lines complicated

cleanup, since soil removal

could only be conducted to

certain depth above and

around fuel gas, and only

hand tools and water knife

was allowed around fiber

optic.

CASE SUMMARY – COLVILLE DHMP219.4 TANKER ROLLOVER

• Incident occurred on February 12,

2019, when tanker departed

highway and travelled approx.

70ft down an embankment only

<500ft from Dietrich River.

• Tanker carrying 10,003 gal of ULSD,

only 2gal released from cracked

hatch on top of tanker

compartment.

• Several factors would have

complicated cleanup:

• Record snowfall in area

• Steep embankment

• Cold ambient temperatures

(<-40°) during response effort.

CURRENT VOLUME AND TYPE OF PRODUCT TRANSPORTED NORTH TO SUPPORT OIL FIELD• Estimated 30,000,000 gallons of refined

petroleum transported north of Fairbanks via road, to the oil field, per year.

• Colville successfully landed barge off West Dock during the summer of 2018 to offload in to Deadhorse tank farm.

• Five major transporters:• Colville: Five 10,000gal tankers/day;

90%ULSD, 5% JetA, 5% Gasoline (5.13.2019)

• Lynden/Alaska West Express:

• Northern Oil Field Services:

• Big State Logistics:

• Carlile:

QUESTIONS?ADEC Area Planning website:

http://Alaska.gov/go/7EKN

Contact us:

Tom.DeRuyter@Alaska.gov

Fuel farm, Utqiagvik

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