John TurnbullMultifamily Development and Special Projects Providence Community Housing

• Over the next five years, our goal is to bring home 18,000 victims of Katrina by rebuilding and/or developing 7,000 units of housing - both single-family homes and apartments:

• Re-establish 1,500 affordable apartments for seniors • Repair and rebuild 1,200 homes for the most vulnerable • Develop 500 units of supportive housing for special

needs populations • Develop 2,600 mixed-income apartments • Develop 1,200 affordable homes

New Orleans Pre Katrina

Growth of New Orleans along high ground

1895

Historical street patterns

– Traditional hierarchies at local level – Insular and highly idiosyncratic – Extraction economy – Limited scale– Limited capacity– Limited effective public government– Disinvestment– High poverty– Dependence on faith based and social networks

A 19th century economy

French Quarter

Tulane / Canal

CBD

Treme

Lafitte

Iberville

Arenas

CURRENT CITY CORE NEIGHBORHOODS

Post Katrina

• Immense scope of repairs and destruction • Loss of family and social structure• Loss of economic structure, especially

middle class• Accelerated loss of public infrastructure• Challenges beyond capacity of local and

state government – both $ and policy • Influx of outside “experts” unfamiliar with

culture

Current challenges

Our known unknowns

– Predictable population and demand

– Benchmark elevations– Consistent codes – Federal and state

funds– Urban planning – Construction costs– Utility costs

– Legal records– Professional capacity– Urban Infrastructure– Levees/wetlands – Median income– Labor pool– Operating history– Insurance– Tax predictability

2 much (money + priorities)

------------------------------------- = 2 little done

2 little (time and expertise)

What’s wrong with the fast track?

A couple of examples

Piggy Back - Piggy Bank

• $750 Million added funds to LIHTC for

– Operating deficits for units 20%-50% AMI – Construction costs for PSH– Development costs for mixed income housing

• Same application as LIHTC

• Last minute policy write-ups make for untested program • Reluctance to discuss on or off record • Inflexible minimum requirements for market rate • Subsidy tied to very specific income targeting of <40% AMI

• For sale units ineligible • PSH units are essentially “subleased” without subsidy• Possible covenants against use of Section 8 • Not available as construction financing • Fannie Mae debt documents used for soft debt• Operating subsidies may be provided but only as

reimbursement post audit

Piggy Back - Piggy Bank

Developer’s Hold’em

• 75 day call on 10% test • Zoning and permit challenges

• Insurance and utility hikes• Truth and consequences

• All-in gamble for extra credits

Role for not for profits

• Able to influence policy and political risk

• Able to absorb financial risk and defer fees

• Access to grants and soft loans for initial costs and public services

• Established neighborhood networks and services

• Credibility (even though limited capacity)

• Local legitimacy with community groups

Lafitte Treme

French QuarterCBD

Lafitte

Tulane / Canal

Treme

Lafitte site

• Lafitte today

Treme neighborhood

What

Remains

Current housing

stock

• 900 subsidized rentals matched with 600 moderate income homes for sale

• Reactivate community center with new Clinic, Head Start and Education programs

• Phase 1 – 812 units»$119 million LIHTC Equity»$18 million HANO / HUD»$27 million State CDBG

• Redevelopment on 2 scales – mixed income replacement of public housing and scattered site new construction

Respecting the traditional designs – it is the façade that counts

Katrina Cottage

Double Shotgun Camelback

A break in the process

What did HANO do?• Evacuate• Issue displacement

vouchers• Secure sites • Sit out recovery plans• Announce demolition• Begin public process• Enter challenge phase

What didn’t happen?• One on one case

management• Monitor relocation• Evaluate repair costs• Contact residents and

survey demand• Publicize alternative long

term options• Prepare rebuilding and

re-occupancy guidelines

A break in the process

What did HANO do?• Evacuate• Issue displacement

vouchers• Secure sites

• Sit out recovery plans• Announce demolition• Begin public process• Enter challenge phase

– One on One case management– Potential interim rehab of older buildings – Reintroducing historic blocks– Compatible infill on scattered sites– Issues of relocation and reoccupancy criteria– Deconcentration of subsidized units but NOT

reduction in number

Phased development – Now it May be Required

Some current issues

• Land acquisition• Development in manageable increments • Commitment to providing opportunity for all to

return• Resident counseling – “what was normal before

isn’t now”• Blight removal

Some current issues

• Rapid construction incorporating traditional design with new codes

• Coordination of policy and programs• Recreating the other parts of a mixed use

community• Community safety

Some VERY important needs

• Tempering expectations

• Advancing hope

THANKS