john fitzgibbon social movements and the eurocrisis
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Paper Presented at Council European Studies annual conference 2014 on the impact of the Eurocrisis on social movement mobilization.TRANSCRIPT
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CANTERBURY CHRIST CHURCH UNIVERSITY
Social Movements and the Eurocrisis:
Unified in Grievance but Diversified in Protest
Dr. John FitzGibbon
4/14/2014
This paper investigates social movement mobilization and the Eurocrisis in the crisis
states of the EU periphery or the PIGS Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain. Using Ireland as an in-depth case study it develops a framework by which further research
into why the nature of mobilization in these states has varied so much, despite the
common stimuli of financial and unemployment crises and the control of government
policy by the outside agents of the European Commission, European Central Bank
and International Monetary Fund. The paper takes focuses specifically on the
political opportunity structures of each state to account for the variated form of protest
in each state. Its starting point is that Imig and Tarrows (2000) assertion that Europe-wide mobilization would occur as European integration deepened has not
been borne out due to the lack of a shared political opportunity structure for the
singular experience of opposition to austerity policies in the four case studies to be expressed uniformly. From the initial evidence of the Irish case it concludes that
while there is no coordinated pan-European mobilization there is clear recognition of
the shared experience of austerity across the four states and increased cognisance of the need for alternative policies to be articulated at the EU level. From this
perspective the wider argument of the paper is that mobilization and protest in the
PIGS can be understood not only as opposition to specific EU policies but more fundamentally as an important signifier of the emergence of a European demos.
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Social Movements and the Eurocrisis: Unified in Grievance but Diversified in
Protest1
Dr. John FizGibbon
Canterbury Christ Church University
This paper investigates social movement mobilization and the Eurocrisis in the crisis
states of the EU periphery or the PIGS Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain. Using
Ireland as an in-depth case study it develops a framework by which further research
into why the nature of mobilization in these states has varied so much, despite the
common stimuli of financial and unemployment crises and the control of government
policy by the outside agents of the European Commission, European Central Bank
and International Monetary Fund. The paper takes focuses specifically on the
political opportunity structures of each state to account for the variated form of protest
in each state. Its starting point is that Imig and Tarrows (2000) assertion that
Europe-wide mobilization would occur as European integration deepened has not
been borne out due to the lack of a shared political opportunity structure for the
singular experience of opposition to austerity policies in the four case studies to be
expressed uniformly. From the initial evidence of the Irish case it concludes that
while there is no coordinated pan-European mobilization there is clear recognition of
the shared experience of austerity across the four states and increased cognisance of
the need for alternative policies to be articulated at the EU level. From this
perspective the wider argument of the paper is that mobilization and protest in the
PIGS can be understood not only as opposition to specific EU policies but more
fundamentally as an important signifier of the emergence of a European demos.
In Greece there has been high profile mass protest that has turned frequently violent.
Spain witnessed sustained protest by young unemployed giving rise to the concept of
1 Extremely preliminary draft, do not quote without authors permission.
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a generation of Los Indignados based on the protagonists in these protests. The
other two states, however, have not seen similar levels of social movement
mobilization. Though Portugal has experienced increasing protest it has almost
exclusively been funnelled through trade unions and pre-existing left-wing groups.
While Ireland has seen the most limited mobilization of all with only a handful of
ineffectual civil society groups who have had limited influence in terms of numbers
and sustainability.
Introduction
The Eurocrisis provides us with a unique opportunity to study a singular event that
has caused social movement mobilisations across different states. This is a very rare
event. To have such a concrete causal factor present in almost entirely the same
manner in several countries is a tremendous boon to scholars of social movements.
This paper seeks to utilize this situation to examine how social movements in
different countries responded to similar events. The paper focuses primarily on
Ireland but takes substantial empirical evidence from Greece, Portugal and Spain to
develop a snapshot of social movement mobilization in those states most dramatically
affected by the Eurocrisis. These states have come to be labelled as the PIGS a
somewhat derogatory phrase but one that has gained widespread usage in the media
and that will be used in this paper.
The media has given extensive exposure to the apparent wave of protest that emerged
followed the Eurocrisis with Greece being the focus of this coverage. Images of
violence in Syntagma square in Athens between a multitude of protest groups from
spontaneous citizen grass-roots movements to well-established anarchist networks
clashing with police, occupation of university buildings, mass demonstrations by
trade unions were a permanent feature of news reports of the Eurocrisis around the
world in the late 2000s and early 2010s. The Los Indignados movement of young
unemployed citizens in Spain of 2011, fit in with this media narrative of a growing
mass public movement around the as a response to the Eurocrisis. Protests in Greece
became increasingly violent as the economic crisis worsened and the street placed
ruling politicians under intense pressure causing governments to fall. Media
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commentators and radical politicians cheered on these developments, certain that
mass public opposition to the EU brought about by the Eurocrisis expressed by protest
would lead to complete change in the economic and political systems of EU member
states. There was genuine fear amongst the European political elite that the Euro
currency and perhaps even the EU project itself could not sustain such contestation
from popular grass-roots protest.
But no such collapse occurred. The violence and mass protest of Greece was not
repeated on the streets of Dublin or Lisbon, while the Los Indignados movement of
Spains main cities gradually petered out. National and EU-level political actors
breather a huge sigh of relief at the apparent failure of mass public protest to occur in
the PIGS. Those same media commentators, radical politicians and other high profile
actors who had confidently predicted that citizens would tear down the established
order (Kelly: 2012) were left exasperated. The politicians and political parties who
had failed to manage the economy or provide adequate oversight of financial
institutions remained in Parliament. Banking elites who had caused the crisis in the
first place remained in their jobs and retained their bonuses. The economic and
political systems these actors created not only remained in place but began to
implement an economic and financial policy regime known as Austerity. This set of
policies has placed the burden of resolving the crisis on ordinary citizens and those
who for or are dependent on the state.
What went wrong? Why did the citizens of Ireland, Portugal and Spain not mobilize
to protest against the Eurocrisis and Austerity to anywhere near the extent that they
did in Greece? Why have citizens not mobilized to contest existing economic and
political elites who very clearly destroyed national economies and totally failed to do
their jobs? This paper is a first attempt to try and answer these questions. It begins
by initially discussing how social movement scholars have looked at the EU and EU
events more generally in mobilizing protest. Moving on it focuses on the Eurocrisis
itself, disaggregates it, and from a social movements perspective shows how it is
deeply complex and nuanced and many only constitutes a singular event in a very
loose sense. This has important implications for its framing as an issue of grievance
mobilization for social movements. The paper then uses the example of the Irish
Fiscal Compact Treaty referendum and the social movements who mobilized to
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contest it. The referendum was a de facto vote and austerity and the paper argues that
important conclusions can be drawn from investigating the narrative surrounding the
debate on it. Finally, the paper concludes by developing a basic means of
operationalization to understand that the high profile protests in Greece were
themselves a singular event but that the Eurocrisis has promoted social movement
mobilization but in a far less explicit manner.
The Eurocrisis and Social Movement Mobilization
Before discussing the Eurocrisis itself it is important to clarify what type of actors this
paper is concerned with. This paper utilizes the extensive work of Tarrow on social
movement protest to focus not on groups that raise awareness of issues but on those
that take action to contest and provoke conflict (Tarrow: 1994). Such movements
come to represent a heightened and intense collective concern that has come to
express itself outside of institutionalised venues. Using the term, protest, therefore
not only allows this paper to analyze those movements who have mobilized not just
because of the Eurocrisis but also those who have sought to contest, oppose and
provide alternatives to the present economic and political situation as well.
Building on this work and applying it to a specifically EU sphere, Imig and Tarrow
(2000) developed the first analysis of pan-European social movement mobilization.
Their argument was that the growing influence of European integration in the lives of
ordinary citizens would be reflected in increased mobilization caused by EU level
events. Citizens would soon realize the similarity of events affecting them in
different states and begin pan-European mobilizations. The example they cited was
of Renault car factory workers in Belgium and France joining together to protest in
both their own countries and together in Brussels in front of European Commission
offices. This event, however, appears to have been singular and limited to specific
interest groups, trade unions and other producer groups, and to those in direct physical
contact with other states and the European institutions themselves. As FitzGibbon
(2013) has shown there has been no shortage of protest movement mobilization on the
European issue, just that this mobilization has been focused on the domestic and not
the European level for reasons of practicality, opportunity structures, and issue
framing.
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Following on from Imig and Tarrow (2000), della Porta and Caiani (2009) have
conducted an in-depth analysis of social movement engagement with the EU. Their
focus on the European Social Forum (a network of social and protest movements that
meets yearly across Europe) allowed them to get a wide perspective on social
movement engagement with the European issue. Their findings led them to conclude
that social movements were contesting the EU across the continent, but rather than
approaching it from a classic Eurosceptic perspective (Taggart: 1998) they describe
them as critical Europeanists (della Porta and Caiani, 2009: 180). In this criticism,
however, they have had little impact. Social movements have been largely excluded
from the EUs decision making process or even its deliberative process. The
European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) which was designed as a
constituent EU institution to encourage civil society engagement in the European
project has negligible influence and has become focused facilitating a few trusted
civil society groups to access the EU policy process as they are highly unlikely to
rock the boat (Ibid). Moreover the Convention for the Future of Europe which was
created specifically engage civil society was perceived as failing in the similar fashion
that of facilitating only positive pro-Europeanists from institutionalised civil society
groups to the exclusion of critical voices and genuine grass-roots movements.
From a social movements perspective Europe has come to be thought of as being a
potentially fertile issue, and future arena, of mobilization. Imig and Tarrow (2000)
argued it was only a matter of time before widespread pan-European mobilization
occurred as the process of European integration increased and precipitated a response
from social movement activists. della Porta and Caiani (2009), however, identified
the reason for the failure of this hypothesis to develop. They highlight the lack of a
shared supranational sphere and the resultant inability to create a shared European
frame of experience with which to mobilize civil society, as the central reason for the
failure of pan-European mobilization. Additionally they argue that while there has
been no shortage of European frames for individual social movements, there has been
a distinct lack of awareness of the commonness of this experience. It is only through
specific arenas such as the European Social Forum that the awareness of this common
experience critical engagement with, and contestation of, European integration has
become apparent.
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The social movement context of European integration has not gone unnoticed by
scholars. Indeed some of the most influential academics in the discipline have drawn
attention to it as a new frontier in mobilization and supranational mobilization in
particular. This literature emphasises grass-roots movements as opposed to a wider
spectrum of civil society groups who have long been involved at the supranational
level but whose European level representatives have become de-facto institutionalised
in the EU decision making system (Kohler-Koch: 2010). This is particular the case
with groups such as the European Trade Union Federation, Greenpeace and other well
established civil society groups. Thus from the perspective of the EU, civil society
has been brought firmly into the centre of the EUs policy making process. What the
social movement literature has pointed out, however, is that genuine grass-roots
movements who provide critical, though still pro-European, voices of ordinary
citizens have been passively excluded from the EU. Compounding this exclusion has
been the absence of a shared arena of mobilization for civil society based protestors to
collaborate together and thus to increase the strength of their contestation. Instead EU
focused protest has been almost totally nationally based, subject to the vagaries of
political opportunities for each different member state despite significant overlap in
the issues of grievance of those protest groups who have mobilized.
The obvious following on question to this review of the literature is what happens
when there is the tremendous exogenous shock of the economic and financial crisis
hereafter labelled the Eurocrisis to a potential shared European arena and a shared
consciousness of this experience? European integration is very much a reactive
process therefore can we expect social movement interaction with it to respond to
events and change how it functions as well?
What is the Eurocrisis?
This paper began with the assertion that the Eurocrisis was a singular event that had
strong potential to greatly facilitate mass protest movement formation to contest the
EU. But it is fundamentally important to understand what the Eurocrisis itself
actually is. Indeed even the term Eurocrisis used for this paper is itself not the only
accepted label for the situation under discussion. For the purposes of this paper it
does perfectly encapsulates the Euro-centric (both EU and Euro currency) nature of
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the situation and its calamitous and highly negative nature earning the term crisis.
The more broader term used is the economic and financial crisis in the Eurozone or
the sovereign debt crisis or the Eurozone Crisis amongst many others. All of these
terms are perfectly acceptable but fail to capture the meaning of the crisis for both the
Eurozone and the EU itself, simultaneously, beyond just the economic and financial
problems.
There are numerous explanations for the origin of the Eurocrisis. The most common
narrative (Lane: 2012) is that the wider global financial crisis that started in 2008
originally caused by banks holding sub-prime US mortgages overextending
themselves and once the first tranche of loans defaulted there was an almost
instantaneous reduction in credit in the global market choking off economic growth.
Major European banks also held significant amounts of these mortgages and
experienced similar bad debt problems. What made the crisis worse in some
European states, especially Ireland and Spain, was that they both had an extremely
indebted banking system, almost totally property related. These banking systems
were thus extremely exposed to the crash and thus experienced the sharpest reduction
in credit and ultimately the most severe economic reverse. This was compounded
further by the decision of some countries to bailout their banks and to ultimately
convert bank debt to sovereign national government debt. A more Euro specific
argument (Stiglitz: 2013) is that it was the institutional design of the Eurozone itself
that caused the economic damage. Failing to develop centralised financial policies
and a common banking oversight mechanism greatly exacerbated asymmetries in the
Eurozone between those states with export-orientated economies and those with
economies based on domestic consumption. Put more simply the very institutional
design of the Euro currency union was incomplete and rather than uniting its members
it exacerbated differences between the economies of different countries. A further,
more politically motivated, narrative (Schaeuble: 2011) is that those countries that are
now suffering the most from the outcome of the Eurocrisis are those that were the
worst governed, that spent borrowed money recklessly, failed to adequately supervise
their banks or to even comprehend the responsibilities as members of the Euro to
manage their finances prudently.
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Synthesising this brief analysis of the Eurocrisis a clear set of common causal factors
are identifiable, namely a banking crisis, a sovereign wealth crisis and a crisis of
competent government management in the four states this paper is concerned with.
What is less clear, however, from the general term Eurocrisis is that each of the
different countries experience of the Eurocrisis was caused in turn by separate
elements of each of these causal factors. Blyth (2013) in particular has been most
forceful in arguing this position. His fundamental criticism has been that the
Eurocrisis has many different causes in many different states and therefore the policy
response of Austerity is doomed to failure.
Taking his argument and breaking it down into the constituent countries of this study,
in Table 1, shows that far from being a singular event, the Eurocrisis has a variety of
fundamentally different causes, in addition to the three overarching narratives
discussed above. This has important implications for social movement activists and
their ability to frame both the debate and their narrative of the Eurocrisis. Media
outlets have consistently referred to a generalised wave of protest across the three
states without alluding to the specific framing of mobilization in each state (Rachman:
2011). What academic analyses that have been completed have rightly tended to
focus on firstly understanding the nature of protest in each country separately. A few
edited volumes have sought to draw wider comparisons between those countries
categorized as the PIGS group of states, but as of yet this paper is the only one to do
so in a systematic manner in a single piece of work.
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Table 1: Condensed Causal factors for Eurocrisis in each of the PIGS Country Cause of Economic and Financial Crisis
Greece Long term structural failings of Greek economy exposed with
crisis; Government misreporting of budget deficit; Government
mismanagement of economy and finances; Greek banks
overexposed to Greek government debt
Ireland Property market collapse, resultant collapse in government
income from property industry; banking collapse due to
overexposure to property market; failed government bank bailout
policy nationalises worthless bank debt leaving national debt at
unsustainable levels
Portugal Long term structural failings of Portuguese economy exposed
with credit tightening; government failure to reform economy,
promote growth
Spain Property market collapse, resultant collapse in government
income from property industry; regional government owned
banking system collapses, central government forced to bailout
regions; government failure to diversify employment away from
related industries of property and tourism
Adapted from Blyth (2013), Lane (2012) and Stiglitz (2013)
The second point to be made in relation to comprehending the Eurocrisis is that it is
composed of two very distinct elements. Firstly, as discussed above, are the causal
factors of the crisis. Secondly, however, there is the policy response to the crisis.
The first element does not appear to have generated the basis for a shared feeling of
mobilization. Banking systems in Ireland and Spain while heavily leveraged on
property had fundamentally different dynamics. Ireland nationalised its bank debt
through a slow burn process that began in 2008 but where the extent of the losses
only really became apparent in 2011. In Spain the central government implemented a
domino strategy of rescuing each regional bank, or Casa, as they collapsed under the
weight of property debts. Similarly to Ireland it was a long-drawn out deeply
complicated financial process which the Spanish government repeatedly insisted
would end quickly. Government finances in Portugal were a victim of long term
problems of an inefficient and unreformed economy. It was a question of when not if
they would collapse when the global financial crisis, let alone the Eurocrisis, struck.
The causal factors behind Greeces experience of the Eurocrisis are the outlier in this
situation. Fraudulent government finances and the totally unsustainable nature of the
Greek banking system were revealed almost immediately at the onset of the
Eurocrisis. Rather than the long drawn out banking rescue processes in Ireland and
Spain or the widely perceived inevitability of problems in Portugal, the entirety of the
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Greek economic system, both private and public, collapsed in a matter of months once
the global financial crisis struck Europe.
If it is accepted that the causes of the Eurocrisis were so fundamentally different in
each state then it is obvious as to why it did not provide the spark to light up the
streets of Ireland, Portugal and Spain with protests similar to Greece. Therefore it is
to the second element of the Eurocrisis, the policy response of Austerity that must
be examined next to investigate if it had the potential to launch a wave of European
protest.
Austerity as the Real Eurocrisis
In the past two or so years Austerity has come to be construed as the true meaning of
the Eurocrisis. In this sense we are looking at mobilization based on the policy
response or outcome of the Eurocrisis and not necessarily on the causes of the crisis
itself. To understand this proposition the fundamental nature of what actually
constitutes Austerity will be discussed. Blyth (2013) has provided a searing critique
of the concept of austerity that has gathered widespread appreciation he labels it as
a dangerous idea. Unlike the cause of the Eurocrisis the policy developed to deal
with it, Austerity, can be understood in a fairly uniform manner across the three case
studies. The difference has been in the application of austerity. While Ireland has
seen the deepest cuts in spending because of its far higher GDP rate, it has remained
by the far richest per capita of the four states. Despite Portugal not having to engage
in as much spending cuts as Ireland, increased taxation as Greece or structural
reforms as Spain, it has endured the longest period of zero and negative growth.
Amongst the PIGS states Greece is by far the greatest outlier. Looking at Tables 2.1,
and 2.2 the impact of the Eurocrisis in terms of unemployment rates and negative
growth, with Greece in particular being impacted across all two measures, is clearly
visible. Breaking down the experience of austerity shows that while each of the
states have undergone the enactment of austerity policies, not all have had the same
set of policies enacted in the same manner, to the same extent and with the same
effect. To understand austerity further a deeper contextualisation of it must be made
which goes in tandem with the political economic analysis of Blyth.
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Table 2.1: Unemployment Rate in the PIGS
Eurodata: 2014
Table 2.2 GDP Growth Range % in the PIGS
Eurodata: 2014
Austerity has been bundled together as part of bailout packages of emergency
funding to pay for the current account deficits of Greece, Ireland and Portugal. Spain
has not entered a bailout agreement but has implemented austerity along broadly
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similar lines to those of the other two states. These bailout agreements have been
negotiated with, and overseen, in each of the three states by the Troika consisting of
the IMF, European Commission and European Central Bank. Austerity is therefore
not simply just the package of economic and financial policies that Blyth details, it
also the symbol of the subservience of these states to supranational European actors
and the IMF that are perceived to have forced these measures on the states. This is
an important point as it allows for the, correct, perception among citizens that
Austerity is not just an issue to contest with the national government but toward the
EU as well.
Austerity is comprised of a series of policies (Lane: 2012). Principally it is centred on
fiscal policies dramatic reduction in government spending in combination with a
sustained increase in taxation. One does not need to be have an economic training to
come to the conclusion that this will result in the immediate cessation of growth and
will cause deflation. Neither does one have to have a training in public finances to
understand that the burden of fiscal readjustment will fall on those most dependent on
the state and those with the lowest disposable income. In other words those marginal
in society the unemployed, elderly, incapacitated, students, lowest income and
those in the squeezed middle who pay a disproportionate share of taxes relative to
their incomes.
In addition to the fiscal element of Austerity there are also more substantive and
specific long term economic policies (Lane: 2012). These almost exclusively focus
on the liberalisation of previously sheltered parts of the economy such as notaries,
taxi drivers, pharmacists and their opening up to market competition. Additionally
Austerity programmes have laid out detailed plans with corresponding timelines for
the sale of state assets. In the case of Greece where the government dominates this
economy this has amounted to scores of billions of Euro in a country littered with
national cultural and historical treasures. Finally, deep structural reforms of domestic
economies have also been prioritised in labour markets. This has meant the firing of
thousands of civil servants and the end of guaranteed security of tenure for millions of
others. The introduction of flexible labour contracts for young people to encourage
employers to take them on without the risk of having to give them guaranteed jobs.
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Table 3: Implementation of Austerity in the PIGS Cause of Crisis Focus of Austerity Policies
Greece Total collapse of state finances
Tax increases, public service
redundancies, state assets sales,
liberalisation of areas of economy,
reduction in state spending, labour
market reforms
Ireland Nationalisation of private bank
debt
Spreading of tax base, significant
reduction in state spending, some
state asset sales
Portugal Long term deterioration in state
finances
Spreading of tax base, significant
reduction in state spending, some
state asset sales, labour market
reforms
Spain Nationalisation of private/local
authority bank debt
Labour market reforms, significant
reduction in state spending
Blyth (2013), Lane (2012) and Stiglitz (2013)
Taking all of these elements of austerity into consideration it is obvious that there
are numerous avenues for grievances across a wide spectrum of society. As Table 3
shows there was an obvious pattern of policies implemented across the PIGS states.
Moreover, wrapping up these elements in documents commonly known as bailout
programmes, makes the connection between their agreement between national
governments and the Troika and their impact on everyday life clearly comprehensible
for all citizens. Adding to this apparent perfect storm of mobilization conditions
across the four countries is the enforcement of Austerity by outside unelected and
apparently unaccountable supranational actors. If the economic and political collapse
caused by the incipient Eurocrisis could not provoke an immediate and sustained
mobilization then surely the implementation of Austerity must have?
The Irish Referendum on the Fiscal Compact Treaty
Leading Irish opinion writers Fintan OToole and Gene Kerrigan have published
many articles from 2009 on lambasting the Irish public for their failure to take to the
streets to oppose Austerity and to demand radical political and social change. This
frustration was further deepened by the passage through referendum of the EU Fiscal
Compact Treaty in June 2012. This Treaty enshrined the basic principles of Austerity
policies into Irish law principally budget deficit targets of no greater than -3% of
GDP and government debt of no greater than 66% of GDP. Irish citizens were given
a de facto veto over the implementation of Austerity in Ireland and potentially the
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Eurozone itself (FitzGibbon: 2013). Yet they voted Yes by a decisive majority of
60.3% to 39.7%.
What explains such behaviour? The Irish public reeling from four years of Austerity,
bank bailouts and political failure still voted to accepted the policy outcome of the
Eurocrisis. This paper will now examine those protest movements who mobilized to
contest the Fiscal Compact Treaty. Based on a series of interviews with the leading
organisers and founders of these movements it examines the reasons why they
mobilized, why they did not mobilize before and why they think the Treaty was
passed.
Though several trade unions came out decisively against the Treaty, the main trade
union body, the Irish Congress of Trade Unions (ICTU), did not take a position on the
Treaty. While in the past ICTU had been a supporter of some European treaties, and
ambiguous on others, it did not follow the strong condemnation of the Treaty by the
European Trade Union Congress (ETUC). This was the first time the ETUC had come
out against a European Treaty and their language in opposing it was unequivocal: the
new Treaty will undermine the support of the population for European integration,
and it will stifle growth and increase unemployment (ETUC: 2012). Yet despite a
vote at the ICTU general conference authorizing the general committee to advocate a
No vote, they did not make a recommendation either way. Trade union leaders from
the private sector argued that this was because of fear amongst the large and dominant
public sector unions that a No vote would have serious repercussions for jobs and
wages for those in government employment (Devoy: Author Interview). Fear was the
main reason behind this failure of the centre-left to mobilize. The possibility of
Ireland being cut out of ESM funding, and thus having to reduce its public deficit
more quickly, caused many trade unionists, Labour party members, and those reliant
on the public sector, to largely withdraw from the campaign (Horan; ODonoghue:
Author Interviews).
While the Irish trade union movement has organised the largest protests against
Austerity and the Irish government response to the Eurocrisis of bailing out Irish
banks, these protests have been largely one off events, uncoordinated in a systematic
manner and offering only limited changes to government economic policy. From the
interviews conducted it was clear that the sentiment in the trade union movement and
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centre-left civil society groups was one of fear toward the future of the country if the
government did not implement its policies broadly in-line with the bailout
agreements.
This is not to say, however, that simply because the political centre-left did not
mobilize against the Treaty, that there was total lack of civil society engagement with
the Treaty referendum. On the contrary the referendum saw the mobilization of just
as many, if not more, genuine grass-roots protest movements to oppose the Treaty as
had other EU related referendums. These various civil society groups used the
campaign to articulate their opposition to government policies public anger at
government Austerity policies and the European dimension of these same policies.
These issues ranged from the failure of the Treaty to re-negotiate Irelands bank
bailout and stop the on-going payment of bonds to the failed Irish banks, a moral
outrage that campaigners argued was forced on Ireland by the ECB and the French
and German governments. Other groups sought to link the Treaty to the passing of
increased taxes, specifically charges for rural sewage treatment, household charges
(property taxes) and the introduction of water charges (Reynolds; OReilly: Author
interviews). Their argument was that the neo-liberal slant of the Treaty was the basis
for such charges. The European dimension of the Treaty was the focus of the
Another Europe is Possible group. Though small and formed only a few weeks
before the referendum, they sought to highlight, from a non-party aligned position, the
need to reject the neo-liberal austerity policies of the Treaty and participate in a
Europe wide change in direction toward more social and citizen focused policies
(ODonoghue: Author interview).
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Table 4: Indicative List of Irish Protest Movements Opposed to Fiscal Compact
Treaty 2012
Issue/s of Mobilization Support Euro.
Int. Y/N
Offered
Alternative
Policies
Advocated EU
withdrawal
Another Europe
is Possible
End to Austerity;
Renegotiation of Fiscal
Compact to focus on
jobs, economic
expansion
Y Y N
Farmers
Against Europe
Reversal of
charges/taxes on
property, water, sewage
N Y N
Turf Cutters and
Contractors
Association
Reversal of
charges/taxes on
property, water, sewage,
specific environment
regulations
N N N
Ballyhea Says
No
Denationalisation of
Bank debt, end to
austerity;
Renegotiation of Treaty
to focus on jobs,
economic expansion
Y Y N
Cir End to austerity N N N
Libertas Denationalisation of
Bank debt
Y Y N
Citizens Against
Charges
End to austerity;
Reversal of
charges/taxes on
property, water, sewage;
Renegotiation of Treaty
to focus on jobs,
economic expansion
N Y N
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The Irish Fiscal Compact Treaty referendum campaign thus provides an insight into
how social movements have viewed the Eurocrisis. Irish citizens were provided with
a direct vote on an EU treaty that essentially enshrined Austerity policies into law.
Civil society responded by mobilizing as wide a diversity of groups as have mobilized
for any previous EU referendum. As Table 4 shows above, the vast majority of
movements who mobilized to oppose the Fiscal Compact Treaty did not advocate
withdrawal from the EU or withdrawal from the Euro itself. What these movements
did was take the opportunity to articulate either an alternative set of policies for how
they envisioned European integration or to directly challenge specific Austerity
policies that directly affected them. As the majority of groups came from a left-wing
grass-roots background their alternative policies were generally focused on the
changing of EU economic policy away from Austerity toward a Keynesianist
expansionary policy of state spending and investment. Similarly the policies that they
opposed were those they deemed to be unfairly falling on those that had not caused
the crisis, ordinary citizens, instead of those that had banking and political elites.
For these movements the opportunity of the referendum was not just to contest
Austerity but to provide an alternative policy that could be enacted at the European
level. Previous to this, movements that have mobilized against European integration
have focused just on securing the defeat of the European issue in question and not on
providing alternative policies. Additionally it facilitated them to frame their highly
specific issues water charges, rural sewage inspection payments as direct
examples of how the Eurocrisis was affecting ordinary citizens in their local area.
Protest and the Eurocrisis: What went wrong?
From what this paper has discussed several key points toward understanding why far
greater levels of mobilization did not occur to contest the Eurocrisis. Firstly, the
paper showed that the Eurocrisis itself is not a singular event. It was caused by
different factors in each of the four countries. Therefore it should not have been
expected for Ireland, Portugal and Spain to follow Greek citizens in their engagement
of mass protest and direct, frequently violent, contestation of their government.
Secondly, the analysis of the Irish Fiscal Compact Treaty referendum campaign
showed that the Eurocrisis and the resultant policy of Austerity has forced social
movements to provide an alternative to the existing policies of European integration.
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The Irish centre-left was almost wholly absent for this debate, principally because
they could not formulate an agreed, consistent and viable alternative to Austerity. As
Austerity has been promoted as the solution to the present disastrous economic
situation, social movements have had to come up with their own alternative policies.
Advocating the status quo is not possible, while opposing policies without providing
an alternative merely reinforces the narrative of governments/pro-austerity actors that
there is no alternative other than to continue to pursue the existing policy framework.
There is little doubt that Austerity had the unique potential to unite the citizens of the
PIGS to oppose and contest a set of policies imposed on them by supranational
institutions.
What these points emphasise is the extremely difficult situation presented by the
Eurocrisis to potential protest movements. They have to firstly comprehend the
complex economic and financial background to Austerity. Then they have to
progress on to develop a clear and somewhat viable alternative set of policies that
have agreement amongst the membership of the protest movement. Political parties
with extensive policy development capabilities have difficulty achieving such ends.
Similarly such an endeavour is difficult for well established movements on
longitudinal issues. Responding to the rapidly unfurling, and deeply complex, events
in the Eurocrisis has therefore fallen into two areas. Firstly, there has been the almost
instantaneous and direct confrontational protest, without the construction of
alternative policies. The most obvious example of this is Greece where the rapid
deterioration of the economy and the implosion of the government created a distinct
environment of chaos which was mirrored in instant violent protest on the streets of
Athens and other Greek cities. Secondly, after a period of absorption protest
movements mobilized to contest austerity as they have come to an understanding of
the causes of the Eurocrisis in their own country and how the policies of Austerity
directly impact themselves and their communities. This gives the appearance in some
states that civil society has not responded to either the Eurocrisis or Austerity more
specifically. In Ireland there was no mass protest as in Greece, no singular seismic
protest as in Iceland but some five years after the start of the financial crisis there
have been many protest movements campaigning against specific Austerity policies
from the introduction of water charges, the roll out of a property tax, cutbacks to
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special education assistants, among many others. These directly targeted protests are
genuinely grass-roots movements that have developed in many different parts of the
country alongside attempts by established political parties to raise awareness of the
Austerity policies in question.
The immediacy of the Eurocrisis and its initial focus on complicated macroeconomic
issues such as government bonds, subordinated debt holders, monetary policy, made it
difficult both for citizens to comprehend and protest movements to mould into a
comprehensive issue frame of mobilization in all of the countries bar the outlier of
Greece. Once the Eurocrisis evolved and policies of Austerity were implemented, the
highly specific focus of the bailout agreements on policies that impacted directly on
specific groups in society made the potential for issue framing far easier.
Compounding this was the forced implementation of Austerity by the international
institutions of the Troika. The allowed for a deeper framing of specific issues water
charges (Ireland), youth unemployment (Spain), pension cuts (Portugal) as not just
unfair but also undemocratically imposed by foreign actors.
Taking these points into consideration, this paper argues that not only should the
Eurocrisis be seen as a multi-faceted event but also as one consisting of two waves
of protest mobilization. The first wave was that of the immediate impact of the
original global economic and financial crisis. This rapidly impacted Greece before all
the other states whose experience of the Eurocrisis was longer drawn out. The second
wave was that of Austerity, more precisely the direct impact of Austerity policies on
specific communities and groups in societies. As the mass public protests in Greece
have greatly reduced, protests in the other three states have started to increase. The
fundamental difference being that these are not mass public demonstrations in
national capitals but invariably small, local and highly targeted grass-roots organised
protests. Looking on in to the future this paper makes the argument that a further
third wave of protest will occur, one that finally makes the leap into a genuine
European arena of contestation. This protest will take place at the European
Parliament elections in May of 2014 where, as all opinion polls indicate, the dominant
centre-right who have largely been responsible for the policy of Austerity will suffer
significant setbacks to the centre-left and radical-left. Moreover, Eurosceptic parties
and politicians look equally set to take a significant increase in vote share.
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Conclusion: Waves, not wave, of Protest
Media outlets and other social figures in many countries have been quizzical as to the
apparent unwillingness of the citizens of Ireland, Portugal and Spain for failing to
follow the example of the Greek counterparts by taking to the streets amid a wave of
protest. This paper argues that such a perspective is myopic. Instead we should be
looking at the waves of protest that have emerged, are emerging, and more than likely
will emerge to contest the deeply complex and persistent Eurocrisis.
In this paper Greece has emerged as the significant outlier relative to the other states
who have also undergone direct application of Austerity. Expecting the citizens of
these states to take the streets as their counterparts in Athens had conveniently ignores
the radically different set of circumstances Greece has experienced. Comments on the
apparent lack of protest mobilization have been fixated on the lack of large violent
street demonstrations. What they ignore, however, is the growing number of grass-
roots movements who are mobilizing to contest Austerity in their own communities
within a very specific issue framework.
No doubt there will be tremendous surprise when the result of the 2014 European
Parliament elections show substantial gains for Austerity opponents and Eurosceptics.
This paper has argued that the Eurocrisis is multi-faceted and long-drawn-out event.
It should come as little surprise that protest movement mobilisation in contestation of
it has these same features.
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Author Interviews
Eamon Devoy, General Secretary of the TEEU.
Blair Horan, Former ICTU EUTC Rapporteur.
Siobhn ODonoghue, Founder and CEO Another Europe is Possible. James Reynolds, President Farmers Against Europe.
Sen OReilly, Citizens Against Charges.