jennifer stisa granick, esq. exec. director, center for internet & society stanford law school...

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Jennifer Stisa Granick, Esq. Exec. Director, Center for Internet & Society Stanford Law School Stanford, California USA http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu Black Hat Briefings 2004 Legal Liability and Security Incident Investigation QuickTime™ and a TIFF (Uncompressed) decompressor are needed to see this picture.

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Page 1: Jennifer Stisa Granick, Esq. Exec. Director, Center for Internet & Society Stanford Law School Stanford, California USA  Black

Jennifer Stisa Granick, Esq. Exec. Director, Center for Internet & Society

Stanford Law SchoolStanford, California USA

http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu

Black Hat Briefings 2004

Legal Liability and Security Incident Investigation

QuickTime™ and aTIFF (Uncompressed) decompressor

are needed to see this picture.

Page 2: Jennifer Stisa Granick, Esq. Exec. Director, Center for Internet & Society Stanford Law School Stanford, California USA  Black

Intrusion Investigation Tools

• Social Engineering• Wiretap• Sniffing Wireless• Stored Communications• Keystroke Logging• Port Scanning

Page 3: Jennifer Stisa Granick, Esq. Exec. Director, Center for Internet & Society Stanford Law School Stanford, California USA  Black

Intrusion Investigation Tools, con’t

• Vulnerability Scanning• Remote Access• Trojan Horse Programs• Ping, whois, traceroute, finger,

googling• Web Beacons• Strike-Back or “Active Defense”

Technology

Page 4: Jennifer Stisa Granick, Esq. Exec. Director, Center for Internet & Society Stanford Law School Stanford, California USA  Black

Possible Legal Liability/Obstacles

• Fourth Amendment• Fraud• Illegal Interception of/Access to Data

• Computer Crime Laws: Unauthorized Access

• Possessing Illegal Tools/Devices

Page 5: Jennifer Stisa Granick, Esq. Exec. Director, Center for Internet & Society Stanford Law School Stanford, California USA  Black

Fourth Amendment

Protects against unreasonable search and seizure

Constrains government and gov’t agents

Page 6: Jennifer Stisa Granick, Esq. Exec. Director, Center for Internet & Society Stanford Law School Stanford, California USA  Black

Social Engineering

If you have some idea of who attacked your system, or where evidence might be, can you pretend to be someone else to get information (user ids, passwords, etc.) to use in your investigation?

Page 7: Jennifer Stisa Granick, Esq. Exec. Director, Center for Internet & Society Stanford Law School Stanford, California USA  Black

FraudApplies to Social engineering?•Misrepresentation•Fraudulent purpose: “to

deprive another of the intangible right of honest services, money, etc.”?

Page 8: Jennifer Stisa Granick, Esq. Exec. Director, Center for Internet & Society Stanford Law School Stanford, California USA  Black

SniffingCan you monitor in real time

your own system, the suspected intruder’s system, or the system of a third party to get more information about the attack?

Page 9: Jennifer Stisa Granick, Esq. Exec. Director, Center for Internet & Society Stanford Law School Stanford, California USA  Black

Illegal Interception Issues

• Monitoring by:– Intelligence Agency or Law

Enforcement– Service Provider, Business, Employer– Other

• Content of Communications vs. Transactional or Traffic Information

• Real Time vs. In Storage• Rights of Third Parties

Page 10: Jennifer Stisa Granick, Esq. Exec. Director, Center for Internet & Society Stanford Law School Stanford, California USA  Black

Wiretapping/Sniffing

General Rule: No interception (acquisition) of the CONTENTS of communications in transit. – No eavesdropping/sniffing– No using or disclosing

intercepted communications

Page 11: Jennifer Stisa Granick, Esq. Exec. Director, Center for Internet & Society Stanford Law School Stanford, California USA  Black

Exceptions to Rule Against Interception

• Warrant• Computer Trespasser Exception• Consent of a Party to the

Communication Exception• Provider Exception (System

Protection)• Readily accessible to general

public

Page 12: Jennifer Stisa Granick, Esq. Exec. Director, Center for Internet & Society Stanford Law School Stanford, California USA  Black

Wiretap Warrant

• DOJ Approval• Federal Judge• Warrant/Prob. Cause• Predicate Offense• Necessity/No Other Means• Minimization• 30 day authorization

Page 13: Jennifer Stisa Granick, Esq. Exec. Director, Center for Internet & Society Stanford Law School Stanford, California USA  Black

Computer Trespasser Exception

Government may monitor “trespasser” if• No contractual relationship or authority to

be on computer• Provider authorized interception• Government does the monitoring• Only communications to and from

trespasser intercepted and• Reasonable grounds to believe info is

relevant to an ongoing (legitimate) investigation

Page 14: Jennifer Stisa Granick, Esq. Exec. Director, Center for Internet & Society Stanford Law School Stanford, California USA  Black

Party/Consent Exception

Party to a communication can intercept or give consent to intercept–Warning Banners: All activity subject to monitoring

–Terms of Service

Page 15: Jennifer Stisa Granick, Esq. Exec. Director, Center for Internet & Society Stanford Law School Stanford, California USA  Black

Service Provider Exception

• Provider May Monitor to Protect Its Rights or Property

• May intercept communications if inherently necessary to providing the service

• Scope of exception undefined

Page 16: Jennifer Stisa Granick, Esq. Exec. Director, Center for Internet & Society Stanford Law School Stanford, California USA  Black

Accessible to the Public

• 2511(2)(g)(i): It shall not be unlawful under this chapter or chapter 121 of this title for any person - “to intercept or access an electronic communication made through an electronic communication system that is configured so that such electronic communication is readily accessible to the general public”

• Are open wireless access points accessible to the general public?

Page 17: Jennifer Stisa Granick, Esq. Exec. Director, Center for Internet & Society Stanford Law School Stanford, California USA  Black

Can You Do RT Traffic Analysis?

General prohibition• LE needs a pen/trap and trace order• Service provider need

– Relating to operation of service– Protection of rights or property of

provider– To record fact of completion

• Consent of user

Page 18: Jennifer Stisa Granick, Esq. Exec. Director, Center for Internet & Society Stanford Law School Stanford, California USA  Black

Reviewing Stored Files or Logs

Can you search documents the intruder placed on your system? On an intermediary system? On his/her own system?

Page 19: Jennifer Stisa Granick, Esq. Exec. Director, Center for Internet & Society Stanford Law School Stanford, California USA  Black

Accessing Stored Communications

General Prohibition:Illegal to access stored

communications without or in excess of authorization

Page 20: Jennifer Stisa Granick, Esq. Exec. Director, Center for Internet & Society Stanford Law School Stanford, California USA  Black

Provider’s Right to Review

• Any provider may freely read stored email/files of its customers– Not unauthorized access to the

system

• A non-public provider may also freely disclose that information– for example, an employer

Page 21: Jennifer Stisa Granick, Esq. Exec. Director, Center for Internet & Society Stanford Law School Stanford, California USA  Black

Accessing Stored Subscriber Info

Provider may access and disclose non-content records to anyone except a governmental entity

• Exceptions– to protect provider’s rights/property– threat of death/serious bodily injury– appropriate legal process – consent of subscriber

Page 22: Jennifer Stisa Granick, Esq. Exec. Director, Center for Internet & Society Stanford Law School Stanford, California USA  Black

Accessing Other Computer Systems

Can you disable a system that is sending you malicious code? Can you install monitoring programs on another system? Can you gain remote access to that system to search it?

Page 23: Jennifer Stisa Granick, Esq. Exec. Director, Center for Internet & Society Stanford Law School Stanford, California USA  Black

Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (18 USC 1030)

• Unauthorized access that causes damage to protected computer– loss > $5,000 in value– modification or impairment of the medical

data– physical injury to any person; – a threat to public health or safety; – damage to computer system used in

furtherance of the administration of justice, national defense, or national security

Page 24: Jennifer Stisa Granick, Esq. Exec. Director, Center for Internet & Society Stanford Law School Stanford, California USA  Black

Things That Are Unauthorized

Access/Trespass• SPAM• Domain name search robots• Internet auction information

spiders• Travel agent price aggregators• “Cookies”• Port scanning?

Page 25: Jennifer Stisa Granick, Esq. Exec. Director, Center for Internet & Society Stanford Law School Stanford, California USA  Black

Port Scanning

• Metaphors–Jiggling Doorknobs–Looking at the house

• Moulton v. VC3: Not unauthorized access under 18 USC 1030, no damage

• Attempt?

Page 26: Jennifer Stisa Granick, Esq. Exec. Director, Center for Internet & Society Stanford Law School Stanford, California USA  Black

Trojan Horse• 18 USC 1030(a)(5)(A)(i) :

knowingly causes the transmission of a program, information, code, or command, and as a result of such conduct, intentionally causes damage without authorization, to a protected computer

Page 27: Jennifer Stisa Granick, Esq. Exec. Director, Center for Internet & Society Stanford Law School Stanford, California USA  Black

Strike Back•Unauthorized Access/Transmission

•Defense of self/others?•Justification/Necessity?

Page 28: Jennifer Stisa Granick, Esq. Exec. Director, Center for Internet & Society Stanford Law School Stanford, California USA  Black

Possible to Get in Trouble for Net. Analysis Tools?

• COE: Article 6

• France: LEN

• US: DMCA

Page 29: Jennifer Stisa Granick, Esq. Exec. Director, Center for Internet & Society Stanford Law School Stanford, California USA  Black

COE Article 6

• Criminalizes the production, sale, procurement for use, import, distribution of a device or program designed or adapted primarily for the purpose of committing unauthorized access or data intercept, and possession with criminal intent or such a device.

• No criminal liability if not for the purpose of committing an offence, such as for the authorized testing or protection of a computer system

Page 30: Jennifer Stisa Granick, Esq. Exec. Director, Center for Internet & Society Stanford Law School Stanford, California USA  Black

France: loi pour la confiance dans l'économie numérique

• Art. 323-3-1. - Le fait, sans motif légitime, d'importer, de détenir, d'offrir,de céder ou de mettre à disposition un équipement, un instrument, un programme informatique ou toute donnée conçus ou spécialement adaptés pour commettre une ou plusieurs des infractions prévues par les articles 323-1 à 323-3 est puni des peines prévues respectivement pour l'infraction elle-même ou pour l'infraction la plus sévèrement réprimée.»

• “Sans motif legitime”: Burden on possessor to prove legitimate motive

Page 31: Jennifer Stisa Granick, Esq. Exec. Director, Center for Internet & Society Stanford Law School Stanford, California USA  Black

US: DMCA

• Prohibits Circumvention of Technological Measure that Effectively Controls Access to a Copyrighted Work

• Prohibits Manufacturing and Distribution of Any Technology (Tools)– Primarily Designed for the Purpose of

Circumventing Access Controls – Limited Commercially Significant Purpose

OR– Marketed for Use in Circumvention

Page 32: Jennifer Stisa Granick, Esq. Exec. Director, Center for Internet & Society Stanford Law School Stanford, California USA  Black

Talk to a Lawyer Before

• Lying to get account information• Intercepting communications • Doing real time traffic analysis• Accessing, installing code on or

disabling other people’s systems

Page 33: Jennifer Stisa Granick, Esq. Exec. Director, Center for Internet & Society Stanford Law School Stanford, California USA  Black

Jennifer Stisa Granick, Esq. Center for Internet & Society

Stanford Law School

559 Nathan Abbott WayStanford, California 94305 USA

+1 (650) [email protected]