NEYPESvs. COURT OF APPEALSG.R. No. 141524September 14, 2005469 SCRA 633CORONA, J.:Facts:Petitioners filed an action for annulment of judgment and titles of land and/or reconveyanceand/or reversion with preliminary injunction before the RTC against the private respondents. Later, inan order, the trial court dismissed petitioners complaint on the ground of prescription. Petitioners allegedly received a copy of the order of dismissal on March 3, 1998 and, on the 15th day thereafter oron March 18, 1998, filed a motion for reconsideration. On July 1, 1998, the trial court issued anotherorder dismissing the motion for reconsideration which petitioners received on July 22, 1998. Five dayslater, on July 27, 1998, petitioners filed a notice of appeal and paid the appeal fees on August 3, 1998.On August 4, 1998, the court a quo denied the notice of appeal, holding that it was filed eightdayslate.ThiswasreceivedbypetitionersonJuly31,1998.Petitionersfiledamotionforreconsideration but this too was denied in an order dated September 3, 1998. Via a petition forcertiorari and mandamus under Rule 65, petitioners assailed the dismissal of the notice of appealbefore the CA. In the appellate court, petitioners claimed that they had seasonably filed their notice ofappeal. They argued that the 15-day reglementary period to appeal started to run only on July 22, 1998since this was the day they received the final order of the trial court denying their motion forreconsideration. When they filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998, only five days had elapsedand they were well within the reglementary period for appeal. On September 16, 1999, the CAdismissed the petition. It ruled that the 15-day period to appeal should have been reckoned from March3, 1998 or the day they received the February 12, 1998 order dismissing their complaint. According tothe appellate court, the order was the final order appealable under the Rules.Issues:I. Whether or not receipt of a final order triggers the start of the 15-day reglementary period toappeal the February 12, 1998 order dismissing the complaint or the July 1, 1998 order dismissing theMotion for ReconsiderationII. Whether or not petitioners filed their notice of appeal on time.Held:I. The July 1, 1998 order dismissing the motion for reconsideration should be deemed as thefinal order. In the case of Quelnan v. VHF Philippines, Inc., the trial court declared petitioner non-suited and accordingly dismissed his complaint. Upon receipt of the order of dismissal, he filed anomnibus motion to set it aside. When the omnibus motion was filed, 12 days of the 15-day period toappeal the order had lapsed. He later on received another order, this time dismissing his omnibusmotion. He then filed his notice of appeal. But this was likewise dismissed for having been filed outof time. The court a quo ruled that petitioner should have appealed within 15 days after the dismissalof his complaint since this was the final order that was appealable under the Rules. The SC reversedthe trial court and declared that it was the denial of the motion for reconsideration of an order ofdismissal of a complaint which constituted the final order as it was what ended the issues raised there.This pronouncement was reiterated in the more recent case of Apuyan v. Haldeman et al. where the SCagain considered the order denying petitioners motion for reconsideration as the final order whichfinally disposedof theissues involvedinthe case.Basedon theaforementioned cases, theSCsustained petitioners view that the order dated July 1, 1998 denying their motion for reconsiderationwas the final order contemplated in the Rules.II. Yes. To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fairopportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days withinwhich to file the notice of appeal in the RTC, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion fora newtrial or motion for reconsideration. Henceforth, this fresh period rule shall also applyto Rule40, Rule 42, Rule 43 and Rule 45 but does not apply to Rule 64(Review of Judgments and FinalOrders or Resolutions of the Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit) because Rule 64is derived from the Constitution. It is likewise doubtful whether it will apply to criminal cases. Thenew rule aims toregiment ormake the appeal period uniform, to becounted from receipt of the orderdenying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final orderor resolution.This pronouncement is not inconsistent with Rule 41, Section 3 of the Rules which states thatthe appeal shall be taken within 15 days from notice of judgment or final order appealed from. The useof the disjunctive word or signifies disassociation and independence of one thing from another. Itshould, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies. Hence, the use of or in theabove provision supposes that the notice of appeal may be filed within 15 days from the notice ofjudgment orwithin 15 days from noticeof the finalorder,which we already determined to refer tothe July 1, 1998 order denying the motion for a new trial or reconsideration.

REPUBLIC OFTHE PHILIPPINES et al. v.HONORABLERAMON S. CAGUIOA et al.536 SCRA 193 (2007), EN BANCCongress enacted Republic Act (R.A) No. 7227 or the Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992 which created the Subic Special Economic andFreeportZone (SBF) and the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA). Section 12 of R.A No. 7227 of the law provides that no taxes, local and national, shall be imposed within the Subic Special Economic Zone. Pursuant to the law, Indigo Distribution Corporation, et al., which are alldomesticcorporationsdoing businessat the SBF, applied for and were granted Certificates of Registration and Tax Exemption by the SBMA.Congress subsequently passed R.A. No. 9334, which provides that all applicable taxes, duties, charges, including excise taxes due thereon shall be applied to cigars and cigarettes, distilled spirits, fermented liquors and wines brought directly into the duly chartered or legislated freeports of the Subic EconomicFreeportZone. On the basis of Section 6 of R.A. No. 9334, SBMA issued a Memorandum declaring that, all importations of cigars, cigarettes, distilled spirits, fermented liquors and wines into the SBF, shall be treated as ordinary importationssubjectto all applicable taxes, duties and charges, including excise taxes.Upon its implementation, Indigo et al., sought for a reconsideration of the directives on the imposition of duties and taxes, particularly excise taxes by the Collector of Customs and the SBMA Administrator. Their request was subsequently denied prompting them to file with the RTC of Olongapo City a special civil action for declaratory relief to have certain provisions of R.A. No. 9334 declared as unconstitutional. They prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminaryinjunctionand/or Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and preliminary mandatoryinjunction. The same was subsequentlygranted by Judge Ramon Caguioa. Theinjunctionbond was approved at One Million pesos (P1,000,000).ISSUES:Whether or not public respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess in jurisdiction in peremptorily and unjustly issuing the injunctive writ in favor of private respondents despite the absence of thelegalrequisites for its issuanceHELD:One such case of grave abuse obtained in this case when Judge Caguioa issued his Order of May 4, 2005 and the Writ of PreliminaryInjunctionon May 11, 2005 despite the absence of aclearand unquestionedlegal rightof private respondents. In holding that the presumption of constitutionality and validity of R.A. No. 9334 was overcome by private respondents for the reasons public respondent cited in his May 4, 2005 Order, he disregarded the fact that as a condition sine qua non to the issuance of a writ of preliminaryinjunction, private respondents needed also to show aclearlegal rightthat ought to be protected. That requirement is not satisfied in this case. To stress, the possibility of irreparable damage without proof of an actual existing right would not justify an injunctive relief.Indeed, Sections 204 and 229 of the NIRC provide for the recovery of erroneously or illegally collected taxes which would be the nature of the excise taxes paid by private respondents should Section 6 of R.A. No. 9334 be declared unconstitutional or invalid.The Court finds that public respondent had also ventured into the delicate area which courts are cautioned from taking when deciding applications for the issuance of the writ of preliminaryinjunction. Having ruled preliminarily against the prima facie validity of R.A. No. 9334, he assumed in effect the proposition that private respondents in their petition for declaratory relief were duty bound to prove, thereby shifting to petitioners the burden of proving that R.A. No. 9334 is not unconstitutional or invalid.In the same vein, the Court finds Judge Caguioa to have overstepped his discretion when he arbitrarily fixed theinjunctionbond of the SBF enterprises at only P1million. Rule 58, Section 4(b) provides that a bond is executed in favor of the party enjoined to answer for all damages which it may sustain by reason of theinjunction. The purpose of theinjunctionbond is to protect the defendant against loss or damage by reason of theinjunctionin case the court finally decides that the plaintiff was not entitled to it, and the bond is usually conditioned accordingly.Whether this Court must issue the writ of prohibition, suffice it to stress that being possessed of the power to act on the petition for declaratory relief, public respondent canproceedto determine the merits of the main case. Moreover, lacking the requisite proof of public respondents alleged partiality, this Court has no ground to prohibit him from proceeding with the case for declaratory relief. For these reasons, prohibition does not lie.

The Province of Aklan v. Jody King Construction and Development Corp., G.R. Nos. 197592 & 202623, 27 November 2013FACTS:The Province of Aklan (Aklan) and Jody King Construction and Development Corp. (JKCDC) entered into a contract for the design and construction of the Caticlan Jetty Port and Terminal (Phase I) in Malay, Aklan. In the course of construction, Aklan issued variation/change orders for additional works, whichagreed upon by the parties.Aklan entered into a negotiated contract with JKCDC for the construction of Passenger Terminal Building (Phase II) also at Caticlan Jetty Port in Malay, Aklan. JKCDC made a demand for the total amount of P22,419,112.96 covering the items which Aklan allegedly failed to settle. JKCDC then filed a civil case with the RTC of Marikina City (RTC) against Aklan for the collection of said amount. The RTC issued a writ of preliminary attachment against Aklan. The RTC later ruled in favor of JKCDC (RTC Decision). Since Aklans motion for reconsideration of the RTC Decision was filed out of time, a writ of execution was later issued. The sheriff served notices of garnishment on Land Bank of the Philippines, Philippine National Bank and Development Bank of the Philippines at their branches in Kalibo, Aklan for the satisfaction of the judgment debt from the funds deposited under Aklans account. Said banks, however, refused to give due course to the court order, citing the relevant provisions of statutes, circulars and jurisprudence on the determination of government monetary liabilities, their enforcement and satisfaction.Aklans Notice of Appeal was denied by the RTC (RTC Order). Aklan moved for reconsideration of the RTC Order, which was also denied by the RTC.Aklan filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA) to assail the writ of execution. The CA dismissed said petition, on the ground, among others, that the issue on the execution of the RTC decision had been rendered moot by Aklans filing of a petition before the Commission on Audit (COA).Aklan also filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA to assail the denial of its Notice of Appeal. The CA dismissed said petition and ruled, among others, that Akla was estopped from invoking the doctrine of primary jurisdiction of the COA as it only raised it after Aklans Notice of Appeal was denied and a writ of execution was issued against it.ISSUE:Does the COA have primary jurisdiction over JKCDCs money claims against Aklan?HELD:YES. Under Commonwealth Act No. 327, as amended by Section 26 of Presidential Decree No. 1445, it is the COA, which has primary jurisdiction over money claims against government agencies and instrumentalities. Section 1 of Rule VIII and Section 1 of rule II of COAs 2009 Revised Rules of Procedure also provide, among others, that the COA shall have original jurisdiction over money claim against the Government, and exclusive jurisdiction over money claims due from or owing to any government agency, respectively.The doctrine of primary jurisdiction holds that if a case is such that its determination requires the expertise, specialized training and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies, relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before a remedy is supplied by the courts even if the matter may well be within their proper jurisdiction. It applies where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an administrative agency. In such a case, the court in which the claim is sought to be enforced may suspend the judicial process pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its view or, if the parties would not be unfairly disadvantaged, dismiss the case without prejudice.JKCDC sought to enforce a claim for sums of money allegedly owed by Aklan, a local government unit. As JKCDCs collection suit was against a local government unit, such money claim should have been first brought to the COA. The RTC should have suspended the proceedings and referred the filing of the claim before the COA.ISSUE:Are there exceptions to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction?HELD:There are established exceptions to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, such as: (a) where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine; (b) where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction; (c) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant; (d) where the amount involved is relatively small so as to make the rule impractical and oppressive; (e) where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice; (f) where judicial intervention is urgent; (g) when its application may cause great and irreparable damage; (h) where the controverted acts violate due process; (i) when the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot; (j) when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (k) when strong public interest is involved; and, (l) in quo warranto proceedings.None of the foregoing circumstances are applicable to this case.ISSUE:Is Aklan estopped from raising the issue of jurisdiction before the CA, after the denial of its notice of appeal?HELD:No. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence. All the proceedings of the court in violation of the doctrine and all orders and decisions rendered thereby are null and void.Since a judgment rendered by a body or tribunal that has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case is no judgment at all, it cannot be the source of any right or the creator of any obligation. All acts pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no legal effect and the void judgment can never be final and any writ of execution based on it is likewise void.KJCDCs belated compliance with the formal requirements of presenting its money claim before the COA did not cure the serious errors committed by the RTC in implementing its void decision. The RTC's orders implementing its judgment rendered without jurisdiction must be set aside because a void judgment can never be validly executed.

G.R. No. 174908, June 17, 2013DARMA MASLAG,Petitioner,v.AND ELIZABETH MONZON, WILLIAM GESTON, REGISTRY OF DEEDS OF BENGUET,Respondents.

FACTS:In 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint7for reconveyance of real property with declaration of nullity of original certificate of title (OCT) against respondents Elizabeth Monzon (Monzon), William Geston and the Registry of Deeds of La Trinidad, Benguet. The Complaint was filed before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of La Trinidad, Benguet.

After trial, the MTC found respondent Monzon guilty of fraud in obtaining an OCT over petitioners property.8 It ordered her to reconvey the said property to petitioner, and to pay damages and costs of suit.9Respondents appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of La Trinidad, Benguet.After going over the MTC records and the parties respective memoranda, the RTC of La Trinidad, Benguet, Branch 10, through Acting Presiding Judge Fernando P. Cabato (Judge Cabato), issued its October 22, 2003 Order,10declaring the MTC without jurisdiction over petitioners cause of action. It further held that it will take cognizance of the case pursuant to Section 8, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court.Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal15from the RTCs May 4, 2004 Resolution.

Petitioner assailed the RTCs May 4, 2004 Resolution forreversingthe MTCs factual findings16and prayed that the MTC Decision be adopted.Respondents moved to dismiss petitioners ordinary appeal for being the improper remedy. They asserted that the proper mode of appeal is a Petition for Review under Rule 42 because the RTC rendered its May 4, 2004 Resolution in its appellate jurisdiction.18The CA dismissed petitioners appeal. It observed that the RTCs May 4, 2004 Resolution (the subject matter of the appeal before the CA)set asidean MTC Judgment; hence, the proper remedy is a Petition for Review under Rule 42, and not an ordinary appeal.19

Petitioner sought reconsideration.20 She argued, for the first time, that the RTC rendered its May 4, 2004 Resolution in its original jurisdiction. She cited the earlier October 22, 2003 Order of the RTC declaring the MTC without jurisdiction over the case.

The CA denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in affirming the RTCs findings that it has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case; that the Complaint states no cause of action; and that petitioners Araceli and Arnel have no legal capacity to sue in behalf of the other heirs of Severino.RULING:the RTC declared that the MTC has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case based on the supposition that the same is incapable of pecuniary estimation. Thus, following Section 8, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court, it took cognizance of the case and directed the parties to adduce further evidence if they so desire. The parties bowed to this ruling of the RTC and, eventually, submitted the case for its decision after they had submitted their respective memoranda.

We cannot, however, gloss over this jurisdictionalfaux pasof the RTC. Since it involves a question of jurisdiction, we maymotu proprioreview and pass upon the same even at this late stage of the proceedings.25

In her Complaint26for reconveyance of real property with declaration of nullity of OCT, petitioner claimed that she and her father had been in open, continuous, notorious and exclusive possession of the disputed property since the 1940s.As a relief, petitioner prayed that Monzon be ordered to reconvey the portion of the property which she claimed was fraudulently included in Monzons title. Her primary relief was to recover ownership of real property. Indubitably, petitioners complaint involves title to real property. An action "involving title to real property," on the other hand, was defined as an action where "the plaintiffs cause of action is based on a claim that [she] owns such property or that [she] has the legal rights to have exclusive control, possession, enjoyment, or disposition of the same."27 Under the present state of the law, in cases involving title to real property, original and exclusive jurisdiction belongs to either the RTC or the MTC, depending on the assessed value of the subject property.28There are two modes of appealing an RTC decision or resolution on issues of fact and law.34 The first mode is anordinary appeal under Rule 41in cases where the RTC exercised itsoriginal jurisdiction. It is done by filing a Notice of Appeal with the RTC. The second mode is apetition for review under Rule 42in cases where the RTC exercised itsappellate jurisdictionover MTC decisions. It is done by filing a Petition for Review with the CA. Simply put, the distinction between these two modes of appeal lies in the type of jurisdiction exercised by the RTC in the Order or Decision being appealed.Thus,the CA is correct in holding that the proper mode of appeal should have been a Petition for Review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court, and not an ordinary appeal under Rule 41.

SPOUSES SABITSANA vs. MUERTEGUIFACTS:In 1981, Garcia sold his lot to Juanito Muertegui. The land was the occupied by Juanitosfather and brother and they paid real property taxes over the land from 1980 up to 1998.In 1991, Garcia sold thesale land to the Muerteguisfamily lawyer, Atty. Sabitsana, Jr. he also paid real property taxes in 1992, 1993 ,1999.When Juanitos father passed away, his heirs applied registration and coverage of the land under the Public Land Act but Atty. Sabitsana apposed this claiming that he is the owner of the lot sought to be registered.Muertegui, Jr. filed for quieting ofthe title and preliminary injunction against Sabitsana. However, Sabitsana insisted that the RTC where the actionwas filed does not have jurisdiction over the case since the subject matterinvolves title to or interest in aparcel of land which the assessedvalueismerelyP 1,230.00.

The RTC found in favor of the Muerteguis and declared the DOS of 1981 valid and preferred while that entered by Garcia and Sabistana are VOID and of no legal effect. It declared further that Sabistana was a buyer in God faith.This decision was appealed to the CA.

The CA affirmed the RTCs decision in toto. The instant appeal was likewise denied.Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:W/N the RTC has Jurisdiction over the casein view of the fact that theassured value of the subjectlandwasonly1,2340.ooHELD:

Yes, the RTC has jurisdiction over thesuit for quieting of title UnderRule 63 of the Rules of Court, an action to quiet title to real property or remove clouds therefrom may be brought in the appropriate RTC.

Due to Sabitsanas letter-opposition torespondents application for registration, said respondent was prompted to prevent a cloud fro" being cast upon his application for title by obtaining a declaration of hisrights. This, thus, is an action for declaratory relief, w/c falls within the RTCs jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 60of ROC. This is true regardless ofthe value of property in question.

ANCHOR SAVINGS BANK (FORMERLY ANCHOR FINANCE AND INVESTMENTCORPORATION) vs. HENRY H. FURIGAY, GELINDA C. FURIGAY, HERRIETTE C. FURIGAY and HEGEM C. FURIGAYG.R. No. 191178; March 13, 2013; Mendoza

Action: Petition for review on certiorariFacts:

ASB filed a verified complaint for sum of money and damages with application for replevin against Ciudad Transport Services, Inc. (CTS), its president, respondent Henry H. Furigay; his wife,respondent Gelinda C. Furigay; and a John Doe.

While that case was pending, respondent spouses donated their registered properties to their minor children, respondents Hegem G. Furigay and Herriette C. Furigay. Claiming that the donation of these properties was made in fraud of creditors, ASB filed a Complaint for Rescission of Deed of Donation, Title and Damages against the respondent spouses and their children.

The RTC ruled that the action for rescission had already prescribed.The CA found that the action of ASB had not yet prescribed, but was premature and dismissed the case.

Issue: Is the action of ASB to file a complaint for rescission of Deed of Donation premature that warrant dismissal?

Ruling: Yes.

The remedy of rescission is subsidiary in nature; it cannot be instituted except when the party suffering damage has no other legal means to obtain reparation for the same.

Consequently, following the subsidiary nature of the remedy of rescission, a creditor would have a cause of action to bring an action for rescission, if it is alleged that the following successive measures have already been taken: (1) exhaust the properties of the debtor through levying by attachment and execution upon all the property of the debtor, except such as are exempt by law from execution; (2) exercise all the rights and actions of the debtor, save those personal to him (accion subrogatoria); and (3) seek rescission of the contracts executed by the debtor in fraud of their rights (accion pauliana).

A cursory reading of the allegations of ASBs complaint would show that it failed to allege the ultimate facts constituting its cause of action and the prerequisites that must be complied before the same may be instituted. ASB, without availing of the first and second remedies, that is, exhausting the properties of CTS, Henry H. Furigay and Genilda C. Furigay or their transmissible rights and actions, simply undertook the third measure and filed an action for annulment of the donation. This cannot be done.

While, the four-year prescriptive period for action of rescission commences to run neither from the date of the registration of the deed sought to be rescinded nor from the date the trial court rendered its decision but from the day it has become clear that there are no other legal remedies by which the creditor can satisfy his claims.In this case, the action is premature.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

Swedish Match v The Treasurer of the City of ManilaGR No. 181277Date: July 3, 2013Ponente: Sereno, CJ.Facts:This is a Petition for Refund of Taxes with the RTC of Manila in accordance with Section 196 of the Local Government Code (LGC)of 1991. The petitioner says that it had been religiously paying its taxes based on Section 14 of Ordinance No. 7794 or the ManilaRevenue Code (as amended by Ordinance Nos. 7988 and 8011). However, it was still taxed based on Section 21 of the same code.RTC denied the petition because of the failure of the petitioner to plead the latters capacity to sue and to state the authority of Ms.Beleno, who had executed the Verification andCertification of Non-Forum Shopping. It also deniedit on the groundthat Section 14and 21 pertained to taxes of a different nature and, thus the elements of double taxation were wanting in this case.CTA affirmed thedecision.Petitioner points out that Section 21 isnot in itself invalid, but theenforcement of this provision would constitute doubletaxation ifbusiness taxes have already been paid underSection 14 of the same revenuecode. Petitioner further argues that sinceOrdinanceNos. 7988 and 8011 have already been declared null and void in Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. v. City of Manila, all taxescollected and paid on the basis of these ordinances should be refunded.The respondent also arguesthat Sections 14 and 21 pertain totwo different objects of tax; thus, they are notof the same kind andcharacter so as to constitute double taxation. Section 14 isa tax on manufacturers, assemblers and other processors, while Section21 applies tobusiness subject to excise, value-added, or percentage tax. Respondent posits that under Section 21, petitioner ismerely a withholding tax agent of the City of Manila.Issue:WON the imposition of tax underSection 21 of the Manila RevenueCode constitutes double taxation in view ofthe tax collected andpaid under Section 14 of the same code-Ratio:Yes.The Court used the holding in The City of Manila v.Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc to justify that taxation under Sections 14 and21 would result to double taxation. Here, itwas elaborated that Section 143(a) of theLGC: said municipality or city may no longer subject the same manufacturers, etc, to a business tax under Section 143(h)of the same Code. SECTION 143(h)may be imposedonly on businesses that are subject to excise tax, VAT or percentage tax underthe NIRC, and thatare not otherwise specified inpreceding paragraphs. In the same way, businesses such as respondents, already subject to alocal business Tax under Section14 of Tax Ordinance No. 7794 [which is based on Section 143(a) of the LGC], can no longerbe made liable for local business tax under Section 21 of the same Tax Ordinance [which is based on Section 143(h) of the LGC.]Thus, since petitioner has already been payingunder Section 14, it should notbe subjected to the payment oftaxes under Section21.Further, the Court agreed with petitioner that Ordinance Nos. 7988 and 8011 cannot be the basis for the collection of businesstaxes because Coca-Colaalready ruled that these ordinances were null and void.Hence, payments made under Section 21 must berefunded in favor of petitioner.Petition is GRANTED.

InNeypes v. Court of Appeals,G.R. No. 141524, September 14, 2005, 469 SCRA 633, 644,the Court declared that a party-litigant should be allowed a fresh period of 15 days within which to file a notice of appeal in the RTC, counted from receipt of the order dismissing or denying a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration, so as to standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules of Court and do away with the confusion as to when the 15-day appeal period should be counted.