The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Volume 8 | Issue 15 | Number 2 | Article ID 3341 | Apr 05, 2010

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Japan's Stumbling Revolution　　躓く日本の変革

Karel van Wolferen

Japan’s Stumbling Revolution

Karel van Wolferen

Seven months after the DemocraticParty of Japan’s triumph in thenational elections of 30 August2 0 0 9 , H a t o y a m a Y u k i o ’ sgovernment is meeting with somuch trouble that rumours havebegun to circulate that it isdoomed.

For two decades, since he wrotehis classic (and best-selling) TheEnigma of Japanese Power (1989),seasoned political commentator,Karel van Wolferen, has beenthinking and writing about theproblem of political power, theJapanese state’s absent “centre.”Here he offers his reflections onthe current crisis, the controversialDemocratic Party (Minshuto)Secretary-General, Ozawa Ichiro,and the role of the Prosecutor’sOffice. Van Wolferen’s outspokendefense of Ozawa (“one of the mostformidable political figures in theworld today”, superior to PresidentObama in his “political skills andunderstanding of the dynamics ofpower”), his critical attention towhat he sees as the failure of theJapanese media, and his warningsof the possible consequences of afailure and/or collapse of theHatoyama government, meritcareful reading.

This analysis was written for themonthly Chuo Koron, where itappears in Japanese in the March2010 issue. The Asia-PacificJournal is grateful to the author forhis permission to publish it here inEnglish. (GMcC)

The next couple of years will be crucial for therealization of genuine Japanese democracy.More than that. If the Minshuto leaderssucceed in carrying out their aim of creating acabinet-centered government this will be agrand example for others – one of the very fewpositive turns of fate in the political life of ourplanet. But the obstacles to achieving this areformidable. Not only domestic forces but alsoWashington will seek to torpedo the plans for atruly independent Japan that can stand on itsown feet in the world. Understanding thoseobstacles well could help Japanese citizenscontribute to the chances for a good outcome.

If a few years ago we had heard that in a worldof more war, increasing economic misery andpolitical dysfunction in many places, it wouldbe Japan, of all countries, serving up a shiningexample of political improvement, most people,including me, would not have believed it. Thensomething very big happened. For the first timea credible opposition party took over the reinsof the official government and said we want tobe a true government; a political steeringwheel. What happened was bigger, I think, thanis yet realized today by most Japanese.

Put it in the context of recent history. After abr i l l iant three decades of economicachievement following World War II, Japanseemed to have lost a clear purpose, was

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stagnating, and had stopped giving its people asense that their lives were improving.Something important was lacking in thepolitical system, something that would allow itto plot an alternative, more promising, course.In 1993 reformist-minded politicians whounderstood the d i f ference betweenadministrative and political decision-makingwere given a short time to create a politicalcenter to the Japanese system, but they weretoo few and had almost no administrativebacking. On the positive side, however, theydiscovered each other and could eventuallyform the credible opposition party that has nowtaken over.

A new consciousness had spread through thepublic in 1993. Drastic changes were not onlydesirable but also possible. It became commonfor prominent political figures, commentatorsand businessmen, to reiterate in their speechesand writing the desirability of fundamentalpolitical reform. Such a promise seemed tocome close to fulfillment with the surpriseelection of Koizumi as president of the Jiminto(LDP). But he, the first celebrity and TV starprime minister of Japan, turned out to be only afake reformer, thus proving the point that theJiminto with all its encrusted relationships andhabits would have to be shoved aside forattempting a truly new beginning in Japanesepolitics.

That opportunity finally arrived with the greatmajority that Minshuto managed to gain in theelections of last August. And the top Minshutofigures, who – proof that they are serious – hadstuck together since 1993, lost no time inmaking clear that they intended to inaugurate anew era.

What Minshuto’s intentions to establish agenuine government entail is not easilyunderstood by people who are not fully awareof the way in which Japanese politicalinstitutions developed in the Meiji Period. Thequestion of what policies its politicians espouse

is less relevant than the fact that they wish tocreate a policy making center; which means acenter of political accountability. Specialmeasures for crippling elected politicians hadpurposely been built into the system. WhatMinshuto must try to do is nothing less than tobreak with the tradition of governanceestablished by the founder of Japan’sbureaucracy (as well as the military), YamagataAritomo. Yamagata did not want the purity of asupposedly harmonious Japanese nation,grouped around an innately benevolentemperor, to be spoiled by contentiouspoliticians. A political system run by them couldnot be harmonious because they had to fighteach other to get elected. Yamagata introducedarrangements to make sure that they nevercould have the power they were officiallysupposed to exercise. He should, along withBismarck, Lenin and Theodore Roosevelt, beranked among the greatest figures who shapedthe geopolitics of our planet just over a centuryago. His measures allowed a political system toevolve in which military bureaucrats wouldeventually hijack the country in the 1930s forill-considered purposes. His legacy endured inthe odd Japanese relationship between careerofficials (bureaucrats) and elected officials(Diet members).

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DPJ assault on the Yamagata Edifice

Siegfried Woldhek 2009

(other Woldhek cartoons)

To call the task that Minshuto has taken uponitself a heavy one is very, very, understated. Ithas simply not been tried before. There are nomodels from Japanese experience to follow.Almost everywhere Minshuto ministers willturn to re-examine policies, they will meet withpartial, and sometimes heavy, opposition; notfrom the public that elected them, but fromentrenched interests embedded in the old non-democratic establishment that they want toovercome. While the basic institutions fordemocracy, like parliament, the cabinet, and soon, were established in the Meiji Period, theywere not used in line with their originalpurpose, and the many lesser institutions thatallow politician-directed governance to functionmust now be built almost from scratch, giving

many impatient observers the impression thatMinshuto coalition ministers cannot make itwork. Bureaucrats in the Ministry of ForeignAffairs as well as Defense, for example, aredoing their best to beguile the new politiciansto stick to the conventional ways of theirministries, which has already resulted in atragically missed opportunity for a major moveforward in relations with Moscow. Bureaucratsand politicians in this case missed thesignificance of remarks by President DmitryMedvedev made in Singapore in November,indicating willingness to re-open the stagnateddiplomacy concerning Japanese claims to theNorthern Islands. The Prime Minister’s Officeis not functioning at all as it should forpropagating Minshuto’s main messages for thesame reason of bureaucratic conventionalismand, worse, policy subversion. What is expectedfrom Minshuto would be daunting under thebest circumstances. But current circumstancesresulting from ingrained habits are dismal.

A political system that has survived for a longtime is not something one can easily change, asit has developed strong defense mechanisms.When after a year’s absence from Japan (thelongest time away since 1962), I returned ayear ago, Japanese friends were enthusiasticabout how after the summer elections thingswould change dramatically, with Ozawabecoming prime minister. I asked them: “whatabout the scandal that will aim to bring Ozawadown?” It was entirely predictable.

http://woldhek.nl/welcome

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Minshuto Secretary-General Ozawa

Why? Because the Japanese bureaucraticsystem does not only have ancient built-indefenses, it has something akin to an immunesystem. We need to take a step back to see thisin perspective. All countries have a concretepower system that is different from theirtheoretical one. All countries live with politicalhonne and tatemae. The substantial system ofpower exists, as it were, inside the officialpolitical system that is described and regulatedby such things as the constitution. Theinformal, unofficial, substantial system ofpower relations may change and drift fartheraway from what it should be in principle. Thepast decade of American political historyprovides a perfect example of that: powerarrangements centered on the military-industrial complex and huge financial and

insurance firms are stronger than the causesthe American electorate has voted for. There isnothing in the American constitution thatguarantees them such a position. The Japanesecase is, by comparison, particularly interesting.The outlines of its informal structure haveremained virtually unchanged over the post-World-War-II decades, as they have survivedchanges in the law or appeals to theconstitution. While in the United States newlaws, like those pertaining to health insuranceand earlier ones regulating banking practicespromote the development of informal Americancorporatism, an important aspect of theunofficial Japanese system is that its crucialpolitical transactions and relationships aresimply beyond the purview of the law. TheJapanese unofficial political system is blatantlyextralegal.

All unofficial systems of political (and of courseeconomic) power must have ways to protectthem against forces that could bend them outof shape. And the law helps with that in mostcases. But not in Japan, unless it concernsheavy criminal conduct. This means that theinformal but substantial Japanese System isvulnerable to excess. It has been quite all-rightfor Japanese business to pay for the election ofJapanese politicians (as in numerous othercountries), but if one politician gets so muchthat he achieves a kind of power that threatensthe balance inside the system, action must betaken. Hence the Tanaka Kakuei scandals.Entrepreneur ism i s f ine , but i f oneentrepreneur becomes so successful that hethreatens unoff icial social and laborarrangements, like Ezoe Hiromasa who withRecruit was actually helping to create a labormarket for sarariman, he must be stopped [1].If another entrepreneur is breaking unwrittenrules of the unofficial system with financialdealings, and pokes fun at the establishedfigures to boot, we get a Horiemon case [2].After making a study of famous Japanesescandals, I wrote an article for Chuo Koronnineteen years ago, in which I concluded that

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the Japanese System had an immune systemagainst excesses of otherwise permissibleconduct, and that this immune system consistsof the Japanese public prosecutor working intandem with the Japanese media. At that timethe headlines were taken up for months by ahuge security brokerage scandal, involvingcompensation for stock market loss. This wasan exquisite example of what I was analyzingbecause the supposedly guilty financial firmshad actually been operating under the informalinstructions of Ministry of Finance bureaucrats.But the result had been a threat to theJapanese financial system as a whole. Whatfollowed were the ritualistic apologiesdemanded from a political culture that assumesthose rituals help restore harmony.

Reformist politicians constitute an openinvitation for the prosecutor-media team todevelop hawk eyes and find a minor case, or animagined case, of wrongdoing. Rememberwhen Kan Naoto was Japan’s most popularpolitician because he had demanded that theofficials in his ministry told the truth inconnection with HIV infected blood products?Within a couple of years an invented scandal toundermine his prestige had to follow. Because,make no mistake, democratic procedure mayhave placed them where they are, but theofficial representatives of the Japanese voterare a potential threat against the smoothoperation of the informal system. Now, theMinshuto government is about the biggestthreat to the unofficial power system it hasexperienced in living memory. A greater threatthan a program to bring the actual powersystem closer to what it is supposed to be, ishard to imagine. So, right after Hatoyamabecame prime minister, the prosecutor-mediateam got into action to whip up a scandaldesigned to undermine his position.

Change of Government = Change of Japan

Minshuto

Let us think some positive thoughts concerningthe Japanese public prosecutor. Japan’s crimerate is relatively low, and the authorities arenot filling Japanese prisons to the brim, as isthe case in some other countries. The publicprosecutors deserve praise for the way inwhich they keep the penal system geared moreto repentance, reform, and return to society,than to punishment. There is also little doubtthat the Japanese public prosecutor isgenuinely concerned with maintaining socialorder, and that prosecutors think of themselvesas entirely responsible, even as heroicallybrave, when they go after what they conceiveof as the disturbers of the right order in societyand politics. But at the moment that makesthem a threat to Japanese democracy;Minshuto politicians will therefore continue tobe a target for the disruptive energies of theprosecutors.

In the same way that the Japanese extralegalpolitical system is a legacy of YamagataAritomo, the self-image and the concrete role

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played by the public prosecutor go back toanother major historical figure: HiranumaKiichiro. He was a fanatical believer in themoral superiority of the officials supposedlycarrying out ‘the Will of the Emperor’. LikeYamagata he saw himself as a guardian of themystical, morally pure, nation depicted inkokutai ideology, which had to be preservedfrom the onslaught of modern political ways,like Marxism, or liberalism, or simplydemocratic elections. The influence of hisfollowers after 1945 helped to prevent reformsof the Japanese judiciary, which in manyrespects considers itself to be placed above thelaw. We can interpret the activities of thepublic prosecutor today as hearkening back tothese higher spiritual values that rise far abovewhat politicians can make of government. Theforemost Dutch Japanologist, Wim Boot,compares them to the Censorial System ofancient China.

Foreign legal specialists have long beenastonished by the discretionary powers of theJapanese prosecutor. Much of their powerderives from the extraordinary leeway theyhave in making decisions about who to targetfor prosecution. In lighter criminal cases theycan decide whether or not to go after a culprit,and can be extremely lenient, especially if theperson they have been questioning isremorseful and makes a show of repentance.This works well for ordinary people who havebroken the law but do not deserve to bepunished with more than a case of fright, andapproaches to law enforcement in some othercountries could benefit from taking theseJapanese ways as an example.

If they decide on harsh treatment and want tobreak down suspects, however, they will usetricks and psychological pressure and lengthypre-trial incarceration to force confessions. Butfor the purpose of counteracting ambitiousreformist politicians the public prosecutor usesgrey areas of the law, as practically applied.There exists a broad area of vagueness

between what is normally admissible in actualpractice and what is definitely illegal. In manycountries there exists no clear line betweenwhat is permissible tax avoidance and unlawfultax evasion. In Japan, on top of interpretabletax rules, there exists a rich vague arearelating to political funding rules, which is afavorite weapon for the public prosecutor.Many Japanese know how arbitrary theinvestigations of the public prosecutor are. Butstill, there is a widespread sense also amongsympathizers that, for example, Ozawa shouldat least show ‘sincerity’ and apologize. This isin keeping with the demands of ritual thatbelong to the unofficial power system. InOzawa’s case, the arena for the ritual is nowthe Diet itself, even among Minshuto members,and the public at large, where it is taking ongrotesque proportions as the newspapers whipup what they falsely present as ‘publicdemands’. The rituals of apology and‘voluntary’ resignation constitute bowing one’shead to the informal system.

Without cooperation of the media the immunesystem does not work, as it is not the allegedwrong-doing that floors politicians, but thepublic scandal that the media can get going.Prosecutors are continually leaking informationto the newspapers about the cases they intendto tackle, and give journalists and editorsenough warning to be present when they raidanyone’s offices. These leaks about ongoinginvestigations are, of course, not in keepingwith a system that sticks to lawful procedures,but we have already seen that the publicprosecutor operates as if above the law.

Because o f the fa i r l y homogeneousinterpretation of what is happening, the strongsimilarity of their commentary, and therelatively great impact they have on thereading public, Japanese newspapers, morethan newspapers elsewhere that I know of,create political reality as it exists in people’sminds. In that way they tend to be more aparticipant in, rather than monitor of, domestic

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power dynamics. The big newspapers can fairlyeasily bring an end to a sitting government.Quite a few senior editors have mindsets likesenior Japanese bureaucrats, for whom thepreservation of the existing order in their worldmust always remain an almost sacred priority.

In one of the saddest developments of our time,newspapers almost everywhere in theindustrialized world are experiencing greatdifficulties, and because of their growingdependence on commercial interests they haveceased to be reliable monitors of politicaldevelopments. While the Japanese mediasituation is a bit better than that, it must beconsidered very regrettable that at this time ofmomentous change in Japan’s political life thenewspapers appear to be unable to rise to theoccasion and become reliable chroniclers. Untilnow most reporting about the new governmenthas consisted of a huge distraction of attentionfrom what matters for the future of allJapanese, settling instead for the routinescandal mongering that serves no one.

We may blame this on ingrained habits. Thereporters and editors do what they are good atdoing. Japanese political reporters cut theirteeth on getting the details right about theinfighting among the habatsu (factions) of theJiminto, and later the ups and downs ofgovernment coalitions. When I covered politicalnews in Thailand after its fairly regular militarycoups, I used to look up my Japanesecolleagues in Bangkok because they were theworld’s top experts on the factionalism insidethe Thai army. No surprise therefore that rightafter the formation of the Hatoyamagovernment a lot of attention went to real andimagined signs of strains among the coalitionpartners. No surprise that the newspapers getexcited about small disagreements amongMinshuto ministers that drift up to the surface.Now, it was perfectly understandable that theinternal bickering and open wars within theJiminto produced prime copy (as a journalist Ialso followed the fine and juicy details of the

Kaku-Fuku factional war), [3] because thepoliticians of the then so-called ruling partywere, as we have seen, not producing anythingthat could be called policy.

Koizumi, who profited much from the nationalmood wanting political reform, indulged in fakereformist moves at the behest of Ministry ofFinance officials, which were not properlyanalysed by a media apparently mesmerized bycelebrity glamour. Commentators couldapparently not distinguish neoliberal economicfashion from the political repair the public waswaiting for. After him we had one Jimintocabinet after another also structurallyincapable of developing policy to cope withmuch-changed circumstances, inside Japan aswell as in the world. They did not construct apolitical steering wheel. They could only fallback on the administrative decisions of variousministry officials. Administrative decisions,which make necessary adjustments formaintaining a course that was designed in thepast, must clearly be distinguished frompolitical decisions, which establish a newcourse, a fresh departure, an essentialstructural change. In those post-Koizumi years,the newspapers enjoyed their role in bringingdown cabinets, and we had a new primeminister every year.

That development appears to have been habit-forming as well, considering the continuousspeculation about whether the Hatoyamagovernment will last or whether it shouldresign. Much is made of the decliningpopularity of the new government from 70% tosomewhere around 30% according to thenewspaper polls. Such figures are notoriouslyunreliable, as the big papers always tell thepublic what public opinion ought to be. Andsince the newspapers ask those polled whatthey think of a new cabinet’s policies before acabinet has had a chance to lay them out, allJapanese administrations – except for the PR-driven one of Koizumi – experience such steepdecline.

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Quite a few things about the Minshuto situationseem forgotten by the press. We read indignantcomments about a ‘power grab’ by Ozawa, orabout Hatoyama relying on Ozawa. Of coursehe is. He cannot do it alone. It is because ofOzawa that Japan is getting this chance tobreak through the Yamagata Aritomo traditionand create a genuine government with apolitical steering wheel. Without Ozawa therewould not have been the party politicalupheaval of 1993; he started it. Without himthere almost certainly would not have been acredible Minshuto opposition party. WithoutOzawa Minshuto would certainly not havegained its landslide victory last August,perhaps not even a majority. Ozawa is one ofthe most formidable political figures in theworld today. No head of government in Europecan be compared to him. And Washington’sObama does not come close in the way ofpolitical skills and an understanding of thedynamics of power. Ozawa is continuallycriticized for a number of things, including hisautocratic manners, but few widely readcolumnists appear to be interested in thequestion as to why he is what he is. CouldMinshuto become a success without him? HisMinshuto colleagues, who of course are alsopartially influenced by the media-createdpolitical reality, must think very hard beforeasking such an extraordinary leader to retire.Ozawa simply has no equal among prominentpoliticians with regard to a combination ofdetermination and an over-all understanding ofJapan’s informal power system.

If Minshuto were to lose its cohesion caused bya loss of determination through the manner inwhich the informal power system captures it,we will probably witness a very undesirabledevelopment. The emergence of a two partysystem, as existed before World War II, appearsto have become less likely. The Jiminto isbreaking up. Many splinter parties are likely tocompete in future elections and, without a firmMinshuto presence, form temporary andfrequently changing coalitions. Bureaucratic

power will increase, and create a newlystagnant situation of administrative rule,probably worse than what existed under officialJiminto governance.

Another crucial subject, a potential hindranceon the path to Minshuto’s success, does notreceive the close media attention it deserves.The U.S.-Japan relationship was something thatpractically everyone took for granted. Theproblem has been that Washington has nottreated Japan as a fully independent country.This situation has already been fundamentallychanged by the Hatoyama cabinet. Merely byhaving opened the subject of inequality fordiscussion means that things can never be thesame again. But the Obama administration isapparently not ready for a non-Jimintogovernment, which was made poignantly clearby the stern messages of Hillary Clinton justbefore the election and those of Robert Gatessoon after it. The matter of moving anAmerican Marine base in Okinawa isapparently being turned into a test case to seewhether the new government understands whois boss.

Many governments, including Washington,have long wished for Japan to take a moreactive role on the world stage. Its economicmight changed the fate of industries in theUnited States and Europe, but from ageopolitical point of view, and in diplomacy, itwas barely visible. The rest of the world gotused to what was early on labeled as an‘economic giant but political dwarf’. And now,when the new government says that thisundesirable imbalance must change, Americanscan on ly whine about mi l i tary basearrangements different from what they want.

The two cases of the public prosecutorrelentlessly pursuing supposed lawbreaking byOzawa and American insistence on Japanimplementing what Washington had earlierforced the Jiminto to agree to in 2006 havesomething in common. They share the lack of a

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general sense of proportion. A stranger toJapan, just reading big newspaper headlinesbetween December and February on a visit,would get the impression that Ozawa wastrying to evade something like a murderconviction. Any financial misreporting byOzawa’s assistants, a misdemeanor that inother democracies would be quiet lyinvestigated, does not remotely have the weightwarranting the pillory of Ozawa we have justwitnessed. And considering that the publicprosecutor had so little to go on that he wasforced to dismiss the case against Ozawahimself, we can only conclude that things havebeen crazily out of proportion. That such arelatively small thing could be the source ofspeculation about an end to the first Minshutocabinet, and be the basis of daily front pagereporting of mainly invented public opinionabout the need for Ozawa to resign, like thefever chart of a hospital patient, would makestrangers unacquainted with Japanese wayswonder about the sanity of political life here. Ijust read an editorial in one of the majornewspapers that makes the point that while noevidence could be found, this does not meanthat Ozawa is innocent. It is a statement thatindicates a state of hysteria among someeditors, giving the impression that it hasbecome a personal vendetta for them.

In the Futenma base case we see a newAmerican presidency entirely missing thesignificance of what is happening in Japan.Obama and his advisers risk undermining newpossibilities for creating a stable newcooperative relationship. Over what? Oversomething that ought to be minuscule in theirglobal strategic vision. We learn from this thatthe Obama administration does not have its acttogether with respect to the revampeddiplomatic attitude toward the world itannounced when taking over from George W.Bush. It also proves that the American militaryhas taken over far more American foreignpolicy than the details that relate to thecountries it occupies. But considering that

almost all of the top American officials dealingwith Japan are ‘alumni’ of the Pentagon, thislack of a sense of proportion, this tunnel vision,should not surprise us.

When you can upset something very big withsomething that in neutral eyes can only bejudged to be pre t t y sma l l you haveextraordinary power. We need to contemplatethe vagaries of power when we contemplate thestory of today’s Japan. It has undergone thebiggest power-shift since the 1950s, andMinshuto has already changed some thingsbeyond a point where they can go back to whatthey were. But that does not mean that itspower has been consolidated. Its strength willbe tested again and again. An untimelydeparture of the Hatoyama cabinet would bevery unfortunate. With the Jiminto in charge,an annual change of prime minister hardlymattered. But a return to the ‘musical chairs’method of change would be disastrous forJapan’s political future. The consolidation ofMinshuto power will, of course, require dealingwith the problem of the misplaced priorities ofthe public prosecutor, and of journalists whofeed on leaks from the prosecutor's office likemad dogs. When Ozawa first became the targetof investigations last spring, which forced himto resign as Minshuto president, foregoing thechance to become prime minister, several Dietmembers were quoted as saying that if theprosecutor’s office “would apply the samestandards to all of us”, the Diet would be asgood as empty. To be sure, the publicprosecutor theoretically would have had thepower in Jiminto days of emptying, say, half theDiet. But you can imagine that this powerwould not last beyond the first move of suchidiotic action, because everyone in Japan,including the newspapers would conclude thatthe public prosecutor had gone mad.

This thought experiment demonstrates animportant quality of power: it is not absolute.Power is a rather elusive thing; hard to catchconceptually in a concrete way. It has no

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substance that relates in any way to the laws ofNewtonian physics. You cannot measure it,count it, or express it in numbers. The attemptsof some specialists in political science toquantify power fail miserably. Power is inessence different from influence, which can bemeasured. It derives its nature to a large extentthrough what it is in the eyes of the recipient,the person or group to which it is directed (andis in this way somewhat comparable to love).Take an example from recent history. You willremember what happened to the power of theSoviet Union just before the end of the ColdWar. A huge power system existed, which wasbelieved to be unshakeable. It had defined thenature of our post-World-War-II geopolitics.Then something relatively small triggeredevents that led to the collapse of the BerlinWall. In no time in 1989 the great poweremanating from Moscow that kept populationsin Eastern Europe in thrall was gone. Itvanished in less than a week. Why? Because itrested on the psychology of fear. Fear of Soviettanks. And that disappeared suddenly becauseGorbachev demonstrated that he had meantwhat he said about not using violence to stopdevelopments.

What we have just witnessed in Japan, and willprobably witness again, is a power struggle. Onone side, reformist politicians eager toimplement true reform of the structure of theJapanese power system, and on the othervenerable career officials who believe that theestablished order is something sacred. But thepower of these career officials will melt like iceand snow when editorial writers and televisioncommentators warm up to the exciting politicalpossibilities that have opened up for Japan.Being human beings interested in publicaffairs, as well as Japanese with at least aresidual sense of patriotism, such a switch offocus ought not be too difficult for them.

With the U.S.-Japan relationship we haveanother very curious power relationship, whoseproblems could be solved in favor of Japan. The

world’s two greatest industrial powers relate toeach other in unique fashion; there is nothingcomparable to it. Hatoyama’s critics who blamehim for mishandling diplomacy vis-à-visWashington overlook the fact that normaldiplomacy is not possible in this case, becausethe United States does not truly recognizeJapanese sovereignty – an indispensablecondition for diplomacy. It has been taken as amatter of course that Japan would in the endalways do what the United States wanted. TheHatoyama government must deal withunfinished post-World War II business that itsJiminto predecessors have never lookedstraight in the eye.

People speak automatically about the UnitedStates and Japan as allies. But, again, we havea conceptual problem here. An alliance is arelationship entered into voluntarily by two ormore independent states. When this supposedalliance began Japan had no choice in thematter. During the Occupation following WorldWar II, Washington turned Japan into aprotectorate, and has since continued to treatto Japan as such – while, more recently, urgingJapan to participate in American militaryventures in other countr ies . Virtualprotectorate status has certainly had somegreat advantages. Japan’s very rapid growth asa trading power was much facilitated by itssheltering in the American strategic anddiplomatic shadow. But, most importantly forJapan’s place in the world until recently wasthat the main things by which a state isrecognized internationally were carried out byAmerican proxy. In other words, Japan did notneed to present itself to other countries with astrong government, capable of makingfundamental political decisions.

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We only need to think this through to see theconnection between Japan’s lack of a politicalsteering wheel until now and its pathologicaldependence on the United States. I think thatthe foremost Minshuto politicians, and certainlyOzawa, are aware of the mutual dependence ofthese two factors. As long as the United Statesappeared to supply a substitute for genuinelarge-scale Japanese diplomacy and strategicarrangements, there was no urgent need for aJapanese government capable of supplyingthose. And as long as no formal government inTokyo balked at Japan being treated as aprotectorate Washington could afford to meetJapanese sensibilities with disdain, as it isdoing now with respect to the Marines onOkinawa. It is therefore natural that byestablishing a true political center theconditions that have kept this dependencyrelationship going are radically altered.

The problem goes deeper nowadays. A bigcomplication is that the United States hasslipped into the grip of a militant nationalism. Itis hardly a secret that its designs to deal withthe emerging world reality include buildingmilitary encirclement for containing China. Itcounts on Japan to be part of that plan. Hencethe importance Washington attaches to itsbases on Okinawa. But why should Japan giveso much space and money to help maintain anAmerican military empire? Fear that the UnitedStates will withdraw protection from Japancomes from ingrained habits of thought that

under the changed geopolitical order since1989 can only be called naive. I am surprisedthat so few Japanese are apparently aware ofthe fact that the United States needs Japanmuch more than Japan needs the United States,especially considering how important Japanesesupport for the dollar has been. Besides, as isthe case for Europe, American protectionguarantees have become highly questionable.

When a completely out-of-proportion smallthing upsets something quite big, this happensthrough its power of intimidation. The UnitedStates has power over Japan because manyJapanese, including some of its publications,are intimidated. Scared that Japan will benaked; left vulnerable to hostile powers in thefuture. The public prosecutor has the power tohelp wreck the course to a better democracybecause of the media connivance with itsintimidation of ambitious politicians. The twohave come together in a very unfortunateconfluence of circumstances. At this time whenall responsible members of all political partiesneed to pull together to ensure that Japanbecomes a fully sovereign state – of, by, and forthe people, and not the bureaucracy or otherusurpers of legitimate power – the prosecutor'soffice is having one of its egocentric moments,fulfilling its need rigidly to preserve the order ithas always known without ever taking a stepback to consider the political health of thenation. And Japan's mass media is unwittingly(or is it deliberately?) collaborating with theAmerican government's hope of having its ownway in Okinawa in the event the presentgovernment fails, by contributing to thebuilding frenzy of demand for Ozawa and evenHatoyama to resign (for acts or non-acts thatamount to, if anything, misdemeanors). Thiswould be a great setback for popularsovereignty in Japan.

The unofficial Japanese political system, whichJapan’s new government wants to curb, hasbeen kept going through a lot of built-in andalmost automatic intimidation, which is the

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exercise of extralegal powers. Because of thathistory elected officials in Japan can easily beintimidated because they are used to it. Themanner and tone and the substance of whatClinton and Gates said clearly aimed tointimidate the Japanese public. It is cruciallyimportant for the future of the Hatoyamacabinet that it not give in to such intimidation.Solving the conflict to Japan’s advantage can beaccomplished by doing nothing for a while, andreiterating that fundamental discussions aboutthe future of the relationship must come first.Nothing bad will happen to Japan if, in theabsence of an important American compromise,the deadline set for May is postponed untilafter such serious mutual rethinking.

Coping with domestic intimidation is moredifficult for the Hatoyama cabinet. Normally,the way to counter intimidation is to fightstraight back – by exposing the intimidator'smotives, strategy, and tactics. Politicians of amind to criticize the Public Prosecutors Officecannot easily do so, as they risk being accusedof interference. Political committees to lookinto ‘alleged abuse’ of public prosecutorpowers are unlikely to abolish a traditionrooted in pre-World War II days. Only anindependent and vigilant media can counter theoffice's abuse of its delegated and assumedpowers. Japan's media is free. But if it is to helpfoster a healthier democracy in a trulysovereign state, then it must switch from itspresent obsession with chasing and evencreating scandals, to being a responsiblemonitor of domestic and global politics – andotherwise learn to use its potential power morewisely. Japan’s citizens, who voted for politicalreform, should take a step back, take in what ishappening at the moment, and urge theirmedia to do precisely that.

Notes

[1] Ezoe Hiromasa – Founder of Recruit Co.specializing in job placement publications. Avictim of mainstream press hysteria, he wasforced by prosecutors to make a confession in1988. The scandal brought down the Takeshitacabinet.

[2] Horiemon – Takafumi Horie, the verysuccessful entrepreneur who broke unwrittenrules of the business world, challenged itspractices, was arrested, and in 2007 foundguilty of securities fraud.

[3] Kaku-Fuku war – The grand battle betweenthe habatsu (clique) of Tanaka Kakuei and thatof Fukuda Takeo, and their respective loyalists,which virtually split the LDP during the 70s,80s and early 90s.

Karel van Wolferen is a Dutch journalist, writerand Emeritus University Professor ofComparative Pol i t ical and EconomicInstitutions at the University of Amsterdam.

He is the author of The Enigma of JapanesePower and of George W. Bush and theDestruction of World Order, as well asnumerous books in Japanese to be found here.

His website in English is karelvanwolferen.com

See also his 2009 essay, written on the eve ofthe Democratic Party’s election victory, "LiftingJapan's Curse of Muddling Through," and his"Japan-U.S. Relations Prosper on Isolation."

Recommended citation: Karel van Wolferen,"Japan’s Stumbling Revolution," The Asia-Pacific Journal, 15-2-10, April 12, 2010.

http://www.amazon.com/dp/0679728023/?tag=theasipacjo0b-20http://www.amazon.com/dp/0679728023/?tag=theasipacjo0b-20http://www.wolferen.jp/index.php?t=1&h=2http://japanfocus.org/-Karel_van-Wolferen/3155http://japanfocus.org/-Karel_van-Wolferen/3155http://japanfocus.org/-Karel_van-Wolferen/1664

APJ | JF 8 | 15 | 2

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